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Tear Down This Wall: the Tri-Border Discussion

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Tear Down This Wall: the Tri-Border Discussion TEAR DOWN THIS WALL: THE TRI-BORDER DISCUSSION 1 Tear Down This Wall: The Tri-border Discussion Pedro Erik Carneiro1 RESUMO Este artigo analisa o debate sobre terrorismo islâmico na Tríplice Fronteira. Examinamos os comunicados do Grupo 3+1, apresentamos os fatos conhecidos de ameaças terroristas na região, realizamos uma comparação do capital intangível dos países da Tríplice Fronteira com os países do G20 e com o Irã, e debatemos os aspectos econômicos dos países que formam esta fronteira. Concluímos que os países do 3+1 devem unificar suas posições sobre terrorismo e grupos terroristas. Além de ser necessário um aprimoramento na governança econômica e institucional da região. Palavras-chave: Tríplice Fronteira, Grupo 3+1 Sobre Segurança na Tríplice Fronteira, Terrorismo Islâmico e Controle de Fronteira. ABSTRACT This article examines the debate on Islamic terrorism in the tri-border area. We consider the 3+1 Group communiqués, present the public facts on terrorist threats in the region, carry out an international comparison on intangible capital using the G20, Iran and the tri-border countries and analyze the economic aspects of the tri-border area. We conclude that the 3+1 countries should seek to unify the criminalization of terrorism and the perception of terrorist groups versus political parties. Besides that, the tri-border countries need to improve their economic and institutional governance. Key-words: Tri-border, 3+1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security, Islamic Terrorism and Border Control. 2 Introduction In 2004, the Brazilian ambassador to the United States, Rubens Barbosa, reacted to an article on the presence of terrorists in the tri-border area (the region where Paraguay, Brazil, and Argentina meet, through the cities Ciudad del Este – Paraguay, Foz do Iguaçu – Brazil and Porto Iguazu - Argentina) written by Jessica Stern2. He said that ―the Brazilian government is committed to fighting terrorism anywhere in our country. We have never failed to investigate any serious accusation or credible lead regarding the presence of terrorists. We cannot fail, therefore, to respond to Jessica Stern's groundless assertions, which perpetuate a damaging stereotype that in no way does justice to Brazil's struggle against terrorism, nor to the thousands of Brazilians, Paraguayans, and Argentines who live and work in the tri-border area‖3. Stern argued against Barbosa’s reaction right away: ―I regret giving the impression that I doubt Brazil's sincerity in its commitment to the war on terrorism. On the contrary, Brazil's involvement in the 3+1 effort is an extremely important contribution. I cannot accept, however, the assertion that I had no basis for my claim that terrorists are operating in the tri-border area. Although my sources requested anonymity, there has been a great deal of discussion of the problems in the area by Brazilian, Argentine, Paraguayan, and U.S. officials, in the international press -- including the Brazilian press - - and elsewhere…Brazil, Paraguay, and Argentina have been cooperating in their efforts to surveil the region because of its long-standing status as a hub of criminal activities, especially counterfeiting and smuggling. There is a vast literature assessing the criminal activity in the tri-border area.‖4 In newspapers, government and politician speeches, communiqués and academic journals, we, recurrently, see the Barbosa-Stern dispute. Countries from the tri-border region defend themselves against allegations of terrorist cells in the region and the United States try to show that the region is a hub of international terrorism. 3 Are the countries in the tri-border area playing with fire? After 9/11 attacks, the tri-border countries and the United States decided to form the 3 + 1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security, this group was supposed to debate and implement joint policies against these terrorist threats. Is it the plus sign in the 3+1 Group’s name an insurmountable wall, a strong fortress between two policies and two cultures? If the answers for both questions are positives, this wall must be tore down, to allow deeper collaboration. Only international cooperation, acquiring intelligence, can respond to the long-term effort to combat terrorism. Why not G4, instead of 3+1? We have G20 to such different countries like Brazil and Saudi Arabia, or Korea and South Africa. Here, we are dealing only with Islamic terrorist threats in the tri-border region, because it was this kind of terrorist threat that put together the US and the tri-border countries to discuss terrorism in the same table. It can be included other terrorist threats in the South America, like those from leftist guerrillas or groups related to narcoterrorism, but it was the Islamic terrorist threats that colligated the four countries. To discuss the terrorism issue in the tri-border region, we divide this article in four sections besides a section to conclusion. In the first one, we discuss the 3+1 Group communiqués since its formation in 2002 to its interruption or end in 2008. Secondly, we present some public terrorist facts since 1992 Israeli Embassy bombing in Argentina. In the third section, we compare the tri-border countries’ intangible capital with G20 countries and Iran. Then, we present the economic aspects related to the tri-border area. These two last sections before conclusion have the goal to provide a wider view of the tri-border discussion on terrorism. Monghadam (2008/09) considered that ―governments struggling against terrorism should therefore conceive their battle not as a war whose goal is victory, but as a long- term effort that requires commitment, endurance, and ingenuity‖5. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones (2008) also argued that ―we need better international responses to transnational threats, along with smoother intelligence sharing and interagency cooperation‖6. Kydd and Walker (2006) highlighted the need of intelligence to cope with 4 terrorism, because it should be emphasized that the problem of terrorism ―is not a problem of applying force per se, but one of acquiring intelligence and affecting beliefs‖7. Aldrich (2009) considered that ―the most important recent chance within the realm of intelligence and security services has been the expansion of intelligence co-operation. The growing connectivity between both foreign intelligence services and also domestic security services means that we might speak – not just of growing international co- operation – but perhaps even of global co-operation‖8. These authors reinforce that international cooperation is essential in this long enduring battle against terrorism. In the South America, the 3+1 Group on Tri-Border Area Security was established to fulfill this need of intelligence cooperation in order to reduce the chances of terrorist threat in the tri-border region. Let’s observe how the tri-border countries respond to this need and observe their institutional and economic conditions. The 3+1 Group The Governments of the tri-border region have long recognized criminal activities in the area. The countries have observed crimes like arms and drugs smuggling, document fraud, money laundering, the manufacture and movement of contraband goods and terrorism. Twenty years ago, Brazil and Argentina signed the Agreement on Integrated Control of Transit in the Brazilian and Argentinean Borders9. In 1993, through Decision 05/9310, the control of transit was extended to Mercosur countries (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay). Four years later, Mercosur countries signed an agreement to cooperation and reciprocal assistance against customs illegalities (Decision 1/97)11. In 1998, Mercosur established the Joint Mechanism to Register Consumers and Sellers of Firearms12. The Plan to Cooperation to Regional Security13 was also signed in 1998 and had a specific point about terrorism. One of the Plan’s goal was ―to detect groups and individuals related to terrorist cells‖. In the same year, Mercosur signed the Plan to the Tri-Border Security. In 1999, the General Plan to Cooperation and Coordination to 5 Regional Security14 replaced 1998 plans and included Bolivia and Chile. With this Plan was established the Mercosur System for Interchange of Security Information (SISME). In October 2002, the Organization of American States published the ―Compendium of Replies of the Member States to the Questionnaire on New Approaches to Hemispheric Security‖15. Let’s focus on the third question of this questionnaire: ―What does your government consider to be the risks, threats and challenges to security faced by the Hemisphere?‖ Paraguay, unfortunately, did not answer the question. But, Argentina and Brazil did and mentioned terrorism as a threat to security in the Hemisphere. Argentina considered the following threats: ―drug trafficking, terrorism, organized crime, corruption, the illegal trade of weapons, illegal immigration, extreme poverty, environmental damage, economic instability, just to mention the most important‖. Brazil argued that ―there is evidence of "new threats" to the security and stability of the region, whose implications relate more specifically to the extensive and complex area of security than to that of defense, which involves traditional armed forces missions. Notable among such threats are drug trafficking and related criminal activity, and terrorism‖. United States responded that ―Transnational threats do not respect national borders and often arise from non-state actors who take advantage of the massive flow of legitimate travel and commerce that occurs
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