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Bullet'n Backstory Bullet’n Backstory Volume 9, Issue 7 Joint Munitions Command July 2021 Climbing to Victory: The Battles for Chattanooga (November 23-25, 1863) By early November 1863, the 1st Division of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas’ Army of the Cumberland, detached to Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker’s command, had broken the Confederate siege of Chattanooga by opening up the “cracker line” supplying the city. With the arrival of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman’s Army of the Tennessee, Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant had more than 72,000 men on hand, compared to 50,000 under Gen. Braxton Bragg. Grant decided to take the initiative. On November 22nd, Maj. Caleb B. Cox, of the 84th Illinois Volunteer Infantry Regi- ment (3rd Brigade, 1st Division) wrote to his wife from camp in Whiteside, “I think a big battle is close at hand. We have a large force here, and the enemy are also in great force. Should the battle come off, it will be the big battle of the war. I am not partic- ularly anxious to get into a fight, but I would as soon fight it out now, as to wait two or three months and then fight.” The battles for Chattanooga erupted the next day, though the 84th would not immediately take part. Concerned that the enemy was consolidating his forces beyond Missionary Ridge, Grant or- dered Thomas to make a reconnaissance in force of the heights east of the city, but to withdraw once they had determined the strength and position of Confederate forces. At midday, 14,000 of Thomas’ forces charged across the low ground and seized Orchard Knob without a fight. Rather than withdraw, Union forces held this position. Bragg, realizing the major battle was imminent, re- called all available forces from the north and east to establish a line on Missionary Ridge. Though initially tasked with the job of simply holding Lookout Valley, by late November Hooker had over 10,000 men at his disposal. Grant accordingly authorized Hooker to engage Confederate forces on Lookout Mountain. Grant’s intentions are up for debate. In his memoirs, he claims that Hooker’s forces were meant to be a feint to dis- tract Bragg from the more important action against Missionary Ridge. Whatever Grant’s intentions, Hooker took the opportunity to launch a full-scale assault on Lookout Mountain. After the war, Louis A. Simmons, al- so of the 84th, described the initial action: The morning of November 24th, 1863, was damp, foggy and dismal. As soon as it was fairly light, our Bri- gade moved directly toward the base of Lookout Mountain; and the 2nd Brigade, being temporarily attached to Gen. Geary’s Division of the 12th Corps; with Gen. Osterhaus, Division of Gen. Sherman’s army, moved about three miles to the Southward, and there succeeded in crossing Lookout Creek, which runs nearly par- allel with the ridge and almost at its Western base. Having crossed, they began slowly to advance up the mountain, at the same time marching toward the nose or Northern extremity, instead of directly toward the summit. This threw the right wing of the advanc- ing line much higher up the mountain [than] the left, where our Regiment was stationed. By the time the main force was ready to begin the assault, our Regi- ment had with no little difficulty waded the creek, (a rapid stream with steep banks, and now fully four feet deep,) and drove the enemy from their skirmish pits, in the open field upon the opposite side. The fog now cleared away, and the heavy batteries sta- tioned on strongly fortified ridges West of Lookout Creek, began to play upon the enemy’s lines, now in full view, and confronting our advancing columns. The 84th advanced on the far left with the 1st Division (XIV Corps), under Brig. Gen. Charles Cruft, and the 1st Division (XV Corps), under Brig. Gen. Peter J. Osterhaus. Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. John W. Geary’s 2nd Division (XII Corps) swept up the ridge from the southeast, where they found few defenders. As Cruft and Osterhaus slowly advanced, Geary moved swiftly along the ridge, forcing the Confeder- ate forces to retrench further up the mountain. By the afternoon, a thick fog developed. While this pre- vented the combatants from seeing each other, the forces in Chattanooga could see the fight being waged above the fog bank, prompting Brig. Gen. Montgomery C. Meigs to dub the conflict, “The Battle Above the Clouds.” That evening, Bragg reluctantly pulled his remaining defenders from Lookout Moun- tain, to further reinforce Missionary Ridge. The JMC Archivist has been given exclusive access to the personal papers of Caleb Brinton Vol. 9 Cox, an abolitionist Union soldier from Vermont, Illinois. For the next year, the Bullet’n Backstory Iss. 7 will trace Cox’s Civil War service. Pg. 2 Sherman’s troops completed their crossing of the Tennessee River on the 24th and took a position on what he thought was the northern end of Missionary Ridge. In fact, there was a valley between Sherman’s men and well-fortified Confederate forces at Tunnel Hill. On November 25, Sherman attacked, but under- estimated the opposing forces, neither committing enough men nor utilizing them effectively. As these forc- es became bogged down, Thomas’ support troops were forced to take a more active role to relieve the pressure on Sherman. Grant ordered Thomas forward to take the Confederate rifle pits at the base of the ridge. The Army of the Cumberland charged and easily forced the en- emy defenders to scamper up the hill. Thomas’ men now found them- selves under heavy artillery fire, trapped at the base of the hill, pinned down by Confederate batteries atop the ridge. With no withdrawal plan in place, and still stinging from their losses at Chickamauga, the Army of the Cumberland charged up Missionary Ridge without orders from commanders. Grant angrily demanded to know who had ordered the action; Thomas could do nothing but claim ignorance. While the Army of the Cumberland took Missionary Ridge, the divisions of Cruft, Os- terhaus, and Geary, fresh from their capture of Lookout Mountain, ap- peared at the southern end of Missionary Ridge and pushed north. Ef- fectively surrounded on three sides, Bragg had little choice but to with- draw to the east, ceding victory to Grant. While Grant would later call Lookout Mountain an insignificant action, Cox would say, “Our Regi- ment made the first charge and fired the first gun in the attack on Lookout Mountain. The assault on Lookout was a brilliant affair and was the turning point of the whole battle.” Whatever Grant’s hindsight view, this initial victory, followed by the pincer move against Mission- ary Ridge, found the 84th serving well at both battles. Union losses numbered 5,824, compared to 8,684 Confederate casualties. Grant now had a solid base from which to move on Atlanta. ~ ~ PTF The Battle of Missionary Ridge Kurz & Allison (1886) This Month in Military History July 5, 1775: In an effort to avoid war between the American Colo- nies and Great Britain, the 2nd Continental Congress adopts the Olive Branch Petition, asking King George III to intervene. However, the next day, Congress published Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms to back up their argument for re- sistance. The king refused to read the petition, and the American Revolution ensued. July 12, 1943: As part of the larg- JMC Historical Document Collection er Battle of Kursk, the Soviet 5th Guards Tank Army attacks the The JMC Public and Congressional Affairs Office (PCA) maintains German II SS-Panzer Corps 87 the JMC Archives, which collects and maintains historically significant kilometers southeast of the city. records, including: emails, manuscripts, letters, reports, studies, images, Soviet forces do not defeat the videos, films, photographs, oral history interviews, briefings, SOPs, poli- Germans, but hold long enough to cies, decision papers, memoranda, statistics, newspapers, newsletters, force a German withdrawal. brochures, maps, blue prints, drawings, artifacts, and more. Such rec- July 19, 1524: A combination of ords are pertinent to the Army’s institutional knowledge of active and economic, social, and religious predecessor installations, the ammunition industrial base, and JMC mis- unrest in Central Europe results in the German Peasants’ War. The sions. JMC regularly uses these materials to research command history, united aristocracy put down the and to answer research queries. When JMC workers leave positions or revolt, killing 100,000 peasants. make physical moves, it is vital that their records be assessed before July 26, 1863: Union forces sur- disposal. If employees are uncertain about the historical value of materi- round and defeat Confederate als, the best policy is to make the items available to Command Historian forces at the Battle of Salineville Keri Pleasant ([email protected]) or Archivist Paul Ferguson (Ohio), forcing the surrender of ([email protected]) in Room 661 for assessment. raid leader John Hunt Morgan. .
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