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Iraq's Hostage Crisis: Kidnappings, Mass Media and the Iraqi Insurgency

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Iraq's Hostage Crisis: Kidnappings, Mass Media and the Iraqi Insurgency View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Calhoun, Institutional Archive of the Naval Postgraduate School Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive Faculty and Researcher Publications Faculty and Researcher Publications 2004-12-01 Iraq's Hostage Crisis: Kidnappings, Mass Media and the Iraqi Insurgency al-Marashi, Ibrahim http://hdl.handle.net/10945/37387 ttp://www.gloria-center.org/2004/12/al-marasi-2004-12-01/ !raq’s Hostage Crisis: Kidnappings, Mass Media and the !raqi !nsurgency December 1, 2004 gloria-center.org !his article analyzes the use of kidnapping as a tactic by the Iraqi insurgency in its effort to influence Iraqi, Arab, and Muslim public opinion and politics, as well as the international arena. It assesses how this method has yielded important advantages for the insurgents, despite the horror and opposition this behavior arouses in the outside world. Since te ousting of Saddam Hussein?¯?¿?½s regime in 2003, tere ave been ample reports covering and analyzing te Iraqi insurgency?¯?¿?½s diverse use of armed tactics suc as roadside explosives, mortar attacks, and suicide bombings. At te same time, toug, tere as been less attention paid and understanding developed on te insurgents?¯?¿?½ media campaign directed at Iraqis as well as te Arab and Muslim worlds more generally. Observers of te Iraqi insurgency agree tat its combat tecniques ave grown more sopisticated since President George W. Bus announced te end of major combat operations in May 2003. A media strategy, owever, as simultaneously complemented tese military activities. Iraqi insurgents[1] employed tese metods in order to garner sympaty from te Iraqi population for teir ?¯?¿?½struggle,?¯?¿?½ wile keeping te international media spotligt on te American-led occupation of Iraq. Te penomena of kidnapping foreigners in Iraq emerged as a result of te insurgents?¯?¿?½ attempts to influence world media. Taking ostages and releasing video recordings of teir captivity proved to be a successful tactic for gaining immediate coverage in bot Arabic and international news sources, as well as pressuring world leaders to give in to te insurgents?¯?¿?½ demands. Te tactic of kidnappings reveals tat Iraqi insurgents ave a ?¯?¿?½public relations?¯?¿?½ campaign intended to affect audiences inside and outside Iraq. Videos of kidnapped ostages ave proved successful in forcing world leaders to witdraw troops from Iraq, preventing international firms from participating in reconstruction efforts, and instigating rallies against te occupation of Iraq in te ostages?¯?¿?½ countries. Terefore, owever repugnant is te footage, it constitutes a success for te insurgents in attracting world attention to teir cause. THE MEDA AND TERRORSM According to James E. Lukaszewski, a pubic relations counselor wo previously advised te U.S. military and major international firms, ?¯?¿?½Media coverage and terrorism are soul mates–virtually inseparable. Tey feed off eac oter. Tey togeter create a dance of deat–te one for political or ideological motives, te oter for commercial success.?¯?¿?½ [2] Lukaszewski as argued tat tis relationsip is a mutually beneficial arrangement, ?¯?¿?½Terrorist activities are ig profile, ratings-building events.?¯?¿?½ Te media, Lukaszewski continues, provides te terrorists wit access to an audience out of necessity, especially since it needs ?¯?¿?½[t]o prolong !age 1 of 13 Nov 13, 2013 02:18:55M MST ttp://www.gloria-center.org/2004/12/al-marasi-2004-12-01/ tese stories because tey build viewersip and readersip.?¯?¿?½[3] His comments–made in 1987, prior to te spectacle of planes crasing into te Twin Towers–old true in understanding wy kidnappings occur in Iraq. Jon Alterman, director of te Middle East program at te Center for Strategic and International Studies in Wasington described te beeadings videos as ?¯?¿?½made-for-television events.?¯?¿?½ He writes tat te beeadings videos are part of ?¯?¿?½A calculated set of actions and images directed toward influencing a mass audience. In tis way, te audience is often more important tan te action itself, and te symbolism is inseparable from te strategy. Missing tis vital point can lead to precisely te wrong response.?¯?¿?½[4] Brigette L. Nacos, wo as written extensively on te subject of terrorism and te media, describes a ?¯?¿?½classical terrorist desire for publicity in terms of seer volume of news coverage.?¯?¿?½[5] Nacos explains te relationsip between te media and terrorism based on tree variables. Se calls te first ?¯?¿?½te Bomb and te Message,?¯?¿?½ or in oter words, te terrorist act and te media?¯?¿?½s reporting of te incident. Te second variable is ?¯?¿?½public opinion,?¯?¿?½ wic reacts to te terrorist attack, wile te tird variable is te ?¯?¿?½decision-makers,?¯?¿?½ wic ave to react based in large part on te public perception of te event. By manipulating tese tree variables, terrorists affect public policy in a more efficient way tan peaceful metods suc as petitions or marces. Terrorism is guaranteed to create a mass-media mediated debate tat influences policymakers, proving tat wen peaceful metods fail, violence succeeds. Kidnappings in Iraq, Nacos?¯?¿?½s first variable, ave proven to succeed in rallying ?¯?¿?½public opinion?¯?¿?½ in countries. Tis as forced decision-makers to react, eiter by paying a ransom for ostages, witdrawing teir troops entirely from Iraq, or refusing to negotiate wit te terrorists, an option tat as so far resulted in te deat of te captives. THE EMERGENCE AND EVOLUT!ON OF THE !RAQ! !NSURGENCY In 2003, Amed Hasim, an instructor at te U.S. Naval War College, categorized te Iraqi insurgents into tree groups: regime loyalists, Iraqi nationalists and Islamist groups. At first, te regime loyalists appeared to be te strongest element in te Iraqi insurgency, yet e predicted tat if one faction of te Iraqi insurgency were weakened, anoter faction could manage to consolidate its control over te oters: ?¯?¿?½Te elimination of Saddam?¯?¿?½s sons, of Saddam imself, and of regime figters opened te way for te consolidation of a group wose combat against U.S. forces ad noting to do wit trying to bring back te ancien regime.?¯?¿?½[6] Hasim suggested tat te triump over one group opened te field for its rivals. Te most prominent insurgent group immediately after te 2003 Iraq war was ?¯?¿?½Te Return?¯?¿?½ (Al-?¯?¿?½Awda), made up of former Iraqi security service members and soldiers determined to bring teir former leader back to power. However, after Saddam Hussein?¯?¿?½s capture in December 2003, te group?¯?¿?½s stated goal seemed unattainable as e was in U.S. custody. Terefore, many of tese forces offered teir services to te armed Islamist organizations and bolstered teir ranks, as Hasim predicted. A few monts after te war, elements in Iraq emerged tat ad no desire to figt for te return of teir former dictator. Teir attacks against Coalition forces were specifically directed towards ending te !age 2 of 13 Nov 13, 2013 02:18:55M MST ttp://www.gloria-center.org/2004/12/al-marasi-2004-12-01/ American occupation of Iraq. Tese groups can be categorized as te second faction, te Iraqi nationalists, most of wose figters are recruited from Iraqi towns suc as Falluja, Ramadi and Samarra, in wat as become referred to as te ?¯?¿?½Sunni Arab Triangle.?¯?¿?½ Tey ave limited temselves to guerrilla-type tactics, and if tey kidnapped foreigners, tey avoided te grisly punisment of beeadings tat ave become synonymous wit te tird group, te Islamist insurgents. A sadowy organization known as ?¯?¿?½Te Soldiers of Islam?¯?¿?½ (Jund al-Islam), emerged in September 2001, made up of Kurdis Islamists wo began to seize control of several villages near te Iraqi town of Halabja in nortern Iraq in order to establis a mini-state similar to te Taliban?¯?¿?½s Afganistan. Te organization, wic as ties to al-Qa?¯?¿?½ida, accepted tat organization?¯?¿?½s figters as tey fled Afganistan in October 2001. Te group later canged its name to ?¯?¿?½Te Supporters of Islam?¯?¿?½ (Ansar al-Islam) in December 2001. After U.S. Special Forces and Kurdis militias destroyed teir main base during te Iraq war, members of Ansar al-Islam scattered over Iraq itself and, most likely, among Iraq?¯?¿?½s neigbors. Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian national and former Arab figter in Afganistan, was believed to play a key role in directing Ansar, altoug e was not declared its leader. Al-Zarqawi opened is own terrorist base in te Afgan city of Herat in 2000, were it was believed tat e forged connections wit! Al-Qa?¯?¿?½ida.[7] It is reported tat in late 2003, Abu Abdalla al-Safi?¯?¿?½i, also known as Warba Holiri al-Kurdi, took over te leadersip of Ansar al-Islam and canged its name to ?¯?¿?½Army of te Supporters of te Sunna?¯?¿?½ (Jays al-Ansar al-Sunna). Its relationsip to anoter organization, ?¯?¿?½Te Unity and Jiad Group?¯?¿?½ (Jama?¯?¿?½at al-Jiad wal-Tawid), also believed to be led by al-Zarqawi, is unclear. For example, a posting on te internet depicting te beeading of a Turkis truck driver appeared on te website of te Jays al-Ansar al-Sunna. However, te statement read out during te beeading identified te kidnappers as belonging to te Unity and Jiad Group?¯?¿?½s Qaqa?¯?¿?½ Brigade. Te various names of tese organizations are confusing. In fact, tey essentially refer to te same group of insurgents, but peraps also reveal a tactic designed to give te impression tat te Islamist elements are more numerous tan te oter factions. To make matters even more confusing, te Unity and Jiad Group assumed a new name, ?¯?¿?½Te al-Qa?¯?¿?½ida Organization for Holy War in te Land of te Two Rivers?¯?¿?½ (Tandim Qa?¯?¿?½ida Jiad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn), indicating al-Zarqawi?¯?¿?½s allegiance to Usama bin Ladin?¯?¿?½s organization. Besides te al-Zarqawi-linked factions, tere are oter Islamist insurgent groups responsible for conducting kidnappings in Iraq.
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