Department of Political Science University of Peshawar

Home , Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, Arbab Sikandar Khan, Farhatullah Babar, Hanif Ramay, Hyderabad tribunal, Khalid Mahmud Arif

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PEOPLES PARTY-OPPOSITION RELATIONSHIP IN PAKISTAN (1972-1977)

Supervised by

PROF. DR. TAJ MOHARRAM KHAN

Submitted by

ARIF KHAN Ph.D Scholar

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE UNIVERSITY OF PESHAWAR

(2016)

Acknowledgment

First of all I want to express my heartfelt gratitude to Almighty Allah, for blessing me to face and complete this challenging task successfully. I am greatly indebted to Professor

Dr. Taj Moharram Khan who, being the head of department and inspite of his very busy and tedious schedule, gave me sufficient time for guidance and discussion. His guidance helped reduced many shortcomings in this research work.

I do acknowledge the kindness of staff of different libraries in the University of

Peshawar, Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, Pakistan Study Centre (University of

Karachi), National Assembly (Islamabad), National Documentation Centre (NDC)

Islamabad, Peshawar archives, National Library (Islamabad) for their support and help in providing concened materials. And yes, I am grateful to the staff of the Department of

Politics library (Royal Holloway University), Department of Political science library(University of Oxford), Birmingham University Library and Birmingham City

University library and British Library who extended every possible help during my six months academic visit to UK.

I would like to thank all the worthy faculty members of the Department of Political

Science (University of Peshawar) for not only motivating and guiding me but for also providing me with a vibrant atmosphere to study. And of course, my special thanks to

Professor Dr Markus (my external supervisor during my 6 months academic visit to

Royal Holloway University of London) who was kind and cooperative to me and from whose experiences I benefited a lot during the short period.

I am also grateful to my friends particularly, Bakhtiar Khan, Ashfaq-ur-Rehman, Saif-ul-

Islam Lala, Fazal Said (Professor) and Zulqarnain (Lecturer) who generously gave me their precious time and advise, while providing me some time with additional insight on

some important aspects and issues. I would also express my profound love and respect for my two elder brothers whose love, care and sincere wishes always inspired and encouraged me.

In the end, I will surely express my thanks and regards to the contemporaries of Zulfikar

Ali Bhutto like Abdul Hafeez Peerzada, Munnawar Hasan, Muhammad Hussain Mehinti,

Professor N. D. Khan, Hafiz Naeem ur Rehman, Syed Usmani, Malik Miraj Muhammad

Khan, Retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan and Abdul Akbar Khan who gave me time to interview them. I am also thankful to the two academicians/experts of political developments in Pakistan, Professor Syed Jaffar Ahmad (Director Pakistan Study Centre,

University of Karachi), and Professor Tauseef Ahmad (ex-HOD, Federal Urdu

University) for useful interaction on the theme of my study.

Arif Khan PhD Research Scholar

Abstract State of democracy in Pakistan has been one of the burning issues of discussion since long. Those aware of the nature of Pakistan politics are genuinely apprehensive about the future of democracy in Pakistan. This research work is an attempt to find answers to certain key questions pertaining to democracy in Pakistan with reference to the ruling-opposition relationship, in general, and during PPP government under Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1972-177), in particular. This study seeks to explore the role of PPP and opposition parties in that critical time when a truly elected government came into power as a result of first ever general elections held in December 1970. Since the state was then under an elected set-up, it was hoped that a new era in the politics of Pakistan would usher. In fact, there was seen a marked improvement in the style of politics as was evident from the mutual relations of political parties particularly during the formation of government and process towards constitution making. But soon there was seen a patent divergence in attitudes once the 1973 Constitution was put into effect. It appeared as if the ruling PPP and the opposition have parted ways. The study reveals the way PPP and the opposition parties reacted to certain situations, how they maneuvered and how they agreed on some occasions and fought among themselves on others. It also investigates the extent to which the personal characteristics of party leaders influenced the state of politics during the period. In fact, it was a deviation from the established principles on both sides that obstructed the growth of democracy in Pakistan. One of the findings of this study is that democracy has persistently remained in a state of uncertainty because of the lust for power, clash of egos and most importantly, the extra-democratic behavior on the part of politicians. The thesis investigates as to how the PPP and the opposition parties lost the opportunity to transform Pakistan into a truly democratic polity.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AKMC Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference

ANP Awami National Party

BD Basic Democracy/Democracies/Democrats

BLA Baloch Liberation Army

CENTO Central Treaty Organization

C-in-C Commander-in-Chief

COAS Chief of Army Staff

Con ML Covention Muslim League

Coun ML Council Muslim League

COP Combined Opposition Parties

CWO Commonwealth Organization

DAC Democratic Action Committee

DPR Defense of Pakistan Rules

EBDO Elective Bodies Disqualification Order

ECP Election Commission of Pakistan

EP East Pakistan

FRB Federal Review Board

FSF Federal Security Force

IRSP International Research Support Initiative Program

ISI Inter Services Intelligence

JI Jamaat-i-Islami

JUP Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Pakistan

JUI Jamiat-i-Ulama-i-Islam

KP Khyber Pukhtunkhwa

KSP Krishak Sramik Party

KT Khaksar Tehrik

LFO Legal Framework Order

NAP National Awami Party

NAP (W) National Awami Party (Wali Khan Group)

NDC National Documentation Centre

NDP National Democratic Party

NDU National Defense University (Islamabad)

NWFP North West Frontier Province

PDM Pakistan Democratic Movement

PDP Pakistan Democratic Party

PM Prime Minister

PMLQ Pakistan Muslim League Qayyum Group

PNA Pakistan National Alliance

PNC Pakistan National Centre

POW Prisoner of War

PPP Pakistan Peoples Party

PRB People‘s Representation Bill

PRODA Public and Representative offices (Disqualification) Act

PSP Pakistan Socialist Party

PTV Pakistan Television

QAU Quaid-e-Azam University (Islamabad)

RTC Round Table Conference

SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organization

TI Tehrik-i-Istiqlal

UDF United Democratic Front

UF United Front

UK United Kingdom

US United States

WP West Pakistan

Z. A. Bhutto Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto

TABLE OF CONTENTS S. No Titles Page No Acknowledgement…………………………………………………. i Abstract………….…………………………………………………. iii List of Abbreviations……………………………………………… iv

Chapter: 1 INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………… 1 1.1. Statement of the Problem……………………………………… 4 1.2. Objectives of the Study………………………………………… 5 1.3. Research Questions……………………………………………... 6 1.4. Literature Review ……………………………………………… 6 1.5. Significance of the Study………………………………………... 13 1.6. Methodology…………………………………………………….. 14 1.7. Data Collection………………………………………………….. 14 1.8. Limitations ……………………………………………………… 16 1.9. Chapter Structure 17

Chapter: 2 FUNCTIONAL DEMOCRACY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE KEY COMPONENTS………………………………………………….... 20 2.1. Introduction………………………………………………….. 20 2.2. Elements of Democracy relating to the Study …………….. 22 2.2.1. Respect for Majority Rule and Minority Rights……………… 22 2.2.2. Free, Fair and Impartial Elections…………………………… 23 2.2.3. Rule of Law…………………………………………………. 25 2.2.4. Separation of Powers and Independence of Judiciary……… 26 2.2.5. Independent Media………………………………………….. 26 2.2.6. Conflict and Consensus ……………………………………… 27 2.2.7. Accountability of Government……………………………….. 28 2.3. What is a Political Party……………………………………… 29 2.4. Democracy and Political Parties……………………………… 30 2.5. The Need for Political Parties………………………………….. 32 2.6. Political Conflicts and their Resolution in a Democratic ……… 33 2.7. Importance of Political Parties to Democracies……………….. 34 2.8. Opposition in Democracy……………………………………… 37 2.9. Importance of Opposition in a Democratic system ………….. 38 2.10. Rights and Responsibilities of Opposition …………………… 39 2.11. Role and Obligations of Opposition………………………….. 41 2.11.1. Opposition as the Voice of the Voiceless ……………………. 44 2.11.2. To Offer a Viable Alternative to the Government ………….. 44 2.11.3. Seeking Accountability of Government……………………… 45 2.11.4. To Oppose the Government in Power……………………….. 45 2.11.5. In Case of National Tragedy and National Glory…………… 46

Chapter: 3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND………………………………… 48 3.1. Introduction…………………………………………………….. 48 3.2. Political Instability After Independence……………………….. 48 3.3. Political Parties and Democracy in Post Independence Pakistan.. 51 3.4. The Situation during 1954 Elections……………………………. 55 3.5. Lack of Elections in Pakistan…………………………………… 57 3.6. Delayed Framing of Constitution……………………………….. 58 3.7. Bureaucratic and Military Influence in the Politics of Pakistan… 62 3.8. Pak-India Comparative Study…………………………………… 65 3.9. Military Intervention and Decade of Military Rule……………... 66 3.10. 1965 War, Tashkent Declaration and Bhutto‘s Maneuvering…. 75 3.11. The Formation of Pakistan Peoples Party …………………… 77 3.12. Opposition to Ayub Khan…………………………………….. 83 3.13. Transfer of Power from Military Man to his Comrade in Arm .. 87 3.14. 1970 Elections and Yahya Khan………………………………. 90

3.14.1. Competing Political Parties in 1970 Elections……………… 91 3.14.2. Campaign for the Elections and Politicians Maneuvering…… 92 3.14.3. Party-wise Candidates on Territorial Basis………………….. 97 3.14.4. Election Results and Political Maneuvering of Bhutto …….. 100

Chapter: 4 POLITICS IN PAKISTAN: THE PPP STYLE…………………. 107 4.1. Introduction…………………………………………………….. 107 4.2. Failure of Dhaka Negotiation and Responsibility of Political…... 107 4.3. PPP in power…………………………………………………… 111 4.4. 1973 Constitution and Bhutto Maneuvering…………………. 114 4.5. Constitution of 1973 and Provincial Autonomy……………… 122 4.6. Why opposition Accepted the 1973 Constitution the ……… 126

Chapter: 5 THE POST 1973 SCENARIO………………….. 130 5.1. Introduction……………………………………………………. 130 5.2. Tripartite (PPP, NAP and JUI) Accord of March 1972……….. 133 5.3. Politics of Rivalry and Political Maneuvering in NWFP (KP)…. 137 5.4. Political Rivalry in the Province of Balochistan ……………… 138 5.5. Jamotes-Mengals Dispute……………………………………….. 141 5.6. London Conspiracy and Bhutto Maneuvering…………………. 142 5.7. Death of Hayat Muhammad Khan and Ban on NAP………….. 147 5.8. State of PPP‘s Intra-Party Relationship ……………………… 150 5.9. Bhutto‘s Team A & Team B………………………………….. 152 5.10. Constitutional Amendments and their Impact on PPP-………. 153 5.10.1. First Amendment……………………………………………. 156 5.10.2. Second Amendment………………………………………… 157 5.10.3. Third Amendment………………………………………….. 158 5.10.4. Fourth Amendment………………………………………… 160 5.10.5. Fifth Amendment…………………………………………… 162 5.10.6. Sixth Amendment…………………………………………. 162

5.10.7. Seventh Amendment……………………………………… 162 5.11. Conclusion…………………………………………………… 164

Chapter: 6 1977 ELECTIONS, PPP’s HANDLING OF PNA MOVEMENT 167 AND THE DREADFUL OUTCOME…………………………… 6.1. Introduction……………………………………………………. 167 6.2. Why the 1977 Elections were held Before the End of ………… 167 6.3. Formation of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)……………… 172 6.4. The Issue of Election Symbol…………………………………. 175 6.5. Qayyum Khan‘s PML(Q)……………………………………… 177 6.6. Selections of Candidates for 1977 Elections…………………. 179 6.7. The Campaign for 1977 Elections…………………………….. 180 6.8. The Elections Results………………………………………….. 187 6.9. Aftermath of the Elections…………………………………….. 189 6.10. PPP-PNA Reconciliatory Dialogue…………………………… 197 6.11. Opposition Faults after the 1977 Elections………………….. 205 6.12. Conclusion …………………………………………………… 207

Chapter: 7 BHUTTO’S LEADERSHIP, RULING-OPPOSITION 209 RELATIONSHIP, STATUS OF DEMOCRACY AND THE DISMISSAL OF PPP: A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS (Based on Interviews) 7.1. Introduction …………………………………………………… 209 7.2. PPPs Success in 1970 Elections and Aftermath………………. 211 7.3. Ruling Party‘s Relation with the Opposition Provincial ………. 217 7.4. PPP and the Local Government……………………………….. 222 7.5. Freedom of Expression Under Bhutto………………………….. 223 7.6. Bhutto Attitude towards Members of his Party ……………….. 224 7.7. Formation and Use of Federal Security Force…………………. 224 7.8. Constitutional Amendments…………………………………… 226 7.9. Why the Dialogue in the Aftermath of 1977 Elections Failed…. 227 7.10. Military takeover ……………………………………………… 228 7.11. PPP‘s Slogan: ‗Democracy is Our Polity‘……………………. 232

Chapter: 8 CONCLUSION…………………………………………………… 235 8.2. Findings of the study…………………………………………. 242 8.3. Recommendations …………………………………………… 245 BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………….. 251 ANNEXURES…………………………………………………… 267

Chapter - 1

INTRODUCTION

This chapter introduces the topic, the objectives, significance of the study and provides literature review to determine the importance of the study in the light of studies already conducted on topics closer to the current one.

Democracy is that form of government in which people get themselves governed through their elected representatives. A democratic form of government is considered to be the most suitable one for territorial and political integration and for equitable distribution of the national resources among various sections of the population. Democracy, by virtue of its mechanics, is considered to be a cementing force binding different and, sometimes, opposing sections of a society together. Popular sovereignty, participatory governance, periodic elections, rule of law, independence of judiciary, supremacy of constitution, freedom of expression, right to set up political and other organizations within the framework of law, consensus based decisions, the right for dissent and respect for minority rights are some of the novel principles of democracy.

In democracy, political parties work in two different capacities, i.e., either they form the government or act as opposition. Democracy places emphasis on an orderly pattern of relationship between the ruling and opposition parties which is to be characterized by accommodation and tolerance. Although opposition parties do not have a share in the exercise of executive power, yet they do exercise a check on the ruling party/coalition. In democracy, the opposition is free to criticize the government and offer alternative policy options. The opposition, under the principle of respect for majority rule, is required to grant recognition to the authority of the government but, at the same time, exercise an effective check on the rulers. This is because a successful democracy needs an effective and vigilant opposition. In democratic states, the ruling and opposition parties develop an environment of tolerance, trust and understanding and resolve their differences

peacefully. The rulers in democracies govern the country on the consent of governed. The opposition parties also recognize the right of the majority party to rule and make decisions but, at the same time, the ruling party also respects the minority‘s right to dissent.1

It is true that strong and formidable opposition is necessary for a sound democratic system. The role of opposition in the strengthening, stability and the successful working of democracy is now internationally acknowledged. In the absence of such an environment, the ruling party would tend to get tardy and complacent or become autocratic. Wherever there is organized opposition capable of bringing to the surface the wrongs committed by the government and its acts of omission and commission, the government can hardly be negligent in the performance of its duty towards the people in particular, and the state, in general. These principles have consistently been followed and acted upon by countries that are relatively more developed with strong democratic traditions. They establish a close link between the state and society. They regularly and consistently allow input from their electorates. All state organs i.e. the legislature, the executive and the judiciary function within their clearly demarcated sphere of influence.

In Pakistan, the political parties, in general, and their leaders, in particular, demonstrate enormous enthusiasm for, and commitment to, these principles but on coming to power they start pursuing personalization of power and authoritarian style of governance. Thus, they go contrary to the principles which they so loudly speak about.

Till the launching of Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in November

1967, there was no political party of a national stature. In the absence of popular, organized and public-spirited political parties, the country was ruled by the nexus of bureaucracy and military oligarchy. There was a lack of participation on the part of the masses with marginal attention given to their welfare.

1. Wondwosen Teshome, (2009). Opposition Parties and the Politics of Opposition in Africa: A Critical Analyses. International Journel of Human and Social Sciences vol: 4, pp. 287-88.

Things started changing with the appearance of Z. A. Bhutto on the political horizon of

Pakistan. He had come to power in response to people‘s grievances against Ayub Khan regime. Bhutto promised to redress those grievances and, for the purpose, launched sectoral reforms. He became popular not only because of his attractive personality but also because of his sensational speeches and slogans such as ‗PPP‘s voice is people‘s voice‘. The nation trusted him and considered him to be a Messiah who would rid the nation of all its maladies and would bring a true form of democracy. Ironically, Bhutto came to symbolize the very vices that he had come to remedy. He went against the principles of democracy which he would, otherwise, pronounce so proudly.

The spirit of democracy was damaged by the arbitrary amendments that were made to the

1973 Constitution. His reforms were meant for strengthening his personal position and not of institutions such as parliament and judiciary.2 Political freedom and the independence of judiciary were both curtailed. He used state authority to muzzle the recalcitrant segments of the dominant social groups and to reward those who supported him.3 Bhutto‘s regime had no respect for the principle of dissension and disagreement.

Through Bhutto‘s stay in power, his government remained uncompromising with the opposition and did not tolerate any dissent. The PPP government soon became the rule of one man. The central government‘s intervention in provincial affairs was seen as betraying the democratic tradition. Bhutto was accused of personalizing power, mauling state institutions and subverting the populist dream.4 Not only did Bhutto stifle and harass the opposition but also interfered wherever the opposition was in power. He pressurized and terrorized not only the opposition but his dissidents within the PPP as well. Arbitrary

2. Ayesha Jalal, (1995). Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia: A Comparative and Historical Perspective. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, p. 80. 3. Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, (2011). Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy. London: Routledge, p.195. 4. Ayesha Jalal, (1995). Op. cit., p. 77.

jailing, fake criminal charges and physical intimidation were the tactics that were applied so frequently.5

In fact, Z. A. Bhutto, with a group of rascals prostituted the noble and lofty goal of PPP6 very soon and the autocratic style of PPP leadership also played its part in preventing democracy from gaining roots. In short, the five and half years of Z. A. Bhutto‘s abominable rule (1972-1977) was bad for democracy.

A nation that was born with the promise of democracy did not favor dictatorial inclinations on the part of one who had sought mass support against dictatorship. The agitational politics in the post 1977 general elections with the active participation of the opposition parties and all those who had suffered from the arbitrary measures of Bhutto made the downfall of his government inevitable.

1.1. Statement of the Problem:

The very concept of democracy presupposes the existence of a healthy opposition. The absence of a vigilant and active opposition encourages the ruling party to pursue dictatorial tendency. If the opposition parties exhibit negligence in exercising a check over the ruling party, it is tantamount to betraying the electorates. Likewise, stifling the voice and restricting the movement of opposition by the ruling party is also an act of damaging the fundamental principles of democracy. Bhutto era (1972-77) is characterized with sensational, storming and dramatic political developments. Bhutto came as the right man at the right time. He had charisma, education, links and a family that was fully rooted in politics. No one could have anticipated Bhutto‘s fall as such. But, as the post 1972 developments revealed, the PPP style of politics was quite different from what it had been projecting ever since 1967. The PPP had no guidelines and was lacking the collaborative working mechanism. The autocratic style of politics by the regime

5. Philip Oldenburg, (2010). India, Pakistan and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths. London: Routledge, p. 184. 6. Lawrence Ziring, (1997). Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 382.

created an environment of gloom and suspicion. The opposition leaders sensed the undemocratic treatment all the times. Intimidation and incarceration were the tools used just to protect the person and operations of Bhutto.7 This study focuses on whether the style of governance during the Bhutto era was consistent with the fundamentals of democracy. It further also focuses on the role of opposition as to what extent did it support/promote democratic values and norms, and the kind of treatment that was meted out to them by the ruling PPP.

1.2. Objectives of the Study:

Following are the objectives of this study:

1. To examine the rationale of democratic principles in the context of relationship

between the ruling and opposition parties and their impact on the smooth

functioning of state institutions;

2. To bring on record the causes as to why politicians in Pakistan have been

demonstrating a marginal interest in their commitment to democracy;

3. To make a critical analysis of the PPP style of governance under Z. A. Bhutto

(1972-1977) and determine its relevance to democracy;

4. To point out the extent to which the ruling PPP adhered to a collaborative

framework with the opposition while managing the state affairs;

5. To highlight the pattern of relationship which the PPP maintained with the

opposition both inside and outside the parliament during 1972-1977.

1.3. Research Questions:

This study seeks answers to the following questions:

7. Lawrence Ziring, (1980). Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development. Colorado: Westview Press, p. 122.

1. By making ‗Democracy is our polity‘ a party motto, did Bhutto mean business or

was it merely a slogan to mobilize public opinion?

2. Did Bhutto‘s government create the sort of political environment where the

opposition could perform its role effectively?

3. Did PPP, under the leadership of Z. A. Bhutto (1972-77), adhere to the principles

of consensus, dissension and dialogue being the cardinal features of democracy?

4. Could the opposition parties fulfill their obligations towards the promotion of

democratic values in Pakistan during the period under review?

5. Cold PPP government‘s arbitrary style of politics be regarded as a major cause of

its downfall in 1977?

1.4. Literature Review:

Ziring (1980) is of the view that it was a noble intention that led to the creation/birth of

Pakistan but unfortunately the early leadership could not provide it with a sound foundation. The personal, regional and professional rivalries among the politicians rendered them incapable to run the system smoothly and hence military‘s intervention was not unexpected. The author provides a deep insight of the country‘s experimentation with different political and military regimes. The autocratic decision making and eager of the ruling politicians to satisfy their vested motives rendered democracy a failure/fiasco.

As far as the constitutional history is concerned, the author holds the view that there was little success in framing a viable constitution. Pakistan proved a laboratory for constitutional experimentation but none accomplished what the constitutions proclaimed.

The ethnic tension which Pakistan is suffering from the very inception and which has given birth to many other problems, still plague the country. In the end, the author discusses the foreign policy of Pakistan, saying that foreign policy is the extension of

internal condition and due to the domestic dilemmas, Pakistan‘s foreign policy remains a source of its weakness. So internal factors intertwined with external factors can play a significant role in shaping Pakistan‘s future.

Ziring (2003) holds the leadership of various political parties responsible for the failure of political system of Pakistan. He has pointed to the lack of interest on the part of country leadership in the growth of the political system that led to the absence of involvement of the common people into the system of the country. The political process, in place of the political parties is mostly carried out by the bureaucracy (civil and military). This led to the incapability of parties for providing disciplined expressions of public aspirations. He also holds that politicians from Punjab province dominated the administration, the economic structure, the general decision making power and political reforms process.

Jalal (1995) has expressed her views on the success of democracy in India and its failure in Pakistan and Bangladesh. The author questions as to why a common British colonial legacy led to divergent political development after independence in 1947. The author has discussed the similarities between the populist experiments of both India and Pakistan.

The popular leaders in both the countries have been accused of personalizing power, mauling the institutions of the state and subverting the populist dream. Both the countries were ruled by leaders having strong roots in the old structure of power. After the disintegration, the anti bureaucratic sentiment and the army humiliation afforded the popularly elected leaders of Pakistan an opportunity to tilt the institutional balance in favour of popularly elected institutions against the non elected institutions of the state.

But the legacies of military rule had greatly reduced such prospects. The populist experience of Bangladesh was different from that of India and Pakistan. Sheikh Mujib-ur-

Rahman concentrated on the Awami League‘s political networks instead of the non- elected institutions of the state. Steps were taken to establish and build the Awami

League‘s organizational machinery down to the district level and to ensure political

control over the administrative arms of the state. Yet Mujib failed because the Awami

League reflected the broader ideological divisions in Bangladeshi society. The Indian populism met with the same fate as those of Pakistan and Bangladesh and proved to be a mirage and nothing more than reassertion of authoritarian tendencies.

Talbot (1998) recounts the problems that Pakistan faced since its inception. To develop a perspective, he goes back a couple of decades back when Pakistan was in the process of making. Pakistan‘s present problems are predicated on the colonial rule, incompatible regional and cultural interests of the groups inhabiting the subcontinent before partition.

Furthermore, the author inquires into the separation of East Pakistan (Bangladesh), Z. A.

Bhutto‘s decline, Zia‘s rule, Benazir Bhutto‘s failure to establish an enduring democratic government and Nawaz Sharif‘s rise to power. Finally, the impact that these rulers had on

Pakistan and the issues which plagued Pakistan are vividly brought into focus.

Mazari (2006) gives a historical description of Pakistan. Sherbaz Khan Mazari entered into the politics of Pakistan by joining an alliance of five opposition political parties called Combined Opposition Parties (COP) which jointly nominated Fatima Jinnah for presidential elections of 1965. Ayub Khan‘s era is critically discussed. This is followed by an indepth analysis of Z. A. Bhutto and Zia periods. Bhutto‘s autocratic and inhuman attitudes towards opposition, his use of military in Balochistan, personalization trends in politics and subsequently his downfall are important contents of the book. The author also evaluates Zia‘s rule and his relations with the opposition. Besides, the leading political figures and important political events are also focused fascinatingly.

Raza (1997) traces the formation of PPP in 1967 to the fall of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto government. The author evaluates the political career of Zuilfiqar Ali Bbhutto who was the first elected Prime Minister of Pakistan. The author discusses in detail the first general elections of 1970, campaign strategy of Zuilfiqar Ali Bhutto in the 1970 elections and the electoral performances of national level parties i.e. PPP and Awami League in the

West and East Pakistan respectively. He further holds that the victory of Awami League

in Eastern Pakistan and PPP in Western Pakistan set the scene for and led to the dismemberment of Pakistan. The author analyzes PPP leadership (Bhutto) dealings with the Muslim countries including Bangladesh. He also throws light on Pak-US relations during Bhutto rule. The author is of the view that on national front Bhutto had to face and deal with some serious issues and problems like provincial autonomy, nationalization, the

Qadiani issue, and the clash between fundamental Islam and the liberals. In the end the

1977 general elections, unopposed election of some of the PPP members and the dreadful aftermath culminating in the promulgation of Martial Law led by Zia ul Haq are analyzed.

Yousuf (1999) examines and scrutinizes the role of different political parties. He discusses the history and evolution of political parties and incumbent government clashes with the opponents during the period of study.

Aman (1974) holds the politicians and political parties responsible for political instability in Pakistan. The author is of the view that democracy could not get roots in Pakistan and the democratic process remained stuck due to the unfair and authoritative attitude and behavior of political leaders. The political parties have a loose democratic base and lack roots in the masses. Revolving around persons of influence, these parties serve their leader‘s vested interests. Due to their lack of proper organization and committed leadership, no party is up to the mark. Most of the parties national and regional are under the control of a particular group or family. He also condemns those demoguage politicians who show strong commitment for democracy, but do little when voted to power.

Hussain (1979) discusses the political system of Pakistan. The author holds that different groups of elites i.e. the landlords, political, religious, industrial, professional, and military elites all are active competitors for gaining power. Military has used both feudals and bureaucrats for establishing its hegemony over the political system of Pakistan. The author is of the view that the initial problem of Pakistan was more administrative than

political. He has focused on the role of military and is of the view that military ruined the political system. It is very sad that the political parties were excluded from the process of forming the government and this caused irreparable damage to the political system of our country. The author holds both the civil and military elites responsible for the destruction of the system.

Syed (1992) evaluates the political career of Z. A. Bhutto. He was, no doubt, the most controversial prime minister in the history of Pakistan. He ruled the country first as president till 1973 Constitution and then till the end of his rule i.e. July 1977 as a prime minister. The author throws light on how Bhutto successfully mobilized the masses and campaigned for the first general elections of 1970. The author also discusses the causes of the disintegration of Pakistan, Bhutto‘s attitude towards and style of managing internal issues and crises and his dealing with the issues of peace and war between Pakistan and the rival India. The author also focuses on the unending search for personal power on the part of Bhutto, where he ignored the institutions of the state where power out to be stored/housed. In the end, the author gives his view that Bhutto‘s efforts for making the masses politically conscious and his concern for the neglected section (poor) of the people much more than his operational style as a ruler are his legacy for Pakistan which are likely to last for a long time.

Mahmood (2000) has given a detailed account of the political history of Pakistan. He explores the process of constitutional development and pinpoints the factors responsible for its failure. The author also evaluates the military governments of Ayub Khan, Yahya

Khan and Ziaul Haq and, in the same pattern, examines the functioning of the civilian governments. The political parties, their working, their achievements and their leadership is also part of the discussion. The author gives his views on the poor performance of elected governments in the past.

Kumari in her essay holds that opposition is an integral part of the democratic process.

Being the representatives of the masses, the opposition leaders protect their interests.

When the ruling party derails from the track, it is the opposition that puts her back on the track either by raising the issue in the parliament or questioning the matter in the public.

It also educates the masses about issues of national importance and raises their level of political consciousness. If a government acquires autocratic style and starts serving its partisan interests instead of those of the masses, the opposition reacts and stirs the masses for agitation and thus brings the government to her sense.

Rais (2009) says that family-based politics is the dominant feature of political system of

Pakistan and also one of the factors that has caused political crises. The absence of democratic values within the parties has damaged the politics of Pakistan. The author has expressed the fear that the current despotic attitude of politicians and growing trend of manipulating the politics for personal and partisan ends will perpetuate confrontational politics in Pakistan.

Johnson (2013) centers his attention on the political opposition in Japan and its contributions. He gives charming details about the role of opposition and stresses on the central role of opposition. Due to its importance for the system, the opposition should not be neglected.

In a study published by the Commonwealth Organization (CWO), the role of opposition as an essential part of legislative framework has been thoroughly analyzed. It also focuses on various problems faced by the opposition parties.

Hasan (2000) gives an in-depth account of the rise and fall of the first elected but controversial prime minister, Bhutto. He was fascinating and interesting personality coupled with Machiavellian qualities. The author holds that a popular protest ousted

Bhutto from power. Bhutto was ultimately executed by the order of the Highest Court of

Pakistan for his alleged role in the murder of a political opponent. The author was not only a political supporter but also a close friend of Bhutto, therefore he presents and shares useful information about Z. A. Bhutto rule.

Rizvi (2000) focuses on and discusses in detail the weak political structure of the country and holds the weak and vulnerable political parties responsible for the failure of the political system and development of military. Most of the time these political parties ignoring the standards of political system engaged in regional, biased and factional issues damaging the political system of the country. These less-organized and less-integrated political parties provided an opportunity to the already dominant Punjab-based civil and military bureaucracies to prevail.

Jahan (1972) has discussed Pakistan‗s failure in national integration. The author argues that the situation of imbalance between the East and West Pakistan‗s political parties led to the disintegration of Pakistan. She holds that the problem of regionalism was a basic one that restricted the process of national integration. The struggle between the political leaders of East and West Pakistan resulted in the creation of different interest-based political parties, which ruined the party politics and the political system of Pakistan.

Therefore, the political leaders could neither develop nor fortify the existing political institutions during the formative phase from 1947 to 1958.

Saeed (1967) deeply observes the politics in Pakistan. His investigation reveals that

Pakistani politics was based wholly on clashes which hindered the growth of the political system. Mostly, these conflicts were between the civil and military bureaucracies on one hand and political leaders on the other which significantly harmed the political system of the country. This resulted into regionalism among the political parties in both parts of the country i.e. Eastern and Western Pakistan. Each party only paid attention towards its regional interests, deserting the rest of the populace.

Callard (1968) projected that Pakistanis had until the end of time idealized democracy but did not know how to put it into practice. He is of the view that the initial phase of the country‗s history was a period of change and vagueness. To him, though political parties in Pakistan are greater than before in number but have declined and they have also

experienced a number of interruptions. The author further describes and holds military and civil bureaucracy responsible for the powerlessness of the religious leaders of

Pakistan to get better the political system.

1.5. Significance of the Study

It is an important research work on the theme as it brings on record the factors responsible for derailing democracy and, at the same time, strengthening the hands of anti-democratic forces. The success of democracy demands fairplay, recognizing the rights of opposition and establishing relationship with them in accordance with the spirit of constitution. Ironically, all these pre-requisites were blatantly violated. Enormous literature is available on the subject but the particular area that the researcher has chosen, has not received adequate attention. This research work examines the democratization process in Pakistan from 1972 to 1977. The PPP was a new addition to the existing political parties in Pakistan and its landslide victory in the firstever general elections of

1970 afforded to the party an opportunity to make a new beginning. A change in attitude of the party leadership, however, did not allow the ship of the nation to sail smoothly.

This study brings to the surface those facts which not only caused insurmountable damage to the future of democracy but also paved the way for military to enter once again into the political arena of Pakistan. The findings of this study will surely make significant contribution to the existing body of knowledge. It will also facilitate the task of new researchers to investigate other related aspects of the politics of the era.

1.6. Methodology:

This is an exploratory research work and the techniques adopted by the researcher for data collection include a detailed survey of the available literature covering different aspects of the PPP government (1972-1977). Both primary and secondary sources have been used such as books, newspapers, journals, unpublished dissertations, research articles, related research work, government documents, reform reports etc. Facts were

also collected by conducting interviews with politicians, political analysts, academicians and the contemporaries of Z.A. Bhutto known for their candid views on the politics of

Pakistan. Fifteen respondents representing different segments of the society were interviewed for the purpose. The gathered facts have been analyzed for drawing conclusions.

1.7. Data Collection

Data collection is a method to obtain and collect materials (data) for research study. The sources which provide data may either be primary or secondary. First hand information that the researcher collected was through methods such as observation, interviewing, post or e-mailing etc. Data collected through secondary sources included journals, reports, articles, important statements and surveys conducted by different organizations.

In this qualitative research study, the researcher has extensively relied upon secondary data. Data was also collected through interviews with the contemporaries of ZAB and thus made use of primary source. As far as secondary source is concerned, it has many advantages as compared to the primary source such as the easy availability of materials, low/negligible cost, and it can also be easily saved. The reliability and authenticity of data is considered during data collection process. The researcher has tried to go through books written by authors of standing. The researcher also selected national newspapers and benefitted from the writings of columnists known for their balanced analysis. The researcher interviewed the contemporaries of Zulfiqar Ali Bbhutto both from ruling and opposition parties, an exercise that was found very insightful.

For giving weight to this study, the researcher searched both print and electronic media for covering different aspects and also found answers to the questions raised in this study.

The researcher also benefitted from the relevant articles published in journals of repute.

Under the key words, there were many articles and literature available which the researcher benefitted from. It was through the study of these materials that the researcher got an insight into the manner in which both the PPP under ZAB and different opposition

parties worked to strengthen or hamper democracy in Pakistan. Initially, the researcher selected data that showed how ZAB parted ways with his mentor Ayub Khan and formed his own Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and joined the opposition camp, and how he injected political awareness among the masses and brought them to streets against his mentor. The researcher also benefitted from the vast literature for covering the first general elections in Pakistan which, of course, was a new development being based on the principle of universal adult franchise. The researcher searched internet for 1970 elections with different key words. Here the researcher analyzed the role of different political parties especially PPP from West Pakistan and Awami League from East

Pakistan and drew conclusion as to how much democratic loving these parties were. The factors that played their part in derailing the process of democracy in its very beginning have also been examined.

To have an understanding of the main political parties, their role in the mirror of democratic norms, the researcher studied available literature particularly written by

Bhutto‘s contemporaries and by scholars of national and international repute. For collecting data, the researcher visited various seminar libraries of the University of

Peshawar, libraries of other universities such as Quaid-e-Azam University (Islamabad),

University of Karachi (Karachi) and the National Defense University (Islamabad). The researcher spent a lot of time in Peshawar Archieves and the National Library in

Islamabad. The researcher also won the reward from IRSP for a six months academic visit to the Royal Holloway, University of London. The visit provided me with an opportunity to collect data for my research work from different libraries of the United

Kingdom. The most recognized libraries of UK which the researcher visited were British

Library, SOAS Library, Library of Political Science in the University of Oxford,

Birmingham University Library and Birmingham City University Library. The researcher made a valuable use of internet for getting information which is comparatively easy and economical. While collecting information from internet, the researcher also saved links

with captions. In all this process, the researcher tried his best to rely on those books, journals, articles etc having greater relevance with the topic chosen by the researcher.

1.8. Limitations

One limitation for the researcher in collecting data to be ever remembered was that when the researcher visited Royal Holloway University of London, he could not get access to the online materials of different Libraries thought it was reliably learnt that the visiting students are allowed access to the online materials. Along with all the available literature, the plan was to conduct interviews with prominent politicians especially the contemporaries of Zuilfiqar Ali Bbhutto, military personnel and academicians with sound knowledge and interests in the politics of Pakistan to obtain their views on the politics of

Pakistan during the period under review but there were many hurdles to have an access to these targeted persons and getting an appointment with them. The researcher could not get an appointment with an army officer because of his tight schedule. Similarly, the politicians in Pakistan tend to be very busy and it is not an easy task to get an appointment with them. In certain cases, however, the researcher was fortunate to have sitting with high profile persons whose views enlightened the researcher tremendously.

Similarly, as the target was contemporaries of Zuilfiqar Ali Bbhutto, many of them had either passed away like Professor Ghafoor Ahmad or were in a weak/ill stage of health like Sardar Sherzbaz Khan Mazari whom the researcher visited twice to interview but found him unable to discuss anything. Similarly, the researcher found some of the respondents out of Pakistan. Cost of travelling also limited my visits to some very important places. Also some of the interviewees gave little time.

1.9. Chapter Structure:

The dissertation consists of the following chapters:

Chapter 1: Introduction

The first chapter of this research work introduces the topic, the objectives and justifies the significance of the study and also provides a literature review to identify the work already done on issues related to the subject so far.

Chapter 2: Functional Democracy: An Analysis of the Key Components

This chapter debates democracy and the key elements of a democratic system. It also discusses the political parties, their role and importance in democracy. The last section comprises the role of opposition in a democratic system. For this purpose, some of the internationally reputed authors and experts have been quoted.

Chapter 3: Historical Background

This chapter consists of a detailed account of the political instability in Pakistan, the centralization of governmental authority, constitutional dilemma, the undemocratic attitude of political parties and leadership. It further discusses the role of bureaucracy and military in the politics of the country and the military intervention into the politics. The

Ayub Khan era is also discussed in detail. The chapter also highlights the formation of

Pakistan Peoples Party by Z. A. Bhutto, the first ever general elections of 1970 and its aftermath as a background study.

Chapter 4: Politics in Pakistan: The PPP Style

This chapter examines the Tri-Partite Talks after the 1970 general elections, finds out that why a peaceful transition could not take place and who were responsible for the failure of the talks. The chapter also discusses the contributions of ruling as well as opposition parties towards the framing of the 1973 Constitution. The focus is on assessing the governing authority of PPP under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto till the promulgation of the Constitution in 1973.

Chapter 5: The Post 1973 Scenario

This chapter evaluates the performance of PPP government in the aftermath of 1973

Constitution i.e., 1973 to 1977 when the party was in full control of the affairs in Pakistan and had acquired an autocratic style. Reference in this connection has been made to the termination of two provincial governments under the 2-party opposition alliance and the arbitrary handling of the constitutional amendments. The purpose is to determine whether

the relationship between PPP and opposition parties was in line with the spirit of the constitution and in accordance with the established principles of democracy.

Chapter 6: 1977 Elections, PPP’s handling of PNA Movement and the Dreadful

Outcome.

This chapter discusses the emergence of PNA and the 1977 general elections in Pakistan.

It focuses on whether the elections were fair and free and the incumbent government sincerely contested the elections. It also makes an evaluation of the PNA‘s allegations of rigging in the elections and the launching of a movement against the PPP government leading to the downfall of the latter in July 1977.

Chapter 7: Bhutto’s Leadership, Ruling-Opposition Relationship, Status of

Democracy and the Dismissal of PPP: A Qualitative Analysis

This chapter consists of an evaluation of the views of experts gathered through interviews or questionnaires. Their views have been subjected to analysis with the aim to determine how sincere the party was to the establishment of a truly democratic set-up in Pakistan.

The genuineness of the charges leveled against the government of Z. A. Bhutto culminating in the termination of his government, has also been examined.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

This chapter draws the conclusion based on the analysis of data gathered for this study.

Recommendations are given based on the findings of the study.

CHAPTER - 2

FUNCTIONAL DEMOCRACY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE KEY

COMPONENTS

2.1. Introduction

According to Rustow democracy is a competitive and challenging process and this competition gives an edge to those who can rationalize their commitment to it and an yet better edge to those who genuinely believe in it.8 A democratic system is one where people choose their representatives by voting in free, fair and impartial elections. In democracy, people are afforded with a choice among different parties and their candidates who desire access to power. In a democratic system, government is based on the will of the people and it can hope to stay as long as it enjoys the support of the masses. If the elected representatives fail to serve the public interests, the latter have the right to criticize and replace them. The elected representatives are bound to fulfill the needs and aspirations of the citizens.9 In the western concept of democracy, sovereignty belongs to the masses which is to be exercised through their elected representatives.

Hence according to Schmitter and Karl (1991), modern democracy is ―a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of the elected representatives.‖10 According to Dahl (1971), ―it is the responsiveness of government to the preferences of its citizens (who are, in theory, ―political equals‖ of the rulers), that is the key characteristic

8. Dankwart A. Rustow, (1970). Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. Comparative politics, 2(3), 337-363. 9. https://web.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/DemocracyEducation0204.htm. 10. Philippe C. Schmitter & Terry Lynn Karal, (1991). What Democracy is... and is Not." Journal of Democracy, 2(3), pp. 75-88.

of democracy.‖11 Such responsiveness necessitates that general public have the right to formulate their preferences, articulate them and have them considered by those at the helm of affairs. According to Churchill, ―No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all other forms that have been tried from time to time.‖12 In the above famous quote, the former British Prime Minister Sir Winston Churchill focuses on the weak side of democracy. Of course, there is no perfect form of government in the world anywhere. But all other forms of government produce less desired results than democracy. It is the democratic system that can regulate public affairs in a better way.13 In simple words, a democratic system is one in which everyone is treated equally and has equal rights. When people have a voice in the government, they have more trust in it.14

Democracy is a suitable form of government particularly for a multi-ethnic society like

Pakistan. The legitimacy of democracy is accepted throughout the world. Most countries of the world are moving towards the adoption of this system. Some are more developed, some are in the process of making but if internal conditions are not favorable, snowballing alone is unlikely to promote democracy in a particular country. For example, the democratization of India, UK and Turkey does not mean that there will be democracy in Pakistan unless the conditions that promote democracy are met in Pakistan. The ongoing process of democratization worldwide will certainly create an environment for those regions that are lagging behind to come up to a required level of acceptability.15 In a non-democratic state, a single party holds power that violates the human rights by misusing authority that results in a negative reaction leading to disturbance and anarchy

11. Robert A. Dahl, (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press, p. 1. 12. http://www.democracy-building.info/definition-democracy.html. 13. Ibid. 14. Samuel P. Huntington, (1991). Democracy's Third Wave. Journal of democracy, 2(2), 12-34. 15. Ibid.

in the country. Strikes, violence, and disorders of all sorts become routine affairs in such a polity.

A Resolution (A/RES/59/201)16 adopted the UN General Assembly in 2004, provided for certain ‗essential elements of a democracy‘.17 A state that guarantees the observance of all or many of these elements/principles deserves to be called democratic.

According to Prothro and Cregg, some basic principles for successful democracy demand that public officials should be chosen by majority vote, citizens should have equal opportunity and chance to affect the government, the minority should have the right to criticize majority decisions provided that are inconsistent with the state laws, the opposition political parties should be free to mobilize public opinion in support of their programs, respect for majority rule and protection of minority rights (freedom to dissent).18

2.2. Elements of Democracy relating to the Study

Some of the key elements of democracy which relate to this study are discussed below:

2.2.1. Respect for Majority Rule and Minority Rights

Majority rule is a way for any government to stay organized. Majority rule allows people to vote for or against an issue.19 Minorities should not be deprived of their rights. They

16. Adopted 20 December 2004, the resolution was officially published in 2005. See: http://www.undemocracy.com/A-RES-59-201.pdf. also available at: International Consensus: Essential Elements of Democracy, Democracy Reporting International (DRI), October 2011. P. 06. 17. Paragraph 1 of the said resolution emphasizes on the, ―respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, inter alia, freedom of association and peaceful assembly and of expression and opinion, to vote and to be elected at free, fair and timely elections by universal adult suffrage and by secret vote ensuring the free expression of the will of the people, as well as a pluralistic system of political parties and organizations, and the right of participation in the conduct of public affairs either directly or through the elected representatives, accountability in public administration, separation of powers between different branches of government, respect for the rule of law, the independence of judiciary and lastly free and independent media.‖ 18. James W. Prothro and Charles M. Cregg, (1960). Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement, The Journal of Politics, 22(2), 276-294. 19. For example, an eighth grade class is faced with making a choice for a class trip. The choices are Hershey Park or Knoebels. The class holds a vote and 51% of the class votes for Hershey Park and only 49% votes for Knoebels. Majority rule in this case shows that Hershey Park will be the class trip. Minority rights are when the group that does not have the majority rule will not be discriminated against. Their basic rights cannot be taken away from them, and they will still be represented. As in the example of the class trip, the group that did not vote in favor of Hershey Park still has the right to go to Hershey Park.

should be treated in a fair way. Minorities will feel comfortable when they are treated fairly with no discrimination. They hold strong onto their basic rights and represent them.

Though the government is of majority, the minority avails the same rights and benefits as availed by the majority. The minority rights can be well protected if they are given opportunities of participation on equal footings.20

2.2.2. Free, Fair and Impartial Elections

According to Katz, ―Elections‖ ―are the defining institutions of modern democracy.‖21 All citizens use their right to vote in electing representatives of their choice who then take decisions for the betterment of their voters. Periodic elections are the sign of a healthy political system where the chosen representatives run the system and take initiatives for the general welfare of citizens.22 Election is a formal and organized process enabling a person to have access to a public office. It empowers the citizens to exercise their right of choosing those who would hold authority. Democracy manifests itself through the electoral process; continous process of free and fair elections and peaceful and orderly transfer of power.23

One of the basic criteria for democracy is ensuring an equitable and open competition/choice to the electorates allowing them to choose from among different political parties without interference. Democracy gains strength when citizens are free to raise voice for their rights, when there is equality, media is free and when equitable conditions for electoral competition are ensured. In a country where a party or personality dominates the system, the playing field will be tilted in favor of the incumbent government.24 Free and fair elections lead towards a sustainable democracy. It is also a mechanism of political education. The stability and growth of political institutions of a

20. http://ronstadt.proboards.com/thread/3544/springsteen-cancels-concert-carolina-bigoted 21. Richard S. Katz, (1997). Democracy and Elections. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 1. 22. Riccardo Pelizzo, (2006). Free and Fair Elections. Singapore Management University, p.1. 23. Touqir Hussain, (2011). Democracy vs Democracy, Published in The Express Tribune, June 25th, 2011. 24. Samuel P. Huntington, (1991). Op. cit., pp. 12-34.

country is linked with free and fair elections. So, for a country to be democratic there would be an open competition and electorates should be given a free hand to elect candidates of their own choice.25

For political scientists, democracy is a system where the power rests with the people and where all citizens are equally entitled to influence the politics of the state. To Dahl, however, this basic democratic principle is violated:

1. If citizens are not permitted to devise their political preferences;

2. If citizens are not permitted to express – through individual or collective action, their

political preferences to their fellow citizens and to the government; and

3. If the government does not respect the citizens‘ preferences.26

The above conditions will stand fulfilled if certain rights are guaranteed under the constitution. The Constitution must protect citizens‘ right to associations, citizen‘s right to freedom of expression, right to vote, right of all eligible citizens to compete for public offices, the right to information, free and fair elections and institutional arrangements for ensuring that government‘s policies and actions are meant for public welfare.27

The above mentioned rights and freedoms cover not only pre-election phase but the post also. It is to keep the government accountable for all of its actions.28 For the stability and consolidation of a democratic system, both free and fair elections and government accountability is necessary. Accountability is inherently connected with electoral competition and it creates a competitive environment for the representatives.29 Sartori, for example, argued that ―representation intrinsically consists of two ingredients:

25. Farhatullah Babar (n.d). Democracy and Elections: How Elections are Rigged in Pakistan (Peshawar: Peoples Institute of Democracy), p. 6. 26. Robert A. Dahl, (1971). Op. cit., p. 2. 27. Ibid., p. 3. 28. Philippe Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl identify these eight conditions that make democracy possible, see, Philippe C. Schmitter and Terry Lynn Karl, (1991). Op. cit., pp. 75-88. 29. Riccardo Pelizzo, (2006). Op.cit., p. 5.

responsiveness and independent responsibility.‖30 Sartori states that free and fair election is by itself an instrument which ensures accountability of government.

The citizens do have the right to vote for the political parties and politicians in power but they also have the power to vote them out. The parties have to remain sensitive to voter‘s demands and work for the interests of the citizens because their future depends on public support. If they do not remain responsive and fail in fulfilling the demands of their voters, the latter will not support them in future. Thus the electorate may vote them out by supporting their rivals. The opposition political parties, too, have to be sensitive to voters‘ demands. It is because of this behavior of opposition that justifies their claim to be a good alternate to the incumbent government whenever the incumbent fails to do its duty. But elections can seek accountability of government only if they are free and fair.31

2.2.3. Rule of Law Democracy stands for the rule of law. A democratic set up facilitates fair and equal application of law and procedures without any discrimination on the basis of caste, creed or religion. Everyone is treated equally. The rule of law guarantees protection of the rights of all by putting limits on the power of government. It maintains order and protects the country from anarchy and all sorts of disturbances. No one is arrested and punished arbitrarily. All are equally treated, so as to enjoy their rights and freedom. Law is for all either head of the state or a common man. Courts are free bodies and they implement the laws in their letter and spirit.32 Similarly, in a democratic set up, if someone is accused of some crime they have the right to a fair, speedy and open trial because of the fact that they are entitled to the equal protection of law. They are innocent unless proven guilty by the court during the trail. The accused has full right to know about the charges against

30. Giovanni Sartori, (1987). The Theory of Democracy Revisited. Chatam: Chatam House Publisher, p. 170. 31. Riccardo Pelizzo, (2006). Op. cit., p. 5. 32. https://web.stanford.edu/~ldiamond/iraq/DemocracyEducation0204.htm

him, to remain silent and to be defensive. The same charges are not to be applied against him twice. Torture and torment is not allowed even though seizing his property.33

2.2.4. Separation of Powers and Independence of Judiciary

In any political system if political power is to be restricted and accountable, the independence of judiciary from executive control must be ensured. In a democracy, the exercise of political power by the elected representatives of the people must respect the law, the constitution and the will of the people. This requires that power be separated with clearly defined span of control so that the cabinet ministers could not interfere and hinder in court cases. In a democratic system, it is the responsibility of the executive to put into practice programs and policies, administers budget and deal with state affairs. The executive ay have the right to propose laws, however, only the elected members in the parliament who represent the people have the power of enactment. Only the courts have the power to decide the guiltiness or innocence of persons charged with a crime and only the higher courts can determine whether a law or a government action/policy is in line with the constitution.34

2.2.5. Independent Media

Media freedom is inevitable in a democratic set up. It not only helps in creating plural and open societies, accountable and transparent system of government but also protects human rights and fundamental freedoms. It is the free and independent media that guarantees freedom of expression and freedom of information which are the two essentials facilitating active participation of citizens in governmental business.35 The press plays an important role in public awareness about government policy and other matters of importance and thus promotes a democratic culture. Those responsible are

33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Michael Meyer-Resende, (2011). International Consensus, Essential Elements of Democracy. democracy reporting international, p. 14.

brought to the limelight and also ensure means for mutual interaction.36 To perform these functions, the press must not only be independent but it must also have both material and human resources to deal with all the important problems of a society.37

2.2.6. Conflict and Consensus

Conflict and consensus occupy a central position in democracy which manifests in numerous forms. Conflicts do arise in any democratic set up but are managed amicably.

All have to search for compromises, give and take, consensus or other agreements that would be acceptable to all. It should, then, discover means to alleviate disagreement and cleavage with consensus.38

Consensus is more than the sum total of ideas of the persons in a group.39 Consensus strives to consider each disagreement and come to a decision earlier than a judgment is made. More significantly, this course encourages a setting where one and all are valued and all contributions are appreciated.40 For any democratic set up to sustain, all persons and groups should be prepared to stomach each other‘s differences. They should admit that the competitor has a convincing right and a genuine opinion.

2.2.7. Accountability of Government

36. David Beetham and Kevin Boyle, (2009). Introducing Democracy: 80 Questions and Answers. UNESCO. 37. M Cherif Bassiouni, (1998). Democracy: its Principles and Achievement. Vol. 1021. Inter-Parliamentary Union. P. 45. 38. L. Diamond & M. Plattner, (1999). Democratization in Africa. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, p. xiii. 39. Through deliberations, more ideas come to the front producing fresh ideas and as a result the most excellent decision comes out. This lively activity is called the innovative interaction of ideas. It is creativity that plays a key role in finding out what is best for the public and when more populace are drawn in this accommodating endeavor as a result more ideas and possibilities are generated. In this respect, the relentless, indiscriminate and rigid use of parliamentary majority is essentially offensive and not consensual. The purpose has repeatedly been capturing the vote, in spite of another option that might be in the interest of the entire group; it resorts to the power of domination as an alternative of persuasion. When the will of the majority supersedes the concerns of minority, it is intrinsically conflictual. 40. http://www.consensus.net/occac1.html.

In democracy political parties take part in elections, make efforts to win the elections for capturing political offices and managing governmental affairs.41 In a democracy, elections are held and the contending candidates represent their parties and the people are free to vote to power candidates of their own choice. The political party that wins the majority of seats, forms government and exercises control over the administration.42 Occasionally, if no party gets the required majority to form government, two or more parties join hands for a coalition government. In a democracy, political parties build a balance between demands and support such as interest expression and aggregation. It is the political parties that connect a government to the people.43 The party or parties which form government and acquire control of administration are responsible for every action of the government.

The government can only be popular and effective when it seeks public good, protects their rights, their lives and their possessions.44

Accountability is a virtue without which free, popular and powerful/strong government cannot endure long. Political parties must be provided with the means of accountability that they could make a stable and functional government. The Social Contract Theory stresses upon the need for accountability. People must have the right to replace the government if it fails in fulfilling its responsibilities.45 This provides a means for public accountability of government for its deeds. The masses keep in mind the previous record while electing their representatives. This fear keeps the government vigilant and responsive to public demands. If the government is accountable, the elected representative would not violate the citizens‘ rights and would not abuse power. An unaccountable government is always corrupt and irresponsible. It cannot function well because it is not afraid of doing wrongs. So, in short, accountability is an essential and

41. Ivan Doherty, (2001). Democracy out of balance. Policy Review, (106), 25, p. 32. 42. V. Randall & L. Svåsand, (2002). Introduction: The Contribution of Parties to Democracy and Democratic Consolidation, Democratization, p. 7. 43. David Mckay, (2001). Designing Europe: Comparative Lessons from the Federal Experience. OUP Catalogue, p. 82. 44. Available at: 45. David Mckay, (2001). Op. cit., p. 82.

central pillar of a successful system. It maintains a liaison between the rulers and the ruled.46

2.3. What is a Political Party

According to T. Luta Maliyamkono & Fidelis Edge Kanyongolo, a political party is systematic group of those individuals who work collectively to struggle and compete for political office and advance their agreed-upon policies.47 Downs is of the view that a political party is a group of people who hunt for controlling the governing machinery by gaining office in a duly constituted election.48 The organization of a political party is based on certain basic principles and interests and it is not a loosely knitted organization of a few individuals. A close and intimate relationship among party members is inevitable. Party leadership should ever try to expand its support base. It will lead to legitimize the circle of decision makers. Another important aspect of a democratic party is the adoption of constitutional means for capturing power. It will enable party leadership to implement its programs or to protect and promote its specific interests.49

No one can deny the importance of political parties for the successful working of a democratic system. Political parties are the only source to present the needs, interests and grievances of the masses to the elected assemblies.50 Different authors consider political party as a bridge between the citizens and government.51

46. Nadeem Akhtar, (2013). Role of Political Parties in the Democratic System of Pakistan (Master Thesis), School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg, p. 29. 47. T. Luta Maliyamkono & Fidelis Edge Kanyongolo, (2003). When political Parties Clash. Tema Pub Limited, P.41. 48. Anthony Downs, (1957). An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers, P. 25. 49. Saddique Muhammad Abdullah, (1999). Comparative and development politics, pp. 292-293. 50. Available at: http://www.dawn.com/2011/08/01/political-parties-act.html. 51. According to Randall and Svåsand, ―parties connect the people with the government and serve as an intermediary between the government and civil society organizations.‖ Vicky Randall & Lars Svåsand, (2002). Party Institutionalization in New Democracies. Party Politics 8(1), pp. 5-29. Sartori is of the view that ―parties are best conceived as a ―means of communication‖ between the government and the civil society groups.‖ Giovanni Sartori, (1976); reprint 2005. Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge (UK): Cambridge University Press. P.28. While Lipset claims that ―political parties not only connect the government with civil society groups but they also stimulate other associational activities.‖ Seymour Martin Lipset, (2000). The Indispensability of Political Parties. Journal of Democracy, 11(1), pp. 48-55.

Political parties are inevitable in a democratic set up because during the elections they perform an important function of creating consciousness among the electorates. Political parties enable the citizens to take interest in the political affairs of the state and thus keep the nation politically alive. Once the voters take interest in political affairs, they get attracted towards key issues and problems of the state. To serve this purpose, political parties not only deliver lectures from time to time but also distribute literature.52

2.4. Democracy and Political Parties

Political parties are essential for a democratic system. Democracy cannot exist or flourish without political parties. Lipset argues that through parties people choose amongst the contestants so as to change government officials and bring about a change in political office.53 Despite all the weaknesses of parties and in spite of all the challenges that parties face, one thing remains certain: without parties, democracy cannot function.54 According to Encyclopedia Encarta (2009), political parties mobilize the masses on the basis of a common set of interests, needs and objectives. Political parties are not restricted just to formulate political and policy agendas but also have some other important tasks like to select suitable candidates, to arrange campaigns for elections and to regularly monitor the work of their elected representatives. Also, political parties have to make connections between the citizens and the government and ensuring that masses interference in governmental affairs.55 No one can think of democracy without political parties. It is the political party or group of political parties that form the government or opposition. The political party/parties that get the majority of seats form the government while other political parties sit on the opposition benches and attempt to check and control the abuses

52. K. Kabir (n.d.). Essay on the Importance of Political Parties in Democracy. Available at: http://www.publishyourarticles.net/knowledge-hub/essay/essay-on-the-importance-of- political-parties-in-democracy/6006/ 53. Seymour Martin Lipset, (2000). Op. cit., pp. 48-55. 54. Wilhelm Hofmeister and Karsten Grabow, (2011). Political Parties, Functions and Organization in Democratic Societies. Singapore :Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, p. 91 55. Encyclopedia Encarta (2009), Available at: < http://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2496/200sbd.pdf > p4)

of authority by the ruling party. Political parties play the role of a bridge between the citizens and the government. It is the political parties that inform the government of public demands, needs and other problems. Political parties educate the people about their policies and through their policies they spread awareness among the citizens.

Political parties, whether ruling or opposition, also offer different policy options to the masses. It is political parties that educate the people to defend their rights and it is the support of masses that strengthens political parties. It is one of the important responsibilities of political parties to develop democratic norms and values and promote democratic roots in the society. Political development is impossible without political parties.56 If a political party has democratic structure, respect democratic values and norms, it gets popular support and its leadership wins the trust of masses. On the other hand, if a political party has undemocratic structure and lacks democratic values and practices, it becomes unpopular and its leadership also loses trust of the people. A well organized political party ensures a responsible and accountable form of government that strengthens state institutions and also promotes public participation in state affairs especially in decision-making process.57

In the 21th century, political scientists agree that political parties have not only promoted democracy in the West but are also serving vital functions in modern day states. But it is also a fact to which most of the political scientists agree that the emergence and continuance of regular party competition is possible in a country whose citizens have acquired a measure of political sophistication. A country with flourishing political parties is one where there is a resort to the rules of game, tolerance towards dissent and respect for the rights of opposition etc. On the other hand, a country with inchoate/ languishing

56. Ishrat Husain, (2009). The Role of Politics in Pakistan's Economy. Journal of International Affairs, 63(1), 1. p. 1-18 57. Ishrat Husain, (2009). Op. cit., pp. 1-18

parties is considered as underdeveloped or perverse. Development of political party is essential for democratization and both are signs of political development.58

2.5. The Need for Political Parties

Hofmeister and Grabow hold the view that every society has different needs, opinions, expectations and views on common matters. On the contrary, in every society there are opposing interests that often have a collision with one another. For the peaceful resolution of clashes and conflicts there must be a process of debate and discussion among those have differences of opinions. There should be some common conviction and sincerity. Each and every citizen has the right to represent his view and conviction in a peaceful exchange of views. This assumption of conflicting interests within every society which are lawful is called pluralism and is a substance of ―Competition Theory‖ of democracy.59 As ―tyranny of the majority‖ upset rules of democracy and abuses undeniable individual rights so it must not be there. Yet majority decision may involve deficiency or even unfairness. For that reason, on the one hand, minorities must be provided protection with constitutionally guarantee and on the other the losing side should recognize it electoral defeat which serves as a constitutive element of democracy.

In fact, once the divergent interests are clearly and explicitly expressed and all the parties tolerate and accept and allow other parties to stand for their particular interests and also all the parties accept the principles of the political game (for example parties agree on constitution) then it is likely to decide and resolve conflicts peacefully and form political compromises in a proper way.60 Bryce holds the view that political parties are unavoidable part of democracy. There is not a single democracy in the world which exists

58. Kenneth Kolson, (1978). Party, Opposition, and Political Development. The Review of Politics 40(2), 163-182. 59. The theory holds that the formation of political opinion in the pluralistic society is attained through a process of competition between varied interests. Owing to the diversity of opinions and social conflicts, the way out to the problems is that decisions have to be reached with the support and approval of a majority of the people. 60. Wilhelm Hofmeister and Karsten Grabow, (2011). Political Parties, Functions and Organization in Democratic Societies. Singapore :Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, p. 14.

without political parties. One cannot imagine a representative government without political parties. It is the parties that bring order out of the chaos and confusion of a multitude of voters.61

2.6. Political Conflicts and their Resolution in a Democratic System

According to Hofmeister and Grabow, conflicts may arise within political parties. This may arise either due to varying perceptions on different political issues or due to rivalries among party members for different positions. These conflicts are inevitable in any democratic set-up but need a mindset to be resolved in a correct manner. The conflicts among party members must be resolved under a laid down procedure. All party members including those involved in the conflict should respect the party decisions taken in a democratic manner. In some countries, politicians who enjoy a strong support of voters or who occupy a high public office often do not respect party decisions and leave their parties, if conflicts are not resolved in their favor. This is a negative approach which harms the image of concerned member. In a nutshell, democracy means respect for majority even if one‘s personal position is ―only‖ the opinion of a minority.62 Party conventions and meetings are the two useful tools where intra-party conflicts and disputes are discussed, debated and resolved in a democratic way.63 The ruling party in a democratic set-up takes care of the needs, interests and preferences of the electorates.

Dahl is of the view that the government should be responsiveness to the preferences of citizens and this is the essential feature of democracy.‖64 Consensus building is inevitable part of democracy and it requires compromise and tolerance.65

2.7. Importance of Political Parties to Democracies

61. K. Kabir (n.d.). Op. cit., 62. Wilhelm Hofmeister & Karsten Grabow, (2011). Op-cit., p. 51. 63. Ibid.,, p. 52. 64. Robert A. Dhal, (1971). Op. cit., p. 1. 65. UNDP [United Nations Development Program], 2002: Human Development Report 2002: Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World. New York: Oxford University Press.

Political parties are important in a democratic set up for various reasons. Ezrow is of the view that political parties not only ensure accountability of government for all of its actions but also check the rise of anti-party elements. It also educate the people to the values and norms of democracy.66

One of the functions of political parties is that they educate voters and help them to identify and remove unpopular leadership. Parties not only inform the masses about different issues that different candidates support67 but also enable the electorates to evaluate and judge the past performance of the leaders.68

Political parties also ensure horizontal accountability69 or accountability of the various branches of government. Parties prevent the blending of the executive power with legislature and put a check on the executive branch. Parties in the legislature regularly inquire and oversee the executive and prevent any exploitation by the executive. For example, the parties prevent the executive from appointing or promoting biased judges who might serve the executive. By doing so, parties not only protect and promote the integrity of judiciary but also ensure the fairness and transparency of electoral process.70

Parties also make the government accountable by overseeing the implementation of policies.71 In a democratic system, political parties perform a number of important functions and in their absence or when parties are weak, the two non-elected institutions i.e., military and civil bureaucracy encroach upon the domain of politicians. A more powerful leader may also take the advantage and once the personalities become more important than political parties, democratic accountability becomes weaker.72

66. Natasha Ezrow, (2011). The Importance of Parties and Party System Institutionalization in New Democracies. Institute for Democracy & Conflict Resolution- Briefing Paper (IDCR-BP-06/11). Part of the University of Essex Knowledge Gateway, p. 3. 67. Anthony Downs, (1957). Op. cit., 135-150. 68. Vicky Randall & Lars Svåsand, (2002). Op. cit., pp. 5-29. 69. Guillermo A. O‗Donnell, (1998). Horizontal Accountability in New Democracies, Journal of Democracy 9(3), pp. 112-126. 70. Steven Levitsky & Maxwell A. Cameron, (2003). Democracy Without Parties? Political Parties and Regime Change in Fujimori‗s Peru, Latin American Politics and Society 45(3), pp. 1-33. 71. Natasha Ezrow, (2011). Op. cit., p. 3. 72. Ibid., p. 4.

It is the political parties that block the way for any politician to promote his own interests rather than those of the people. In established democracies, there is little chance for such a politician to succeed. While in a fragile democracy where parties are not well organized, there are more chances for anti-party candidates to be more successful because in the absence of organized parties, the electorates vote on the basis of personal characteristics of the candidates and their personal links with the citizens rather on the basis of some ideology or programe.73

Political parties habituate the masses to democratic values, norms and practices.74 In democracy, no doubt, conflicts occur between the incumbent government and the opposition parties but the manner in which these conflicts are resolved lead to further strength of democratic values and procedures.75 The debate, discussion and other sorts of interactions among various political parties promote the spirit of tolerance among politicians.76 Parties also habituate the public to democratic norms and practices by educating, mobilizing and motivating them to cast their votes. Parties inspire the masses to come forward and take interest and participate in the political process of the country.77

Political parties are the source of articulating and aggregating interests.78 Often different groups come together and compromise on different issues and policies and join hands to form political party.79 It is difficult for independent politicians and they do not compromise on policies that do not match with their own individual preferences. But the hope of winning a larger support base, a political party easily comes to compromise.80

Political parties are also important for a democratic system as they nominate, recruit and socialize political leadership. Parties make search and find the best politicians to lead by

73. Steven Levitsky &Maxwell A. Cameron, (2003). Op. cit., pp. 1-33. 74. Vicky Randall & Lars Svåsand, (2002). Op. cit., pp. 5-29. 75. Seymour Martin Lipset, (2000). Op. cit., pp. 48-55. 76. Ibid., 77. Larry Diamond & Richard Gunther, (2001). Op. cit., pp.7-8. 78. Vicky Randall & Lars Svåsand, (2002). Op. cit., pp. 5-29. 79. Gilat Levy, (2004). A Model of Political Parties. Journal of Economic Theory, 115(2), pp. 250-277. 80. Ibid.,

recruiting zealous and committed candidates. The leadership is selected through established procedures and thus rare chances for leaders to subordinate the party. Parties allow politicians from all backgrounds to come and rise to power. Parties socialize politicians about different democratic values and practices like negotiation, compromise, coordination and consensus building. All this enables politicians to preserve and promote democratic institutions.81

In a democracy where there is parliamentary set up, political parties form and sustain governments. It is done not only through coalition negotiations but also through the allotment of various ministries and offices. Parties also establish rules of procedures in parliament to organize different legislative committees and prepare legislative agendas.

Parties also prevent confusion and chaos by educating politicians in discipline and thus bring order and stability to the system.82

2.8. Opposition in Democracy

Opposition is an unavoidable part of democracy. In a parliamentary system, the political party voted to power, forms the government and remains in office for the mandated term.

The house is usually a two wings house. On the right side of the speaker, the ruling party members are seated whereas the left side is the opposition‘s abode.83 According to

Schapiro, opposition is ―an organized political group which the aims to oust the government in power and to replace it by one of its own choosing.‖84 In an open democracy, there is always room for choice all the way up to the selection of government. This means that divergent opinions are provided an opportunity to be heard in the legislature. It also refers to the views of those parliamentarians who are not part of government and are opposed to the policies of incumbent government. Simply, the

81. Natasha Ezrow, (2011). Op. cit., p. 5. 82. Ibid. 83. Hon. Alban S. K. Bagbin, (2015). The Role, Rights and Responsibilities of the Opposition, p. 2 available at: http://stephendieseruvwe.com/2015/05/27/the-role-rights-and-responsibilities-of-the- opposition-by-hon-alban-s-k-bagbin/ 84. L. Schapiro, (1967). ―Putting the lid on Leninism: Opposition and Dissent in the Communist One-Party States.‖ Government and Opposition vol.2, n°2, 1967.

elected representatives of the people, either belonging to the government or opposition must be provided opportunity to express their opinion, present alternative policy options and take part in parliamentary discussion and debates. Such a faction in the parliament that does not belong to government is called opposition.85

The political parties with less number of seats sit in the assembly as opposition and present their own view, give suggestions to the government and sometime challenge the government policies if they are against the interest of the common people. In a democracy, the opposition parties are free to work and draw the attention and support of the masses and convey a signal to the incumbent government and present itself as the second choice to replace the incumbent party/parties.86

The opposition may be of different types according to the nature of political system.

Simply, opposition means the political party or parties that do not have majority in the parliament and always ready to disagree with and criticize government actions and policies that are not seeking common interests.87 The term opposition refers to those political parties whose members seek support of citizens not as individual candidates but as an organized and disciplined political party and as an alternative government.88

Parliament is the place of debate and transaction of the people‘s business by their elected representatives. Thus opposition in democracy is necessary for representing people and for settling differences with the government. Discussions and dissent is the part of democracy and opposition becomes inevitable for the system. Strong and effective democracy needs an equally strong and effective opposition. The strength of opposition

85. siteresources.worldbank.org/PSGLP/Resources/commonwealthunit7.pdf 86. Nadeem Akhtar, (2013). Role of Political Parties in the Democratic System of Pakistan, p. 30. 87. European conference of presidents of parliaments, Oslo, Norway, 11-12 September 2014, p. 2 88. 53rd Commonwealth parliamentary conference, Role, rights and responsibilities of the opposition, New Delhi, India, 27 September 2007, The Parliamentarian 2007/Issue Four 307.

in a parliament shows the quality of democracy.89 In fact, opposition is an inevitable component of a democratic system.90

2.9. Importance of Opposition in a Democratic system

It is a fact that for a successful democracy, multi party system or, at least, bi-party system is a must. If in a country there is single party system and there is no vigilant and effective opposition, there will be every possibility of government to become autocratic. One party system degenerates into dictatorship. Where there is one party system, the opposition is muzzled and crushed and the dictatorship of the single party is established. Germany during Hitler‘s rule and Italy during Mussoloni rule are the cases in point.91

One cannot think of a democratic set up without a healthy and vigilant opposition. For the success of any parliamentary democracy, an effective opposition is must to perform its functions fearlessly and effectively. The opposition basically works for the rights of the people. History teaches us that freedom dies when criticism ends. It is the opposition that checks the incumbent party‘s despotism. Where there are elements in the form of informed critics for good means, a healthy criticism which can hold the government responsible and answerable for its actions then the government is attentive to its duties.

The continuous situation at loggerhead with the opposition keeps the government in action all the time around as it cannot afford to be lacking and careless. Excellence could only be achieved in strict checks and watchful eyes of opposition. Mutual consensus allows a bill to become law and it is sanctioned from opposition too. The opposition

89. 53rd Commonwealth parliamentary conference, Op. cit., 90. According to Democratic Theory ―the principle of legitimate political opposition is one of the most fundamental components of liberal democracy. As Hon. Alban quoted, Ian Shapiro, ―democracy is an ideology of opposition as much as it is one of government.‖ Hon Alban S. K. Bagbin, (2015). Op. cit., p. 1. Helms is of the view that ‗there can be no real democracy without opposition. Helms Ludger, (2008). Studying Parliamentary Opposition in Old and New Democracies: Issues and Perspectives‘, the Journal of Legislative Studies, vol. 14, nos. 1/2, March/June 2008, 6-19, p. 6. 91. K. Kabir. Essay on the Importance of Political Parties in Democracy, available at: http://www.publishyourarticles.net/knowledge-hub/essay/essay-on-the-importance-of- political-parties-in-democracy/6006/.

combs through the bill for any discrepancies and its after effects in the long run. If opposition is absent then the ruling party can act despotically.92

2.10. Rights and Responsibilities of Opposition

The opposition in any democratic set-up enjoys the right to operate freely and promote democratic values. Laws or actions that hinder or put fetters on opposition are not only harmful for opposition but also have adverse effects on the promotion of democracy.

Some of the guidelines mentioned in the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly

Resolution 1601 (2008),93 (For details see annexure 2) are enumerated below:

Opposition members must have freedom of expression, freedom of opinion and to freely express their views on matters under discussion in the house.

Members of the opposition in parliament shall enjoy the right to information. They must have free and equal access to information in the same manner like the ruling party members.

Opposition members have the right to inform the citizens. They also have the right of access to different sources of information such as television channels, internet sites etc.

The opposition members shall be privileged to debate, discuss and scrutinize the policies, decisions and actions of the government. Right to ask oral or written questions from the members of the government. In the same manner they have the right to receive replies to their questions. They have the right to open question time and members of the opposition shall be privileged to ask more questions than members of the government. The opposition can hold the incumbent government accountable by tabling a motion of censure or no confidence. The right to ask for a discussion and debate regarding an urgent and important issue and it should be granted if the required number of members demand

92. http://www.preservearticles.com/201103254718/role-of-an-effective-opposition-in-a-democracy.html 24-10-2013. 93. The Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly. Resolution 1601 (2008). Procedural Guidelines on the Rights and Responsibilities of the Opposition in a Democratic Parliament. Available at: http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2H-Xref- ViewPDF.asp?FileID=17626&lang=en

so. The right to request for setting up a committee of inquiry, a fact-finding mission or parliamentary mission of information. The right to ask for a special session of parliament to discuss some matter of urgency. It should be granted if the required number of parliamentarians so demand. Opposition shall be allotted sufficient speaking time. Under certain circumstances, equal speaking time to government and opposition members should also be ensured.

The right to take part in the management of parliamentary work. The right of access to different posts likes vice-president and other posts of responsibility. The composition of any governing body in parliament shall respect the principle of proportional representation and opposition shall be given its due share.

It includes the right to initiate legislation and table bills and motion on various legislative matters, the right to propose and present amendments in laws, the right to speak in all legislative debates. Similarly, they have the right to vote, the right to present procedural motions for change in the adopted agenda and the right to refer a report back to the concerned House Committee.

The chairmanship of various permanent and standing committees inside the parliament shall be allotted to the parliamentary parties on the basis of proportional representation.

Opposition be allowed to head at least one permanent committee. Chairmanship of the main monitoring and oversight committees94 should be allowed to a member from the opposition. All the committees, permanent or standing shall be composed of various political parties in accordance with their strength in the parliament. In the committees, the members of opposition shall have the right to speak and right to vote. The right to be designated as a rapporteur on the basis of proportional representation.

94. Such as the committee on finance, committee supervising security and intelligence services or the committee on audit.

The right to ask for reviewing the constitutionality of the adopted laws and refer the matter to constitutional court or other legal body prior to their adoption. The right of access to Audit Court and asking for its opinion on financial matters.

Along with all the above mentioned rights, the opposition shall participate in political decisions. Opposition shall also be consulted before any decision to dissolve the parliament.

2.11. Role and Obligations of Opposition

Both ruling and opposition parties are central to the working of democracy. That is why both ruling and opposition parties share the basic democratic values such as the freedom of speech, rule of law and equal protection under the law. In fact, the opposition is,

―government-in the-waiting.‖ The opposition should have the right to express their views, to dissent or criticize the incumbent government, if democracy has to be promoted.

Besides, the opposition parties need to have confidence that they have a chance to campaign and present themselves before the electorates for seeking their votes through free, fair and regular elections.95 Shortly, if democracy is to be promoted the principle of

‗majority rule, must be accompanied by minority right i.e., accommodation of dissenting views.

Political pluralism and democracy cannot be separated. Government‘s acceptance of opposition, protest and the existence of an institutional representation for the political opposition are the pre conditions for the effective working of democratic institutions.

French philosopher and political scientist Raymond Aron, holds the view that democracy is a system ―in which a peaceful rivalry for the acquisition of power exists constitutionally.‖96 The role of opposition in the proper functioning of liberal democracy is universally acknowledged.97

95. Julius Kiiza & Hotel A. Impala, (2005). The Role of Opposition Parties in a Democracy. In Regional Conference on Political Parties and Democratization in East Africa, Tanzania. 96. European conference of presidents of parliaments, Oslo, Norway, 11-12 September 2014, p. 2. 97. Hon Alban S. K. Bagbin, (2015). Op. cit., p. 1

Democracy places emphasis on an orderly pattern of relationship between the ruling and opposition parties which is to be characterized by consensus and participation. Although the opposition parties do not hold executive positions, yet they do exercise a check on the ruling party/coalition. Democracy allows the opposition to criticize the government and put forward alternative policy options. On the one hand if opposition is required to grant recognition to the authority of government, on the other hand, it is also expected to exercise a check on the government. This is because a flourishing democracy always needs an active and effective opposition. In a democratic system, all the political parties whether from ruling or opposition side develop an atmosphere of trust, tolerance and understanding and resolve their difference peacefully. The rulers govern the country on the consent of governed. The opposition parties also recognize the right of the majority party to rule and make decisions but, at the same time, the ruling party also respects the opposition‘s right to dissent.98

For determining effectiveness of democracy in its real sense, it is important to examine the role of opposition as a yardstick. Not only the ruling party but the opposition parties too have an important role to play. The role of opposition parties should not be critical only but it should also be constructive.99 The effective role of opposition is more important in parliamentary system because there is every possibility of combining the executive and legislative powers which may enable the executive to acquire preponderance over all other state institutions. In such a situation, the presence of an active and vigilant opposition and regular alteration of government are important for having a check on the executive branch of government.

The opposition parties struggle for safeguarding the rights and the interests of the people.

With this view, they criticize the government in case the latter ignores them. They resort to protestation in the House and at the public level. It counts very much for raising the

98. Wondwosen Teshome, (2009). Opposition Parties and the Politics of Opposition in Africa: A Critical Analyses. International Journel of Human and Social Sciences vol: 4, pp. 287-88. 99. Nadeem Akhtar, (2013). Op. cit., P. 45.

level of political consciousness among the people. However, sometime just for the sake of opposition, the opposition criticizes the right policy of the government which is harmful for democracy.100

Members of the opposition parties are also included in various committees connected to the respective ministries. All procedures and dealings of the government associated with the respective ministries are talked about and settled by them. The opposition plays a considerable role in it through making recommendations.101

The responsible opposition parties play an important role in the promotion of democracy as is evident from the following headings:

2.11.1. Opposition as the Voice of the Voiceless

The opposition in a democratic set up monitors the day to day activities and performance of the incumbent government and keeps the citizens informed. Both the party in power and the one in opposition are the agents of citizens. 102 The opposition plays a special role both inside and outside the Parliament by voicing concern over the grievances of various groups and other interests that are not represented in the parliament.103 It makes certain that the opinions of the opposition are given full coverage, particularly when the issue at hand is of immense national importance. Thus, the opposition becomes the voice of the voiceless section of society. By doing so, they build the confidence of the public and assures them that their concerns and interests are competently expressed and protected.104

2.11.2. To Offer a Viable Alternative to the Government

100. Sheetal Kumari. An essay, What is the Role of the Opposition in a Democracy. Available at: http://www.publishyourarticles.net/knowledge-hub/essay/what-is-the-role-of-opposition-in- democracy/5092/. 101. Ibid., 102. Adam Przeworski &Susan C. Stokes, (1999). Democracy, Accountability and Representation. CambridgeUniversity Press: Cambridge, United Kingdom, P. 48. 103. Hon Alban S K. Bagbin, (2015). Op. cit., p. 3. 104. 53rd Commonwealth parliamentary conference, Op. cit.

The opposition also develops alternative policies and programs and presents itself as a viable alternative to the incumbent government.105 In a democratic set up, there is a constant reminder to the voters that there is a credible alternative to the government of the day. An alternative that has the potential to improve the quality of life of the people, serve their interests and let them realize their aspirations. The opposition presents a viable alternative ideological program and shows that it is more competent, to rule, than the ruling party.106 To attain democratization, only advocating democratization is not enough rather the opposition should serve as a credible alternative to the serving government as it is not possible to achieve and sustain democracy in the absence of alternative power.

Stronger the opposition, brighter would be the future of democracy.107

2.11.3. Seeking Accountability of Government

It is the opposition that scrutinizes activities of the government by making the latter to justify its move. The opposition always remains active and vigilant and serves as a watchdog. It keeps the government within the prescribed limits of law by pointing out her shortcomings. It does not loose sight of its aims and objectives which is to keep the government on the track. Thus opposition ensures transparency in state affairs.108 The opposition also keeps check on the activities of the incumbent government by asking questions in the parliament and in different committees. Opposition members who are also members of different parliamentary committees usually call on and ask the government to account for the performance of its duties. Thus, the opposition has the opportunity not only to highlight but expose those aspects of the government that do not serve common/national interests. Resultantly, the government of the day is induced to

105. Ibid., 106. Hon Alban S. K. Bagbin, (2015). Op. cit., p. 4. 107. E. Y. Wing‐yat, & N. C. Ka‐man, (2012). The Political Opposition and Democracy In Macao: Revolutionaries or Loyalists? Government and opposition, 47(1), 97-116. 108. Commentary: The Role of the Opposition in a Democracy: available at http://dominicanewsonline.com/news/homepage/features/commentary/commentary- the-role-of-the-opposition-in-a-democracy/

rethink and bring modifications in its policies and programs by bringing them in harmony with the common good.109

2.11.4. To Oppose the Government in Power

Opposition derives its status from the role of being opposing all the time. This role of the opposition to oppose the government is both vague and beneficial at the same time. Their ultimate goal is to convince the people to throw away the incompetent government and allow or facilitate the opposition to come into power and serve the masses in a better way. To achieve the purpose, the opposition parties highlights and exposes those aspects of the serving government which, it believes, are contrary to the national interests. The opposition exposes the dark side other side110 which the government attempts to put out of public sight i.e. unconstructive aspect. This is a fundamental responsibility of opposition to shield and protect the masses and society from the undemocratic acts and policies of the government in office. Performing this responsibility is not easy, because it attempts to confront and challenge each and every misuse of executive authority, violation of individual rights, waste of public money, and exposes all these for control. This is really a watchdog job and serves as a check over the unrestrained exercise of authority by the executive. It is through the performance of this role that the negative perception of the opposition arises.111 The opposition has the right to criticize the policies of the government but it has to be fair in its criticism. The opposition should put forward alternative proposals with supportive arguments.112 It is essential for the opposition to be cautious while criticizing the incumbent party as it may be in government in coming time and yet fail to put into practice what it was criticizing the government for.113

2.11.5. In Case of National Tragedy and National Glory

109. 53rd Commonwealth parliamentary conference. Op. cit. 110. Hon. Alban S. K. Bagbin, (2015). Op. cit., p. 4. 111. Ibid., p. 5. 112. Ibid., p. 8. 113. 53rd Commonwealth parliamentary conference. Op-cit.

It is the primary responsibility of not only the incumbent government but of the opposition as well to uphold and defend the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state. Both must make every possible effort to ensure stability of the country and avoid such activities that are detrimental to the unity of the state.114 In the same way, if there occurs some national tragedy or mishap, they have to ignore and to put aside all their differences with each other and make collectively efforts to deal with the tragedy.

Likewise they also have to celebrate jointly when it is a matter of national pride and glory.115 It is in the interest of not only the democratic practice but also in the interest of the nation that both the incumbent and the opposition parties are loyal to the nation and uphold the rule of law regardless of the fact that they are critical of each other.116

In a true democratic set-up, opposition is as important as the government and it has to perform its role fearlessly and effectively. For performing such a role, the opposition has to be recognized, it should be accorded rights and it should also be provided to act responsibly.117 In case of extreme confrontation between the ruling and opposition parties, if the incumbent government is all powerful and wants to muzzle the opposition then opposition has to go for mass movement and agitation. This is then the only option available to opposition to save the democracy. The great Greek philosopher Plato has rightly put when he said that, ―the punishment of wise man who refuses to take part in the affairs of the government, is to live under the government of unwise men.‖118 It is for the incumbent government to allow the opposition to fulfill these functions which indicate a sign of democratic maturity on the part of the government. The opposition has to focus on its democratic functions and if it fails to do so, it will be a sign of dysfunctional democracy.

114. Hon. Alban S. K. Bagbin, (2015). Op. cit., p. 8. 115. Ibid., p. 9. 116. 53rd Commonwealth parliamentary conference. Op. cit. 117. Ibid., 118. Sheetal Kumari. Op. cit.

CHAPTER - 3

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

3.1. Introduction

This chapter consists of a detailed account of the causes of political instability in

Pakistan, the centralization of governmental authority, constitutional dilemma, the undemocratic attitude of political parties and leadership. It further discusses the role of bureaucracy and military in politics and the military intervention into the politics. The

Ayub Khan‘s era is also discussed in detail. In the end, the 1965 war, Tashkent

Declaration and Bhutto‘s maneuvering is also discussed. This chapter further examines the initial style of PPP politics i.e. from November 1967 to 1970 general election‘s result.

During this period, the party acted in dual capacities i.e., as a new platform opposing

Ayub Khan‘s stay in power; and then as a majority party in the Western Pakistan maneuvering for getting into power. The focus here is as to why Pakistan Peoples Party was formed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto when already there was an established political party

(Muslim League) and he himself was a strong supporter of Ayub Khan. Opposition to

Ayub Khan not only by Bhutto but by other politicians from both parts of the country is also discussed in detail. Next, the chapter focuses on the 1970 elections and its aftermath.

3.2. Political Instability After Independence

Well organized and well entrenched political parties are vital for any political system to function efficiently. Regrettably, Pakistani political parties are unsuccessful to develop into strong vehicles of national political will.119

Since from its very birth, Pakistani leadership is struggling for a better form of government. Though they have agreed to adopt democracy as a system of government but

119. Hamid Khan, (2001). Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 352.

could not sustain it for a number of reasons democracy including military interference into politics of the country.120

Initially Pakistan adopted the Government of India Act 1935 with certain amendments as its interim constitution. A parliamentary form of government, as provided by the Act, was agreed to put in practice. But, as on one hand, the Governor General exercised more powers, likewise, the central government overpowered the provinces.121 It is true that

Jinnah as the first Governor General acquired a powerful position because of a number of factors such as the lack of experienced politicians, lack of professional experts, serious administrative and management problems faced by the newly born country, fear of the survival of the state122 in the wake of Indian threat and many other domestic issues that needed special attention. In such a grave situation, it became inevitable for the leadership to assert central authority. Jinnah was a man of great insight and his towering personality dominated early political conditions of the country. All his actions were necessitated by the exigency of time. He always concentrated on executive decision making and crisis management and had these not been done, the country position would have been more perilous.123 In the early days of the independence, it was the need of the time for the central leadership to adopt a dominant role. Under the system, the Governor General was given more powers as compared to the prime minister.124 A few people condemn that

Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah‘s wielded more authority to himself and became a strong and powerful Governor General. They argue this as a first blow to parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. But this decision has to be examined and appreciated both in the light of the constitutional arrangement in place under 1935 Act, the Indian Independence

120. Hasan Askari Rizvi, (2011). Democracy in Pakistan. Project on the State of Democracy in South Asia as part of the Qualitative Assessment of Democracy, Lokniti (Programme of Comparative Democracy), Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi, p. 3. 121. Ibid. 122. Lawrence Ziring, (2000). Pakistan in the Twentieth Centuary: A Political History. (The Jubilee Series), p.100. 123. Ibid. 124. Surendra Nath Kaushik, (1985). Pakistan Under Bhutto's Leadership. New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House, pp. 39-40.

Act, as adopted by Pakistan (Provisional Constitution) Order 1947, and the political situation under which the founder of the Nation had to exercise his constitutional authority, for nurturing the newly born country.125 It was unfortunate that Quaid‘s successors did not posses any of his great qualities nor did they command the obedience that had been enjoyed by him Thus, Pakistan‘s democracy soon fell perpetually victim to factionalism and dictatorship. Among his followers, those who tried to imitate Jinnah made a shamble of the high office and pushed the country into deeper difficulties.126

After the demise of Jinnah, there was disappointment over the appointment of Khawaja

Nazimuddin from all sections of society, which proved an unmitigated disaster. Liaqat

Ali Khan had passed a long time in Jinnah‘s company and was eager to assert his own position and did not want a leader who could disturb him. So Nazimuddin was a perfect choice for Prime Minister.127 On various occasions, heads at the centre and also in provinces turned to adopt arbitrary attitudes and did not show any respect for the norms of parliamentary government.128 But unfortunately no party had a leader bold enough to come forward and protect the system. It is not because of the lack of competent leadership but because of the lack of commitment to democratic principles. The leaders were always at squabbles with each other for their vested interests, for their families and for their regional/provincial groups. There was a continuous struggle for power all the

125. A specific provision as was available in British North America Act and other Dominion constitutions binding the Governor General to the advice of the Cabinet or Council was not available in the Provisional Constitution Order for Pakistan. Therefore Governor General of Pakistan was constitutionally a more empowered Governor General, in the Vice Royal mould.In addition, there were other reasons also as to why Pakistan was not a fully functioning democracy, at its birth. It mainly comprised regulated provinces and areas of British India, with features like: executive was excessively strong, elected institutions were weak, undeveloped middle class, and feudal aristocracy. The above geo-polity needed a strong Governor General. Shahzado Shaikh Quaid-e- Azam‘s Vision: A Democratic Pakistan. Available at: http://www.hamariweb.com/articles/article.aspx?id=41771. 126. Lawrence Ziring, (2000). Op. cit., p. 100. 127. Lawrence Ziring, (2000). Ibid., pp. 100-101. 128. Khalid Bin Saeed, (1959). Collapse of Parliamentary Democracy in Pakistan. The Middle East Journal, 389-406.

time. Like Hobbe‘s state of nature, every political group was at war with every other group.129 The cure for this trouble emerged in the shape of martial law in October, 1958.

3.3. Political Parties and Democracy in Post Independence Pakistan

Political parties are the integral part of democratic system. In the absence of political parties, it is difficult for democracy to see light of the day. The mere presence of political parties is not enough, there must be dynamic leadership and the parties must concentrate on their basic functions of interest articulation, interest aggregation, participation in election and governance within the prescribed democratic limit, otherwise it will adversely affect governance and the whole political setup.130

Political parties connect the state and society together and that is why they perform a vital role in the institutionalization of democracy. But unfortunately, political parties remained underdeveloped in Pakistan due to a number of reasons i.e., low level of development of

Pakistani society, the authoritarian and intolerant attitude of the early leaders which has been embraced by the latecomers and the imbalance of power between state and political institutions, which invited time and again the non elected institution i.e. military to the corridor of power, consequently democracy could not gain ground in Pakistani environment.131 It is not because there is lack of political parties, but they have not worked well. The parties have been ineffective in the performance of their fundamental functions such as interest articulation, interest aggregation and policy making. Thus the two non-political institutions of the state i.e. Bureaucracy and Military assumed the responsibility of policy formulation.132 Most of the political parties in Pakistan lack organized membership. Even the party members are often not well informed about the party program. With the exception of few political parties, others lacked organized structure. A majority of political parties remain dormant most of the time and become

129. Khalid Bin Saeed, (1959). Op. cit., p. 389-406. 130. Inayatullah, (1997). State and Democracy in Pakistan. Lahore: Vanguard, p. 39. 131. Ibid., p. 39. 132. Craig Baxter, et.al,(1998). Government and Politics in South Asia. Lahore: Vanguard books, p. 188.

active only on the occasion of elections. Very few of the parties in Pakistan practice internal democracy and educate their members adequately. They do not bother about developing a sound foundation for the strengthening of democracy and creating a sense of nationhood among the masses.133 There are mainly four explanations for the ineffectiveness of political parties in Pakistan. Firstly, personalism, most of the political parties are amorphous grouping attached to a few individuals. And as the leader/individual disappears, the party automatically disperses into various warring factions e.g. Muslim League after the death of the founder of Pakistan (Muhammad Ali

Jinnah) in 1948 and then after the assassination of Pakistan first Prime Minister Liaqat

Ali Khan in 1951. Secondly, regionalism has always played its negative role. The majority of the post-Jinnah political leaders regionalized and localized politics as they did not have a nationwide appeal and had regional and local stature.134 This is very much clear from the results of first ever general elections of 1970 in Pakistan. In the said elections, political parties gained strength from the regional constituencies. Thirdly, factionalism is not less effective in the ineffectiveness of political parties. In Pakistan, political leaders are members of prominent families. Loyalty to such leaders is neither doctrinal nor ideological allegiance to a party program but rather by the individuals association with the party. Last but not the least, is the repression which is the rule and not the exception of Pakistani political culture.135 It is the cultural and material development of a society in which citizens are free to form groups and associations so as to articulate their interests and demands that leads to the emergence of political parties. But the lack of such development and absence of freedom in Pakistani society particularly during the first decade constrained the development of political parties. But later on during 1960s, the industrial development accompanied by certain other social changes led to the emergence

133. Inayatullah, (1997). Op. cit., p. 39. 134. Hasan Askari Rizvi, (2011). Op. cit., p. 3. 135. Craig Baxter (1998). Op. cit., p. 188-190.

of new political parties such as Pakistan Peoples Party and old parties like Awami League also gained strength.136

Well-organized and well-entrenched political parties are very much essential for a sound and effective political and constitutional system.137 It is the primary responsibility of political parties to safeguard democratic values in a country, but unfortunately, political parties in Pakistan have failed in fulfilling this responsibility. The political parties could not carry the representative system of governance forward. The All-India Muslim

League which had launched the struggle for independent Pakistan from 1940 to 1947, was not a well organized political party.138 Keith Callard has beautifully portrayed the scenario.139

It was the negative attitude of Pakistan Muslim League towards rival parties that badly affected the development of other parties.140 It did not extend recognition and respect to the legitimate opposition and often labeled other parties as traitors. The Muslim League never hesitated in initiating repressive measures against opposition. This political culture of Muslim League was later on adopted by other political parties particularly Pakistan

Peoples Party.141 Soon after independence, the ruling Muslim League‘s lack of democratic experience forced important political figures to form opposition. On the one hand, the

Muslim League could not satisfy masses and, on the other, it sidelined those key personalities who were opposing its policies which cost her heavily. The result was that some capable and influential leaders along with their supporters parted ways with the

136. Inayatullah, (1997). Op. cit., p. 39-40. 137. Noor ul Haq, (2010). Governance and Democracy in Pakistan: Weaknesses, Strengths and Prospects, IPRI journal x, no.1, 7, p.8. 138. Ibid., p. 8. 139. The system of political parties in Pakistan bears little resemblance to that of the other democratic countries. Politics has begun at the top. Pakistan has neither a two party system in which struggle is waged between fairly stable groups, one of which is in office and the other in opposition; nor a multi-party system, in which clear differences of program or ideology separate a variety of opponents. In Pakistan, politics is made up of a large number of leading persons who, with their political dependents, form loose agreements to achieve power and to maintain it. Keith. B. Callard, (1957). A Political Study. London: Allen and Unwin. p. 67. 140. Inayatullah, (1997). Op. cit., p. 40. 141. Ibid., p. 40.

Muslim League. Suhrawardi was one such disgruntled leaders who felt that the ruling clique was unable to accommodate the political aspirants to play their part in politics. In a very short time, he became a leader of opposition in both parts of the country. Some other important political figures also joined Suhrawardi and thus they formed their own political party known as All Pakistan Awami Muslim League.142

In fact, the ruling party showed indifference even to its own members and made no efforts to persuade the dissatisfied workers to remain affiliated with the Muslim League.

Thus, those members and workers had no other option but to join opposition. As the

League identified itself with the state, every sort of opposition to Muslim League was treated badly and was labeled as anti-state or anti Pakistan.143 The elections for the East

Bengal Provincial Assembly was announced in March 1954. Here it is to be noted that there were demands for fresh elections because the members of the assembly who were elected in 1946 had lost popular support and ceased to reflect public opinion.144 The ruling Muslim League was biased towards Awami League and did not provide a level playing field during Provincial Legislative Assemblies elections to its members including

Suhrawardy who was the leader of the party. No member of the Awami League was allowed to campaign freely for the party. Due to the negative attitude of the ruling clique, the Awami League could not produce the desired results and got a negligible representation in the western province. Suhrawardy, after experiencing such sort of situation in West Pakistan, decided to challenge Muslim League in the Eastern province.

The Bengali grievances against central government were on the peak which provided

Suhrawardy a chance to exploit and advance his party agenda.

Most of the influential leaders from East Bengal who were not satisfied with the Muslim

League rule joined Awami League while some others decided to establish their own

142. Ghulam Mustafa, (2010). Alliances Politics in Pakistan: A study of the United Front, Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, Vol.XXXI, No.1, p. 103-129, p. 106. 143. Akhtar Hussain, (2008). Politics of Alliances in Pakistan 1954-1999 (PhD Thesis), Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad, p. 1. 144. Ibid., p. 2.

political parties. Thus, gradually new opposition parties started to emerge on the scene.

Some prominent figures from these opposition political parties, sensing the dominant position of Muslim League, decided to form a United Front against it in the 1954 elections.145

3.4. The Situation during 1954 Elections

All the opposition parties antagonized against the Muslim League, realized that fighting among themselves would bring no positive change but further strengthen the Muslim

League. Most of the opposition parties in East Bengal welcomed the idea of a United

Front. The parties that constituted the United Front were: Awami League, Krishak

Saramic Party (peasants and workers party), Maulana Ataha Ali‘s Nizam-i-Islami (NI)

Party and Ganatantri Dal (GD), a party of the left including the communists and led by a leader of the Tebhaga Peasant Movement.146 Although some other small parties like

Khilafat-i- Rabbani and East Pakistan Communist Party did not form part of the United

Front, yet they had a secret understanding to support it in the provincial elections against the ruling Muslim League.147 The constituent political parties of the United Front jointly adopted a 21-point programme.148 This programme was actually meant to accommodate the agendas of all the political parties forming the United Front. In the strict sense, the programme differed in some respects from the declared party agendas of the constituent parties of the United Front.149 The 21-point programme of the United Front incorporated different demands such as the adoption of Bengali as one of Pakistan‘s national languages along with its adoption as a source of education, guaranteeing economic improvements, nationalization of jute trade and ensuring fair prices.150 The said programme also insisted that only defense, foreign affairs and currency should remain

145. Ghulam Mustafa, (2010). Op. cit., p. 107. 146. Christophe Jaffrelot, (Ed.). (2004), A History of Pakistan and its Origins. Anthem Press, p. 48. 147. Akhtar Hussain, (2008).Op. cit., p. 6. 148. Christophe Jaffrelot, (Ed.). (2004). Op. cit., p. 48. 149. Akhtar Hussain, (2008). Op. cit., p. 7 150. Christophe Jaffrelot, (Ed.). (2004). Op. cit., p.48.

with the central government while rest of the subjects should be left to the provinces. In a nutshell, the United Front incorporated in its twenty one point manifesto something for everyone in East Bengal.151 The Muslim League started its election campaign in January

1954. It called upon the masses to vote for Muslim League as it would ensure the ―very existence of Pakistan‖. In Dhaka, on twenty first January 1954, the Chief Minister Nurul

Amin, while addressing a conference of the All East Pakistan Muslim Students League said that general elections would be a ―sort of referendum to decide if East Pakistan would remain a part of Pakistan or join India‖.152 The Chief Minister accused that all the units of United Front were against Pakistan and the Muslim League. The opposition parties were alleged as a group combined together to destroy Pakistan and dismantle the founder organization. The Chief Minister also severely criticized the two prominent leaders of United Front namely A. K. Fazlul Haq and Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy.153

The League leaders emphasized that only Muslim League could bring harmony and understanding between the two wings of Pakistan. They claimed that the solidarity of

Pakistan was in the victory of Muslim League. They also made scathing attacks against the United Front for the inherent disunity among its constituent units. They described that

United Front had only one thing in common that was their prejudice and hatred against the Muslim League. They also alleged the United Front that ―it received a donation of

Rupees one crore from India and that if succeeded in the elections, the Front would be controlled by the Indians.154

It was the first general elections on the basis of adult franchise. The people of East

Pakistan gave their verdict against the Muslim League and against the central government. The United Front emerged victorious by securing 229 seats out of the total

309. The Muslim League won only nine seats and met its waterloo at the hands of United

151. Ibid., p. 48. 152. Akhtar Hussain, (2008). Op. cit., p. 8. 153. Ibid., p. 8 154. Ibid., pp. 8-9

Front. The party was never given a hearing in the province again.155 The chief minister and the president of East Pakistan Muslim League Nurul Amin was defeated by a law graduate Khaliq Nawaz.156

3.5. Lack of Elections in Pakistan

The general elections at national level were held in Pakistan after a lapse of 23 years of its birth. However, in the provincial elections people went to the polls in 1951 in Punjab and N.W.F.P (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and a little later in Sindh and East Pakistan.

Unfortunately, these elections did not contribute to either promote political institutions or democracy in Pakistan. 157

These provincial elections particularly in West Pakistan were a mockery and fraud with the masses. The ruling party (Muslim League) used all sorts of means for maintaining its hold over the three provinces of West Pakistan. However, in East Bengal, despite the firm support of central government for Muslim League, the United Front swept the polls and routed the Muslim League out from East Pakistan.158 As put by Kamran,Yunas Samad confirms it by arguing that the central government ceased to be neutral and non-partisan in the elections held in the Punjab, NWFP and Sindh. It was confirmed that some of the state functionaries at the call of the central government interfered and disturbed the free exercise of ballot. In some cases, the nomination papers of the opposition candidates were rejected on baseless and flimsy grounds and in other cases, they were thrown into prison on the charges of their being a threat to the state.159

The Muslim League, unlike Congress, had no post independence planned political program. It lacked grassroots support, powerful factional leaders and had weak organizational structure. After independence, the Muslim League consisted of mostly big landowners whose interests were in conflict with democratic dispensation. It was also a

155. Christophe Jaffrelot, (Ed.). (2004). Op. cit., p.48. 156. Akhtar Hussain, (2008). Op. cit., p. 12. 157. Tahir Kamran. Electoral Politics in Pakistan (1955-1969), Pakistan Vision, 10(1), p. 82. 158. Ibid., pp. 82-83. 159. Ibid.

fact that a few of the Muslim Leaguers had roots in Pakistan.160 Their ineffectiveness and mutual rivalries for power and position had played its role for delaying the constitution making. Instead of consensus, cooperation and mutual understanding, they were busy most of the time in ceaseless infighting. The imposition of mini Martial Law in 1953 was the result of a conflict between the central and provincial leadership.161

3.6. Delayed Framing of Constitution

According to the proposals of Cabinet Mission Plan, a constituent assembly was indirectly elected by the provincial legislatures, which was charged with the task of framing the constitution for united India.162 But with the partition of India, the constituent assembly got divided. Initially, the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan was consisted of 69 members who were later on increased. The Assembly was given the dual responsibility i.e. in addition to framing of the constitution it had to shoulder the responsibility of acting as a legislature.163 The most urgent and pressing task was structuring of a constitution.

The constitution was supposed to lay down that which form of government to be adopted, what will be the role and responsibilities of judiciary, military, and bureaucracy.

Additionally, religion and the state, provincial autonomy, joint or separate electorate, fundamental rights and civil liberties and minorities and women representation were other important issues that the Constitution had to decide. The representation of both the wings and religion versus secularism were the main hindrances in the framing of the constitution.164

The members of the assembly belonged to two parties i.e. the Muslim League and the

Congress. All of the League members except one or two represented the Muslims, while

Congress party was representing Hindus mostly from East Pakistan. The strength of

160. Noor ul Haq, (2010). Op. cit., p.8. 161. Ibid. 162. Hamid Yousaf, (1998). Pakistan: A Study of Political Developments, 1947-97. Lahore: Pakistan Academy of Administrative and Social Science, p.47. 163. Ibid. 164. Noor ul Haq, (2010). Op. cit., p.7.

Muslim League was 59 mostly from landlords while members of the Congress came from the middle class. The opposition that Muslim League had to face in the Constituent

Assembly came from within, in the form of various groups.165

The Objectives Resolution passed in March 1949 was a landmark development in the constitution making process. It stated the fundamental principles and basic objectives on which the future constitution was to be based. The minority leaders opposed the

Objectives Resolution on its religious accent.166 The Pakistan National Congress was the main opposing party. Its argument was that the Objectives Resolution has mixed religion with politics and it will reduce the minorities to the status of serfs.167 On the other side, the religious leaders also opposed the resolution on its secular implications.168 However, the real problem was how to give these principles/objectives a practical shape in the form of future constitution.

East Bengal which was about 1/6th the size of the western wing had more population than Western part, demanded for democratic rights and better economic conditions, while the western part having larger area, had better strategic situation and natural resources. It was also in a dominant position as far as the administrative and army services were concerned. The West Pakistan was apprehensive of the predominant position of Bengal that might pose a threat to the feudal interests. Another complicating feature was that a significant percentage of the population in the Eastern wing belonged to Hindu minority.

So in such a strain situation, it was very difficult to devise a constitutional arrangement acceptable to both parts of the country.169

Thus the constitution making process was delayed for about a decade due to the harsh and adverse attitudes of elites both from West and East Pakistan. The central point of

165. Hamid Yousaf.,(1998). Op. cit., p.47. 166. Safdar Mahmood, (2000). Pakistan: Political Roots and Development, 1947-1999. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 36. 167. Ibid. 168. Mushtaq Ahmad, (1971). Politics Without Social Change. Space Publishers, p. 28. 169. Hamid Yousaf, (1998). Op. cit., p. 48.

conflict was the distribution of powers between the centre and the provinces governments. West Pakistan stood for a strong centre while East Pakistan demanded maximum provincial autonomy. The second issue that played its part in complicating the process of constitution making was that of representation. As the East Bengalis constituted 54% of the total population, they demanded for representation proportionate to their numbers.170 But the West wing elite were not ready to accept this demand.171 They considered themselves more important and more leading so they made every possible attempt to put an end to every such development that might give the Bengalis a sway in the decision making process. In a nutshell both East and West Pakistan feared of each other‘s domination. None of the two sides were ready to create an atmosphere of harmony and understanding. The deadlock/controversy lasted for a long time which gave birth to regionalism and negative feelings against each other that rose to the surface in

1971.172 Thus, the mutual rivalry between the two wings of Pakistan led to a bloody conflict which, at last, resulted into the separation of East Pakistan and her emergence as

Bangladesh.

In October 1954, when the Governor General Ghulam Muhammd dissolved the first

Constitutional Assembly, the Supreme Court mandated a second Constituent

Assembly.173 The second Constituent Assembly met in 1955 and in a very short time amalgamated the three provinces (Punjab, Sindh, NWFP now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and the commissioner province of Balochistan of the West Pakistan into One Unit. The One

Unit was supposed to give the Punjabis control over the other three units of West

Pakistan and it was also to balance the influence of Eastern Wing. Thus the first constitution was framed by the second Constituent Assembly in 1956 and was officially

170. Hamid Khan, (2005). Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 78. 171. Muhammad Hassan, (2011). Causes of Military Intervention in Pakistan: A Revisionist Discourse. Pakistan Vision, 12(2), 66-100. 172. Lawrence Ziring. (1977). Pakistan: The Vision and the Reality, Asian Affairs: An American Review, 4(6), 385-407, p. 394. 173. Ibid.

promulgated in March of the same year.174 The constitution contained a parity formula wherein both East and West Pakistan had equal representation in the central legislature.

East Pakistan gave to the constitution only a token support because they were at disadvantage.175

After a long period of nearly a decade, constitution was enforced in the country. Of course, it was a moment of great happiness and celebrations but unfortunately it lasted for little more than two and a half years. The politics of the country had already degenerated.

The promise of general elections remained unfulfilled.176 Had the general elections held at proper intervals, the situation would have been better. After the integration of West

Pakistan, the Republican Party under Dr Khan Sahib got majority in the West Pakistan

Assembly.177 It did not have roots in masses but political manueures added with patronage helped it to form the government. While at the centre, a coalition government was the only option which tended to be a weak government. The Muslim League proved to be in a weak position. It remained in power till September 1956. The Muslim League was succeeded by Awami League and Republican Party.178 But as the political instability was at peak at that point of time which did not allow this coalition ministry to stay in power for long. Political loyalties and floor crossing became so frequent that there was no chance for any political party to stay in power for a reasonable length of time.

Demonstrations in favor of provincial autonomy and also against One Unit scheme further degenerated the political atmosphere. Finally, the lack of popular leadership with national stature and high caliber led to the imposition of martial law in October 1958.179

3.7. Bureaucratic and Military Influence in the Politics of Pakistan

174. Ibid. 175. Ibid. 176. Safdar Mahmood. (2000). Op. cit., p. 53. 177. Ibid., p. 53. 178. Ibid. 179. Ibid., p. 54.

From the very beginning it was Jinnah‘s personality cult and preference for viceregal system that gave bureaucracy a dominant position in the politics of Pakistan. Jinnah had more trust on civil bureaucracy, therefore, he preferred them over politicians. Under the inherited viceregal system, the Governor General was more powerful than the Prime

Minister. The parliamentary norms were violated in the appointment of the first prime minister because there was no respect for the consent of parliament as far as the appointment of Liaqat Ali Khan as prime minister was concerned.180After the demise of

Jinnah, the second Governor General Khawaja Nazimuddin strictly followed his predecessor in matters of exercising discretionary powers. PRODA, Public and

Representatives Offices (Disqualification) Act of 1949 further enhanced the discretionary powers of the head of the state. For example, in 1948 Pir Ilahi Baksh‘s ministry and in

1949 Daulatana‘s ministry were dismissed.181

With the passing away of the first prime minister in October 1951, the second Governor

General took the office of prime minister while a Punjab based bureaucrat Ghulam

Muhammad replaced the Governor General. He left no stone unturned in making the civil and military bureaucracy part of decision making in Pakistan. Ghulam Muhammad followed Muhammad Ali Jinnah and continued the trend that had begun in the era of the founder of the nation consolidating powers in the hands of two non-political institutions of the country. In 1951, General Ayub Khan became the Commander-in-Chief of

Pakistan Army and the then Defence Secretary Major General Iskandar Mirza, a prominent man in the establishment played a key role in pushing Ayub Khan to the post of Commander-in-Chief of Army. Thus, the closed links between the two non-political institutions got consolidated after Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan.182After Jinaah and Liaqat

Ali Khan, the bureaucratic elite did not spare any opportunity to convert the office of

180. Surendra Nath Kaushik, (1985). Op. cit., p.33. 181. Chaudhry Muhammad Ali, (1967). The Emergence of Pakistan. New York: Columbia University press, pp. 367-368. 182. Surendra Nath Kaushik. (1985). Op. cit., p.34

Governor General into an instrument of bureaucratic intervention into politics.

Bureaucratic intervention was seen, from time to time in the provinces in the shape of

Governor‘s rule. The chief ministers were thrown out of their offices by violating parliamentary norms.183

After their induction into politics, the bureaucrats became addicted to it. Bureaucrats considered themselves not only more competent but also more patriot than the politicians.

The politicians also stifled the democratic impulses and provided an opportunity to the civil servants to usurp power. Gradually, the two unelected institutions assumed responsibility for dealing with Pakistan‘s internal and external affairs.184 Very soon they turned politicians and dominated the politics of the country. The bureaucracy consolidated its position as a real and permanent pillar of power. They turned masters of the ministers.185

In a democratic set up, the military is subordinate to the elected government and it cannot act unilaterally. But the lack of regard for such a rule in Pakistan harmed the image of the country and that of military as well. Civil supremacy and control over the military has been weak in Pakistan. Under the cover of national security, the military usually escapes not only from political scrutiny but also from debate in the parliament. Actually, the weak and inefficient democratic set up and well organized military along with extended tenures for military chiefs made them headstrong.186 It was the fragile and corrupt political system and the lack of political leadership in Pakistan that provided the military with an opportunity to enter into the corridors of power.187 Thus the two non-political institutions i.e. civil bureaucracy and the military were in dominant position because of their better organization. As they were used to protect and promote the colonial interests with a stress

183. Muhammad Hassan, (2011). Causes of Military Intervention in Pakistan: A Revisionist Discourse. Pakistan Vision, 12(2), 66-100. 184. Lawrence Ziring. ( 1977). Op. cit., 385-407. 185. Khalid Mahmood Arif. (1995). Working with Zia: Pakistan‘s Power Politics 1977-1988. Oxford University Press. pp. 14-15. 186. Khalid Mahmood Arif, (1995). Op. cit., p. 16. 187. Ibid., p. 16-17.

on obeying the orders of their superiors, so they had no commitment to democracy.

Besides, the third most powerful group was the feudal class. Its source of power was access to bureaucracy, control over political leadership and legislative institutions. As following/adopting of democratic norms came in conflict with their vested interests so they never tried it.188

Feudalism became dominant in the politics of Pakistan from the early days of independence. Feudalism played a great role in damaging political parties. As this feudal class was not capable of dealing with the complicated problems faced by the country, they were always in need of help from the civil-military bureaucracy. There was a lack of competent head of the state from amongst the political leadership that is why most of the time this position was assumed either by a bureaucrat or by a military man. Both these institutions often took decisions without consulting political leaders.189This adversely affected the image of political leadership and resultantly handicapped democracy in

Pakistan.

In short, from the very early time those who had power, lacked commitment to democracy because of the fear of losing their power. While those who were potential beneficiaries of democracy such as writers, lawyers and journalists lacked power to enforce it.

3.8. Pak-India Comparative Study

It is rare in the world history that two countries with so much similarities as Pakistan and

India have such a contrasting political history. Both got independence from the same

Colonial era at the same time. Both served as host to multireligions, multi languages with extreme poverty and inequality. All these factors militated against democracy as it usually happens. In fact democracy failed in Pakistan from its inception. It experienced a façade of military- bureaucratic rule. India also experienced an authoritarian rule but just

188. Inayatullah. (1997). Op. cit., p.52. 189. Noor ul Haq. (2010). Op. cit., p.10.

for a brief period i.e. 1975-77. After 1977 elections, democracy was put on the track in

India.190

Both Pakistan and India inherited the same legal system, same bureaucratic system and same constitutional structure. In Pakistan, the fragile political system both at the centre and provinces provided an opportunity to the higher bureaucracy to take the responsibilities of the day to day administration. So in Pakistan, the independence brought little change. Before 1947, the bureaucrats were without local bosses to control them while after the death of Qaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan, there was no competent leadership of exercising such a control.191 On the other side of the boarder, India presented a different picture. The political maturity of the Congress Party coupled with great insight and effective leadership of Nehru rationalized the position of

Indian Administrative Service vis-à-vis the emerging political structure.

In a nutshell, the post independence period witnessed the weakness of Muslim League in

Pakistan and the strength of Congress in India. Even in the presence of Jinnah and Liaqat

Ali Khan, the bureaucracy in Pakistan assumed a dominant position as compared to the

Indian bureaucracy.192

3.9. Military Intervention and Decade of Military Rule

When General Ayub Khan took control of power, he assumed supreme power. After the imposition of martial law, some drastic steps were taken i. e. abrogation of 1956

Constitution, dismissal of cabinets both central and provincial, dissolution of the national parliament and the provincial assemblies, and banning of all political parties. His authority heavily relied on the support of army while for running the administration of the country, Ayub Khan needed bureaucratic support which he got. He had no respect for politicians. They were lumped with smugglers and black marketers. He warned

190. Philip, Oldenburg. (2010). India., Pakistan and Democracy: Solving the Puzzle of Divergent Paths. Routledge. p.1. 191. Ibid., p. 45. 192. Ibid.

politicians to behave, otherwise, they will face retribution.193 Ayub Khan was of the view194 that politicians have brought the nation to the verge of disintegration.195

193. Sherbaz Khan Mazari. (1999). A Journey to Disillusionment. USA: Oxford University Press, p. 94 194. Ever since the death of Quaid-i- Azam and Liaqat Ali Khan, politicians have started a free-for-all type fighting in which no holds were barred. They waged a ceaseless and bitter war against each other regardless of the ill effects on the country, just to stimulate their appetite and satisfy their personal motives. There has been no limit to the depth of their baseness, chicanery, deceit and degradation. Having nothing constructive to offer, they used provincial feelings, sectarian, religious and racial differences to set a Pakistani against a Pakistani. In this mad rush for power and acquisition of dominant position, the country and people could go to the dogs as far as they were concerned. 195. Ayub Khan, speeches and statements. 1958-64.

Ayub Khan distrusted politicians. He introduced Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order

(EBDO) in August 1959 to ban corrupt politicians from elective offices.196 Article five197 of the EBDO was used against political opponents and about 75 politicians and individuals were disqualified until December 1966.198 Some people including Suhrawardy who were arrested, fought prosecution. Muhammd Waseem quoting Ian Talbot holds that

EBDO was one of the strongest arms in the hand of Ayub regime through which he stifled the opposition.199

Restriction on press further damaged the opposition. Ayub Khan not only used the Public

Safety Ordinances (PSO) already on the statute book to control news items, but in 1963 promulgated the Press and Publications Ordinance to make the press conform to standard principles of journalism and patriotism.200 Apparently, an independent National Press

Trust was established in 1964. It acquired ownership of earlier radical newspapers such as ―Pakistan Times‖ and shortly changed them into government puppets. Sycophancy and servility substituted a true patriotism born of candid reporting.201 Altaf Gauhar as a

Central Information Seceretary was the virtual Editor-in-Chief of more than fifteen hundred publications.202 Such acts of Ayub Khan, on the one hand, if weakened struggle against his despotic ruling, on the other, also spoiled the long-term progress of civil society.

196. The Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order (EBDO) authorized special tribunals to try former politicians for "misconduct," an infraction not clearly defined. Prosecution could be avoided if the accused agreed not to be a candidate for any elective body for a period of seven years. Available at: http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/18.htm. 197. Under Article 5 of EBDO:a) public servants who had been removed from service on any charge other than inefficiency; (b) persons who had ever been served with an order underr the Secuity of Pakistan Act or a similar law relating to an act prejudicial to the defence, external affairs, or the security of Pakistan;(c) persons found guilty by the Federal Court or High Court or a tribunal under PRODA; and(d) persons convicted of any offence, and sentenced to more than two year imprisonment stood debarred from being candidates or members of an elective body, until 31 December 1966. 198. https://lubpak.com/archives/3591 199. Ian Talbot. (2012). Pakistan: A New History. Hurst, p. 77. 200. Ibid. 201. Ibid. 202. Iftikhar H. Malik, (1997). State and Civil Society in Pakistan: Politics of Authority, Idealogy and Ethnicity. Basingstoke: Macmillan, p. 135.

Ayub Khan banned the activities of political parties. Although Ayub regime took several steps in economic and social areas, yet the concept of freely and directly elected legislatures to make laws at national and provincial levels was not in the thoughts of

Ayub. Instead he preferred Basic Democrats who were elected directly. They also served as members of the Electoral College not only for the election of the president but for national and provincial assemblies as well. For the civilianization of his rule, Ayub conducted indirect elections in 1962 for the national and provincial assemblies which were held on non party basis. This further empowered the landlords and biraderi heads that were already unfriendly to the development of political organization at the grassroots level.203 Later on, political parties were allowed through the Political Parties Act 1962 and when the Convention Muslim League emerged as a majority party, Ayub Khan became its president a year later.

Ayub Khan put the blame on politicians for all the ills and overlooked the fact that he himself was the most powerful chief of the most powerful institution i.e. army and all the major political decisions taken at the centre had his tacit approval. In fact, Ayub Khan had remained very close to the centre of power since 1951. He abetted Ghulam

Muhammad in two crucial acts i.e. the dismissal of Khawaja Nazimuddin which abolished the parliamentary norm of cabinet‘s responsibility to the parliament and the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly in October 1954 which was an unconstitutional act. In reality, it was bureaucracy that ruled Pakistan during the

Country‘s first attempt at a democratic system. The army abetted the bureaucratic rule by and large. At the end, the man in uniform had gained upper hand but at the expense of bureaucrats.204

Initially, there was a popular support for Ayub Khan when he seized power from politicians. One of those who hailed Mirza‘s exit and Ayub Khan‘s ascension to power

203. Sherbaz Khan Mazari. (1999). Op. cit., p. 94 204. Ibid.

was Miss Fatima Jinnah who, after some time, became a serious and strong contender for the presidency against Ayub Khan.205 Once she praised206 Ayub Khan. But after some time when it was an open secret that the General had no intention to make a shift of power from military to civilian rule, opposition to his rule strengthened. It also came to surface that the so called Basic Democracy System was serving the elite group instead of the masses.

In 1958, Ayub Khan had promised a return to constitutional government as early as possible. A Constitution Commission was established in February 1960. The Commission consisted of eleven members. The Commission brought its recommendations but Ayub

Khan was not happy with several of the recommendations and found these repugnant towards his plan of government. The Commission‘s recommendations with which Ayub

Khan disagreed are direct elections, free political parties, strong legislative and judicial organs and defined limitations on presidential authority. Ayub Khan considered these recommendations against his planned government, so he constituted different committees to make changes in the recommendations.207 Ayub Khan wanted to retain as much power as possible so he tried to retain certain aspects of his dominant authority in the 1962

Constitution which brought an end to martial law. The Constitution provided for a presidential system in which the powers of the chief executive were increased. The chief executive was provided the power to control the legislature, the power to issue ordinances, the right of appeal to referendum, control over the budget, and protection from impeachment. The chief executive was also given emergency powers, by which he could suspend civil rights. The 1965 presidential elections proved that those who equated

205. Sharif Al Mujahid. (1965). Pakistan‘s First Presidential Election. Asian Survey, 280-294. 206. A new era has begun under General Ayub Khan and the Armed Forces have undertaken to root out the administrative malaise and the anti social practices, to create a sense of confidence, security and stability and eventually to bring the country back to a state of normalcy. I hope and pray that God may give them wisdom and strength to achieve their objective. With Faith, Unity and Discipline, let us march forward as one nation. Lawrence Ziring, (1980). Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development. Folkestone, Kent: Dawson; Boulder, Colo: Westview, p. 86. 207. Ayub Khan. Available at: http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/18.htm 12-12-2013.

constitutional government with parliamentary democracy, opposed the presidential system of government.208

The 1962 Constitution which is also known as ―One Man Constitution‖ was an attempt to give a legal cover to the non elective group of civil and military bureaucracy and to curtail the influence of politicians who were supporting the parliamentary set up.209 This received great condemnation. Ayub was against parliamentary system for Pakistan therefore parliamentary set up was replaced with a centralized presidential system. The constitution was aimed to concentrate power in the president‘s hands. Some of the features of 1956 constitution were incorporated i.e. the division of the country into East and West provinces, parity of representation in National Assembly. Power was distributed between the centre and provinces so as to give it a federal appearance but practically it was unitary. The president concentrated all the executive powers in his own hands and was not responsible to parliament. The cabinet ministers were his handpicked men who served as his advisors and president could accept or reject their advice.210 The

1962 Constitution promulgated by Ayub Khan shifted the executive authority from legislature to the office of the president. This move was aimed to secure president for a fixed term of five years in the office and the president was not to depend on majority support in National Assembly like prime minister in a parliamentary setup. This arrangement made the president indifferent towards the demands of both opposition and the provinces. The same pattern was applied to the provinces where governors were not elected but they were nominees of the president. Thus, it became very difficult for political parties to enter into the Ayub Khan system at both federal and provincial

208. Ibid. 209. Robert La Porte, (1976). Power and Privilege: Influence and Decision Making in Pakistan. New Dehli: Vikas publications House, p. 57. 210. Muhammad Hassan Shaikh, (1987). Role of Political Parties in Pakistan 1969-1977 (Doctoral dissertation, University of Sindh, Jamshoro). p. 81.

level.211Ayub regime used stern measures and preventive laws for silencing his political dissidents. Every effort was made to popularize the regime and to muzzle the opposition.

There was a sort of disappointment among the political parties and they felt suffocated.

No doubt, political parties were allowed to operate but the indirect elections through BD

System minimized the role of political parties and reinforced the bureaucrats. Stifling the voice of politicians led them to agitate but that was of no use without popular backing/support. It was in 1965 that war with India and later on the Tashkent Agreement provided a chance for political opponents of Ayub Khan to exploit.212

The changes that were made to the Constitution of 1962 through First Amendment Act of

1963 created an impression that Ayub could change the constitution if it didn‘t serve his interests. Ayub‘s term as president of Pakistan was due to expire in 1965, he, therefore, managed to hold presidential elections in January 1965.213 His plan actually was to use the same BDs who had participated in the referendum held in February 1960, for presidential elections. To give a practical shape to his plan, the Second Amendment Bill was passed in the National Assembly in June 1964 which brought the presidential elections five months earlier before the fixed time. The opposition proclaimed this tactic of Ayub regime as a cynical manipulation of the constitution just to serve the interests of ruling party.214

In 1964, with the efforts of Khawaja Nazimmuddin, a pre- poll alliance of five opposition parties .i .e Combined Opposition Parties (COP) was formed. The Combined Opposition

Parties adopted nine point programme as its manifesto and decided to put Miss Fatima

211. Mohammad Waseem, (2002). "Causes of Democratic Downslide." Economic and Political Weekly, 37, ( (44/45), 4532-4538. 212. Lawrence Ziring, (1977). Pakistan: The Campaign Before the Storm. Asian Survey, University of California press, 581-598. 213. Hamid Khan, (2004).Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 237. 214. Altaf Gauhar. (1985). Pakistan: Ayub Khan‘s Abdiction. Thirld World Quarterly, 7(1), 102-131.

Jinnah as their presidential candidate. The ruling party reacted to this development quite bitterly and somewhat maliciously. The COP was referred to as an association of heterogeneous parties which consisted of discredited and disgraced leaders with no aim but to seize power. The members of COP were also taunted with the lack of a head/leader of national stature215 and that opposition was not in a position to agree on a candidate to oppose Ayub in the upcoming elections.

The opposition parties were in search of such a leader whose patriotism, honesty, sincerity and integrity were above question. The COP actually needed a leader who commanded the respect and devotion of a large section of the population. Finally, the name of Miss Fatima Jinnah was proposed and accepted unanimously for the exalted office of presidency. The ruling party got astonished with the name of Fatima Jinnah as

COP‘s sole candidate in the presidential contest. Elderly Fatima Jinnah was a venerable lady, had great respect throughout the country. She was the only hope for both masses and opposition political parties who could bring down the authoritarian rule of Ayub

Khan and restore democratic rights of the people. As Miss Fatima Jinnah had held no office in the past and, therefore, she could not be blamed for inefficiency and charges of corruption or maladministration which were leveled against most of the opposition leaders. Fatima Jinnah‘s personality attracted mammoth crowds of masses but upset all the calculations of Ayub regime and also sent shocking news through the administration and Basic Democrats. As Fatima Jinnah was committed to direct elections, her coming into power was not a good sign for Basic Democrats. Ayub Khan responded to Miss

Jinnah‘s decision to fight Ayub in the presidential elections in these words: ―I didn‘t know the reason that compelled her to be the presidential candidate. She was living a life of seclusion and didn‘t participate in politics except giving statement to press on national days. After the death of Quaid-i-Azam, she made it a habit to criticize every coming government. She was an opposition party in the period of Liaqat Ali Khan. She never

215. Sharif Al Mujahid. (1965). Op. cit., 280-294.

missed any occasion to make people disappointed and depressed. When Martial Law was imposed, she welcomed it but soon adopted her old routine.‖216

Ayub Khan declared the manifesto of the Combined Opposition Parties as a ―bundle of lies,‖ a string of ―catchy slogans based on sentiments of parochialism, regionalism and petty issues.‖ On the other hand, the Combined Opposition Parties featured Ayub Khan‘s program as an ―election bluff‖. His pragmatic approach to democracy, the opposition claimed, meant nothing but ―a superimposed constitution or an ordinance issued as fundamental law.‖ He had already practiced his pragmatism by rejecting the reports of the Constitution and Franchise Commissions.‖217 Fatima Jinnah accused Ayub of ―lack of faith in the people‖ and called him ―a dictator‖ who was now trying to wear the garb of a democrat.‖218

The opposition‘s approach was aimed to exploit the aggrieved and dissatisfied masses of the country. They chanted slogans like ―democracy versus dictatorship‖, give me votes and I will give you democracy.‖ These slogans were meant to make the people believe that the Combined Opposition Parties wanted to bring democracy and the president for autocracy. On the other hand, the incumbent party not only characterized the Ayub‘s

Basic Democracies System as the most suited form of democracy for Pakistan but also tried to deflect the election campaign into side issues which were aimed to hurt the opposition causes.219 As far as the role of Ulema in the presidential elections of 1965 is concerned, Shah is of the view220 that they supported Ayub Khan.221

216. Akhtar Hussain. (2008). Op. cit., p. 35. 217. Sharif Al Mujahid. (1965). Op. cit., p.280-294. 218. Ibid., pp. 280-294. 219. Ibid. 220. A faction of the ulema and pirs supported Ayub Khan and held Fatima Jinnah‘s candidature in contravention of the injunction of the Shariah. The Pir of Dewal Sharif claimed that ―God has communicated to him His displeasure with the Combined Opposition Parties.‖ Some traditionalist ulema like Abdul Hamid Badayuni not only issued fatwas in favour of Ayub and against the COP, but also criticized Maududi for opposition to the creation of Pakistan. 221. Shah, Hussian, Syed. Mujawar, (1996). Religion and Politics in Pakistan. Islamabad: Quiad-i-Azam Chair. NIPS, Quid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, p.70

The vote in the elections was limited to the 80,000 members of Electoral College. When the election results were declared, Ayub Khan won by securing 64% votes as against

35% for Fatima Jinnah.222 Many causes can be attributed to the defeat of Fatima Jinnah and one of the causes was that Islamic teaching forbids a female to become the head of the state which Ayub Khan exploited and was triumphant to get the sympathy and support of religious section. Miss Jinnah‘s intent to scrape the Basic Democracies System too worked against her as the Basic Democrats for the sake of their own survival voted

Ayub Khan to power against Fatima Jinnah.223 Ayub Khan won the elections but with the help and support of governmental apparatus. Most of the observers agree that despite the difficulties of indirect elections and clear advantages for Ayub in his self created system of Basic Democracies, Fatima Jinnah would have won the elections had they been free and fair. Of course, she would have won with a huge margin in East Pakistan and would have also had a good contest in West Pakistan. The elections were rigged not only through officials‘ interferences but also the basic democrats from opposition parties were either forced or bribed to vote for Ayub Khan. Thus a very good opportunity to involve the people of both the wings in governance of the country and restore democracy in the country was lost.224 He also imposed restrictions on the press, political activities and freedom of expression. Fundamental rights were denied to the people. His own made constitution made Ayub Khan virtually a dictator. The democratic principles were violated by not putting the constitution to referendum. Thus no hope was left for the democratic institutions to grow.225 This maneuvering of the system by the ruling party for

Ayub Khan further weakened public faith in his system and the masses decided that a system in which they are unable to elect a person of their own choice then they have only one option i.e., to change the system.

222. Altaf Gauhar, (1985). Pakistan: Ayub Khan‘s Abdication. Thirld world quarterly, 7(1), 102-131. 223. Akhtar Hussain, (2008). Op. cit., p. 62. 224. Hamid Khan, (2001). Op. cit., pp. 237- 238. 225. Safdar Mahmood, (2000). Op. cit., pp. 363-364.

3.10. 1965 War, Tashkent Declaration and Bhutto’s Maneuvering

On bad advice of some of his ministers, Ayub Khan ordered Pakistan Army to cross the ceasefire line in Kashmir. This led to the commencement of an all out war with India on

September 6, 1965 which ended in a stalemate on September 23, 1965.226 Some of the observers in Pakistan believe that Bhutto was the man responsible for initiating the conflict with India which soon escalated into a full fledged war.227 It became visible that as early as Spring of 1965, Bhutto had intimated with a few men of which Bhutto had the principal role. The group made plans for commencing a conflict that might compel the

Indian government to start talks with Pakistan on the basis of more suitable conditions.228

Bhutto believed that if his strategy wins in Kashmir, he will be appreciated more than

Ayub Khan. But if it was lost, Ayub Khan and the army will be dishonored while he will emerge as the next man.229 Ayub Khan once expressed his opinion to a political analyst

(G. W. Choudhury) that his decision to start war with India in 1965 was a serious and fatal mistake and he also blamed Bhutto and Aziz Ahmad (then Foreign Secretary) for having misled him.230 On September 17, China turned its protest against the successive violations of China‘s territory and sovereignty by the Indian troops into a three days ultimatum, demanding the dismantling of Indian military structures on the Chinese side of China-Sikkim border. Though India took China‘s ultimatum as a ploy but the U.S and

Soviet Union took it serious and invigorated their efforts to get a standstill cease-fire resolution in the Security Council.231 After the termination of 1965 War and before the notorious Tashkent Agreement, there was a clear display of unity among different

226. Hamid Khan, (2001). Op. cit., p. 238. 227. Anwar Hussain Syed, (1992). The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Macmillam, p. 48. 228. Ibid., p. 49. 229. Philip E. Jones, (2003 ). Pakistan People‘s Party Rise to Power. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 84. 230. Golam W. Choudhury, (1974). The Last Days of United Pakistan. Karachi: p. 20. 231. Philip E. Jones, (2003). Op. cit., p. 82.

segments of the Pakistani population. The feelings of unity among the public can be summed up in a few lines.232

On September 23, 1965 both India and Pakistan agreed and accepted the Security Council

Resolution bringing an end to the war.233 The Russian Prime Minister Alexi Kosygin, playing a mediating role, invited Ayub Khan and the Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur

Shastri to Tashkent. Kosygin urged them to negotiate their issues and problems and reach an understanding. He also took part in a week long negotiations. At last an agreement known as Tashkent Declaration was signed.234 The Tashkent Agreement became possible because of Soviet Union aegis. But there was also pressure from the United States,

Britain and United Nations asking the two countries to reach a solution.235

Common people in Pakistan started pronouncing that Pakistan had prevailed in the war in the battlefield, however, lost it on the negotiating table. In fact, the Tashkent Agreement, to a great extent, damaged Ayub Khan‘s personality and it turned out to be one of the central causes of his demise. The said Declaration annoyed Pakistani people who had quite different expectations. The situation further worsened at Ayub‘s denial to comment.

He went into seclusion instead of taking people into confidence for signing the

Declaration. Resultantly, demonstrations started at different places which slowly spread throughout Pakistan.236 The post Tashkent Declaration saw severe ramifications in

Pakistan. Once Pakistani delegation came back home, the then foreign minister started to throw hints of a secret clause in the Declaration. No doubt it was a lie, but he was playing to the gallery. That was his own way of getting support for himself after a war that was

232. ―No government in Pakistan ever had such a healthy climate and opportunity to mould Pakistani people into a nation of which not only posterity will feel proud, but which would command the respect and admiration of the world at large. Such moments and opportunities in the life of nations are rarely witnessed. It is a moment whose significance should be fully realized. It is a moment which should not be allowed to go unheeded. It is a moment of destiny for Pakistan.‖ Lawrence Ziring, (1971). The Ayub Khan Era: Politics in Pakistan, 1958-1969. Syracuse University Pr, p. 67. 233. Hasan Askari Rizvi, (1999). The Military and Politics in Pakistan, 1947-1997. Lahore: Sang-E-Meel Publication, p. 127. 234. Ibid. 235. Syed Badrul Ahsan, Tashkent 1966 and its ramifications, published in The Daily Star, January 10, 2016. 236. See details on: www.mapsofindia.com. Retrieved on 23.09.2015.

started on his wrong advice.237 Ayub, fed up with Bhutto‘s grumbling, asked him either to resign or go on leave. Bhutto opted for the second option but after a month, under pressure from his former boss, he resigned and Sharifuddin Pirzada the then Attorney

General replaced him.238

After Tashkent Agreement, Bhutto parted ways with Ayub Khan, and thereafter differences increased between the two. When Bhutto was foreign minister in Ayub

Khan‘s Cabinet, he had the information about powerful organizations.239 He met and sought the support of labor organizations, farmer/kisan organizations, and the associations of advocates. Thus he met with all the downtrodden sections of the society.

He emerged as the first political leader of the downtrodden and suppressed people.

3.11. The Formation of Pakistan Peoples Party

Why was PPP formed? The Muslim League as an established and founder party was already there. The founder of PPP was a strong supporter of Ayub Khan‘s regime. In fact, the new system of Basic Democracies established by Ayub Khan proved a first step towards weakening his rule. The system of Basic Democracies through which Ayub

Khan ruled the country was aimed for stabilizing and strengthening his position.240 Ayub

Khan introduced the system of Basic Democracies and took 80,000 basic democrats, the number of which was increased to 120 thousand, later on. He got himself elected through basic democrats. He also introduced 1962 Constitution which is also known as a ―one man constitution‖. Then the presidential elections were held in 1965 in which Ayub Khan was opposed by Fatima Jinnah (Mother-e- Millat). And he once again got elected as president of Pakistan. Thus he got the mandate from basic democrats to run the system of the country. The said system though had many good points but due to its faulty system of

237. Syed Badrul Ahsan, Tashkent 1966 and its Ramifications, published in The Daily Star, January 10, 2016. 238. Ibid. 239. Interview with Miraj Muhammad Khan (Contemporary of Bhutto and senior member of PPP) on 30-07- 2015. 240. Interview with Syed Usmani (Contemporary of Bhutto and senior member of JI) on 16-07-2015.

electing Assembly members and president, invited severe criticism from the masses, in general, and from politicians, in particular. All this was an effort towards a presidential, better to say, a dictatorial system. The people were disappointed with the said dictatorship. Although Ayub Khan‘s rule had some very good points yet as a whole not only politicians but masses too were annoyed. In that scenario, the opposition against

Ayub Khan was divided into two groups. The most important opposition leaders from

East Pakistan were Hussain Shaheed Suhurwardi, Khawaja Nazimuddin, Maulana A.K.

Fazal-ul- Haq and a few others who had adopted more democratic attitude than their counterpart in Western part of the country.241 The main opposition leaders from West

Pakistan were Choudhury Muhammad Ali, Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan Daualtana,

Abdul Qayyum Khan, Maulana Maudoodi etc.242 They all were against Ayub‘s Martial

Law, Basic Democracies and also 1962 Constitution. In this whole situation, Z. A.

Bhutto was a strong supporter of Ayub Khan. He also remained as a chief polling agent of Ayub Khan in the presidential elections of 1965.243

Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardi made an effort to form a United Front in East Pakistan against the dictatorial rule of Ayub and, thus, the three most important parties of East wing i.e. Awami League, Krishik Siramic Party and Nizam-i-Islami got united.244

Maulana Maudoodi sent a message to Suhrawardi that it is high time to form the United

Front from both wings of the country. Suhrawardi agreed to Maulana Maudoodi‘s proposal and, in a meeting held at Suhrawardi House in which 24 leaders from different opposition parties participated, it was decided to form United Democratic Front (UDF).245

Soon after the formation of UDF, Ayub Khan started a treason based trial of Nawabzada

Nasrullah, Attullah Mengal, Choudhury Ghulam Muhammad of JI and Muhammad-ul-

Haq Usmani of NAP and few others. This was aimed to suppress the opposition, although

241. Ibid. 242. Ibid. 243. Ibid. 244. Ibid. 245. Ibid.

the case was later on withdrawn. In that scenario, the shrewd Z.A. Bhutto was noticing everything. Sensing the political disturbances, Z.A. Bhutto started his politics with greater enthusiasm.

As his relations with Ayub had deteriorated after the 1965 elections. Though Ayub Khan had won the election, the uneasiness had increased among the masses throughout the country. When Fatima Jinnah announced to contest the 1965 presidential elections, Ayub

Khan got annoyed and called on Bhutto where he expressed his extreme sadness and told

Bhutto that ― thoo ne tho muje batya nahi,Ye Teri Maa Khaha Se Agaee‖ (where this mother of you came from, you did not tell me).246 After the 1965 war, US withdrew itself from supporting Pakistan but Russia kept supporting India. Russia had also vetoed

Kashmir issue at the United Nations. Some people say that a big defense agreement was also made between the two.247 There was disappointment and hatred especially among political circles against US. Being members of SEATO and CENTO, US did not extend its support to Pakistan. Kosygin made efforts to bring both Pakistan and India on table and got an agreement signed between the two rival states known as Tashkent Agreement.

The Agreement prompted mixed reactions. Some criticizing it while others appreciating it in view of its promoting Pak-India relationship, to some extent. As the relations between

Ayub and Bhutto had turned worse when the latter used the said agreement as a launching pad.248 When Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto left Ayub‘s cabinet, he kept his political prospects afloat, to weigh the plan of an increasingly antagonistic government, to know the directions of the public opinion, and to know and test the strengths and weaknesses of various opposition political parties and their leaders. During this period, Zulfiqar Ali

Bhutto was going through the process of sifting among different options. He wished and was in search of credible central role in the national politics for which he had three options. He was struggling to build a political base outside the Ayub regime by

246. Ibid. 247. Ibid. 248. Ibid.

consolidating the anti Tashkent constituency and employing it either (1) to create a block of opposition parties led by pre-Ayub elites, (2) to bargain for entry into the leadership echelon of an established opposition party, or (3) to organize his own political party and seek power through socialist politics.249

After Z. A. Bhutto exit from Ayub cabinet, he spent most of his time (particularly from

1966 to 1970) in building his political position. After parting ways with Ayub, Bhutto had met all the major opposition leaders. Choudhury Ghulam Muhammad of JI was of the view that Bhutto contacted us but because of the part of Ayub Khan‘s government, we could not accommodate him.250 Then socialists who need a leader for pushing forward their agenda found Bhutto most suitable. Bhutto belonged to a landlord family of Sindh and got political training under Ayub Khan‘s one party rule. He was never found to be such a strong supporter of democracy earlier. In West Pakistan, the leftists supported

Bhutto against Ayub Khan. Those were the days when a layer of hatred had started against US. Bhutto took advantage of both and decided to establish a party of his own.251

PPP was founded at a ground adjacent to Dr Mubashar Hassan‘s house in Gulburg,

Lahore on November 30 and December 1 1967. It took four sessions to finalize the party formation. It was launched at a convention that was announced almost a month earlier and attended by, at least, 300 delegates from West Pakistan, the majority of whom were from Punjab.252 Initially three names253 were proposed and in the end, the delegates approved Pakistan Peoples Party as the name. They also approved a tri-colour flag for the

249. Philip E. Jones. (2003). Op. cit., p. 99. 250. Interview with Syed Usmani, Op. cit. 251. Ibid. 252. Other important delegates who attended were Malik Sharif, Hakim Abdul Latif, Mian Mohammad Aslam, Mohammad Safdar, Aftab Rabbani, A.W. Katpar, Shaukat Ali Lodhi, Mir Rasul Bakhsh Talpur, Mairaj Mohammad Khan, Begum Abad Ahmad, Khurshid Hasan Meer, Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao, Chakar Ali Junejo, Mujtaba Khar, Haq Nawaz Gandapur, Jehangir Khan, Imdad Hussain Jamali, Ahmad Dehlvi, Sardar Pir Bakhsh Bhutto, Mir Hamid Hussain, Mian Mohammad Aslam, Malik Naved Ahmad and Abdul Razak Soomro. 253. (1) People‘s Progressive Party (2) People‘s Party (3) Socialist Party of Pakistan.

party. They also approved ‗chairman‘ as the designation of the party chief.254 The two renowned persons i.e., J. A. Rahim (a diplomat) and Mubashir Hasan (an engineer by profession) were the ideologues of the party. Stanely is of the view that Bhutto had shared his intention and had informed J.A. Rahim about his plan for establishing a new party. Bhutto revealed his plan to J. A. Rahim in Paris in 1966. At that time Rahim was serving as Pakistan‘s ambassador to France. Bhutto often used to praise him.255 When

Pakistan Peoples Party was founded, the socialists provided Bhutto with the 3 basic slogans.256

Bhutto focused on all the important sections of the country i.e., starving and shelterless poor masses, trade unionists, workers, students, mullahs etc. Bhutto‘s slogan of Roti,

Kapra, Makaan (food, clothes and shelter) was for attracting the sympathies of poor. In fact, the slogan of food, clothing and shelter (roti, kapra aur makan) was borrowed from

East Pakistan. The East Pakistan peasant leader Maulana Bhashani had already stated in

1969 during his speeches that food, clothing and shelter as the fundamental demands of workers. PPP‘s chairman cleverly used the slogan to his full advantage.257 Socialism is our Economy, was directed towards trade unions, workers, students and a section of intelligentsia. While for religious people (mullahs) he raised the slogan of ‗Islam is our faith. Bhutto‘s slogan of a thousand years war attracted hawks in the army and most of the Punjabi and Sindhi population.258

Bhutto‘s decision to form his own political party was criticized by some circles, for example, the then Provincial Minister for Health and Social Welfare, Begum Zahida

254. Abdul Razak Soomro (Founder Member of PPP Karachi). The PPP‘s Founding published in Dawn on 1st June 2013. 255. He once said, ―Above all he more than anyone else made me to decide for launching a new party. Actually he and I founded it in Paris in 1966. He worked hard on the Foundation Papers‖. Stanely Wolpert, (1993). Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times. New York: Oxford Unversity Press, p. 110. 256. Golam W. Choudhury. (1974).Op. cit., P. 22 257. Dawn, March 23, 1969. 258. Samuel Baid, (2011). Pakistan: Crisis is Inherent. Strategic Analysis, 35(2), 342-371.

Khaliquzzaman, criticized Bhutto for his contradictory attitude.259 When the PPP raised socialist agenda, the religious parties took it something against the ideology of Pakistan.

The ulema were not united at that point of time. Maulana Maudoodi strongly reacted against socialism and said: ―ye mulk Islam k leye bana hay aur yahan koi naya nizam hamari gardano ko kat kar hi laya jaya ga (this country was founded in the name of Islam and any other new system would not be tolerated).‖260 Most of the religious leaders tried to start a united struggle against socialism. So all these things including PPP‘s slogan for unity and integrity of the country, socialism and socialist support led to the formation of

Pakistan Peoples Party.

3.12. Opposition to Ayub Khan

When Bhutto established his own political party, soon it was joined by a great number of sympathizers like students groups, urban intellectuals, zamindars etc. Thus soon he got many in PPP. The party motto was summed up in four points. The socio political and economic problems during Ayub Khan‘s regime provided an opportunity to the PPP to emerge and got strengthened. Bhutto took advantage of the opportunity and announced

PPP‘s below mentioned four point manifesto. 261

Democracy is our polity

Socialism is our economy

Islam is our religion

259. She alleged that the formation of PPP is Just a ruse to hoodwink the masses and gain his personal political ends.‖ In a press statement, she disclosed that ―ever changing and vacillating attitude of the former foreign minister was baffling and could convince not even a layman. It was strange that the erstwhile supporter of the Ayub Constitution was now disowning it and flirting with the opposition leaders some of whom were inherently opposed to the very creation of Pakistan.‖ Referring to the support given by Bhutto to the Six-point programme of Sheikh Mujib, Begum Zahida remarked that ―it was an enigmatic somersault which politicians of his status should not have ventured to make. Dawn, November 1, 1967. 260. Interview with Syed Usmani (senior member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 261. Craig Baxter. (1971). Pakistan Votes--1970. Asian Survey, 11(3), 197-218.

All power to the people262

Bhutto had close links in military, bureaucracy and the ruling party. He was informed about the struggle for succession within the regime. He had established close contact with

Major-General S. G. M. M. Peerzada, a man of inordinate ambitions and a trusted friend of Yahya Khan.263 Both Bhutto and Peerzada had established friendship because both had grievances against Ayub khan, as they were pushed out of the close circle of Ayub Khan.

A deal was struck between Bhutto and Peerzada that initiated a movement against Ayub.

Peerzada assured Zulfiqar Ali Bhutt that army support for Ayub Khan would be lacking in a mass confrontation and Bhutto was ready to start the movement on the popular theme of Ayub‘s alleged sacrifice of ‗national honor‘ preserved at the cost of the brave jawans

(soldiers), at the conference table in Tashkent‖264

Bhutto, having superb oratory skill, presented himself as the champion of democracy and the masses stood behind him against Ayub Khan‘s dictatorial rule. The factory workers, labourers, peasants and students, all rallied behind Bhutto to overthrow the illegitimate and anti-people government of Ayub. In its efforts to emerge as a progressive party, PPP leadership focused on three objectives i.e. to oppose Ayub Khan‘s dictatorial and undemocratic regime, to establish democracy in Pakistan and to transform Pakistan into a

Socialist polity. Bhutto‘s glamour call attracted the masses and they took him as their savior.265 PPP chairman believed that Ayub Khan rule was unbearable sowing the seeds of confrontation, agitation, discontentment and deprivation amongst the masses. He started struggle for the rule of people. Pakistan Peoples Party, in a very short time, became the most popular party in the Western Pakistan. He believed in the power of common masses and focused on the issues pertaining to common man and also offered tangible solutions to their problems. His slogan ―Roti, Kapra aur Makan‖ (food, clothing and shelter) for

262. Golam W. Choudhury. (1974). Op. cit., p. 22 263. Ibid. 264. Philip. E. Jone, (2003). Op. cit., p. 150. 265. Surendra Nath Kushik, (1985). Op. cit, pp. 65-66.

every one also attracted millions of masses.266

When Bhutto started his campaign against the military regime of Ayub Khan, he was a strong advocate of human rights. In one of the pamphlets produced by Pakistan Peoples

Party Bhutto had argued:

―Civil liberties hold key to our future happiness…All fundamental rights are important and stand or fall together. Genuine freedom of speech cannot function genuinely without freedom of press or without a proper opportunity for free association.‘ In a ferocious literary onslaught, Bhutto had compared Pakistan in 1968 to the Kuomintang regime in pre-revolutionary China, and insisted that ‗the present conditions must give way to a democratic dispensation in which the entire population participates… All power must pass to the people. This can only be done by democracy.‘267

It was this combination of democratic demands and socialist promises that made most of the West Pakistan‘s population to support Bhutto in the 1970 general elections

In a very short span of time, various annoyed politicians from both wings of the country brought the masses to streets aimed to force Ayub Khan to step down and a total demolition of his centrist political system. Asghar Khan, a well known figure and former air chief, also joined Bhutto. Sheikh Mujib ur Rehman of East Pakistan and also leader of the Awami League was an active critic of the General‘s rule and his imprisonment by

Ayub Khan‘s regime on the allegations of conspiring with India made Mujib more popular. Through his six points program, Mujib demanded for more political and economic autonomy for his province. So, the political environment in both the wings was against Ayub Khan and he was unable to curb the discontent.268 In 1968, Zulfiqar Ali

Bhutto was busy by bringing together, students, peasants, workers, lawyers and various other sections of society especially in West Pakistan to form a united opposition against

Ayub regime. He knew who were politically important in towns, big cities and even in

266. Z A Bhutto - Symbol of Democracy by A. Z. Kalhora published in The Daily Times, January 5, 2012. 267. Tariq Ali, (1983). Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State. Penguin Books, p.107. 268. Iftikhar Haider Malik, (2008). The History of Pakistan. Greenwood Publishing Group. pp.150-151

rural areas. He also got himself informed about their associations and rivalries. He met these people and talked politics to them. It is right to say that Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto not alone was responsible for ending the Ayub Khan‘s autocratic regime but he did prepare a ground for a violent movement against the regime.269 By 1968, the fires of resentment had grown into a national movement against Ayub and his autocratic regime, absorbing various interest groups, leading by students and labors. The resentment against the undemocratic rule of General Ayub reached to a point of no return. The people belonging to various fields of life came out on the streets and a mass movement was launched against the government. Having no other option, Ayub Khan offered some political concessions to reach an understanding. He pledged not to seek re-election, restore parliamentary system in the country and to hold direct elections. But it was too late to make the political forces accept anything. They wanted nothing less than Ayub Khan‘s resignation. Although he made an attempt to contain public pressure by the use of state apparatus but that backfired.270 From the very start of 1969, anti Ayub rioting grew day by day and there was almost a collapse of law and order situation.271 Opposition in the shape of Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) resorted to countrywide perilous demonstrations against Ayub regime.272 The said PDM was formed in May 1967 by

Awami League, Council Muslim League, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the Nizam-i-Islami

Party. The movement was formed for the reintroduction of parliamentary system, direct elections to both federal and provincial assemblies and the establishing of a federal structure. The PDM also accommodated the Bengali‘s grievances against West Pakistan‘s political and economic dominance. The movement won a great deal of sympathy from

Eastern Wing (East Pakistan) of the country. In December 1968, when the movement

269. Hamid Khan, (1992). The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. London: The Macmillan press, P. 64 270. Safdar Mahmood, (2000). Op. cit., p. 364. 271 Meenakshi Gopinath, (1975). Pakistan in Transition: Political Development and Rise to Power of Pakistan People's Party. Delhi: Manohar Book Service, p. 18. 272. Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, (1988). Phir Marshal Law Aagaya (Then Martial Law Came), Lahore: Jang Publishers, p. 16.

against Ayub Khan rule got strengthened, the PDM joined hands with other political organizations and formed a more viable organization.273

In early 1969, several opposition parties grouped together in the form of Democratic

Action Committee (DAC) and decided to restore democracy in the country through mass movement. Ayub Khan used both conciliatory and repressive measures, but disorder spread. The army moved into different cities to restore order. In February, sensing the situation Ayub Khan invited a Round Table Conference (RTC) in Rawalpindi to find a solution but in vain as the General was averse to concede to the demands of universal empowerment, direct elections and provincial autonomy. Eventually, the old Ayub Khan confined to a small group of advisors, on 25 March 1969 abdicated in favor of Yahya

Khan instead of speaker of the National Assembly.274 The 1962 Constitution made by

Ayub Khan, could not save his power and position. According to the Chief Justice of

Pakistan Justice Yaqub Ali Khan, Ayub khan had established a council which was the real authoritative body to govern the country.275 General Yahya Khan, General Sayed

Peerzada and General Sayed Fida Hussain were also its members. So the fault was not that of law but of those who executed it. It was unconstitutional to hand over power to

Yahya Khan. According to the 1962 Constitution, Ayub Khan had to hand over power to the Speaker of the National Assembly.276 Thus Second Martial Law was imposed on

March 25, 1969. The major cause for Ayub Khan‘s downfall was lack of respect for democratic norms and democratic principles. During his rule, there was almost absence of participatory opportunity on the part of common man in governmental affairs. The people had realized that they had been deprived of their political rights. At that point of

273. Pakistan Democratic Movement. Available at: www.kppsc.com.pk. 274. Iftikhar Haider Malik, (2008). The History of Pakistan. Greenwood Publishing Group, p. 151. 275. Aslam Pervez Mamon. Wafak-i-Pakistan aor Qumi Yakjehti, 1947 se 1971 ka Seyasi Jaiza (Federation of Pakistan and National Integration from 1947 to 1971: A Political Analysis) (PhD Thesis), p.185. 276. Ibid.

time, the people had lost trust in Ayub Khan and his government and they had no hope for the restoration of parliamentary system under his rule.277

3.13. Transfer of Power from Military Man to his Comrade in Arm

Yahya Khan occupied the office of the president in the midst of the period of that forced his guru Ayub Khan to resign the office. The collapse of Ayub regime was a burden which Yahya had to shoulder as his soldier‘s code of duty. This was a great test for

Yahya Khan and he had to go through personal embarrassment.278 It is the innate weak point of our military headship who desires to turn into political leaders. As civil-military bureaucracy assumed a central position in the political affairs of the country from the very start and particularly in the post 1958 period, politicians were powerless to play any dynamic role. It was this shrunken political state of affairs that hard-pressed a military man for the second time into the corridor of power.279

Since 1968-69, the Ayub regime was faced with political crisis in the country when the military decided to dissociate itself from the president. The main opposition from military to Ayub Khan‘s regime emerged with the emergence of Air Marshal Asghar Khan and some other retired Generals who vocally and openly opposed his regime. The military was also unhappy with him because of his decision to withdraw the Agartala Conspiracy

Case.280 The accused were in the custody of the military and most of the evidence of the case was collected by the military intelligence. Its withdrawal put the military in an

277. Safdar Mahmood, (2000). Op. cit., p. 364. 278. Lawrence Ziring, (1974). Militarism in Pakistan: The Yahya Khan Interregnum. Asian Affairs: An American Review, 1(6), 402-420. 279. Ibid. 280. Agartala Conspiracy Case was a case framed by the Pakistan Government in 1968 during the Ayub regime against Awami League chief Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, some in-service and ex-service army personnel and high government officials. They were accused of involvement in a conspiracy to secede the East wing from Pakistan with the help of the government of India. The petitis principii in the petition was that the conspiracy was concocted between the Indian party and the accused persons at Agartala city of Tripura in India. The case was thus called Agartala Conspiracy Case. However, the Pakistan government was compelled to withdraw the case in the face of a mass movement in East Pakistan. See: http://en.banglapedia.org/index.php?title=Agartala_Conspiracy_Case.

embarrassing position.281 Ayub Khan had made every possible efforts to keep the dignified office of the president but the political anxiety together with his poor health compelled him to hand over the role and responsibilities of the office to one of his followers.282

As soon as Yahya Khan assumed office, he promised to restore democratic process and creating a conducive environment for the establishment of a constitutional and democratic government. He also pledged to hand over power to the freely and impartially elected representatives of the people soon. Through an Ordinance, Yahya Khan presented a Legal Framework Order (LFO).283 It was intended to serve as a modus operandi for the approaching elections. The Legal Framework Order (For details see annexure 3) provided that the elections would be held on the basis of one man one vote. Thus East Pakistan got

169 seats in contemplated National Assembly of 313. The newly elected assembly would provide the country with a constitution within hundred and twenty days and the constitution would be drafted in the light of the principles of LFO.284 The Legal

Framwork Order promulgated in March 1970, declared that the future constitution would preserve five fundamental principles i.e. an Islamic idealogy, territorial integrity, free elections plus independence of judiciary, a federation securing and ensuring provincial autonomy as well adequate administrative, legislative and financial powers for the federal government285 and full opportunities and chances should be given to all the people to participate in national affairs. It was also clear that the final authority rested with the

281. Anas Malik. (2010). Political Survival in Pakistan: Beyond Ideology. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 82-83. 282. Lawrence Ziring. (1974), Op. cit., pp. 402-420. 283. The Legal Framework Order, 1970 (LFO) was a decree issued by then President of Pakistan Gen. Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan that laid down the political principles and laws governing the 1970 general election, which were the first direct elections in the history of Pakistan. The LFO also dissolved the "One Unit" scheme of West Pakistan, re-establishing the four provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and the Northwest Frontier Province. See: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_Framework_Order,_1970. 284. Meenakshi Gopinath, (1975). Pakistan in Transition: Political Development and Rise to Power of Pakistan People's Party. Delhi: Manohar Book Service, p.18. 285. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., p. 64.

president of the country to approve or reject the constitution drafted by the assembly.286

Yahya Khan announced the breakup of One Unit in July 1970 and thus he demonstrated his respect for the sentiments of the people of Pakistan. The nature of federation was, however, to be studied and finalized by the newly elected national assembly. The stage was ready for the first ever general elections of 1970.287

3.14. 1970 Elections and Yahya Khan

Thus Ayub Khan departure from office did not ensure a return to civilian rule. In the absence of a broad based and responsible national political organization, Ayub had to surrender in favor of his comrades in arms. The administrative system was semi militarized and army and air force officers took control of decision making process while civil administrators were made accountable to these officers. The administrators who held key positions in Ayub Khan‘s government were reduced in stature. The Basic

Democracies system was no longer in practice, constitution was abrogated and efforts were made to get the support of intelligentsia and political leadership.288 Yahya Khan treated politicians with great care. He promised to return the country to civilian rule and also restore the activities of political parties. The new military leader insisted that military will be sent back to barracks but first to ensure that politicians have produced a suitable

Constitution and that they work to serve national interests.289 Yahya Khan announced to dissolve One Unit scheme, to reestablish parliamentary system and to draft a new constitution. Initially, unlike his predecessors, Yahya Khan seemed to hand over power to civilian leaders as early as possible and was not interested to prolong his rule. Soon after taking reign of the country, Yahya was looking for chances to hand over power to the popularly elected representatives. Unlike Ayub Khan, Yahya recognized the necessity of both political parties and politicians and started conciliatory policies towards political

286. Gopinath Meenakshi, (1975). Op. cit., p. 19. 287. Ibid. 288. Lawrence Ziring, (1980), Op. cit., pp. 97-98. 289. Lawrence Ziring, (1974), Op. cit., pp. 402-420.

parties and politicians. Yahya Khan was a ray of hope for the aggrieved common man as he could not ignore the aspirations of the masses and promised an early return to democratic rule. Unlike his predecessor, Yahya Khan did not muzzle politicians nor opted for measure such as Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order (EBDO) of Ayub and pledged to play a role of referee among the various competing political groups.290 The credit goes to Yahya Khan for holding the first ever general elections in Pakistan. But actually, the military junta appeared to have assumed that 1970 elections would bring a factionalized parliament and the dominant position of the civil-military bureaucracy would continue where the military would have a chance to hold the de facto balance of power. Contrary to the military supposition, the elections did not bring the parliament as desired by Yahya and his comrades291 and all the hopes of military junta shattered when the results were announced.

3.14.1. Competing Political Parties in 1970 Elections

Despite strong misgiving against Legal Framework Order (LFO), the political parties decided to participate in the elections and issued their manifestos. The political activities began in January, 1970.292 About twenty political parties took part in the 1970 elections.

The most important were the following.

1. Pakistan Muslim League (Council)

2. Pakistan Muslim League (Conventiona)

3. Pakistan Muslim League (Qayyum)

4. Pakistan Peoples Party

5. Awami League

6. National Awami Party (Wali Khan Group)

7. Jamiat Ulma e Islam

290. Surendra Nath Kushik, (1985). Op. cit, p. 57. 291. Katharine, Adeney, (2009)."The Limitations of Non-consociational Federalism: The Example of Pakistan." Ethnopolitics 8.1 (2009): 87-106. 292. Syed Fakharuddin Shah, and Muhammad Zubair Khan, (2012). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Regime and Growth of the Baloch Nationalism in 1970s,Global Journal of Human-Social Science Research 12.7.

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8. Jamaat-e-Islami

9. Jamiat Ulma e Pakistan

10. Nizam e Islam Party

11. Pakistan Democratic Party.293

In East Pakistan, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman‘s Awami League was the main political party which led election campaign. In West Pakistan, among the various political parties campaigning for the election Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) led by Z. A. Bhutto was the leading party. National Awami Party (NAP) led by Wali Khan, Pakistan Democratic

Party (PDP), Council Muslim League, Convention Muslim League, Qayyum Muslim

League, Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam, Jamaat-i-Islami and Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Pakistan also took part in the elections from Western Pakistan.294 Certainly, the six points program of

Awami League was the most controversial issue in the elections compaign. The military junta considered it a form of secession while Mujib-ur-Rehman consistently used six points in his electoral campaign.295

3.14.2. Campaign for the Elections and Politicians Maneuvering

The 1970 elections were held not in normal but in critical conditions. The country was ruled by Martial Law regime and the elections were held under Martial Law regulations.

The elections were meant for resolving certain issues which were heat generating, of constitutional nature which revolved around the division of the country into two wings.

That was first experience of general elections on the basis of adult franchise. The confrontation with India was at peak. The most important issue during the time was socio-economic one. The people struggled for economic security. PPP leadership caught masses‘s imaginations by raising the slogan of Roti, Kapra and Makan. The campaign for the 1970 elections went for one whole year.296

293. Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, (1988). Op. cit., pp. 17-18. 294. Hasan Askari Rizvi. The first 10 general elections of Pakistan, p.11. 295. Lawrence Ziring, (1980). Op. cit., p. 100. 296. Abdullah Malik. What will be the Bhutto Strategy? Published in Viewpoint on February 4, 1977.

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The election campaign started on first January 1970 when Yahya Khan allowed political activities which were restricted earlier. Politicians started their political activities but there was no match for Bhutto‘s charisma and mass appeal. Previously drawing room negotiations and bargaining were the part of electoral politics in Pakistan. People were approached usually through intermediaries such as revenue officials, police men, and important persons in villages and also through caste and clan elders. But this time the modes of contacting the masses were different because of the political strategy and style of PPP leadership. The yearlong election campaign was dominated by public meetings, processions, rallies, slogan chanting teams with fitted loudspeakers in vehicles, posters and handbills. Politicians from all political parties visited cities and towns and delivered emotional speeches; some like Bhutto also approached peasants and addressed them. This was, of course, a different scenario where people participated enthusiastically.297 People also flew flags on the top of their houses and shops were made attractive with portraits of their favored politicians. The common and illiterate masses became so involved in political activities that formal education appeared irrelevant to political participation.

People everywhere (In coffee houses, intellectual forums, the press, in homes, barber shops, and the workplaces) started discussing political issues. Sometime members of the same family supported opposite sides.298 Tensions built up, and political polarization was everywhere. The political environment was full of intolerance and violence. Supporters of all political parties tried to eliminate the viewpoint of others. This situation was created by some elements that were close to Martial Law Administrator. This group had made Yahya Khan‘s mind to fish in the troubled water of politics for his survival. And that is why he kept hobnobbing most of the time with different party‘s leadership and even some were supported with money. Yahya Khan and his group were convinced that in the tense and polarized environment, no single party would be able to emerge as a

297. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., pp. 68-69. 298. Iftikhar Ahmad, (1976). Pakistan General Elections, 1970. South Asian Institute, Punjab University.

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strong party, and challenge his authority. So, he would be able to play one against the other and himself occupy a dominant position.299

Bhutto welcomed support from each and every side before elections. Print media gave a cordial and favorable coverage to Pakistan Peoples Party. Except a few pro-Islam papers, the whole press extended its support to PPP campaign. The Nusrat (ed. Hanif Ramay) and the Shahab (ed. Kausar Niazi) two independent weeklies were almost converted into

Peoples Party papers. On the political platform, there was no match for Bhutto to compete in oratorical tactics. He would address a dozen of meetings in a day. Besides,

Bhutto also activated his strong networking that he had established earlier when he was a part of Ayub Khan‘s government, to promote his party influence. He had closed friends among the military leadership and also some of the civil servants who subscribed to his views on different issues extended their help to Bhutto and his party. These contacts also kept Bhutto informed of the government policies and thinking which helped him to plan for the upcoming elections. Many, suspected of working against Bhutto, were threatened.

Bhutto himself criticized his opponents and used abusive and objectionable words against them but government turned a deaf ear and took no notice.300

PPP leadership succeeded in mobilizing the masses against the dictatorial regime of Ayub

Khan. The people became more involved in politics because of PPP‘s progressive and secular calls. Neither Yahya Khan nor Ayub Khan could damage the PPP‘s reputation and growing popularity. PPP was the first opposition party which succeeded in persuading the military leadership to hold general elections in the country and give the reins of government in civilian hands, later on. The PPP manifesto for the first general elections in Pakistan reflected radical and revolutionary postures, which annoyed the orthodox and conservative segments of society. In both wings of the country, the Ulema

(Sunni and Shia) violently attacked PPP‘s radical program and declared it disgusting and

299. Viewpoint. Abdullah Malik, (February 4, 1977). What will be the Bhutto Strategy? 300. M. Rafique Afzal, (1998). Political Parties in Pakistan: 1969-1971.

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repugnant to the principles of Islam.301 In February 1970, socialism was declared as the greatest of all the dangers to the security and well being of the country by 113 Ulema.

The Ulema also urged all Muslims to rise against this ―accursed‖ ideology.302 They strongly criticized and opposed Bhutto‘s socialism and perceived Bhutto as kafir (infidel) and his socialist program anti religious.303 The Ulema declared that those who practiced socialism were rebels against Allah and His Book, and it would be morally wrong and wicked for all those who support or vote for them.304 The Islamic parties and the Muslim

League presented the election as a competition/contest between Islam and its enemies.

They condemned Bhutto‘s association with Ayub Khan‘s regime and called him a drinker and a womanizer.305 The Fatwa of about 113 Ulema, initiated by Deobandi ulema appeared in the press against Bhutto‘s socialism306 but it could not stop or even prevented the attractiveness of Bhutto. Shah had discussed the situation in a few lines.307

All these accusations were of no effect as the results of the elections showed it later. All the three Islamic parties raised the slogan ―Socialism Kufr Hai‖ (Socialism is unislamic) while campaigning for the elections. Sensing the growing criticism among Islam Pasand and right wing political parties, Bhutto shrewdly introduced modifications in PPP‘s manifesto. Bhutto, in order to gain mass support, modified PPP‘s election manifesto and

301. Surendra Nath Kushik, (1984). Politics in Pakistan: With Special Refrence to Rise and Fall of Bhutto. Reproduced by Sani Hussain Panhwar, p. 66. 302. Anwar H. Syed, (1992), Op. cit., p. 69 303. Shafqat, Saeed, (1988). Public Policy and Reform in Pakistan 1971-77: An Analysis of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's Socio-Economic Policies. Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, 11(3), 37, p. 39. 304. Rana Rehman Zafar, (1973). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Azeem Siyasi Rahnuma ( Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: A Great Political Leader). Lahore: Khyber Publishers, pp. 260-61. 305. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., p. 69. 306. Mughees Ahmed, (2009). Relationship Between Political Parties and Non-Political Powers: An Analysis with Reference to Pakistan. Journal of Social Sciences (PJSS) Vol. 29, No. 1, 107-115. 307. The Fatwa declared socialism as the greatest of all dangers to the security and well-being of Pakistan and called upon all Muslims to rise against this ―accursed‖ ideology. The ulema declared that individuals and groups who preached socialism were rebels against God and His Book, and that it would be gravely sinful for any Muslim to aid, or vote for them. In fact, they claimed that ―Islamic Socialism‖ was a distorted exploitation and abuse of Islam by shrewd and power-hungry politician who was a non-practicing Muslim and who had never cared to study Islam carefully. More important was the fact that there exited no unity among religious or Islam pasand Parties. Shah Hussian Syed Mujawar, (1996). Religion and Politics in Pakistan. Islamabad: National Institute of Pakistan Studies, p. 101.

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Socialism was portrayed as Islamic socialism.308 He also pledged to base Pakistan‘s society on egalitarianism as mentioned in the Holy Quran and Sunnah of Prophet

Muhammd (s.a.w). Masawat-e-Muhammadi was also added to the PPP program.309 The

PPP members and supporters ran a folksy and colorful campaign for the elections.

Portraits of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto were displayed everywhere in meetings and processions.

Catching slogans310 were shouted in rallies and processions.311

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto symbolized himself as a civil, open-minded, moderate politician, as a

Pakistani loyalist, and as one devoted to democracy. He would make certain that democracy should in no way be endangered again in Pakistan, for a dictatorship was no alternate for democratic rule. He did not trust in animosity, he was of the view and would not let his personal emotion to manipulate his political decisions. He was not intolerant or conceited and did not desire to become a dictator. He told that ―some of his opponents had alleged that he was an Indian, some that he was a communist, and others that he was a fascist. But ―I swear by God, I am nothing but a Pakistani.‖ And, again, this is your country, and my country, and this is where we have to live and die.‖312

In fact, it was Bhutto‘s big-name in Sindh that greatly enhanced his resulting success at the polls in the southern province. For the world, his populasim was not a miracle, however, for the West Pakistan it was a great development. Before that the approach of

West Pakistan‘s politicians towards politics was very low/different. They preferred to negotiations and discussions among themselves rather than to use public support to chase

308. Surendra Nath Kushik, (1984). Op. cit., p. 66. 309. Dilip Mukherjee, (1972). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto: Quest For Power, pp. 179-180. 310. For example: ―Bhutto Sada Sher Hai, Baqi Hayr Pher Hai‖ (Our Bhutto is truly a lion while the rest are merely devious); ―Valika Tha, Amrika Tha, Bhutto Wah, Wah, Wah‖ (Valika, the industrialist, is down, America is down, cheers for Bhutto); ―Sada Bhutto Awe-i-Awe‖ (Our Bhutto is bound to come to power); ―Bhutto Jiye Hazar Sal‖ (May Bhutto live a thousand years).‖ 311. Yunas Adeeb, (1972). Quaid-e-Awam (Leader of the Masses). Urdu (Lahore: Maktaba-e-Pakistan, pp.203-204. 312. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, (1971). Marching Towards Democracy: A Collection of Articles, Statements and Speeches: 1970-1971. Pakistan Publications, pp. 39,44,148.

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their dreams, ambitions and aims.313 Pakistan Peoples Party stood for a republican form of government, civil liberties, adult franchise, minimum wages and health facilities for the workers, and independence of judiciary, elimination of illiteracy, equal rights for women and separation of judiciary from the executive etc. PPP leader did not show any interest in East Pakistan and focused on West Pakistan. They concentrated on the economic exploitation of the capitalists in West Pakistan.314 Thus Bhutto successfully campaigned for the election and gained massive popular support.

3.14.3. Party-wise Candidates on Territorial Basis

In West Pakistan, almost all the political parties decided to participate in the first general elections. In East Pakistan, the situation was different. The Awami League had a fairly sound base in East Pakistan at the advent of elections. Maulana Bhashani, the National

Progressive League and Krishak Saramik Party in East Pakistan boycotted the elections which favored the Awami League of Sheikh Mujib to sweep the elections, as it was left virtually alone in the field.315 When the National Assembly received the nominations, it became clear that no party would secure an overall majority in the house. A total of 1957 candidates participated for 300 seats of National Assembly. However, some candidates were rejected and 1579 were left in the field. Out of the 1579 candidates, 319 were independent. Similarly, 1850 candidates were from East Pakistan‘s Provincial Assembly and 1385 were participating in the West Pakistan Provincial Assembly. They all had conflicting ideologies.

Party-wise Candidates on Territorial Basis were as under

Party Candidates in East Pakistan Candidates in West Pakistan Awami League 162 4

313. Shahid Javid Burki, (1991). Pakistan: the Continuing Search for Nationhood. Boulder: Westview Pr, p. 59. 314. Safdar Mahmood, (1984). Pakistan Divided. Lahore: Ferozesons Ltd, p. 78. 315. Muhammad Rizwan, (2014). The Elections 1970: From Ballot to Nowhere. Asian journal of social sciences and humanities, vol. 3(4), pp. 28-36.

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Jamaat-i-Islami 69 79

Muslim League (Convention) 93 31

Muslim League (Qaiyum) 65 67

Pakistan Peoples Party …….. 119

Muslim League (Council) 50 69

Pakistan Democratic Party 81 27

Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan 13 90

National Awami Party 36 25 (Wali Khan Group) National Awami Party 15 5316 (Bashani Group)

Pakistan Peoples Party put up its candidates for the National and Provincial assemblies in the following order:

Peoples Party Candidates for National Assembly

S.No. Description Number of Candidates

National Assembly (West Pakistan)

1 Punjab 78

2 Sindh 25

3. NWFP (KP) 16

4 Balochistan 01

National Assembly (East Pakistan)

316. Herbert Feldman, (1972). The End and the Beginning: Pakistan, 1969-1972. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 72-73.

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1 East Pakistan 0

Peoples Party Candidates for Provincial Assemblies

S.No. Description Number of Candidates

1 Punjab Assembly 166

2 Sindh 49

3 NWFP (KP) 37

4. Balochistan 0

4 East Pakistan 3317

In East Pakistan, Awami League under Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman dominated the election campaign where the provincial autonomy was a vital issue. Awami League had associations of students, labourers and peasants to support its aims. Nonetheless, it was

Mujib-ur-Rehman‘s leadership that raised the League as the dominant party in that part of

Pakistan. As Hussain Shaheed Suhrawardy passed away in 1963, he left the National

Democratic Front and revitalized the Awami League in January 1964. On one hand, if

Mujib the Awami League leader attracted the masses through his superb speaking power, on the other, the depressing role of West Pakistani establishment also added to his fame and ultimately to Awami League victory. The populace of East Pakistan was disappointed, when 3 Prime Ministers318 belonging to East Pakistan were brutally sacked because of intrigues devised by West Pakistani coterie holding power at the Centre.

Furthermore, inability of the central government to respond positively to the three vital issues and demands319 of Bengali genuinely offended people of East Pakistan.320

317 M. Rafique Afzal, (1998). Political Parties in Pakistan: 1969-1971, p. 133. 318. Khawaja Nazimuddin, Muhammad Ali Bogra and H.S. Suhrawardy 319. To introduce Bengali language, the unfair provision of public resources to East Pakistan and little representation of Bengalis in the central services, mainly in superior positions.

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The Awami League‘s campaign soon turned itself into a movement of Bengali revival and devoid of any doubt the most contentious question in the campaign was the use of

Six Point Programme. As a result, Yahya Khan‘s Government did not disallow Sheikh

Mujib of using the Six Point Programme from his party platform. To create affront against dominant Punjab Awami League leaders visited West Pakistan. Hyder Bakhsh

Jatoi and Abdus Samad Achakzai and G. M. Syed, were Mujib‘s colleagues in the

Western Wing 321 Despite these relations, Mujib asserted that West Pakistan had been urbanized by East Pakistan‘s capital and described the 6 Point Formula as ―Magna Carta‖ for the Bengalis which would turn East Pakistan into ‗Sonar Bangla‘ (golden Bengal).322

3.14.4. Election Results and Political Maneuvering of Bhutto

The following three different centers of power emerged after election results were announced: Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman‘s Awami league (AL) in East Pakistan, the Pakistan

Peoples Party in Sindh and the Punjab, National Awami Party and Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam

(JUI) in NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and Balochistan.323 In the Eastern Pakistan, the

Awami League got all but two seats and secured overall majority in the National

Assembly. The Awami League gained a massive victory winning 167, out of 169 seats allocated for that province but it could not win a single seat from Western Pakistan. In the

West Pakistan, it was the recently established Pakistan Peoples Party under Z. A. Bhutto leadership which gained a sweeping victory by capturing 81 seats out of total 144 seats allocated for West Pakistan.324 The performance of the rightist parties was disappointing.325 Similarly the performance of the leftists was even more

320. Muhammad Rumzan, (1985). The Role of Religio Political Parties in Elections of 1970. M.Phil Dissertation, Department of History, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, p. 90. 321. Ibid. 322. Muhammad Afzal Rafiq, (2001). Pakistan History and Politics, 1947-1971, Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 392. 323. Syed Fakharuddin Shah, and Muhammad Zubair Khan, (2012). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Regime and Growth of the Baloch Nationalism in 1970s,Global Journal of Human-Social Science Research 12.7. 324. Lawrence Ziring, (1980). Op. cit., p.101. 325. The rightist parties could not perform well and these parties were badly uprooted as they could get only 37 out of 300 seats for the National Assembly. The Muslim League Qayyum (PMLQ) secured

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unsatisfactory.326

The Awami League performed tremendously well in the elections. No one expected it to be in such a powerful position. The common prospect was of a factionalized parliament but such sort of state of affairs created a stalemate. Z. A. Bhutto whose party swept the polls in the West Pakistan demanded a share in the government and was not ready to let

Awami League form a majority government. On the other hand, Awami League leadership was reluctant to allow Bhutto such a role.327 The Awami League secured an overall majority in the National Assembly but it was not given a chance to form the government. The military junta hesitated to call upon Mujib as his party had no representation in the western wing. There was a need for a mutual understanding between

Bhutto and Mujib which sadly didn‘t take place. As Bhutto sensed/realized that Awami

League leadership was in the bad books of the military leadership, he turned down to discuss terms and reach an agreement with Sheikh Mujib unless he could agree, at least, to dilute if not publically renounce his six points program. On the other hand, Mujib and his colleagues in the Awami League were firm that the six points must form the basis of the future constitution. Of course, this was a difficult situation for Yahya but an opportunity for PPP leadership.328

The 1970 elections were the first ever general elections after independence and it was the start of a democratic process. Free, fair and timely elections are very important for the growth and development of democracy. The right to vote is undeniable right of every citizen. But unfortunately, in 1970 when this right was given to Pakistanis, a large number of citizens did not cast their votes. Of all the registered voters, only 58 % used

only 9 seats, Council Muslim League 2, Convention Muslim League and JUI 7 each, MJUI 7, JIP 4 and PDP 1 seat. Craig Baxter, (1971). Op. cit., pp. 197-218. 326. National Awami Party (Wali Group) which was a pro-Russian party and which like the Awami League stood for secularism, socialism, full autonomy for East Bengal and pleasant relations with India, secured only 7 seats, 3 in each province of NWFP (KPK) and Balochistan and 1 indirectly elected women‘s seat. Muhammad Rizwan, (2014). The Elections 1970: From Ballot to Nowhere. Asian journal of social sciences and humanities, vol. 3(4), pp. 28-36. 327. Katharine Adeney, (2007). 5. Democracy and Federalism in Pakistan. Federalism in Asia, 101, p.113. 328. Lawrence Ziring, (1980). Op. cit., p.102.

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their right to vote while 42 % refrained. It was the combined responsibility of both the

Awami League and PPP to get rid of Martial Law and put the country on the road to democracy by ensuring a peaceful transfer of power to the civilian hands.329 The Awami

League and PPP had promised the masses of a better future. The official name of the party was Pakistan Awami League but the party was concentrating on East Pakistan only and got overwhelming victory in the province.330 Eight of Awami League members were also contesting elections from the West Pakistan but it was just to give a posture of national level.331 Similarly, the PPP also fielded all of its 120 candidates in West Pakistan.

There was not a single candidate from PPP contesting the elections from East Pakistan, despite its election manifesto wherein it is mentioned that if a party which seek to be a parliamentary party has to get, at least, five percent of the total votes cast in both parts of the country, so that it could be rightly called a national party.332 Thus the Awami League emerged as a representative party of East Pakistan and PPP as a representative of the

West Pakistan only.333 Once the election results were announced, the League‘s leadership declined any option of making any amendment in the six point formula. Sheikh Mujib-ur-

Rahman declared that the people of East Pakistan have voted for six points formula in the elections and it is now the property of the people and he or his party has no authority to amend the said formula. Mujib stated further that ―none would be able to stop us from framing a constitution on the basis of six point program.‖334 Bhutto threatened to stay away from the National Assembly if Mujib didn‘t yield. Thus he included himself in the ruling body. Sheikh Mujib observed the alliance between Bhutto and military junta and claimed that his party has been given a popular mandate to take the reins of government.

329. Ghafoor Ahmad, (1988). Phir Martial Law Aa Gaya (Then Came the Martial Law). Lahore: Jung Publishers, p.18. 330. Ibid. 331. Ibid., p. 20. 332. Ibid. 333. Ibid. 334.The Pakistan Observer, 4th January 1971.

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He reiterated that the masses had opted for Awami League and therefore the only justifiable government would be the one formed by it.335

Initially, when the talks failed, the PPP‘s leadership adopted a strict attitude to counter the Awami Leagues‘s presuure and to force its leadership for some concessions in the six point formula. In February 1971, the PPP‘s leadership informed the press of its decision of not attending the National Assembly session which was due on March 3, 1971, unless and until he was satisfied that PPP‘s fairly good suggestions and demands were accommodated.336 Bhutto also issued threat of starting a great movement if the session of the assembly was held without PPP‘s participation.337 He stated, ―I cannot put my party men in a position of double jeopardy (by sending them to Dhaka),‘ he said and threatened ‗a revolution from Khyber to Karachi,‘ if the Peoples Party was left out.‖338

He also started issuing threats and warning to the western wing politicians not to attend the National Assembly session. He further said: ―The PPP expected the people to take revenge from the people, who had chosen to attend the assembly session, if the people failed to take the revenge, the PPP itself would take action against them. If any member of his party attends the session, the party workers would liquidate him.‖339 He threatened the politicians from West Pakistan of dire consequences if they tried to attend the session.340 The undemocratic and defiant attitude of PPP leadership caused Yahya Khan to announce the postponement of the National Assembly session scheduled for 3rd March

1971 on the pretext that the largest political party from West Pakistan was not attending the session.341

335. Lawrence Ziring, (1980). Op. cit., p. 102. 336. Hasan Askari Rizvi, (1986). The Military 1947-86 and Politics in Pakistan. Lahore: Progressive Publishers, pp. 183-184. 337. Dawn, 1st March, 1971. 338. Ahmad S. S., (2004). History of Pakistan and Role of the Army. Karachi: Royal Book Company, p. 369. 339. Dawn 1st March, 1971. 340. Ayesha Siddiqa, (2007). Military Inc. Inside Pakistan‘s Military Economy. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 77. 341. Hasan Askari Rizvi, (1986). Op. cit., p.184.

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Such sort of situation led the military leadership denied to hand over power to Mujibur

Rahman without revision of Awami League‘s six point program. He later announced to hold the National Assembly session on 25th March. Sheikh Mujib considered this act against the autonomy of the Bengali and reacted brutally and challenged the decision of the postponement of the National Assembly session and started street protests.

Meanwhile Yahya Khan asked both parties to meet him and sort out a solution. Yahya and some other political figures from West Pakistan visited Dhaka and met Mujib.

Bhutto, however, refused to do so. It was, of course, a time of grave national crisis and mutual understanding was inevitable. Yahya and Mujib met for six days and discussed the matter and it appeared that Yahya agreed to most of the Bengali demands. A draft declaration called for the end of the martial law in both wings and also for the division of the National Assembly into two committees, one representing the East Pakistan and the other the West Pakistan. The future constitution was to be based on the integrated recommendations of both committees. Autonomy for East Pakistan as demanded in

Mujib‘s six points program was assured.342

Yahya once again asked PPP leadership to join the talks. This time Bhutto agreed and went to Dhaka, where Yahya informed him that only Pakistan Peoples Party‘s acceptance of the draft declaration was needed for the settlement.343 All this proved fruitless because, on the one hand, the Awami League leadership was unwilling to accept any amendment in the six point formula while; on the other hand, PPP‘s leadership was not ready to accept all the six points.344 Bhutto discussed the documents with his advisors and refused to support the draft declaration because, in his judgment, it would lead to the dismemberment of the country. In fact, Bhutto and his high command had prepared a

342. Lawrence Ziring, (1980). Op. cit., pp. 102-103. 343. Ibid., p. 103. 344. Zulfikar Ali. Bhutto, (1971). The Great Tragedy. Karachi: Pakistan People's Party, pp. 21-26.

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formula for a compromise settlement which was very close to the one agreed to by Yahya and Mujib but Bhutto vetoed that one as well.345

Neither Bhutto nor the military junta could deny Mujib‘s firm and strong claim but they were not ready to transfer power to Mujib. Bhutto‘s negative response to attend the

National Assembly meeting scheduled in Dhaka meant not accepting the mandate of the winning party which was very much against the fundamentals of democracy, while the

Awami League leadership grew more unbending after securing an overwhelming majority in the elections.346 Not accepting the mandate of the Awami League and using undemocratic language to warn or coercive the politicians on the part of a national leader, shows his commitment to seat of power and disrespect for democratic norms and values.

This was something against the norms of democracy which Bhutto so loudly spoke about during his election campaign. The strict and rigid stance of Mujib on the six points formula too was undemocratic.

The above discussion makes it clear that Bhutto‘s point of view was utterly against democratic norms and values. One of the reasons for Bhutto‘s undemocratic and unyielding stand was, undoubtedly, his support from military, bureaucracy and feudal class in the West Pakistan. Although Yahya Khan drawn in Awami League headship in the discussion but in reality that was a plan just to hunt for legitimacy for him. It was a dual endeavor of the military leadership and Bhutto to prevent Mujib-ur-Rehman from coming into power.347 The military junta sided with Bhutto who, according to Haqqani and Siddiqa, supported military‘s anti- India agenda.348

345. Lawrence Ziring, (1980). Op. cit., p. 103. 346. Waseem-ur-Rehman, Governance Crisis and Pakistan, published in Jahangir‘s World Times in April 2011, p. 31. 347. Surendra Nath Kushik, (1985). Op. cit., p. 69. 348. Ayesha Siddiqa, (2007). Op. cit., p. 78.

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CHAPTER - 4

POLITICS IN PAKISTAN: THE PPP STYLE

4.1. Introduction

This chapter examines the Tri-Partite Talks after the first general elections, finds out that why a peaceful transition could take place and who were responsible for the failure of the talks. The chapter also discusses the roles and contributions of ruling as well as opposition parties towards the framing of the 1973 Constitution. The focus is on assessing the governing authority by PPP under the leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto till the promulgation of the Constitution.

4.2. Failure of Dhaka Negotiation and Responsibility of Political Leadership

Bhutto had to talk and negotiate with one of the two power centers. Although there were possibilities of risks in both cases, his first priority was to reach a settlement with the

Awami League's leadership on the basis of a sdemocratic alternative to military rule.

Bhutto approached to Mujib from a position of strength rather than weakness; he portrayed himself as a leader of the Western part of the country, and ruled out any possibility of either framing of the constitution or forming government at the centre without the cooperation of his party. On December 20, 1970, in his speech to the Punjab

Assembly members, Bhutto stated it clearly not to occupy the opposition benches in the

National Assembly. PPP's leadership was not ready to occupy opposition benches and wait for another five years. It wanted to get into power for the realization of its pledges to the masses.349 He stressed that his party had won the elections in two provinces of Punjab and Sindh where the real power existed, so there was no possibility of forming a government at the centre keeping it out.350 The very next day after Bhutto speech in the

Punjab Assembly i.e. 21 December 1970, he told in a news conference and rejected the

349. Philip E. Jones. (2003). The Pakistan People's Party: Rise to Power. Karachi: Oxford University Press, pp. 429-430. 350. The Pakistan Times, 21 December 1970.

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idea to decide issue of autonomy for East Pakistan by the force of majority in the

National Assembly, arguing that because in that case the House would not be able to form a constitution for both wings of the country. Pointing to the bifurcation of the country, along party lines, Bhutto suggested and called for a grand coalition of the PPP and Awami League at the National Assembly so that both the parties would be able to fulfill their promises to their people.351 In the early post election days, Bhutto had emphasized his programme of economic and social reform, openly condemned industrial and business sectors for inflation of prices. He also promised oppressive feudal lords that the day would come soon when they would have to answer to his party.352 Thus, his first post election strategy was to make way for transfer of power from military to a PPP-AL coalition at the central level. It is clear that Bhutto's demand for share of power and framing of a constitution with mutual settlement was not only aimed to safeguard the interests of West Pakistan but of Pakistan as a whole. So some concessions from the

Awami League's side on the six points formula was extremely important for the grand coalition strategy.353 About this period, Bhutto writes in his books ‗The Graet Strategy‘.354

Many blamed PPP‘s leadership for the fall of Dhaka. Almost all political parties except

PPP were of the view that Bhutto did play a major role in the failure of tripartite (Yahya,

Mujib and Bhutto) dialogue.355

Yahya had also sensed the discontent in the military high ranks and he, therefore, sided with his colleagues and Bhutto. As the writ of the government became ineffective in most of the Eastern Pakistan, the military regime of Yahya Khan launched a major security

351. The Pakistan Times, 22 December 1970. 352. Philip E. Jones, (2003). Op. cit., p. 430. 353. Ibid. 354. "whether to surrender to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman's six points demand which would have led to constitutional session within a few months, or to resist the demand, which would endanger the return to democracy and civilian rule, and carry with it the possibility of a violent parting of the ways. It was, therefore essential to make every endeavor to find a political compromise on six points so that democracy could be restored and Pakistan saved from disintegration." Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, (1971). The Great Tragedy. Karachi: Vision Publications Ltd, p. 27. 355. Interview with Syed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and senior member of JI) on 16-07-2015.

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operation and unleash forces to contain the uprising led by Awami League under the command of Tikka Khan who was infamous for mercilessness.356 In his interview with

Fallaci, Bhutto stated that he was not involved in the campaign of Yhaya Khan against

Bengalis. He condemned357 the way the operation was carried out.

Sensing the failure of the Mukti Bahini358 to achieve the objective, India hurriedly attacked Eastern province and a full-fledged war started on November 22, 1971. On

December 16, 1971 military leadership admitted defeat and Pakistani forces surrendered.

Two days later, fierce protests started throughout West Pakistan. On December 19, military officers in GHQ, Rawalpindi also resorted to vocal revolt which compelled

Yahya Khan to resign. Thus Bhutto got the opportunity to be sworn in as the president of the country on December 20, 1971.359 The general elections of 1970 proved the shortest way for Bhutto to gain political power. Bhutto too was ambivalent about democracy.

During his good days in the Ayub Cabinet, he was a pro-Ayub and anti-democracy. Out of power, he became anti-Ayub and pro-democracy. Bhutto‘s attachment to democracy depended on his position in the power structure.360

The responsibility for December 1971 debacle has to be ascribed to political leadership and Gen Yahya Khan‘s junta as well. As noted by Askari, Prof Wayne Wilcox of the

Southern Asian Institute of Columbia University was of the view that the three parties engaged in the last-minute negotiations in Dhaka in March 1971 were all negotiating from a position of weakness and none of the three leaders, Yahya Khan, Mujib and

Bhutto could accept what would have had to be a ―major, visible compromise without

356. Lawrence Ziring. (1980). The Enigma of Political Development in Pakistan. Folkstone: Dawson, p. 103. 357. There are circumstances where a bloody suppression is justifiable and justified. In March, the unity of Pakistan depended on the suppression of the secessionists. But to carry it out with such brutality on the people instead of those responsible wasn‘t necessary. Oriana Fallaci, (1976). Interview with History. New York: Liveright. p. 7. 358. Mukti Bahini is a popular Bengali term which refers to the guerrilla movement formed by the Bangladeshi military, paramilitary and civilian during the War of Liberation that transformed EP into Bangladesh in 1971. 359. Waseem-ur-Rehman, (2011). Governance Crisis and Pakistan. Published in Jahangir‘s World Times- April, p. 31. 360. Ashok Kapur, (2002). Pakistan in Crisis. London: Routledge, p.109.

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being rejected by their followers‖. Wilcox says, ―Mujib-ur-Rehman was left with the position of ‗national hegemony or provincial secession‘, Bhutto, with the position of

‗shared national power or West Pakistan secession‘, and the army with ‗adequate support for national unity and defense or civil war‘. And as a result, each group made its irreconcilable demand and committed all of its resources in the hope that they would be enough.‖361

In fact, the military leadership and politicians from the Western Pakistan did not show any respect for the election results. Their undemocratic attitude and the unfriendly reaction from Eastern Pakistan and particularly the adamant stand of Sheikh Mubijur Rehman on six points program, led to a stalemate. The political intolerance and short sightedness of the political leadership resulted into the disintegration of the country.362 Yahya could not deal the situation rightfully. Yahya wanted to become the president of the country. Mujib stressed on the implementation of six points and Bhutto was not ready to accept the points. Thus the mismanagement of the army and misktakes on the part of political leadership did play its role in the fall of Dakha.363 Both Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman and

Bhutto could not sort out the solution which resulted in the disintegration of the country.

One cannot say that Sheikh Mujib wanted to keep the country united and Bhutto was wholly responsible for disintegration. Actually politicians had their own priorities, but adjustment is very much essential. This is very clear that Sheikh Mujib should have been allowed to form the government. If the 1973 Constitution was formed by the National

Assembly‘s elected members under 1970 elections, then why Mujib was not allowed to form the government, whose party had won majority of seats and majority of votes in the same elections? PPP‘s leader was going to be opposition leader and had also chances of becoming a deputy Prime Minister. It was a matter of bargaining. He then formed his

361. Dawn, 18th December 1990. M. H. Askari. The Stark Lessons of 1971. 362. Ayesha Siddiqa, (2007). Military Inc Inside Pakistan‘s Military Economy. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 77. 363. Interview with Prof. N. D. Khan (Senior Member of PPP) on 28-07-2015.

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government on the basis of PPP majority and with support of other groups. Why Awami

League was not allowed to form the government?

Pakistan Peoples Party came to power and took most of the praise for overthrowing both

Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan. It took over the reins of power after the breakup of

Pakistan when Dhaka had fallen to Indian troops. Zulfiqar ali Bhutto drew strength from the humiliation and demoralization of the nation. He assumed the office of president of the country but continued with martial law in operation. The embarrassment of Pakistan army and the disorder in its ranks also provided Bhutto a chance to become chief martial law administrator. The dual roles and their interrelationship gave him total power required/wished by Bhutto. Thus Z. A. Bhutto became the undeniable and total leader of the new Pakistan after the dismemberment.364

4.3. PPP in Power

After the disintegration of the country in 1971, the new Pakistan (West Pakistan) was faced with the problem of succession, authority and legitimacy. The military leadership was not on the same page and stood clearly divided. Gen. Yahya Khan with some of his associates made every possible effort for retaining power but Lieutenant General Gul

Hasan Khan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan (Then Chief of Pakistan Air Force) with a few others sided with the civilian leaders and persuaded Yahya Khan and other senior officers to hand over power to the civilian leadership.365In this context, one observer aptly remarked, ―Bhutto was an obvious choice for the military high command which, one

364. Lawrence Ziring, (1997). Pakistan in Twentieth Centuary: A Political History. Karachi: Oxford University Press. p. 375. 365. Veena, Kukreja, (2003). Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises. New Dehli: Sage Publications, p. 33. Also see Muqeem Khan, Fazal. (1973). Pakistan‘s Crisis of Leadership. Islamabad: National Book Foundation, pp. 129-30. Lieutenant General Gul Hassan Khan, (1993). Memories of Lt Gen. Gul Hassan Khan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, pp. xi- xii, 346-50.

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saner counsel prevailed, accepted that vacating the political arena willingly would leave the door open until the time was ripe to capture it again.‖366

There was lack of such a constitutional arrangement which could help Bhutto to become prime minister of the country; he therefore, became head of Civilian Martial Law regime.

As quoted by Sartaj Aziz, Raza noted in his book, Yahya Khan made an effort to develop a mutual understanding with Bhutto and suggested to him that he should become president of the country while Bhutto as prime minister. Bhutto wanted full authority and effective control as president and as civilian martial law administrator. He therefore, rejected the proposal. He also turned down Yahya Khan‘s second offer that he should be allowed to continue as Chief Martial Law Administrator and Commander in Chief of the army while Bhutto should become president of the country. As far as the withdrawal of martial law was concerned, Bhutto refused to do so as long as there was a constitutional arrangement approved by the assembly.367

In December 1971, Bhutto assumed the dual offices of the president and Chief Martial

Law Administrator amidst serious national and regional problems. After a few hours when Bhutto was sworn in as president and Chief Martial Law Administrator,368 he addressed the nation on radio and television and removed ban on the National Awami

Party.369 Bhutto said that there was indeed a ―thin line‖ between autonomy and secession.370

366. Ayesha Jalal, (1990). The State of Martial Rule: The Origin of Pakistan Political Economy of Defence. Cambridge University Press, p. 313. 367. Sartaj Aziz, (2009). Between Dreams and Realities. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 47. 368. Anwar H. Syed, (1992).The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. London: The Macmillan Press, p.117. 369. ―I will start with a clean state. I am assuming that we are all patriots and that we all want to serve Pakistan. So I am withdrawing the ban on the National Awami Party and I am going to request the leaders of NAP to meet me very soon. In this connection, I am also going to ask leaders of other political parties to meet me.‖ Government of Pakistan (1974). White Paper on Balochistan, Islamabad, p. 6. 370. Tahir Amin, (1993). Ethno-National Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors, Islamabad:Institute of Policy Studies, 1988, Rept. p.123.

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It is very much clear that Z. A. Bhutto came to power with the support of military but once in power, he emphasized that he was a duly elected leader.371 Despite PPP‘s majority, Bhutto needed the support of both civil and military bureaucracy. One was needed for his ambitious reform agenda and the other was vital for the survival of his government. Pakistan might have entered the era of mass participation but the structure of the state had not as yet been brought into conformity with an emergent social reality.

According to Ayesha Jalal, ―Extending his control over the mandarins and Praetorian

Guard, jealously watching his impregnable hold over the unprivileged social groups and also placating the dominant interests groups, petrified by his populistic rhetoric, without toning down his party‘s promises, required more canning and tact than is possible in a single life time.‖372 Bhutto wished to consolidate his position and he, therefore, persisted with the martial law so that to deter his political opponents.373

Bhutto wished to extend his power and consolidate PPP‘s influence therefore during the transition phase he concentrated on consolidating these objectives. He exercised unlimited powers as the Chief Martial Law Administrator even when he did not belong to the armed forces. Subsequently, on assuming the office of the President of Pakistan under the interim constitution, his powers further enhanced. He did not permit the democratically elected National Awami Party,-Jamiat Ulama-e-lslam coalition to form provincial governments in the NWFP (KPK) and Balochistan till mid-April, 1972. Both the parties were allowed to form provincial governments after persistent pressures by the opposition political parties.374 Bhutto realized that although in a House of 144, he had the support of 88 members, the opposition, comprising the remaining 56 members, could create enough trouble for him. Bhutto also delayed convening the National Assembly,

371. Z. A. Bhutto, ( President of Pakistan). Speeches and Statements: 2O December 1971- 31 March 1972. (Karachi: The Department of Films and Publications, 1972, p. 3. 372. Ayesha, Jalal, (1990). Op. cit., p.314. 373. Surendranath Kaushik, (1985). Pakistan Under Bhutto's Leadership. New Delhi: Uppal Publishing House, p.77. 374. Ibid., p. 81.

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with a view to defer issues which needed urgent attention as those of framing a permanent constitution.375

Thus election results compelled PPP leadership to form coalition government at the centre and in two of the four provinces of the remaining Pakistan. To form central and provincial governments Bhutto made an understanding with different parliamentary parties. Muslim League headed by Abdul Qayum Khan became PPP partner in the centre.

An understanding was reached with National Awami Party and JUI in forming provincial governments in NWFP (KP) and Balochistan..376 It was hoped that these coalitions would heal the polarization caused by the divisive nature of the elections but it did not as the succeeding events proved later on. About 60% of the adult population gave their verdict but unfortunately it led to a highly divided parliament. LackIing of legitimacy for popular politics and the vulnerable law and order situation led Pakistan to muddle for five and half years, vacillating between aspirations for a true democracy and an authoritarian desire to ensure order and bring prosperity to the country.377

4.4. 1973 Constitution and Bhutto’s Maneuvering

Bhutto was not sincere in bringing democracy to the country he was actually maintaining a facade of democracy and was trying to concentrate and acquire absolute power. The popular resentment was seen everywhere against Bhutto‘s undemocratic attitude. The country was moving fast towards a severe domestic crisis. The opposition political parties stuck to adamant stand for the introduction of federal-parliamentary form of government in line with Pakistan Peoples Party manifesto for the 1970 elections. Inter-party differences arose which adversely affected PPP‘s discipline and harmony.378

375. Ibid., p.77. 376. Hasan Askari Rizvi. (2013). The First 10 General Elections of Pakistan: A Story of Pakistan‘s Transition from Democracy Above Rule of Law to Democracy Under Rule of Law: 1970-2013, p. 48. 377. Ibid. 378. Surendra Nath Kaushik, (1985). Politics in Pakistan. With Special Reference to Rise and Fall of Bhutto. Reproduced by Sani Hussain Panhwar, p. 13.

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Bhutto wanted extension in the period of martial law for securing and strengthening his power and position. But he had to yield to strong clamor from the opposition parties and also from some of his own party men for the lifting of martial law. The press and the general public demanded the same. The deteriorating law and order situation brought the law enforcing agencies, on the verge of collapse. The industrial unrest was at peak, police strikes were observed in certain cities and frequent clashes erupted between the Pakistan

Peoples Party and the opponents. The aforesaid scenario pushed/compelled Bhutto to focus on constitution making and parliament. At the end of National Assembly session on its very first day, Bhutto announced that he would repeal martial law on April 21, 1972.

By this master stroke, Bhutto retained the power and popularity for which he was not ready to end martial law earlier.379

He had got under his belt the support of more members in the parliament but was cautious about the opposition members. Delaying tactics in convening of assembly session were adopted by Bhutto. During the constitution making process, Bhutto threw to the wind established constitutional norms and exercised unlimited authority as President.

He reneged on the promise made with the opposition in the Constitutional Accord of

1972. The opposition wanted him to shed some measures which were detrimental to the growth and development of democracy. The Political Parties Act of 1962380 and the provision of two third majority for a no confidence vote were some of those measures.

Out of the controversy between the opposition and the government, Bhutto got the better of it in the end. He was successful in securing enough support for the approval of

379. Hussain Mahboob, (2013). Parliament in Pakistan 1971-77 and Chief Executive: An Analysis of Institutional Autonomy. Journal of Political Studies, 20(1), 83-95. 380. Political parties were banned and not allowed to function in June 1962 when Ayub Khan regime enforced the 1962 constitution. The national and provincial assemblies elections in April and May 1962 were party less elections. It was felt necessary that once the National Assembly start functioning Pakistan must have political parties. Therefore, political party‘s act was passed in 1962. The said act provided for working of the political parties and after the passing of the act the political parties began to function in the country.

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constitution of 1973.381 Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and even the founding members of Pakistan

Peoples Party were never truly compatible; the former was all in all while the latter were powerless without the leader. J. A. Rahim, Mubashar Hasan, Mehmud Ali Kasuri, Miraj

Khalid and Rana wanted a parliamentary constitution. They believed that it would elevate their social objectives and would also act as a check on the freewheeling powers of PPP leadership.382

Through this dramatic change in his attitude, Bhutto not only silenced his vociferous opposition but also remained as powerful as ever. Securing unanimous vote of confidence enhanced Bhutto respect and there was no but minimal opposition to the interim constitution. During his term of office as Chief Martial Law Administrator and president of the country, Bhutto seized as much authority as possible and played a vital role in the formation of the Constitution. The 1973 Constitution was promulgated in the backdrop of which opposition was coerced and skillfully persuaded to endorse it.383

To begin with, the National Assembly agreed over an interim constitution which substituted martial law on 21 April 1972. Within a short period one year, a new constitution was unanimously approved by the National Assembly which became operational from 14 August 1973.

Members of the PPP and those who joined Bhutto camp were willing to follow him.

Bhutto‘s PPP had enough majority i.e., 110 in a house of 144 at that time (138 General seats plus 6 for Women) to pass the constitution with ease.384 But he was not content with only PPP‘s support and wished to get the support of all political parties. In early 1971, during his controversy with East Pakistan leadership, he had argued that a constitution should be the one acceptable to all the provinces and it should not be imposed by the

381. Surendra Nath Kushik, (1985). Op. cit., p. 73. 382. Lawrence Ziring, (1997). Pakistan in Twentieth Centaury: A Political History. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 397. 383. Hussain Mahboob, (2013). Op. cit., 83-95. 384. Ghafoor Ahmad, (1988). Phir Martial Law Aa Gaya (Then Came the Martial Law). Lahore: Jung Publishers, p. 34.

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brute majority of one province. As PPP had lost elections of 1970 in the two provinces of

NWFP (now KPK) and Balochistan, and both the provinces were strong supporters of the demand of provincial autonomy, a constitution rejected by these provinces would not be a satisfactory one for Bhutto.385

For preparing the draft of 1973 Constitution, the National Assembly formed a committee consisting of twenty five members from both the ruling and opposition parties. The

Federal Minister for Justice and Parliamentary Affairs Mahmood Ali Qasuri was the chairman of the committee. Other members of the committee included Ghaus Bakhsh

Bizinjo, who served Balochistan in the capacity of governor from March 1972 to

February 1973, Council Muslim League‘s leader Mian Mumtaz Muhammad Khan

Daultana was a member of the committee. Mian Mahmmod Ali Qasuri as chairman of the committee approved the Interim Constitution and the draft was presented to the National

Assembly. For approving the Constitution, it was must that there should be a president of the country. So, that is why on April 14, the National Assembly had elected Bhutto unanimously as president of the country. The Assembly then approved the Interim

Constitution on April 17, 1972. On the same day Mahmood Ali Qasuri declared that the new constitution would be prepared unto October 1972, and if the Assembly failed to do till 1973, the Interim Constitution would become the permanent constitution. Bhutto took oath of the office of the president on April 12, 1972.386 After this the process of constitution making got accelerated. There were differences not only between the ruling and opposition on different points but Qasuri too had reservations and resigned. Abdul

Hafeez Pirzada replaced Kasuri and soon they reached an agreement on October 20,

1972.387

385. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., p. 173. 386. Aslam Pervez Mamon. (n.d). Wafak-i-Pakistan aor Qumi Yakjehti, 1947 se 1971 Ka Seyasi Jaiza (Federation of Pakistan and National Integration From 1947 to 1971: A political Analysis (PhD Thesis). University of Sindh (Jamshoro), p. 213. 387. Ghafoor Ahmad, (1988). Op. cit., p. 32.

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After the overthrow of Ayub Khan along with his Constitution of 1962, there was seen a national consensus for establishing a parliamentary system, universal adult franchise and direct elections. Almost all the politicians from West Pakistan were in favor of sufficient autonomy for provinces. The issue of Islam had assumed an important place and was in need of a debate at length. All the Islamic parties and those who held similar opinions about Islam were pressing that Pakistan should become an Islamic state. Thus the three important issues which the future parliament of Pakistan was to address while framing the constitution included: Provincial Autonomy, the place of Islam and the promotion of democracy.388 Earlier Bhutto had promised to restore democracy, but once came to power, he felt it necessary for the government to have enough power to restrain and contain opponent‘s pressure. Bhutto was a Muslim, but once in power, he was not willing to allow the Ulema to play a role in state affairs. He would, if he could, allow the individuals to practice Islam according to their own lights and as the spirit moved them.389

He was against the concentration of authority in the central government and advocated provincial autonomy time and again, before coming to power. But when he assumed the headship of central government, Bhutto indulged in increasing rather than diminishing his authority.

The important opposition groups to the PPP regime in the National Assembly were the two Muslim League factions (Muslim League Council and Muslim League

Conventional), the three Islamic parties and most importantly, the NAP. As for as

Muslim League was concerned, it had always favored a strong centre and was seemed comfortable with limited concessions to Islamic sentiment. The Islamic parties advocated an Islamic state but at the same time also wanted an energetic central government to implement its goal. The secular NAP had always been advocating decentralization and provincial autonomy. These differences of orientation and emphasis within opposition

388. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., p. 172. 389. Ibid.

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ranks provided PPP leadership an opportunity to get the Constitution approved that accommodated most of Bhutto‘s preferences.390 In the beginning, the PPP‘s government faced severe criticism during the process of drafting the constitution from the Provincial

Assemblies of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (NWFP) and Balochistan. The leader of the National

Awami Party (NAP), Abdul Wali Khan warned the government not to deprive the

Pakhtuns and Balochs of their democratic rights; otherwise it would become difficult to stop them from protesting and retaliation in the same manner.391 Also there were differences between Peoples Party and the opposition over the Central-Provincial relationship and power of the Prime Minister (Head of the Government). This debate between the incumbent party and opposition political parties created bitter feelings and retarded the process of framing a permanent constitution. During the haggling for the constitution, the opposition parties threatened government of walk-outs and boycotts of the National Assembly session, but it was Bhutto‘s cleverness that opposition parties came to heal and all the controversies in the formation of the constitution ended.392 Also the two most vocal opposition parties of NAP and JUI withdrew from some of their demands in the larger interest of the country and also constitution and the religious parties particularly Jamaat-i-Islami showed a spirit of accommodation.393

The promulgation of 1973 Constitution raised Bhutto‘s confidence as well as his stature in the politics of the country. In the process of constitution making, the opposition was committed to make the office of the prime minister answerable to the parliament. Also, some of the PPP members showed their desire for an effective legislature where every member could have a say in the affairs of the state. On the other hand, Bhutto wanted to become a more powerful executive. The draft constitution provided executive (Prime

Minister) with almost dictatorial powers. Thus in spite of the strong opposition, Bhutto

390. Ibid., p. 173. 391. Dawn, April 20, 1972. 392. Hussain Mahboob, (2013). Op. cit., pp. 83-95. 393 Hamid Yusuf, (1999). Pakistan : A study of Political Developments 1947-97. Sang-e-Meel Publications, P. 152.

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managed to add more powers in the P.M office.394 Initially, Bhutto preferred presidential system but ultimately he agreed to a modified parliamentary system where P.M would be a strong person. Bhutto‘s acceptance to become prime minister of the country (despite his inclination for presidential system) was because; under the 1973 Constitution, the prime minister would be a powerful chief executive.395 It was unfortunate that Bhutto did not respect the rules of the game. Almost all the executive powers were concentrated into the prime minister office. This fulfilled the desire of Bhutto to become a powerful chief executive so that he might be able to overrule all the institutions and those who dared to oppose him.396

At the outset, both NAP and JUI boycotted the National Assembly session because of the arbitrary sacking of the NAP-JUI coalition government in Balochistan and the resignation of NAP-JUI government in the province of NWFP (KPP). But later on, the boycott was ended and the assembly adopted the constitution without dissent.397 The opportunity was never stronger to give the country a truly democratic constitution. The army was humiliated by the defeat and the dismemberment of the country, so it was not in a position to challenge/oppose the leadership of Pakistan Peoples Party. However, the emergency provisions remained as part of the constitution. Bhutto was as much charismatic politician in Pakistan as was Sheikh Mujib in Bangladesh and Indira Gandhi in India. Centralization is certainly compatible with democratic form of government but all the three operated in such an autocratic ways that hampered democracy in their respective countries.398

394. Mahboob Hussain, (2013). Op. cit., pp. 83-95. 395. Under article 48 of the original 1973 constitution the president of the country was bound by the advice of the prime minister, and it was mandatory that every order issued by the president must be countersigned by the prime minister and unless the prime minister had signed it, no order or decision of the president would have any legal sanction. What he wanted was absolute power and the 1973 constitution does not obscure Bhutto's efforts in forming a totalitarian system, something his predecessors considered but rejected as unsound. Lawrence Ziring, (1980). Pakistan: Enigma of Political Development. Folkstone: Dawson, p.104. 396. Mahboob Hussain, (2013). Op. cit., pp. 83-95. 397. Hamid Yusuf, (1999). Op. cit., P. 151. 398. Katharine Adeney, (2007). Democracy and Federalism in Pakistan. Federalism in Asia, 101, p. 113.

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The Constitution of 1973 came into force on August 14, 1973. Addressing the nation, Z.

A. Bhutto emphasized on harmony, cooperation, national unity and democratic practice.

However, he signed an order just after that in which the Balochistan Governor was directed to take into custody the provincial opposition leaders.399

The Constitution of 1973 introduced federal parliamentary system and promised the basic and fundamental rights. It also gave independence to the judiciary. It gave power to the provinces (provincial autonomy) and created a framework for participatory governance.

It was hoped that the framing of the constitution would strengthen democratic institutions, traditions and values.400 The framing of the Constitution which was in fact the comeback of Pakistan to democratic rule created much hope that it would shortly beat its problems and build a workable and democratic system. These were the assumptions.

Unfortunately, the Constitution failed to work in its true spirit.401 PPP‘s leadership soon

―began honoring the 1973 Constitution more in the breach than in the observance.‖402 It was ignored by the leadership and the party that was chiefly responsible for piloting it in the National Assembly. The constitution‘s democratic character was compromised by introducing amendments particularly (fourth, fifth, and sixth) which constrained political freedom and independence of judiciary. In addition, the government adopted a biased attitude towards dissent and the opposition was attacked by the government and their leaders were arrested for different nominal reasons. The press and media were also restricted. In short, it stopped the growth of political institutions and democratic traditions.403 Accordingly, the PPP government turned into a personalized authoritarianism which resorted to undemocratic practices repeatedly.

399. Lawrence Ziring, (1997). Op. cit., pp. 396.397. 400. Tanvir Ahmad Tahir, (2010). Political Dynamics of Sindh, 1947-1977. Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, p. 635. 401. Mushtaq Ahmad, (1959). Government and Politics in Pakistan. Karachi: Pakistan Publishing House, p. 126. 402. Jalal 1999, 317. 403. Mushtaq Ahmad, (1959). p. 126.

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4.5. The Constitution of 1973 and Provincial Autonomy

The Constitution of 1973 was a great achievement and the credit goes to Bhutto for securing consensus of different political parties. Bhutto took on board all the political parties of the country and was able to get an all agreed constitution in 1973. The said constitution proved to be a permanent constitution in reality, not only during Bhutto‘s rule but for all the time till today. Even dictators like Zia and Musharraf could not dare to abolish it because it had the unanimous approval of all the parties.404

If truth be told, PPP‘s leadership and opposition leadership sharply differed on the issue of provincial autonomy. NAP leader Abdul Wali Khan and other political figures from opposition parties thought that devolution of power to the provinces was the only way to safeguard the interests of different provinces. But Bhutto thought that only a strong centralized government could protect national unity. In reality the Constitution of 1973 was the most centralized constitution.405

The division between the federation and the four provinces over legislative subjects was settled by the 20th October Accord. The table given below shows the extensive list of subjects over which the Central government continued to enjoy exclusive or concurrent jurisdiction.

Comparative Table

------

List of 1935 1956 1962 1973

Subjects Act Constitution Constitution Constitution

------

Federal 61 30 94 Part one-59

(One List only) Part two-8

404. Interview, with Abdul Akbar Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, senior PPP member and Ex Deputy Speaker of KPK Assembly) on 18-11-2015. 405. Sonia Tasneem, (2013). Working Relationship between Central and Provincial Governments in Pakistan, (1971-77). International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 3 No. 17, p. 196-204.

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Provincial 55 94

Concurrent 19 47

Residuary With Provinces Provinces With Provinces

(with overriding

provision regarding

national interests)

______

Source: Rafi Raza, (1997). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967-1977. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p.181. The representatives of the smaller provinces, particularly NAP, showed a surprising degree of accommodation in agreeing to such wide-ranging federal legislative powers in order to achieve consensus in October. Bhutto indicated to them that the concurrent list of subjects could be reviewed in ten years time406 but that did not happen.

In addition to that, a further innovation was Part two of the Federal List.407 On the

Administrative side, Article 153 established a Council of Common Interests to formulate and regulate policies for these matters. Composed of equal numbers from provinces and the Centre, with the four Provincial Chief Ministers and four Federal Ministers including the Prime Minister. The CCI was responsible only to parliament in joint setting.408 It was to redress the provincial grievances. CCI was an important constitutional institution aimed to iron out differences, issues and problems not only between different provinces but also between provinces and centre.409

The basic demands for provincial autonomy were met subject to Articles 232 and 234 relating to Emergency, whereby the Federal Government could assume powers in the

406. Rafi Raza, (1997). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967-1977. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p.180. 407. Covering railways, oil and gas, the development of major industries and water and power which were subjects of inter-provincial concern. 408. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p.181. 409. Amin Ahmad, Ministry of Production, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, PLD, 1996, Karachi, 27.

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provinces.410 Such provisions are normal in a federation and can be salutary if used properly. In Pakistan, they have throughout been weapons in the hands of federal governments to be used against the provinces, particularly those provinces where opposition parties govern.

Only one formal meeting of CCI was held, at the end of 1976. Instead the ministry for

Provincial Coordination, which was established to iron out routine differences between the provinces, functioned as a mini-Council and the constitutional issues of concern to the

Council were left largely unattended. In fact, the Council had been given vast powers but in reality power remained centralized in Bhutto and was not exercised through the

Council.411

In fact, the 1973 Constitution provided less room for provincial autonomy but as it was the result of the consensus of all major political parties in the country thus, capable to facilitate cooperative center-provincial relations. Unfortunately, it did not so happen,412 as the provincial government of Balochistan under the leadership of Atta Ullah Mengal was dismissed and NWFP (now KPK) provincial government under Mufti Mahmood was forced to resign very soon after the promulgation of the 1973 constitution. This shows a clear disrespect for mandatory and crucial constitutional obligations. Central government on April 27, 1973 appointed Ghulam Qadir Baloch from Balochistan who belonged to

ML(Qayyaum) as Chief Minister. It was a constitutional requirement that before becoming a chief minister he had to prove his majority in the Balochistan Assembly and

Ghulam Qadir claimed that he had the requisite majority. But on the very same day NAP demonstrated in Quetta (Baluchistan) and presented to the audience its 11 out of the total

21 members of the Balochistan Assembly. Although Central Government‘s claim was

410. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p.181. 411. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 182. 412. Sonia Tasneem, (2013). Op. cit., pp. 196-204.

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proved false but undeterred by the exposure of its false clamis, on April 29, 1973

Inayatullah Khan Gandapur was sworn in as the Chief Minister of NWFP (KPK).413

In fact, 1973 provided for a federal state but with more executive powers and centralized government. This displeased the NAP which was strong advocate of provincial autonomy. Provincial autonomy was the main issue raised by NAP during constitution drafting process. Even once Abdul Wali Khan stated,‖When we wanted our rights in the past we were dubbed as traitors, but now the situation has changed. Now we shall take our rights and not beg for them. And if anyone tries to oust us from Pakistan then he should remember that we are not Bengalis who separated.‖414 In fact, from the very early days the relationship between PPP and NAP-JUI coalition was not cordial and PPP‘s government faced politico-constitutional tension with the two coalition provincial governments. The coalition partners were not happy with the governmental structure provided by the 1973 constitution. Though all the political parties approved the constitution but the differences between PPP and the two provincial governments of

Balochistan and NWFP (now KPK) were extreme. Also, Bhutto had fear that these differences might threaten his plan that was to rule Pakistan for a long time. The central government differences with the provincial governments can be settled by giving space and by allowing more administrative and financial autonomy but the centralized intention on the part of PPP‘s leadership ousted the duly mandated provincial leaders and was committed to settle the issue by force and not in the parliament.415 The centre-provinces relationship is discussed in detail in chapter five.

4.6. Why Opposition Accepted the 1973 Constitution

Obviously, the 1973 Constitution was a great and brilliant achievement of the PPP government under Zulfikar Ali Bhutto leadership. After Bhutto‘s ousting from power by

413. Zulfikar Khalid Maluka, (1995). The Myth of Constitutionalism in Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 248. 414. Dawn 20 April 1972. ―No Denying Rights to Phatoonistan, Baluchis,‘‘. 415. Lawrence Ziring, (1999). Pakistan: A Political History. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p.396.

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General Zia, some of those who often opposed him, desired the restoration of 1973 constitution. They had a great respect for this sacred document and considered it a national asset because it was a constitution that represented a broad national consensus.416

But opposition too played a commendable role on its part. Bhutto‘s maneuvering and bargaining tactics did play a major role in making the opposition political parties to agree and approve the constitution but opposition also showed responsibility by withdrawing some of its demands. Even those who had a close look at developments during constitution making process wondered that how the opposition which had severe objections, agreed to such a document which was far short of their demands.417 It would be fair to say that the opposition political parties particularly NAP, JUI and JI leadership realized the importance of the constitution in that critical time. The NAP and JUI members who were right to oppose Bhutto particularly after the then developments418 in

Balochistan and N.W.F.P showed high-mindedness. The JI which led the Islamic parties too displayed a considerable accommodation in the national interest. It is true that the entire country wanted a permanent constitution and both the ruling and opposition parties, by demonstrating an attitude of accommodation for reaching a consensus, did not disappoint the people.419

However, there were some other factors that forced the opposition leaders to yield to a constitution which could not include most of their demands. The October 1972 Accord and the 1973 Constitution did not fulfill much of the opposition demands, then why did the opposition parties assented to the constitution. It was because the opposition was in a state of disarray and there was a lack of trust on each other. Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo was suspicious about some of the rightist elements in Jamat-e-Islami and cautioned his NAP‘s

416. Syed Hasan Mahmood, (1988). Mera Siyasi Sfar (My Political Journey).Urdu (Lahore: Jung Publishers), p. 283. 417. Particularly the demand for Provincial Autonomy was withdrawn by NAP and JUI. 418. The dismissal of NAP-JUI government in Balochistan, the change of NAP Governors in the two provinces, and the resignation of the NAP-JUI Government in NWFP. 419. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 179.

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colleagues that they would stab us in the back at some time. He was also of the view that

NAP had more in common with the ruling party than other opposition parties.420

Similarly, another Muslim League leader, Mir Mardan Khan Jamali from Balochistan believed that the NAP was more evil than the PPP. Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi, a leader of JUI was a pro PPP and a critical of both the NAP and JI. Also, some of the opposition leaders like Maulana Abdul Haq (JUI) and Maulana Zafar Ahmad Ansari had separate negotiations with the ruling PPP before the approval of the constitution. Some of the Jamiat-ai-Ulema-e-Pakistan (JUP) leaders were against the opposition boycott of the

Assembly.421 But the most compelling was the opposition strength of only 36 votes as against the government‘s 110 in the Assembly.422 In the elections of 1970s PPP initially secured 81 seats. But unfair means were used by PPP leadership and members of other political parties were compelled to change their loyalties. Thus, in a house of 146 PPP‘s membership raised to 110.423

NAP and JUI coalition partners were on the driving seats in both NWFP (KPK) and

Balochistan when the Constitutional Accord of October 1972 was agreed upon. This was the first experience for both NAP and JUI leaders to be in government and they did not want to be out. Abdul Wali Khan, who never trusted Bhutto and was always a vocal critic of PPP‘s leadership, was in London when the Accord was signed. Bizenjo, who deputized for him, was of the view that it is better for NAP to remain in power to be able to expand its support base.424 JUI first accepted the Constitutional Accord and also agreed to the

1973 Constitution which accommodated some of its demands while, reserving the right to make other demands at some other opportune time. JUI did not stress on provincial autonomy and was happy with the proposed Islamic provisions. NAP, the most vocal of all opposition parties, was not willing to challenge Bhutto regime alone. Also, Bhutto had

420. Anwar H. Syed. (1992). Op. cit., p. 178. 421. Mukhtar Hasan, (1973). A Report published in Zindagi, March 11, 1973, pp. 5-7. 422. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., p. 178. 423. Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, (1988). Op. cit., p. 34. 424. Anwar H. Syed. (1992). Op. cit., p. 179.

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caused the impression that NAP-JUI government in both provinces NWFP (now KPK) and Balochistan would be restored, so NAP leadership did not want to lose the opportunity.425 Thus each of the main opposition parties and their leaders were ready to have a settlement with the ruling party. The PPP leadership, on the other hand, was content more with concessions to the Islamic parties, which he thought cost him little in terms of his authority than concessions to the provincial autonomists.426

425. Mukhtar Hasan, (1973). Op. cit., pp. 5-7 426. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., p. 179.

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CHAPTER - 5

THE POST 1973 SCENARIO

1.1.Introduction

This chapter evaluates the performance of PPP government in the aftermath of 1973

Constitution i.e., 1973 to 1977 when the party was in power and had acquired a dominant position. Reference in this connection may be made to the termination of two provincial governments under the 2-party opposition alliance and the arbitrary handling of the constitutional amendments. The purpose would be to determine whether the relationship between the PPP and opposition parties was in line with the spirit of the constitution and in accordance with the established principles of democracy.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto the chief executive of Pakistan, from 19th December 1971 to 13th

August 1973 was president and after the promulgation of the 1973 Constitution from 14

August 1973 to 5th July 1977 as prime minister.427 On National Day i.e. on 14 August

1973, Bhutto designation changed from President to prime minister and the same day he addressed to the nation over radio and television.428

Bhutto was leading the first elected parliament of the country. Undoubtedly, he was a strong personality and also his image as popular leader of the masses was superior. On the political stage, Bhutto was a prevailing personality and violently attacked his

427. Mahboob Hussain, (2013). Parliament in Pakistan 1971-77 and Chief Executive: An Analysis of Institutional Autonomy, Journal of Political Studies, voi.20, Issue-, pp. 83-95. 428. "Today, we bid good-bye," he said with cheerfulness and hopefulness, "finally and for all time, to the palace revolutions and military coups which plagued Pakistan for nearly two decades." He encouraged all voices to be "raised in defense of all view-points" but cautioned against "pandemonium." Democracy could work only if there was "discipline." He warned against "separatist tendencies," and advised the opposition to rest "content" and "wait until future elections." He reminded his listeners that "we have pledged to Allah" to permit no "intrigues subversive of government." He spoke at some length about Pakistan's external relations, and sounded very much like Nixon discussing Watergate when he said, "Let me make it clear that, when I talk of the Opposition, I am mindful of the fact that the Pakistan Peoples Party may itself be in opposition some day. ... ―I am no Great Khan that I should entertain dreams of ruling Pakistan in perpetuity." He had as he spoke already ordered Governor Bugti to arrest former Governor Bizenjo, former Chief Minister Mengal, and Sardar Marri, but made no mention of those "insurgents." Stanley Wolpert, (1993). Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 236-237.

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opponents, capitalists and the landlords who were in a vulnerable position. He was the only dominant actor on the political scene of the country and there was no one who could challenge his authority not even those who had been expressing their disappointment in

Bhutto. He was the supreme power both inside and outside the parliament. Others might have desired but not determination and cleverness. Bhutto believed in the concentration of power in his hands. According to Asghar Khan (an opposition leader), Bhutto was not a democrat by temperament or conviction. As a political leader of the country, he acted like an autocrat rather than a democratic political leader. He became authoritarian with the every passing day. He used martial law powers to suppress his opponents. His critics viewed Bhutto as a strong civilian political leader who had no respect for parliamentary democracy. Before the promulgation of 1973 Constitution, there were neither constitutional restrictions nor any interruptions from the institutions which came into being under the provisions of the constitutions. Bhutto struggled hard to concentrate powers in his own hands and ensure his continuity in office. The delayed lifting of martial law was a tactic aimed to secure his desires. It was apparent from the very early days of Bhutto rule that hopes of parliamentary government would not materialize.

Bhutto looked quite comfortable with his dictatorial powers and was in no hurry to get rid of the same.429

Bhutto was not ready to accept his vocal opponents with calmness. He wanted to guide and lead all of Pakistan and thought it his destiny. He thought about himself; as he was born for and well educated to assume a leading role. He wished every Pakistani to adore and support him in that task. It was an insult to his Izzat, his personal feudal "honor," to be challenged, distrusted, and explicitly attacked either in provincial assemblies or at press conferences.430 In no instance has the power of the government been used so relentlessly as against retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan, a former commander-in- chief of

429. Mahboob Hussain, (2013). Op. cit., pp. 83-95. 430. Stanley Wolpert, (1993). Op. cit., pp. 254-255.

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the Pakistan Air Force who, during Bhutto rule, headed a moderate opposition party. His house was set on fire, his lands confiscated, and his family and friends persecuted.431

The story of Bhutto, and for that matter, of any other ruler who makes tall but unsustainable claims and the subsequent disappointment of those they rule is not a new phenomenon in the realm of politics. The Bhutto that we saw post-elections when he came to power was a far cry from the Bhutto whom we saw campaigning before elections. Many of the promises that Bhutto had made, he could hardly deliver on few of them. He became, unfortunately, so intoxicated by his new found power that all the established conventions of a democratic rule were thrown out of the window. His vengeance, intolerance and cynicism towards the opposition, in general, and the NAP, in particular, was beyond forgiveness. The NAP ministries in Balochistan came under particular wrath from the centre. The bureaucratic cadre was loaded with personnel from

Punjab.432 The job security and career promotion that those employees enjoyed was owed to the goodwill of the PPP. The provincial government in Balochistan was obstructed in its governance by the same civil service personnel. Unlike before when there was a healthy balance between the bureaucracy and government, the Bhutto government tilted that balance in his favor. The civil servants in Balochistan were repeatedly reminded of their status as the hirelings of the federal government and instructed that they had better be loyal to PPP if they held their career dearer.433

5.2. Tripartite (PPP, NAP and JUI) Accord of March 1972

NAP leader Abdul Wali Khan pressed the government by lifting of martial law. He warned the government of launching a mass movement if martial law was not lifted and

431. Newsweek, July 16, 1973. Pakistan: Life with Bhutto, p. 13. 432. People's Front. London. Vol. 2 No. 6-7. 1975. p. 5. 433. Ibid.

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democracy was not restored in the country.434 Bhutto knew that consensus of different political parties was not possible in that point of time. He therefore, concentrated on an interim constitution.435

Amidst political crisis, Bhutto needed to bring different political forces on board so as to reach an understanding for making a constitution. In this regard, he first removed the ban on National Awami Party (NAP) imposed by previous military regime. The opposition political figure Abdul Wali Khan and other regionalists came to heal and behaved like establishment groups.436 Once Maulana Mufti Mahmud said, ―The president realizing the gravity of the situation has joined hands with other political parties to evolve a common formula which has saved Pakistan.‖437 It was difficult for Bhutto to form provincial governments in the two provinces of NWFP (KPK) and Balochistan, though not impossible. He could seek support from other political parties and independents to prevent

NAP-JUI alliance from establishing a majority in the two provincial assemblies. He wanted support from all political parties so as to create national unity before going to

Shimla Conference.438 He started negotiations with the main opposition parties such as

NAP and JUI and reached an agreement on March 6, 1972, known as PPP-NAP-JUI

Tripartite Accord.439 PPP negotiating team comprised of Hayat Muhammad Khan

Sherpao, Ghulam Mustafa jatoi, Abdul Hafeez Pirzada, Maulana Kausar Niazi and Rafi

Raza. Bhutto and Rafi Raza were the most important players.440 Four representatives,

Abdul Wali Khan, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizanjo, Arbab Sikandar Khan Khalil and Khair

434. Dawn, 7 February 1972. 435. Sonia Tasneem, (2013). Working Relationship Between Central and Provincial Governments in Pakistan(1971-77). International Journal of Humanities and Social Science, Vol. 3 No. 17, pp. 196-204. 436. Syed Fakhruddin Shah and Muhammad Zubair Khan, (2012). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Regime and Growth of the Baloch Nationalism in 1970s. Global Journal of Human-Social Science Research, 12(7), pp.1-9. 437. Hasan Mehdi, (1977). Pakistan ki Siasi Jamatian (Pakistan Political Parties). Lahore: Feroz Sons, p. 190. 438. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Macmillan, p. 181. 439. Government of Pakistan (1972), PPP-NAP-JUI Accord, March 6, 1972, Islamabad. 440. Mubashir Hasan, (2000). The Mirage of Power: An Inquiry into the Bhutto Years 1971-1977. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 87.

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Bakhsh Marri from NAP and Mufti Mahmood and Maulana Ghulam Ghaus Hazarvi represesnted JUI.441 PPP‘s leaders had his own vision and target before him. In the interim period between the lifting of martial law and the framing of a permanent constitution, he wanted to retain as much power with him as he could. He was not happy to share authority with a prime minister if he was the president or with a president if he was to be a prime minister.442 So, he went for the said agreement with great skill. The

NAP presented the names of their nominees (Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Arbab Sikander

Khan Khalil) as governors of Balochistan and NWFP (now KPK) respectively and Bhutto agreed to appoint. This tripartite agreement allowed NAP-JUI to form coalition governments in these two provinces. Bhutto also agreed to call the Natinonal Assembly session on April 14 and not to interfere in provincial affairs. In return, both NAP and JUI were to support the continuance of martial law until August 14, 1972 and would also vote in favor of a motion of confidence in President Bhutto.443 In another agreement, they also agreed not to oppose the federal government‘s emergency powers.444 Thus the three parties agreed to accept the rule of the PPP at the center and in the two provinces of Punjab and

Sindh, the NAP-JUI coalition rule in NWFP and Balochistan.445 Thus PPP leadership was successful to sign an agreement with representatives of the main opposition parties on 6th March,

1972.446 It was also agreed upon that there would be presidential system at the centre while a parliamentary form of government in all the four provinces. The agreement was, of course, a great achievement and it was the result of the spirit of accommodation from

th both sides.447 (For details of 6 March Agreement see Annexure 4)

The said agreement was a marriage of political expediency rather than ideological affinity between the three political parties. Bhutto, the shrewd, considered both NAP and JUI

441. Ibid. 442. Ibid. 443. Jang (international edition), March 29, 1972. 444. Jang, May 9, 1972. 445. Dawn, Karachi, 7 March 1972. 446. Dawn, 7 March1972. 447. Sonia Tasneem, (2013). Op. cit., pp. 196-204.

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most suitable to be allied with because he had feared that other parties might pose a greater threat to his rule. The NAP and JUI, on the other hand, took it as a chance to wield power.448 PPP-NAP-JUI Tripartite Accord, no doubt, saved the country from political quagmire for the time being but in the long run, it failed to put an end to the confrontational politics.449

Unfortunately, the Agreement ran into trouble within days of its conclusion. Bhutto wanted to do things without NAP and JUI because he feared the radical elements might pose a threat to the interests of PPP. Also, a faction of PPP under the leadership of

Ahmad Raza Qasuri, which had parted ways with the parent party, had decided to rejoin it as Qasuri held the view that the political troubles and other problems gripping the country and India‘s threatening attitude on Pakistan‘s borders had made it imperative for everyone to extend support to President Bhutto.‖450 Besides, Bhutto had also got the assurance from some independent MNAs of their support, so the need of NAP and JUI support in the National Assembly was not felt necessary.451 There was also an element of distrust between the signatories of the said agreement. Bhutto government used martial law and dismissed many of the provincial civil servants. They were also not allowed an access to court. In March 1972, about 1300 federal and provincial civil servants were removed under the cover of martial law on the alleged charges of corruption, incompetence and bad management.452Since many of the dismissed officials belonged to the provincial governments, Bhutto‘s move was termed as an invasion on provincial autonomy. This action of PPP‘s leadership distressed the NAP leaders and created serious misgivings about PPP government. They took it as an attack on provincial autonomy and

448. Muhammad Hassan Shaikh, (1987). Role of Political Parties in Pakistan 1969-1977 (PhD Thesis), University of Sindh, Jamshoro, p. 364-365. 449. Sonia Tasneem, (2013). Op. cit., pp. 196-204. 450. Hasan Mehdi, (1977). Op. cit., p. 195. 451. Muhammad Hassan Shaikh, (1987). Op. cit., p.366. 452. Hasan Askari Rizvi, (2003). Military, State and Society in Pakistan. Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications, p. 153.

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threatened to withhold support for the continuation of martial law.453 Bhutto replied in the same coin and refused to appoint NAP-JUI nominees as governors of Balochistan and

NWFP (now KPK) But after several rounds of talks Bhutto agreed and made a declaration of lifting martial law on April 14, 1972 at the National Assembly session. In return, Bhutto received the National Assembly approval for provisional constitution and also a unanimous vote of confidence in his government.454 On April 21, 1972 martial law came to an end and the Interim Constitution was promulgated. On the same day, Bhutto was sworn as President under the Interim Constitution of 1972. As agreed upon in the tripartite agreement, the nominees of NAP-JUI455 were appointed Governors on 28 April

1972.456 Consequently, the NAP-JUI governments were sworn in on May 1, 1972.457 Thus coalition governments of NAP-JUI were formed in April 1972, lasted till February 1973.

Chief Ministership of NWFP (KP) Provincial Assembly was given to Maulana Mufti

Mahmood while Ataullah Khan Mengal became leader of the house in the Provincial

Assembly of Balochistan. It was the beginning of a new chapter in the relationship between the center (PPP) and the two provinces (NAP-JUI). However, under the Interim

Constitution, Bhutto as President of Pakistan had the power that he could use to harass the NAP-JUI coalition governments which would be a patent violation of his pre-election pledges.458

5.3. Politics of Rivalry and Political Maneuvering in NWFP (KP)

In NWFP, Bhutto appointed NAP‘s Sikandar Khan Khalil as governor and allowed Mufti

Mahmood to become chief minister. Thus, Mufti Mahmood was the first among maddrasa graduates in the Indo-Pak Sub- Continent who became chief minister. In both

453. Anwar H. Syed. (1992). Op. cit., p. 182. 454. Ibid. 455. Namely Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, in Balochistan and Arbab Sikandar Khan Khalil, in NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). 456. Jang, April 29, 1972. 457. Jang, May 2, 1972. 458. Sonia Tasneem, (2013). Op. cit., pp. 196-204.

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the provinces of Balochistan and NWFP (KPK) he gave the impression to be supporting the provincial governments and struggling for the rights of the provinces. In fact, Bhutto wanted to create a rift between JUI and NAP. Bhutto thought that Mufti Mahmood would not be able to run the government smoothly with NAP a secular-nationalist platform.

PPP‘s leadership gave the impression that it had accommodated different opposition parties but actually, he wanted to create a rift between NAP and JUI.459 But Mufti

Mahmood made some very important decisions which were accepted by NAP leadership.

For example, JUI leadership passed s resolution and adopted Urdu as provincial language.460 NAP could demand for Pashto to be adopted as provincial language. It was the consciousness of NAP leaders who willingly accommodated Urdu language and did not protest. Certainly this was a positive message for all to focus on common and not personal interests.

Bhutto wanted to get rid of annoying and defiant provincial government members. To achieve this purpose, Bhutto encouraged rival political forces in NWFP (Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa) and Balochistan. PPP made an alliance with Qyyum Khan‘s Muslim

League. It was agreed upon that the Muslim League(Qayyum) would support PPP in the

National Assembly and also in the provincial assembly of NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) and, in return, Qayyum Khan was to be appointed as interior minister. In reality Bhutto did not need the support of Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan but the latter was, a foe of NAP leaders, could be relied upon to harass and disrupt the NAP-JUI governments in the two provinces.461 Hayat Mohammad Khan Sherpao was given the portfolio of Ministry of

Water and Power in the federal government, who also became the leader of the opposition in the Provincial Assembly of NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). As a federal minister, if, Hayat Muhammad Khan, a rival political figure in NWFP, on the one hand, could deny cooperation and delay the release of province funds then on the other hand, as

459. Interview with Sayed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 460.Ibid. 461. Askar Ali Shah, (1972). The Story Behind the Hurry. Outlook, April 22, 1972, p. 5.

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leader of the opposition in the Provincial Assembly, he could denounce the opposition government of NAP-JUI coalition for its failure or tardiness in solving the people‘s problems and grievances.462 While the some socialist elements in PPP were finding an opportunity to create troubles for both the provincial governments and extended every possible support to Qayyum Khan to destabilize these governments.463 From the very outset, Bhutto was not happy with the growing popularity of NAP. The victory of NAP in

1970 general elections in the two provinces added strength to the provincial autonomy movement. Therefore, in order to counter and suppress the NAP, Bhutto cultivated rival political forces to make his task easy. All these political maneuverings and tactics of PPP leadership worked in a manner that turmoiled the center-province relationship.

5.4. Political Rivalry in the Province of Balochistan

Baluchistan got the status of a full-fledged province for the first time during Bhutto regime. The province had its own governor and provincial government. Earlier, it was a

Commissioner‘s Province and was ruled by an agent of the central government (governor general/president). Bhutto, as President of Pakistan showed a gesture of political accommodation by allowing the NAP-JUI opposition to form governments in Balochistan and NWFP. PPP government also yielded to the NAP insistence for the governorships of the two provinces.464

Bhutto was ruling Pakistan with 81 members in the National Assembly. PPP had secured majority in Punjab and Sindh. In Sindh, PPP‘s position was not that much strong but it included many independents in its fold. After the 1970 elections there were very heated discussions and negotiations between PPP and NAP-JUI. It was not easy for Bhutto to form government in the other two provinces. He also had a fear that NAP, Mufti

Mahmood and some other independents might form anti opposition provincial

462. Askar ALI Shah, (1972). The Coalition Anixiety. Outlook, August 19, 1972, p. 5. See also:Hamid Khan, (2005). Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan, p. 260 463. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., p. 182. 464. The Pakistan Times, December 1, 1974. Baluchistan: Retrospect and Prospect.

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government and there would be direct confrontation. So, he wisely appointed Mir Ghos

Bakhsh Bizinjo (a nominee of NAP-JUI) as governor of Baluchistan and Attaullah

Mengal became chief minister on 1 May 1972. Mir Ghos Bakhsh Bizinjo was appointed because Bhutto had the information about his tense relations with Attaullah Mengal and some other Baloch leaders. Both of these Baloch leaders were against Bhutto and both belonged to NAP but due to certain reasons like Baloch-Pashtun rift which had started after Ayub Khan regime, their internal relationship was disturbed.465 Bhutto knew that both Baloch leaders were not on the same page. So, he made use of this tense relation between the two Baloch leaders. Yet again, the Bizinjo‘s entrance into NAP is something very strange because he was a communist nationalist and had been struggling against the

Baloch sardars, then how he joined NAP, where sardars like Bugti and Mengal were its members.466

Mir Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo, Sardar Khair Baksh Marri and Sardar Ataullah Mengal were dominant political figures belonging to NAP. The NAP came into the government for the first time in its history. The Centre-province relations grew sour from the very outset. The province wanted a share in the provincial services and the relocation of the Punjabi civil servants to their respective areas. The Baloch felt dispossessed and disempowered. The coalition government headed by Attaullah Mengal sought to pursue the central government to delegate provincial autonomy to Balochistan. Several measures were taken in this regard but Bhutto accused him of confronting the federal government. But

NAP-JUI government countered these accusations by claiming that it had been working for fostering democratic norms and values in Balochistan. Enacting land reforms, allowing freedom to the media men, withdrawing section 144 in Quetta were cited as examples. The federal government was bent on suppressing the traditional values and

465. Interview with Sayed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 466. Ibid.

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culture of the Baloch and ordered the governor to do the same.467 The Balochistan government was bound to its electorate for fulfilling promises made during the election campaigns. As a first step, the Baloch government started cleaning the provincial bureaucracy of the non Baloch officials. The provincial government further wanted to take control of the police and law enforcement agencies in the province. But the PPP government termed these steps as incompatible with the constitution. The provincial government was further strengthened and encouraged to stand its ground against the

Centre because of the growing Baloch resentment and frustration over the domination of the provincial bureaucracy by the non Baloch and the ruthless competition for limited land resources. The provincial government was willing and suggested it to the Centre to nationalize the land and distribute it among those who deserved it i.e. the tillers. The

Centre, despite its reputation as a socialist and poor friendly government, brushed aside the said suggestion.468 The provincial government of Mengal was frustrated to such an extent by the intransigence of Centre that he ordered a new force to be recruited by the name of Dehi Muhafiz. The federal government took it as a bluff to its absolute authority and set itself on the course of eliminating it altogether. Although the same force was formed with the consent and approval of the Governor‘s conference, yet the Centre labeled it as a private army of the NAP.469 Ironically, it was the same force that the PPP itself maintained by changing its label to Balochistan Reserve Police (BRP).470

5.5. Jamotes-Mengals Dispute

The situation was, literally a tug of war between the Centre and the province with no win in sight for either side, the federal government adopted extreme measures and willfully

467. Syed Fakhruddin Shah and Muhammad Zubair Khan, (2012). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Regime and Growth of the Baloch Nationalism in 1970s, Global Journal of Human-Social Science Research, 12(7), pp. 1-9. 468. The Herald. (1986), Karachi. July 1986, P. 59. 469. People's Front. London. Vol. 2 No. 6-7, 1975, p. 5. 470. Muhammad Breseeg, (2004). Baloch Nationalism its Origin and Development, Karachi: Royal Book Company, p. 325.

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created law and order situation in Pat Feeder and Las Bela districts471 to destabilize the provincial government. The PPP‘s government at the centre alleged the Balochistan government for arresting some of the Jamote tribe leaders in Lasbela who were anti-NAP and pro-PPP.472 The Dehi Muhafiz and other supporters of the NAP came forward to meet miscreants, sent and supported by the federal government.473 The centre was alarmed by the combined prowess of the Dehi Muhafiz and supporters of the NAP.

Armed forces were sent to face the challenge which was created by the centre itself. The provincial government reported it to the federal government but the centre denied any such involvement.474 Instead, the central government tried to convince the Balochistan government for stopping action against the Jamote tribe but in vain. The central government sent army contingents to Lasbela to halt the lashkar‘s activities.475 When the central government sent troops to Lasbela, Mengal instructed the civil armed forces not to take orders from the army.476 The armed forces from the centre made their way to the hotspot stealthily. News of the armed forces in the provincial government infiltrating into and fighting its own people spread like wildfire. Yet, the federal government denied it and provided the false news to the media men that the operation was conducted on the request and on behalf of the provincial government to restore law and order situation over there. The Mengal government was alleged to have tried causing the civil war in the province.477 The centre came out triumphant in this tug of war at the end. The provincial government was dissolved and most of the provincial assembly members were arrested on trumped up charges of one kind or another.478 The NAP-JUI government headed by

471. Janmahmad, Essay on Baloch National Struggle in Pakistan, p. 301-302. 472. Syed Fakhruddin Shah and Muhammad Zubair Khan, (2012). Op. cit., pp. 1-9. 473. People's Front. London, Vol. 2 No. 6-7, 1975, p. 3. 474. Ibid., pp. 3-4. 475. Hamid Khan. (2005). Constitutionaland Political History of Pakistan. USA: Oxford University Press, p. 260. 476. The Pakistan Times, December 1, 1974. 477. S. Mahmud Ali, (1993). The Fearful State: Power, People and Internal War in South Asia. London, pp. 145-146. 478. Syed Fakhruddin Shah and Muhammad Zubair Khan, (2012). Op. cit., pp. 1-9.

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Attaullah Mengal opposed the central government‘s interference and alleged that Bhutto‘s regime had caused the Jamotes unrest for political cause to send away the provincial government.479

5.6. London Conspiracy and Bhutto Maneuvering

Z. A. Bhutto, in fact was not comfortable with the opposition coalition governments in the two provinces. His regime, therefore, unleashed a serious campaign against the NAP-

JUI coalition government. After having come back from Shimla where he successfully concluded the issue of prisoner of war, Bhutto approved a publicity campaign about the

‗London Plan‘.480 This campaign was started against Bhutto opponents.481 The NAP leaders denied the existence of such a plan in the strongest terms. Abdul Wali Khan called

London Plan a false and baseless and an attempt of the federal government to malign and degrade the NAP provincial government.482 The provincial Governor Mir Ghous Bakhsh

Bizenjo described London Plan as a ‗figment of imagination‘.483 Nawab Akbar Bugti supported the NAP against Bhutto‘s PPP in the elections of 1970. But differences developed between Bugti and NAP leaders. Nawab Akbar Bugti expected NAP support for his women candidate for Senate which NAP refused to extend. Thus differences developed and Bugti agreed with the government allegation of London Plan against NAP leaders. He also claimed that he too, was a party to the secessionist conspiracy and later abandoned it.484 Bugti‘s acknowledgement of the Plan provided a support to the Central government in overthrowing the NAP-JUI coalition government in Balochistan. It is believed that he portfolio of Governorship of Balochistan was awarded to Nawab Akbar

479. The Pakistan Times, December, 1974. 480. Rafi Raza. (1997). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967-1977. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 267. 481. This alleged conspirational ‗London Plan‘ was given wide publicity for degrading the opposition government. The pro-Bhutto‘s regime media accused the Balochistan Chief Minister, Attaullah Mengal and NAP leader Khan Abdul Wali Khan for conspiracy against the integrity of Pakistan during their stay in London. The Pakistan Times, September 10, 1972. 482. Syed Fakhruddin Shah and Muhammad Zubair Khan, (2012). Op. cit., pp. 1-9. 483. Surendra Nath Kaushik, (1985). Pakistan Under Bhutto‘s Leadership. New Dehli: Uppal Publishing House, p. 169. 484. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., p. 186.

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Bugti.485 In fact, Nawab Akbar Bugti and NAP leaders had become opponents for tribal reasons and the vigilant Bhutto took advantage of their rivalry.486 Once, Bhutto himself admitted it.487

As if Bhutto had prayed for it, a cache of arms was found in Iraqi Embassy at Islamabad.

The ISI which had knowledge of the arrival in existence of such arms in the said embassy had duly informed Bhutto about it. Although the likely destination of those weapons, was

Iran, where Iraq was eager to ignite insurgency. Bhutto hypothesized that the same weapons were being imported into Pakistan for the NAP leaders. The Baloch NAP leaders were accused without an iota of evidence of plotting to provide insurgents in

Baluchistan with those weapons.488 The state owned media, following dictates from the central government, went on rampaging the reputation of local leadership in Baluchistan.

The governors of NWFP and Baluchistan were scraped on Feb 17, 1973.489 Presidential rule of thirty days was imposed in Baluchistan. The governments of NWFP (KPK) resigned in protest. The Balochi leaders were severely criticized and sent behind the bars.

About 100,000 soldiers were used to fight and muzzle the Balochis.490 Akbar Khan Bugti who was earlier a member of NAP was appointed governor of Baluchistan and

Muhammad Aslam Khattak was appointed governor of NWFP (Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).

As PPP had the majority in Punjab and Sindh Assemblies, it was entitled to form provincial governments there, similarly, in Balochistan and NWFP (Khyber

Pakhtunkhwa), NAP-JUI coalition had the same right but Bhutto dismissed Balochistan government. This shows the controversial face of PPP‘s leadership due to which Bhutto cannot be termed as a true democrat. Democracy was not as democracy during Bhutto

485. Syed Fakhruddin Shah and Muhammad Zubair Khan, (2012). Op. cit., pp. 1-9. 486. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 261. 487. He stated that he knew Bugti and the NAP leaders had been ―birds of the same feather,‖ that they had become opponents for tribal reasons and that he had taken advantage of their recent rivalry. Pakistan Times, December 17, 1974. 488. Sherbaz Khan Mazari , (1999). A Journey to Disillusionment. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 292. 489. Ibid. 490. Shahid Javed Burki, Op. cit., pp. 71–72.

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rule but rather democracy as hypocrisy remained dominant.491 This action of the PPP leadership revealed his true picture of militarism and his willingness to settle political issues not by peaceful negotiation and debates in the assembly but by military means.

This operation shows Bhutto‘s mental attitude and his character.492

Mubashir Hasan who was the founding member of PPP says that the Centre- Province confrontation in Baluchistan ―was partly due to the Baloch leaders inexperience of formal government, though they were natural administrators. More important, however, was

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto‘s failure to accept Sardars dominated government of NAP with their traditions, who rejected his assumption of superior wisdom and leadership.‖493

Within a short period of only two months, when presidential rule was introduced in

N.W.F.P (KPK), Bhuttto maneuvering made it possible to form a coalition government led by Inayatullah Khan Gandpur. The new coalition government had the support of twenty two members out of forty two members of the assembly. The coalition government consisted of PPP, United Front of Aslam Khattak and Qayyum Muslim

League, where PPP had only four members.494 Actually the government was formed on

15 April 1973 i.e. within days, once the permanent constitution was signed. The NAP and

JUI had agreed to 6 March Agreement, to the Constitutional Accord of 20 October and lastly to the constitution in the hope that the PPP leadership would reinstate NAP-JUI government. But they got disappointed and considered it a poor return for their cooperation.495 The opposition, particularly the NAP stepped up its activities against the federal government and also against the provincial government of NWFP (KP). Abdul

491. Interview with Sayed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 492. Shahid Javed Burki. Op. cit., pp. 71–72. 493. Mubashir Hasan, (2000). The Mirage of Power: An Inquiry Into the Bhutto Years 1971-1977. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 169. 494. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 275. 495. Ibid.

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Wali Khan, stated in a public meeting near Charsadda that ―the time of appeals had passed and they would now ‗meet force with force‘ to realize their rights.‖496

On the one hand, if Bhutto was not happy with NAP-JUI coalition provincial governments and was bent upon to create problems and consequently ousted these governments, on the other, the opposition leaders particularly Baloch leaders too adopted rigid attitude. The dismissal of NAP-JUI coalition government in Balochistan, was an overreaction. Some disgruntled Baloch politicians could not understand the vulnerability of the situation. After establishing provincial government, they thought that they could do whatever, which is done after a revolution. At that point of time, there was need of dialogue and negotiations but the NAP leadership particularly the youngsters showed no sign of patience. They did not realize the seriousness of the situation and did not play a responsible role. Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, was the only opposition leader who adopted a reasonable attitude and was not in favor of a direct clash and conflict with the centre. He believed in democracy and considered differences of opinion as inevitable part of any democratic system. He wanted solution of all the problems within the democratic norms.

On the one hand, if some elements among the opposition did want a direct clash with the centre, on the other hand, the presence of Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan as a interior minister and in Balochistan Akbar Khan Bugti who wanted to oust NAP from power, made the task easy for Bhutto to scrape the provincial government. Neither Bhutto nor the opposition from Balochistan showed any respect for the rules of the game, which resulted in the derailing of the democratic process in its very early years.497

It is a common practice in Pakistan that elites occupying the federal government always desired and insisted that provincial governments be subservient to their will and dictation, and Zulfiqar Ali Bbhutto was not an exception. Even without Iraqi arms incident which was never directly linked to NAP in Balochistan or NWFP, Bhutto had planned to

496. Dawn, Karachi, 16 July 1974. 497. Interview with Sayed Jaffar Ahmad (Director Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi) on 31-07- 2015.

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anyhow dismiss the Balochistan government.498 If the NAP-JUI governments in the two provinces had agreed to accept Bhutto‘s junior partner role and comply without protest, he would have not forced them out of power. He kept contacting NAP-JUI leadership even after their ousting of power. He actually wanted to see if they would bend after being rebuked. Most likely Bhutto could have reinstated the NAP-JUI government, had their leaders agreed to join his cabinet at the centre and formed coalition governments with PPP in the two provinces of NWFP and Balochistan. But joining the central cabinet would have meant a role of Bhutto‘s junior partner which NAP leadership was not ready to accept. Because, firstly, they did not need the support of PPP to form governments in the said two provinces and secondly, they had no trust on PPP‘s leadership and worried that PPP ministers would disrupt more than strengthen their governments. Actually, the political conflict between PPP‘s central government and the two (NAP-JUI coalition) provincial governments was not a contest between the state of Pakistan and the secessionist forces but more like a clash of rival political wills and interests, initiated by

Bhutto‘s repression of the Baloch politicians.499

5.7. Death of Hayat Muhammad Khan and Ban on NAP

A bomb blast on 8th February 1975 in a public meeting at the University of Peshawar took the life of Hayat Mohammed Khan Sherpao. PPP leadership raised finger at NAP leadership and held them responsible for the great tragedy. There are several views as to who arranged Sherpao assassination.500

498. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 269. 499. Anwar H. Syed, (1992). Op. cit., pp. 189-190. 500. One view that cannot easily be dismissed was that it had been carried out on the direct instructions of Sherpao‘s own leader Bhutto himself. It is a known fact that before his death Sherpao had become very disappointed with the leader he had once hero-worshipped. Bhutto had perceived Sherpao‘s growing popularity and had come to rail against it and had begun politically marginalizing him at every available opportunity. Even one of their close PPP colleagues commented: ―A few months before his death, Sherpao seriously considered leaving the party altogether. He only changed his mind on the persuasion of Rafi Raza and a few other friends from the NWFP. Among all the colleagues of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Hayat Khan Sherpao‘s personal devotion had been at the peak, and his later disappointment was, accordingly, the most intense. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 300.

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Having alienated Sherpao, Bhutto had most likely little use left for him. When a campaign of bomb blasts began in the NWFP (KPK) Bhutto even sent Rafi Raza to

Peshawar to accuse senior ministers of masterminding the bombings. It is ironical that the very next day Sherpao met his end in a bomb explosion.501 Bhutto came back from a foreign tour. NAP was alleged for ―operating in a manner prejudicial to the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan," and NAP was banned.502 Bhutto also called an emergency session of the National Assembly and in an affecting speech, said the country was passing through another serious crisis. He condemned the "politics of violence," and stated that he was duty bound to liquidate "all anti-national elements and anti-national forces." Pakistan had to be saved from "the scourge of secession."503 In addition to that, the Political Parties Act of 1962 was amended to authorize the government to declare any foreign aided political party as an unlawful organization. The ban was referred to the

Supreme Court which endorsed the action of the government. Beside the ban, a well thought-out propaganda movement was started against the NAP and its leadership, and the official media was also used for to serve the purpose. Top NAP leaders including

Abdul Wali Khan with fifty two others were charged with high treason and arrested.

They were tried by a tribunal specifically constituted for this purpose known as

Hyderabad Tribunal504 also known as ―Hyderabad Conspiracy Case‖505 Finally, the son

501. Ibid., p. 275. 502. Richard S. Wheeler, (1976). Pakistan in 1975: The Hydra of Opposition. Asian Survey, 16(2), pp. 111- 118. 503. Dawn, February 11, 1975. 504. Safdar Mahmood, (2000). Pakistan Political Roots and Development (1947-1999). Karachi; Oxford University Press, p.150. 505. The Hyderabad tribunal (1975–1979), also known as Hyderabad conspiracy case, is the name of a former judicial tribunal used in Pakistan to prosecute opposition politicians of the National Awami Party on the charges of treason and acting against the ideology of Pakistan.The tribunal was set up on the orders of Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.The National Awami Party, which the government banned on 10 February 1975. The Supreme Court of Pakistan, on 30 October 1975, held that the party was working for an independent Pakhtunistan and greater Balochistan at the cost of Pakistan‘s territorial integrity. It was ultimately wound up after General Zia-ul Haq overthrew Bhutto in 1977. A total of 52 people were arrested. Those arrested from the National Awami Party leadership included Khan Abdul Wali Khan, Khan Amirzadah Khan, Syed Muhammad Kaswar Gardezi, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, Mir Gul Khan Nasir, Sardar Ataullah Mengal, Habib Jalib, Barrister Azizullah

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of Abdul Wali Khan Asfandyar Wali and two other students were found guilty of Hayat

Khan‘s murder and they were imprisoned for 10 years.506 An ordinance was passed in the assembly which allowed for detaining of Members of National Assembly (MNAs) even if the assembly was in session. Earlier, it was not allowed to arrest MNA‘s for the period of a session, nor for the duration of a ten day period prior to and following a session. A few days later, the NWFP governor Aslam Khattak and the Gandapur government were also dismissed and the federal government imposed its direct rule in the province.507 Bhutto took advantage of the Hayat Khan‘s murder by exploiting it for attacking his political opposition. The Supreme Court also upheld the decision of the special tribunal

On June 19, 1975 Abdul Wali Khan appeared before the Supreme Court to speak but he was forbidden except through his counsel. He insisted to appear in person but objected to the presence of Justices Muhammad Gul and Muhammad Afzal Cheema because these judges had served as federal law secretaries at different points in time and there was suspicion that they had dealt with the file of NAP and its leaders in such capacity which, of course, they did being part of the executive at that time.508 Due to Abdul Wali Khan refusal to take part in court proceedings, the court gave its decision509 based on the ex- parte submissions of the government.510

Shaikh, Aslam Baluch (Shaysani), Aslam Kurd, Saleem Kurd, Sher Mohammad Marri (General Sherof), Najam Sethi, Saleem Pervez, Majid Gichki, Mir Abdul Wahid Kurd (read article) and Karnel Sultan Mengal. In addition, several members of the Muslim League and even prominent critics of Bhutto within his own Pakistan Peoples Party were also arrested. 506. Richard S. Wheeler, (1976). Op. cit., pp. 111-118. 507. Sherbaz Khan Mazari . (1999). Op. cit., p. 372. 508. Hamid Khan. (2005).Op. cit., p. 295. 509. ―We find on the material produced before us no difficulty in holding that the NAP and its leaders are not reconciled to Pakistan's existence, integrity and sovereignty, that they have consistently been attempting to create doubts about (sic) people's belief in the ideology of Pakistan with a view to destroying the very concept which formed the basis of the creation of this country that they have always been preaching the doctrine of four nationalities/nations to prepare the ground for the ultimate secession of NWFP and Balochistan on the pretext of demanding the right of self- determination for different nationalities/nations inhabiting these provinces and advocating a policy of subversion of the Constitution, rule of law and democratic institutions in the country.‖ 510. Richard S. Wheeler, (1976). Op. cit., pp. 111-118. See also: Dawn Overseas Weekly, November 9, 1975.

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The court thus declared that by organizing insurgency in Balochistan and using threats against federal government and also against masses, NAP has made itself liable to government strict action.

It was expected that the PPP government, under the leadership of Quaid-e-Awam would focus on Balochistan and would work in collaboration with the provincial government for the betterment of the province and alleviate the poverty and would promote democratic norms. But as expected, the central government created troubles for the Balochistan government with the intention to remove the duly mandated NAP-JUI coalition provincial government and establish PPP government511 although it had not won any seat in the general elections of 1970.512

Bhutto was an opportunist democrat. Whenever he needed the support of opposition or to protect his slogan i.e. democracy is our polity, he took the path of dialogue and preferred consensus which is the part of democracy. So, if his personal interests or that of PPP demanded he was a democrat. And once his interests were served, he cared but little for the rules of game.

5.8. State of PPP’s Intra-party Relationship

The desire for absolute authority entails the elimination of each and every thing/every one which might come in one‘s way. There was a stark dichotomy between what Bhutto actually was doing and what he had idealized. Not only was Bhutto recklessly impatient and intolerant towards the opposition but he also was maintaining a tight hold on his own party men. No digression from Bhutto‘s hidebound and self styled standard of loyalty was countenanced. According to one of his ministers, Bhutto believed that it was he himself from whom authority and loyalty flowed513 and should anyone of his party

511. Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, (1988). Phir Marshal La A Gaya (Then Martial Law Came) Lahore: Jang Publisher‘s Press, p. 57. 512. Ian Talbot, (1999). Pakistan: A Modern History. Lahore: Vanguard Books, p. 200. 513. Rafi Raza, (1997).Op. cit., p. 301.

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member threaten Bhutto‘s inherent sense of insecurity by brandishing the slightest of independence in thinking, he would be mercilessly punished.

In fact, Bhutto was suspicious, of not only his political opposition but those who had supported him in attaining the highest position of authority. Once he assumed the office of power and having enjoyed it for a few years, Bhutto thought that he no longer needs their advice. The stalwarts of PPP like J. A. Rahim, Mubashir Hasan, Mairaj Mohammad

Khan, Mukhtar Rana, Ahmad Raza Kasuri, all were men of integrity and learning. All of these Bhutto‘s colleagues catered to basic needs of masses and gave importance to the social improvement of all. None of these refuted men wished personal power. They jointly decided Bhutto as their leader because he was not only well known/famous leader but had also sound education plus good oratory skills. They all thought that there will be collective decision making process under Bhutto‘s leadership, but these proved to be wrong.514

The dismissal of Mumtaz Ali Bhutto as chief minister of Sindh and his replacement by his rival Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi515 exemplified the point. Another example was one of

Bhutto‘s disciples Ghulam Mustafa Khar who asserted himself in the province of Punjab was met with the same fate of Mumtaz Ali Bhutto.516 When Mahmud Ali Kasuri, vice chairman of PPP quit government as Minister of Law in protest against its disregard for civil liberties, he promptly found himself and his two sons implicated in a murder charge.

When the charge failed to stick, the government launched a tax audit against all members of the Kasuri family.517 Bhutto was fearful about his own security and invincibility that he was unsparing towards none. He would not spare even some of his diehard loyalists

514. Lawrence Ziring, (2004). Pakistan: At the Crosscurrent of History. Lahore: Vanguards, p. 146. 515. Sherbaz Khan Mazari, (1999). Op. cit., p. 335. 516. Ibid. 517. Newsweek, July 16, 1973. Pakistan: Life with Bhutto, p. 13.

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who had done him invaluable services. J. A. Rahim and Mubashar Hassan illustrated this particular point.518

In the first three years of PPP government, its leadership provided an opportunity to the politicians of all shades to join PPP, while honest and committed workers got annoyed and there was internal disturbance in the PPP.519 By October 1974, for all practical purposes, the stronger and committed colleagues from Bhutto‘s old team520 were out. Mumtaz Ali

Bhutto had been sidelined to a non political portfolio, Hayat Khan Sherpao was assassinated in February 1975, and Rafi Raza was no longer holding the position of

Special Assistant to the prime minister. Hanif Ramay had been removed from the Punjab.

These people had been replaced by new faces.521 Under Bhutto‘s deft guidance, the power of the new team increased and by the end of 1974, tables had been completely turned on the old team or what remained of it. Still, later, when Ghulam Mustafa Khar enquired from Bhutto as to why he had opted for the team comprising of civil and military bureaucrats, his reply was frank and straightforward. Bhutto said that ―to come into power one needed a special team, but to retain power one needed another kind of team.‖522

5.9. Bhutto’s Team A & Team B

Khurshid Hasan Mir, Mukhtar Rana, J.A. Rahim, Khurshid Ali Qasuri, Mahmood Ali

Qasuri, Rasul Bakhsh Khan Talpur and Miraj Muhammad Khan were the members of team A of Bhutto. These people played a key role in establishing Bhutto‘s relations with the masses and they used to bring out the people on roads when such a need arose. But

Bhutto expelled them all. Some were ousted from the party without any explanation, charge sheet and others were arrested. That was the reason when Bhutto was hanged, no

518. Sherbaz Khan Mazari, (1999). Op. cit., p. 335. 519. Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, (1988). Op. cit., p. 59. 520. J. A. Rahim, Ghulam Mustafa Khar, Khurshedd Hasan Meer and Mubashir Hasan 521. Aziz Ahmad, Vaqar Ahmad, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Ghulam Jilani Khan, Saeed Ahmad, Masud Mahmud, Yahya Bakhtiar, and Kausar Niazi. 522. Mubashir Hasan, (2000). Op. cit., p. 277.

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one protested in Rawalpindi, Lahore, Multan, Faislabad and Karachi.523 Tamman,

Tawana, Dawlatana, Buchcha, Sadiq Hussain Qureshi and Jam Sadiq Ali were members of team B of Bhutto. Some notorious police personnel like Masood Mahmood were also included in team B. Why did Bhutto include these guys at the cost of his colleagues who had made many sacrificies? These were the enemies of the party but Bhutto allowed them.524 Many of those initially opposed PPP and its leadership were facilitated and rewarded. Sadiq Hussain Qureshi ( Father of Shah Mehmood Qureshi) who was opposed to PPP was awarded governorship. The Khan of Kalat and the Nawab of Bahawalpur were also rewarded with governorships.525

PPP had very good slogans like Islam is our religion, Democracy is our polity Socialism is our economy, All power to the people526 but Maulana Kausar Niazi was a man supported by military establishment when entered into PPP, destroyed the ideological foundation of PPP. He never did or uttered something against PPP, but made PPP‘s program controversial. On the one hand, he told that by socialism we mean to bring

―Masawat e Muhammadi‖ but on the other hand, he told that we considered different sects of Muslims such as Shia, Sunni and Wahabi as one and equal. Thus, Kausar Niazi destroyed this by his controversial views.527

5.10. Constitutional Amendments and their Impacts on Ruling-Opposition

Relationship

The political mindset in the post 1973 Constitution illustrates the disloyalty by Bhutto of the trust that not only common people but the political opponents also had reposed in him during the thorniest period of his government by supporting him and ensuring its full collaboration in framing of the constitution. The opposition was not happy and, initially,

523. Interview with Miraj Muhammad Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Founder member of PPP) on 30-07-2015. 524. Ibid. 525. Ibid. 526. Ibid. 527. Ibid.

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it disagreed with some of the provisions of the constitution bill, such as the process for a vote of censure against the prime minister; but looking at Pakistan‘s critical situation at that time, it did not push the objections. The country lay traumatized and the downhearted nation had not yet come out from the painful occurrence of disintegration. Almost a one lac Pakistani armed forces and civilians were still in prisoners camps in India. Serious negotiation had to be made with India and Bangladesh, two immediate neighbors.

National harmony and integrity was very important. So, the opposition leaders extended its cooperation to PPP‘s leadership plea and combine its efforts with him in providing to the country a permanent and viable constitution. How the government had repaid them for their positive and productive mindset was well known.528

Most of the amendments incorporated into the constitution during this period were unilateral. The opposition was mostly ignored. Opposition had no role in these amendments but to oppose. Though, the amendments were passed from the National

Assembly but unilaterally. This act disappointed not only opposition but also the common man. Democracy has its rules of the game. There are rules for elections, agitation, dealing with opposition, respect for traditions and most importantly for law and amendments to constitution but PPP‘s leadership violated these norms and values of democracy time and again. 529

Any constitution does not mean a final and everlasting thing but amendments are made in extreme emergency cases and normally a cumbersome procedure is adopted and not an ordinary process. Amendments in a constitution are made everywhere but in most of the world constitutions are amended with a slow pace. Constitutions are not treated as ordinary laws. In Pakistan, the first two Constitutions of 1956 and that of 1962 were abrogated arbitrarily. The 3rd Constitution of 1973 was drafted as a result of consensus of

528. Viewpoint, February 4, 1977. NDP has its own Identity. 529. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Ex. Chairman and senior member of JI) on 29-07-2015.

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almost all political parties but with a lot of amendments. The PPP government under the leadership of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto amended the constitution seven times between May

1974 and May 1977. Although some of the amendments were need of the time and were appreciated but most of these amendments undermined the rights of individuals and the judiciary.

Out of the said amendments to the 1973 Constitution, only the second amendment which declared Qadianis non-muslims was supported if not encouraged by the opposition.530

Prime Minister Bhutto thought that the way he was ruling would not be acceptable to judiciary that is why he aggressively curtailed the judiciary powers through amendment.531

First, Bhutto used to solve many issues through ordinances. Although there was not a strong opposition, yet he was not ready to tolerate it and often tried to bypass National

Assembly through ordinances. This was something undemocratic on the part of a leader whose party was committed to promote democracy. Within two to three days of the approval of 1973 constitution, Bhutto amended it unilaterally which opposition strongly protested. These amendments are not on the record i.e. the right to access to courts and right of expression which constitution guaranteed were scraped through an ordinance within 48 to 72 hours of its approval.532 Some of the amendments made by Bhutto were dismissed/ declared null and void by Bhutto himself due to opposition pressure.533

The ruling party had stultified the constitution that it had itself made and enforced with the cooperation of the opposition parties in the parliament. In the face of their concerted resistance, the government had subjected the constitution to a series of amendments

530. Raza, Rafi,(1997). Op. cit., p. 185. 531. Interview with Sayed Jaffar Ahmad (Director Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi) on 31-07- 2015. 532. Interview with Syed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and senior member of JI) on 16-7-2015. 533. Interview with Miraj Muhammad Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Founder member of PPP) on 30-7-2015.

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clearly repugnant to its spirit.534 In fact, the amendments were meant for ensuring

Bhutto‘s continuity in office and enhancing the power of executive branch of the government. To bring in an amendment in the Constitution 2/3rd majority of the National

Assembly was needed to and with the unconditional support of party members it was easy to for PPP‘s Chairman to ensure the passage of amendments. Interestingly, out of a total of first six constitutional amendments carried out up to 1976, four extended the range of executive powers. In addition, the third, fourth, fifth and sixth amendments further strengthened the grip of ruling PPP.535 (For the details of first seven amendments see annexure 5)

5.10.1. First Amendment

Consequent to the recognition of Bangladesh in 1974, the Constitution (First

Amendment) Act 1974 was passed on 8 May 1974. Through the Act Clause (2) from

Article 1 was removed. The Clause provided for representation of East Pakistan in the federation of Pakistan.536 It is commonly believed that the first Amendment to the 1973

Constitution was made to recognize Bangladesh. In fact, Bangladesh had already been recognized as an independent country to ensure Mujibur Rahman‘s participation in the

Islamic Summit Conference at Lahore in February 1974; by amending Article 1 of the

Constitution in April 1974, the mention of East Pakistan was deleted. But there were other aspects of the First Amendment that showed as to what Bhutto actually wanted.537

The more serious and violent changes made to Article 17 of the constitution through first amendment paved the way for limiting the freedom of association. The amendment placed reasonable restrictions on the right to associations, imposed by law in the interest of sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan. Accordingly, the Political Parties Act of 1962 was also revised. It gave power to the central government to declare any political party

534. Viewpoint, February 4, 1977. NDP has Its own identity. 535. Surendra Nath Kushik, (1985). Op. cit., p. 83. 536. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 290. 537. Dr Naazir Mahmood, (2015). Early Mutilations in the Constitution. Published in ―The News‖ 18 October 2015.

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accused of working against the sovereignty and integrity of Pakistan; the accused party would stand dissolved and all its properties and funds would be forfeited to the federal government.538 The Supreme Court was also involved.539 Certainly, the apex court could declare the government‘s decision null and void but as the judiciary too was willing to obey the federal government, it never happened.540 It was under this provision of the amended constitution that NAP was later dissolved in 1975 and the matter was referred to the Supreme Court.541 There were two main reasons that pushed PPP‘s leadership to bring in such changes to the constitution:

One, if he wanted to crush the most vocal opposition political party, NAP, he had the fear that some of the annoyed members within PPP such as Ghulam Mustafa Khar and J. A.

Rahim might wish and decide to establish a new political party, which, of course, would oppose Bhutto, so he wanted to keep the sword in his hands.542 It was a move towards

Bhutto‘s ultimate aim. He wanted to establish a single party state where he would control everything.543 This shows Bhutto‘s trend towards authoritarianism and away from democratic norms which Bhutto had promised so loudly. In addition to that, the first amendment also reduced the maximum period intervening the two consecutive sessions of the Senate, the National Assembly, and the Provincial Assemblies, from 130 days to

90 days.544

5.10.2. Second Amendment

The 2nd amendment chiefly dealt with the Qadiani problem nevertheless it had other repercussions on the politics of Pakistan. Unmatched in the world history, an elected

538. Ibid. 539. It was also provided in the law that where the federal government declared that any political party had been formed or was operating in a manner prejudicial to the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, the federal government shall, within fifteen days of such declaration, refer the matter to the Supreme Court whose decision on such reference would be final. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 290. 540. Dr Naazir Mahmood, (2015). Op. cit. 541. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 290 542. Dr Naazir Mahmood, (2015). Op. cit. 543. Shahid Javed Burki, (1986). Pakistan: A Nation in the Making. Boulder: Westview Press, pp. 71-72. 544. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 290.

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parliament took it upon itself to make a decision about the fate of a religious denomination by passing ruling on the limits of a faith. An issue that even Justice Munir

Report had left open for debate was now closed and sealed to the happiness of some of the most veteran politicians of the country. A process of declaring other minority sects as infidels were initiated that would in due course tear asunder the very fabric of this society.545

5.10.3. Third Amendment

As said earlier, Bhutto government was intolerant and was bent upon restricting people‘s freedom and fundamental rights. He adopted extremely repressive measures towards those who opposed PPP government. Some were arrested and detained. The political opponents had to seek judiciary help which was not up to the mark. The court‘s decision often favored government and extended very limited relief to the political opponents of

Bhutto‘s government. Bhutto and his comrades were not happy with such relief for opposition and the judiciary interference in PPP leadership‘s dealing with the opposition was seen as against PPP government. Bhutto government decided to limit the powers and jurisdiction of the courts. An arrangement was made and adopted to demoralize the judiciary for keeping it away from interfering in such matters.

The Code of Criminal Procedure was amended through the 3rd Constitutional

Amendment which prohibited the courts from granting bail before arrest (BBA) to a person except a case was registered against him.546 It also provided that no bail would be effective if case is not registered.547 Such bails before arrest were a safeguard for political workers to save themselves from victimization and a court could approve such bails even if there was no case registered but a victim anticipated that a case would be filed and he would be arrested before approaching the court.548 Until that time, the courts had

545. Dr Naazir Mahmood, (2015). Op. cit. 546. Ibid. 547. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 293. 548. Dr Naazir Mahmood, (2015). Op. cit.

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permitted blanket bail before arrest to political opponents in cases registered and to be registered as part of the process of such ill-treatment.549 But this right was snatched through the 3rd Amendment and Article 10 of the Constitution, which provided for certain safeguards against preventive detention, were amended in February 1975.550 It was a move aimed against all those who opposed PPP leadership.

The Third Amendment, on the one hand, limited the rights of political detenus and on the other hand, enhanced the powers of the central government. It allowed the federal government to put under detention a political opponent for an unlimited period of time, if accused of indulging in anti-state activities. Interestingly, by the time the Third

Amendment was passed; action against the more vocal opposition political party i.e.,

NAP had already been taken.551 In particular, the 3rd Constitutional Amendment also gave power to the executive (Prime Minister) to use direct authority to prolong the duration of emergency with no earlier endorsement of the legislature.552 In the National

Assembly, Bhutto defended the introduction of the said Amendment and stated that the amendment was aimed to restrain the nondemocratic manner of the opponents. Bhutto further maintained and held opposition responsible for maintaining emergency. He said that opposition has embarked on the path of violence. They themselves ruined the atmosphere of dialogue and cooperation.553 The Third Amendment simply was meant for enhancing the power of PPP government to firmly deal with its political opponents and put their leadership under indefinite detention. The purpose of the said amendment was very clear i.e. NAP was the target. Abdul Wali Khan along with the topmost leadership was put behind the bars. This was a severe blow to the prospects of democracy in

Pakistan.

549. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 293. 550. Ibid. 551. Ibid. 552. Surendra Nath, Kaushik, (1985). Op. cit., p.83. 553. For details see National Assembly of Pakistan (Legislature) Debates, February 12, 1975, Vol. II, No. 16, pp. 282-283.

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5.10.4. Fourth Amendment

PPP leadership was all the time intolerant to any criticism against its program and policies. It was never willing to hear the opposition viewpoint. Bhutto wanted to take a firm action against those who were unwilling to follow his instructions. The opposition complained against repressive measures. The Peoples Party government, for muzzling and suppressing the opposition, resorted to another arbitrary amendment.

In November 1975 the Fourth Constitutional Amendment was passed. The said amendment specified the jurisdiction of the executive regarding the issuance of orders for preventive detention.554 Through this Amendment the government plan to limit the jurisdiction of courts was materialized.555 The aim was to prevent the courts from granting relief to PPP opponents. This was actually limiting the power and jurisdiction of the High

Courts and preventing them to come to aid and help the political victims or to allow such persons bail when they were detained.556

The said amendment was passed in haste. Various opposition members wished to have a debate over the 4th Amendment Bill because the Bill was to curtail the powers of the courts, they were not only denied their due right but most of the opposition members557 were thrown out of the assembly by force.558 And voting on the Bill was held in the absence of the PPP opponents.559 The speaker justified pushing out of the opposition leaders by saying that he had to ensure order of the assembly. Maulana Mufti Mahmood and Ahmad Raza Kasuri made every possible effort to stop the passage of the Bill but in vain. Other opposition leaders also tried their best but without any success. Thus the said

Amendment Bill was passed by the assembly on Nov 14, 1975. The Amendment Bill was

554. Surendra Nath Kaushik, (1985). Op. cit., p. 84. 555. The High Courts were forbidden from prohibiting the making of an order for preventive detention of a person or to grant bail to anyone so detained. 556. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 294. 557. Like Mahmood Ali Kasuri, Chaudhury Zahur Ilahi, Malik Suleman, Ahmad Raza Kasuri, Dr Ghulam Husain and Zulfiqar Ali Bajwa. 558. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 294. 559. Dawn, 15 November 1975.

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passed with one hundred and two votes in its favor and none against.560 The PPP government, on account of its numerical majority in the Assembly, was able to pass the

Amendment Bill through the Assembly. Also, Bhutto had well disciplined party members and there were little chances that the PPP members would vote against the will of party leadership. So, there was no need to silence the opposition but such maltreatment towards the opposition showed his disrespect not only to his political opponents‘ but democratic norms and traditions as well.

The government point of view in defense of the Bill was that the opposition had to establish a peaceful relationship and avoid conflict with government. Also, the

Amendment was aimed to empower the government to deal with the uneasy situation created by the opposition.561

Bhutto‘s defense for the 4th Amendment was that it had no impact on the fundamental structure of the constitution. He was of the opinion that amendments, relating to the laws of detention, would not bring judiciary and parliament face to face. Instead, the Supreme

Court had already declared the NAP as a party having some members working against

Pakistan. The fact, according to Bhutto, was that the opposition had not understood its role as an opposition and was negating the constitution by imposing its will on the majority party. This is a negation of democracy.‘562

In fact, the 4th Amendment was devoid of any national interest, it was meant for further strengthening PPP‘s position to handle the opposition by reducing the powers of the courts and narrowing down freedom of expression and fundamental rights. Through this amendment Bhutto signaled to his political opponents that they could not seek a constitutional remedy.

560.The Pakistan Times, 15 November 1975. 561. Farhat Imrana Aslam, (1988). Constitutional Development in Pakistan-1972 to 1985, (PhD Thesis), University of the Punjab, Lahore, pp.102. 562. National Assembly of Pakistan (Legislature) Debates, Vol. VII, No. 12, November, 1975, pp. 77-79.

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5.10.5. Fifth Amendment

The Fifth Constitutional Amendment was made in September 1976. It was aimed to further clip the wing of courts vis-as-vis parliament. The 5th Amendment was intended at restricting the discretionary powers of judges. Bhutto himself defended the amendment in the National Assembly on September 3, 1976.563 The reality was that the amendment did empower the parliament to legislate freely in matters of emergency regulations and fundamental rights at the expense of judiciary powers.564 The same amendment also set the term for the judges of Supreme Court and High Court as five and four years respectively. By extending the term of office even after retirement for the judges of

Supreme Court and High Courts565 who were in his good books signified his favoritism and duplicity vis-à-vis his struggle for democracy.

5.10.6. Sixth Amendment

The 6th Amendment, brought in December 1976, excluded some important office holders566 from civil service rules in order to enable them to contest elections.567 In essence, the said Amendment was introduced with the intention of facilitating the followers of the PPP to take part and contest the upcoming elections. This amendment was meant for enabling the Government‘s advisors and Special Assistants to participate in elections immediately after their retirement. Bhutto sought to politicize the career of his advisers and assistants568 and thus he politicized these institutions on the part of PPP.

5.10.7. Seventh Amendment

Bhutto acknowledged that since he had been made the central figure of opposition‘s campaign in 1977, he had decided to put the issue in the hands of the people through a

563. ―the Fifth Constitutional Amendment shall, in no way, affect the basic features of the Constitution and that the parliament had the legal right to bring amendments in. Dawn, September 4, 1976. 564. Surendra Nath Kaushik, (1985). Op. cit., p. 84. 565 . http://historypak.com/constitutional-amendments/ 566. Special assistants of the PM, the Chief Ministers, the members of Law Commission and the members of the Council of Islamic Ideology. 567. Ibid. 568. Dawn, December 23, 1976.

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referendum.569 He proposed that a joint sitting of parliament would pass a temporary amendment to the constitution to provide for a referendum. Accordingly, the Seventh

Amendment to the Constitution was passed and which became effective on 16 May 1977.

The said amendment was meant for holding a referendum where the voters had to demonstrate their confidence in the prime minister.570 The Seventh Amendment was not only a novel but a strange constitutional provision and was essentially repugnant571 to the parliamentary system.

In fact, PPP‘s Chairman had secured a popular majority in Western Pakistan and had also become a strong prime minister but yet he was not satisfied. Though, the 1973 constitution had already provided prime minister with enormous powers not only in the decision making in central government but also in matters vis-as-vis provincial governments. It is believed that Bhutto wanted to continue himself in office and to establish one-party supremacy in politics of the country. It was for that reason that he pretty like his forerunners, brought in constitutional amendments.572

Bhutto‘s amendments in the constitution for making the prime minister stronger illustrate his concern for seeking legitimacy to his authoritarian rule for which, he even ignored constitutional values, traditions and practices. Bhutto‘s pursuit for authoritarian rule was based on important factors. The first one was that he was Sindhi and could not fully trust the dominant Punjabi segments and could not take their long support for granted.573

Secondly, he wanted to ensure his continuity in office i.e., rule Pakistan for long time.

And in that pursuit, it is remarkable to note, despite the fact that Bhutto severely

569. Dawn, 14 May 1977. 570. Hamid Khan. (2005). Op. cit., pp. 313-314. 571. Because a vote of no confidence was to be obtained from the parliament and not through a referendum. If a prime minister was obliged to go to the people for a vote of confidence, then he owed nothing to the parliament and should not be answerable to it. It is indistinguishable to a presidential system and the prime minister factually assumes the characteristics of a president after having won any such referendum since referendum is, conceptionally, part of the presidential system. Ibid., p. 314. 572. Khalid Bin Sayeed, (1980). Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change. New York: Praeger Publisher, pp. 104-105. 573. Surendra Nath Kaushik, (1985). Op. cit., pp. 84-85.

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criticized Ayub Khan but in getting and sustaining power in absolute manners, in reality the former was, by no means, different from the latter. Both made use of constitutional autocracy.574 The amendments show the political pressure which the Bhutto government had faced with. The most crucial point of the whole maneuver is that constitution was put in service of the government to prevail over its troubles. Yet while amending the

Constitution the usual line was not taken up and some of the important amendments were made without taking the opposition into confidence575 which is so much against democratic norms and values. Bhutto had strong partiality for concentrating all the levers of power in himself. That is why he had made every possible effort to establish presidential system of government. He was, however, curbed by people from both within his own party and the opposition not to do so keeping in view the elections manifestos

(parliamentary democracy) PPP had put forward to the public. Later on the half a dozen amendments that were added to the Constitution of 1973 were aimed exactly at realizing his hidden and biased motives.

5.11. Conclusion

Before coming to power and during struggle for power (1966-1971) Bhutto stressed for civil liberties. He cried for the right of opposition parties to disagree with the ruling party

(right to dissent) and criticize its policies and programs. Bhutto severely criticized his former patron for intimidating and suppressing the opposition. He stressed that political participation and distributive justice are inevitable for national solidarity. He was of the view that the denial of democratic rights and freedoms to the citizens would provide an opportunity to the foreign forces to make their influence and break up the country.576 But once he came to power, he did not act upon what he preached. In fact, Bhutto had never accepted provincial autonomy as a mindset. He did not want any other party to share

574. Khalid Bin Sayeed, (1980). Op. cit., p. 104. 575. Farhat Imrana Aslam, (1987). Op. cit., p. 120. 576. Anwar H. Syed , (1980). The Idea of Pakistan Nationhood. Polity, p. 575-597.

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power.577 In his relationship with opposition, Bhutto did not adopt a democratic attitude.

He used FSF for the suppression and cajoling of those who opposed. He treated those badly who criticized him. Here, first comes the name of Dr Nazir. The public meetings and gatherings of opposite groups were dispersed by using a para-military reserve force called Federal Security Force (FSF). The White Paper published by Zia, in the statements of Masaod Mahmood and also in Bhutto‘s trail these facts had come to the limelight.

During Bhutto rule, the masses could not fully enjoy the fundamental rights which they deserved. The freedom of expression was restricted. Many newspapers and journals were either banned or censored. Hussain Naqvi‘s journal, who was a friend of Bhutto, was banned and he was arrested.578

PPP meetings with NAP and JUI leadership after the 1970 elections, the Tripartite

Agreement, the appointment of NAP governors in NWFP and Balochistan where it got majority of seats, signing of the Constitutional Accord on 20 October, 1972, producing a consensus based permanent constitution and inclusion of opposition members in Simla delegation highlighted healthy signs of interaction between PPP leadership and the opposition parties that had put the country on a democratic path. But the real story behind the scene was quite different. Bhutto actually had some objectives in mind for the sake of which he adopted the process of negotiation and accommodation. These objectives were: seeking an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank, settling with India the issue of

prisoners of war and, most importantly, a permanent constitution for the country.579 Once these objectives were achieved, PPP‘s leadership attitude towards NAP-JUI changed altogether.

577. Interview with Professor Tauseef Ahmad (Ex Chairman of Mass Communication Department Federal Urdu University of Arts, Science and Technology (FUUAST) Karachi, on 16-07-2015. 578. Interview with Sayed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 579. Both NAP as well as JUI were kept involved in all the three issues. NAP-JUI governors were appointed in time to make them participate in formal meetings on devaluation which was required for making an agreement with the IMF and the World Bank. N.W. F. P. governor Arbab Sikander

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Successful leaders build each other up and they motivate, inspire, and push each other.

Unsuccessful leaders just hate, blame and complain. Although, both PPP as a ruling party and the opposition had taken some very commendable and healthy steps but as a whole democratic norms and values could not gain grounds during the seventies because of the undemocratic attitudes from both sides, most of the time.

Khan Khalil and others were the members to the delegation to Simla. Also, NAP-JUI were parties to 6th March and 20th October accords preceding first interim constitution and finally the permanent Constitution of 1973. Rafi, Raza, (1997). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967- 1977. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 273.

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CHAPTER - 6

1977 ELECTIONS, PPP’S HANDLING OF PNA MOVEMENT AND

THE DREADFUL OUTCOME

6.1. Introduction

This chapter of my research study discusses as to why the 1977 elections took place before the mandated period, how did the PNA emerge out of the variant political ideologies of different political parties which were previously not so close in their relationship. It further dwells on the issue of election symbol. The campaign for 1977 elections by the ruling PPP and PNA is also part of the discussion. Having studied the state affairs before the 1977 elections this chapter discusses the election results and the plethora of allegations about rigging that ensued after the election results were declared.

The focus is on whether the elections were fair and free and the incumbent government sincerely contested the elections. The chapter also makes an evaluation of PNA‘s allegations of rigging against Pakistan Peoples Party and finally the downfall of Bhutto leadership and the imposition of Martial Law. The movement launched by the PNA against the rigging in elections and the ruling PPP‘s handling of the situation is a part of the discussion in this chapter. At the end, light is shed on the way negotiations were held and the settlement which the PPP and the PNA was about to reach but failed.

6.2. Why the 1977 Elections were held Before the End of the Mandated Term

Bhutto already had the fear in mind that his proposed constitutional changes will be opposed by the middle class. But from the very start of 1977, he was sure to overcome such sort of opposition to his scheme by appealing directly to those sections of the society who got benefited from different reforms introduced by the PPP government and to those who were influenced by personal charisma of Bhutto.580 PPP came into power in

December 1971 and in that case the five years term was to end in December 1976 but the

580. Shahid Javed Burki, (1988). Pakistan under Bhutto 1971-1977. Macmillon, p. 184

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five years constitutional term of the National Assembly had started from August 14,

1973, which was to expire on August 13, 1978. But PPP‘s leadership deemed it favorable time for elections to secure a fresh mandate from the masses.581 Z. A. Bhutto decided to hold general elections and seek a fresh mandate one and a half years earlier than the mandated time. Article 271(1) of the Constitution provides that the first National

Assembly, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue until 14th of August 1978. It was only under the proclamation of emergency that Article 234(6) provides that parliament may by law, extend the term of the National Assembly for a period not exceeding one year.582 On

January 7, 1977 Bhutto addressed the National Assembly, in which he discussed the achievements of his government during the last five years, in rebuilding the country, contribution to Islam, and particularly the 1973 constitution. Then he announced that the general elections would be held on 7 March followed by elections for the provincial assemblies on March 10, 1977. The retiring Chief Election Commission was given a 3- year extension in service and was asked to continue working for the sake of free, fair and impartial elections.583

Bhutto wanted to get two third majority that would enable him to change the 1973 constitution. He had given the responsibility of preparing a new presidential constitution to an academic expert of London School of Economics and Political Science. He was, to draft a document that would be composed of such ―secret codes‖ and ―deceptive use of appendices‖ that no one could read or understand until it was imposed.584

Bhutto was against parliamentary set up and was of the view that the system has sacrificed the rights of many for protecting the privileges of few. In fact, Bhutto was not satisfied with the Constitution of 1973 for the little constraints that it had imposed on his

581.The Pakistan Times, January 11, 1977. 582. Rafi Raza, (1997). Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967-1977. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 320. 583. Ibid. 584. Stanely Wolpert, (1993). Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 267.

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authority. He condemned the opposition for using different provisions of the constitution and bringing the social and economic downfall of the country. Throughout 1976, Bhutto visited different constituencies and made speeches to catch people attention for his own ideas. In fact, PPP‘s leadership was going to face the masses and he wanted a heavy mandate that would give him the power to change the political and constitutional set up of the country.585

Bhutto, in February 1975, had banned the NAP and for disqualifying the members of different opposition parties from national assembly and provincial assemblies passed some special ordinances. The said ordinances also disqualified some from contesting the elections. These moves of PPP‘s regime made the opposition skeptical about his intentions. Though Bhutto announced in the beginning of 1976 to hold general elections before the expiry of the national assembly term but deferred the elections by recalling that complete freedom during the 1970s elections created such a situation which ultimately led to the disintegration of the country and the provincial elections held during

Liaqat Ali Khan, gave birth to provincialism, sectarianism and parochialism.586 Anyhow

Bhutto deferred the elections till he was sure of PPP‘s victory. In the early 1977, all the activities were in control of the ruling party. The disturbances in both the provinces of

NWFP and Balochistan were calmed to a great extent. Army was already there in

Balochistan to muzzle the hostile elements and not allow these to reemerge. The main opposition party NAP was banned in the first quarter of 1975 while Abdul Wali Khan and other topmost leaders of the NAP were sent behind the bars. The other opposition parties in the parliament were also in a weak position because none of these had more than three members. The political discussion and meeting were banned by applying

Section 144 and other measures. The opposition was not in a position to convey its views

585. Shahid Javed Burki, (1988). Op. cit., pp. 182-183. 586. Dawn, January 2, 1976.

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to the public. It was very rare that media reported critical speeches of the opposition leaders in the National Assembly.587

Although Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was himself a product of popular support in 1970, first as a president and then as a prime minister, yet he thought that elections in Pakistan always resulted in ill fortune. Previously, the elections resulted in a landslide victory for one party or group of parties, which produced confusion and disorder followed by some corrective action.588 He was of the view that elections damaged authority with little or no matching benefit. The country had passed through such experiences in 1954 in East

Pakistan. Similarly, in 1965 the presidential elections brought disrepute for the then president Ayub Khan and the 1970 elections also led to the disintegration of the country.

He, however, felt that a fresh mandate from the masses was overdue and necessary to tackle important problems facing the country. In addition, an early election will also make it difficult for the opposition to get united and gain momentum.589 Thus having no fear of the opposition, he willingly decided to go for general elections. He not only expected a bland victory but also wished to get such a mandate that would enable him to restaff his party from those whom he thought to be more loyal to him and to get rid of the undesirable members. The establishing of such a new National Assembly composed of

Bhutto‘s loyalists would surely facilitate PPP‘s leadership to act according to his own whims and wishes and to begin with even more innovative policies at domestic as well as at international front.590

During both phases i.e. 1972-74 when the decision making power rested with the left, and

1976-77 when Bhutto took command of policy making, the economic and political decisions taken were not aimed at helping and supporting the essential part of Bhutto‘s middle class constituency. Also, the Pakistan of 1977 did not reflect the Pakistan that

587. Marvin G. Weinbaum, (1977). The March 1977 Elections in Pakistan: Where Everyone Lost. Asian Survey, 17(7), 599-618. 588. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., pp. 318-319. 589. Ibid., p. 319. 590. Lawrence Ziring, (1977). Pakistan: The Campaign Before the Storm. Asian Survey, 17(7), 581-598.

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politically important middle class wanted to shape. By March, 1977 when Bhutto decided to go to polls, the Pakistani middle class composed of different social, economic and political groups had already abandoned him.591

On the one hand, if Bhutto was convinced that he was the sole asset and vote catcher of the party, a view with which the party officials around him eagerly concurred. On the other hand, it is also a fact that by the time of the elections, Bhutto had lost his old and committed colleagues and PPP‘s original identity and vitality had died. Also the Federal

Security Force (FSF), which had been created as a substitute for army to deal with civil disturbances had become unpopular and was ineffective except pressurizing and terrorizing the opposition. So, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto entered the election year, with a disillusioned PPP and questionable support from the bureaucracy, on which he relied.592

Also, the decision of the nine different opposition parties to form a coalition called

―Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)‖ badly hit Bhutto‘s perception.

6.3. Formation of Pakistan National Alliance (PNA)

Afraid of Bhutto‘s dictatorial tendencies, the opposition tried to close its ranks and stand as one against the PPP. The alliance which different opposition parties formed was named PNA.593 The formation of PNA not only surprised but also shocked PPP leadership. In point of fact, Bhutto‘s planned strategy was based on the assumption that the various opposition political parties would not be able to unite because of their differences. However, if they get united, there would be only small adjustments for different seats. The vast intelligence network had not made any indication of such a possibility. Even the political journalists of the government press, could not predict this

591. Shahid Javed Burki, (1988).Op. cit., p. 189. 592. Rafi Raza, (1997).Op. cit., 308-309. 593. Lawrence Ziring, (2005). Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History. Manas Publications, p. 156.

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possibility.594 The PNA was composed of those different social and economic groups which had suffered at the hands of oppressive policies of PPP leadership in one way or the other. These groups constituted the middle class which was hurt by the social, economic and administrative reforms of Peoples Party.595 Not only Bhutto was confident of this support but he was also sure that the various opposition political parties would not be able to get together and form a platform against PPP. But once the opposition alliance came true in the form of Pakistan National Alliance, Bhutto called it, ‗a cat with nine tails‘.596 PNA also decided to have one flag and one manifesto.

The PNA was a cluster597 which incorporated groups from both the right and left wing.598 The said alliance of opposition political parties included all of the older United

Democratic Front, this time more strengthened by coming into the row Asghar Khan's

Tehrik-i-Istiqlal. Chief of JUI Maulana Mufti Mahmood was unanimously elected president of the alliance.599 Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan was appointed as vice president and Rafiq Ahmad Bajwa of JUP‘s as Secretary General, while Pir of Pagaro was accommodated as head of the Central Parliamentary Board.

PNA anxiously challenged and gave a tough time to PPP which was out of question at the time of its rule and put Bhutto and his party on defensive. The nervousness of PPP‘s leadership was obvious from Abdul Hafeez Peerzada‘s decision to challenge the allotting of a single election symbol to PNA. This, at least, set the precedent that the ruling party

594. Abdullah Malik,(1977). What will be the Bhutto Strategy? Published in Viewpoint, February 4, 1077, p. 15. 595. Shahid Javed Burki, (1988). Op. cit., p. 184. 596. Ibid 597. The three Islamic parties i.e. Maulana Mufti Mahmud‘s Jamiatul-Ulema-e-Islam, Mian Tufail Muhammad‘s Jamaat-i-Islami, and Maulana Shah Ahmed Noorani‘s Jamiatul-Ulema-i-Pakistan were representing different points of view about the conduct of the affairs of the state on Islamic lines. Air Marshal (retd) Asghar Khan‘s Tehrik-i-Isteqlal, Pir Pagara's Muslim League, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan‘s Pakistan Democratic Party and Sardar Abdul Qayyum‘s Azad Kashmir Muslim Conference were fundamentally parties of the centre, stressing for and advocating return to the parliamentary democracy and private enterprise. Sardar Sherbaz Mazari‘s National Democratic Party and Khan Muhammad Ashraf Khan‘s Tehrik were parties of the left believing in some kind of state ownership of capital and decentralized government. 598. Ibid., pp. 193-194. 599. Stanely A. Wolpert, (1993). Op. cit., p. 298.

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could be challenged.600 Asghar Khan once said, Bhutto stated time and again that he

(Asghar Khan) did not know politics, but now the nation could see who the novice was.

The opposition, he claimed, had deliberately put up a facade of disunity and demoralization, so that Bhutto should be "trapped" into holding general elections.601 It seemed quite true because the moment the ruling party announced the election dates; the opposition got together and within forty-eight hours was able to hammer out a united alliance.602 The alliance boosted the morale of the opposition. The secretary general of

PNA, Rafiq Ahmad Bajwa told to the Viewpoint reporter that the last three day experience (since the formation of the alliance) had convinced him that the opposition is going to "make a sweep."603 PNA was a conglomeration of nine different political parties who joined their forces for using one central theme namely, Bhutto government was dictatorial which must be weed out at once, because its continuation would be no more than the end of Pakistan‘s democratic dream.604

From the start of 1976, Bhutto used governmental machinery ensuring victory for his own party. Several months before announcing the schedule of general elections, the

PPP‘s leadership set various agencies which were given the task to prevent the coming together of opposition political parties.605

The speed with which the leaders of different opposition parties worked and formed the

PNA was unbelievable and it surprised and shocked Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. He criticized and spoke angrily to those agencies; he was reassured by Rao Rashid, Masood Mahmood and others that the leadership issue particularly among the religious parties would prove a fatal stumbling block.606 The PNA alliance consisted of several influential centrist parties as well as the religious parties, most importantly the effective cadre-based Jamaat-i-

600. Abdullah Malik,(1977). Op. cit., p. 15 601. Viewpoint. January 21, 1977. PPP and the Alliance (Report), p. 9 602. Ibid. 603. Ibid. 604. Lawrence Ziring, (1977). Op. cit., pp. 581-598. 605. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 321. 606. Ibid.

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Islami. By the time, the PPP‘s leadership had also lost the confidence and support of his left and liberal constituents.607

The civilian governments stand or fall with the support of the masses. It becomes fairly easy for a military dictator to take over when and if a civilian government loses its legitimacy608in the eyes of the public. In such a case, both the amateur and the professional politicians doubt the authority of the same government. The government is seen as not worth their allegiance and loyalty.609 Bhutto‘s rule suffered from the same skepticism and doubt on the part of political leaders as well as the public. Bhutto was basking under the illusion that he was immune from being challenged unanimously. The same illusion was shattered by the opposition closing their ranks and joining the one grand alliance. The same alliance was made up of parties ranging from the extreme right to extreme left. Those political parties had very little, if anything, common between them.

The only purpose which had united them was their unanimous opposition to Bhutto. It came, then, as no surprise that the masses who had started losing their belief and trust in

Bhutto, openly wailed against the loss of the civil liberties, rampant corruption and the extravaganza of the PPP members of parliament. A hole had been made in the edifice of the invincible Bhutto government and policies. It was widened further by even more complaints and indignation on the part of the public.

Many people remained confused by the different faces PNA had. Being consisted of political parties led by leaderships having different programs and thinking, it seemed difficult to believe that Mufti Mahmood, Asghar Khan and Pir of Pagaro (not to mention other partners) would be able to pull PNA in the intended direction. But it was their enmity towards PPP‘s leadership that they buried all their differences and stood as united force against Bhutto. Bhutto, on the other hand, was not only the leader of PPP but also the leader of his government and the nation and he also held dictatorial power. Although,

608. Eric A. Nordlinger, (1977). Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments. Prentice Hall, p. 45. 609. Ibid., p. 92.

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the opposition in their election campaign, criticized Bhutto for having such dictatorial powers and used it as a major complaint against him but such powers proved to be his greatest asset for winning majority in the elections.610

6.4. The Issue of Election Symbol

PNA also decided to have one flag and one manifesto. PNA members applied for ‗Hal‘

(plough) as its election symbol. PPP leadership was upset with the decision Abdul Hafeez

Peerzada challenged the award of a single symbol to PNA.611 Malik Muhammad Qasim, a

PNA leader and a candidate himself in the election, in a statement to the Viewpoint expressed his bitterness about the way the government had reacted to the allocation of plough as election symbol to the combined opposition of PNA. He said, the government‘s overreaction to the allocation of the symbol was ―symtomatic of its defeatist tendency‖.

As other parties outside the PNA and independents had been allowed symbol of their own choice, so PNA too should be allowed to have election symbol of their own choice, as it had applied united for the symbol. Malik further said that none of the PNA components had filed nomination paper of its candidates separately, so PNA should be treated as a party.612 Complain from PNA side was that the Election Commission had watched for two full years the government conducted its election campaign, but when the PNA started its own, the Commission had virtually suspended its campaign until the disposal of the symbol‘s case.613 It meant allowing as little time for PNA campaign as possible. In support of their claim for a common election symbol, PNA supporters also cited a similar situation in India where Election Commission had denied recognition to the Janata Party grouping of four different opposition political parties the status of a political party, but had ruled that the group could nevertheless have a common election symbol.614 The PNA leadership and supporters were in a state of anxiety. The PNA leadership had the fear that

610. Stanely A. Wolpert, (1993). Op. cit., p. 303. 611. Abdullah Malik,(1977). Op. cit., p. 15 612. Viewpoint. January 28, 1977. Opposition Protest (Report), pp.10-11. 613. Ibid. 614. Viewpoint, February 4, 1977. Have your Plough.

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their plea would not be granted. They seemed to be suffering from feeling that they have been discriminated by the authorities.615 Their fear and misgiving, however, came to an end when the verdict of the Election Commission came. The Election Commission gave the decision that under the rules, the Pakistan National Alliance could not be considered as a party, but in the interest of the fair elections and in view of the PNA submission that taking away of the plough from it at this stage would seriously impair its position at the polls, the Election Commission had nevertheless, recommended to the president that the relevant laws be suitably amended to enable this collection of opposition parties to contest the election under a common symbol. When the Election Commission‘s made the announcement, within hours there came the prime minister statement, paving the way for amending ordinance, which was made the same evening616 Bhutto did the right thing by accepting the Election Commission‘s recommendation and advising the president to amend the relevant law which allowed PNA to use one symbol for all its candidates.617

This was, of course, a rational decision on the part of the Commission. Bhutto‘s showing of a sense of accommodation at this critical time was good. But there were different interpretation for showing magnanimity on the part of PPP leadership. One important explanation is that Bhutto‘s act of accommodating PNA demand was aimed to polish his party image which had been tarnished by the unopposed return of many important figures of PPP including Bhutto himself and all the four Chief Ministers.618 Anyhow, whatever may be the reason for this accommodation; it was a commendable act on the part of PPP leadership.

6.5. Qayyum Khan’s PML (Q)

615. Ibid. 616. Ibid. 617. Viewpoint. January 4, 1977. Clash of Symbols. 618. Viewpoint. February 4, 1977. Have your plough.

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As for Muslim League (Qayyum) was concerned, some ranks in PPP were of the view that it was no more required as a coalition partner.619 But some PPP members like

Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, Mir Afzal Khan, Kausar Niazi and Rafi Raza were of the opinion that it would be advantageous to have the support of this party because of its traditional base in the North West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).620 The PPP government was weak and unpopular in the province and needed this support to counter

JUI and former NAP. At the time of division of seats in the province, Zulfiqar Ali

Bhutto‘s advisors such as Abdul Hafeez Pirzada made it impossible for Qayyum Khan to accept the poor terms. Qayyum Khan and Yusuf Khattak were later on formally asked to resign from the cabinet.621 Consequently, launching his party‘s election Campaign at

Gujrat, Qayyum Khan stated that remaining in coalition with PPP for five years-that he was wholly opposed to socialism and believed that only his own version of Islamic system could guarantee Pakistan‘s existence as a sovereign state. He further stated that the PPP did not exist in NWFP and Balochistan; that only NAP and QML had strength in these two provinces; since the NAP had been banned, all that remains was his faction of

Muslim League. And he concluded that if QML was demolished in this region, the province would break away from Pakistan. He then said that, having pledged his loyalty to Quaid-i-Azam, he could not possibly accept either Zulfikar Ali Bhutto or Mufti

Mahmood as his leader. All this may be dismissed as part of the usual election shenanigans- admissible during election campaign, even if the claims made were utterly meaningless and the logic senile. However, Qayyum Khan went further and said that if

619. In fact, the QML had lost most of its leaders to Pakistan Peoples Party in NWFP and also QML, as separate party was losing its identity speedily in the Frontier province. It was, therefore, not unprotected that it was precisely on point of additions to the PPP from QML ranks that the alliance had been disrupted. According to knowledgeable sources, Qayyum Khan, incensed over the defections, largely brought about by Mr Nasrullah Khattak had demanded that the frontier Chief Minister should be removed before the elections because he would work against the interests of QML. When PPP‘s leadership did not accept this condition, Qayyum Khan and Yusuf Khattak either resigned or were asked to leave. Available at: Viewpoint January 21, 1977. QML left high and dry. 620. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 322. 621. Ibid.

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PPP returns to power it could only be through rigging in the elections that if it happened, then the ruling party would not be able to remain in office for more than ten days, as there would be a ―big revolution‖ in the country.622 This shows nothing but a threat to use unconstitutional means to reject the voter‘s verdict, if it did not confirm to the expectations of QML‘s leadership. It is common in Pakistan that those who are not in a winning position, use threats of inviting non-political elements to interfere in the political process. Actually QML leadership was frustrated after being ousted from high office and being denied quota of seats that it wanted in the NWFP.623 Also, Qayyum Muslim League had neither any worker nor candidate in NWFP, which was once its stronghold. Qayyum

Khan had also approached to National Democratic Party (NDP) for electoral cooperation which was rejected by the latter because NDP was of the view that QML was responsible for creating confusion in the national politics. Most of the opposition parties in PNA were also against Qayyum Khan.624 Thus PPP stood alone in the field against all other political parties. This was the isolation of PPP, which was sought and struggled by opposition.625

6.6. Selection of Candidates for 1977 Elections

Dismal was evident on the part of many aspirants as their number increased. It could be clearly seen that in the process of tickets for national and provincial assemblies only a few would get it and disappoint others. In some cases, the number crossed ten and a score for the very same ticket. It was flamboyant process involving new faces on party lists. A number of uninteresting and lifeless lawmakers were substituted by many fresh aspirants.

Unexpectedly, many of the torchbearers of the party‘s nominations who were also the enthusiastic officials were dead. Forty out of hundred PPP members in the just dissolved

National Assembly were deprived of tickets.626 Upon investigation of the situation it came to surface that the new entrants were from influential political backgrounds and those

622. Viewpoint. February 4, 1977, Election Shenanigans. 623. Ibid. 624. Viewpoint January 21, 1977. QML Left High and Dry. 625. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 322. 626. Marvin. G. Weinbaum, (1977). Op. cit., pp.599-618.

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who had recently joined the PPP. Interestingly, about one-fifth of them had contested last elections as active opponents of PPP. This pouring in from the diverse backgrounds confirmed the fact that the ideological diversity between the PPP and its opposition, reasonably sharp in 1970, would be vague in 1977 elections. PPP‘s leftwing stumbled down further with its already weak position.627 The lists did not display PPP‘s original workers and loyals. The PPP leadership felt the need to revise the lists not because of the issues within but as a response to the grouping together of the nine political parties

(PNA). Their resolve was to coordinate their efforts and choose and field a single candidate for each National Assembly and Provincial Assembly constituency. The PPP‘s higher-ups ignored the fact of bridging the gap between certain parties and leaders e.g., the Islamic fundamentalists of JUP and JI, the political moderates of Tehriq-e-Istaqlal or the often radical-sounding NDP leaders. The establishing of PNA made PPP leaders cautious to nominate candidates of prominent position and those having dominance in clans.628

6.7. The Campaign for 1977 Elections

The favorite subject in those days was the March elections. Will the Peoples party win?

With what majority? Will the Opposition obtain sufficient strength to forestall the unilateral amendments of the constitution? There were even some persons who considered the possibility that a wind of revolt would topple Bhutto and would bring

PNA to power, just as 1970 elections had brought him to power.629

Both PPP and PNA launched their election campaign in earnest once the election dates were announced. The Peoples Party drive was launched by chairman Bhutto at a public meeting held at Liaqat Gardens (Rawalpindi), while PNA started its election campaign with a public meeting at Karachi's Nishter Park.630 PPP also announced its manifesto for

627. Ibid., pp. 599-618. 628. Ibid., pp. 599-618. 629. Abdullah Malik,(1977). Op. cit., p. 15. 630. Viewpoint. January 28, 1977. The Campaign Get Under Way.

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the coming elections. With the March 7 polling date for election to the National

Assembly, less than one and a half months away, the vote seeking campaign throughout the country was gaining strength with every passing day. PPP was banking heavily on its achievements and reforms introduced during its previous tenure, while opposition was trying to make out that these reforms have not, in fact, been of any real benefit to common man. They maintained that in most cases, the government measures had just opposite effects on country's economy and the standard of living of common man. In this respect, they specially mentioned the fall in the production of the taken over industries, scarcity of vegetable ghee and cement, and soaring prices of almost all commodities. The

PNA leaders promised the electorate that they would bring the prices back to the 1970's level.631 They also blamed government‘s policies pertains to the increase in administrative expenditures. For example, Asghar Khan told in the Karachi meeting that expenditure on police alone had gone up from Rs. 20 crore in 1971, when East Pakistan had not been disintegrated, to Rs. 80 crores now. Foreign loans and the disintegration of East Pakistan were other issues that PNA discussed during election campaign.632 The opposition also criticized

the PPP for having cramped the working people right with serious restrictions, rendering them abstract and inane. They also alleged that in the five years of PPP's rule, graft, corruption, bureaucratic highhandedness and self aggrandizement have touched an all time hi and its monetary policies and excessive expenditure on unproductive activities had all contributed in decrease in production growth and increase in inflation rate. As far as the government foreign policy is concerned, one of the opposition leaders Mr. C. R.

Aslam, President Pakistan Socialist Party (PSP), was of the view that it moved in opposite direction: they talked of the third world unity and yet they are tied to the world

631. Ibid. 632. Ibid.

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capitalist economy and the CENTO and RCD".633 PPP in general and the person of Z. A.

Bhutto, in particular, was targeted by the opposition. Their attacks were exclusively directed against Bhutto‘s politics, his personal life style and his family.634

Bhutto‘s announcement that the politicians imprisoned in different jails would be freed to compete the general elections of 1977 was one of his campaign ploys. The other one was scaling down the size of large land holdings to make available more land to the landless tenants/farmers.635 The PPP itself was popular amongst the populace but it was the superimposing personality and charisma that the PPP hoped would win the day for them.

The opposition had grown pale in its appeal as compared with Bhutto. The latter had it ensured that the opposition, even if released from behind the bars, would not endanger his chance of securing the premiership yet again.636

Although the allied parties represented different political ideologies and it suffered from divided leadership speaking different languages, yet they were united for their mission.

The state owned media described the opposition political parties disloyal to the country and projected PPP as the right choice of the masses of the country particularly when the nine opposition parties decided to coalesce in the form of PNA to oppose Bhutto dictatorial stature, the Pakistan Times labeled PNA as an ―opportunistic alliance‘ and stated that the voters are fully well aware of their conspiracy against ―the new order. It was also stressed that the nation ―will reject the anti-democratic and anti-people elements that are now making a desperate last-ditch attempt to stop the march of history."637 In one of his meetings Bhutto stated about his close relation with the masses and also criticized

PPP opponents.638

633. Ibid. 634. Lawrence ziring, (1977). Op. cit., pp. 581-598. 635. Lawrence Ziring, (2005). Op. cit., p. 156. 636. Ibid. 637. The Pakistan Times, January 13, 1977. 638. ―In 1970, I promised you democracy. In 1973, I gave you democracy. You asked for participation at all levels of decision making. I provided you with that opportunity. I not only asked you to participate in the decisions I took, I also asked your permission when I took the decisions that affected all of

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In one of his addresses, Bhutto criticized PNA by commenting that the Alliance had adopted the plough as its election symbol and then proceeded to excoriate its membership for making the cultivators "the puppets of jagirdars (extensive land- holders) and capitalists." Noting the greater relevance of the PPP symbol, he remarked: "We have adopted the sword as our election symbol because we used this sword to eliminate exploitation, and to control capitalism. The sword had cut down the chains and freed the poor people."639 The PPP wanted to seek a fresh mandate on the basis of its achievement i.e. socio-economic policies, services to Islam and achievements in foreign policy.

PNA on the other hand, targeted and highlighted the loopholes in the PPP government‘s domestic and foreign policies and especially the limiting of civil and political rights.

They showed their loyalty to Islam and promised to put in force the Islamic system

(Nizam-i-Mustafa) in its genuine form in the country if it comes to power. With the lifting of the restrictions on public meeting and jalsas for election campaign, PNA got an opportunity to express their opinion about people grievances against the PPP government and get support for their program.640 The election of 1977 was one of those elections which were contested not for the sake of grand visions about governance and progress. It was an election which was marked by libels, slanders and vilification of personalities.

The opposition was cognizant of the importance of the charisma of Bhutto. They considered him as the man standing their way for the realization of the attainment of a democratic form of government.641

us. You allowed me to send Mujibur Rahman home; you permitted me to go to Shimla to discuss peace with Ms. Gandhi; you let me to go to the countries of Middle East to seek their help in our hour of need. You and I have trusted each other. But there are people in this country that don‘t approve of our association. These people have attempted to put obstacles in our way; to stop us from building a new Pakistan. They can do this because we have allowed them to do so. Should we continue to permit them this freedom? Mustn‘t we change the rules of the game so that our progress towards a new and dynamic Pakistan is not continuously thwarted?‖ Shahid Javed Burki, (1988). Op. cit., p.181. 639. The Pakistan Times, January 31, 1977. 640. Hasan Askari Rizvi, (2000). The Military & Politics in Pakistan 1947-1997. Sang-E-Meel Publication, p. 219. 641. Lawrence Ziring, (2005).Op. cit., p. 156.

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Bhutto activated every channel and launched an offensive strategy against PPP‘s opposition political parties. He wanted no excuse and no reason either. Bhutto seemed more nervous this time which made him aggressive. This was because of lack of unity and discipline in his own party, disappointment with Bhutto‘s policies and programmes and strong determination of the opposition political parties to snatch the reins of power from PPP‘s leadership.

Bhutto made the necessary changes in both administrative and military structures to counter any expected challenges to PPP‘s victory. He reshuffled his cabinet in February

1976 and orders were issued for reorganization of the federal secretariat and provincial structures. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting too was restructured.642 The state owned media was made responsible for projecting the image of PPP and its leadership and also exposing the incapability of the opposition political parties.

Muhammad Hanif Khan took the charge of Information Ministry in February 1976, and made an immediate review of the structure and activities of different media and submitted, on February 15, 1976, a report to Bhutto.643

The government launched a vast publicity campaign both at domestic and international front for projecting the achievements of PPP regime. The cost for this was massive.

Massive influx of financial grants to the Pakistan National Centre (PNC) inflated in

1975-76. This organization was for the sole purpose of PPP‘s political propagation and highlighting its public sector projects in the same vein. The considerable and notable flow of amount doubled and tripled in the course of these years i.e., 1975-77.644 The role of

PPP and its leadership was eulogized through several books produced for the same purpose. 30,000 copies of a book entitled, Promises and Performance, stating the implementation of PPP‘s manifesto in different local languages was produced. The total

642. Morning News, February 6, 1976. 643. White Paper on Misuse of Media, Islamabad, Government of Pakistan; August (1978), December 20, 1971-July 4, 1977, p.243. 644. Ibid., pp. 243-44.

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cost for this was about Rs. 10 lakhs. Furthermore, three books costing forty thousand rupees for 1000 copies of each book were published for government popularity for the upcoming elections. The then information minister was patron of the publications.645 Rao

Rashid, Bhutto‘s special secretary advised for revision of electoral laws so that to put an end to the expected moves of the opposition. The secretary further forwarded different plans for preventing strong candidates of the opposition political parties from contesting the elections. He also suggested removing the undesirable and unfavorable officials. For ensuring the PPP‘s victory, Bhutto had passed some special constitutional measures. On

September 5, 1976 fifth constitutional amendment was passed through the National

Assembly which was aimed to cut down the powers of the judiciary.646

For precluding the leaders of the defunct National Awami Party from the upcoming elections, the Peoples Representation Bill647 was passed from the National Assembly in

November 1976.648

In the same manner, the Sixth Amendment in the Constitution of 1973 was made in

December 1976 which was aimed to allow the assistants and advisors of the PPP‘s Bose to contest the upcoming general elections.649

645. The Architect of New Pakistan, by Main Said Rasul Rasa (English); Yadon Ke Jazeeray by Raza Hamdani (Urdu) ; and Ulsi Hindara, by Prof. Afzal Raza in Pushto. Ibid., p. 248. 646. According to the fifth constitutional amendment, the powers exercisable by the Supreme Court were made subject to clause 2 of Article 175 of the 1973 Constitution whereby the Supreme Court could exercise only such powers as were conferred by the constitution or under any law, and not go beyond its jurisdiction. Particularly, it had been brought about to safeguard any law, rule or order made in pursuance of the Emergency provisions against any challenge on the ground of inconsistency with any of the Fundamental Rights. The Pakistan Times, September 6, 1976. 647. The People‘s Representation Bill‘ (PRB) had been introduced (in November 1976) to disqualify a person from being elected as a member of an Assembly in case he was an office-bearer of a dissolved party under sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Political Parties Act 1962. The PRB also provided for a deterrent punishment for corrupt practices during elections such as imprisonment up to five years or a fine up to Rs. 5,000. The ceiling on election expenses was put at Rs. 40,000 for National Assembly elections and at Rs. 25,000 for Provincial Assembly elections 648. Dawn, November 19, 1976. 649. Through this amendment article 260 was amended and favorites of Bhutto holding different offices were allowed to contest the elections. Chief Ministers, chairman and members of Law Commission and of the Council of Islamic Ideology were excluded from the ‗purview‘ of the definition of ‗Service‘ of Pakistan. Dawn, December 24, 1976.

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Such measures were taken just to help support the ruling party and create hurdles for the opposition. All these sustained and carefully planned moves provided Bhutto the ground which helped him to build up his electoral strategy. Therefore, confident of winning the elections, Bhutto in December 1976 announced to hold free and fair general elections in the country. Bhutto stated in his speeches that PPP has no hesitation for going to elections. Pointing to India, Bhutto said that Pakistan would not follow other Asian countries where elections were postponed.650

Once supporter of Z. A. Bhutto, Malik Ghulam Jilani, had described the whole situation of the country651 at a time when the former announced the March 1977 elections in, in some precious words;652. Malik Ghulam Jilani was sensing the situation and was sure of

PPP‘s victory and disappointment and defeat for opposition in the election. The elections result later on, came out as expected by Jilani.

The PNA attracted an unsurprising support of the public in its meetings.653 There was a series of heated speeches from both sides, and confrontation, each wanted to downgrade and impose its will on the other. The opposition charged Bhutto as a drunker and

650. Addressing a Press Club meeting at Lahore on December 23, 1976, Bhutto declared that ―he had faith in democracy‖ and as evidence thereof, he was ―willing to hold general elections in the country according to the constitution.‖ Bhutto asked: ―why should we postpone elections? There was no need for such an attitude.‖ Without naming a neighboring country, Bhutto said that ―though there was a democratic system in that country, since its inception they had put off their elections twice, firstly for one year and then for a period of two years.‖ He said that there were a number of other countries also where elections had been postponed, and added that he would not name those countries because it would result in a diplomatic protest from them claiming that they still had democracy in their country. Bhutto further observed that ―Pakistan is fortunate to have both a democratic and constitutional government.‖ Morning News, December 24, 1976. 651. Malik Ghulam Jilani. Unpublished essay, ―Time Always Passes‖, quoted in Lawrence Ziring, (1977). ‗Pakistan: The Campaign Before the Storm. Asian Survey, 17(7), pp. 581-598. 652. ―Justice is no longer a matter of right. It is a matter of accident notwithstanding the elaborate judicial farce. All your rights are suspended and there is no hope that the rulers are likely ever to revive them. All laws are meant only for the convenience of the rulers and to mislead the world. Any law which a citizen can invoke in his defense or for his protection is quickly changed. The so called constitution finds itself amended and mutilated the moment any court of law appears likely to grant relief to a citizen under its provisions, and the courts accept amendments with obvious satisfaction. The press works as an elaborate device for circulating the printed word. Expression is stifled and dissent is frowned upon. The press dances to the music of its chain s.‖ 653 For the detailed account of election campaign, see, Lawrence Ziring, ―March 1977 Elections in Pakistan‖, Asian Survey (May 1977), pp. 60-80.

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indulged in Bacchanalian orgies. Bhutto responded to this charge by saying that he drank wine not people blood.654 Bhutto was of the view that PNA leadership is grouped together against him either ―obscurantist‖ or ―agents of capitalism‖ or ―foreign reactionaries‖.

Bhutto never respected PNA leaders and considered them as ―light-weights‖.655

6.8. The Election Results

A tough and heated contest was expected between sword (PPP election symbol) and the plough (Opposition election symbol). Both PPP and PNA contested the elections like vicious battle in which score of people lost their lives and many more injured. The polls for the national assembly were held on March 7, 1977. The PPP‘s officials facilitated its supporters to have an easy access to polls but stopped the supporters of PNA from casting their votes.656 When the results were announced, PPP had won the elections in three of the four provinces. PPP won nearly four-fifth of the National Assembly seats. PNA won only 36 seats which is less than one-fifth while the remaining seats (Tribal Areas) were captured by the independents. It was a victory more than enough, required for amending the constitution and altering overhauling the political system. In addition, the 8 independents candidates were quasi-PPP in some sense as in the past practice, tribals would not accept any party‘s label were expected to join the ruling party. As a result it increased the ruling party seats in the National Assembly and gave PPP 81.5% of the seats.657

The following table shows the National Assembly results.658

RESULTS

654. Shahid Javed Burki, (1988). Op. cit., P. 195. 655. Stanely A. Wolpert. (1993). Op. cit., p. 301, 656. Shahid Javed Burki, (1988). Op. cit., p. 196. 657. Ibid. 658. Hasan Askari Rizvi, (2000). Op. cit., p.219.

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Party Number of candidates Number of Seats

PPP 191 155

PNA 168 36

PML (Qayyum) 37 1

Independent 324 8

Other Minor Parties 21 0

Total 741 200

The members of PNA from the very outset blamed the PPP for fraud and for voter manipulation. The charisma of Bhutto maintained the same level of insurmountability in the eyes of the observers as it had been enjoying couple of years before in the eyes of the populace. They were dead sure about the PPP‘s victory by a landslide. The opposition alliance was believed to secure at least a modest number of seats in the parliament so as to resist the would-be ruling PPP‘s excesses. But, surprisingly for the public and the opposition, and unsurprisingly for those observers who had stuck to the belief that the

PPP would win elections by a huge margin, the PPP came out as occupying an absolute majority in the parliament. It secured 155 out of 200 general seats. The opposition had to console itself with merely 36 seats. Accusations and allegations were natural. The combined opposition leadership termed the election as virtually rigged and farcical.

Demand for fresh elections and removal of Bhutto gathered tremendous support.659 The ruling party under Bhutto‘s leadership got a massive victory in 3 out of four provinces of the country. Out of the rest 45 seats, PNA secured only 36 leaving 1 seat to Qayyum

Muslim League and 8 to independent candidates from tribal areas. Out of total 31 million registered voters, 17 million cast their votes.660 Poor performance of PNA in Sindh and

Punjab surprised everyone. In Sindh, out of eleven Karachi constituencies and three

659. The Pakistan Times. March 10, 1977. 660. Dawn , Karachi, 13 March 1977.

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Hyderabad constituencies, PNA was able to secure 9 and 2 constituencies respectively. In

Punjab, PNA won only 8 seats but not a single one in Lahore and Rawalpindi. In NWFP

(now KPK), PNA won 17 seats while in Balochistan it refused to take part in the elections.661

The prospects of PNA success in the polls was dark because of the incoherence and differences among the alliance partners, lack of access to mass media for the opposition, restrictions imposed by government for preventing PNA members from contacting the people and PPP‘s one sided propaganda through controlled communication media. The opposition got a short period of only two months for campaigning when section 144 which prohibits assembly of more than four persons was lifted. Sensing the situation, some of the PNA favorites had admitted that it would not be able to give a tough time to

PPP.662 In some areas, polling agents of PNA were thrown out of the polling stations.

There were more malpractices at the women polling stations. Also, PNA votes were burnt. Deputy Commissioners were ordered to ensure PPP‘s victory.663

6.9. Aftermath of 1977 Elections

Consequently, the opposition was not ready to accept the results. PPP victory as predictable came true but the members of PNA knew in advance that elections would not be fair and free. They knew that PPP‘s leadership would not be satisfied with simple victory. Bhutto, they knew, was determined to put an end to all the challenges to his authority and position. When the PNA voices of vote rigging erupted, Bhutto not only denied the claim but ordered the FSF to punish those who, according to PPP‘s leadership, negated the will of the masses and the expression of the democratic process. PNA in

661. Mehrunnisa Ali, (1977). Pakistan: Aftermath of the March 1977 Elections. Pakistan Horizon, 30(3/4), pp. 77-102. 662. Ibid., pp. 77-102. 663. Aslam Pervez Mamon. (n.d). Wafak-i-Pakistan aor Qumi Yakjehti, 1947 se 1971 ka Seyasi Jaiza (Federation of Pakistan and National Integration: A Political Analysis), (PhD Thesis), p. 265.

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response to Bhutto‘s undemocratic attitude, called for a countrywide strike.664 The huge attendance at the public meeting of the PNA indicated that it would surely catch more seats than the opposition captured in the first general elections of 1970. The PNA, an alliance of nine different opposition parties, did not accept the results and charged the

PPP‘s leadership for rigging and other malpractices in the election and without any delay, the opposition opened a campaign against the incumbent government which got strengthened quickly.665

The General Council of Pakistan National Alliance unanimously decided, on 9th March, to reject the National Assembly elections "rigged" and "stolen" by PPP "election thieves.666 The PNA also boycotted the elections of the provincial assemblies.667 At the evening when the results were announced, Z. A. Bhutto informed a press conference that the results were as he expected. The next day he appealed publicly for a large turnout for the elections to the provincial assemblies, emphasizing that a vote for PPP was a vote for democracy and would frustrate the PNA boycott.668 Bhutto insisted on conducting the provincial elections on March 10, 1977 as scheduled. He severely criticized the boycott of the provincial elections and appealed to the electorates ―to turn out for the vote with full vigor and enthusiasm, no less than they showed at the National Assembly polls." But masses positively responded to the PNA appeal of boycotting the provincial elections scheduled for March 10, 1977. It was almost a complete boycott. The masses did not go to the polling stations669 as more than half of those who had voted for National Assembly candidates on March 7, remained absent. The opposition alliance (PNA) leadership decided and called for a ―strike" to "demonstrate" the nation's "loss of confidence" in its

664. Lawrence Ziring,, (2005). Op. cit., p. 157. 665. Shahid Javed Burki, (1988). Op. cit., p. 171. 666. Stanely A. Wolpert, (1993). Op. cit., p. 304. 667. Dawn, 9 March 1977. Press Conference of Asgar Khan of 8 March 1977. 668. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 337. 669. Aslam Pervez Mamon, (n.d)., p. 266.

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present leadership.670 As it proved true, the turnout was so poor that at some polling stations there were more law enforcement personnel than voters. The patrolling military witnessed all this. In Rawalpindi, some party members were annoyed because that had not been consulted over the issue of tickets and at the time of voting for National

Assembly, they often found their votes already cast, so they were not ready to come forward. To make matter worse, hugely inflated turnout was announced.671 Kausar Niazi, a close colleague and cabinet minister in Bhutto‘s government admitted672 the fact. Abdul

Hafeez Peerzada also expressed similar opinion that PNA boycotted provincial elections and its boycott was very effective. Not a single PNA member was seen at polling.673

The General Council also demanded the elected members of PNA to resign immediately.

The said Council also demanded the resignation of the Chief Election Commissioner for its failure to conduct free and fair elections in the country. The PNA leadership gave a call to the people for a peaceful strike against the alleged malpractices in the elections on

11th March.674 The agitation started on March 11, 1977.675

As Burki put it, the Nawa-i-Waqt had predicted that the post election period would not be a period of success but of trial for PPP leadership. Bhutto was very disturbed with the opposition unease. He warned the PNA leaders,676 in a press conference a day after the election.677 Bhutto warned the opposition to approve the results and also warned that they would not be allowed to bring death and destruction to the people of the country. Despite

670. Stanely A. Wolpert, (1993). Op. cit., p. 304. 671. Rafi Raza, (1997). Op. cit., p. 336 . 672. ―The PNA‘s mass popularity was proved on the 10th of March when the Provincial Assembly elections were scheduled and the polling booths lay deserted. That day it was only the People‘s Party candidates who were in the field. Complete boycott of the Provincial Assembly polls gave me clear indication that the anti-government campaign launched by the PNA…would prove very effective‖. Kausar Niazi as quoted in A Journey to Disillusionment by Sherbaz Mazari. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p p. 445. 673. Interview with Abdul Hfeez Peerzada. (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Minister and senior member of PPP) on 13-06-2015. 674. The Pakistan Times, 10 March, 1977. 675. Nawa-i-Waqt, March 12, 1977. 676. ‗if the opposition leaders took the law in their own hands and tried to subvert the constitution and created agitation in that case the government is quite capable of dealing with the situation. 677. Shahid Javed Burki, (1988). Op. cit., p. 197.

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Bhutto‘s warning, strike was observed on 11th March 1977. More than two hundred persons including opposition prominent leaders were arrested in Karachi.678 On March

12, Bhutto offered the opposition to have a dialogue if they had any complaints; he however rejected the demand for reelection. He also made an impassioned plea to the

PNA to accept their defeat in the elections and told that National Assembly elections could not be discussed.679 Bhutto expected a positive response from Maulana Mufti

Mahmood and waited for a written confirmation as he himself wrote for it in pursuance of the invitation. There was an air of mistrust and lack of approval of Bhutto‘s idea i.e., election being regarded as a settled matter. Instead of a nod, Maulana Mufti Mahmood denied the invitation.680 On March 13, PPP‘s leadership expressed his desire that he

"would not hesitate" to invite the army if he found it "necessary" to "restore order." Both

General Gul Hasan and Air Marshal Rahim Khan, who played main role in supporting and helping Bhutto‘s coming to power wired their resignations, as ambassadors to Greece and Spain respectively as a reaction to Bhutto threat of using army for restoring order.681

The resignations were a bad omen as what was next in pipeline proved to be disastrous.

Both of the officers were never stopping to be the game changers and masterminds for military.682

The protest started by PNA led to impasse. They were demanding for Bhutto resignation and fresh elections while PPP leadership was prepared to correct only the minor irregularities.683 To deal with such a situation needed magnanimity on the part of both sides. But unfortunately that could not happen. Bhutto admitted that some individuals had

678. The Statesman, 13 March, 1977. 679.The Pakistan Times, 13 March, 1977. 680. Stanely A. Wolpert, (1993). Op. cit., p. 305. 681. Rahim Khan charged Bhutto with having "made a mockery of democracy in Pakistan. . . . You have not honoured your pledges. . . . The previous regime held fair and free elections but you have imperiously ignored that fine precedent and allowed them to be rigged instead. I cannot sit idly by and see the country being dragged into another civil war by power-hungry men. I am, therefore, resigning in protest against your oppressive and dictatorial regime. Gul Hasan‘s statement was much the same as that of Rahim Khan. Both officers were in close touch at that time, coordinating their resignations as well as the speeches they were soon to make in Britain against Bhutto's regime. 682. Stanely A. Wolpert, (1993). Op. cit., p. 308. 683. Shahid Javed Burki, (1988). Op. cit., p. 198.

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violated the rules of the game and committed malpractices in the elections. They had committed malpractices in their individual capacity for which the premier was not responsible. But he also maintained that it did not mean that government had made a plan to rig the elections.684 He rejected the allegation of rigging and also re-elections. 685

Having gathered large crowds before the elections, the PNA was expecting the proposed strike to be one of the same. Civil disobedience was started; section 144 and threat of being arrested were defied by the PNA. The movement grew violent. Encounters between the demonstrators and the police/ federal security forces were increasingly becoming common.686

The masses, having seen and participated in the political campaign on the part of

PNA, were flabbergasted by the landslide victory of the PPP. People‘s misgiving about the results were in large part the outcome of their preconceived notion about the PNA as being one of the most favorite before the elections. The PPP could not have been expected to win the elections with such a majority. Fingers were raised at the transparency and fairness of the elections. Whatever the scale of rigging might have been, the PNA and its supporters rallied for altogether cancelling the elections687 and conducting new one under the watch of Pakistan army and judiciary. The PNA, when it voiced concerns about the rigging and fraud in the elections, was mocked by the people for its poor show in the elections. It took quite some time before the people could be convinced and won over by the PNA to acknowledge that the elections were not indeed free and fair.

684. The Pakistan Times, March 28, 1977. 685. He said, ―I don‘t want to go down in history as a rigger of the elections, which I am not. If I have reelections, I would be conceding their false charge that I am a manipulator and rigger of elections... What the hell is office of Prime Minister? I am more concerned about my place in history‖. The Pakistan Times, April 9, 1977. 686. Mehrunnisa Ali, (1977). Op. cit., pp. 77-102. 687. Ibid., pp. 77-102.

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In March, National Assembly voted Bhutto to power.688 He denied PNA demand of dissolving the National Assembly by saying that there was no moral or political justification for such action.689 However, rallies and procession organized by PNA against the government made Bhutto to negotiate with opposition. Bhutto, at the same time insisted for the legitimacy of the election and also offered PNA to come to negotiation table but the opposition denied the offer until their basic demands were accepted. 690 Observers and correspondents from abroad reported as saying the rigging and other malpractices were circumscribed to a limited number of constituencies. But they were clearly mistaken. The rigging was done at a scale unprecedented in the electoral history of Pakistan. The PPP had actually been doing homework for winning the elections, whatever opposition might come in its path. The Prime Minister‘s Secretariat, the Intelligence Agencies and the Ministry of Information were collectively engaged in recommending different candidates to different seats and advising various secret moves for PPP‘s win. Some of the ministers attacked the voters and stamped the ballot papers.691

Of course the elections were rigged and the rigging was not confined to a limited constituencies.692 Responding to the opposition insistence, the Chief Election

Commissioner ordered for the recounting of votes at some disputed polling stations.

When it became clear that malpractices had been there, the government withdrew the authority from the Election Commission to announce the results. But the Chief Election

Commissioner admitted the rigging.693

The Election Commission of Pakistan sided with the PNA when its Chief Election

Commissioner expressed doubts about the fairness of the elections. Justice Sajjad Ahmad

688. On March 28, 1977 voting took place in National Assembly with a total membership of 168. Among the present members 155 were from Pakistan Peoples Party while the rest were from tribal areas and women. 689. The Pakistan Times, March 29, 1977. 690. The Pakistan Times. March 10, 1977. 691. Walter Schwarz, (1977). Why Bhutto‘s Power is Crumbling London: The Guardian, May 1,1977. 692. White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March, 1977, Government of Pakistan, July 1978. 693. Aslam Pervez Mamon, (n.d)., p. 266.

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Jan came out on various occasions stating the fact that the elections were indeed rigged and expressed his helplessness to put an end.694 Those allegations included the abduction of presiding officers, use of violence to either coerce the voters to vote for the PPP or deter them from voting altogether if they did not comply with the demands of PPP workers, the forceful removal of ballot boxes, the casting of bogus votes and the closing of polling stations for hours without any rhyme or reason. The PNA itself was not innocent either. The above mentioned malpractices were committed on both sides. The

ECP had too little authority and not enough resources to ascertain which side was guilty of the malpractices committed. The ECP was at the forefront of suggesting fresh elections to be held for all the 200 seats.695 Later on, Sjjad said that he was shocked by such massive irregularities and put forward the idea of reelections.696 The ECP‘s sealing of the results of 80 constituencies convinced the PNA that the rigging, fraud and other malpractices were indeed committed on a large scale.697But one opportunity for ascertaining the truth about the level of rigging was discouraged by the PNA leaders.

They rejected the idea of being any help to the Election Commission in probing into the matter on the basis of their shaky trust on the Commission. The Election Commissioner revealed, in a statement, the horrifying abuses on several occasions of which he and his officers were well aware of and accused particularly prominent members of Bhutto administration to be abusing power. Later, almost after a period of five weeks, the

Election Commission announced to investigate Hafeezullah Cheema, Railways Minister for electoral abuses in his constituency of Sargodha. The findings of the Commission were i.e., ballot boxes stuffed with ballot papers, were tempered, intentionally invalidated opposition votes, thumb prints were used a number of times for hideous purposes. In certain cases, voting was banned and while in other it was pre-casted even before the

694. Tahir Amin, (2007). 1977 Coup D‘etat in Pakistan. Pakistan Journal of History and Culture, 28(2), pp. 31-52. 695. Mehrunnisa Ali, (1977). Op. cit., pp. 77-102. 696.The Pakistan Times, June 23, 1977. 697. Mehrunnisa Ali, (1977). Op. cit., pp. 77-102.

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actual arrival of the individuals. Cheema displayed violence where his needs were not met satisfactorily.698 It all seemed a pre-planned heinous crime to avert the smoothly sailing purpose of elections and to manipulate things into his favor where his victory will be more than certain. Blaming Cheema, the Election Commission accused him of using such mean tactics in order to grasp his motive of seat. Not only Cheema but his followers too adopted violence and were malignant to secure their nefarious designs.699 According to Miraj Muhammad Khan who was a critics of Bhutto during 1977, Bhutto never made any plan of rigging the elections because he had confidence in himself and in his party.

But there were black sheeps in his party (Lekin oski party me buht se kali bherain thi), who saw their future in danger and these few peoples therefore rigged the elections and damaged not only PPP but also Bhutto.700

Concerns about fairness and transparency in the election process occur almost everywhere where there is democracy. What made the 1977 elections so contentious was the fact that the malpractices of every sort were committed on too large a scale to be overlooked as being a routine in democratic form of governments. Bhutto was not willing to resign and he planned to hold referendum as evasive tactic. The PPP government passed the 7th Amendment Bill in May, 1977 which was aimed to seek legitimacy for the ruling party through a referendum in the country.701 When the amendment bill was moved in the National Assembly, the opposition boycotted because things were not yet settled between PPP and the opposition leadership. The bill meant to empower the Prime

Minister to place an issue/matter to referendum. Bhutto aimed that if situation got worse referendum would bring adjustment. Referring to the referendum Bhutto insisted that as

PNA had turned down all his reconciliatory efforts, let the people decide his fate, but the

698. Salmaan Taseer, (1979). Bhutto a Political Biography, reproduced by Sani Panhwar, pp. 166-167. 699.Ibid., p. 167. 700. Interview with Miraj Muhammad Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and founder member of PPP) on 30-07-2015. 701. Surendra Nath Kushik, (1985). Politics in Pakistan: With Special Reference to Rise and Fall of Bhutto, Reproduced by Sani Hussain Panhwar, p. 95.

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PNA condemned and rejected it. They were of the view that it is a device for supporting

PPP‘s illegitimate rule and ensuring one-party hegemony.702

6.10. PPP-PNA Reconciliatory Dialogue

According to Abdul Hafeez Peerzada, one of the Army officers Gen. Iqbal (Core

Commonder Lahore) told Bhutto in a meeting held on May 15, 1977, ―you are acceptable but your party is not acceptable‖, while Sindh Core Commonder Arbab Jehan Zeb said

―sir the things are so bad like Bangladesh. I do not know tomorrow some lieutenant come to my office and shoots me‖.703 It conveys a message that there was resentment in army.

Army got divided into two groups one opposed to PPP and another favored it with the plea that PPP should hold on to power as it had popular mandate. This meeting alarmed

PPP leadership and on the next day they approached Mufti Mahmood who was jailed in

Sihala.704 In May 1977, leaderships of both PPP and PNA, for reaching an understanding held several meetings in Sihala (Rawalpindi). Bhutto had made offer for dialogue and reaching an agreement with PNA. The PNA, after thoroughly discussing the proposed settlement responded to Bhutto‘s offer along with the following demands:

1. The immediate lifting of emergency, martial law and section 144 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure.

2. The release of all political prisoners;

3. Removal of limitations on press;

4. Dissolution of National as well as Provincial Assemblies within seven days once the

proposed agreement was reached;

5. Holding of general elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies within a one

month period after their dissolution;

6. Dissolution of special courts and tribunals;

702. Ibid. 703. Interview with Abdul Hafeez Peerzada. (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Minister and senior member of PPP) on 13-06-2015. 704. Ibid.

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7. Appointments of the governors for all the four provinces with a mutual consent;

8. Appointment of a new Election Commission with mutual consent;

9. Appointment of a New Chief Election Commissioner;

10. And, for ensuring free and fair elections, changes be made in certain key

appointments but with mutual agreement. 705

The above demands showed leniency on the part of the combined opposition. PNA dropped down their basic demand of Bhutto‘s resignation. It meant they wanted a settlement. Bhutto also asked the opposition leadership to end demonstrations and drop some of their demands if they really wanted a solution. Bhutto ordered some of his colleagues to hold preliminary discussions with PNA at Sihala.706

The army was now showing signs of restiveness, which only added to Bhutto‘s alarm. At an earlier meeting, the Chief of General Staff, General Abdullah Malik, made some remarks about the army‘s responsibility for restoring order in the country. In Bhutto‘s presence, General Malik was sharply rebuked by General Faiz Ali Chisti, Corps

Commander ‗You are not a Corps Commander, what do you know about our difficulties!

Why should we fire? Political problems should have political solutions‘. Chisti was followed by two of the other corps commanders present, General Sarvar Khan and Arbab

Jehanzeb, who also heatedly denounced General Malik views.707 According to Kausar

Niazi who had witnessed these proceedings PPP chairman was very upset.708

For After the odd deadlocks, several disagreements, a proposal and a counter proposal and numerous sessions and counter sessions, a sort of compromise of sorts was reached between the two negotiations teams. PNA‘s members Mufti Mehmood, Nawab Zada

705. Dawn, 6 May 1977. 706. Dawn, 9 May 1977. 707. Kausar Niazi, (1991). Last Days of Premier Bhutto. Lahore: Jang Publishers, p. 145 708. After this meeting …Bhutto appeared fairly upset; anxiety was writ large on his face. That was the first occasion that the generals had spoken in this strain in his presence. Actuallay, it was only after this episode that Bhutto started thinking seriously about having negotiations with PNA; The importance of such an exercise had now dawned upon him. Ibid., see also: Sher Baz Khan Mazari, A journey to disillusionment, pp. 461-462.

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Nasrullah, Prof. Ghafoor Ahmad and from government side Abdul Hafeez Peerzada and

Maulana Kausar Niazi held talks. After a lengthy discussion, both sides reached an agreement on June 15, 1977 wherein it was decided to hold general elections on October

7, 1977.709 The 15 June 1977 agreement had been agreed upon by both sides on the eight important terms.710

Although both sides worked hard and reached an agreement but still there existed some sort of mistrust and credibility gap. Both parties wanted to put pressure on one another.

The agreement was not yet signed and Bhutto made a sudden decision to visit five

Islamic states and Yasir Arafat the Plaestinian leader711 to show that he had no fear of the opposition and could remain outside the country in such a critical situation.712 This visit should have been made once after a committee had drawn up a legal document covering all the points of settlement including the holding of the new general elections and the agreement was signed. The PNA leaders also claimed it would be unfair of Mr Bhutto to give the impression to the governments of Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, the United Arab

Emirates and Iran that agreement had been reached and peace restored.713 As the political situation inside Pakistan remained uncomfortable, therefore, it would be better if Bhutto had stayed at home or cut short his visit to one or two days during the tense time.

The second rate leaders of both PPP and PNA bogged down the talks because of their skirmishes. Bhutto‘s PPP wanted the subcommittee to be an advisory body while PNA was in favor of giving it full authority to ensure free and impartial elections. Bhutto was not ready in that he was not to accept a super government. On the other hand, Mufti

709. Aslam Pervez Mamon, (n.d)., p. 286. 710. New elections would be held as early as possible, it was also agreed upon that army would be withdrawn from Balochistan, all special tribunals would be shut down (with particular reference to the Hyderabad Conspiracy Case), all political prisoners will be released, the constitutional amendments breaching fundamental human rights would be declared null and void, press censorship of all sorts would be stopped, both PPP and PNA would be provided with equal time on television and radio nd on the day the agreement was signed, the state of emergency would be lifted. Sher Baz Khan Mazari, (1999). Op. cit., p. 464. 711. The Times, June 20, 1977. 712. Tahir Amin, (2007). Op. cit., pp. 31-52. 713. The Times, June 20, 1977.

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Mahmood in the capacity of president of PNA alleged the government of avoiding the agreement.714 At last, this dispute was also resolved on the third of July 1977 and both the parties agreed to a new accord about the powers of the committee. It was decided between PPP and PNA that both will send equal number of members to the committee and the committee will have the power to review any decision taken by the government.

In case of dispute, the matter would be referred to the Supreme Court which will be bound to give its verdict within seventy two hours.715 Unfortunately, this chance was also missed when the PNA General Council refused to accept the accord and Tehreek-i-

Istiqlal‘s head Asghar Khan openly refused to accept the accord.716 In fact, the PNA rejected the new agreement because Bhutto proposed some amendments e.g., Bhutto had proposed that in the second week of July, provincial governments should be dissolved and that the provinces should be placed under the direct federal rule but PNA found it unacceptable.717 The Opposition had earlier accepted the amendments subject to confirmation by the central committee. However, within hours of the announcement of an agreement, the opposition members accused their three members negotiating team of having accepted a government formula, different from their own revised draft. Air

Marshal Asghar Khan, who was considered to be the expected candidate for prime ministership in case the PNA won the proposed elections in October, said that the

Government‘s amendments would strengthen Bhutto‘s power in the provinces.718

In Bhutto‘s last address on July 4, 1977, he invited PNA to talks by saying that he will reopen as many issues as they want.719 This time he was really interested to create an environment of peace and understanding between PPP and PNA and reach a solution. As noted by Hamid Khan, Bhutto held his last cabinet meeting on the evening of Monday, 4

714. The Pakistan Times, July 29. 1977. 715. Tahir Amin, (2007).Op. cit., pp. 31-52. 716. Dawn, July 3, 1977. 717. The Times, July 4, 1977. 718. The Times, July 4, 1977. 719. Dawn, July 5, 1977.

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July 1977. The minutes of this meeting showed that he had second thoughts during the day. He sensed that the ongoing clash with the opposition alliance (PNA) would not bring any good results but would harm not only the internal stability of Pakistan but also damage its international standing. He thought that in case the PNA revived and revitalized its protest, and even if the government was able to control it, again the process of discussion and dialogue had to be started. Mere controlling the agitation and restoring of law and order would be of no use without a solution of the problem. Bhutto further stated that the armed forces had stood by the government but they would be out to a severe strain in case of another agitation.720

Recalling the final week of June, General Arif writes as quoted by Mazari721 that Bhutto changed his mind about settlement with PNA.

It appears that on the evening of 4 July, apprehensive of a military coup, Bhutto was ready to make a settlement with the PNA. He consulted further with Abdul Hafeez

Peerzada, Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi (the Chief Minister of Sind), and Mumtaz Ali Bhutto.

Peerzada still opposed concessions to the PNA, but the other two important personalities counseled acceptance of PNA‘s latest demands.722 At a press conference held at 11:30

Bhutto announced his intention to accept723 the PNA‘s terms. According to General K.M.

Arif, Bhutto said in his press conference that, ‗my colleagues had not differed with me during the past five and half years as they did now.724 The version of the evening of 4

July although given by Kausar Niazi, a close associate of Bhutto, is not free from doubt.

720. Hamid Khan, (2005). Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. USA: Oxford University Press, p. 317. 721. ―Zia expressed his apprehensions [to Bhutto] that, if the agitation did not end, it could erode the army‘s discipline and cause divisions in the ranks. This would be disastrous for the army and for the country. Mr. Bhutto sensed the mood. Employing his charm, he said, ‗you are my brother and I trust you.‘ He went on to confide that he had taken ‗other measures‘ to deal with the PNA agitation. That statement rang alarm bells in General Zia‘s mind.‖ Sherbaz Khan Mazari. (1999). Op. cit., pp. 467-468. 722. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 317. 723. The PNA negotiating team had brought in ten new points; they did so apologetically, saying they were helpless; perhaps they were; but I am not helpless, and so I shall sign the accord tomorrow 724. Khalid Mahmud Arif, (1995). Working with Zia: Pakistan‘s Power Politics 1977-1988. Oxford University Press, p. 84.

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If Bhutto was really keen to sign the accord, there was nothing to stop him from doing so on the evening of 4 July. All of the PNA leadership was available in Sihala.725

Actually the PNA team for negotiations with the PPP had not the authority to influence the negotiation and their outcomes. The PNA spokesmen had not full power to make decisions and take action on behalf of PNA. The unanimous approval of the PNA

Council i.e., a council/committee which was consisted of eighteen representatives, two for each of PNA‘s nine constituent parties was required for any agreement they negotiated with PPP. Out of these four members of the council were not sincere and did not want PNA team to reach an agreement with PPP and they preferred the Army to takeover the government, oust Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and then hold fresh elections. They were Asghar Khan ( Tehrik-e-Istaqlal), Sher Baz Khan Mazari and Begum Nasim Wali

Khan (National Democratic Party) and Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani (Jamiat-al-Ulema- e-Pakistan).726 According to Sherbaz Khan Mazari, Asghar Khan trusted military and was of the view that,

―I have contacts with military; they will hold elections within 90 days, stop talks with

PPP.‖

Mazari further said, that Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Professor Ghafoor Ahmad were opposing Asghar Khan stance. Ghafoor Ahmad was an honest man. He wanted the talks to be successful. While Shah Ahmad Noorani and Chudhury Zahoor Ilhai were supporting Asghar Khan. In our meeting with PPP a day or two before Martial Law

Asghar walked out of a meeting. He also confessed that Asghar Khan had also written a letter to army in which he invited military take over.727

Asghar Khan was most prominent who made every possible effort to assure the PNA council that Army would come for a short span and hold elections within ninety days of

725. Hamid Khan, (2005). Op. cit., p. 317. 726. Anwar Hussain Syed, (1992). The Discourse and Politics of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Macmillan, p. 237. 727. Sherbaz Khan Mazari Interview with Farrukh Sohail Goindi, downloaded from Youtube on October 10, 2015.

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its taking over. Here it is necessary to mention that the Retired Air Marshal had invited the Army through a letter 728 as early as May 4, 1977. He was of the opinion that Bhutto‘s government was illegal and the Army should not support the illegal regime of Bhutto.729

At last, the Army general imposed martial law on July 5, 1977. Although Bhutto had tried his best to keep army at a distance from politics through constitution but the said constitution failed to stop army from coming into the corridor of power once again.730

Although Bhutto had agreed to hold fresh elections on October 8, 1977, yet General Zia imposed Martial Law in the name of Operation Fairplay. It was totally an unconstitutional act. Both PPP and PNA leaderships were conceding towards new elections and an agreement. They should have been allowed to seek a political solution and had there been chaos after elections, then army could have intervened. The

Constitution allows the civil government to seek help/support of the armed force in time of need. It is the constitutional right of the government to use/apply its discretionary power and invite military and send it back once the situation becomes normal and if military denies going back, it is the violation of the constitution, and is regarded as high treason. But Zia had taken oath of his office under the said constitution and yet he violated the same by imposing Martial Law while giving it the name of Operation

Fairplay.731

Not only Bhutto but PNA too was responsible for the sorry state of affairs. If on the one hand, PPP‘s leadership had many more shortcomings and weaknesses for promoting democracy in the country, on the other hand, PNA composed of leaders having different ideologies and thinking could not present itself as a viable alternative to the autocratic regime of Bhutto. The only thing which united them was to oppose Bhutto jointly and

728. ―As men of honor (it is for you) to do your duty and the call of the duty in these trying circumstances is not blind obedience to unlawful commands. There comes a time in the lives of nations when each man has to ask himself whether he is doing the right thing. For you that time has come. Answer this call honestly and save Pakistan.‖ 729. Anwar Hussain Syed, (1992). Op. cit., p. 237 730. Aslam Pervez Mamon, (n.d)., p. 269 731. Ibid., p. 270.

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oust him from power. Having such great figure like Mufti Mahmood, Attaullah Mengal,

Asghar Khan, Abdul Wali Khan, Maulana Maudodi, Sherbaz Khan Mazari and Begum

Naseem Wali, not to mention all, PNA could not convince a substantive part of the

Pakistani population.732

6.11. Opposition Faults after the 1977 Elections

Actually the 1977 general elections, for most of the PNA factions, represented as a last chance to get rid of Bhutto. They believed that if Bhutto could not be detached from power at the time of 1977 elections process, it was uncertain that they would ever be able to oust him and in case if he secured a two-third majority in the National Assembly, he would be stronger than before and would be even more secure. The opposition (PNA) leadership speculated in case PPP won the elections, Bhutto would bring in new constitutional amendments so that he could slip back to establish presidential system for pursuing his dreams of third world influence while either ignoring or taking only an occasional interest in the affairs of Pakistan by then run by his junior colleagues from the

PPP. There was a possibility that made variegated opposition to close their ranks and to bring down PPP leadership.733

The political groups came to the conclusion that for them the democratic process can not open the door to power, work on a policy of creating crisis of such dimensions that it becomes necessary for Army to be called out so that to maintain law and order situation.

Some of the PNA leaders thought that once the army comes they would deal with the crisis. Thereafter, they assumed and hoped that military regime would speedily evolve a new constitution presumably like that of Yahya Khan and hold elections in a manner that would make it easy for them to realize their ambitions.734 They did not hesitate to confess that in their view only Army intervention could get them rid of Bhutto; that they could

732. Surendra Nath Kushik, (1985). Op. cit., p. 98. 733. Salmaan Taseer, (1979). Op. cit., p. 169. 734. Viewpoint. April 1, 1977. Third Martial Law, Between the Lines.

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never hope to attain the political power through ballot box. Some of their partners, known for their political integrity and faith in democratic process, seemed to had resigned themselves to the view that in that situation nothing could be done and they had to go along with the partners, even though they did not share the confidence of the self- appointed Army lobby that such a development would lead to a quick takeover of power, followed by an altruistic handing over to the opposition leadership.735

It seemed quite clear that PNA had decided in advance that if the PNA won the elections, then the results would be accepted and the constitution should be respected and if the PPP won then the elections would be considered as rigged and the result would not be accepted. One illustration of such a behavior of the opposition is the Air Marshal Asghar

Khan‘s press interview in Karachi, held a few days earlier than the elections in which he stated that he and his party were not ready to accept the victory of government. He did not advance any proof of Bhutto intention to rig the elections on this stage which seemingly was not an issue. They blatantly refused the victory claiming it to be country‘s disaster that PPP will rule Pakistan. He did not express the need for strike and violence and said that it would not serve much purpose but simply by refusing to sit in the parliament. This was the base for a full fledged agitation. Later on, this stirred up the opposition supporter‘s emotion and they were on the streets with much the same motto as that of the Air Marshal. Their sole purpose was to bring Bhutto down. It was their sheer demand and they were ready to pay any price for it.736 The fact that rigging in reality did take place in certain constituencies had served the purpose of those PNA groups very well, in that had been able to carry with them the parties which stood to lose a great deal by refusing to seek a political way out of that deadlock.737 It seemed that some of the PNA hardline leaders had decided to use other means to topple Bhutto‘s regime. But what these people had in mind could not happen and every one lost.

735. Ibid. 736. Salmaan Taseer, (1979).Op. cit., pp.170. 737. Viewpoint. April 1, 1977. Third Martial Law, Between the Lines.

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6.12. Conclusion

The adopting and persisting of the undemocratic attitude and practices on the part of the incumbent government is limiting the efficiency of the opposition political parties in different ways and that was what PPP practiced during 1977 elections. During election campaign the PPP tried its best to block, weaken, suppress and also to divide different opposition parties. Limited space was made available for opposition to take part in the elections with its full vigor. In fact, the PPP established the rules for electoral contest which favors them. They sought to limit or disallow opposition parties‘ access to the media. All the available resources were used for the period of election campaign to manipulate and influence voters. Different tactics were used to keep the potentially dangerous opposition leaders away from contesting the elections.

Bhutto should have made every possible effort to ensure the fairness and smoothness of the March 1977 elections, and that the country remains free of any trouble that had been forecast by a band of rumor mongers. He had to have made such arrangement that would eliminate all possibility of clashes during the whole process of elections. He should have reached an understanding with the PNA leadership at the earliest without any delay, which could have kept the democratic process intact. The deadlock created in the aftermath of 1977 elections between PPP and PNA could only be resolved by political process. Peaceful means could have been found to expunge the electoral record of all the seats that were considered suspect on reasonable ground. Irrespective of the PNA‘s stance, the Election Commission had to probe the National Assembly elections and vacate all seats where it was claimed that election was rigged. Those found guilty of malpractices, whether officials or ministers should have been dealt with severely. They should have arrived at an early settlement that there would be re-election on the suspected seats and that future elections would be held without any fear of rigging or other malpractices. Both PPP‘s leadership and PNA‘s as well had to realize that ultimately a mutually acceptable, negotiated settlement had to be found. The opposition parties, as

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they claimed to have been interested in the restoration of full democracy, should realized that the situation provided them with a welcome opportunity to move forward to this goal, and also prove their own estimate of their strength by accepting the proposal for provincial elections. That would have created conditions for the elimination of crisis. And if the opposition parties had secured majorities in all or most provinces, this would have helped to strengthen PNA‘s demand for the re-election of the National Assembly.

Although there were experienced politicians on both sides who cried for establishing democracy in the country. The need was to join hands and bring Pakistan out of that crisis. Both PPP and PNA did not move on the path of reconciliation and created a situation that facilitated military‘s come back to the corridor of power.

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CHAPTER - 7 BHUTTO’S LEADERSHIP, RULING-OPPOSITION RELATIONSHIP,

STATUS OF DEMOCRACY AND THE DISMISSAL OF PPP: A

QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS

7.1. Introduction

This chapter consists mostly of the views of experts gathered through interviews. These views are subjected to analysis with the aim to determine how sincere the ruling party was to the establishment of a truly democratic set-up in Pakistan. The genuineness of the charges leveled against the government of Z. A. Bhutto culminating in the dissolution of his government are also examined.

The chapter under discussion is based mostly on the primary sources; the information the

Researcher has collected from different persons particularly contemporaries of Z. A.

Bhutto. In this research, the researcher includes interviews taken from different people regarding their views about the real picture of PPP-Opposition relationship and style of politics of both PPP and opposition leaders. Whether it was in line with the democratic norms and whether it promoted democracy or hampered it? For this purpose the researcher has set questions to accumulate the views on the above stated theme. The questionnaire has a list of questions dealing almost all the issues regarding PPP-

Opposition relationship during Bhutto era. For these open ended questions, the researcher has selected two types of people from the society who may be the suitable people for all these questions i.e., politicians (contemporaries of Z. A. Bhutto) from different political parties and academicians from different institutions. Both types of people have a wide knowledge about topic of research. The researcher‘s plan was to cover all the four provinces but unfortunately it could not be made possible. From Baluchistan Sherbaz

Khan Mazari was hardly approached by the researcher but he was ill and not in a position to have a discussion. The researcher tried his best to contact Atta Ullah Mengal but in

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vain. From Punjab Etizaz Ahsan once agreed to give time but when he was contacted, he was on a foreign visit. Same happened in the case of Raza Rabbani. From Khyber

Pukhtunkhwa, the researcher was able to interview Abdul Akbar Khan (senior member of

PPP, ex Deputy speaker of KP and personal secretary of Bhutto). Thanks to the

Karachians who not only gave time but also shared with the researcher some in-depth information.

In all these interviews, the researcher faced many problems in conducting interviews, because of different issues. Many interviewees especially from PPP became conscious of their response regarding the questions. Many times, the interviewees gave very deep information regarding my topic but also called it off the record. The second one is the long and comprehensive questionnaire, containing open-ended questions which have very comprehensive answers. Some of the interviewees have pressed for time and eventually we have concluded the interview in a restricted time. The third is the accessibility of the interviewees. Usually, once the time was fixed, but the respondent was busy in another activity. This occurred mostly with the politicians. Many times, the researcher went from

Mardan to Islamabad for interview but failed to conduct even an interview because of the busy schedule of the politicians, even the researcher stayed there for a couple of days in

Islamabad but could not conduct a single interview.

How much the political parties, both ruling and opposition, during PPP‘s first rule have fulfilled their democratic obligations can be judged from the critical study of the political developments during Bhutto rule (1972-1977).

7.2. PPPs Success in 1970 Elections and Aftermath

PPP under the leadership of its founder Bhutto got success, in the very first general elections, in West Pakistan. The election results also afforded PPP an opportunity to put the country on the track of democracy. Bhutto had before him examples of populist

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dictators such as Sukarno whom Bhutto used to imitate religiously. But the difference was stark in the sense that those dictators had created a stable structure or took the support of some genuine political force to help them stay in power. The truth was soon dawned upon Bhutto to organize a strong political base for him. The PPP that Bhutto gave birth to was formed mainly of his devotees. As a political party of the masses, the

PPP should have been organized from the bottom-up i.e. the grassroots level-the trade unionists, the peasants and the students; had they been included in the PPP, it could have been of far more value and worth than the family heirlooms that Bhutto handpicked. The consequence was that he could not tolerate dissent from among those he had bestowed favors on. Instead of projecting the PPP as being one of the major political parties, Bhutto believed it to represent the whole of Pakistan.738 Ayub khan was blamed by Bhutto of restricting the freedom of expression and civil liberties. The military regime was lambasted and compared with the Kuomintang regime of pre-revolutionary china where there was limited opportunity for free association and press freedom. Bhutto had it set as his manifesto to help Pakistan embark on a parliamentary and participatory democracy where all power should be vested in the people. It was primarily on these promises of democratic demands and socialist aspirations that Bhutto won the 1970 elections.739

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto‘s ascendency to the office of the authority was a departure from the previous bureaucracy-military axis to democratic traditions. He was one of the democratically elected leaders of the country. He was acclaimed as leader of Pakistan who had the international reputation as well. After the father of the nation, Muhammad

Ali Jinnah, he was believed to be the first popular charismatic leader who could sustain the credibility of being a popular leader and soon he came to be known as Qauid-i-Awam

(Leader of the people). Bhutto‘s charisma as an endearing leader still rings in the hearts of many people. He generated a new style in politics by departing the long standing

738. Tariq Ali, (1983). Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State. Penguin Books, p.108. 739. Ibid., p.107.

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military civil bureaucratic traditions. After the founding fathers he is recognized as the leader who has left his imprint on politics of the country. Even when Bhutto was ousted by General Zia, Mehmood Sham, editer of a Journal ―Meyar‖ from Karachi stated in a title story that ―Bhutto ka ektedar hatam howa hey Bhutto ka dauar khatam nahi howa‖(Although Bhutto‘s rule has ended but not the period)740. The conditions at present have changed a lot. A lot of water has gone under the bridge; PPP has lost its luster but

Bhutto‘s personal achievements stand apart.

Bhutto was a leader who came to power and took control of state affairs in his own hands when there was a lot of confusion. There was lack of leadership at national level particularly in West Pakistan, and there were some from Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (NWFP) and Balochistan whose politics was limited to regional level. The only national level party was Awami League which was popular in the Eastern Pakistan. The PPP was relatively a new born party but which enjoyed equally the same popularity as the Awami

League in Western Pakistan. The PPP gave slogans like: if it came to power it would fight a long war with India; it would give respect to the poor and deprived people of the country; it would change the whole system through democratic process. 741 Bhutto was indeed an intelligent leader who knew how to mould public opinion and how to get benefitted from an opportunity. Not only he raised the slogan of democracy but for the first time he introduced popular politics in Pakistan. He himself introduced popular issues. And the masses supported him. He visited cities, villages and all the far flung areas of the country and created political consciousness among the Pakistani masses. He gave them courage to take interest in political affairs. He knew that the ultimate power rests with people. They bring leaders to power and they can oust them. He also raised the heart touching slogan of Bread, Clothes and Shelter (Roti, Kapra aor Makan). He gave

740. Interview with Syed Jaffar Ahmad (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Director Pakistan Studies Centre, Karachi University) on 31-07-2015. 741. Iftikhar Ahmad Interview in Tv Talk Show, ―Great Debate on Bhutto‖.

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voice to farmers, labourers and all the aggrieved sections of the society and promised to provide Roti, Kapra and Makan to everyone.742

There were no general elections in the country from 1947 to 1970. In the first general elections of 1970, Bhutto through his slogans, speeches and party‘s manifesto gave the impression that if it came to power, PPP would end feudalism, landlordism and the suppression of the poor people. PPP‘s leadership talked about the common man politics.

It gave the impression that PPP was the party of poor people. It promised it would empower the masses in real sense. But unfortunately he violated the very basic ideals of democracy which he stressed upon, before coming into power.743 Later on it proved that most of PPP‘s candidates from Sindh were feudals and landlords. Similarly a lot of those elected from Punjab too belonged to the same class.

Leftists and progressive used Bhutto, as they needed a leader for their program and policies i.e. socialism to be spread and implemented across the broad spectrum of society.

Bhutto, by the same token, used these leaders. Bhutto‘s close relationship with masses was due to the efforts of Miraj Muhammad Khan, Tariq Aziz and Mustafa Khar, among others. But the same leaders were treated as exiles in their own party.744

When in the aftermath of 1970 general elections the East Pakistan debacle took place, the meeting of the assembly was deferred till 1972. There was anxiousness in the air and people felt deserted. In the backdrop of the same circumstances, Bhutto took charge as president of the country. Bhutto and opposition relationship was not good enough, as people held him responsible for Dakha debacle.745 It is considered that the seeds of disintegration were sown during Ayub Khan‘s period and situation got worse during

Yahya Khan period and it is true that the leadership of West Pakistan was not ready to let

742. Interview with Muhammad Hussain Mehinti (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI) on 27-07-2015. 743. Tariq Ali, (1983). Can Pakistan Survive? The Death of a State. Penguin Books, p. 108. 744. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex Chief and Senior Member of JI) on 29-07-2015. 745. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex Chief and Senior Member of JI) on 29-07-2015.

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East Pakistan rule. Bhutto was also responsible and he did not let any peaceful settlement to take place because of his thirst for power and authority. He once told, ―the keys of

Sindh and Punjab are in my pocket ant this is the source of authority‖ (Sindh aor Punjab ki kunji mare jaib ma hey aor yahi ektedar ka sarchashma hey).746 Initially, both Sheikh

Mujib-ur-Rehman and Bhutto could not sort out the solution which resulted in the disintegration of the country. One cannot say that Sheikh Mujib wanted to keep the country united and Bhutto was wholly responsible for disintegration. Politicians always have their own priorities and preferences but they should rise above their personal interests and think of their people. By the same logic Sheikh Mujib should have been allowed to form the government. Democracies sustain themselves on the basis of consensus and cooperation and not on the basis of one dominant party exploiting the other. The civil war in East Pakistan had eroded the trust of the public which they had in the rulers and the institutions.

Bhutto, despite being recognized as a great leader, in the end was hanged but he never sought amnesty. He avoided compromise with military general. He was supporter of Pak-

China friendship and was against US. He helped Arabs in their war against Israel. He called Islamic summit in Lahore. He provided Pakistan military with atom bomb. That is why US had turned against him.747 Once while delivering a speech in the National

Assembly he said, ―Sufaid hathi mere khoon ka peyasa ho geya hy‖ (the bloodhound are after my blood) Bhutto told, ‗the bloodhounds are after my blood‘.748 The provision of

Identity Card to the citizens of Pakistan was a great achievement of PPP leadership.

Earlier, passport was allowed only to the importers and exporters. This was Bhutto‘s contribution that every citizen got the right to have it.749

746. Haroon Rashid. Interview in Tv Talk Show, ―Great Debate on Bhutto‖. 747. Interview with Miraj Muhammad Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Founder Member of PPP) on 30-07-2015. 748. Tariq Ali.(1983).Op. cit., p. 130. 749. Interview with Abdul Akbar Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex- Deputy Speaker and Senior Member of PPP) on 18-11-2015

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The Martial Law derailed the democratic process in its very beginning/early days.750 So when Bhutto came to power he focused on to provide a constitution to the country. That was a challenging task. The country was unable to create a viable constitution in the previous 25 years. This was our bad luck that half of our population, who struggled equally for Pakistan, was separated then. The rest of Pakistan was faced with similar movements which we could not eliminate till today. That is because of the lack of justice in our society. Our leadership could not deliver justice and justice come through democratic system, where ultimate power rests with the people. They can form the government, bring changes in it and can even oust an undesirable government. But, for all that, there is always the need of a document i.e. constitution.751 When he assumed power the main problem was the framing of a constitution. He soon converted the Martial

Law into an interim constitution in 1972 and with the support of other political parties provided a permanent constitution to the country in 1973. Although, before Bhutto, there were great democrats in the country, they were known as champions of the democracy like Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, Liaqat Ali Khan and a lot more from East

Pakistan like Hussain Shahed Suhurwardy who was a great democrat but they could not provide a constitution to the country. The 1956 constitution was formed, according to which there were going to be elections in 1959 but was nipped in the bud by imposing

Martial Law in 1958.752 The 1956 constitution could not get the chance to be implemented and the second one i.e. constitution of 1962 was formulated by a dictator i.e. Ayub

Khan.753 So it was Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, who gave a federal, parliamentary democratic and

Islamic constitution to country, unanimously approved by the elected members of the

750. Interview with Syed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 751. Interview with Prof N. D. Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of PPP) on 28-07- 2015. 752. Interview with Syed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 753. Interview with Prof N. D. Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of PPP) on 28-07- 2015.

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Assembly.754 This was a great contribution on the part of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto that he

invited all the opposition parties with open heart and took all the political parties on

board despite their political differences. All the political parties whether from left, right

or centrist, framed a practicable constitution acceptable to all.755 Most of the opposition

suggestions were also accepted. For example it was on opposition suggestion that Islam

was declared as state religion. No law would be made that clashes with Quran and

Sunnah and all the existing laws would be adjusted accordingly. Fundamental rights were

guaranteed and sovereignty of parliament was ensured in the Constitution. Steps were

taken for the independence of courts. One of the very basic demand of opposition to

declare Qadianis as non-muslims was accepted after a prolong debate and discussion in

the parliament.756

The credit for the 1973 constitution goes not only to Bhutto but to opposition too, where

they withdrew from some of their important demands. If Bhutto accommodated

opposition, the opposition too accommodated Bhutto. After all both sides played their

parts and formulated a constitution and if opposition had adopted the path of

confrontation in that point of time there would be chances for a third Martial Law.757 The

environment was set for a peaceful and trustworthy relationship between the ruling and

opposition parties. The draft of the constitution was approved by parliament

unanimously. All the political parties, ruling as well as all the opposition parties played a

positive role. There were still chance of embitterment of relations between PPP and

opposition on various other issues. Consequent to such controversies, emergency was

754. Interview with Syed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 755. Interview with Prof N. D. Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of PPP) on 28-07- 2015. 756. Interview with Muhammad Hussain Mehinti (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI) 27-07-2015. 757. Interview with Syed Usmani on (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI) 16-07-2015.

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imposed in the country immediately after the promulgation of the constitution758which made constitution practically inactive.

7.3. Ruling Party’s Relation with the Opposition Provincial Governments

However, practically Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto‘s authority was based less on the 1973 constitution and more on his personal strength. Bhutto‘s program of socialism coupled with his skill of making powerful and effective speeches radicalized especially the urban sectors in the second half of the 1960s and was responsible for boosting the hopes of the public for restoration of democratic rule. But after some time factionalism and patrimonialism erupted in the ruling party, especially in the province of Punjab. Also, the

PPP internal cohesion was affected and lost it public esteem by the political and bureaucratic corruption, state intervention in the economy and equally the political violence ( beating, arresting and murdering) the opponents. Although Bhutto‘s PPP mobilized the people for overthrowing the military regimes and restoration of democracy in the country but it failed to transform into an organized political party, based on peaceful and cooperative functioning in an open polity.759

From the very outset the relations between federal government of PPP and NAP-JUI coalition governments in the two provinces of NWFP (now KPK) and Baluchistan were not cordial. Both of the coalition partners were not satisfied with Bhutto‘s style of politics and the governmental structure as conceived by the 1973 constitution. The differences between federal government and the two provincial governments were getting worse and waiting for a cause to burn. PPP leadership perceived these differences as a serious threat to his intention of ruling Pakistan for a long time. The Bhutto government had the negotiating tools at his disposal for settling matters with the opposition governments in the two provinces. The federal government had to give more provincial autonomy in

758. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chief and Senior Member of JI) on 29-07-2015. 759.Pakistan: Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and A New Constitutional System, available at: http://www.mongabay.com/history/pakistan/pakistanzulfiqar_ali_bhutto_and_a_new_constitutional _system.html

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administrative and financial fields but unfortunately the centralized intention of Bhutto to rule Pakistan changed provincial leadership through unfair intervention from the centre that led to settle the issue in the battlefield and not in the assembly.760 Bhutto should had given a free hand to the NAP-JUI leaders to govern Baluchistan within the democratic framework, because they were the elected leaders of the masses as Bhutto and other PPP leaders were in the centre, Punjab and Sindh. But the opposition too was responsible for such sort of situation. After establishing provincial government they thought that they could do whatever, which is done after a revolution. 761 In that point of time, there was need of dialogue and negotiations but the NAP leadership particularly the youngsters showed no signs of patience. They did not realize the seriousness of the situation and did not play a responsible role. Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, was the only opposition leader who adopted a reasonable attitude and was not in favor of a direct clash and conflict with the centre. He believed in democracy and considered differences of opinion as inevitable part of any democratic system. He wanted the solution of all the problems within the democratic framework. Rift among Baloch political leaders paved the way for Bhutto to scrape the provincial government. 762 Neither Bhutto nor opposition from Baluchistan showed any respect for the rules of the game, which resulted in the derailing of the democratic process in its very early days. Baluchistan issue was not handled properly. In point of fact the biggest problem of Pakistan was and still is that it is projected to be a security state. It has always been remained the main issue to protect and promote its unity and integrity. In Baluchistan such a situation was created by the mishandling of the government that led to security risk. The use of force was not a good idea. There was need for some democratic means to solve the problem Bhutto used undemocratic attitude

760. Lawrence Ziring, (1997). Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p.396. 761. Interview with Sayed Jaffar Ahmad (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Director Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi), on 31-07-2015. 762. Interview with Sayed Jaffar Ahmad (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Director Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi), on 31-07-2015.

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and strategy for the solution which disrupted the democratic process in its premature phase.

Parliament is the main forum where difference is made and debated. But there has to be a debate and discussion that leads towards a consensus. Differences of opinion are something natural but try for the development of an understanding through discussion and negotiation. It is good and inevitable to take opposition in confidence and if consensus is not possible then at least get a majority for taking decisions. Bhutto might want to establish relationship with opposition in accordance with the norms and values of democracy but his attitude was aggressive and that is why that might have led to misunderstanding. However, if PPP‘s leadership did believe in democracy then they had to accommodate those who differed.

Sometimes PPP leadership showed a great respect for democratic norms. For example,

Tri Partite Agreement of 6th March 1972 with NAP-JUI coalition and allowing these parties to form governments in Baluchistan and NWFP (now KP). Bhutto also included opposition members to Shimla Delegation, as for as the constitution making process is concerned, Constitutional Accord of Oct 1972 is a commendable effort on the part of ruling and opposition political parties. In the end, in the aftermath of 1977 elections

Bhutto took opposition on board to reach an understanding and agreement. Bhutto adopted kind and democratic attitude on the above occasions. On some occasions he was very friendly and accommodating towards opposition. But as a whole his attitude towards different opposition political parties as well as members of his own party who ever dared to oppose Bhutto, he was very much offensive and sometimes he took a small danger as big one, and an ordinary opponent leader as a big enemy. He used to personalize the political differences.763 Being recognized as a political leader, Bhutto should have reconciled differences and ignored pity issues. It does not mean that whatever opposition

763. Interview with Syed Jaffar Ahmad (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Director Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi) on 31-07-2015.

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political parties were doing was right, they too adopted offensive and non-democratic attitude, but being a ruling party, being an elected representative party, PPP should have exhibited greater responsibility and established cordial and peaceful relations with all.

Bhutto had extraordinary quality of dialogue, and it was he who led the greatest movement after independence of the country. He had some very good dialogues with the opposition which no doubt bore fruits. Quite a few times there arose chances of understanding and settlement between the ruling and opposition parties. The 1973 constitution was formed with the cooperation of opposition. The Quaidiani issue was resolved through second constitutional amendment. And if the opposition did not agree and showed no accommodation, the situation would surely become worse. But the

Bhutto‘s ego and vindictiveness could not allow it to happen. In fact, he had trust only on himself and ever tried to belittle opposition. So any hope for both the sides to work in a cooperative environment and promote democratic culture in the country proved an illusion.764

Bhutto is still alive for his two great achievements i.e. 1973 Constitution, and nuclear program. He formed the 1973 Constitution with the consensus of all political parties but after that his rule did not give the required space to the opposition to play their role. The gap between Bhutto and opposition was so wide that no opposition leader issued a condolence message except Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan and Sardar Qayyum. When

Martial Law was imposed Hyderabad tribunal was established Abdul Wali Khan and

Baluch leaders were arrested. Abdul Wali Khan was admitted in Combined Military

Hospital (CMH) for treatment. Zia-ul Haq visited him in CMH where Wali Khan told

Zia.‖ admi do hen aor kabar ek, agar ye kabar ma nahi jaega to tum jaoge.‖ (there are two men and one grave, if he does not go then you will).765 And it was this huge gap that led to Martial Law for long time. The basic thing is political forces should provide space to

764. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chairman and Senior Member of JI) on 29-07-2015. 765. Mujib ur Rehman Shami. Interview in Tv Talk Show, ―Great Debate on Bhutto‖

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each other. Bhutto left no stone unturned to suppress and intimidate opposition. It was perhaps of this that Abdul Wali Khan did not protest when Bhutto was hanged. Once he said, ―ye saala es ka kabil hy‖, (he deserved this). Begum Wali Khan has once stated in a news paper, that Abdul Wali Kahn said, ―esko phansi charna chaheye, Bhutto Phansi se kam nahi manega‖ (Bhutto should be hanged).766 According to Munnawar Hasan this was

NAP leader‘s reaction to what they had suffered at Hyderabad prison.767

Bhutto was an opportunist politician. Whenever he felt the need of opposition or to protect his slogan i.e. democracy is our polity then he took the path of dialogue and preferred consensus which is the part of democracy. So if his personal interests or PPP‘s interests demanded he was a democrat. And once his interests were served, then he cared but little for the rules of the democracy.768 In this undemocratic relationship between PPP and opposition political parties particularly NAP leaders too were responsible. On the one hand, if Abdul Wali Khan, Khair Bkhsa Marri and Communist party led by Jamal Naqvi at that time adopted extreme approach769 Bhutto on the other was not ready to retreat. All of them could not understand the fledgling democracy and result was the loss for each.

And once again the rightists got entry into power. If they had worked in cooperation and had created a spirit of accommodating each other and let the PPP government to work, the result would be different and far better than what happened thereafter.

7.4. PPP and the Local Government

During the first period of PPP in power, there were no elections within the party. All office bearers were either appointed or approved by Bhutto himself. This was totally against the norms of democracy. The problem was further compounded by the fact that

766. Interview with Sayed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 767. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chairman and Senior Member of JI) on 29-07-2015. 768. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chairman and Senior Member of JI) on 29-07-2015. 769. Interview with Professor Tauseef Ahmad (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Ex. Chairman of Mass Communication Department Federal Urdu University of Arts, Science and Technology (FUUAST) Karachi, on 16-07-2015.

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even though under the 6th March accord of 1972, local body‘s elections were envisaged on a date to be fixed as early as possible after the provincial assemblies were convened but no such elections were held in the provinces.770 Rafi Raza admitted this in a note to Bhutto on 21 December 1976, where he stated that looking back over past five years, one of the greatest errors was not having local democracy at the grass root level; control continued to be from the top.771 Looking to the politics of PPP at federal level, it was not ironic that despite the fact that PPP manifesto provided for local government but in reality the party leadership was not prepared to devolve power to the local governments. Local governments are the important components of democratic process. It is only through the devolution of power to the gross root level that strengthens democracy but Bhutto did not show any interest, and thus the expectations of the masses were dashed to the ground.772

7.5. Freedom of Expression under Bhutto

Freedom of press, freedom of expression and freedom of association are the pillars of an open and democratic society. Unfortunately during PPP‘s rule under Bhutto leadership different newspapers which dared to criticize Bhutto‘s government, were either banned or silenced by using Federal Security Force (FSF). Even a friendly U.S diplomat admitted that "for all his suave wordiness, Bhutto craves power, total power, and he is incapable of tolerating opposition or criticism of any sort." The Pakistani press had been frightened by arrests and fabricated cases against editors of critical publications.773 The dissenting press was not allowed and was rigorously suppressed. The editors of the dissenting press were detained and imprisoned under preventive laws. The prominent among those were Altaf

Gauhar editor Dawn, Muzaffar Qadir editor Weekly Punjab Punch, Altaf Hasan Qureshi editor Urdu Digest, Mujibur Rehman Shami editor Weekly Zindagi, Muhammad

770. Mubashir Hasan, (2000). The Mirage of Power-An Inquiry into the Bhutto Years (1971-1977). Karachi: Oxford University Press, p.146. 771. Rafi Raza, (1997). Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and Pakistan 1967-1977. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p.304. 772. Dawn Newspaper, November 4, 2015. Local Government Polls: Back to the Gross Root Level. 773. Newsweek, July 16, 1973. Pakistan: Life with Bhutto, p.13.

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Salahuddin editor Jasarat.774 Under Defence of Pakistan Rules (DPR) not only opposition leaders were arrested but also most of the critical newspapers and journals were censored.

He used to use force and suppress all who opposed him in any way. He terrorized some, and caused fear to others. Through his autocratic attitude he wanted to keep everything in his control. This situation continued till the end of his rule.775

7.6. Bhutto’s Attitude towards Members of his Party

Bhutto treated very badly even his own party stalwarts like J. A. Rahim, Miraj

Muhammad Khan, Rasul Bakhsh Talpur, Mir Ali Ahmad Talpur, Mubashar Hasan, Tariq,

Abdul Haliq Mardan. When Mahmud Ali Kasuri, vice chairman of PPP quit government as minister of law in protest against its disregard for civil liberties, he promptly found himself and his two sons caught up in murder blame. When the charge failed to stick, the government launched a tax audit against all members of the Kasuri family.776 The ministers, MNA‘s and MPA‘s of his own party could not get their due rights. Some were ousted forcefully without any explanation, charge sheet and any respect for party constitution and some left the party one by one due to the harsh attitude of the their party leader.777 So if a leader is not ready to democratize his party then how he could be believed to give democracy to the country. Resultantly, this was the proof that if he was not ready to work in cooperation with his own party members how he could be expected to cooperate with opposition.

7.7. Formation and Use of Federal Security Force

The military surrender and the disintegration of the country in 1971 had its basis in

Bhutto‘s role due to which Tri-Partite (Muji-ur-Rehman, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and Yahya

774. Tanvir Ahmad Tahir, (2010). Political Dynamics of Sindh 1947-1977. Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi, p.636. For details see, Government of Pakistan, White Paper on Misuse of Media Islamabad ,1978. 775. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex Charirman and Senior Member of JI), on 29-07-2015 776. Newsweek, July 16, 1973,Pakistan: Life with Bhutto, p.13. 777. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex Chairman and Menior Member of JI on 29-07-2015.

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Khan) Dialogue failed. Bhutto had the fear of military revenge and also wanted to disengage the military from politics thus, FSF was created for limiting his reliance on military.778 And after coming into power Bhutto sent the army into background. Although

Bhutto successfully negotiated Shimla Agreement with India in 1972 and was able to bring back about 93000 prisoners of war but yet internally had a fear of army, so he established FSF.779 He attempted to get two pronged objectives by the said force, first, it was, a search for administrative reforms, which was no doubt an admirable move, second, the FSF was used against his opponents to coerce them and ensure Bhutto‘s paramountacy in the politics of the country.780 According to Ziring, Abdul Wali Khan‘s allegations that Bhutto had plotted to have him murdered added fuel to the fire. Bhutto was warned and threatened not to venture into the border provinces, forced Bhutto into forming the federal security force (FSF) to guard him from dangers to his life.781 FSF did increase the mistrust of opposition towards PPP. Unfortunately, it could not deliver its objectives which PPP claimed. It interfered in the political affairs which led to the opposition mistrust.

The said paramilitary force was formed of the retired army personnel and some of the most notorious criminals. Akbar khan, the alleged accomplice in the Rawalpindi conspiracy case , was handed the charge of its leadership. The FSF was, by extension, empowered with intimidating, isolating, and attacking anyone suspected of designing plots against PPP leadership. The FSF used indiscriminate force against the innocent citizens which terrorized the already suspicious public. The Pakistan army was also alarmed by the activities of this parallel force. The FSF was used as an instrument of power. Briefly put, both the creator and his creation were widely mistrusted and resented

778. Veena Kukreja, (2003). Contemporary Pakistan: Political Processes, Conflicts and Crises. New Dehli: Sage Publications, p. 37 779. Interview with Sayed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI) on 16-07-2015. 780. Ashok Kapur, (2006). Pakistan in Crisis. London: Routledge, pp.114-115. 781. Lawrence Ziring. (2005), Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History. Manas Publications, p. 141.

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by the public in general and PPP political opposition in particular.782 According to Hafiz

Naeem ur Rehman FSF was Bhutto‘s goondaism. It was a part of Bhutto cruelty.783 It seemed that Federal Security Force (FSF) was meant for crushing the opposition. The said force gave a tough time to PPP‘s opposition in general and NAP and Tehrik-i-

Isteklal of Retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan in particular.784 FSF was established to protect his personal power and position. FSF did play a role in damaging democracy.

PPP‘s leadership applied FSF and other illegal and unconstitutional means to suppress opposition. It would be better if FSF would not have been created.

7.8. Constitutional Amendments

First Bhutto used to solve many issues through ordinances. Although there was not a strong opposition, but he was not ready to tolerate it and often tried to bypass National

Assembly through ordinances. This was something undemocratic on the part of PPP leadership. Then the way the Constitution was amended during Bhutto rule was not a right one. If opposition was involved and consensus was reached upon it would be better.

Some of the amendments if not made would be better. During the amendments made under Bhutto leadership the spirit with which the 1973 Constitution was formed was totally lost.785 Most of the amendments were unilateral. Opposition had no role in these amendments but to oppose. There was no participation and no initiative on the part of opposition. Although the amendments were passed from the National Assembly but unilaterally and opposition was not taken into confidence.786 Even some of the amendments were approved when the opposition was on protest staying away from the parliament. This act disappointed not only opposition but also the common man.

782. Ibid. 783. Interview with Hafiz Naeem ur Rehman (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and President JI Karachi) on 14-07-2015. 784. Interview with Syed Jafar Ahmad (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Director Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi) on 31-07-2015. 785. Interview with Muhammad Hussain Mehinti (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI) on 27-07-2015. 786. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chairman and Senior Member of JI) on 29-07-2015.

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Democracy has its rules of the game. There are rules for elections, agitation, opposition, and respect for traditions and most importantly for legislation and amending constitution but PPP‘s leadership violated these norms and values while amending the Constitution.

Similarly the democratic claims of PPP also proved false in the process of 1977 elections.

7.9. Why the Dialogue in the Aftermath of 1977 Elections Failed

In January 1977, Bhutto announced the dates for general elections i.e. 7 March and 10

March for National and Provincial Assemblies respectively. PPP leadership found it an opportunity for elections. Bhutto thought that if on one hand he was at the peak of his popularity on the other hand opposition parties were in a weak and in scattered position and they would not be able to get united. But surprisingly within hours nine different opposition parties got united and formed PNA. Mufti Mahmood was elected as president and Rafiq Ahmad Bajwa secretary general.787 The formation of PNA was aimed to challenge Bhutto‘s authoritativeness.

Not only Bhutto but all the Chief Ministers and some other were elected unopposed. It means that though election was announced but selection was preferred. According to

Munnawar Hasan Bhutto rigged the election for securing two third majority and for weakening the opposition. But till midnight on 7 March opposition had planned what to do next. The campaign for the election from January 7, to March 7, had made the masses to take interest in politics. And there were chances of an organized movement on the part of opposition against the rigging. They also boycotted the provincial elections. According to Munnawar Hasan on 10 March Pakistan Television (PTV) showed the huge crowed of masses that had come out to vote on 7 March. This was to negate the boycott of the opposition and give the impression that the absence of opposition did not make any difference and it was useless to boycott.788

787. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chairman and Senior Member of JI) on 29-07-2015. 788. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chairman and Senior Member of JI) on 29-07-2015.

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On 23rd March 1977 National Assembly session was called on but as opposition was on boycott so they did not participate in the session. They rejected the March 7 election and demanded for fresh polls. They also demanded for the dismissal of the old Election

Commission and a new one to replace it. As most of the opposition leaders were arrested and sent behind bars, so the National Assembly session was considered as unilateral.789

If Bhutto‘s government machinery had not committed rigging and other malpractices in the elections, PPP would yet win the election but with a little margin, but it would meant respect for votes, respect for popular choice and respect for democracy but sorry to say

PPP autocratic leadership wasted the chance. Due to the opposition boycott the elections lost its credentials. It became very difficult for Bhutto to keep his standing either in media, courts or in other democratic institutions.

At last after 1977 elections, on the call of opposition, almost across the country the protesters took to the streets for seeking their fundamental right that government is accountable to them and responsive to their aspirations. It was a wan organized movement led by PNA leadership that culminated in the military entrance into the corridor of power.

7.10. Military Takeover

Bhutto wanted to establish his dictatorship after the 1977 elections but this time it was difficult. As the situation grew beyond the control of FSF, army was called in, which took it as a chance to get rid of the FSF. Most of the Zia‘s disenchanted colleagues denied to act in support of Bhutto. The latter refused to yield to opposition demands and warned the opposition of disastrous consequences if they continued the rioting and could not rein in their supporters.790

After the March 1977 elections, during the negotiations between ruling PPP and PNA, the opposition put forward two key demands i.e., withdrawal of cases against Pathan and

789. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chairman and Senior Member of JI) on 29-07-2015. 790. Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan at the Crosscurrent of History, 2005, p.158.

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Baloch leaders and army should be called back into barracks. As by that time Bhutto had made his mind to reach a settlement with the opposition so he agreed to these demands.

Zia and group of his corps commander were not ready to accept such a settlement. During the negotiation and a few days before the military take over Zia attended a meeting of

PPP and PNA leaders with some documents and charts arguing/pleading that it would be difficult to accept the demands and release ‗secessionists‘ and ‗traitors‘.791Abdul Hafeez

Peerzada also expressed similar view, during interview when the researcher asked Abdul

Hafeez Peerzada that when PPP and PNA leaderships were agreed to reach a settlement and both sides had sorted out everything then why the agreement remained unfulfilled, he was of the view that Army showed its resistance over two points i.e., withdrawal of

Hyderabad conspiracy case and secondly army withdrawal from Boluchistan.792The generals insisted that unless an immediate agreement was reached between the government and the opposition parties, they would not be able to control the situation.

Bhutto was effectively trapped by this pincer movement.793 When general Chishti was asked that an agreement was reached on 3rd July between PPP and PNA and on 4th July

Bhutto made a press conference and they were going to sign the agreement on the morning of 5th July, Abdul Hafeez Peerzada from PPP and Professor Ghafoor from PNA who were the members of negotiation team, are on the record that things were settled down between them and also Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan is on the record that agreement had reached then what was the need to impose Martial Law?. General Chishti denied and stated that they are wrong, telling lie no such agreement had been reached between the two sides.794 When Chishti was asked that when did operation Fair Play was plan? He replied that Zia called me and General Arif on 3rd July and asked that situation was not

791. Tariq Ali, (1983). Op. cit., p. 134. 792. Interview with Abdul Hafeez Peerzada (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Minister and Senior Member of PPP) on 13-06-2015. 793. Tariq Ali.(1983). Op. cit., p. 134. 794. General Faiz Ali Chishti interview with Farrukh Sohail Goindi in a talk show, Tannazur: Perspective [email protected]

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good so it might happen to impose Martial Law. Zia got a message that everything is right. Then on 4th July when there was cabinet meeting General Arif (military secretary)

General Riaz (Agetent General) and myself (local core commander) were present in

General Zia house. Gen Zia was standby that Bhutto would ask and he would go there.

We were sitting there and Zia got a telephonic message from Bhutto that ―apko ane ki zarorat nahi hey, ye teek raste pe nahi arahe, hum hod sara kuch teek karlenge.‖ (You do not need to come, they are not coming on the track, and I myself will handle them.) Then

Zia decided that no understanding had developed and there is no agreement.795

In fact it was a failure of the political parties who could not sort out a solution of their problems. On one hand, if initially Bhutto did not agreed to the key demands of the opposition then some forces among the opposition did not want a peaceful settlement and even invited military intervention. In a nutshell, both PPP as a ruling party and opposition parties (PNA) a coalition of nine different opposition political parties too played their part in weakening democracy to the extent of allowing inviting military to take over.

Extremist elements on both sides did not allow the democratic process to be continued smoothly. In PNA there were of course some, who wanted an understanding with PPP leadership and did not want to derail democratic process but some of its extremist elements, wanted military takeover like Asghar Khan and Begum Nasim Wali Khan thought that military would come for 3 to 4 months and would conduct elections and they would get power.796

Also the adoption of the tradition of a dictator affected Bhutto politics negatively and his mass support which had brought him to power was decreasing day by day. The military took advantage of that. Think tanks of military feared that Bhutto rule was not suitable

795. General Faiz Ali Chishti interview with Farrukh Sohail Goindi in a talk show, Tannazur: Perspective [email protected] 796. Interview with Syed Jafar Ahmad (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Director Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi) on 31-07-2015.

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for its own maneuvering.797 Time and again Bhutto used repressive measures and military might to silence and punish those who opposed him. His more and more reliance on military afforded military an opportunity to intervene in the domestic situations and thus it slowly and gradually entered into the corridor of power and ultimately it removed

PPP‘s leadership from power in 1977.798

When ruling party is suppressing and intimidating the opposition, no doubt they had to react. So all who suffered at Bhutto‘s hands got united and linked with military and ISI.

Wali Khan, JI, Muslim League and Asghar all sought ISI support against Bhutto Fascist tendencies. 799 There seemed undemocratic tendencies in PNA movement and this was negative on the part of opposition. In the end Asghar Khan, Begum Nasim Wali and

Sherbaz Khan Mazari did not let the agreement with Bhutto. All of them could not understand the fledgling democracy and result was the loss for each. And once again the rightists got entry into power. If they had worked in cooperation and had created a spirit of accommodating each other and let the PPP government to work, the result would be different.

7.11. PPP’s Slogan: ‘Democracy is our Polity’

As a civilian leader Bhutto took the control of the country as Civil Martial Law

Administrator which itself was the negation of democratic norms. Either it was the need of the time or he had no other option, but as a democrat he got the stain that he had come through Martial Law. Once came to power, PPP‘s leadership used to take unilateral actions. When the constitution was approved on the very next day emergency was imposed and he took all the authority in his own hands. Also, if constitution was implemented, then what was the need for emergency through which he practically ruled

797. Interview with Professor Tauseef Ahmad (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex Chairman of Mass Communication Department Federal Urdu University of Arts, Science and Technology (FUUAST) Karachi, on 16-07-2015..) 798. Monshipouri, Mahmood, and Amjad Samuel. "Development and Democracy in Pakistan: Tenuous or Plausible Nexus?" Asian Survey (1995): 973-989. 799 . Professor Tauseef Ahmad (Ex Chairman of Mass Communication Department Federal Urdu University of Arts, Science and Technology (FUUAST) Karachi, on 16-07-2015.

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the country? Most of the time he used undemocratic means to treat the opposition i.e. undue interference in the NAP-JUI coalitions provincial governments of NWFP (KP) and

Baluchistan, keeping the opposition out while amending the constitution, restricting the freedom of press, suppression and intimidation of all those who opposed him, curtailing the freedom of judiciary etc. When the opposition sought the support of courts which seemed only hope for them but unfortunately the courts could not help the opposition.800

All this proves that Bhutto had no respect for any law or constitution and the slogan,

―Democracy is our Polity‖ was meant to catch public imaginations and support and not a real commitment for democracy.

Bhutto was a great leader and will be remembered as such in the history of Pakistan. He was well educated, well learned, conscious and hard worker. He used to meet common people every time. He was a popular leader. J. A. Rahim, Miraj Muhammad Khan,

Khurshid Hasan Mir, Hayat Muhammad Khan, Rasul Bakhsh Talpur, Mukhtar Rana were men of respect. Asghar Khan, Wali Khan, Sherbaz Khan Mazari, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo,

Khair Bakhsh Mari all were renowned political figures. Mufti Mahmood was great political figure. Some of the Baluch leaders when asked by Zia for support against

Bhutto, they did not agree and responded that they would fight Bhutto without seeking support from military. Attaullah Mengal was very much clear. He was against opposition support for Zia against Bhutto. Some of the opposition leaders did not support Martial

Law. This was their greatness. But sorry to say neither PPP nor its opponents could sustain democracy and miserably failed to curtail autocratic tendencies in the politics of the country. But being the ruling party PPP leadership was more responsible. There was extreme political enmity between Abdul Wali Khan and Bhutto, 801 which was unnecessary. Bhutto wanted to suppress and sideline the opposition leaders that were not

800. Interview with Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chairman and Senior Member of JI), on 29-07-2015. 801. Interview with Miraj Muhammad Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of PPP) on 30-07-2015.

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a good strategy because in the end he was alone to face military. If he had established close ties with the opposition and had accommodated all the political leadership particularly those who had secured majorities in the 1970 elections the result would have been different. If Abdul Wali Khan remained close to Bhutto, if Attaullah Mengal, Ghaus

Bakhsh Bizenjo, Khair Bakhsh Mari, and Mufti Mahmood not to mention all stood by his side there was no chance for military to dethrone civilian leadership and usurp power.

Bhutto attitude was a mixture. If on one hand he started discussion and negotiation with some political leaders, then on the other he started suppression and intimidation of others.

If on one hand he took some brilliant initiative to glorify Pakistan then on the other hand he not only hampered democratic norms but also provide a chance for military to the corridor of power once again. In fact, there was a clash of egos. Bhutto was most popular leader but could not take opposition into confidence. In fact, neither Bhutto did justice to his opponents nor did they do justice with Bhutto. As stated earlier there was a clash of egos. Urge to dominate was the biggest fault on the part of Bhutto.

In a nutshell, Bhutto was a controversial leader and met his fate the lesson for today is…if we want to see democracy flourishing in Pakistan we have to bear and accommodate each other, we have to change our way of politics. Unless political forces and parties do not accommodate each other we cannot run democracy and unless we do not follow democratic norms and values then we have to suffer.

Political leadership during PPP first term in office (1972-1977) had no real commitment to democratization that is why it could not get roots. Before coming to power they have good reason to cry for and advocate democracy. But once came to power most of the time they failed the test of their democratic commitment. In the end military came to power but the politicians themselves were responsible for ending the democratic journey.

Bhutto was an enthusiastic and articulate advocate of democracy, and like Indira Gandhi in India, had won power through the electoral system but after consolidating his position

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proceeded to undermine the same system. In fact there was a great difference in his slogan for democracy and his commitment to democratic practices.

It is the irony of the fate of the people of Pakistan that they are led by those who themselves are strangers to democracy and its norms. Their constituencies form their so called ‗bank vote‘ either being feudals, bureaucrats, industrialists, men of clergy or any other elitist elements. They keep harping on the tune of democracy and make the downtrodden masses fool enough to seek their votes. Bhutto belonging himself to feudal elite had been one of such most successful imposter of his age in deceiving public in the name of democracy. No democracy can flourish progressively in a society which is primarily and inherently polarized into different classes and elite power structure.

Pakistan presents the same picture since its very birth

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CHAPTER - 8

CONCLUSION

This chapter draws conclusion based on the analysis of data gathered for this study. It is on the basis of these findings that recommendations have been set in accordance with the prevalent political scenario in

Pakistan.

Democratic system has different manifestations in different countries. Even the despotic governments are forced to incorporate some appearance of democracy in the governing structure. Democracy is viewed as an elastic, egalitarian and people friendly governance system that is appropriate for diversified societies like Pakistan where people are divided on ethnic, cultural and linguistic lines. However, only the use of the word ―democracy‖ does not make a system democratic. Realistic measures are obligatory for the political leaders to engage all the stakeholders in the governance of state affairs.

In democracy, the elections serve as a medium through which the people bestow their confidence in one or another political party authorizing them to govern the state on their behalf. These elected representatives, once voted to power, are expected to serve the electorate and meet public aspirations to the best of their abilities. On the other hand, those defeated in the elections (opposition parties) act as a watchdog and keep a vigilant eye on the working of the ruling party and to hold it accountable for its public policy and actions.

Dissent of opinion which is the universally accepted right of opposition, is an important and unavoidable feature of democracy. Therefore, a real democracy is only possible in the presence of a strong and stable opposition.

The Pakistan Peoples Party led government (1972-1977) under the leadership of Z. A. Bhutto made some great achievements for the establishment of democracy in Pakistan. Bhutto was a popular leader who made experiment of popular politics in Pakistan by inculcating political awareness among the masses. The politics became known in streets, in villages and homes because of Bhutto. A consensus based Constitution of 1973, atomic power capability, Pak-China relations, unity of the Muslim world and increase in aid from the Muslim World vis-à-vis the US were the landmark contributions of Bhutto.

For most of its ruling period, however, the PPP leadership was satisfying itself with these achievements and could not focus on a systematic program of action to actualize the aspirations of the masses for a true democracy on the pattern of developed countries. In other words, the party could not act as a bridge between the government and the public and could not do much for bringing and promoting democratic values and norms in the country.

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After the first general elections held in December 1970, there was a need for consensus between the political parties especially in West Pakistan. This consensus was essential for establishing and promoting a parliamentary system. Almost all the political parties including PPP which contested the 1970 elections, had demanded from Ayub Khan the introduction of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan. Z. A. Bhutto being the head of majority party in the post-disintegration scenario had an opportunity to introduce parliamentary democracy. It was necessary for PPP leadership to set healthy traditions of political behavior.

But due to the unfavorable political conditions, Z. A. Bhutto‘s lust for power, rigid behavior, and confrontational style of politics had led to the perpetuation of martial law for quite some time. Therefore, it sowed the seeds of distrust from the very beginning between the ruling PPP and the opposition parties.

After assuming power, rifts erupted in the ranks of PPP and thus it lost its ideological harmony. The PPP leadership was more concerned with increasing its personal influence than establishing itself as a strong political platform. There was seen disharmony between the party leadership and senior members when the latter showed reluctance in demonstrating unconditional loyalty to the former. Due to the autocratic behavior of the party chief, most of the party ideologues parted their ways. No serious effort was made to persuade and bring these disappointed members back to the party.

There was also a lack of intra-party democracy. Due to the authoritative style and aggressive behavior of

Bhutto, PPP could not emerge as a symbol of true democracy in the sense of willing to accommodate the dissenting opinion of party leaders. The two prominent party members, Mukhtar Rana and Ahmed Raza

Kasuri started criticizing Bhutto‘s attitude. Both the leaders were penalized for their alleged violation of the so-called party discipline. Soon Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri, who was the vice chairman of PPP also parted ways with the PPP on differences over certain provisions of the future constitution of Pakistan. Shaikh

Rashid and Meraj Muhammad Khan also resigned from PPP. The PPP thus suffered from the severe crisis of internal rift. The ideological differences and the failure of PPP leadership to fulfill their election commitments did play a role in creating widespread discontent among PPP members but the main thing was the behavior of Bhutto. The new entrants included mainly the elite and feudal lords who were power hungry and aimed at self aggrandizement. A large number of those who joined PPP were opportunists who wished quick fortune while Bhutto himself ran the party like his estate. Transparency and accountability are the basics of democracy and the leader must be accountable for his actions, however, this feature was partially adhered to by the PPP leadership i.e., Z. A. Bhutto.

PPP had emerged as a dominant platform in the Western wing of Pakistan bagging the second largest number of seats at the centre and the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. The National Awami Party under the leadership of Khan Abdul Wali Khan and Jumaat-e-Islami under the leadership of Maulana Mufti

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Mahmood formed coalition governments in the provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

(NWFP). Unfortunately these provincial governments were not allowed to exercise the power which they deserved under the constitution. In fact, Bhutto was not happy with such an arrangement and soon started a move against the two provincial governments.

Bhutto‘s undemocratic and harsh attitude towards opposition parties and undue interference in the provincial government of Balochistan compelled the latter to form an alliance against PPP. Known as the

United Democratic Front (UDF), the alliance courageously challenged the aggressive and intolerant attitude/behavior of PPP leadership. The leaders of the alliance never hesitated in criticizing the policies of

PPP government and its leader‘s undemocratic behavior. Though on 17 April 1972, Bhutto had appointed a committee of 25 members of the National Assembly, including six from opposition to prepare a draft of constitution802 but the opposition was not involved in the real sense and discussions on the said constitution were conducted in the absence of opposition as a result of their boycotting the session as a protest.

However, the alliance handled the matter in a democratic way in passing the 1973 Constitution with a unanimous vote, which will be remembered forever as a great achievement of the then political leaders, both the opposition and the ruling PPP. The UDF severely criticized Bhutto‘s regime for its military action in Balochistan. The UDF also resisted the PPP government‘s attempts for amending the Constitution. On the other hand the UDF could not maintain internal coherence, differences on petty issues among the alliance partners, attempts on the part of major parties to dominate the alliance led to the failure of UDF to become a stable and effective opposition platform.

Bhutto always remained antagonist towards the opposition with a few exceptions. Bhutto had a suspicious mind and his attitude was inherently undemocratic. He attempted to establish a system where he could be the sole decision maker. Therefore, he accepted no equals, dissent and challenge to his authority. He used coercive measures through (FSF and Police Force) to disrupt the opposition public processions. He never missed an opportunity to embarrass and malign the opposition leaders. He gave tough time to opposition leaders particularly Abdul Wali Khan and Asghar Khan who were very critical utilizing every opportunity to denounce Bhutto‘s policies and his style of politics. The NAP led by Abdul Wali Khan was also banned for charges of anti-state activities which could not be proved. Bhutto did not spare his own party stalwarts

(particularly J. A. Rahim, Ahmed Raza Kasuri, Mian Mahmud Ali Kasuri, Khursheed Hasan Meer and others) whoever dared to oppose him. Some resigned from PPP as a protest against humiliationwhile others were forced to resign.

802. Hamid Khan, (2005). Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan. Karachi: Oxford University Press, p. 269.

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PPP‘s headship took its success in the 1970 elections as a certificate to follow and practice any political program until the next general elections. The PPP regime weakened the newly started democratic system by resorting to what is described as the ―tyranny of the majority‖ which involved the use of voting authority in the legislative body and approved such legislation that negated the ideals and spirit of democracy. Vital legislation was frequently passed and approved by the regime with opposition parties staying away from the assemblies in protest against the arbitrary style of PPP headship. Thus a genuinely mandated government turned into an authoritarian one on account of abusing the state institutions and processes to advance the personal power agenda.

Similarly, judiciary as the protector of fundamental rights and freedom was not spared. Through amendments to the 1973 Constitution, the judiciary was brought under the influence of executive and was thus deprived of its role i.e. to defend the rights of people against the unrestrained behavior of the executive. Thus by clipping the wings of judiciary, this hope of the opposition was also eliminated. The situation compelled the opposition to resort to confrontational and agitational politics. The opposition left no stone unturned in resisting the maneuverings of Bhutto but to no avail. Some of the opposition leaders also took these strategies of Bhutto as an opportunity to worsen the situation for political benefits.

Most of the amendments made during Bhutto era (1972-1977) were unilateral i.e., opposition was either not provided with opportunity to debate and discuss the amendment bill or the views of opposition were not incorporated in the said amendment bills. Any bill passed by the Assembly without debate and discussion and without obtaining consensus is termed as a bad law or even as a black law. Through blindly and blunt imposing of constitutional amendments, PPP manifested despotism.

When the 1977 elections scheduled was announced, the opposition formed Pakistan National Alliance (an alliance of 9 opposition parties). The PNA aimed at ousting Z. A. Bhutto from power and introducing

Nizam-i-Mustafa (Islamic System) in the country. After the 1977 general elections, the PPP and PNA failed in settling the allegations of rigging and the military under Ziaul Haq took over. But with the end of PPP rule, the PNA also disintegrated and thus lost the chance of becoming a viable alternative government. Its first aim (ousting of Bhutto) got fulfilled and their vested interests persuaded them to withdraw from the second one i.e., establishing Nizam-i-Mustafa. Actually the opposition political parties regarded opposition as a stepping stone to achieve greater influence in the politics of the country rather than acting as a torch bearer.

The development of democracy is possible when all political parties irrespective of their differences sit together to debate and discuss the national issues, build consensus and find solution of the common problems. It was the lack of this consensus developing mindset of the politicians that allowed military to

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takeover the government. All politicians both ruling and opposition, were supposed to realize the seriousness of the post-1977 elections situation. They should have found solution to their differences within the democratic framework. But unfortunately some of the extremist elements did not want to seek peaceful solution of the problems with the ruling PPP. There was a division among the opposition members as some wanted to reach a peaceful solution of the issues while others thought of resorting to agitational means.

Care should have been demonstrated for the sake of continuity of the political process that had restored after thirteen years of military rule (1958-1971).

The opposition got the opportunity to boost its prestige but it could not muster enough support to take a formidable stand with regard to different controversial issues. Some of the opposition leaders like Mufti

Mahmood, Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Abdul Wali Khan and Attullah Mengal were career politicians. They fulfilled the requirements for becoming an effective opposition but failed in the process to be so. Thus the opposition could not present itself as a viable option of an alternative government. Due to the internal differences and the rigid attitude adopted by some hardliners, the opposition during Bhutto rule could not contribute much to the healthy growth of democracy.

Though Bhutto started a democratic process, it was not only Bhutto and his PPP but also the opposition parties that hampered the political process. During PPP rule under Bhutto, opposition parties got the opportunity to emerge and grow but it failed to do so. As demanded by democracy, the opposition could not offer a viable alternative to the ruling government. If, on the one hand, Bhutto was suffering from personality cult and wanted to establish a one party (PPP) rule, on the other hand, opposition too appeared to be least interested in establishing a truly democratic system. In a nutshell, neither Bhutto nor the opposition particularly from NWFP (now KPK) and Balochistan showed respect for the rules of the game which resulted in the derailing of democratic process from the very initial stage. No doubt, there was a parliamentary system during Bhutto‘s premiership but it was not worked out successfully. The reason was the failure of both the ruling and opposition parties to realize their responsibility towards democracy.

The 1970 elections were the firstever general elections in Pakistan and PPP government under Bhutto leadership was the first popularly elected government. Democracy got a chance for the first time in the real sense. It was an opportunity after the death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan that raised hopes from all circles that onward Pakistan would be a democratic state. But democracy is not a wild rose that grows and flourishes of its own. Despite the failure of our political leadership to maintain a democratic set- up, the period was good for democracy. There were democratic figures on both sides i.e. ruling and the opposition like Bhutto, Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, Abdul Wali Khan and Mufti Mahmood not to mention all but certain faults on both sides, provided an opportunity to the military to exploit the situation and

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snatch the rein of power from the civilians. Though, there were faults on both sides, it was the beginning of the democracy and the faults had to be sorted out and improvement could be brought through reforms. The political leadership, whether in government or opposition should have understood their responsibilities with commitment to put the country on the path to democracy.

8.1. Findings of the Study

Following are the findings of this study:

During PPP‘s first term of office (1972-1977), politics in Pakistan had turned into the domain of the ruling party. Intolerance to opposition and criticism was a common feature of governance during this period. The party in power did not treat the opposition (who were also the elected members of the people) in a democratic way and they were not provided the space to fulfill their obligations. The way the game of politics was played by these politicians weakened rather than strengthened democratic norms in the country.

Weak structure of political parties was another aspect of fledgling democracy in Pakistan. Most of the political parties during PPP‘s first term were not well organized in their internal structure. Lack of intra party elections and dominance of personalities led to the loss of national character of the political parties.

Most of the parties were personality driven. Pakistan Peoples Party was an instrument of Bhutto as today‘s

Muslim League is that of Nawaz Sharif. This mindset weakened the image of the politicians within their parties. The parties were used as tools by the powerful personalities. Most of the political parties, whether in power or opposition, had a dismal record as far as self-democratization and the observance of the rules of the game is concerned. The parties were weak and vulnerable because of lacking internal democracy.

Unfortunately, the Centre-province relationship during PPP‘ first government was most of the time complex and lacked the spirit of cooperation. Not only that PPP government under Bhutto leadership did not provide the required space to the opposition controlled provincial governments of Balochistan and

NWFP (KP) but the leadership of respective provincial governments also availed every opportunity in furthering the gap in centre–province relationship.

Instead of institution building and seeking institutionalized political support, the PPP leadership preferred extra-state apparatuses aimed to coerce opponents while personally loyal people were given headships of different state institutions. The persistently weak political institutions in Pakistan could not let democracy to gain grounds. The PPP government was unable to create a balance between state institutions and this situation too negated democratic traditions to strengthen.

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In Pakistan, the politicians in power for most of the time have supported a centralized administration with the purpose to serve their vested interests. Initially only East Pakistan but later on the other smaller provinces of Western Pakistan also felt neglected and exploited by the centre. Decentralization (devolution of power to provincial/local level) is very much essential for a democratic system. PPP‘s leadership, before coming into power, strongly advocated decentralization of power but once they got into power, they preferred centralization of authority as much as possible. This over centralization of state authority and failure to work the federal principle, appeared to be a cardinal feature of the parliamentary system in

Pakistan under the 1973 Constitution which strengthened the centrifugal elements rather than the democratic forces.

Time is a crucial factor in dealing with important matters of a political set-up. That may be elections, debate and discussion for reaching a consensus based decision or an agreement etc. Lack of timely agreement/settlement between PPP‘s leadership and NAP- JUI coalition led to the dismissal of an elected government in Balochistan. Similarly in the end, after the elections of 1977 when allegations of rigging were leveled against Pakistan Peoples Party, the lack of interest on the part of Z. A. Bhutto in reaching a timely agreement with PNA leadership made matters worse. Bhutto did offer concessions but the concessions were of no use on account of their being not only too little but also too late.

There was a gap between the perception and practice of democratic norms on the part of PPP‘s leadership.

They expressed love for and faith in these norms in public before their coming into power but once voted to power, they barely practiced them in their true spirit. Consensus is a pre requisite for any successful democracy but it was the non accommodative and intolerant manner of the politicians in power towards dissent that always rendered all efforts made for reaching a consensus ineffective. There was a dire need for the spirit of goodwill, harmony and understanding between the ruling PPP and opposition political parties for that could have avoided the derailing of democratic process and military‘s coming into power.

The absence of a strong organization and lack of accountability during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto‘s era not only weakened democracy but also made PPP mere a tool in the hands of powerful personalities. Bhutto enjoyed a lot of popular support from the very beginning of his rule. This was a valuable asset for PPP‘s leadership.

Unfortunately, as noted by Hasan Askari Rizvi, he could not sustain this support because he preferred to concentrate power in his own hands as an alternative to using his mass appeal to institutionalize participatory framework, promote democratic norms and practices and establish self sustaining political

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institutions. He established a patrimonial system which gave more importance to the leader than to the system. Thus the whole edifice of the political system was built around Bhutto‘s personality.803

Unopposed election is not only undesirable but also dangerous for a democratic system. Actually PPP leaders had lost their nerve and wished to return to assemblies without facing a contest. The unopposed election of Z. A. Bhutto, chief ministers and others in the General Elections of 1977 further deepened the doubts of opposition (PNA) and also of the observers about the fairness/credibility of the 1977 general elections.

The spirit of cooperation and accommodation strengthens democracy. Confrontational and offensive politics between the ruling and opposition parties is at all times harmful to the state interests. Sadly, the politics of confrontation was a common phenomenon during Bhutto‘s rule. Lack of the spirit of give and take, consultation and compromise on the part of Pakistani political leadership (both ruling and opposition) during 1972-1977 period and considering each other as rivals played its part in hampering democracy in

Pakistan.

Bhutto came to power on the basis of his popular support and he lost office once he lost that support.

Actually after the 1977 elections, fingers were raised at election results. It was the weakening of the populist support that Bhutto was unable to do something. PPP under Bhutto leadership was unable to stop agitation against itself after the 1977 elections which ultimately led to the downfall of PPP government and military intervention.

During Z. A. Bhutto rule (1972-1977) democracy has persistently remained in a state of uncertainty because of the lust for power, clash of egos and most importantly, the extra-democratic behavior on the part of politicians. A clash of egos was going on from both sides. Their personal rivalries and ambitions retarded the political process. It flared more and more violence with each passing day and it was that clash that led some politicians to facilitate/support military entrance into power. This shows the lack of political foresight on the part of politicians not only from the PPP but also from opposition. In fact, the political leaders had to make serious efforts and kept on the process of reconciliation.

8.2. Recommendations

Following are the recommendations of the study:

It is absolutism that does not accept and tolerate differences of opinions. If we want to nurture and promote a true spirit of democracy, we must be tolerant towards others. Intolerant is something that betrays want of faith in one‘s cause. The evolution and fruition of democracy is unattainable if we are not ready to hear our opponents. Debates and discussion are the unavoidable parts of democracy and certainly during these

803. Hasan Askari Rizvi (1986), The Military and Politics in Pakistan 1947-86, p. 216.

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debates there would arise dissent of opinions. The holders of governmental authority should recognize that the competitors have a convincing right and a genuine opinion. If there arises any deadlock between the ruling and opposition political parties, they should immediately seek a mutually accepted settlement through discussions, debates and accommodating each other and should leave no room for intolerance. The peaceful ruling and opposition relationship is extremely essential for the success of democracy. If they adopt flexibility giving space to each other, accommodate each other viewpoints, and struggle for broad based consensus despite their differences and stay united, none would dare to derail the democratic process.

It was extremely important for the PPP and opposition parties to get their differences settled and not indulged the military in the political business. With sincerity of purpose, goodwill and spirit of accommodation not only from ruling but also from the opposition side, they should have sorted out most of the issues.

Some drastic and severe changes are required in the functioning of political parties for ensuring an accountable and true democracy in Pakistan, some drastic The parties should adopt transparent political process. They should faithfully represent the people and serve their interests and aspirations. To achieve this, the democratization of the political system is must and that can happen only when, as a forerunner, political parties democratize themselves from within. In short, only well organized political parties possessing intra-party democracy can promote democracy in Pakistan.

Without having the spirit of cooperation, partnership and collaboration between the federal and provincial governments a federation cannot stay alive or endure. A federation to remain intact, fair and equitable treatment added with mutual respect is the vital requirements. Looking to the geo-political and socio- economic structure of Pakistan, the diverse culture and tradition, Pakistan can only survive through democratic spirit of co-operation and partnership between the centre and provinces. Biased attitude towards any province should be stopped and all the four provinces should be treated on an equitable basis. Peaceful

Centre-province relations are very important for a successful democracy as these lead towards cooperation, accommodation and create the spirit of partnership. Mutual respect and just treatment of the provinces is inevitable for a successful federation.

Both visible and hidden centralizing tendencies should be stopped. A steady and significant process of decentralization of political power should take place and all the stakeholders should make efforts towards this process of decentralization. Institutionalization of decentralization through an effective mechanism for power sharing is more important. Any move to counter this effort must be nipped in bud. Only then can democracy take roots in Pakistan.

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If there arises any deadlock between the ruling and opposition political parties, they should immediately seek a mutually accepted settlement through discussions, debates with the spirit of accommodating each other. The only way out is political process and the search for any other means will lead to instability and disaster. Debates and discussion should be set and ideas should be shared as they lead to good decisions.

More people should be involved in decisions and their suggestions should not be ignored. In any democratic setup, it is inescapable for the ruling and opposition parties to disagree over issues that are uncompromisable from their respective viewpoints, but where compromise is possible; it should be achieved without the slightest delay. History tells us that too rigid an attitude in politics has not yielded in the long run. On a very few occasions, the PPP government under Bhutto leadership demonstrated the spirit of compromise i.e. PPP‘s leadership allowed NAP-JUI coalition to form government in the two provinces of NWFP (KP) and Balochistan, accommodated some of the important demands of opposition at the time of framing the 1973 Constitution and also included opposition members in Shimla delegation. Similarly, the opposition also showed a spirit of accommodation but on rare occasions e.g. they withdrew some of their demands during constitution framing process etc. Both should have adopted similar positive attitude for the sake of continuity in the democratic process in the post 1977 general elections that would have prevented the military from takeover.

Unopposed election should be avoided as much as possible. All those who want to be elected should contest public will. PPP leadership should have avoided unopposed election and particularly in some prestigious cases, they had to have faced a contest to prove their credibility. Muhammad Ali Jinnah enjoyed a lot of respect from his supporters but he all the time encouraged democratic trends and carefully avoid leaving any authoritarian instance. When the Muslim Leagures, out of their deep love for Jinnah, sought to assign him the responsibility of president ship of Muslim League for life, he at once stopped them from doing so.804

No politician in the world is perfect. Everyone has weaknesses. But if one has more strength than weaknesses and if he has rendered great services for the country and its people and has protected and promoted country‘s sovereignty, he should be given chance.

Continuity is must for democratic growth. Faults associated with the system should be removed through reforms. Z. A. Bhutto came to power because of his power, intelligence and motivating tactics and the end met with his destiny. He should have been given chance as he had won 1977 elections. He should have

804. ―Let me come to you at the end of every year and seek your vote and your confidence. Let your president be on good behavior. I am definitely opposed to your electing life president‖. Mumtaz Husain. Jinnah and Gandhi: A Comparison.The Pakistan Times, 22 December 1974.

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been allowed to rule and there should have been another election. Democratic maturity is something that takes decades so they were to bring an improvement slowly and gradually through reforms.

The success of democracy depends on the sanctity of elections. Free, fair and timely elections are a guarantee for the growth of democracy. Once elections are protected from rigging and other malpractices then those who enjoy public support can hope to complete their mandated period.

Law should be passed and constitution amended after necessary debates and discussion. Whether the incumbent government agrees or not with the proposal of opposition members, chance must be given to the latter to express their views on the draft bill and consensus must be preferred. In this connection, promulgation of ordinances must be avoided as much as possible.

Violence is always dangerous for the growth of democracy. It should be the joint responsibility of all the political stakeholders to avoid violence and adopt negotiated settlement of disputes. To achieve this end, the parties in power should hold regular dialogue and interaction with the opposition.

Democracy would not gain grounds in Pakistan and efforts in this direction would fail unless our leadership makes a shift from personality to a system based politics.

Undoubtedly, one indicator of political development is the manner in which transfer of power from one party to another takes place smoothly. The political rivals may not essentially like each other but they should, at least, tolerate one another. They should consider one another important and admit that all have a lawful and significant function to play. Therefore, regardless of the fact which party wins elections; both winner and the loser must be of the same mind to persuade patience and ensure a peaceful transition. It should be an obligation on the part of both the incumbent and opposition parties. Also, there should be a powerful and independent Election Commission with members appointed jointly by the ruling and opposition political parties to help ensure a peaceful democratic transition.

Every agitation, movement, protests must be aimed at some essential legislation. Whenever the opposition is disappointed of the performance of the incumbent government or it has some reservations against the government, the opposition should not deviate from the democratic path and should get the issue sorted out in the parliament.

Last but not the least, there is need for democratic behavior on the part of politicians. One cannot hope to see democracy flourishing in Pakistan and all such efforts on the part of democratic forces to review democracy in its true spirit continue to be disturbed unless and until the mindset of our politicians become democratic and start behaving in accordance with the democratic principles.

Politics is a chaotic affair. It is sluggish, evolutionary, complex, unexpected, changeable, inter-subjective and tedious. It is constructed around human desires, emotions, reservations and hopes rather than wisdom

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and objectivity. A durable way out of political dilemma can only be found in the political space through evolution, give and take, concession and compromises among country‘s legitimate political stakeholders.

This is why continuation and amplification of the democratic process notwithstanding its failing, gaps and incompetencies is imperative. Also, the Pakistani military establishment should comprehend this and provide more space to political stakeholders instead of further squeezing the already shrunk political space or attempt short-range changes through handpicked politicians.

As in Pakistan, there is a vacuum for genuinely democratic politics, there is need for hard work on the part of those active in the game of politics. And this is not an easy task that can be achieved with pressing a button. It requires struggle for decades and counseling with intellectuals and experts. They should also learn lessons from the experiences of the democratically advanced countries of the world like US, UK,

Switzerland and Germany. A grand strategy is the need of the time. This is all inevitable for democracy, progress and prosperity of Pakistan.

The political leadership must remain steadfast in their commitment to cooperation, connectivity, contact and they should have firm belief to create a peaceful atmosphere. They need to work to that end in the larger interest of the people of Pakistan.

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M.Phil/PhD Thesis

Akhtar, Nadeem. (2013). Role of Political Parties in the Democratic System of Pakistan (Master Thesis), School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg.

Aslam, Farhat Imrana. (1987). Constitutional Development in Pakistan 1972-1985 (PhD Thesis), University of Punjab (Lahore).

Baloch, Akhtar. (2003). Impact of Political and Constitutional Development on Administrative System: A Case Study of Civil Bureaucracy in Pakistan (PhD Thesis), University of Karachi.

Hussain, Akhtar. (2013). Politics of Alliances in Pakistan 1954-1999 (PhD Thesis), Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad.

Mamon, Aslam Pervez. Wafaq-i-Pakistan aor Qumi Yakjehti 1947-1971 ka Seyasi Jaeza (PhD Thesis), University of Sindh (Jamshoro).

Rizvi, Arshad. (2003). The Political System of Pakistan, (PhD Thesis), Karachi: Harndard Institute of Education and Social Sciences, Hamdard University.

Shaikh, Muhammad Hassan. (1987). Role of Political Parties in Pakistan 1969-1977 (PhD Thesis), University of Sindh, Jamshoro.

Suhail, Adeem. (2010). The Pakistan National Alliance of 1977 (Master Thesis), University of Texas (Austin).

Websites

American Institute of Pakistan Studies http://www.pakistanstudies-aips.org/

The website provides rudimentary information about the country‘s political system and some useful links.

Guide to Law Online: Pakistan http://www.lcweb.loc.gov/law/guide/pakistan.html

Prepared by the Law Library of Congress, the Guide to Law Online is an annotated compendium of international sources accessible through the Internet. Links on the Pakistan section provide access to primary documents, legal commentary and information about the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary.

National Assembly of Pakistan

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http://www.na.gov.pk

Even though not as comprehensive as other parliamentary websites, it is a good source to track the performance of the assembly through press releases and the Gazette. The site also contains the lists of government ministries, committees and political parties in the current assembly.

Pakistan’s Legislative History http:www.jinnah.org/pakistan/legislation

The site is a commendable effort to put together Acts, Ordinances and other legal instruments that constitute Pakistan‘s legislative history.

PILDAT http://www.pildat.org/publications/lcp.pdf

Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, a Lahore-based organization, works to strengthen and sustain democracy and democratic institutions in Pakistan. The website contains a directory of MNAs, reference on parliamentary issues and some very useful links.

Senate of Pakistan http://www.senate.gov.pk/Main.asp

Relatively more comprehensive and user-friendly than the National Assembly website, it contains a complete list of senators with email addresses, some useful publications such as Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the Senate, and news about various committees. www.mapsofindia.com. Retrieved on 23.09.2015. http://countrystudies.us/pakistan/18.htm 12-12-2013.

Documents

UNDP, (2002). Human Development Report 2002: Deepening democracy in a fragmented world.

Government of Pakistan, White Paper on the Conduct of the General Elections in March, 1977: Ministry of Information. July 1978.

Government of Pakistan, White Paper on the Misuse of Media, Islamabad, August, 1978, December 20, 1971-July 4, 1977.

Government of Pakistan, White Paper on the Performance of the Bhutto Regime, Vols.1-3, Islamabad: Ministry of Information.1979.

National Assembly of Pakistan (Legislature) Debates. November, 1975, Vol. VII, No. 12.

National Assembly of Pakistan (Legislature) Debates, February 12, 1975, Vol. II, No. 16.

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News Papers

The Aaj (Urdu Peshawar).

The Daily Star.

The Dawn (Karachi).

The Express (Urdu) (Islamabad).

The Herald.

The Jang.

The Mashriq (Peshawar).

The Morning News.

The Nawa-i-Waqt.

The News (Islamabad).

The Newsweek.

The Pakistan Times.

The People's Front.

The Statesman.

Interviews

Prominent among those interviewed, include the following:

Abdul Akbar Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Deputy Speaker and Senior Member of PPP) on 18-11- 2015.

Abdul Hafiz Peerzada (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Minister and Senior Member of PPP) on 13-06- 2015.

Hafiz Naeem ur Rehman (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Leader JI, Karachi) on 14-07-2015.

Miraj Muhammad Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of PPP) on 30-07-2015.

Muhammad Hussain Mehinti (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI) on 27-07-2015.

Munnawar Hasan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto, Ex. Chairman and Senior Member of JI) on 29-07-2015.

Professor N. D. Khan (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of PPP) on 28-07-2015.

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Professor Tauseef Ahmad (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Ex Chairman of Mass Communication Department Federal Urdu University of Arts, Science and Technology (FUUAST) Karachi, on 16-07-2015.

Sayed Usmani (Contemporary of Z. A. Bhutto and Senior Member of JI) on 16-07-2015.

Sayed Jaffar Ahmad (Director Pakistan Study Centre, University of Karachi) on 31-07-2015.

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Annexure - I Interview Schedule 1. Your opinion about Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto as a leader and advocate of democracy? 2. Do you think Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto had been successful in developing a harmonious relationship with the opposition? If not, how far was the opposition responsible for this? 3. It is generally understood that the PPP‘s relations with the opposition was reasonably cordial as long as the constitution of 1973was at its preparatory stage. Do you agree? And how did it change later on? 4. What is your assessment of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto attitude towards national minority in Pakistan (Balochistan and NWEP provincial governments)? 5. Do you think Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto style of politics was a true reflection of the slogan, ―Democracy is our polity‖? 6. Did Bhutto‘s government provide a conducive environment where the opposition could play the game of politics in accordance with the rules? 7. What is your assessment of the opposition‘s response to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto government? 8. What was the central idea behind the formation/establishment of Federal Security Force (FSF) by Bhutto‘s government? 9. To what extent did the creation of Federal Security Force (FSF) contribute to the opposition distrust of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto government? 10. Politicians in Pakistan during 1972-77, both in power and in opposition were experienced and patriotic. Why they could not stop the element of autocracy in national politics? 11. Were the opposition leaders demonstrating a responsible attitude towards the so called ‗autocratic‘ style of PPP politics? 12. The PPP leadership, despite their knowledge of the ―framework of ruling- opposition relationship‖ acted contrary to the said framework. What, in your opinion, motivated them to follow the path? 13. Do you think that the spirit with which the constitution was framed, was also demonstrated in amending it? 14. Did PPP and other opposition parties proved as the agents of democracy during the study period 1972-77?

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Annexure -II Parliamentary Assembly (Council of Europe) Resolution 1601 (2008)805 Procedural Guidelines on the Rights and Responsibilities of the Opposition in a Democratic Parliament 1. ―Democracy is founded on the right of everyone to take part in the management of public affairs; it therefore requires the existence of representative institutions at all levels and, in particular, a parliament in which all components of society are represented and which has the requisite powers and means to express the will of people by legislating and overseeing government action‖ (Universal Declaration on Democracy, Inter- Parliamentary Union, 1997). A politically representative parliament shall embody society in the diversity of its composition and shall work with due respect for the plurality of opinions. 2. The promotion and consolidation of pluralist democracy is one of the main objectives of the Council of Europe and its Parliamentary Assembly. The member states of the Organisation shall endeavour to develop common standards and practices aimed at promoting a free and pluralist parliamentary democracy and the means for their implementation in national parliaments. The democratic quality of a parliament is measured by the means available to the opposition or the parliamentary minority to accomplish its tasks. 3. A political opposition in and outside parliament is an essential component of a well functioning democracy. One of the main functions of the opposition is to offer a reliable political alternative to the majorityin power by providing other policy options for public consideration. By overseeing and criticising the work of the ruling government, continuously evaluating government action and holding the government to account the opposition works to ensure transparency of public decision and efficiency in the management of public affairs, thereby ensuring the defence of the public interest and preventing misuse and dysfunction. 4. The Assembly considers that effective follow-up should be ensured, at the level of national parliaments, to its Resolution 1547 (2007) on the state of human rights and democracy in Europe, in particular when it recalls that the right to form a political opposition shall be considered as a key element of a genuine democracy. It then recalls its Resolution 1154 (1998) on the democratic functioning of national parliaments, in which it calls on national parliaments, inter alia, to ―give the opposition a status enabling it to play a responsible and constructive role …‖. 5. Granting the parliamentary opposition a status according to which it is entitled to rights contributes to the effectiveness of a representative democracy and respect for political pluralism, and thereby to the citizens‘ support for and confidence in the good functioning of institutions. Establishing a fair legal and procedural framework and material conditions enabling the parliamentary minority to fulfil its role is a prerequisite for the good functioning of representative democracy. Opposition members should be able to exercise their mandate in full and under at least the same conditions as those members of parliament who support the government; they shall participate in an active and effective

805. 1. Assembly debate on 23 January 2008 (6th Sitting) (see Doc. 11465, report of the Committee on Rules of Procedure, Immunities and Institutional Affairs, rapporteur: Mr Van Overmeire). Text adopted by the Assembly on 23 January 2008 (6th Sitting).

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manner in the activities of the parliament and shall enjoy the same rights. Equal treatment of members of parliament has to be ensured in all their activities and privileges. 6. The Assembly recalls that in Resolution 1547 (2007) it calls on opposition parties and their members not to ask only for rights and means, but also to show responsibility and willingness to use them and make their best efforts to enhance the efficiency of the parliament as a whole. They should not restrict themselves to merely criticising the powers in place. 7. The Assembly welcomes the fact that procedural rights of the opposition are currently of political relevance in several national parliaments. It recalls in this context the conclusions reached during the last meeting of the Council of Europe Forum for the Future of Democracy held in Stockholm/Sigtuna from 13 to 15 June 2007 regarding the role and responsibilities of the opposition. It considers that appropriate follow-up should be given to them at the level of national parliaments. 8. Differences exist in the degree of institutionalisation of the opposition in the parliaments of Council of Europe member states, ranging from informal recognition in the parliamentary rules of procedure when granting rights to the parliamentary minority to formal recognition of the opposition in the constitution of the state. However, beyond diversity of parliamentary systems in Europe, all parliaments of the member states grant rights to the parliamentary minority, whether organised around political groups or not. The Assembly notes that the notion of parliamentary opposition has undergone changes in conjunction with the modernisation of political debate. Several innovative good practices have been developed in a number of states which merit the attention of a wider audience. Therefore, the Assembly welcomes the current tendency in some parliaments to achieve full parity between the majority and the opposition concerning some rights, irrespective of the strength they have in parliament. 9. Consequently, the Assembly invites the parliaments of the member states to reform or update their rules on the rights of the opposition or parliamentary minority and encourages them to draw up a charter on the rights of the opposition, or to define the status of the opposition in parliament, taking inspiration from the guidelines below. 10. While bearing in mind the variety of parliamentary democratic institutions in Europe, the Assembly encourages the member states of the Council of Europe to start as soon as possible a genuine and thorough reflection on the modernisation of their democratic institutions and the adaptation of their parliamentary institution to the needs of a modern society. To this end, member states should take into account the guidelines set out below, as well as good practices established in the most innovative parliaments. 11. The Assembly also invites the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) to undertake a study on the role of opposition in a modern democratic society. Guidelines on the Rights and Responsibilities of the Opposition in a Democratic Parliament 12. Parliamentarians must exercise their mandate independently. They shall not be bound by any instruction or receive a binding mandate. One cannot blame a member of parliament for defending ideas that go against the government‘s official policy or that are not well received by a majority of the population. 13. National parliaments of the Council of Europe member states shall acknowledge the following rights in relation to the opposition or parliamentary minority:

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13.1. freedom of expression and freedom of opinion; members of the opposition shall enjoy freedom of speech; they must be able to express their ideas freely; 13.2. the opposition shall participate in the supervision, scrutiny and control of the action and policy of the government: 13.2.1. opposition members have the right to information; opposition members and members of the majority are entitled to receive the same information from the government; 13.2.2. opposition members have the right to ask written and oral questions, and to receive replies to these questions; 13.2.3. opposition members shall be privileged during question time with the government (in particular they shall have the right to open question time and to ask more questions to the government than members of the majority); 13.2.4. opposition members have the right to interpellation (oral question with debate) and the right to move a motion of no confidence; 13.2.5. opposition members have the right to request the convening of a plenary sitting of the parliament/chamber,which should be granted if a quorum of one quarter of members is reached; 13.2.6. opposition members have the right, at regular intervals, to set the agenda of plenary sittings, and to choose subjects for debate, including bills tabled by opposition members, control of government actions and evaluation of public policies and spending; matters selected on those days shall have precedence over government business; 13.2.7. opposition members have the right to ask for debates to be held, including urgent or current affairs debates, which should be granted if a quorum of one quarter of members is reached; 13.2.8. opposition members have the right to request the setting-up of a committee of inquiry or a parliamentary mission of information and to become members thereof; this should be obtained if a quorum of one quarter of members is reached; a member of the opposition shall be appointed either chairperson or rapporteur of every committee of inquiry or mission of information successfully requested by opposition members or political groups; 13.3. speaking time in plenary sittings shall be allotted at least according to the respective weight of political groups; allocation of an equal speaking time between majority and opposition, irrespective of their strength, should be privileged under certain circumstances; 13.4. the opposition shall participate in the organisation of legislative work: 13.4.1. opposition members have the right to participate in the management of parliamentary business; they shall have access to posts of vice-president and other positions of responsibility in parliament; the composition of governing bodies of parliament shall respect the principle of proportional representation and reflect the political composition of the parliament or chamber; 13.4.2. opposition members have the right to request the holding of an extraordinary session, which should be granted if a quorum of one quarter of members is reached; 13.5. the opposition shall participate in the legislative procedure: 13.5.1. opposition members have the right to table bills and motions on legislative matters;

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13.5.2. opposition members have the right to speak and to vote in all debates; 13.5.3. opposition members have the right to table amendments; 13.5.4. opposition members have the right to present procedural motions (change in the proposed agenda or the adopted agenda; request to ascertain a quorum; request to refer a report back to a committee, etc.); 13.6. the opposition shall participate in parliamentary committees‘ work: 13.6.1. the presidency of standing/permanent committees shall be allocated among parliamentary groups on the basis of proportional representation; at least one permanent committee shall be chaired by a member of the opposition; the chairmanship of committees responsible for monitoring government action, such as the committee on budget and finance, the committee on audit, or the committee supervising security and intelligence services, should be granted to a member of the opposition; 13.6.2. any committee, permanent or not, shall be composed on the basis of proportional representation; 13.6.3. in committees, opposition members shall enjoy speaking and voting rights, the right to table amendments and to move a procedural motion; they shall have the possibility to append a dissenting opinion to a report adopted in committee or to present a minority report; 13.6.4. opposition members have the right to request the organisation of committee hearings; it should be granted if a quorum of one quarter of members is reached; 13.6.5. opposition members have the right to be appointed committee rapporteurs; in any case, rapporteurships in committees are allocated on the basis of proportional representation; 13.7. the opposition shall participate in political decisions; the opposition or parliamentary minority shall be consulted prior to any decision to dissolve parliament; 13.8. the opposition shall participate in the constitutional review of laws: 13.8.1. opposition members have the right to apply to the Constitutional Court or the appropriate legal body and to request a constitutional review of adopted laws; 13.8.2. opposition members have the right to request examination of constitutionality of draft laws or parliamentary acts by the Constitutional Court or the appropriate legal body prior to their adoption; 13.8.3. opposition members have the right to apply to the Court of Audit and to request its opinion on budgetary and finance matters. 14. National parliaments shall provide political groups or individual members of the opposition with the appropriate financial, material and technical resources and means to enable them to properly perform their functions and duties. Opposition members shall have fair access to state funds and allowances; they shall have free and fair access to media, including public radio and television channels, and sources of information. 15. The provisions of the rules of procedure concerning the rights of members of parliament and particularly of the minority should not be altered after each parliamentary election in order to adapt them to the election results. 16. The political opposition in parliament shall show political maturity and should exercise responsible and constructive opposition, by showing mutual respect, and using its rights with a view to enhance the efficiency of parliament as a whole.

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Annexure -III Legal Framework Order 1970

Yahya Khan after becoming the Chief Martial Law Administrator in 1969 announced that he would make it possible that free and fair elections will be conducted in Pakistan and a new constitution will be made soon. For that reason, he introduced a Legal Framework Order in March 1970 that determined principles for the future constitution of Pakistan. It also dissolved the One-Unit scheme on 1st July 1970.

Features of LFO 1970

Following are the features of the LFO 1970:

1: The National Assembly of Pakistan will consist of 313 seats with 13 seats reserved for women. Out of 313, 169 seats were to be for East Pakistan, 85 for Punjab, 28 for Sindh, 19 for NWFP, 5 for Baluchistan and 7 seats were allotted to the tribal areas.

2: Each province will have a provincial assembly consisting of elected members. East Pakistan provincial assembly will have 400 members, Punjab 186, Sindh 62, Baluchistan 21 and NWFP 42.

3: The elections for National Assembly will be held on 5 October 1970 and for provincial assemblies not later than 22 October.

4: The new constitution of Pakistan will follow these principles: a: Pakistan will be a Federal Republic and will be known as Islamic Republic of Pakistan b: The head of the Pakistan state would be a Muslim and the divinity of Islam will be preserved. c: The principles of democracy will prevail by holding free elections for federal and provincial legislatures on the basis of adult franchise. Independent judiciary will be made possible along with fundamental rights for the citizens. d: All provinces will be given maximum autonomy while the centre will also remain strong. e: The citizens of the country will be able to participate actively in the affairs of the state and the state will try to eliminate economic disparities in the society. f: The constitution of the country will make it possible for the Muslims of Pakistan to live their lives according to the teachings of Islam. The minorities will be free to follow their own faiths and will be able to enjoy the benefits of citizenship along with their fellow Pakistanis.

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g: The LFO clarified the status of national and provincial assemblies. It stated that the National Assembly would either be the only legislature provided that federal legislature consisting of one house or it would be the lower house if federation has two houses. Its tenure would be for the full term in both cases. The same went for provincial assemblies. h: Within 120 days of the first meeting of the National Assembly, it would form a constitution bill and if it fails to do so, it will dissolve.

5: After the elections of the National Assembly, provisions will be made to arrange its meetings.

6: The LFO set broad outlines, structures, conditions and qualifications. Any contesting political party failing to qualify these conditions would not be able to participate in the elections.

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Annexure - IV Memorandum of Settlement Between Pakistan Peoples Party, National Awami Party and Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islam on 6 March 1972. The following participated in the discussions which began on 4 March and concluded on 6 March 1972: PPP Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Chairman of PPP and President of Pakistan Mr. Hayat Muhammad Khan Sherpao Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi Mr. Abdul Hafeez Pirzada Maulana Kausar Niazi Mr. Rafi Raza NAP Mr. Abdul Wali Khan President of NAP MIR Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo Mr. Arbab Sikander Mr. Khair Bakhsh Mari JUI Maulana Mufti Mahmood General Secretary JUI Maulana Ghulam Ghous Hazarvi 1. (a) The Pakistan Peoples Party proposed that a short session of the National Assembly should be convened on 21 April 1972, for a period not exceeding 3 days. (b) The NAP/JUI proposed that the National Assembly session be convened on 23 March 1972. (c) It was settled that the summons to the members should be issued on 23 March 1972, and the National Assembly session should be convened on 14 April 1972, for a period not exceeding 3 days during which time the matters specified at paras 2, 3 and 4 below will be voted upon. 2. (a) The PPP proposed that the National Assembly should meet for the purpose of endorsing an interim Constitution on the basis of the Government of India Act, 1935, read with the Independence Act, with consequential amendments, or on the basis of 1962 Constitution with consequential amendments. (b) The NAP/JUI proposed that the interim Constitution should be passed on the basis of the Government of India Act, 1935, read with the Independence Act, with consequential amendments. (c) It was settled that an interim Constitution should be prepared on the basis of the 1935 Act, read with Independence Act 1947 with consequential amendments and that there should be a debate not exceeding 3 days at which only party leaders or their nominee would speak. The parties for this purpose would be Pakistan Peoples Party, Pakistan Muslim League ( Qayyum Group), Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam, National Awami Party, Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan, Pakistan Muslim League (Council), Jamaat-i-Islami, Pakistan Muslim League (Convention), one representative from the Independents MNAs of Tribal Areas and one MNA of the remaining independents MNAs.

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3. (a) The PPP secondly proposed that the National Assembly on being convened on 21 April 1972 pass a vote of confidence in the Government and approve and confirm the continuation of Martial Law till 14 August 1972. (b) The NAP/JUI proposed that Martial Law should be continued till 7 June 1972. (c) It was settled that there would be a vote of confidence in the Government and approval of continuation of Martial Law till 14 August 1972. 4. (a) The PPP thirdly proposed that the National Assembly on being convened for the short session should appoint a committee of the House to draft a Constitution to be presented by 1 August 1972. (b) The NAP/JUI proposed that the draft Constitution should be presented by 1 July 1972 and that the National Assembly should be reconvened on 7 July 1972. (c) It was settled that the report of the Committee on the Constitution should be submitted by 1 August 1972, and that the National Assembly be reconvened on 14 August 1972. 5. (a) The PPP proposed that when the National Assembly was reconvened on 14 August 1972, it should act only as a constitution making body to ensure the early framing of the Constitution. (b) The NAP/JUI proposed that when the National Assembly meets on 14 August 1972, it should also act as a legislative body after 14 August 1972. (c) It was settled that after 14 August 1972, the National Assembly should act both as a constitution making body and as a legislative body till the permanent Constitution comes into force. it was reiterated that the powers of the president in pursuance of the Declaration of Emergency will continue till the Emergency is lifted. 6. (a) The PPP proposed that the Provincial Assemblies should be convened after the passing of the interim Constitution i.e., on 1 May 1972. (b) The NAP/JUI proposed that the Provincial Assemblies should be convened on 10 April 1972. 7. It was accepted that the Government both at the Centre and in the Provinces would be formed on the basis of parliamentary majority. 8. It was accepted that till the new Constitution comes into force, a person elected as a member of more than one Assembly would be permitted to retain his seats in both the Houses till the Constitution is fully passed. Similarly, the President, the Vice President, Governors, Ministers and Advisors both at the Centre and in the Provinces will retain their seats in their respective Assemblies. 9. (a) The PPP proposed that the present Governors should continue till the new Constitution is passed, but after the interim Constitution is passed they would cease to be Martial Law administrators. (b) The NAP/JUI proposed that after the Provincial Assemblies are convened, the Governors may be appointed in consultation with the Chief Minister. Meantime from today till the convening of the Provincial Assemblies of the Governments in NWFP (now KPK) and Baluchistan should be given to the NAP/JUI. (c) It was settled that until the permanent Constitution is framed by the National Assembly, the Central Government should continue to have the right, as in the past, to appoint the Governors in the Provinces but by way of compromise the Central Government would, during the interim period, also appoint the Governors in consultation with the majority in the two aforesaid provinces.

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10. It was accepted that in the NWFP (now KPK) and the Province of Baluchistan the majority parties are NAP and JUI and they will be entitled to form the Governments in these two Provinces. 11. The PPP proposed that the date for the Local Bodies Elections should be fixed as early as possible after the Provincial Assemblies are convened and that the Elections in all the Provinces should be on the same date. This was agreed to and the elections would be held on an agreed date soon after the convening of the Provincial Assemblies. 12. The President said that he would announce today that Martial Law would be lifted on 14 August 1972. Signed by Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto Khan Abdul Wali Khan Maulana Mufti Mahmood

Rawalpindi 6 March 1972.

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Annexure - V First Seven Amendments to the Constitution of 1973 Pakistan

Constitution (1st Amendment) Act, 1974

President's Assent Received: 4th May 1974

Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part I, 8th May 1974

An Act to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

Whereas it is expedient to amend the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the purposes hereinafter appearing;

It is hereby enacted as follows:-

1. Short title and commencement (1) This act may be called the Constitution (First Amendment) Act ,1974. (2) It shall come into force at once.

2. Amendment of Article1 of the Constitution.

In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic Of Pakistan hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, in Article 1, for clauses (2), (3) and (4) the following shall be substituted, namely. (2) The territories of Pakistan shall comprise:- (a) The Province of Baluchistan, the North-West Frontier, the Punjab and Sind; (b) The Islamabad Capital Territory, hereinafter referred to as the Federal Capital ; (c) The Federally Administered Tribal Areas; and (d) Such States and territories as are or may be included in Pakistan. Whether by accession or otherwise.

(3) Parliament may by law admit into the Federation new States or areas on such terms and conditions as it think fit."

3. Amendment of Article 8 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 8, in clause(3) in paragraph (b), after the word "day" at the end, the words "or as amended by any of the laws specified in that schedule" shall be added.

4. Amendment of Article 17 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 17, for clause (2), the following shall be substituted, namely-- (2) Every citizen, not being in the service of Pakistan, shall have the right to from or be member of a Political Party , subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan and

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such law shall provide that where the Federal Government declare that any political party has been formed or is operating in a manner prejudicial to the sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan , the Federal Government shell , within fifteen days of such declaration , refer the matter to the Supreme Court whose decision on such reference shall be final.

(3) Every Political Party shall account for the source of its funds in accordance with law.

5. Amendment of Article 61 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 61, after the words "Deputy Chairman" at the end, the words, commas, brackets and figures "and as if, in the proviso to the said clause (2) of Article 54 for the words "one hundred and thirty" the words "ninety" were substituted" shall be added.

6. Amendment of Article 101 of The Constitution. In the constitution, in Article 101, in clause(3), after the word "President" at the end, the words and comma "and shall be entitled to such salary, allowances and privileges as the President may determine"shall be added.

7. Amendment of Article 127 of the Constitution. In the constitution, in Article 127,-- (a) in paragraph (e), the word "and" at the end shall be omitted; (b) in paragraph (f), for the full-stop at the end the semi-colon and word ";and" shall be substituted; and (c) after paragraph (f) amendment as aforesaid, the following new paragraph shall be added, namely:- "(g) the said clause (2) of Article 54 shall have effect as if, in the proviso thereto, for the words "one hundred and thirty" the word "seventy" were substituted".

8. Amendment of Article 193 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 193, in clause (2), after paragraph (c) the following Explanation shall be added, namely— "Explanation. In computing the period during which a person has been an advocate of a High court or held judicial office, there shall be included any period during which he has held judicial office after he became an advocate or, as the case may be, the period during which he has been an advocate after having held judicial office". 9. Amendment of Article 199 of the Constitution. In the constitution , in Article 199 , for clause (3), the following shall be substituted, namely-- " An order shall not be made under clause (1) on application made by or in relation to (3) a person who is a member of the Armed Forces of Pakistan , or who is for the time being subject to any law relating to any of those Forces, in respect of his terms and conditions of service, in respect of any matter arising out of his service, or in respect

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of any action taken in relation to him as a member of the Armed Forces of Pakistan or as a person subject to such law".

10. Amendment of Article 200 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 200, after clause (2), the following new clause shall be added, namely-- "(3) If any time it is necessary for any reason to increase temporarily the number of Judges of a High Court, the Chief Justice of that High Court may require a Judge of any other High Court to attend sittings of the former High Court for such period as may be necessary and, while so attending the sittings of the High Court, the Judge shall have the same power and Jurisdiction as a Judge of that High Court. Provided that a Judge shall not be so required except with his consent and the approval of the President and after consolation with the Chief Justice of Pakistan and the Chief Justice of the High Court of which he is a Judge".

11. Amendment of Article 209 of the Constitution. In the constitution, in Article 209, in clause (2), in the Explanation, after words "Chief Justice ", the words "otherwise than as acting Chief Justice" shall be inserted. 12. Amendment of Article 212 of the Constitution. In the Constitution in article 212 - (a) in clause (1), (i) For the word "establish" the words "provide for establishment of" shall be substituted and shall be deemed always to have been so substituted ; and (ii) in paragraph (a) after the word "persons", the words "who are or have been" shall be inserted and shall be deemed always to have been so inserted; and

(b) in clause (2) after the words "Tribunal extends", the following words shall be inserted and shall be deemed always to have been so inserted, namely:- "and all proceedings in respects of any such matter which may be pending before such other Court immediately before the establishment of the Administrative Court or tribunal shall abate on such establishment."

13. Amendment of Article 250 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 250, in clauses (1) and (2), the words and comma "a governor", wherever occurring., shall be omitted. 14. Amendment of Article 259 of the Constitution. In the constitution, in Article 259,-- (a) in clauses (2), after the word " gallantry", the comma and words " meritorious service in the Armed Forces" shall be inserted ; and (b) in clause (3) after the word " gallantry" , the comma and words " meritorious services in the Armed Forces" shall be inserted and shall be deemed always to have been so inserted.

15. Amendment of Article 260 of the Constitution.

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In the Constitution, in Article 260, in clause (1),- (a) after the definition of the "Chairman" , the following new definition shall be inserted, namely:- "Chief Justice", in relation to the Supreme Court or a High Court, includes the Judge for the time being acting as Chief justice of the Court ;" and (b) In the definition of "service of Pakistan" , after the words "Provincial Minister" , the commas and words " , Attorney-General, Parliamentary Secretary" shall be inserted.

16. Amendment of Article 272 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 272, in the marginal heading , after the word " First" the words " constitution of " shall be inserted. 17. Amendment of First Schedule to the Constitution. In the Constitution, in the First Schedule for Part IV the following shall be substituted ,namely:- "IV. FEDERAL ACTS 1- The Censorship of Films Act, 1963 (XVII of 1963) 2- The Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1974."

Constitution (2nd Amendment) Act, 1974 President's Assent Received: 17th September 1974 Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part I, 21st September 1974

1. Short title and commencement (1) This act may be called the Constitution (Second Amendment) Act, 1974. (2) It shall come into force at once.

2. Amendment of Article 106 of the Constitution. In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, in Article 106, in clause (3), after the words "communities" the words and brackets "and persons of Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves 'Ahmadis')" shall be inserted. 3. Amendment of Article 260 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 260, after clause (2) the following new clause shall be added, namely-- (3) A person who does not believe in the absolute and unqualified finality of The Prophethood of MUHAMMAD (Peace be upon him), the last of the Prophets or claims to be a Prophet, in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after MUHAMMAD (Peace be upon him), or recognizes such a claimant as a Prophet or religious reformer, is not a Muslim for the purposes of the Constitution or law.

Constitution (3rd Amendment) Act, 1974 President's Assent Received: 13th February 1975

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Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part I, 18th February 1975

1. Short title and commencement (1) This act may be called the Constitution (Third Amendment) Act, 1975. (2) It shall come into force at once.

2. Amendment of Article 10 of the Constitution. In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, in Article 10- (a) in clause (4), for the words "one month" twice occurring the words "three months" shall be substituted; (b) in clause (5), for the words and comma "as soon as may be, but not latter than one week" the words "within fifteen days" shall be substituted; and (c) in clause (7), in the proviso, after the word "enemy" the commas and words ", or who is acting or attempting to act in a manner prejudicial to the integrity, security of defense of Pakistan or any part thereof or who commits or attempt to commit any act which amounts to an anti-national activity as defined in a Federal Law or is a member of any association which has for its object, or which indulges him, any such anti- national activity" shall be substituted;

3. Amendment of Article 232 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 232, in clause (7), for paragraph (b) the following new clause shall be substituted, namely-- "(b) shall, subject to the provisions of paragraph (a) cease to be in force upon a resolution disapproving the proclamation being passed by the votes of the majority of the total membership of the two Houses in joint sitting."

Constitution (4th Amendment) Act, 1974 President's Assent Received: 21st November 1975 Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part I, 25th November 1975

1. Short title and commencement (1) This act may be called the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975.

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(2) It shall come into force at once.

2. Amendment of Article 8 of the Constitution. In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, in Article 8- (a) in clause (3), for paragraph (b) the following shall be substituted, namely- "(b) any of the- (i) laws specified in the First Schedule as in force immediately before the commencing day or as amended by any of the laws specified in that schedule; (ii) other laws specified in Part I of the First Schedule,"

3. Amendment of Article 17 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 17, in clause (1), for the words "morality or public order" the words "sovereignty or integrity of Pakistan, public order or morality" shall be substituted. 4. Amendment of Article 19 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 19, for the word "defamation" the words "commission of" shall be substituted. 5. Amendment of Article 51 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 51, (a) after clause (2), the following new claue shall be inserted, namely- "(2- In addition to the number of seats referred to in clause (1), there shall be in the A) National Assembly six additional seats reserved for the persons referred to in clause (3) of Article 106." and (b) after clause (4), the following new claue shall be inserted, namely- "(2- In addition to the number of seats referred to in clause (1), there shall be in the A) National Assembly six additional seats reserved for the persons referred to in clause (3) of Article 106."

6. Amendment of Article 54 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 54, in clause (2), the following explanation shall be added at the end , namely:- "Explanation. In this clause, `working days' includes any day on which there is a joint sitting and any period, not exceeding two days, for which the National Assembly is adjourned." 7. Amendment of Article 106 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 106, in clause (3),-- (a) for the word "or" occurring for the second time; the words "and other non-Muslims and persons belonging to" shall be substituted; and (b) for the figure "3" against the Province of the Punjab the figure "5" shall be substituted.

8. Amendment of Article 199 of the Constitution.

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In the Constitution, in Article 199,-- (a) after clause (3), the following new clause shall be inserted, namely:- "(3- A High Court shall not make an order under clause (1) A) (a) prohibiting the making of an order for the detention of a person, or (b) for the grant of bail to a person detained, under any law providing for preventive detention."

and (c) after clause (4), the following new clause shall be inserted, namely:- "(4- An interim order made by a High Court on an application made to it to A) question the validity or legal effect of any order made, proceeding taken or act done by any authority or person, which has been made, taken or done or purports to have been made, taken or done under any law which is specified in Part I of the First Schedule or relates to, or is connected with, assessment or collection of public revenues shall cease to have effect on the expiration of a period of sixty days following the day on which it is made, unless the case is finally decided, or the interim order is withdrawn, by the court earlier."

9. Amendment of Article 271 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 271, in clause (1), (a) after the words "subject to", the word, figure and comma "Article 63," shall be inserted; (b) for paragraph (a) the following shall be substituted, namely :- "(a) the first National Assembly shall consist of- (i) persons who have taken oath in the National Assembly of Pakistan existing immediately before the commencing day, and (ii) the persons to be elected in accordance with law by the members of Assembly to fill the seats referred to in clause (2-A) of Article 51, and unless sooner dissolved, shall continue until the fourteenth day August, one thousand nine hundred and seventy seven; and reference to total membership of the National Assembly in the Constitution shall be construed accordingly."

(c) in paragraph (b), after the word "vacancies" the commas, words, brackets, figures and letter, "or to be elected to the additional seats referred to in clause (2-A) of Article 51," shall be inserted.

10. Amendment of Article 272 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 272,- (a) the brackets and figure "(1)" occurring after the figure '272', shall be omitted ; and (b) after the words "subject to", the words and figure "Article 63 and" shall be inserted.

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11. Amendment of Article 273 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 273; in clause (1),- (a) after the words "subject to", the word, figure and comma "Article 63," shall be inserted ;and (b) for paragraph (a) the following shall be substituted, namely:- "(a) the first Assembly of a Province under the Constitution shall consist of - (i) the members of the Assembly of that Province in existence immediately before the commencing day, and (ii) the additional members to be elected in accordance with law by the members of the Assembly to fill the seats referred to in clause (3) of Article 106, and, unless sooner dissolved, shall continue until the fourteenth day of August, one thousand nine hundred and seventy-seven ; and reference to total membership of the Assembly of a Province in the Constitution shall be construed accordingly." and (c) in paragraph (b), after the word "vacancies", the commas, words, brackets, and figures ", or to be elected to the additional seats referred to in clause (3) of Article 106," shall be inserted.

12. Substitution of the First Schedule to the Constitution. In the Constitution, for the First Schedule the Schedule set out in the Schedule to this Act shall be substituted. 13. Amendment of the fourth Schedule to the Constitution. In the Constitution, in the Fourth Schedule, in the Concurrent Legislative List, after entry 43, the following new entry shall be inserted, namely;- "43-A. Auqaf"

14. Certain orders shall cease to have effect after specified period. An interim order such as is referred to in clause (4-A) of Article 199 of Constitution, made by High Court before the commencement of this Act shall cease to have effect at the expiration of sixty days from such commencement, unless the case is finally decided, or the interim order is withdrawn, by the Court earlier.

Constitution (5th Amendment) Act, 1974 President's Assent Received: 16th September 1976 Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part I, 16th September 1976

1. Short title and commencement (1) This act may be called the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1976.

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(2) It shall come into force at once, except section 8 and section 13, which shall come into force on the first day of December 1976.

2. Amendment of Article 101 of the Constitution. In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, in Article 101, in clause (2), for the full-stop at the end a colon shall be substituted and thereafter the following proviso and new clause shall be added, namely:- Provided that, after the holding of the first general election to the National Assembly, a person shall not be appointed to be the Governor of the Province of which he is a permanent resident. (2- Nothing contained in the proviso to clause (2) shall apply during the period that an A) Order under paragraph (c) of clause (2) of Article 232 or a Proclamation under Article 234 is in force."

3. Amendment of Article 160 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 160, in clause (3), for paragraph (ii) the following shall be substituted namely :- "(ii) taxes on the sales and purchases of goods imported, exported, produced, manufactured or consumed.;"

4. Amendment of Article 175 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 175 in clause (3), for the word "three" the word "five" shall be substituted.

5. Amendment of Article 179 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, Article 179 shall be re-numbered as clause (1) of that Article and, after clause (1) re-numbered as aforesaid, the following new clauses shall be added, namely :- "(2) The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, whether appointed before or after the commencement of the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1976, shall, unless he sooner attains the age of sixty-five years, hold office for a term of five years and shall thereafter have the option either :- (a) to retire from his office and receive the pension to which he would have been entitled if he had retired from office on attaining the age of sixty-five years; or (b) to assume the office of the most senior of the other Judges of the Supreme Court and to continue to receive the same salary which he was receiving while holding the office of Chief Justice.

(3) When a Judge assumes the office of the most senior of the other Judges of the Supreme Court under clause (2), the Judge who was until then the most senior of the other Judges shall rank next after him in order of seniority.

(4) A person who has once held office as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, otherwise than under Article 180, shall not again be appointed to that office.

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(5) The provisions of clauses (2), (3) and (4) shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in Article 275.

6. Amendment of Article 180 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 180, for the words "the most senior of the other Judges of the Supreme Court" the words "one of the Judges of the Supreme Court who have not previously held the office of Chief Justice of Pakistan otherwise than under this Article" shall be substituted.

7. Amendment of Article 187 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 187, in clause (1), for the word "The" the words, brackets, figures and comma "Subject to clause (2) of Article 175, the" shall be substituted.

8. Amendment of Article 192 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 192, for clauses (2), (3) and (4) the following shall be substituted, namely :- "(2) The Sind and Baluchistan High Court shall cease to function as a common High Court for the Provinces of Baluchistan and Sind.

(3) The President shall , by Order, establish a High Court for each of the Provinces of Baluchistan and Sind and may make such provision in the order of the principal seats of the two High Courts, transfer of the Judges of the common High Court, transfer of cases pending in the common High Court immediately before the establishment of the two High Courts and, generally, for matters consequential or ancillary to the common High Court ceasing to function and the establishment of the two High Courts as he may deem fit."

9. Amendment of Article 195 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, Article 195 shall be re-numbered as clause (1) of that Article and, after clause (1), re-numbered as aforesaid, the following new clauses shall be added, namely :- "(2) The Chief Justice of a High Court, whether appointed before or after the commencement of the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1976, shall, unless he sooner attains the age of sixty-two years, hold office for a term of four years and shall thereafter have the option either:- (a) to retire from his office and receive the pension to which he would have been entitled if he had retired from office on attaining the age of sixty-two years; or (b) assume the office of the most senior of the other Judges of the High Court and to continue to receive the same salary which he was receiving while holding the office of Chief Justice.

(3) When a Judge assumes the office of the most senior of the other Judges of a High Court under clause (2), the Judge who was until then the most senior of the other Judges shall rank next after him in order of seniority.

(4) A person who has once held office as Chief Justice of a High Court, otherwise than

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under Article 196, shell not again be appointed to be the Chief Justice of that High Court.

(5) The provisions of clause (2), (3) and (4) shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in Article 275."

10. Amendment of Article 196 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 196, for the words "the most senior of the other Judges of the High Court" the words "one of the Judges of the High Court who have not previously held the office of Chief Justice of the High Court otherwise than under this Article" shall be substituted.

11. Amendment of Article 199 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 199, for clause (3-A) the following shall be substituted, namely :- "(3- A High Court shall not make under this Article - A) (a) an order prohibiting the making, or suspending the operation, of an order for the detention of any person under any law providing for preventive detention; (b) an order for the release on bail of any person detained under any law providing for preventive detention; (c) an order for the release on bail, or an order suspending the operation of an order for the custody, of any person against whom a report or complaint has been made before any Court or tribunal, or against whom a case has been registered at any police station, in respect of an offence, or who has been convicted by any Court or tribunal; (d) an order prohibiting the registration of a case at a police station, or the making of a report or complaint before any Court or tribunal, in respect of an offence; or (e) any other interim order in respect of any person referred any of the preceding paragraphs.

(3 - Every such order as is referred to in clause (3-A), made at any time after the B) commencement of the Constitution (Fourth Amendment) Act, 1975, shall cease to have effect and all applications for the making of any such order that may be pending before any High Court shall abate.

(3 - The provisions of clauses (3-A) and (3-B) shall also apply to the disposal of an C) application in a petition for leave to appeal, or in an appeal, from an order such as is referred to in the said clause (3-A) that may be pending before the Supreme Court immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Fifth Amendment) Act, 1976."

12. Amendment of Article 200 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 200, in clause (1), for the full-stop at the end a colon shall be substituted and thereafter the following proviso shall be added, namely :- Provided that such consent, or consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Courts, shall not be necessary if such transfer is for a period not exceeding one year at a time.

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Explanation. In this Article, "Judge" does not include a " Chief Justice".

13. Amendment of Article 204 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 204, for clauses (2) and (3) the following shall be substituted, namely :- "(2) A Court shall have the power to punish a person for contempt of Court in accordance with law".

14. Amendment of Article 206 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, Article 206 shall be re-numbered as clause (1) of that Article and, after clause (1), re-numbered as aforesaid, the following new clause shall be added, namely:- "(2) A Judge of a High Court who does not accept appointment as a Judge of the Supreme Court shall be deemed to have retired from his office and, on such retirement, shall be entitled to receive a pension calculated on the basis of the length of his service as Judge and total service if any, in the service of Pakistan."

15. Amendment of Article 212 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 212, in clause (2) after the word "Tribunal" occurring for the third time, the commas and words "other than an appeal pending before the Supreme Court," shall be inserted and shall be deemed always to have been so inserted.

16. Amendment of Article 260 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 260, in the definition of "Service of Pakistan", after the word and comma "Attorney-General", the word and comma "Advocate-General," shall be inserted.

17. Amendment of Article 280 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 280, after the word "made" at the end, the words and figures "and shall not be called in question in any Court on the ground of inconsistency with any of the rights conferred by Chapter I of Part II" shall be added and shall be deemed always to have been so added.

18. Amendment of the First Schedule to the Constitution. In the Constitution, in the First Schedule, in Part I, -- (a) under the sub-heading "II REGULATIONS", after entry 6, the following new entry shall be added, namely :- "7. The Settlement of Disputes of Immovable Property (Chitral)(Amendment) Regulation, 1976 (XII of 1976)."

(b) under the sub-heading "III FEDERAL ACTS", after entry 2, the following new entries shall be added, namely :- "3. The Flour Milling Control and Development Act, 1976 (LVII of 1976).

4. The Rice Milling Control and Development Act, (LVIII of 1976).

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5. The Cotton Ginning Control and Development Act, 1976 (LIX of 1976)." and (c) after the sub-heading "V PROVINCIAL ACT" and the entries relating thereto, the following new sub-heading and entry shall be added, namely :-

"VI. PROVINCIAL ORDINANCE The Land Reforms (Pat Feeder Canal) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1976."

19. Amendment of the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution. In the Constitution, in the Fourth Schedule,- (a) in the Federal Legislative List,- (i) in Part I, for entry 49 the following shall be substituted, namely:- "49. Taxes on the sales and purchases of goods imported, exported, produced, manufactured or consumed." ;and (ii) in Part II, in entry 3, for the words "West Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority and the West Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation" the words "Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority and the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation" shall be substituted; and

(b) in the Concurrent Legislative List, for entry 41, the following shall be substituted, namely :- "41. Production, censorship and exhibition of cinematograph films."

Constitution (6th Amendment) Act, 1974 President's Assent Received: 13th December 1976 Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part I, 4th January 1977

1. Short title and commencement (1) This act may be called the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) Act, 1976.

(2) It shall come into force at once.

2. Amendment of Article 179 of the Constitution. In the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, in Article 179, after clause (5), the following new clause shall be added, namely :-

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"(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1) or clause (2), a Chief Justice of the Supreme Court who attains the age of sixty-five years before he has held that office for a term of five years may continue to hold that office until he has completed that term."

3. Amendment of Article 195 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 195, after clause (5), the following new clause shall be added, namely - "(6) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (1) or clause (2), a Chief justice of the High Court who attains the age of sixty-two years before he has held that office for a term of five years may continue to hold that office until he has completed that term."

4. Amendment of Article 246 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 246,- (a) in paragraph (b), in sub-paragraph (i), (i) after the brackets, words and comma "(which includes Kalam)" the words and comma "the Tribal Area in Kohistan District," shall be inserted and shall deemed to have been so inserted on the first day of October, 1976; and (ii) for the word "Hazara" the word "Mansehra" shall be substituted and shall be deemed to have been so substituted on the first day of October, 1976; and (b) in paragraph (c), for the sub-paragraph (v) the following shall be substituted shall be deemed to have been so substituted on the first day of December, 1976, namely:-- "(v) Bajaur Agency:

(v -a) Orakzai Agency:"

5. Amendment of Article 260 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 260, in the definition, of "service of Pakistan", after the words "Parliamentary Secretary", the commas and words, "Chairman or member of a law commission, Chairman or member of the Council of Islamic Ideology, Special Assistant to the Prime Minister, Adviser to the Prime Minister, Special Assistant to a Chief Minister, Advisor to a Chief Minister" shall be inserted.

Constitution (7th Amendment) Act, 1974 President's Assent Received: 16th May 1977 Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary, Part I, 16th May 1977

1. Short title and commencement (1) This Act may be called the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1977.

(2) It shall come into force at once and section 4 shall be deemed to have taken effect on

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the twenty-first day of April 1977.

(3) Section 2 shall cease to be in force on the thirteenth day of September, 1977.

2. Insertion of new Article 96-A, in the Constitution. In the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the Constitution, after Article 96, the following new Article shall be inserted, namely :- "96A Referendum as to confidence in Prime Minister. (1) If at any time the Prime Minister considers it necessary to obtain a vote of confidence of the people of Pakistan through a referendum, he may advise the President to cause matter to be referred to a referendum in accordance with law made by Parliament.

(2) The law referred to in clause (1) shall provide for the Constitution of Referendum Commission and the manner and mode of holding a referendum.

(3) On receipt of the advice of the Prime Minister under clause (1), the President shall call upon the Referendum Commission to conduct a referendum amongst the persons whose names appear on the electoral rolls for the immediately preceding general elections to the National Assembly as revised up-to-date.

(4) Any dispute arising in connection with the counting of votes at referendum shall be finally determined by the Referendum Commission or a member thereof authorized by it and, save as aforesaid, no dispute arising in connection with a referendum or the result thereof shall be raised or permitted to be raised before any court or other authority whatsoever.

(5) If, on the final count of the votes cast at the referendum, the Prime Minister fails to secure majority of the total votes cast in the matter of the confidence of the people of Pakistan, he shall be deemed to have tendered his resignation with in the meaning of Article 94.".

3. Amendment of Article 101 of the Constitution. In the Constitution, in Article 101, in clause (2-A), for the word, brackets, letter and figures "an Order under paragraph (c) of clause (2) of Article 232 or a Proclamation under" the words and figure "a Proclamation under article 232 or" shall be substituted.

4. Amendment of Article 245 of the Constitution. In the Constitution Article 245 shall be renumbered as clause (1), of that Article and, after clause (1) renumbered as aforesaid, the following new clauses shall be added, namely;-- "(2) The validity of any direction issued by the Federal Government under clause (1) shall not be called in question in any Court.

(3) A High Court shall not exercise any jurisdiction under Article 199 in relation to any area in which the Armed Forces of Pakistan are, for the time being, acting in aid of

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civil power in pursuance of Article 245: Provided that this clause shall not be deemed to affect the jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of any proceeding pending immediately before the day on which the Armed Forces start acting in aid of civil power.

(4) Any proceeding in relation to an area referred to in clause (3), instituted on or after the day the Armed Forces start acting in aid of civil power and pending in any High Court shall remain suspended for the period during which the Armed Forces are so acting."