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The Toxic Captain by ROBERT I

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The Toxic Captain by ROBERT I FLIGHTDECK hortly after takeoff from Douala, Cam- The Cameroon Civil Aviation Author- eroon, on a dark night with convective ity determined the probable cause to be “loss activity in the area, the pilots of Kenya of control of the aircraft as a result of spatial Airways Flight 507, a Boeing 737-800, lost disorientation ... after a long slow roll, dur- Scontrol of their aircraft. The captain experienced ing which no instrument scanning was done, confusion and spatial disorientation while try- and in the absence of external visual refer- ing to manually recover. His inputs greatly exa- ences on a dark night. Inadequate operational cerbated the bank angle, and the aircraft entered control, lack of crew coordination, coupled an unrecoverable spiral dive. with the non-adherence to procedures of flight A captain who makes the cockpit environment acrimonious can be a safety risk. The Toxic Captain BY ROBERT I. BARON © bojan fatur/iStockphoto FLIGHTSAFETY.ORG | AEROSAFETYWORLD | MARCH 2012 | 39 FLIGHTDECK monitoring, [and] confusion in the utilization Polar Opposites of the [autopilot], have also contributed to A crew pairing such as this, where there is a cause this situation.”1 strong, domineering captain combined with a This accident was the result of missed reserved and nonassertive first officer, represents opportunities, at the organizational level, to polar opposites in terms of crew coordination, address the captain’s documented deficien- adherence to CRM principles, standard oper- cies in both his flying skills and crew resource ating procedures and general communicative management (CRM). The official investigation ability. Another perspective suggests that the highlighted the captain’s known psychological “trans-cockpit authority gradient” in this ac- traits and deficiencies before, as well as on the cident crew was much too steep.4 At best, a crew day of, the accident. They included his strong pairing should fall into what I call the “ideal character and heightened ego; authoritative crew-pairing zone” (Figure 1). In the Kenya and domineering attitude with subordinates; Airways accident, the crewmembers were at the paternalistic attitude toward the first officer left and right extremes. on the accident flight; documented deficien- The topic of crew pairing deserves much cies in upgrade training, which included CRM, more attention. However, the main subject adherence to standard procedures, cockpit scan of this article is the behavioral tendencies of and situation awareness; a “touch of arrogance” “toxic captains” and how the organization and “insufficient flight discipline.” There had handles them. been numerous recommendations that he attend The term “toxic captain” is not likely to be remedial training.2 found in a flight training manual. Some people Sometimes a captain with a personality of know from unhappy experience what it implies. this type is paired with a first officer who lacks I define a toxic captain as a pilot-in-command the ability and/or experience to voice concerns who lacks the necessary human and/or flying related to the captain’s decisions and actions. skills to effectively and safely work with another The Cameroon accident investigation revealed crewmember in operating an aircraft. Addition- that the first officer was known to be reserved ally, the toxic captain, at times, can make the and nonassertive, and that he was subdued by cockpit environment so acrimonious that the the captain’s strong personality. He was con- successful outcome of the flight may be in seri- cerned about the weather but did not question ous jeopardy. the decision to depart.3 The pilot-in-command of Flight 507 could be categorized as a toxic captain. His deficien- ‘Ideal Crew-Pairing Zone’ Versus Kenya Airways Flight 507 cies were not hidden or hard to detect. In fact, deficiencies documented in the captain’s records clearly indicated red flags and potential prob- lems. Additionally, multiple first officers did not want to fly with the accident captain because of The cockpit his reputation for an overbearing personality Captain First officer and arrogant attitude. left extreme right extreme One of the clearest ways to determine if there is a “toxic captain problem” is to collect and ana- lyze reports, provided they are made. If only one first officer has reported an issue with a particular Note: The ideal crew pairing is in the center of a scale from dominating, at left, to submissive, captain in, for instance, a one-year period, it was at right. The extremes represent the situation on the flight deck of Kenya Airways Flight 507. probably just an isolated incident. However, if 15 Source: Robert I. Baron different first officers during that year went on Figure 1 record that they did not feel comfortable with, 40 | FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION | AEROSAFETYWORLD | MARCH 2012 FLIGHTDECK or want to fly with, a certain captain, it is safe to a first officer so disrespectfully. Yet, this type of assume the problem lies with the captain. toxic behavior seems to be more ubiquitous in The toxic captain may not have had an ac- aviation than many realize. cident; however, it may just be a matter of time, as the toxic leadership behaviors go unchecked. Hiding in Plain Sight Take, for example, the following report from an The fundamental question is why are these toxic air carrier first officer that was submitted to the captains, who pose a significant safety risk, U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Admin- allowed to fly for a commercial operator? They istration (NASA) Aviation Safety Reporting typically are not concealed in the system. They System (ASRS): are usually well known to other flight crewmem- bers and to flight attendants. They may even The captain slapped I just finished a trip with the most unprofes- have documented deficiencies that have been sional, nonstandard, weak and violation- the headset off ignored by the airline, as with the Flight 507 prone captain at my air carrier, on a 13-day captain. the first officer’s intra-Asia flight. I must have caught 30 Reasons may exist at the organizational level or more of his mistakes. If I missed some, or at the individual level. The following are head while the first it was because I was getting yelled at. The examples from the organizational aspect: whole trip he tried to get me to quit, but I officer was flying didn’t. On the 12th day, he tried to get off • It could be one of the unusual cases in the trip, but the company didn’t let him. We which the airline is unaware of the toxic an approach. are both under company review. This man is captain. a menace to aviation and an accident wait- • The organization has, perhaps tacitly, ing to happen.5 recognized the captain’s behavior but be- Two additional examples come from the U.S. lieves it is a personality issue rather than Federal Aviation Regulations Part 135 char- a safety risk. ter domain in which toxic captains created an • The organization is fully aware, by virtue of extremely hazardous flight deck environment. safety reports and deficiencies documented In the first example, the captain slapped the in training records, that the captain may headset off the first officer’s head while the first be a safety risk. However, the organization officer was flying an approach. The captain was feels that the safety risk is minimal and not reacting to the new first officer having trouble worth the effort to mitigate. maintaining the proper approach speed. In the second example, the captain lashed out at • The managers responsible, at the organi- the first officer for the duration of a four-hour zational level, for addressing technical and flight because, according to the captain, the first behavioral deficiencies in flight crews do officer “could not do anything right.” During not want an awkward confrontation with a the entire trip, the first officer was subjected to captain, perhaps very senior, who has been harsh criticism about his flying skills and other with the airline for decades. In my opin- negative comments. So bad was the climate in ion, that was at least partially the case with the cockpit that after they landed and stepped the Flight 507 captain. There was a lack of out of the aircraft, the first officer punched the assertiveness, or the ability to speak up to captain in the face. The captain then struck the captain, from the instructor level up to back, and a full-fledged altercation ensued. Both and including upper-level management. pilots spent the night in jail. All of this was exacerbated by Kenya’s I knew both of these first officers. While, at “high power distance” culture, in which the time, they were both new and inexperienced, citizens tend to accept authoritarianism in there is never justification for a captain to treat employee-to-employer relations.6 FLIGHTSAFETY.ORG | AEROSAFETYWORLD | MARCH 2012 | 41 FLIGHTDECK Some factors at the individual level are these: traits and attributes. In many cases, reme- diation may be out of the question. Some of • Above all, the captain may not acknowl- those vitriolic personality traits may never be edge that he or she has a problem. Many reversible. captains believe that the other crewmem- That brings us to the second option for bers are the source of cockpit strife. resolution of the toxic captain, termination • Some of the captain’s arrogance and ego- of employment. This can be a very awkward, tism may actually be a coping mechanism uncomfortable undertaking by the airline. used to ameliorate personal insecurities. However, in some cases, where remediation has The captain may feel more in control of been, or would be, ineffective, this may be the situations by making other crewmembers only viable option.
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