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NATIONAL REPORTS

US initiatives: Implications for the IAEA

Under two US initiatives, the IAEA would play a greater role in safeguarding fissile material that can be used for nuclear weapons

In a comprehensive statement of United States IAEA safeguards. However, in 1980 the US con- by non-proliferation policy on 27 September 1993, cluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA Fred McGoidrick President Clinton proposed a number of major which makes eligible for safeguards all source new initiatives to help strengthen US policy and and fissionable materials in all its nuclear facili- practice in this area of vital importance to US and ties except only those facilities associated with global security and, more generally, to help rein- activities of direct national security significance. force the international nuclear non-proliferation Historically, the IAEA has typically selected for regime. Some of these initiatives can and will be safeguarding one to three of the some 230 nu- carried out by the United States acting on its clear facilities that the US has made eligible for own. Others must be a common effort by the inspections. It is the US intent to place excess United States and other countries if we are to highly-enriched (HEU) and build a more secure future for all humankind. from the US defense program under this US- Many of the proposed initiatives have important IAEA voluntary safeguards agreement. implications for the IAEA, and especially for its The Nuclear Weapons Council — an inter- crucial role in applying international safeguards. agency US body charged with the responsibility Key among the initiatives proposed by Presi- of determining how much is dent Clinton are several designed to mitigate the necessary to meet defense requirements — has continuing threat posed by weapons-usable fis- made some initial decisions on what nuclear ma- sile material. This article focuses on two initia- terials are excess and therefore eligible for safe- tives in particular: US policy to deal with exist- guards. This will be a continuing process, and it ing stockpiles of fissile materials including its is impossible to predict at this stage how long it intention to submit fissile material excess to US will take. defense needs to IAEA safeguards, and the pro- Nuclear materials excess to defense require- posed global treaty banning the production of ments are located in a variety of facilities, some fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nu- of which maintain a national security mission. clear . Excess materials will need to be segregated from nuclear materials retained for defense purposes in order to permit IAEA inspection. They will Submitting excess fissile material from also be in a variety of different forms including US weapons to safeguards residues, spent , HEU in metal form, and plutonium in oxide and metallic forms. Much of The United States has begun a process of the material resulting from the dismantlement of submitting US fissile material no longer needed nuclear weapons will be in the form of nuclear for the US deterrent or other defense purposes to weapons components since the US presently has inspection by the IAEA. As a nuclear-weapon no facilities for converting such components into State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation less sensitive forms. of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United States is The US is proceeding in a step-by-step fash- not obligated to place its nuclear activities under ion. As a first step in September 1994, the United States placed approximately 10 tonnes in non- sensitive forms of HEU located in Oak Ridge, , on the eligible list of the US-IAEA Mr. McGoidrick is the Principal Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy Affairs, US Department of State, safeguards agreement. The IAEA conducted its Washington, D.C. initial inspection the same month. The United

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States informed the Agency that it would not cluding only those associated with activities hav- remove such material from safeguards for nu- ing direct national security significance. clear purposes. In furtherance of the Presidents' statement, The US has submitted several tonnes of plu- the US Department of Energy and the Russian tonium in oxide and metallic form located in Ministry of Atomic Energy announced on 16 Hanford, Washington, and expects to submit ad- March 1994 their intention to host reciprocal ditional quantities of plutonium at Rocky Flats, inspections to facilities containing plutonium re- Colorado in the near future. moved from nuclear weapons. The US and Rus- Submitting components to sian sides also registered their intention to con- IAEA safeguards will pose particularly challeng- clude an agreement on the means of confirming ing and as yet unresolved issues. If nuclear weap- the plutonium and HEU inventories from nuclear ons components are to be inspected by the IAEA, disarmament. They also noted that these inspec- the US and the IAEA must devise an inspection tions would be an important step in the process approach which will provide the IAEA with the of establishing a worldwide control regime for opportunity for credible verification of the nu- fissile materials. clear material concerned while at the same time The United States and Russia have estab- protecting sensitive nuclear weapons design in- lished two working groups to address fissile ma- formation. terial issues. One is a working group on safe- The US is conducting two major reviews to guards, transparency, and irreversibility (STI) address the issue of component inspection. In the which is examining specific measures to im- first study, we are examining potential inspec- prove confidence in and increase the transpar- tion and measurement alternatives to those in- ency and irreversibility of the process of reduc- volved" in standard IAEA practices. Such ap- ing nuclear weapons. At their September 1994 proaches include verification of non-sensitive summit meeting, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin characteristics of weapons components, or con- agreed that their two governments should also firmation of sensitive information without such work together to: information being revealed to inspectors. At the • co-operate on a bilateral and multilateral ba- same time, a study is under way to examine sis, including through the exchange of appro- whether revealing certain information about nu- priate information, to prevent illegal trade in clear weapons components, such as mass, would nuclear materials and undertake measures to involve serious proliferation risks. strengthen the regime of control and physical The results of these studies will be closely protection of such materials; co-ordinated to identify inspection options that • exchange detailed information at the next result in a high level of verification while mini- meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commis- mizing proliferation risk. The US intends to sion on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear war- work closely with the IAEA in assessing the heads, on stocks of fissile materials, and on inspection options and in designing procedures their safety and security; which will provide a high degree of assurance to • direct their joint working group on STI to the international community that material re- pursue by March 1995 further measures to moved from nuclear weapons and declared ex- improve confidence in and increase the trans- cess will not be returned to such use. parency and irreversibility of the process of US-Russian joint summit statement. In ad- reducing nuclear weapons; dition to this unilateral step, President Clinton • facilitate broad co-operation among appropri- and President Yeltsin issued a joint summit state- ate agencies in both countries to ensure effec- ment on non-proliferation on 14 January 1994, in tive control, accounting and physical protec- which tion of nuclear materials; " They agreed among other things to establish .• facilitate co-operative programmes between a joint working group to consider steps to ensure US and Russian national laboratories in the the transparency and irreversibility of the proc- areas of safety, physical protection, control ess of reduction of nuclear weapons, including and accounting of nuclear materials; the possibility of putting a portion of fissionable The US and Russian steps noted above can material under IAEA safeguards. Particular at- have only a salutary impact on arms control, tention would be given to materials released in non-proliferation, and international and regional the process of and steps to peace and security. Some of these initiatives ensure that these materials would not be used could also have a major impact on the IAEA as again for nuclear weapons." they will be the first cases in which the IAEA They also agreed to consider including in will play a role in verifying certain aspects of the their voluntary safeguards offers with the IAEA disarmament process. Over time they will also all source and special fissionable materials ex- have an important effect on the costs of IAEA

50 IAEA BULLETIN, 1/1995 NATIONAL REPORTS safeguards. Some argue that the benefits of safe- prohibiting the production of HEU or the separa- guards in nuclear-weapon States are not com- tion of plutonium for civil nuclear activities un- mensurate with the costs. Such safeguards are in der safeguards. Nor does the US see the conven- the security interests of all States. We must there- tion as requiring full-scope safeguards. It would, fore find the resources for the application of safe- however, have the important effect of imposing guards to nuclear materials excess to defense needs. a "cap" on the fissile material available to the treaty's members — both nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States — for nuclear Proposed treaty on the cut-off of explosives. production of fissile material It is particularly important that the ban on HEU production and plutonium separation for In his non-proliferation statement of 27 Sep- nuclear explosives be credibly verified. The tember 1993, President Clinton also called for an United States sees the IAEA as the appropriate international treaty prohibiting the production of agency to carry out this role. The safeguards highly and the separation of measures themselves should be nondiscrimina- plutonium for nuclear explosives or outside in- tory and applied in a similar manner in all States ternational safeguards. party to the treaty. In December 1993, the United Nations Gen- The verification of the basic obligations of eral Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution the cut-off treaty raises a number of significant on the prohibition of the production of fissile safeguards issues. A key question is what facili- material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear ties and materials would be subject to safeguards explosive devices. This resolution, inter alia, under the treaty. There are various possibilities. • expresses the conviction of the international One option would apply safeguards to all community that a nondiscriminatory, multi- reprocessing and enrichment facilities in States lateral and internationally and effectively party to the treaty as well as the plutonium and verifiable treaty banning the production of HEU products of these plants. One question is fissile material for nuclear weapons or other how far through the fuel cycle safeguards should nuclear explosive devices would be a signifi- follow the HEU and plutonium. In order to pro- cant contribution to nuclear non-proliferation vide credible verification of the basic undertak- in all its respects; ing of the treaty, safeguards would have to apply • recommends the negotiation of such a treaty to these materials at least up to the point of their in the most appropriate international forum; irradiation in a reactor. Safeguards would, of • requests the IAEA to provide assistance for course, apply to any reprocessing of the spent examination of verification arrangements for fuel. such a treaty as required; and , A second option would be a more extensive • calls upon all States to demonstrate their com- one in which safeguards would apply to all nu- mitment to the objectives of such a treaty. clear materials in a State party to the cut-off The United States attaches great importance treaty except the unsafeguarded special fission- to the proposed treaty, and envisages a key role able materials produced prior to entry into force for the IAEA in verifying the commitments made of the treaty. This would not be full-scope safe- pursuant to it. The purpose of such a treaty is to guards but would provide a greater level of assur- strengthen international nuclear non-prolifera- ance of the undertakings of the cut-off than tion norms generally, and to give constraints on would the first option. It would, however, raise weapons-usable nuclear material the additional the cost of verification. weight of a binding international commitment. A third approach would be a phased one The United States believes the main undertak- which would start with the first option described ings of such a convention should include com- above and move over time to a more extensive mitments to: option. The broadening of safeguards coverage • refrain from producing fissile materials for could take place according to a predetermined use in nuclear explosive devices; schedule, or the parties to the treaty could meet • refrain from assisting other States to produce periodically to take a decision on whether and to fissile materials for proscribed purposes; and what extent safeguards coverage should be ex- • accept IAEA safeguards to verify the under- panded under the treaty. taking not to produce fissile materials for pur- It is also possible to consider certain transpar- poses proscribed by the treaty. ency measures to supplement classical safe- The United States believes that the treaty guards. For example, State Parties could declare should be open to universal membership, and the location of all nuclear activities in their terri- should be non-discriminatory in its provisions. tories, whether civil or military. Depending on The United States does not envisage the treaty as which safeguards option is selected and on the

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sensitivity of the activity, these declarations tain unsafeguarded nuclear activities. Second, could range from a simple declaration of the whatever the legal form or forms of the safe- location and purpose of facilities to detailed re- guards arrangements chosen, the verification of porting on the nature of the activities and the the treaty's undertakings must be nondiscrimina- quantities of nuclear material. Such transparency tory in its effect. The safeguards obligations of measures would, of course, be a complement to, nuclear weapon States, NPT parties, and States not a substitute for, IAEA safeguards. without a full-scope safeguards agreement must Clearly, States will have to weigh options be the same under the treaty. such as these (and perhaps others) very carefully. The United States does hot expect that a cut- Each has profound implications for the IAEA's off treaty and its associated safeguards arrange- safeguards system, as well as for the resources ments will be concluded over night. Many issues required, not only for the IAEA but for the States need to be thoroughly vetted and resolved not and operators being inspected. only with respect to the safeguards aspects of the Adequate verification of this treaty will re- treaty but also a number of other treaty-related quire the IAEA to have the right to carry out its issues. Nevertheless, the U.S. strongly favors safeguards responsibilities to ensure against un- moving forward in negotiating this treaty as ex- declared activities prohibited by the treaty. Spe- peditiously as possible. cial or challenge inspections under a cut-off The United States and Russia have already treaty raise certain questions since States will taken steps in advance of the cut-off treaty to have sensitive facilities on their territories. Per- cease production of fissile materials. Both coun- haps some form of managed accessibility along tries have ceased the production of HEU for the lines of that found in the Chemical Weapons nuclear weapons. In addition, in June 1994, US Convention or other approaches should be exam- Vice President Gore and Russian Prime Minister ined for their applicability to the cut-off treaty. Chernomyrdin signed an agreement providing Several important technical safeguards ques- for the shutdown of plutonium production reac- tions will also arise under a cut-off treaty. The tors and the cessation of the use of newly pro- treaty, as we envisage it, will prohibit the produc- duced plutonium for nuclear weapons. Under tion of HEU, plutonium, and uranium-233 for this agreement all plutonium production reactors nuclear explosives. It would not, however, pre- in both countries will cease operations no later vent the production of or the use of HEU that the year 2000. The US has ceased production for nonexplosive military uses such as naval re- of plutonium for nuclear weapons and has al- actors. In the case of tritium production, if safe- ready shut down its production reactors, and un- guards were applied to HEU fuel in a reactor, der this agreement the Russians have pledged to inspections would have to be carried out without cease operation of their three remaining produc- exposing information which States regard ,as tion reactors at Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk. In Oc- classified. tober 1990, Russia also has ceased production of The IAEA may also be called upon to safe- plutonium for nuclear weapons. The US and guard old reprocessing facilities which were Russia are now studying ways to develop re- built to separate weapons grade plutonium for placement sources of heat and electricity to en- nuclear weapons programmes and were never able the Russian reactors to shut down on sched- designed to facilitate the application of safe- ule. In addition, the two sides are developing guards. This will place significant demands on procedures necessary to ensure that plutonium the Agency's ingenuity and resources. The produced by these production reactors before IAEA will also take on some new tasks such as shutdown will not be used in nuclear weapons. verifying that certain enrichment and reprocess- The parties also agreed to strive to reach agreement ing plants are shut down, and perhaps safeguard- on the earliest possible total cessation of the pro- ing enrichment facilities which are producing duction of plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. HEU. These challenges will require the develop- We hope that all States producing unsafeguarded ment of new safeguards approaches. fissile material could take similar positive steps in Another important issue arising from the pro- advance of the conclusion of a cut-off treaty. posed cut-off treaty is what sort of legal instru- There is little doubt that a cut-off treaty, once mentshould be used to define the Agency's safe- in effect will have profound impact on the guards rights and obligations in verifying the IAEA's safeguards responsibilities. It will undertakings of the cut-off treaty. In considering greatly increase its inspection activities and this question we must keep two facts in mind. could result in a significant increase in the re- First, the parties to this treaty will be nuclear sources required for the safeguards function of weapon States, non-nuclear weapon States the IAEA. Most importantly, it will greatly ex- which have full-scope safeguards agreements; pand the Agency's contribution to an effective and non-nuclear weapon States which have cer- international non-proliferation regime. O

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