Abstract Gawrys, Michaela L., MA May 2021 Geography the Implications

Abstract

Gawrys, Michaela L., M.A. May 2021 Geography

The Implications of Changing Border Structure: A Case Study in Kosovo

Thesis Advisor: David H. Kaplan

Currently we witness and endure brutal identity-based conflict all over the world that is directly connected to political borders. With the rise in Nations wishing to break off from modern States, it may be time to question where the standards for modern borders will get us and whether they are here to last. This research attempts to understand how these identity-based border conflicts develop both before and after their resolution. The goal is to identify a pattern in the escalation of the identity-based border conflict between Kosovo and Serbia, as well as recognize possible steps in the reconciliation and development processes Kosovo took once the conflict was over.

The development of Kosovo as a Nation-State and the impact its recognized border has had on identification and feelings toward “others” can provide vital information about the future formation of Nation-States as a solution to border conflict. Therefore, this essay reviews the cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia from the end of the war in 1999 to the present day and uses information from interviews to ponder the implications of future “bordering” on the relationships between Nations/ethnic groups.

The Implications of Changing Border Structure:

A case study in Kosovo

A thesis submitted

To Kent State University in partial

Fulfillment of the requirements for the

Degree of Master of Arts

Michaela Lynn Gawrys

May 2021

Except for previously published materials

Thesis written by

Michaela Lynn Gawrys

B.A., Lock Haven University, 2018

M.A., Kent State University, 2021

Approved by

David H. Kaplan , Advisor

Scott C. Sheridan , Chair, Department of Geography

Mandy Munro-Stasiuk , Interim Dean, College of Arts and Science

Table of Contents

Table of Contents ………………………………………………………………………… iii

List of Figures ……………………………………………………………………………. iv

List of Tables …………………………………………………………………………….. v

Acknowledgements ………………………………………………………………………. vi

Chapters

I Introduction ……………………………………………………………….. 1

II Nation-States within a Changing International Structure ………………… 7

III Case Study & Methodology ………………………………………………. 21

IV Kosovo in Context ………………………………………………………… 30

V Ethnic Development within the Landscape ………………………………. 46

VII Individual Perception of Growth & Identification within Kosovo ……….. 58

VIII Conclusions ………………………………………………………………. 83

Bibliography ……………………………………………………………………………….. 89

iii

List of Figures

Image 3.1 – Kosovo Location …………………………………………………………… 22

Image 3.2 – Kosovo Fieldwork Locations ………………………………………………. 24

Image 4.1 – Assumed extent of Dardania ……………………………………………….. 31

Image 5.1 – Gathering before unveiling of Pristina Madeleine Albright statue ………… 47

Image 5.2 – Albanian flags lining the streets of Gjakova ………………………………. 48

Image 5.3 – Traditional Albanian clothing store in Gjakova ……………………………. 48

Image 5.4 – Monument to Heroes of the National Liberation Movement in Pristina …… 49

Image 5.5 – Church of Saint Elijah in Podujeva ………………………………………… 50

Image 5.6 – Church of Christ the Savior in Pristina ……………………………………... 51

Image 5.7 – Guards at the Vermica border crossing …………………………………….. 54

Image 5.8 – Traffic at the Merdare border crossing ……………………………………… 56

List of Tables

Table 3.1 – Participant Age Groups …………………………………………………….. 27

Table 6.1 – Interview participants in Podujeva …………………………………………. 59

Table 6.2 – Identification in Podujeva …………………………………………………... 60

Table 6.3 – Podujeva opinions on Serbians ……………………………………………… 69

Table 6.4 – Interview participants in Gjakova …………………………………………... 73

Table 6.5 – Identification in Gjakova ……………………………………………………. 74

Table 6.6 – Gjakovar opinions on Serbians ……………………………………………… 79

Acknowledgements

We do not accomplish anything alone and there are multiple people that I would like to thank for their support throughout this process. If I miss anyone, it certainly is not because their support has been forgotten.

My advisor, Dr. Dave Kaplan, is someone I cannot thank enough for guiding me through this process. From my very lofty research questions to my insistence on international fieldwork, regardless of the short timeline, he was there to help center me and encourage me. I could not have completed this without his patience and direction. Dr. Jennifer Mapes was also integral in the development of my research plan. Her insight into the realm of qualitative methods and cartography gave me the tools to write and present this thesis as it is now. I was also lucky enough to have Dr. Carl Dahlman on my committee, who provided me with direction both on the general topic of Kosovo and in the country itself. The connections that he helped me acquire and the encouragement during my fieldwork helped me stay on track and achieve my goals.

I want to extend my gratitude to everyone who participated and helped me to gather the data I needed. Without knowing the language, I would not have made it anywhere without my two Albanian interpreters, Shqiprojë Shala and Diona Ymeraga. Not only did they provide translations during interviews, but they helped me see a lot of Kosovo.

I would like to thank the Kent State faculty that have taught and guided me throughout the master’s program. The faculty at Lock Haven University who supported me during my bachelor’s program also need to be thanked for pushing me to do what I love. My friends and family have been here through it all and I would not have made it this far without them.

Thank you all so much.

Chapter I Introduction

Borders have been given the power throughout history to control national and individual identity, as well as power structures within the international community. We have concrete examples of borders, such as the Great Wall of China, the West Bank Barrier, the border of the

United States (US) and Mexico, etc., as well as some borders that are practically non-existent when travelling around the European Union (EU). Regardless of how noticeable they are, we can see how these abstract lines have separated people both physically and mentally. The reasons behind the existence of a specific border may vary but are often attributed to territoriality.

Territoriality over land has been maintained throughout history as an integral part of the human process, giving land and space power over the way we see and interact with others.

During the time of empires, we saw massive territorial expansion as a sign of power and authority. Even today there are ongoing territorial and border conflicts in regions like Kashmir,

Tibet, Bangladesh, Israel/Palestine, Kosovo, Catalonia, Chechnya, Ukraine, and the list goes on and on. Though we cannot deny the importance of territory in the very definition of a State at an international level, there is a difference between the current reasons for border conflict compared to those during the age of empires.

The end of WWII brought a shift from territoriality for power to territoriality for representation. Often accredited with the beginning of this international shift, though, is

Woodrow Wilson in The Fourteen Points speech that outlined the idea of self-determination where,

“the world be made fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every

peace-loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its own

institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other people of the world as against

force and selfish aggression” (Wilson, 1918).

These ideas applied at an international level, along with colonial instability after WWII, promoted the era of independence for colonized States and territories of former empires.

Recognizing the lack of influence local populations had on the creation of the aforementioned borders, we can understand the difficulty those populations have faced in the creation of coherent societies and sovereign systems. There are countless examples of States that dealt with devastating civil war, or even war with neighboring countries, due to an overwhelming inability to allocate land in a way that pleased all involved parties. Some conflicts that come to mind include the genocide in Rwanda along with continued tribal warfare throughout Africa, and the many conflicts (including ethnic cleansing) that occurred in the Balkans during the Balkan wars.

In these examples, though the end goal is the control of specific territories, the conflict was no longer about expansion and conquest, and instead about the right of each group to that territory, excluding the others. Territorial and border conflict became more about identity than the sheer power of land. From this we can see the next phase in our international development that requires recognition of suppression and support of more peaceful institutions. The conversation has become about what the creation of more autonomy for groups may look like and what the consequences would be. A more specific argument is about establishing new

Nation-States and whether their sovereignty would bring more peace to the world. In this essay, I would like to address the Nation-State and attempt to find the consequences of its future establishment.

In order to do this, I have chosen to study the history of Kosovo, along with its more recent development as a new Nation-State, to gain a deeper understanding of Nation vs. State conflict, as well as the dynamic between the two when a Nation does achieve statehood. I have sought out to answer two specific questions;

1. How has identification within Kosovo changed since the establishment of its semi-

recognized border in 1999? What implications does this have for future relations with

Serbia?

2. What can be learned from the demarcation and development of Kosovo as a Nation-

State?

The goal for addressing question one is to understand the ethnic development within

Kosovo since the end of the war and increased recognition of Kosovo as a Nation-State in 2008.

Being that the conflict is identity-based, it is important to address the personal identification among Kosovars and the role that plays in their ideas of others, and in this case, Serbians. Citizen connection with the border specifically will also contribute to understanding the direction and depth of their identification to Kosovo, opening up a discussion on the future of the border between Kosovo and Serbia, being that it is currently not recognized by Serbia. Observations at border points along the Albanian and Serbian border will contribute to this discussion from a more objective perspective about international efficiency between Kosovo and these two neighbors. Ultimately this information will be used to discuss the second question about what we can learn from Kosovo’s recent development and how that may apply to the development of future Nation-States, or just future Nation vs. State conflict in general.

Posing question two comes from the realization that international conflict as we know it today is often identity-based, supplemented by the current international framework that continues

3 to support territoriality as power. States become adamant to retain their sovereign rights and tend to oppose any kind of international interference, especially if it is not asked for. Therefore, if an underrepresented group is to try and seek representation at an international level, it is likely to meet great opposition, even if there is a moral reason for secession. Here is where we see the development of devastating territorial and border conflict. As we can already see in multiple regions of the world, conflicts of this nature tend to be long lived and violent. Knowing that these conflicts are projected to increase over time, it becomes important to question the ways we currently look at and give power to border structures. Using Kosovo as a case study, I intend to question current international precedent dealing with territorial sovereignty and the unilateral development of states, hoping to identify possible changes and steps that could be made for more peaceful transitions out of Nation vs. State conflict.

Research Framework

Borders have been changing with ideas of world order since their inception, both in shape and types of inhabitants. After an overview of current border definitions, this thesis will present an in-depth overview of power dynamics between Nations and States, as well as its applicability to border recognition and identity-based conflict. With this base, the deep seeded issues that identity-based conflict and many territorial/border disputes face can be better understood. In understanding them, we have the ability to hypothesize their outcomes, as well as how we may be able to mitigate and recover from them. My broad hypothesis has two parts. One is that the people within a newly recognized Nation-State border do have the capacity to accept and recognize “others” without feeling as though their identity is threatened because of the “other’s” existence. Two, there may be specific steps for future Nation-State border development, some unavoidable and others that could be implemented to enhance peace between States.

The next section of chapter II will focus on literature that explains how groups that have experienced identity-based conflict can recover in a way that is conducive to ethnic development.

By looking through current literature on development after conflict, not only can we understand what it may look like, but also how it could be structured. Examples of what peaceful borders and borderlands can look like are also given in this chapter to express that it may not be borders themselves that cause conflict, rather the reasons and way they are identified with.

Chapter III will present the methodology for the case study of Kosovo to display the process behind the fieldwork that was conducted, as well as why. This section has been placed before the history of the case study area, so it is easier to understand the themes being accentuated, as well as why Kosovo was chosen. The methodology, of course, leads into chapter

IV, which is specifically meant to outline relevant times and events regarding Kosovo’s borders, nationalism, and autonomy. Current developments within Kosovo are also presented in this section in order to bring in a more substantial study of Kosovo as a Nation-State. Information on more recently established institutions, agreements, and cooperation give more context to the landscape analysis and interview information that is analyzed in chapters V and VI respectively.

The fieldwork that was conducted in Kosovo has been used as a means to communicate ethnic development at an individual and local level, rather than a State or international level. By using this point of view, I have the ability to focus more on societal changes rather than changes just made with pen on paper. Societal change, as presented in this thesis, is considered to be the key to understanding and mitigating identity-based conflict. It also signifies growth from a local level, which can be translated into more tolerance and ethnic cooperation. Laws can be implemented that enforce non-discrimination, however, ethnic cooperation and peace will be recognized when the people, as individuals, accept each other.

Conclusions regarding my two research questions and hypotheses will be presented in chapter VII. This section will accumulate the information from all parts of the thesis and explain how they fit together, as well as suggest what future research may be necessary regarding

Nation-State development.

Chapter II

Nation-States within a Changing International Structure

The importance of strictly demarcated borders has increased over time with the race to develop in a globally aware society. Although imperfectly, we have demarcated and claimed all of Earth’s land surfaces except for Antarctica. The UN is the official organization for the recognition of international borders, thereby giving all recognized countries a say in the creation of new territorial boundaries. Each State, however, has the ability to refuse or accept recognition on their own terms, regardless of the majority within the UN. Also, if there is a State in the UN

Security council that does not approve recognition of an aspiring country border, they have the ability to veto even a majority vote. Regardless of the outcome from the UN, there are borders that are recognized by States and UN member States that some choose not to recognize. This means that even unrecognized borders can give a certain level of legitimacy to a region, though it does not grant them the ability to vote in the UN. The ultimate goal for regions with unrecognized borders, would be to gain recognition within the UN so that their ideas can be represented at an international level.

The representation and interaction between different regions relies on the recognition of said region’s border. Borders can be given different levels of recognition, which is why we see different words being used for political borders. I have started with the use of the word “country” being that it is generally the most familiar, however, this next section will define three different border types and their development over time. This thesis will focus on issues that surround what we define as States, Nations, and Nation-States.

Defining Borders by Recognition

Goals for a centralized government to attain exponential, economic growth and control over others within the international community promoted the creation of the modern, strict border (Agnew, 2007; Benjamin, 2015; Diener & Hagen, 2010; Gellner, 1983). Starting with the

Treaty of Westphalia, guidelines were established for world order and border formation in international affairs. The guidelines emphasized the importance of territorial sovereignty and each recognized estate’s right to it (Treaty of Westphalia, 1648). Territorial sovereignty was a way for rulers to give lords autonomy and representation within the empire by means of explicit demarcation of their territory. Due to the increased importance of international affairs in economic growth and the consolidation of power, the definition of regions started to include specific criteria; a defined border, population, governing body, and recognition (Glassner &

Fahrer, 2004; Hurd, 2018).

Modern States are defined using these criteria in that they must occupy a specific territory that has a population, governing body, and recognition from other States. Nations, on the other hand, remain on a wide spectrum embodying the same criteria as a State at different levels, but is not recognized internationally. A Nation is a group of people with a common identity that are often physically bound by, or originate from, an unrecognized border. Demarcation of a Nation’s border has not always been important, but the border tends to have cultural or historic significance (Newman & Paasi, 1998). Nations are often identifiable and recognized at the level of their existence, but not by their political efficacy or competence, thus leaving them without sovereignty over any territorial claims. The combination of these two borders into a ‘Nation-

State’ creates exactly what the name implies; a recognized territory in which the population is from the same nation and identifies as such. From this we understand that all Nation-States can

8 be categorized as States, but not all States as Nation-States. Today, it is the Nation variable that determines the stability of the border.

In reference to the development of political borders, there are two schools of thought within border theory; either the Nation creates the border, or the border creates the Nation

(Agnew, 2007; Newman & Paasi, 1998). During the early days of territorial demarcation in

Europe, the border was drawn around the Nation, for the most part. However, border demarcation expanded through imperialism and colonialism to Africa, Asia, and the Americas, as well as later on, with the collapse of the Ottoman empire, to Eastern Europe, North Africa, and Southwest Asia (Berberoglu, 2008). While this form of demarcation was pushed into other regions of the world by the West, it did not follow the same criteria as in Europe. Instead, the cultural identities of any specific region or group were often disregarded during colonial expansion (Gellner, 1983; Haselsberger, 2014; Saatci, 2002). Examples of this are most notably found in the history of colonialism, such as with the scramble for Africa, where borders were drawn according to resource abundance and the will of European governments. Civil identification was not as important as exponential economic growth and power among the international community.

Being that most of the world’s borders were drawn for resources by colonists, Nations have been split by, or incorporated into States that have international recognition and sovereignty. Nations within recognized States often seek to mold themselves into the modern idea of a Nation-State, so they may participate and have representation on an international scale

(Williams & Smith, 1983). The increase in Nation vs. State conflict and Nation-State development is what defines the new, postmodern world order. Therefore, it is important to

9 analyze the power dynamics between Nations and States that can cause conflicts so that we may find new ways to prevent or resolve them.

Borders & Identity-based Conflict

The international community continues to support the power of State recognition and sovereignty generally for the sake of keeping the peace (Blaney & Inayatullah, 2000; Caporaso,

2000). Part of this has included the development of an international system of recognition where sovereign States agree upon new borders in order to “contain difference” and “secure internal sameness” (Blaney & Inayatullah, 2000, p. 54). Therefore, the unilateral development of States is unprecedented within international politics, making it even more difficult for any kind of Nation-

State establishment.

Without the support of any international precedent, Nations with a lack of representation within their State borders are forced to seek representation through their own means. This causes great tension between the State and residing Nation because it is a direct threat to the sovereignty of that State. The ingrained idea of unified nationalism is what continues to cripple the State due to its lack of willingness to understand the Nation or come to a compromise (Loh, 2017).

Essentially, the State is weakening itself. However, it should be noted that international recognition and sovereignty is not easily taken away, so the State has increased chances of winning the fight.

Nations within unrepresentative States. There are negative implications that a lack of civil coherence can have on an imposing State. History has given us many examples of this, especially during the time of colonialism. McLane (2008) outlines the example of India, a country colonized by the British for nearly two centuries that drained it of its resources and wealth, as well as took autonomy away from Indians in their own State. Britain was able to set

10 up European systems and develop English as the lingua franca in India, but there was never a

Statewide shift from feeling Indian to feeling British. Indian citizens recognized and became unhappy with their lack of representation and the general racism from their colonizers, so nationalist groups started to form in favor of an independent Indian State. Being that India is a

State made up of a multitude of cultures, the nationalist movements were unable to motivate the masses with a campaign supporting Indian culture, but rather a platform based on shared oppression from their colonial history. India’s State development is a prime example of how a lack of identification and loyalty to the controlling government can lead to unrest and revolution.

When Nations begin to establish themselves and attempt to create their own legitimacy,

States have been known to crack down harder. This has been the case for Kurdistan within the

State of Turkey. The State enforced formation of Turkish identity caused deeper ethnic bonds within the Kurdish Nation (Saatci, 2002). Turkish government chose not to recognize this Nation because that would mean giving up land. Instead, the State tried to eradicate Kurdish identity by banning their culture, causing Kurds to have stunted development and a lack of representation within Turkey (Saatci, 2002).

Establishing nationalism. In order to maintain power and international rank, States need to ensure the cooperation of their citizens. The absence of a unified State identity leaves the impending threat of civil unrest that could undermine the legitimacy of the State (Kolossov,

2005). Recognizing this threat, State governments attempt to establish a national identity to their

State border (Brown, 1998; Kochin, 2018). States use the power of identification to solidify and legitimize their borders in order to justify economic, political, and military goals (Newman &

Paasi, 1998; Paasi, 1996). Often, this is done by stretching the limits of history to find common ground for the new Nation to be developed on. States have been known to consider every

11 possible avenue in order to find what seems to be the perfect basis for the creation of State nationalism (Staaci, 2002). In Turkey, for example, there was the development of the “Turkish

Historical Thesis,” that presented a world history where Turkish was the basis for all languages and the region of Turkey was the origin of many different countries (Erdentug, 2008). With the threat of Kurdish identity in Turkey, there was also the creation of laws banning the Kurdish language in order to force the Turkish identity upon the Kurds (Staaci, 2002). Though this process can be successful in some respects, it still tends to create conflict.

Provoking State nationalism does create nationalism among communities; however, it is not always toward the State as intended. Before the territorial model of the modern State,

Nations did not exist explicitly because people were able to identify without fear of persecution

(Gellner, 1983). It has been suggested that the forced creation of State nationalism gave culturally defined groups reason to establish nationalism to their Nation (Gellner, 1983; Williams

& Smith, 1983). State competition in the form of war with other States and the pressure to change identity in order to be treated fairly resulted in increased ethnic identification (Saatci,

2002; Williams & Smith, 1983). Failure of the State to create an inclusive atmosphere with economic, political, and social stability is what has driven the increase in ethnic identification

(Brown, 1998). From nationalism among Nations, history began to see nationalist movements in pursuit of recognition and independence. The pattern of conflict around Nation-State development can be explained at a much smaller scale using the psychology of identity.

Cycle of Identity-based Conflict

Due to the inefficient tactics employed by States to create uniform nationalism to their border, we often see the development of an “us vs. them” mentality, provoked by the inequalities enacted by the State. At a citizen level the “us” and “them” can be understood as those who

12 identify with the State vs. those who identify with a smaller, non-sovereign Nation. Border creation conflict can therefore be categorized as an identity-based conflict that turns into a State vs. Nation fight for territorial sovereignty and power. This causes the conversation to be based on arguments of antiquity, emphasizing the rights to territorial sovereignty that the already recognized State should have the authority to exercise. The negotiations become about control over land, rather than the identification conflict happening at the citizen level.

Understanding the roots of a conflict is imperative to the creation of a proper solution

(Rothman, 1997). The types of border conflicts mentioned above are often considered intractable conflicts, meaning extremely deep seeded and seemingly impossible to resolve (Kelman, 2001;

Maddison, 2017). Many conflicts that are identity based are originally assessed as resource based, which causes the negotiation process to deepen the conflict, rather than resolve it

(Rothman, 1997). Identity based conflict is generally difficult to point out because it tends to escalate due to specific problems originally unrelated to identity, such as economic, political, or social inequalities (Hancock, 2016). Due to this cyclical process of conflict escalation and misinterpretation of the type of conflict, both sides begin to “perceive their conflict in zero-sum terms, with respect to not only territory and resources but also national identity and national existence” (Kelman, 2001, pg. 187).

At the depths of a ‘new State conflict’ we can find that it is an existential one. As is characteristic of intergroup conflict, the general idea is that if the new Nation-State exists, the others’ history within the disputed territory cannot, thereby ripping away a piece of the other group’s identity (Allport, 1979; Blaney & Inayatullah, 2000; Rothman, 1997). If the conflict were truly resource based, then a compromise over land could potentially be reached. However, what can be observed with identity-based conflict is that a resource based compromise will not

13 ease tensions (Rothman, 1997). The goal of negotiation should, therefore, be to create a reality where the competing identities can peacefully coexist (Hancock, 2016; Kelman, 2001; Rothman,

1997).

We can theorize the possibilities of coexistence within and across borders because the concept of hatred toward ‘others’ is influenced by social-structural and motivational conditions

(Brewer, 2001), rather than an inherent hatred due to positive bias toward one’s own identity

(Sumner, 1906). If this is true, then peace can be found when those social-structural and motivational conditions are addressed. In the case of a conflict based around Nation-State development, this would mean that the hatred between the opposing groups is not inherent and can be mediated if the inequalities between groups decrease. It can also be theorized that peace is possible due to the “zero-sum” nature of the conflict where, eventually, each party comes to a stalemate conclusion (Anderson & O’Dowd, 1999). There is then an opening for new ideas and creative solutions to the conflict (Kelman, 2001; Maddison, 2017). The beginning of the solution to identity-based conflict include techniques that emphasize similarities rather than differences

(Allport, 1979; Rothman, 1997).

Coexistence beyond the border

Along with identification within and between States and Nations, there are also varying levels of what can be described as either thick or thin borders (also referred to as porous/impervious) (Anderson & O’Dowd, 1999). Thick borders refer to those that are difficult to cross due to political restrictions, whereas thin borders are known for being easy to cross. EU members are considered to have thin borders, specifically because of the political agreements within the EU, making it easy for citizens and goods to move freely. A thick border is often more physical in nature with a fence, wall, or militarized area, but can also be an international border

14 that heavily regulates the movement of people and goods through policy. Some examples would be the borders of the U.S. and Mexico, Israel and Palestine, South Korea and North Korea,

Kashmir, etc. The nature of the border depends on the agenda of the State, as well as the relationships between groups (Kaplan, 2001). Anderson and O’Dowd (1999) indicate four especially important factors; “relative economic wealth, political power, national loyalties, and cultural identities” (pg. 596).

All of the aforementioned factors play a role in the ‘thickness’ of the border itself. Due to the fact that the border is quite literally the outermost part of a territory, the policy and cross border relations can differ greatly from those authorized by the central authority. These areas around political borders are called borderlands and they present examples of regions where there can be unprecedented numbers of ethnic mixing and cooperation as well as extreme levels of ethnic violence (Anderson & O’Dowd, 1999; Kaplan & Häkli, 2002). By studying borderlands, we can effectively study the relationship between two territories both at the local and international level (Kaplan, 2001). A multi-ethnic borderland with thin borders can promote an ethnically diverse and equal region where both sides of the border build with one another economically and socially (Anderson & O’Dowd, 1999; Kaplan, 2001). An environment such as this would indicate recognition, respect, and cooperation between the two territories. However, a thick border can lead to discrimination, violence, and disrespect.

The circumstances of each borderland depend on the historical and political context of the region itself. With varying circumstances and identification, it is important to talk about identity salience and scale (Kaplan, 1999, 2001). Identity salience is a psychological theory that posits, individuals have multiple identities, and each identity can become more salient than the other depending on the social context (Serpe & Stryker, 2011). What we can see in European

15 borderlands is a bottom-up approach where local mechanisms and institutions are used to facilitate cooperation in more multi-ethnic areas that had once been defined by conflict (Kepka &

Murphy, 2002).

Euroregions. The European region is one where Nation-States do and have existed for centuries. Since the Peace of Westphalia, European States have generally stayed true to ethnic population, making mediation after conflict easier (Agnew, 2002; Minghi, 2002). While relatively unchanging in recent times, borders among European States have shifted quite a bit throughout their history, however, the nature of those borders has allowed peace over violence in most cases (Minghi, 2002). Euroregions were created around the same time as the Nation-State and they focus on creating peace through the use of local, transboundary relations and reconciliation mechanisms (Kepka & Murphy, 2002), allowing peace and cooperation to develop over time after tensions from conflict are overcome (Minghi, 2002).

Not only do Euroregions focus on transboundary economic development, but there is also a focus on creating a common, transboundary culture through, “intercultural dialogue, diminishing language barriers, and creating a ‘Euregio identity’ and a sense of place that spans national boundaries” (Kepka & Murphy, 2002, 59). Within Euroregions, the goal is for the more salient identity to remain focused on a transboundary scale, rather than a nationalistic one.

Identification within a borderland, or Euroregion, can lead to its own complications on representation. Certain regions (Catalonia, Basque Regions, South Tyrol, Julian, etc.) have been granted different levels of autonomy within their respective State because of the sometimes extreme differences between cultures.

However, not all Euroregions have the same outcomes; it is still important to keep historical and political context in mind, meaning that each region will present different obstacles

(Kaplan & Häkli, 2002). The level of difficulty around these obstacles is related to the scale of identification among local citizens. In more recently divisive borderlands, it can be common for the national identity to be more salient than the multicultural one being created within the region

(Kaplan & Häkli, 2002). This can cause difficulties establishing any form of cooperation between the people of the borderland, as well as between the States themselves. The European

Union (EU) presents a region where new culture is being developed within it, but borderlands of conflict still remain on the outskirts.

Identity salience and geographic scale explain how there can be a growing identification toward being European, while simultaneously identifying more with an individual State

(European Commission, 2018). We can use identity salience to understand the prioritization of individual identities at different levels regarding geographic scale. For citizens of the EU, their identity salience could be tied to geographic scale in that they may identify more with the EU when talking about distant international affairs, and more with their own State concerning immigration from a neighboring State. During the recent refugee crisis in Europe, there was a shift in political attitudes within EU member States because of the responsibility being placed on

EU States to act (Prooijen, et al., 2018; Skleparis, 2017). There have also been accounts in the past of displeasure over EU mandates, like those used to support other States. Identification with the EU could, therefore, decrease when it no longer feels beneficial to citizens, which could consequently increase identification with the State instead.

From the Eurobarometer data frequently collected by the European Commission we know that tensions along the EU borders and an increase in ‘European culture’ have brought an increase in identification with the EU at an international scale. However, identity salience is stronger at a local level, meaning citizens within the EU will still feel more connected to their

State and prioritize it first. Even though citizens of the EU oftentimes identify more with their own State, the common values and goals that have been developed within the EU have helped to create a cooperative, multi-ethnic environment. The cooperation within the EU and in borderlands should not be overlooked when studying the development of new Nation-States. The development of a Nation-State involves mutual recognition and cooperation between States, as well as some form of peace and tolerance among citizens. Knowing that conflict comes from new Nation-State development, we must discuss how opposing groups can reconcile once the conflict comes to an end.

Development after conflict

Should there be future development of stable Nation-States, there will need to be mechanisms in place that allow growth between governments and ethnic groups within and across new borders. As with the development of any new State, after the creation of a Nation-

State, leaders will look to establish legitimate and effective political systems, rebuild communities, improve economic and social structures, etc. However, this essay argues that the most important step toward establishing a peaceful and internationally efficient Nation-State, will be the recognition of the new Nation-State from the old State.

Within transitional justice literature, there is a lot to be said about acknowledgement, legitimacy, and recognition of past wrongs from both the wrongdoers and the government (if the government is not the wrongdoer) (Billerbeck & Gippert, 2017; Minow, 1998; Simic, 2017).

This recognition legitimizes the suffering of the victims and is ultimately the only way to open up the State to any meaningful transitional justice and reconciliation. Sincere acknowledgement of the wrongs committed not only shows the victims that their government will work to make sure it never happens again, but it is also an acknowledgement among the international

18 community. It is my opinion that, in the development of Nation-States, recognition will play the most important role.

Without mutual recognition, even with the development of a semi-official border, the conflict may continue, manifesting itself as discrimination and unresolved ethnic tension. The point of Nation-State building is to create representation for oppressed groups of people, not delegitimize and oppress different ones. Transitional justice mechanisms have the ability to take on many different forms as well as address a wide range of issues (Minow, 1998; Simic, 2017), meaning they can be used to address recognition.

The world has recently seen an increase in the use of transitional justice mechanisms because it is believed that, though their goals may be lofty, they do have generally positive outcomes (Minow, 1998; Simic, 2017). Some examples of transitional justice mechanisms include war crimes tribunals, truth commissions, memorials, lustration and vetting processes, reparations, amnesty, and restitution. While all of these mechanisms aim to achieve different goals, their fundamental purpose is to mend broken relationships in a way that helps to push a society forward. The UN, EU, and other NGOs have been known to initiate transitional justice mechanisms within post-conflict societies because of the belief in their effectiveness. Due to the increase in intra-state conflict in recent times and the international community’s support of peacebuilding, state-building, and transitional justice operations, there should be development in the integration of all three so that state-building can be more effective (Kent, 2017).

Though there are mechanisms that form at the civil level, transitional justice depends on the national and international acknowledgement of the victims and the atrocities they faced at the hands of their perpetrators (Bakiner, 2016; Mihr, 2017; Minow, 1998). Meaning that if there is lack of national political will to participate in transitional mechanisms, they could fail, or the

19 outcomes have the potential of being extremely skewed (Bakiner, 2016). Any kind of motion forward toward peace will require not only the recognition of past wrongs from both sides, but also the recognition of the newly established border. The border does not have to symbolize conflict and separation, instead, it could simply be symbolizing the recognition of the rights of a group of people. Though this may be difficult due to the power dynamics of the international system, it is still possible.

Chapter III

Case Study & Methodology

The overarching methodological approach for this research is qualitative. With a specific goal to understand citizen perspectives on their own identity and the development of Kosovo as a whole, qualitative research became the clear avenue. The qualitative methods used for this research included semi-structured interviews and landscape analysis. These methods were used to spotlight themes of personal identification, community changes and perceptions, and physical borders, much like those used by Steven Oluic (2007) in his study on ethnic identification in

Bosnia and Herzegovina. Understanding these three concepts will provide the means to answer the questions at hand by showing the changes that may happen both internally and externally within a Nation’s population and border.

The Case Study

Without the context of a case study, the research would be based more on theory and broad themes. The use of an in-depth case study with fieldwork will present the intricacies of development within a new Nation-State. In order to understand how the creation of a Nation-

State will affect the people within and around it, I chose to study a relatively new Nation-State that broke off from a recognized State. This allows for the study of its entire development from

Nation to State. One of the more recent examples of this, that was stable enough for me to visit, was Kosovo (Image 3.1). Kosovo unilaterally declared independence in 2008, approximately 8.5

21 years after the end of the Kosovo War in 1999, making it a good area to find people that still remembered Kosovo before the war and independence.

Image 3.1 - Kosovo Location

Though it is recognized by many States, it has not received full recognition within the

UN or, possibly more importantly, by its neighbor Serbia. Without recognition from the State it has seceded from, Kosovo and Serbia still face great ethnic tensions, which is less than ideal with the remaining Serbian enclaves within Kosovo. Regardless of these imperfect variables, I believe that Kosovo provides the right environment, given the specified definitions, to facilitate the discussion of identity within a Nation-State that this research calls for.

By going through the steps of the conflict and rebuilding of Kosovo, it may be possible to understand what the development of future Nation-States could look like. Kosovo goes through a series of recognizable issues characteristic of territorial disputes, but it has made it farther than some Nations in the process. Meaning that the Steps Kosovo has taken past other Nations could

22 be showing an important pattern. It could also provide the opportunity to figure out better strategies for conflict mediation related to Nation-State development.

Demographics. Kosovo is located in Southeastern Europe neighboring Serbia, Albania,

Montenegro, and North Macedonia (Image 3.1). After a long history of changing borders, different ethnic majorities, and varying levels of autonomy, Kosovo has become an unofficial

Nation-State. According to the CIA World Factbook, Kosovo occupies a territory of 4,203.5 square miles with a border that is approximately 444 miles long. 227 miles of that border is contested with Serbia. The current population is approximately 1.9 million and while Kosovo was meant to be developed as a multi-ethnic State, 92.9% of the population is Albanian, leaving

7.1% to miscellaneous minorities, of which, 1.5% of the population is Serbian. This population does leave out parts of Northern Kosovo, which is significant to mention because there is a larger

Serbian population in the North, however, there is a lack of cooperation from Serbian populations to participate in census data.

Fieldwork

Looking at the development of a government and other state institutions through political documentation gives an overview of a State’s intentions. Therefore, chapter IV outlines the efforts being made within Kosovo to improve it on a national and international level. However, the perspectives of the citizens is an important indicator of the stability and level of growth within a democratic society, so answering the proposed research questions relied on fieldwork that sought to understand those perspectives within the new Nation-State of Kosovo.

Fieldwork was conducted over a three-week period during the month of June, 2019. With a limited schedule, the goal was to gain as much information as possible through interviews and

23 landscape analysis. Kosovo is not large, however, as with many places, three weeks was not a lot of time to work with. As depicted in Image 3.2, I tried to make the most of my time by studying

Image 3.2 - Kosovo Fieldwork Locations three main areas, the Serbian border, the Albanian border, and a bit of the capital. These three locations gave me the opportunity to develop a balanced research model that allowed comparison between perspectives near the Serbian border and those near the Albanian border.

The capital of Pristina is where I stayed for the first half of the three-week period, commuting almost daily to Podujeva. However, when I was not in Podujeva, I spent time exploring Pristina a bit, as well as conducting a couple of interviews with border officials. No citizen interviews were conducted in Pristina because, with the time I had, I was unable to take on a full study in more than the two border regions.

Podujeva was selected as a study area for its proximity to the Serbian border and its accessibility from the capital. My commute consisted of an hour bus ride from Pristina passing

24 some of the beautiful natural landscape of Kosovo. Interviewing citizens of Podujeva offered insight into a region with history next to a contentious border. I felt that the proximity to the border may yield different perceptions on nationalism and the border than a city further away

(Kaplan, 2001). After my time in Podujeva and Pristina, I travelled by bus to the city of Gjakova.

Gjakova is situated near the Albanian border and is known for the devastation it faced during the

First Balkan War and the Kosovo War. This location was used to understand developmental perspectives from a location that presumably no longer deals with the effects of tensions near the

Serbian border. Of course, the whole of Kosovo is involved in those tensions, however, from a citizen point of view, it was possible to imagine a difference arising due to proximity.

Landscape Analysis. The literature on the importance and value of landscape analysis opens up beautiful theories on how we see and experience the world around us. It is described by many as a symbolic mirror into the culture of a society (Jackson et. al, 1979), “an extraordinary and rich exhibit of the course and character of any society” (Jackson et. al, 1979, pg. 2), and “a clue to a region’s human personality” (Tuan, 1979, pg. 93). Therefore, a lot can be learned by simply observing a landscape. I used this in my study of Kosovo to strengthen my understanding of Kosovo’s economic, social, and ethnic development. Personal notes and photographs were used in my landscape analysis to ensure the fresh outlook and experience of the landscape, instead of relying purely on mental image alone.

Photographs were taken of landscapes that provided context to the ethnic/national development of Kosovo. While I did not seek out any specific landmark, or landscape, these themes guided my analysis of the area around me. Abandoned buildings, neglected churches, and unkempt spaces were observed as indicators for ethnic/national growth, as well as general development. Flags, monuments, and other ethnic/national symbols were also observed to

25 understand levels of identification. Photographs, observations, and relevance of the landscapes that were analyzed are in chapter V of this thesis.

Interviews. Since the goal of this study was to get an idea of how the border affected the identification of the people, I chose to use semi-structured interviews that highlighted the voices of Kosovo citizens (Mandic, 2017). Interviews from border officials were used to gain a better understanding of the recent history of border development, as well as their own perspectives on how operations have changed over time. Semi-structured interviews allowed for guided conversational flow that gave participants the freedom to answer as they pleased (Cloke et. al,

2004). This freedom helped me to understand personal identification, community changes and perceptions, and nationalism since the end of the war in 1999 and Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008.

Participants were selected randomly in public places, as well as through the use of the snowball method. Interviews were held in places like parks, cafes, and public buildings, such as theatres, schools, and libraries. The only restriction for participants was that they be eighteen years or older and the majority of the citizen interviews were conducted in Albanian through the use of an interpreter. Interviews ranged anywhere from five minutes to an hour long, depending on how much the participant had to say. “Official” participants were interviewed in their offices by appointment, for the most part. They included a KFOR border official, as well as Kosovo police border officials in Pristina, at the border in Podujeva, and the border in Gjakova. I also had the opportunity to speak with a few Albanian border officials. Most of the officials were able to conduct their interviews with me in English and an interpreter was used for those that were not.

Along with the four Officers that I had the chance to interview, thirty-four interviews were conducted with citizens throughout Kosovo, twenty-one in Podujeva and thirteen in

Gjakova. Specifics about the questions asked will be provided in the fieldwork analysis in

Chapter VI. The age brackets for the participants are shown in Table 3.1. I made it a point to record the age of each participant since the end of the war was only twenty years ago. Many of the participants were able to remember the time during and before the war, which was important to this study, being that it was about the change of identification and growth over time.

Therefore, putting them into these specific age brackets is important because at these ages people are able to remember different times from different perspectives.

Those who are 18-30 were no older than 10 when the war ended and may have had a very different perspective of someone even just a few years older. Not only that, but remembering the events leading up to the war could be more difficult. The next bracket of 31-40 shows a demographic of people who were young adults during the war, some of whom may have been old enough to fight, or have partners fighting. At this age there may also be information about what life was like before the war, but it is very likely that they only remember a time where tensions had already begun. The participants who were 41-50 would have been 21-30 years old at the time of the war, therefore giving them the ability to remember a time before ethnic

Table 3.1 - Participant Age Groups

Participants by Age

18-30 12

31-40 7

41-50 6

51+ 9

Total 34

27 tensions resurfaced. I was originally very focused on the 51+ age bracket because it was my belief that there would be a lot to learn in terms of history, as well as previous interaction and identification. If the goal was to understand whether or not a recognized border could change the identification of a nation, then the older generation would be the way to predict that because their identity would have already been established before the war.

Limitations

Outlining the limitations of this study is important to maintain the integrity of what has been done. As with many other studies done before me, I was limited on time and money for fieldwork. Fieldwork was only conducted over a three-week period, making it impossible to visit all of the locations necessary for a truly thorough study on the ethnic development of Kosovo.

One location specifically that was missed is Mitrovica in northern Kosovo along the Serbian border. This area is known for the continued ethnic tension, unlike the areas I was able to visit.

Mitrovica was skipped, not just due to time constraints, but also because of my own lack of experience dealing with possibly more hostile situations. Being that it was my first time interviewing random people as a U.S. citizen in a “contested” territory that was “liberated” by the United States, it seemed wise at this time to leave that region out.

While Kosovo-Serbians were not excluded from this study specifically, the population of the regions I visited have little to no Kosovo-Serbians. For this reason, I did not get to interview any Kosovo-Serbians. I knew this would be the situation from the beginning, which is why I only hired Albanian interpreters. Another limitation related to interview participants is that I had to use interpreters. Also, two different interpreters were necessary since my connections with people started shortly before I arrived. I had one for each city, meaning that there could be inconsistencies with the interpretation/translation styles of each.

I believe a complete study on ethnic development in Kosovo would require visiting border points shared with all neighbors, including Montenegro and North Macedonia. In order to gain any kind of depth, a future study would need to include more Serbian history and perspectives. Mitrovica would be an imperative fieldwork area for interviews with Kosovo-

Serbians and landscape analysis. Interviews with Serbians near the Kosovo border in Serbia would also add another important layer to a future research framework. While I stand by the integrity of my interpreters, I believe one for each language would be more accurate and consistent. However, I do believe that the ideas expressed in this essay have merit and set up a platform upon which further research can expand.

Chapter IV

Kosovo in Context

Chapter IV will provide an overview of Kosovo’s history from ancient Illyria to the declaration of Kosovo’s independence in 2008, as well as recent development. In order to maintain a rounded history section, I have used information from a few main sources; Dzino

(2014), Judah (2008), Lampe (2000), Pavlowitch (1999), and Vickers (1998). All of their publications have helped to inform the history section up until the end of Yugoslavia, so specific citations will only be used wherever absolutely necessary. When talking about the Kosovo war, references will mainly consist of official international documents, which will be cited accordingly.

Illyria and Dardania

Ancient Illyria and Dardania seem to be extremely important points in history for the citizens of Kosovo. Illyria has been discussed throughout history in ancient Roman and Greek literature, giving us an insight into the extent of its development and territorial occupation.

Records regarding trade and transportation routes have also been used to identify the boundaries of both Illyria and Dardania over time, however, mapping the exact borders is still difficult.

Illyria itself has had many different names and is known to have described several different peoples and places in the Balkan area.

There is mention of Illyrians dating back to the sixth century B.C.E., where the term was used to describe peoples of the Adriatic coast, as well as those who settled to the West of the

Macedonians and Northwest of the Greeks. There is more mention of Illyria after the fourth century B.C.E., where the “Illyrian Kingdom” has been identified. The “Illyrian Kingdom” and

Image 4.1 - The assumed extent of Dardania. Some accounts claim it reached as far as the Danube River. Map influenced by Petrovic (2007). the Roman province of “Illyricum” (est. 200 B.C.E.) had a wide range of territorial authority.

Illyricum is said to have stretched from the Adriatic coast to the Danube river, meaning that it would have included the territory of modern-day Serbia. It is important to note here that both

Kosovo-Albanians and Albanians feel a strong connection to their territorial history within

Illyria, which is why it is also important to citizens of Kosovo to identify with Dardania.

Dardania is said to have been an autonomous region within Illyria that started to exist during the third century B.C.E., before the region became part of the Roman Empire. As with the specific borders of Illyria, laying out the exact territorial extent of Dardania is difficult (Image

4.1). However, it is believed to have had a border encompassing the northern part of modern-day

North Macedonia, all of Kosovo, and some southern parts of Serbia. While part of the Roman empire, Dardania remained autonomous and mostly untouched by Roman authority. This allowed for traditions and culture to remain the same, laying a strong foundation for future nationalism. The region of Dardania was under Roman/Byzantian control until 1180, which was well into the Slavic invasion of the Balkans.

Medieval Serbia to the Ottoman Empire

It has been recorded that Slavs began crossing the Danube river around 600 AD in an effort to expand their territory. Indigenous tribes in the Balkans were pushed further out throughout the century, including Illyrian speaking peoples that eventually became known as

Albani. It was not until the 11th century that most of the land in modern-day Kosovo was taken by Slavs. After the rule of the Roman Empire over the region of Illyria, the Serbian Nemanjic

Dynasty took over in 1166. 1180 officially marked the end of Byzantian rule in Kosovo and by the end of the 12th century Serbians began migrating south toward Kosovo.

Serbian territory eventually stretched from Hungary to southern Dalmatia, including all of Kosovo. Kosovo was the political and cultural center for the Nemanjic Dynasty because it contained a lot of major routes leading to the regions outside of Serbia. Serbian culture was based on religion, specifically the Serbian Orthodox Church, so much so that the Church and

State were synonymous with one another. With the spread of Catholicism in the Balkans, the

Nemanjic Dynasty found it necessary to enforce the Orthodox faith, which included the conversion of Catholic churches to Orthodox ones. The seat of the Serbian Orthodox Church ended up in Pec, a city in modern day Kosovo. Orthodox Churches and Monasteries shaped the communities they were in and eventually claimed territory throughout the entirety of the southern part of Kosovo.

In 1331, Stefan Dusan became king of the Serbian kingdom. Dusan enforced stricter conversion laws that included mandatory baptisms to the Orthodox faith in order to snuff out heresy. It was during the time of Dusan that western Kosovo was named Metohija, meaning

“owned by the church,” which is still a name that Serbians use today. The time of Dusan marked extreme economic, religious, and cultural growth within the Serbian kingdom, effectively making him a “hero” in the eyes of Serbian history. “His name was to become synonymous with the aspirations of the Serbian nation” (Vickers, 1998 p.10).

The enforcement of the Orthodox faith during the Nemanjic Dynasty caused some to flee to the hills of modern-day northern Albania, so they were free to practice Catholicism. After officially adopting the Catholic religion, the feud between Serbians and Albanians grew stronger, eventually resulting in allied campaigns against Serbia. Though Albania was not a State at the time, borders were able to be drawn based on these differences in ideology. The Orthodox

Church and Serbian culture within Kosovo strengthened against the threat of Catholicism and

Albanians, which is what Serbians use to argue their ethnic and cultural right to the land of

Kosovo.

The Serbian kingdom came to an end in 1389 when the Ottoman Empire started to enclose the region. The Ottoman Empire was known for a more hands-off approach to conquest, that involved local leaders and the freedom to practice the religion of your choice. Populations within Kosovo gradually began to change due to the migration of many Albanians from the

Mountains back down to the plains. This caused the religions of Kosovo to change as well, resulting in a mixture of Catholicism, Orthodox, and Islam. During Ottoman rule there was mass conversion to Islam in the region, while Serbian ideals remained centered around the Orthodox church.

With a rise in tensions between the Ottoman Empire and the Catholic world in the 16th and early 17th century, the Empire sought to abolish Catholicism and the Serbian Orthodox church. Though the facts behind this event are discussed to this day, it is generally believed that the religious restrictions led to what later became known as “The Great Migration,” where

Orthodox Serbians and Catholic Albanians fled north; Serbians to Hungary and Albanians to the province of Vojvodina and Croatia. Those who fled generally had intentions of coming back to their homes, however, their moving allowed for the Albanians who were originally pushed out to migrate back down from the mountains. During this time of forced conversion, many Serbians and Albanians who chose to stay converted to Islam. Similar faith caused a certain degree of assimilation between the two ethnic groups where intermarriage was not uncommon. Tensions grew again when Serbian language dominated the area, effectively causing Albanian traditions to seem less important.

In 1833 Serbia officially became an autonomous region in the Ottoman Empire. This allowed for a re-emergence of Serbian presence and Orthodoxy within Kosovo. However, it was a time of instability for the Ottoman Empire, so as with other Balkan regions, “Kosovo degenerated into an anarchic region where outlaws reigned supreme” (Vickers, 1998, p.31). The

Ottomans were in favor of spreading the Islamic state and the feeling of its superiority, which once again brought tension between the Serbians and Albanians in Kosovo.

Russia saw this time as an opportunity to push its control in the Balkans. The San Stefano agreement was ratified in March of 1878, extending the border of Serbia to include the region of

Kosovo north of Mitrovica Pristina. This northern region was into pieces that became part of

Montenegro and Macedonia, leaving most of the modern extent of Kosovo under Ottoman rule.

With the Serbian-Turkish wars that started a few years prior, there was mass migration by

Albanians back to the region of Kosovo, while Serbians had been leaving for “Serbia proper” for generations. The separation of Albanians and Albanian territory led to the creation of the Prizren

League in June of 1878, which had the goal to liberate and uphold the integrity of the separated

Albanian territories. Skanderbeg, an Albanian nobleman from the 15th century, is widely known for leading the first Albanian movement for independence (Swire, 1930); however, The Prizren

League is said to have been the beginning of organized nationalism among Albanians that has lasted to this day.

Albanian nationalism has always been based on shared Illyrian history and the goal for all

Illyrians to be united as within one border (Swire, 1930). Being that Illyrian history is also important to the people of Kosovo, the concept of a unified Albania has been supported in the past, as well as today. There was hope that the fall of the Ottoman Empire would reunite all

Albanians. Though Albania was finally recognized as a sovereign State, Serbia and Montenegro were granted control of Kosovo in 1912 and received international recognition for rule in 1913.

Kosovo and Yugoslavia

With the fall of the Ottoman empire, Yugoslavia was established as a Slavic state in

1918, after WWI, under the name of “Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.” During this time, Serbia was granted the region of Kosovo. After Albanians started to fight for the international community to reunite Kosovo with Albania, the Serbian State tried to force identification through the suppression of Albanian culture and education, as well as the expansion of the Serbian language. Both tactics were found to cause an increased sense of nationalism among Albanians, so were stopped shortly after they began.

In 1929 Yugoslavia was established as a single country under King Alexander. Between

1918 and 1929, there was a great deal of political difficulty and disagreement within the

35 government of Yugoslavia. The most important development during this time, in the context of this thesis, was the establishment of Yugoslav provinces. There was a total of nine provinces, six of which had a Serbian majority and none with an Albanian majority. Kosovo was intentionally split between three provinces (Vardar, Zeta, and Morava) in order to ensure the lack of Albanian majority. During different periods of Yugoslavia there was a goal to “colonize” Kosovo where

Serbians were incentivized to move to the Albanian majority areas and push them out to split them up even more. There was also a time where Albanians began to be deported to other areas, one being Turkey.

WWII brought the weakening of Yugoslavia, causing the separation of Kosovo into three parts given to Bulgaria, Germany, and Macedonia. By the end of WWII, Yugoslavia had the opportunity to redevelop into a socialist state in 1945 with six republics: Slovenia, Croatia,

Bosnia Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. There was a general drive to spread the communist agenda to the Albanian population, as well as keep Serbian powers at bay, which is why Kosovo was named an autonomous region within Serbia, much like the province of

Vojvodina, though still a lower status (Malcom, 1998). Though it was autonomous, Kosovo was not given the right to secede and had limited self-governing rights (Krieger, 2001). Government and other state institutions were still managed by Serbians and Montenegrins due to the lack of interest from Albanians to be a part of Yugoslavia at the time. Albanians in the region were displeased with the “new Yugoslavia,” leading to the execution of many ethnic Albanians.

Directly after WWII, there was a period where Albanians were allowed to return/repopulate Kosovo, however, after the split from the USSR, the border between Kosovo and Albania was closed. High ethnic tensions emanated from the Albanian community in

Kosovo. In order to quell them, Yugoslav leaders opened Albanian schools, even going so far as

36 to support the education of Albanian teachers for those new schools. For a short time, Albanian culture was no longer being suppressed. Then, in 1953, Serbia was given direct control of

Kosovo, however, the Yugoslav constitution was amended multiple times in the years to follow in response to an awakening of Kosovo-Albanians demanding more freedoms. In 1969 Kosovo was given the constitutional right to establish its own constitutional law.

In the 1950s and 1960s, Yugoslavian reforms brought economic and social growth.

Though seeking to maintain its distance from Eastern and Western ideals, Yugoslavia sought to uphold working relationships with both. With fear of further Soviet expansion, the United States remained especially involved in the support of Yugoslavia, so as to promote the West. The positive growth in Yugoslavia was, however, short lived. A lack of economic diversity led to increasing unemployment rates by the early 1970s. Frequent reform and constitutional changes that were meant to mediate the impending economic crisis, complicated matters further.

Increasing foreign debt continued to destabilize what was once a strong Yugoslavia.

In terms of ethnic development, the 1960s saw a time of prosperity and freedom for the

Albanians within Kosovo. In the grand scheme of things, the economy improved along with healthcare in Kosovo. Family size increased and Albanian culture through the arts flourished.

Not only were Kosovo-Albanians doing well, but so were Kosovo-Serbians, and they lived in relative harmony during this period. As higher education in Kosovo grew in the early 1970s, so did the unemployment rate, which reached approximately twenty percent. Then, a new constitution in 1974 officially gave Kosovo-Albanians the freedoms they had been yearning for, including representation within the Serbian government, a state they were still a part of.

Ultimately, Yugoslavia had developed into an entity that brought relative peace to the region of

Kosovo.

In 1980, difficulties started to escalate with the death of Yugoslavian president Josip Broz

Tito, who was known as the “unifying symbol” of Yugoslavia (Ramet, 2002). Tito was the overarching power that held the threats of Serbian power at bay after political tensions rose with the constitution of 1974. After his death, ethnic tensions across all of Yugoslavia were elevated with the struggle for political power between Slovenia and Serbia. The one-party system led by

Tito was no longer an option as the political feuds manifested themselves at an ethnic level. In

1988 Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević started his nationalist campaign, aimed at exposing the suppression of Serbians. This prompted the movement to reclaim Kosovo as a territory of Serbia, which was of course opposed by Kosovo-Albanians, as well as the Slovenian leader, Milan

Kučan. Nevertheless, Kosovo’s autonomous rights were taken in 1989, reinstating it as a Serbian territory.

The stalemate between Slovenian and Serbian powers came to an end in 1990 when

Slovenia officially left the discussions. The lack of coherent vision for Yugoslavia after Tito’s death, a debt and unemployment crisis, and looming ethnic uprisings all led to the eventual end of Yugoslavia in 1991. This left the Balkan region in general disarray leading to the plethora of ethnic conflicts that the Balkans are known for.

The Kosovo War

Serbia began to impose discriminatory laws against Kosovo-Albanians once again.

Kosovo-Albanians had to deal with an increase in unemployment, lack of education, and inadequate healthcare, along with other discriminatory hardships. Wanting to change their status within Serbia, Kosovo held elections in 1992, in hopes that it would spark a resurgence of autonomy. The new government was not allowed to convene and by 1993, Kosovo-Albanians started to support the idea of armed resistance advocating for independence rather than

38 autonomy. The escalation of Kosovo-Albanian resistance to Serbian discrimination led to more violent retaliation from Serbian police and military. In 1995 the lack of international acknowledgement and conversation on the issue in Kosovo reaffirmed Kosovo-Albanians of the ineffectiveness of their non-violent protest (Krieger, 2001; Lampe, 2000). This eventually led to the establishment of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) that started its campaign in 1997

(Mertus, 1999). The KLA was known for conducting attacks similar to those against the British by the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland (Lampe, 2000).

There was obvious unrest between the two ethnicities within Kosovo, and since Serbia was the recognized State, the government took the uprisings from the KLA as a threat to Serbian sovereignty, much like the riots in 1981. Now known as the Kosovo war, the fighting between the KLA and Yugoslavian/Serbian military forces from 1998-1999 caused the displacement of over 850,000 refugees (Krieger, 2001) and has been labeled an attempt at ethnic cleansing

(Bieber & Daskalovski, 2003). It was an extremely brutal campaign to torture, dismember, burn, rape, and traumatize all Kosovo-Albanians within Kosovo. The UN was aware of the discriminatory laws being put into place against Kosovo-Albanians and the General Assembly made several resolutions condemning those laws, urgently calling upon the authorities of the

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to end the discrimination against Kosovo-Albanians from the

Serbian government (RESOLUTIONS 49/204, 1994; 50/190, 1995; 51/111, 1996; 52/139, 1997;

53/164, 1998; 54/183, 1999).

The UN Security Council eventually followed the General Assembly’s example, writing resolution 1160 in March of 1998, recognizing the conflict and asking both sides to stop their campaigns. Their suggestions were ones of peace, condemning the violence from both sides.

Two more resolutions were signed by the UN Security Council in 1998 (RESOLUTION 1199,

1998; RESOLUTION 1203, 1998) with increasing urgency for a ceasefire and recognition of the

“impending humanitarian catastrophe” (RESOLUTION 1203, 1998). By 1999 the situation had not improved and after a briefing by Special Envoy Richard Holbrooke, NATO, without permission from the UN, started bombing the region to end the conflict (NATO Secretary

General Press Release, 1999). After seven days, Serbia began to withdraw its forces and NATO ceased fire (NATO Secretary General Letter, 1999). It was at this time that the UN Security

Council signed resolution 1244 calling for the official end to the conflict and the implementation of an international security force (KFOR) to ensure peace and security within the region so that refugees may return safely (RESOLUTION 1244, 1999).

Under this resolution the UN also created the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), in order to facilitate peaceful redevelopment and re-establish order in Kosovo (RESOLUTION 1244,

1999). It acted to establish order through law at a time where the political institutions in Kosovo were unable to. The goal was to get Kosovo to the point where the local government could operate on their own. UNMIK took over the civil administration, the promotion of a Kosovar police force in charge of their own international and border affairs, and the advancement of inter- ethnic relations (Judah, 2008). International economic and peace efforts were made by the EU, as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) oversaw the formation of local institution building (Judah, 2008).

The goal of the international effort was to establish Kosovo as a multi-ethnic region, but deliberately pushed off the conversation of its independence, which is considered the most problematic part of UNMIKs efforts (Knudsen et al., 2006; Tahiri, 2018). By not addressing the end status of Kosovo, the international efforts were questioned by the population and the region was subject to extreme levels of ethnic tension. Without proper efforts made to facilitate ethnic

40 peace, ethnic complications escalated in 2004, causing most of the remaining Kosovo-Serbian population to flee the country, or move to Serb enclaves within Kosovo (Dahlman, 2010;

Knudsen et al., 2006). Part of these complications included attacks on Serbian Orthodox churches and homes that were orchestrated by Kosovo-Albanian citizens. It became clear that ethnic tensions between Kosovo-Albanians and Serbians were far from resolved. After the riots in 2004, UNMIK entered into discussions about the final status of Kosovo, as it became apparent that it would be imperative.

Former Finnish president, Marti Ahtisaari, was asked by the UN to facilitate negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia and come up with a plan that would bring cooperation (Knudsen et al., 2006; Siegertszt, 2015). In 2007, Ahtisaari proposed the “Ahtisaari Plan” that officially called for the full international recognition of Kosovo. With remaining Serbian enclaves within

Kosovo, Ahtisaari included stipulations granting autonomy to Serb majority municipalities within Kosovo. In 2008, Kosovo unilaterally declared independence, giving authority to local institutions rather than international ones. Though Kosovo is recognized by approximately 100 countries, it is not yet fully recognized, and its ultimate future is still unknown. With continued opposition from Serbia, there was a lack of negotiation with Kosovo.

Normalizing relations after the war and independence has been a slow process, mostly because of four northern municipalities in Kosovo (Beha, 2015). Zvecan, Mitrovica North,

Leposoviq, and Zubin Potok are Serb majority municipalities that have refused to accept the

Kosovo government and Serbia has yet to cede control of the region (Beha, 2015). While Serbia believes that all of Kosovo is Serbian territory, there is a focus now on Serb majority areas.

Therefore, any cooperation between the two countries since independence has attempted to address the North of Kosovo, which is why there has been a general stalemate. Eventually, the

Ahtisaari Plan (now referred to as the “The First Agreement”) was signed off on by both countries for the first time in April of 2013.

Though there was some development in the implementation of The First Agreement, they barely scratched the surface. In 2018, this inaction and further ethnic tensions led the President of Serbia to revisit the idea of a total land swap, which would give Serbia the Serb majority region in the North of Kosovo and give Kosovo a chunk of land in the South of Serbia.

The future development of Kosovo and Serbia will depend on their ability to cooperate with one another, or at least co-exist. Both countries wish to join the EU, but it has been made clear that even beginning that process will require cross-border cooperation and the full recognition of

Kosovo from Serbia.

Other efforts have been made to create cooperation between Kosovo and Serbia but continue to be met with opposition. One example is the Central European Free Trade Agreement

(CEFTA). This agreement was facilitated by the EU in order to prepare and mold countries within the Balkans for future EU membership (Loxha, 2018). There are stipulations within the agreement that allow for reasonable tariffs when necessary for internal growth, however, there is a 100% tariff on Serbia that is considered a violation of CEFTA. The eventual impact of a true trade agreement among Balkan States could lead to extremely positive results both economically and politically, but the agreements are being tossed aside because of current political difficulties

(Jusufi & Bellaqa, 2019). The Kosovo government has made it clear that the lack of recognition from Serbia leaves them in a position where they are unable to participate in any agreement with

Serbia because without recognition there is very little cooperation from Serbia. For example, in

2008, while Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina were a part of CEFTA, they refused to import

42 products with the new customs stamps from Kosovo that said, “Kosovo Customs,” instead of

“UNMIK Customs” (Jusufi & Bellaqa, 2019).

Ethnic Reconciliation Efforts

Kosovo has utilized a multitude of transitional justice mechanisms at the international, national, and civil levels during its State transition and building processes (Di Lellio, 2013;

Visoka, 2016; Hehir, 2010; Istrefi, 2017; Koschishka, 2015; Kostovicova, 2014). Transitional justice mechanisms have been used in order to diminish ethnic tensions and make it possible for there to be peace between a newly developed Nation-State of Kosovo and Serbia. Since there was conflict at the civil, national, and international level, there has been a need for mechanisms focused on all three areas.

War Crimes Tribunal. The Kosovo Specialist Chambers & Specialist Prosecutors

Office (KSC) is a war crimes tribunal that was adopted by the Kosovo Assembly in August 2015 as an amendment to the Kosovo constitution. It was suggested and heavily supported by the EU both through funding and preliminary/post consultations (KSC, 2019). This tribunal is a temporary judicial system that has been incorporated into the constitution and legal systems of

Kosovo (while remaining an independent body) to investigate crimes against humanity that were committed by “natural persons of Kosovo/Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) citizenship, or over persons accused of committing crimes against persons of Kosovo/FRY citizenship” between January 1998 and December 2000 (KSC, 2019). The ultimate goal of a war crimes tribunal is to prosecute people (usually leaders) for war crimes that they committed, in an attempt to begin reconciliation with the victims.

The tribunal is composed of international judges that have been selected by the EU

Common Security and Defense Policy Mission (EULEX) in order to ensure the impartiality of

43 the proceedings. Victims are also welcomed to attend the hearings and make statements after they go through an application process. However, Kosovars were not very invested in the KSC.

Visoka (2016) argues:

“that the documentation of war crimes in Kosovo was utilized for retributive justice by the

international community for political revenge by former foes, and for power/identity

consolidation by local protagonists” (p.62).

Even with the international support to end the war, there are accusations that it is all for political gain. Something like this could be frustrating to the victims in Kosovo who just seek international respect and representation. When there is too much focus put on prosecution, less attention is paid to how those prosecutions are affecting the victims (Kostovicova, 2014).

Politicizing prosecution and ethno-politics within Kosovo has caused the creation of many civil society level organizations dedicated to memorializing the stories of victims (Kostovicova, 2014;

Visoka, 2016).

Truth Commission. The Regional Commission Tasked with Establishing the Facts about

All Victims of War Crimes and Other Serious Human Rights Violations Committed on the

Territory of the Former Yugoslavia from 1 January 1991 to 31 December 2001 (RECOM) is a truth commission that is intergovernmental and made up of States and regions of the former

Yugoslavia. The Coalition for RECOM was established in Pristina, Kosovo in 2008 within the

Fourth Forum for Transitional Justice in post-Yugoslavia Countries (RECOM, 2018). It started at the civil level with cooperation from many NGOs and individual civil member representatives.

The point of RECOM was to push the creation of a nationally and internationally supported truth commission (Di Lellio, 2013; Kostovicova, 2014; RECOM, 2018). The timeline for the development of RECOM starts in 2006 and moves into the present with the current support at the

44 political level in Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia, and the Bosnian member of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RECOM, 2018).

Truth commissions are centered around finding the truth to the atrocities they are directed toward, rather than prosecuting the perpetrators. In Kosovo there are many grass-roots initiatives that provide a platform for victims to tell their truths. So, it is important for the transitional justice ideas from local communities to be taken into consideration when enacting international mechanisms (Di Lellio, 2013; Kostovicova, 2014). Though RECOM started from the civil level and is internationally and nationally supported, it is not seen as a legitimate truth commission by victims (Di Lellio, 2013). “Significant sections of the victims and of the human rights movement have remained either noncommittal or outright opposed to RECOM, despite their obvious desire for justice” (Di Lellio, 2013, p.131). This opposition does not come from a lack of effectiveness, rather a lack of recognition from Serbia. Without recognition, Serbia can avoid participation in many of these transitional justice mechanisms, therefore impeding the process of perpetrator/victim reconciliation.

Chapter V State & Ethnic Development within the Landscape

Chapter V analyzes observation data that was gathered over the three-week fieldwork period. Observation data was collected in Podujeva, Gjakova, and Pristina, as well as at two border crossings. This data will provide supplemental information on some of the developmental progress in Kosovo made by both the international community and the Kosovo government.

Discussions about the significance of these developments, as well as the landscape of the study areas I visited will be addressed in an attempt to expand on themes of recognition and ethnic tension.

Ethnic Development & Identification

Flags & Ethnic Symbols

Flags are used by countries as unifying symbols. One of the international efforts to establish Kosovo as an inclusive multi-ethnic State was the creation of a new Kosovo flag

(Cosentino, 2015). The hope was that a new flag would spark cohesive identification with

Kosovo itself, instead of separate ethnic groups. In order to do this, however, there were rules about certain details and images that were not allowed to be used, so that there would be no favor given to one ethnicity (Cosentino, 2015). Those stipulations were that the eagle symbol, as seen on the Albanian flag was not allowed, along with red and black or red, white, and blue color schemes. The result was a neutral flag that depicts the country of Kosovo in gold beneath six white stars, atop a blue backdrop.

Image 5.1 Gathering before the unveiling of a Madeleine Albright statue in Pristina

The new flag of Kosovo has not been well received by the general public because their roots are so strongly tied to Albania. The waving or hanging of a flag can indicate the identification of the owner, which is why I find Image 5.1 important in this discussion about identification. Image 5.1 depicts a gathering in Pristina where former President of the United

States, Bill Clinton, came to honor the unveiling of the Statue of Madeleine Albright. The reason for gathering is of course an important indicator to the international ties that Kosovo has, but I want to draw attention to the Albanian flag and the Kosovo flags in the image. The buildings upon which the Kosovo flags are situated are government buildings and the Albanian flag is being carried by a Kosovar citizen of Pristina. I find this to be relevant because we see a government that is trying to foster unity under the Kosovo flag, and a citizenship that continues to hold their Albanian roots so close to their identity.

Gjakova seemed a bit different with their priorities. In Image 5.2 we see the streets lined with both Albanian and Kosovo flags, which are clearly placed by the city. It is an interesting

47 and difficult dynamic where the government is trying to maintain inclusivity for a population that is practically non-existent throughout the majority of Kosovo.

Image 5.2 Albanian and Kosovo flags line the streets of Gjakova

One of the most interesting aspects of the ethnic landscape that I witnessed was the level of importance placed on Albanian identity over Kosovar identity. To anyone living in Kosovo, this is no surprise, but even during interviews I found it odd to hear contradictions of pride for the new State of Kosovo followed by a wish to unite with Albania. Contradictions aside, the

Image 5.3 Traditional Albanian clothing store in Gjakova

Kosovo landscape is full of Albanian culture and tradition. Image 5.3 shows a shop in Gjakova that sells traditional Albanian clothing. It reminded me of a shop that I passed in Pristina that sold Albanian paraphernalia such as flags. The traditional clothing makes sense because of the heritage of the country, however, in a city like Pristina, one would assume the demographic for national trinkets would be tourists. If that’s the case, why not sell merchandise adorned with the flag of the country those tourists are in?

Reminders of the Past

This monument in Pristina caught my eye as I was walking through the city (Image 5.4).

The reason most people may be drawn to this square is because of the 72ft high obelisk, which as you can see from the photo, is not what I was interested in. The abstract human sculptures at the base of the obelisk were very clearly spray-painted with different international flags, which seemed odd. I assumed that this entire monument was erected after the Kosovo War as recognition to the international community for their help in Kosovo’s development. However, it was originally erected in the early 1960s by Tito and was designed by Miodrag Zivkovic to be a

Image 5.4 Monument to Heroes of the National Liberation Movement in Pristina

49 symbol of unity within Yugoslavia for those that fought against fascism in WWII (Mari, 2015).

It was not until after Kosovo declared independence that students painted the human figures in front of the obelisk to acknowledge the international community for their support (Mari, 2015).

There has been discussion over the years about the removal, relocation, and renaming of the monument in order to separate Kosovo from its Yugoslavian history, but nothing major has been done.

Though the areas I visited did not have large Serbian populations, reminders of their presence remain. Images 5.5 and 5.6 show two Serbian Orthodox churches that I came across in

Podujeva and Pristina, respectively. Churches are not uncommon, however, in Kosovo the

Serbian Orthodox churches are surrounded by fences, barbed wire, and security guards. What we learn from this is that there is still fear of continued ethnic tensions.

My first visit to this church (Image 5.5) was not very fruitful, as the guard there did not allow me to enter. However, during my second visit I was allowed in, but forbidden to take any pictures. I was told that I would have had to get permission from the only Serbian community member that lived near Podujeva, who is meant to be a kind of ambassador between the two

Image 5.5 Church of Saint Elijah in Podujeva

50 ethnicities in the area. The officer was worried that any pictures without permission could cause a ruckus as he said, “we do not want [the Serbians] to talk.” I can understand why he said this because, though it was supposedly renovated after the attacks, its condition was terrible. It had not been maintained or used since because there are no longer people practicing that faith in the area. The architecture of the building was very basic with white walls, like those you see on the outside. There were cathedral style ceilings and beautiful chandeliers. Now there are pieces of the ceiling and roof on the ground inside the church, as well as the buildup of mold and mildew in the corners and around the windows.

Image 5.6 Church of Christ the Savior in Pristina

This church in the capital city of Pristina is another example of a Serbian Orthodox church that is fenced off from the public (Image 5.6). Set to finish construction in 1999, the war prevented its completion, making it a hollow shrine to the Kosovo that once was. Now it can be seen as an indication of a low Serbian population. In Gjakova I also passed by a guarded

Orthodox church but was unaware until after when my interpreter told me what it was. The walls were so high that you could not see the church at all. Apparently, there is a yearly pilgrimage

51 made to the church in Gjakova by Serbians who practice this faith. My interpreter mentioned that the yearly pilgrimage tends to cause protests and ethnic tension to this day.

Cooperation at the Border

Pristina

After interviewing Major Veli Pronaj, officer for inter-border cooperation, at the police headquarters in Pristina, the capital of Kosovo, I gained a lot of information about operations near the Serbian border. After the war, KFOR had control over border operations in order to maintain order and peace. In 2008, the Kosovo police officially took over, but KFOR is still there. The conversation was centered around the topic of cooperation and the lack thereof from

Serbia. All their communications still have to go through KFOR as a result of the continued lack of recognition. Major Veli Pronaj mentioned that the lack of cooperation from Serbia was hindering the ability of the Kosovo police to effectively protect Kosovo, as well as the entire region. After talking a bit about the lack of cooperation from Serbia, I asked what Kosovo had been doing to cooperate and how the lack of cooperation affects citizens within Kosovo. Major

Veli Pronaj answered;

“Kosovo so far has been doing everything and has shown constantly that they want

cooperation. At the Kosovo border and as an institution, Kosovo has tried to join different

open forums on borders or different issues like national crime, but because of Serbia we

have had a very hard time joining these forums. They cover different security solutions, for

example dealing with migration, legal or illegal, and other issues of transnational crimes.

For us it has been difficult to join those because of the veto that has been used against us

by other countries and Serbia. Kosovo has actively shown that we are for cooperation with

all regional countries because that is the only way, as institutions, to fight transnational

crime, by sharing information. This is good for us and for Serbia, but also for Europe

because if we have good cooperation, we will be able to solve problems easily.”

It is his hope that there will soon be a more cooperative relationship with Serbia, like the one they have with Albania.

Gjakova

In Gjakova I had the opportunity to meet with Sub-Colonel Nexhmi Krasniqi, head of the regional Kosovo police headquarters. During this interview I was given a lot of information and insight into the development of systems on the other Kosovo borders with Albania, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Their headquarters is responsible for one border crossing with Montenegro and five with Albania, as well as five Green Line stations. I was interested in understanding the level of cooperation at the Albanian border crossings and how that has affected operations. Sub-

Colonel Nexhmi Krasniqi focused on the border crossing in Vermica since it is the largest crossing with Albania. Vermica has a joint border crossing facility that was donated by the EU, which was also mentioned by Major Veli Pronaj. In this facility Albanian and Kosovar officers work together very cooperatively. Sub-Colonel Nexhmi Krasniqi explained the cooperation;

“Albania and Kosovo have a memorandum agreement that allows the Kosovo force to go

50km into Albanian territory for a suspect in emergency cases. It is the same for Albanian

forces in Kosovo. It is only important that either side is aware of the issue beforehand. We

also have an agreement where a certain Albanian freeway is controlled by the Kosovo

police force seasonally due to increased traffic.”

This level of cooperation shows a great deal of trust and clearly creates an environment where both forces are able to conduct their jobs in the most efficient ways possible. Sub-Colonel

Nexhmi Krasniqi mentioned that operations on the border go very smoothly and there is absolutely no violence or issues near the Albanian border.

Image 5.7 - Guards gather at the Vermica border crossing

After our interview, Sub-Colonel Nexhmi Krasniqi graciously offered to drive my interpreter and I all the way to the Vermica border crossing on the Albanian border, without any appointment having been made. At the Albanian border my interpreter and I were welcomed along with Sub-Colonel Nexhmi Krasniqi. Shortly after we started talking with the head of the border crossing station, there was a swarm of officers that came out of the facility to talk with me and with each other. It seemed like a gathering among friends and, as you can see, all lanes were open at the crossing, helping traffic to move through at a steady pace (Image 5.6). For them, the cooperation with Albania and between the two citizenships, facilitated smooth operations and helped to maintain civil order. I can only imagine that this is what Major Veli Pronaj hopes to see at the Serbian border one day.

KFOR/NATO

Being that border operations at the Kosovo-Serbian border continue to be facilitated through KFOR, I coordinated an interview with Colonel Vincenzo Grasso of KFOR that took place in Pristina. According to him, the military/police force relationships are “excellent.” This was in reference to the larger border patrol operation and not to the border crossing points. There

54 are multiple units on both sides of the border that meet almost daily to do synchronized border patrols with one unit on the Kosovo side and one unit on the Serbian side. Colonel Vincenzo

Grasso said that KFOR is “there to prevent any presence of Serbian forces in Kosovo,” as well as

“to check with the counterpart of whether or not a violation report was a real violation.”

Generally speaking, there have not been any border issues other than the dispute over where the border should be. Colonel Vincenzo Grasso did make it clear to me in the beginning of the interview, though, that the Kosovo-Serbian border is not referred to as a border, but a ministry boundary line because “talking to the Serbs you cannot say border. For them there is no border; that is Serbia. It is just a province and the main border of Serbia is North Macedonia,

Montenegro, and Albania.”

After I mentioned what Major Veli Pronaj had told me about the lack of cooperation at the border crossings with Serbia, Colonel Vincenzo Grasso reaffirmed and said that “Kosovo police have to stay 100m from the border.” However, he did go on to say that “we have reports that say they speak with each other. Right on the border crossing point they talk with each other without any problems. They have good relations usually from what we know.” I had not yet been to the Albanian border at the time of this interview, but after going there it was clear that the openness to cooperate and the agreements that they had, truly helped operations as well as the region as a whole. To hear that Kosovar officers are not allowed within 100m of the border already depicted a situation where both sides would have a harder time doing their jobs. Luckily,

I was able to visit the Serbian border crossing in Podujeva to get a better idea of what cooperation and daily operation looked like.

Podujeva It took a while before we (my interpreter and I) were welcomed into the facility because there was preliminary paperwork that should have been filled out before my visit, which I was unaware of. I was told this paperwork would provide an idea of what I was there to learn and would help one of the Kosovar officers prepare to talk with me. The officer that I was able to talk with, even though a public officer, made sure that the interview was anonymous. Going beyond the logistics of talking with someone there, the first thing to notice is that there is only one lane open, as opposed to three at the Albanian border. Also, everyone was inside and there was absolutely no communication with the Serbian officers. The EU has recently built joint border crossing facilities, but the Serbian officers refuse to use them, remaining in their rundown shack, forcing traffic to move through one lane (Image 5.7).

This did not show any kind of cooperation and the officer I spoke with also explained this issue. “Cooperation is all based on politics. For us there is no problem, it is the Serbian government that doesn’t allow Serbians to cooperate here.” When asked if there was any kind of

Image 5.8 - Backed-up traffic at the Merdare border crossing near Podujeva

56 nationalist activity at the border, the officer said, “No … I could give more information if you would’ve gone through the procedures.” Again, this is something that I would’ve done had I been privy to it, but the fact that the officer answered with this sentence makes me believe that there could be information about nationalist activity that the border continues to face.

Chapter VI

Individual Perception of Identification to Kosovo

Podujeva

Podujeva was the first town I visited. The goal for this location was to gain an understanding of how things had changed near the Serbian border and compare it to the other location near the Albanian border, Gjakova. While in Podujeva, twenty-one interviews were conducted with random citizens between the ages of eighteen and eighty-seven (Table 6.1).

These interviews bore interesting and varied information on identification and ethnic development in Podujeva. Many questions were focused on understanding how participant’s feelings, and Podujeva, had changed over time, so it required them to remember the past. Some participant answers were personal memories used to express the way they felt during a moment in time, which truly helped to dive into the past.

From these personal experiences we have an interesting perspective on the history of

Kosovo dating before and after the war in 1998-99. I was pleasantly surprised by the amount of history that many participants knew about Kosovo, however, many of them lived through the time I was asking them to recall and their preceding history is tied to the political issues they face today. In terms of their historic outlook, I address information given about past relationships with

Kosovo-Serbian citizens, the war, and the significance of the border itself. With these historical perspectives, I can address the changes that may or may not have happened since the war ended.

Table 6.1 - Interview participants in Podujeva

Participants

Pseudonym Gender Age

Pria Female 26

Ian Male 87

Ben Male 81

Miar Male 43

Tesa Female 36

Lucy Female 49

Dorian Male 33

Treta Female 22

Ronan Male 19

Arnold Male 18

Leon Male 30

Dona Female 26

Darci Female 27

Grace Female 25

Lionel Male 23

Persim Male 37

Remi Male 50

Mel Female 31

Turim Male 63

Rham Male 35

Jase Male 65

Ethnic Identification

I started this study focused on understanding how the recognition of a border could change identification within it. Would identification get stronger, weaker, or change altogether?

Kosovo was a difficult place to conduct such a study because most citizens of Kosovo have always identified as Albanian, even though they have fought for and lived in what they recognize

59 to be Kosovo. However, I still felt it could be interesting to see if anyone did identify as Kosovar and how their identity may have changed over time. In order to understand what people identified as, they were asked directly, “Do you feel more Albanian or Kosovar?” Participants were encouraged to expand on their answers, so there was more variation and detail received in the answers given. Table 6.2 shows how participants answered.

Five of twenty-one participants in Podujeva said that they identified as Kosovar, however, one still mentioned they felt like an Albanian from Kosovo. The most common answer was “Albanian,” with twelve participants identifying as such and two of them saying “Albanian from Kosovo.” Four participants said that they identified as both, which I left as different from saying “Albanian from Kosovo” because of the different way they answered the question. For example, Darci said, “Albanian and Kosovar is the same thing, I think. It’s saying the same thing” and Ian said, “You cannot be one.”

Table 6.2 - Identification in Podujeva

Age range Kosovar Albanian Both

18-30 3 5 1

31-40 0 4 1

41-50 1 1 1

51+ 1 2 1

Total 5 12 4

Pria, who identifies as Albanian said that

“if we just switch to Kosovars it is like we are putting into the trash everything and all

those things that my father has fought for because he fought for the red and black flag …

he fought for the Albanian language, for the Albanian people, for the Albanian nation.”

Changing how one identifies does not happen out of the blue. People have roots and traditions that they have been holding onto for generations and giving that up for the recognition of a new border may never happen for some people.

Participants were, therefore, asked how their identification has changed over time. The majority of respondents did not feel that their identity had ever changed. Turim, a citizen that identifies as Kosovar said, “I couldn’t identify before the war. If I said I was Albanian or

Kosovar, I would get killed. So, there was no identifying before the war … Now I am happy that

I can identify as Kosovar.” There were also a couple people that noticed an increase or decrease but mentioned that it was general fluctuations depending on the circumstances. Pria mentioned that for her, “even today I get chills during something like a soccer game and it’s Albania and I am cheering.” She was not the only one to mention soccer as an activity that increased identification. Other participants mentioned the Kosovo soccer team as well and the impact that it has had on their identity.

In terms of identification per age group, it can be difficult to draw any concrete conclusions due to the uneven sample sizes. However, from table 6.2 we can see that a significant number of participants between 18-30 identified as Kosovar, while no one between

31-40 did. Those 31-40 were 11-20 years old during the war and are more likely to have formed their identity during that time. It is likely that participants who were younger than 11 during the war had very different perspectives of what was going on around them. They have also had the chance throughout their young adult life to formulate their identity within a relatively free

Kosovo. From table 7.3 we can also see that participants over the age of 40 were more likely to identify as Kosovar than those in the 31-40 bracket. Though there is not enough data to be conclusive, it is interesting nonetheless.

Evolution of Albanian - Serbian Relationships

There were different experiences mentioned regarding past relationships with Serbians in

Podujeva. However, one can see the timeline developing through each participant's comments because some refer to the early to mid-1980s, while others start talking about the years directly preceding the war. The following quote was from Rham, who is speaking of a time in the mid-

1980s;

“I remember my first neighbor next to my house was Serbian. I couldn’t learn Serbian from

him because he always spoke Albanian. So you couldn’t tell that he was Serbian because

he behaved like an Albanian. In my neighborhood there were seven houses that were

populated by Serbians. All of them spoke Albanian and it was like there was no difference

between Albanians and Serbians. So we hung out with them and during holidays they came

to our houses to say happy holidays.”

This was not the first time that Albanians and Serbians assimilated together in Kosovo. As was mentioned in a previous section, during the Ottoman empire when Christianity was pushed out of

Kosovo, those that chose not to flee remained and created ethnically mixed communities that shared traditions and language. Peace among these ethnicities is not unheard of, but it was shortly after this time in the 1980s that political pressure changed the dynamic between Serbians and Albanians in Kosovo, as Jase expressed in his interview;

“We got along with the 5% who lived here before the war, we got along with Serbs. Then

in the 1980s when we started asking for independence and Kosovo to be a republic, that’s

when our relationship started to get worse.”

Pria recalls a time in the late 1990s when she was young that captures the ethnic tension of the time;

“I remember going to a Serbian market and buying stuff. I was just a little kid, but I can

still remember the fear I felt when I got into that market because I thought [a Serbian man]

would not let me leave. And then I remember one time I put a bit of jewelry somewhere on

my coat, it was just a small thing, and I remember he was Serbian and quite old and he bent

down just looking at my jewelry and said it was beautiful, but I was so scared. I thought,

‘now he is going to kill me.’ This is how we felt.”

Perspectives of the Kosovo War

The ethnic tension in Kosovo and Podujeva continued to grow into war in 1998.

Perspectives from Kosovo-Albanian citizens about the war itself give insight into the amount of healing necessary to accept a multi-ethnic and cooperative relationship with Serbia. When recalling his memories of the war and comparing them to when he fought in WWII, Ian said,

“[WWII] was how a war should be; soldiers fighting soldiers and army fighting army. Not

as the one that happened here where a lot of kids and women were killed, which were of

course not armed ...”

It was common for participants to refer to the atrocities that were committed against them, even though they were never directly asked to. I had the feeling that it was important for them to tell their stories for me, an outsider, to understand the impact that those events had on their lives.

Rham told me about a couple of his neighbors that were “brainwashed” to follow alongside

Serbian forces and the injustices done to his family;

“Not only were men in my family killed, but there were also four children, their mother

and their grandmother that were killed. Even though they did not provoke them in any way”

Rham had a good relationship with his Serbian neighbors until the war began. However, the damage done by Serbian forces caused those relationships to change and many Kosovo-

Albanians and Kosovo-Serbians fled the country. Jase said that;

“Those who didn’t flee during the bombing didn’t have food, water, or clothes and Serb

forces were constantly killing. There was a village, Reçak, where all men were killed. This

was before the bombings. William Walker came to this village from the UN and reported

back. He told the world it was a crime against humanity.”

Freedom After the War

After the crimes against humanity were recognized in Kosovo, NATO took a stand and ended the war. It was not until 2008 that Kosovo declared its independence, but for the people of

Kosovo, the end of the war marked the true independence of Kosovo. Every participant said that the end of the war meant more to them than the official independence of Kosovo and that the international recognition of the border is great, but they have always recognized their own border. Pria recalled the end of the war and said;

“I have a feeling that we were independent and we got independence from the time when

KFOR and the NATO forces came into our country. You can see some of the pictures and

all of the joy these people had in their faces, so that is when they felt liberated. That is

when I got back home because we all were removed by force from our homes and our

houses were destroyed, so when we came back to our houses, that’s when we felt like we

won the freedom that we were looking for all those years.”

I asked participants how life had changed since the end of the war and independence, while I indicated to comment on Podujeva specifically, many people made general statements.

The most common answer that I received in Podujeva about what was different from before was

“freedom.” Lucy said, “Now I feel like I’m completely free ... I can do whatever I want without the fear that someone might interrupt or stop me.” Similarly, Remi answered, “After the war I had the freedom to walk freely without being afraid.” When asked if there was anything else that had changed, Remi said, “Freedom is enough.” Turim, who told me about violence from

Serbians against him personally, also mentioned freedom, but said, “There are no Serbs here, so everything got better.” The previous comments from Remi and Lucy about freedom also have underlying connotations that the freedom came from the lack of Serbian population. Pria and

Jase both mentioned that Podujeva had a small percentage of Serbians living there before the war and now the population is almost 100% Albanian, with the exception of 100-300 Roma minorities.

Community Development

Jase gave a good description of physical changes that happened in Podujeva saying that,

“after the war, the burned houses have been rebuilt, along with roads and electricity.” What was more important for him, and other participants, however, was the increase in education for today’s youth. “Schools have been rebuilt and now our kids after High school have the opportunity to go to University at University of Pristina in the capital, which is 30km from here,” said Jase. Ian was very enthusiastic about my interpreter because she was able to translate everything to me. He went on to say that “everything will be ok since all the youth have been educated and they have the opportunity to go abroad.” Education seemed to be a very hopeful topic for many of the people I interviewed in Podujeva, but not every topic elicited the same amount of positivity.

Multiple participants mentioned their disapproving opinions about the local government.

Lucy said, “I was very optimistic after the war, I thought that Kosovo would develop really quickly because of the way it started, but now I don’t have the same impression.” She did not go into great detail about the political reasons she felt this way, but Tesa said she feared a future where Kosovo’s education and economy will get worse “because of the political circumstances

65 and the corruption; basically politics are doing their thing and they are making life worse here.”

Pria tied together the feelings of her fellow citizens of Podujeva and said;

“Generally we are frustrated after independence because we thought we would be living in

an ideal Kosovo after the war … Everyone wanted to do something for their country and

everyone thought that after the war, everything would be perfect because these people who

are fighting and giving their lives would be the ones leading this country. They will work

with integrity and everything would be ok after the war, but it’s not that way. We have a

lot of corrupt people in all those positions that keep people unhappy and frustrated with

this place.”

Developing a government from nothing has often led to great corruption, we can look to many

African countries after they gained their independence as examples. Kosovo, however, is operating under different circumstances because of the enormous amount of support from the

West that has been given to them from the very beginning. I would say it is normal for citizens to have high expectations for Kosovo after the war and now be let down because it does not feel exactly like they thought it would. Ian made an important point about the government in

Podujeva, saying that “the government is really taking baby steps. They are going very slow, but they are going somewhere and I believe that they are working toward a better future.” The development of Kosovo has and will take time because reconciling the past and working toward cooperation in the future always takes time.

Reconciliation Efforts

Reconciliation after a conflict can be difficult because there are at least two sides to the story and each side narrates their own history. Serbia has continued to hold onto their narrative, making any kind of cooperation between the two countries very difficult. Pria, whose father was

66 killed during the war, mentioned a couple of experiences where she was faced with the two-sided nature of history;

“It was in 2007 I think. We went to Montenegro and we were just school kids. We met

some Serbian kids who were there on a school trip and they were trying to fight with us.

They told us ‘you killed our families’ and we were confused thinking, ‘what are you talking

about?’ Everyone has learned history differently. It's not that I have had to learn this, since

I was there and I experienced it, but maybe the new generation will be told that [Serbians]

killed us, which I believe is true because I was there, and Serbs will learn that Kosovars

have killed them.”

When trying to achieve reconciliation, it is important for both sides to work together toward finding truth and common history. This could facilitate future cooperation among new generations because there would be more introspection and less one-sidedness. The EU has facilitated many transitional justice programs in Kosovo and Pria was a part of a couple camps and seminars used to bring Kosovo-Albanian and Serbian youth together. From her experiences in these peace building programs, she felt that “Serbians have been really reluctant to participate and whenever I was part of these, they were just there for the fun part of it, you know, the food.”

She went on to mention that the Serbian participants rarely took these programs seriously.

Another one of her experiences involved an activity where groups from each country were to give a presentation about the conflict that happened in their country. The Kosovo group that Pria was a part of was told to give an overview of what happened without getting into any emotional stories about their families being killed.

“Of course it was boring and no one cared about our presentation. We were done and the

Serbians came to present about what happened during the conflict. They were crying, they

were shouting, and they were telling everyone how Kosovars and NATO bombed their

houses.”

Pria said they were so convincing that in the moment even she started to feel bad for them, though she knew the atrocities were largely against the Albanians.

Cooperative transitional justice mechanisms are meant to bring the truth out from both sides, which is what I believe the original intention was from the EU, however, in this story, the group from Kosovo was not given the ability to express what they went through and knew to be true. The Serbian group, whether they were supposed to or not, expressed their truth. Living through any bombing, regardless of the side you are on, can be traumatizing, so I do not wish to downplay what Serbian citizens went through. Kosovars should have been given the same opportunity to express what happened to them. This kind of open discussion truly creates a platform for constructive and introspective dialogue.

Ethnic Development

The goal of any transitional justice mechanism is to bring people together after conflict.

This means that the way ‘the other’ is seen, must be more positive than negative. In trying to see the development of ethnic relations in Kosovo, I asked participants their opinions about Serbians and I also asked how they felt they were perceived by Serbians. Table 6.3 shows how twenty participants said they felt about Serbians.

Overall, we can see that the majority of participants had neutral feelings toward Serbians, meaning that they do not dislike or like them more than anyone else. Darci expressed this well when she said, “As long as they don’t get in our way and we don’t get in their way we can live together and everything will be ok … I don’t want to discriminate, I just want to be equal.”

Dorian went on to say that there is still tension between the two ethnicities because of the border,

Table 6.3 - Podujeva Opinions on Serbians

Age range Hate Dislike Neutral

18-30 3 0 6

31-40 0 2 2

41-50 1 0 2

51+ 0 3 0

Total 4 5 10 but generally still feels neutral toward Serbians otherwise;

“We were always told not to be friends. Now it is different. We don’t know them as

enemies in business for the time being. We generally have a normal life and it’s all good,

but when it comes to the border we still have hate. They are not bad people.”

This was an acknowledgement that there is a difference between the general Serbian population and their government.

Six people, after I asked this question, asked me if I meant the Serbian people or the

Serbian government before answering. Five of the participants that answered “Neutral” made sure to mention that their issues were with the Serbian government, not the general Serbian population. As Grace said, “I have never had a problem with them, I have met a lot of accepting ones and worked with open-minded ones. They don’t have the hatred, my problem is with the government.” It was encouraging to see this intentional differentiation coming from citizens of

Podujeva.

Others, however, have continued to hate the Serbian population. Miar said that “The enemy will always be an enemy to us.” There will always be people that are unable to reconcile with the past and it is important to understand that being asked to forgive people that may have killed your family, or burned your home may be unreasonable for some. As Ian said, “How can we be on good terms with them?” After living through the war, forgiving those that harmed you

69 can be unimaginable. Everyone heals differently and some never do. It is important to keep that in mind when attempting to transition into a more peaceful era, but it should not discourage the process because it will never be perfect.

I have made a differentiation between those who specifically used the word “hate” and those who described a general dislike for Serbians. “Hate” is a strong word that I believe shows a deeper disconnection with the “other” making it more difficult for multi-ethnic growth. The 18-

30 age range yielded the most split results, without any of the nine participants having responses put in the “Dislike” column. From the data gathered, they were the most likely to express neutral feelings, as well as hatred toward Serbians. With insufficient data from each age group it is impossible to draw any conclusions, however, a similar pattern might be starting within the 41-

50 age group. Altogether, I would say that most of the citizens would like to see cooperation and growth between Serbians and Kosovars.

The Kosovo Border

In order to gain insight into their readiness for cooperation between the two States, participants were asked about the Kosovo-Serbian border itself; how important it is to them and what it means to them. By asking about the border specifically I was attempting to get a sense of how each participant relates to and connects with their country border. This had the potential to present information about levels of nationalism and identity salience. A Nation-State border will oftentimes be connected to one's national identity because of its physical representation of a

Nation, therefore it may be possible to gauge national identity salience through border questions.

The two main questions asked were what the border meant to them and what their thoughts on border control were.

Of the seventeen participants that were asked about the border, all of them acknowledged that the border was important to them, many without further explanation as to why. While some mentioned the importance of the border in defining a recognized State, six participants followed up by saying it made them feel safe, which may have to do with their more immediate proximity to Serbia. Ian, for example, was very adamant in his answer, claiming “we will fight for this quarter that we have here and we will fight till our last breath.” This answer indicates Ian still places a certain level of urgency on the Kosovo border. This held true in his following statement where Ian mentioned that the entire Kosovo border should have equal controls.

Dona said, “I feel good knowing that someone is controlling it, but I do not feel good knowing that it needs so much protection because it is so dangerous.” From the responses I received, I felt like this statement was very profound. Participants wanted border controls with

Serbia, but also wanted to see a world where the Serbian border could be just as relaxed as the

Albanian one. Though Turim did mention the importance of closed borders, he was only referring to the Serbian border; “No one should be allowed to get in. This is the most important border. Regarding the Albanian border, we don’t care,” his comment was not common among other participants in Podujeva. For example, Lionel expressed his desire for more open borders when he said, “we should be more free to move in the Balkans especially because controlling the border makes people more angry and aggressive. Less borders means less aggressive, I think.”

Support for full recognition and freedom of movement was not uncommon when talking about the Kosovo border.

Next Step - Recognition

Recognition was an important topic for some participants when talking about the border due to the lack of recognition from Serbians. This lack of recognition is what fuels tension and

71 discourages cooperation among the different ethnic groups. Therefore, some participants mentioned the recognition of the border itself and how that influenced their opinion on the state of Kosovo-Serbia relations. Grace said, “We are being treated unfairly. I was mad that they gave part of the mountains to Montenegro. Serbia is trying to trade bad municipalities for good ones.

Our politicians are being too generous.” The beginning of this comment is in reference to the land, originally part of Kosovo, that was given to Montenegro. From the Kosovo perspective, this was to quell the conflict and push the country closer to EU membership, however, it was a very contentious agreement among citizens. Serbia is also suggesting a land swap in exchange for recognition, resulting in some strong opinions in Kosovo. Jase said, “Right now Serbia is still interested in getting Kosovo and is manipulating Serbs in the North. It is a goal for them to take that part of Kosovo even though there are only about 30,000 Serbs living there.” He then went on to his final point, “We want to keep the existing borders. We want our relationship with Serbia to get better,” reiterating the idea that many citizens do hope for more open borders in the future.

In Podujeva there seems to have been a lot of growth toward a certain level of openness to co-exist happily with Serbia and Serbians. Participants expressed their ability and active choice to separate the people from the government, which indicates ethnic growth within

Podujeva where a positive relationship between ethnicities could be conceived. Identification has generally not changed from Albanian to Kosovar, however there are some that choose to identify as Kosovar, which also depicts a willingness to accept change and development. Overall, in

Podujeva, it can be said that, while improvements need to be made at the governmental level, generally, people are ready for a more open relationship with Serbia and Serbians, so long as they recognize Kosovo.

Gjakova

I went to Gjakova during the second half of my three week stay in Kosovo. The intention for interviewing people there was specifically to compare how life for people near the Albanian border has changed as opposed to those at the Serbian border. There were 13 participants (Table

6.4) in Gjakova and all interviews covered the same questions as those in Podujeva. One of the biggest differences between participants in the two cities is that people in Gjakova were much quicker to talk about what happened during the war. I received a lot more personal information even though I asked the same questions. Generally people spoke about the war when I asked about how Gjakova had changed.

Table 6.4 - Interview participants in Gjakova

Participants

Pseudonym Gender Age

Angel Male 57

Tiana Female 55

Elane Female 23

Fiona Female 26

Brenda Female 39

Quam Male 57

Riley Female 34

Abe Male 46

Orion Male 46

Ellen Female 26

Edward Male 44

Mason Male 59

Lela Female 56

Identification

As far as identification goes, almost all participants said they felt Albanian, regardless of age, when asked how they identify. You can see from Table 6.5 that one participant said they felt

Kosovar and one said both. Orion said “I think that I am Kosovar. Nationality, maybe it is

Albanian on my passport, but as a citizen I am Kosovar, so I like to respect that.” Tiana, the participant who I indicated as identifying as both said that she did not see a difference between the two. As in Podujeva, there was also a participant who mentioned a fluctuating identification with Kosovo by saying, “when Kosovo played football I suppose I felt Kosovar, but no,

Albanian” (Elane).

Table 6.5 - Identification in Gjakova

Age range Kosovar Albanian Both

18-30 0 3 0

31-40 0 2 0

41-50 1 2 0

51+ 0 4 1

Total 1 11 1

Other than the occasional football match, there were mixed answers on whether or not identification became stronger, weaker, or stayed the same. Orion, who now identifies as

Kosovar said “Before it was a completely different thing. Before the war, the only flag I could have was the Albanian national flag. We didn’t have our own, so somehow it was all Albanians because of the situation.” Once given a choice, Orion changed to feeling Kosovar and mentioned in his interview that Albanians from Albania and Albanians from Kosovo are very different people.

Perspectives of the Kosovo War

Lela told me some of her story before, during, and after the war. From her experiences we are able to learn a bit about the dynamic between Serbians and Albanians before tensions began;

“My mom is from Peje and there were a lot of Serbian communities that lived there. I went

to Peje a lot and had many Serbian friends. This was when I was little and growing up until

the war started. The class next to mine was all Serbs and there was never a problem because

I spoke Serbian at the time. In Gjakova there were not a lot of people that could speak

Serbian. I learned in Peje ... From the moment that the whole war started, they changed

completely and started to behave badly toward us and I never got to see my friends again.”

There were not a lot of people that chose to share memories from times before tensions rose in

Kosovo and started telling their story from a couple years before the war. Mason, for example said, “Before the war, we had a psychological war with the Serbs. People were unsafe. We were not appreciated as a nation. We felt mocked by Serbs. We were considered second hand people just because we were Albanians. The war was inevitable.” From what I heard, this was how most

Kosovo-Albanians felt in the years leading up to the war. Lela continued her story by telling me about the year prior to the start of the war as well;

“The last year before the war started, it was extremely bad. The Serbs started to come here

and we felt very scared going to work and coming back because of the Serbian soldiers

around the place until the moment the war started. I was here for only ten days during the

war and then we went to Albania with my family ... We were there for two and a half

months. When NATO came, it was safe for us to come back. Our house was ruined, but

the whole family was safe.”

Angel showed me a book that brought together pictures of the wreckage after the war, which included a photo of his family's ashes from being burned in his house. Tiana said, “It wasn’t fair. They didn’t have war between armies. They just killed people, women and children

… I only thought that these things happened in movies.” Gjakova was hit hard by Serbian and

Yugoslavian forces during the war, leaving wreckage that exists to this day. When walking down the streets of the old bazaar, I saw buildings that remained collapsed with rubble next to others that had been built up again. Half of the Bazaar was fully renovated and it’s multiple restaurants and cafes are now an area where many of Gjakova’s young adults spend their time. However, the further you walk down the street, the bleaker and less populated it becomes. There are still constant reminders in Gjakova of the devastation that the population had to come home to after fleeing.

Community Development

According to Lela, “many were left with unresolved psychological trauma” there was a lack of psychological services offered to citizens after the war. People were expected to come back and move on, as Mason said, “After the war people were hurt. Everyone was hurt in different ways. Those ways were losing some of their family, or materialistic loss. Anyhow, they decided to move on and continue with their lives. Everything went step by step moving forward.” In an area that was as devastated as Gjakova after the war, it makes sense that participants were holding on to those feelings and so quick to open up about their personal experiences.

Regarding development after the war, beyond a lack of psychological resources, participants mentioned similar changes to those in Podujeva. Some comments were less positive than others and focused on the general lack of development. Brenda mentioned the

76 unemployment, as well as the increase in population and consequent lack of greenspace compared to before. Orion had a similar opinion;

“Knowing that it has been twenty years, we should have more economic development and

higher employment numbers. Plus, most of the population is the youth and we still do have

problems with economic development and employment here. If we could fix these

problems then everything would change for the better. Maybe it is a little bit of our

mentality as well.”

Like in Podujeva, people were expecting development at a much quicker rate than what actually happened. What was different in Gjakova though, is that no one mentioned corruption. Mason explained it like this;

“The people of Kosovo got a little bit lazy after the war. I think that they calculated a couple

things wrong. They thought they would be able to move forward sooner and faster. A lot

of people got disappointed and they showed their weak side. A lot of people are looking to

leave this country and live somewhere else, hoping that a better life waits for them there. I

am not ok with this, I do not like it.”

Instead of blaming politicians specifically, Mason is more concerned with the citizens of Kosovo as a whole. This seems to be a more collective approach to the situation, implying that “we” are moving slowly, instead of just a few people out of many. Angel actually had a very positive comment about the government, saying that before,

“[people] weren’t looked after by the government or the whole country. This country was

always in need and it still has needs, but now the people are better looked after. We are a

country even though it is a capitalist country, we are a social country because we meet

many needs. The difference from the past and now is very huge.”

Freedom After the War

There was a generally positive outlook from Gjakovar citizens because they still mentioned freedom more than anything else. Brenda explained this freedom by referring to past fears;

“We are not afraid anymore to get an education, we are free. Before the war we were afraid

to go to mosques or houses because we felt threatened, especially students … I got pulled

over from the Serbian police and nothing happened to me, thankfully.”

The story of her being pulled over by the police seemed to be completely out of the blue, but the fact that she mentioned it in this excerpt shows that she was recalling a true feeling of fear from the Serbian police at the time. Edward also mentioned the Serbian police when expressing his gratitude for freedom;

“There is a lot of change after the war because you have freedom, you don’t get pulled over

by the police and there are no Serbs. The military and police forces are not staying around.

You are free to do what you want. Before the war, everyone was scared because if you

didn’t speak Serbian there would be a huge problem.”

As Lela mentioned before, there were not many people in Gjakova that spoke Serbian, so this could have been a huge source of fear among many citizens. People in Gjakova were very content with the lack of Serbian population, though no one ever used the word “hate” to describe their feelings.

Ethnic Development

From table 6.5 we can see that no participants used the word hate, three of them mentioned disliking them, and nine people were neutral, seven of which identified the Serbian government as the problem. From this data, we can see that those who were 51+ were most likely to express neutral feelings towards Serbians. In Podujeva the 51+ participants were more

78 inclined to express dislike. Though more data is necessary to draw any conclusions, this could hint at a pattern relevant to location and past Serbian settlement in Kosovo.

This table leaves out one participant answer because Angel did not express any form of hatred or dislike, but felt that Serbians and Albanians should just stay away from each other; “I believe in god, but when Albanians and Serbs live together, there is no god between them ...We will let them live their own life happily and we will live our own life happily.”

Table 6.6 - Gjakovar opinions on Serbians

Age range Hate Dislike Neutral

18-30 0 1 2

31-40 0 1 1

41-50 0 1 2

51+ 0 0 4

Total 0 3 9

Brenda, Ellen, and Edward were the three participants that had generally negative feelings toward Serbians. Ellen, when asked about her opinion, she mentioned that she didn’t know much about them and did not care to learn more. All that was important to her was that they gain independence. Brenda felt that she found more cultured and less political Serbians to be ok, but said, “for the most part, I don’t think they are good people.” Edward had the most negative outlook of the three when he said, “I think negatively of them. They are used to lying and surviving with lies.” However, something that I believe is important to take note of is that no one in Gjakova chose to use the word “hate” to describe their feelings toward Serbians.

The most common stance taken in Gjakova was that of neutral feelings toward Serbian people with blame for negative behavior being placed on the Serbian government. Abe said,

“They are our neighbors and I believe in the near future, we will be friends. As of right now, because of politics, we find ourselves in the situation we are currently in.” Mason, Elane, and the

79 other four people that mentioned having an issue with the Serbian government gave similar opinions on the matter. Tiana mentioned that “[Kosovo-Albanians] need some time to forget what happened, what [they] have been through” and that she did see a future where friendships could be built;

“I agree to form some kind of agreement and let go of as much hate as possible between

the two countries. I think that Serbs need to do most of the work. They need to bring back

the dead bodies that they did not bring. There are a lot of people here that do not know

where the dead bodies of their families are. They need to apologize.”

A connection is being made here between the general opinion of Serbian people and the lack of closure and psychological progress that has been made in Gjakova. Healing takes time, but more importantly, it takes effort from both sides to improve upon the relationship.

The Kosovo Border

Of the ten participants that were questioned about the border, all but two mentioned that it was important to them. An interesting comparison to make with Podujeva is that only two people mentioned their own safety after being asked about the border. Also, four participants in

Gjakova said they would be open to universal borders, meaning that controls would be the same at all borders. Though neither of the data sets are particularly large, this was the reason for interviewing citizens at each border, they did show different attachments to the border itself.

With the improvement of this relationship, participants said they would like to see more open borders with Serbia. Lela said, “I would want to have an agreement with all of our neighbors to be free, to be free to even go to Serbia.” Abe also touched on this issue when he said that,

“the borders have always been a place of negativity, especially after the war ended because

we could not move or travel freely. If we went back to Yugoslavia borders, back in the day,

as a former Yugoslavia citizen, we were able to travel anywhere we wanted to freely.”

The idea of open and free movement was an important issue for the people of Gjakova. Abe’s thoughts show that free movement within the Balkans was a positive policy during the time of

Yugoslavia. Abe then goes on to say that “in a few years our borders will not matter because our goal is to be a part of Europe and be united as one.” While we have seen this drive in Kosovo toward their own recognized State, there has always been a hope to get rid of borders by becoming a part of the EU. Abe was not the only one to mention hopes of more open borders, which shows their willingness to work toward peace, as well as their awareness of proposals being made at the government level.

Next Step - Recognition

According to many Gjakova participants, the first step toward this “peace” needs to be recognition of Kosovo as it exists today from Serbia. Elane expressed that “they don’t accept the fact that we are independent as a country.” Serbia has made a land swap proposal whereby, if accepted, Serbia will recognize Kosovo. Participants in Gjakova feel that there is nothing left for them to give to Serbia and it would be a mistake to follow through with a land swap, even if it would mean recognition. Regarding the proposal, Fiona said,

“Serbia needs to move on. It would not be worth it to change the border again for

recognition. It wouldn’t be worth it, it doesn’t have to be worth it. We have the borders,

now it is over. We gave so much of our country, we don’t need to give them more. We

gave life most importantly, I think it’s enough.”

Orion had a lot to say on this topic as well and started by saying;

“If you look at the territory of our ancestors, you probably know the border of former

Dardania, the former Kosovo. Just imagine where it was and where it is now.

Unfortunately, history has told us that the wars that we won as battles, we lost as

discussions and negotiations. That is what the population is afraid of because the same

thing may happen again and we will lose more territory.”

Orion believes that borders in the region are used for political gain when they should instead be opened up for economic development. While he wishes for the borders to reflect the Kosovar

Nation, he is still an advocate for open and friendly cooperation with Serbia. He went on to explain the land swap situation more, including his beliefs on Serbia’s intentions with the land swap, where he indicates that the benefits from recognition do not outweigh the cost;

“Kosovo will lose 50% of its territory. And that territory that is the most valuable. Plus,

the lake there is where we get a lot of water from. The whole issue is about the lake, not

Trepca. It is all about that lake there. 40% of Serbia and half of Kosovo use that lake. Even

that is in our territory, but they think that belongs to them. If there were no lake there,

believe me, this would not be a problem.”

From Orion, and many others, we can understand that the idea of a land swap is generally unaccepted by Gjakova residents, as they believe Kosovo has given enough.

Chapter VII

Conclusions

Discussion of Findings

The history of ethnic complications in Kosovo points to the inherent difficulties in its unilateral declaration of independence and development as a multi-ethnic Nation-State. After the war ended in 1999 there was a high level of ethnic tension due to heightened nationalism on both sides. Serbians, due to Serbia’s territorial rights and religious claim to Kosovo, feel that they are victims of the conflict and an internationally sponsored bombing campaign. Whereas Kosovo-

Albanians identify themselves as the victims of years of legal discrimination, ethnic cleansing, displacement, and horrific crimes committed against them from the Serbian government. Both continued to lay claim to the territory and ethnic tensions have remained high after the war.

The research that was conducted for this thesis is meant to address the changing opinions among citizens in consideration of growth between ethnicities and States. Intractable conflict can create a social environment where it is acceptable for each side to hate “the other”. For Kosovo, this conflict has been perpetuated through lack of political cooperation between the Serbian and

Kosovar governments. Therefore, it is still socially acceptable as a Serbian to discriminate against an Albanian and vice versa, though there are laws against it in Kosovo. A solution to such an issue is not simple and depends greatly on the receptiveness of each side from “the other”. Understanding the development at personal levels presents the opportunity to gauge citizen capacity to eventually accept “the other” back into their everyday lives. If there is a

83 certain level of openness, then peace could be seen as a possible future outcome with the help of other transitional justice mechanisms.

Acknowledging the limitations of the sample sizes in each age group and city, I will address the patterns within the data I collected. In terms of personal identification, participants in

Gjakova were more likely to identify as Albanian than Kosovar or both. This is significant because it indicates that proximity to Albania may play a role in determining Albanian identity salience in Kosovo. The data also suggests that participants in Podujeva were less likely to express neutral feelings toward Serbians and more likely to use the word “hate” in their responses than the participants in Gjakova. Again, we may be seeing a correlation between negative feelings toward Serbians and the proximity to Serbia.

In both Podujeva and Gjakova most participants seemed to have a good grasp on the history of Kosovo, as well as the new proposals and policies within their government. Though people in Gjakova were quicker to talk about the atrocities that they went through in greater detail than those in Podujeva, both participant groups got personal in their responses. This indicates that there is still a great deal of psychological growth that needs to be done. The

Kosovo government, along with other international organizations have tried to facilitate different psychologically beneficial programs, but citizens have been unreceptive because of the lack of participation from Serbia. During interviews, participants mentioned that it was Serbia’s turn to make a move because Kosovo and Kosovars have been constantly trying to cooperate without anything in return.

From the data that I collected, I have come to a few conclusions. First, Kosovars still have a deep connection with Albanian identity, but there have been changes in identification from feeling Albanian to feeling Kosovar. Second, though there is still ethnic tension due to

84 political pressure and historic territorial attachments, Kosovo-Albanian citizens of Kosovo have the capacity to and have started to move beyond past hatreds. Third, recognition from Serbia is the only way for Kosovo-Albanians to truly seek out mediation and cooperation between peoples. Four, cooperation after recognition could resemble a stable relationship that benefits from cross-border commerce and mobility.

Implications for Kosovo

Kosovo’s independence, which has not been easy for Kosovo economically or socially on an international level. Though remaining unwilling to accept anything short of full recognition from

Serbia, international pressure to end the 100% tariff and resume talks with Serbia continues to influence political decisions. On April 1st, 2020, Kosovo lifted the tariffs so talks could resume

(Kosovo, 2020). For Kosovo, one of the main goals for future communication and cooperation remains, that Serbia stops pushing its non-recognition agenda (Bytyci, 2020).

The future of Kosovo is still unknown. Serbia and a remaining Serbian minority within

Kosovo continue to challenge full international recognition, making it difficult to predict

Kosovo’s future trajectory. However, from what I gathered, the lack of recognition from Serbia is the only thing keeping ethnic relations where they are. The recognition of Kosovo may open the possibility for ethnic transitional justice mechanisms that could mediate ethnic tensions.

Implications of International Intervention in Kosovo

The international intervention used to end the war in Kosovo is seen as a pivotal moment for the future of international precedent (Hehir, 2010; Weller, 2009). It was the international recognition of human rights violations within an established State that ultimately called to question the territorial sovereignty of Serbia. The Serbian government felt it was their right to push back against Kosovo-Albanians by use of force because the KLA was seen as a threat to their sovereignty. With the precedent of non-interference and international law on sovereignty, it can be difficult to identify and act upon human rights violations happening in a sovereign State.

Regarding Kosovo, international actors were at an impasse. There are guidelines stating international responsibility to uphold human rights standards and law, however, there are also guidelines for States to remain uninvolved in the matters of sovereign States.

The situation in Kosovo caused the international community to question sovereignty as a right and ponder the future of sovereignty as a responsibility (Bellamy, 2010). This is one of the reasons that it took the UN Security Council so long to release resolutions calling for the end of discriminatory practices and violence. There were States that opposed intervention because it was in direct violation of the right for States to deal with domestic issues themselves (Lang,

2010). When resolution 1160 was put to vote, Russia and China abstained because it was a document that mentioned the importance of international engagement and they felt it would facilitate the creation of unfavorable international precedent (Bellamy, 2010).

By interjecting in a “domestic” matter, the involved parties were making a statement that each State has an international responsibility to ensure that their citizens do not get treated the way they were in Kosovo. Russia wrote a draft resolution in 1999 after NATO started its bombing campaign, arguing that the violations of the UN Charter and sovereign rights of States,

86 called for the council to condemn the actions of NATO (Krieger, 2001). The dialogue of the

Security Council debate has arguments praising and condemning NATO for its actions (Krieger,

2001). The draft resolution that Russia presented did not lie, NATO did not act according to international law, but here they were being praised for it by so many. The draft did not pass through with only 3 votes for and 12 against (Krieger, 2001). Ultimately the international community agreed that interjection was morally necessary, putting human rights above Serbia’s territorial sovereignty.

Mediating Future Nation vs. State Border Conflict

International order and the concepts behind State territorial sovereignty are changing.

Globalization has caused the most important criteria for defining a State to be representation and recognition, thereby causing Nations to develop and seek out their own representation, successfully questioning modern international border structures. Nations wish to participate in globalization, as well as represent their thoughts regarding decisions at the international level.

However, this requires the breaking up of already recognized States, which is why Nations often face great opposition in their journey toward representation. Statehood includes the benefit of having the power to rule over others both at a civil and international level, making it difficult to negotiate territorial succession from States with that level of power. This is why a new international order will continue to see defiance and conflict, but, regardless of impending conflict, the future will see more Nation-State development.

Therefore, we must seek to understand how these new developments will play out and find a more peaceful way to deal with them. At this point, it is unknown whether Nation-State development will be beneficial to the future of geopolitical structure, but at the very least it is a recognition of oppression and other possible wrongdoings against specific groups of people. This

87 essay sought to take another step toward understanding the process of Nation-State development and its outcomes by studying Kosovo.

When assessing the process of development for Kosovo, there is a lot to learn about the future of Nation-State border development. In the case of Kosovo, this development started with discrimination and violence that was perpetuated by international guidelines for territorial sovereignty. Kosovo saw escalation instead of mediation in the face of discrimination until international intervention was deemed necessary. The escalation of violence increased discrimination and inequality after international intervention “ended” the violence. After reviewing this from Kosovo’s history, there are possible steps that could be taken to create a less violent process for new Nation-State border development.

From the research outlined in this essay, that process may include evaluating current international precedent about sovereignty as a responsibility, international intervention, and the development of transitional justice systems focusing on the recognition of the conflict from both sides and the new Nation-State. There are potential frameworks that could be built upon in the future that emphasize the recognition of the conflict and “the other”, consequently forming a base upon which peace and reconciliation can be fostered.

Future research on the topic of Nation-States should include the process by which they break off and develop, as well as possible ways to make their development easier. From this research, I believe that the creation of new Nation-States, followed by a mediation and transitional process, could lead to more peace in ethnically divisive regions. Not only could there be more cooperation socially, but economically as well, leading to a healthier international system and more diverse global economy.

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