NATIONAL REPORTS US fissile material initiatives: Implications for the IAEA Under two US initiatives, the IAEA would play a greater role in safeguarding fissile material that can be used for nuclear weapons In a comprehensive statement of United States IAEA safeguards. However, in 1980 the US con- by non-proliferation policy on 27 September 1993, cluded a safeguards agreement with the IAEA Fred McGoidrick President Clinton proposed a number of major which makes eligible for safeguards all source new initiatives to help strengthen US policy and and fissionable materials in all its nuclear facili- practice in this area of vital importance to US and ties except only those facilities associated with global security and, more generally, to help rein- activities of direct national security significance. force the international nuclear non-proliferation Historically, the IAEA has typically selected for regime. Some of these initiatives can and will be safeguarding one to three of the some 230 nu- carried out by the United States acting on its clear facilities that the US has made eligible for own. Others must be a common effort by the inspections. It is the US intent to place excess United States and other countries if we are to highly-enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium build a more secure future for all humankind. from the US defense program under this US- Many of the proposed initiatives have important IAEA voluntary safeguards agreement. implications for the IAEA, and especially for its The Nuclear Weapons Council — an inter- crucial role in applying international safeguards. agency US body charged with the responsibility Key among the initiatives proposed by Presi- of determining how much nuclear material is dent Clinton are several designed to mitigate the necessary to meet defense requirements — has continuing threat posed by weapons-usable fis- made some initial decisions on what nuclear ma- sile material. This article focuses on two initia- terials are excess and therefore eligible for safe- tives in particular: US policy to deal with exist- guards. This will be a continuing process, and it ing stockpiles of fissile materials including its is impossible to predict at this stage how long it intention to submit fissile material excess to US will take. defense needs to IAEA safeguards, and the pro- Nuclear materials excess to defense require- posed global treaty banning the production of ments are located in a variety of facilities, some fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nu- of which maintain a national security mission. clear explosives. Excess materials will need to be segregated from nuclear materials retained for defense purposes in order to permit IAEA inspection. They will Submitting excess fissile material from also be in a variety of different forms including US weapons to safeguards residues, spent fuel, HEU in metal form, and plutonium in oxide and metallic forms. Much of The United States has begun a process of the material resulting from the dismantlement of submitting US fissile material no longer needed nuclear weapons will be in the form of nuclear for the US deterrent or other defense purposes to weapons components since the US presently has inspection by the IAEA. As a nuclear-weapon no facilities for converting such components into State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation less sensitive forms. of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United States is The US is proceeding in a step-by-step fash- not obligated to place its nuclear activities under ion. As a first step in September 1994, the United States placed approximately 10 tonnes in non- sensitive forms of HEU located in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, on the eligible list of the US-IAEA Mr. McGoidrick is the Principal Deputy Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy Affairs, US Department of State, safeguards agreement. The IAEA conducted its Washington, D.C. initial inspection the same month. The United IAEA BULLETIN, 1/1995 49 NATIONAL REPORTS States informed the Agency that it would not cluding only those associated with activities hav- remove such material from safeguards for nu- ing direct national security significance. clear explosive purposes. In furtherance of the Presidents' statement, The US has submitted several tonnes of plu- the US Department of Energy and the Russian tonium in oxide and metallic form located in Ministry of Atomic Energy announced on 16 Hanford, Washington, and expects to submit ad- March 1994 their intention to host reciprocal ditional quantities of plutonium at Rocky Flats, inspections to facilities containing plutonium re- Colorado in the near future. moved from nuclear weapons. The US and Rus- Submitting nuclear weapon components to sian sides also registered their intention to con- IAEA safeguards will pose particularly challeng- clude an agreement on the means of confirming ing and as yet unresolved issues. If nuclear weap- the plutonium and HEU inventories from nuclear ons components are to be inspected by the IAEA, disarmament. They also noted that these inspec- the US and the IAEA must devise an inspection tions would be an important step in the process approach which will provide the IAEA with the of establishing a worldwide control regime for opportunity for credible verification of the nu- fissile materials. clear material concerned while at the same time The United States and Russia have estab- protecting sensitive nuclear weapons design in- lished two working groups to address fissile ma- formation. terial issues. One is a working group on safe- The US is conducting two major reviews to guards, transparency, and irreversibility (STI) address the issue of component inspection. In the which is examining specific measures to im- first study, we are examining potential inspec- prove confidence in and increase the transpar- tion and measurement alternatives to those in- ency and irreversibility of the process of reduc- volved" in standard IAEA practices. Such ap- ing nuclear weapons. At their September 1994 proaches include verification of non-sensitive summit meeting, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin characteristics of weapons components, or con- agreed that their two governments should also firmation of sensitive information without such work together to: information being revealed to inspectors. At the • co-operate on a bilateral and multilateral ba- same time, a study is under way to examine sis, including through the exchange of appro- whether revealing certain information about nu- priate information, to prevent illegal trade in clear weapons components, such as mass, would nuclear materials and undertake measures to involve serious proliferation risks. strengthen the regime of control and physical The results of these studies will be closely protection of such materials; co-ordinated to identify inspection options that • exchange detailed information at the next result in a high level of verification while mini- meeting of the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commis- mizing proliferation risk. The US intends to sion on aggregate stockpiles of nuclear war- work closely with the IAEA in assessing the heads, on stocks of fissile materials, and on inspection options and in designing procedures their safety and security; which will provide a high degree of assurance to • direct their joint working group on STI to the international community that material re- pursue by March 1995 further measures to moved from nuclear weapons and declared ex- improve confidence in and increase the trans- cess will not be returned to such use. parency and irreversibility of the process of US-Russian joint summit statement. In ad- reducing nuclear weapons; dition to this unilateral step, President Clinton • facilitate broad co-operation among appropri- and President Yeltsin issued a joint summit state- ate agencies in both countries to ensure effec- ment on non-proliferation on 14 January 1994, in tive control, accounting and physical protec- which tion of nuclear materials; " They agreed among other things to establish .• facilitate co-operative programmes between a joint working group to consider steps to ensure US and Russian national laboratories in the the transparency and irreversibility of the proc- areas of safety, physical protection, control ess of reduction of nuclear weapons, including and accounting of nuclear materials; the possibility of putting a portion of fissionable The US and Russian steps noted above can material under IAEA safeguards. Particular at- have only a salutary impact on arms control, tention would be given to materials released in non-proliferation, and international and regional the process of nuclear disarmament and steps to peace and security. Some of these initiatives ensure that these materials would not be used could also have a major impact on the IAEA as again for nuclear weapons." they will be the first cases in which the IAEA They also agreed to consider including in will play a role in verifying certain aspects of the their voluntary safeguards offers with the IAEA disarmament process. Over time they will also all source and special fissionable materials ex- have an important effect on the costs of IAEA 50 IAEA BULLETIN, 1/1995 NATIONAL REPORTS safeguards. Some argue that the benefits of safe- prohibiting the production of HEU or the separa- guards in nuclear-weapon States are not com- tion of plutonium for civil nuclear activities un- mensurate with the costs. Such safeguards are in der safeguards. Nor does the US see the conven- the security interests of all States. We must there- tion as requiring full-scope safeguards. It would, fore find the resources for the application of safe- however, have the important effect of imposing guards to nuclear materials excess to defense needs. a "cap" on the fissile material available to the treaty's members — both nuclear weapon States and non-nuclear weapon States — for nuclear Proposed treaty on the cut-off of explosives. production of fissile material It is particularly important that the ban on HEU production and plutonium separation for In his non-proliferation statement of 27 Sep- nuclear explosives be credibly verified.