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Kennesaw Mountain NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD PARK

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Kennesaw Mountain NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD PARK ennesaw Mountain --0-- NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD PARK o R I A Kennesaw Mountain NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD PARK Scene of the BAttle of Kennesaw Mountain, June 19 to July 3, 1864, A major engagement of the Atlanta Campaign, Sherman's greAt flanking movement which split in two the heart of the Confederacy. NTHE SUMMER of 1863, the North gained tain was reached. Here, for the first time, Icomplete control of the Mississippi River, Sherman decided on frontal attack. The Battle the decisive action being Grant's capture of of Kennesaw Mountain, therefore, marks a de- Vicksburg on July 4. In the meantime, the parture in the general strategy and tactical plan Northern armies, based principally on Nash- that carried Sherman from Chattanooga to ville, were striving to gain control of Tennessee. Atlanta. In this battle Sherman failed to break This was finally accomplished as a result of the Confederate lines and suffered heavy losses. decisive action in late November around He then took up again his flanking movements, Chattanooga. The Federal Army was now which succeeded, proving that it could have poised to strike, during the next spring, into been done in the first place. Georgia and at the very heart of the South. Johnston on his part fought the Atlanta In a 4-months campaign, during the spring· Campaign with tactics similar to those em- and summer of 1864, Sherman with 100,000 ployed by the Roman General Fabius Maximus men drove 120 miles from Chattanooga into in defending Rome against Hannibal in the the heart of the Confederacy and captured the Second Punic War. Like Fabius, who fell back great base and railroad center of Atlanta. slowly on Rome, delaying and inconveniencing During the months of May, June, July, and his great Carthaginian antagonist without fight- August, Sherman's troops were in almost con- ing a decisive battle, Johnston sought in the stant action, either marching or fighting, against same way to frustrate Sherman and in the end Joseph E.Johnston's Confederates. Possessing to save Atlanta. superior forces, Sherman was able to maneuver The men of both armies were of the same against Johnston in such a way that a part of general racial stock and blood and possessed of his army would hold in front while the re- the same intelligence, courage, and devotion to mainder moved around the Confederate flank their respective causes. Blood brothers often to threaten their rear and communications with fought against each other in the opposing Atlanta, thus forcing a succession of with- armies. The high soldierly qualities displayed drawals toward that city. by the men, from both the North and the In the course of this series of movements South, who fought at Kennesaw Mountain is there were many skirmishes and several battles, for all of us today a matter of pride, 'even including a bloody one at New Hope Church, though that engagement produced its full but no general engagement involving the main share of misery, horror, and regrets. strength of both armies until Kennesaw Moun- At Kennesaw Mountain, in the fourth year of the war, Confederate veterans stayed Federal flanking movements which threatened his line veterans and demonstrated the awful penalty of supplies and communications, and he had to exacted on the attackers when brave and ex- protect this line by withdrawing from one posi- perienced men fought from behind trenches, tion to another. barricades, and field fortifications. THE BATTLE OF KENNESAW THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN MOUNTAIN On March 18, 1864, the Federal Army 10 A series of flanking movements forced the Chattanooga was placed under command of Confederates back to the vicinity of Marietta, Gen. W T. Sherman who made preparations for Ga., where, on June 5,Johnston intrenched on an advance against the Confederate Army in a line 10 miles long between Lost, Pine, and Georgia. He was to start from Chattanooga at Brush Mountains. Sherman gradually pushed the same time that Gen. U. S. Grant began his the Confederates back to a position on and drive in Virginia in a great coordinated cam- around Kennesaw Mountain. The area covered paign intended to end the war. The Confederate by this position constitutes the national battle- Confederate Fort, Cheatham Hill (Loudermilk Studio). Army had intrenched at Dalton, Ga., where field park. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston assumed command As Sherman approached the position and ex- December 27, 1863, and prepared to resist the tended his troops toward the Confederate left and then destroy the separated wings of the menrs, the Confederate Army retired, and expected advance of the Federal forces. flank, Hood's Confederates, on June 22, as- Confederate Army. Thomas' Army of the Sherman entered the city on September 2. On May 7,1864, Sherman with approximately saulted in an attempt to disorganize the moving Cumberland was to make one assault at a point The loss of this manufacturing and railroad 100,000 men moved against Johnston at Dalton, Federals, but were repulsed with heavy losses. in the Confederate center, a hill south of the center was a severe blow to the South because where the latter with about 50,000 men was This action occurred in the vicinity of the Kolb Marietta-Dallas Road, defended by Gen. B. F. it deprived the Confederate armies in the field placed on the defensive. In the campaign that Farm on the Powder Springs Road. Cheatham, and now known as Cheatham Hill. of needed food, equipment, and reinforcements. followed, Johnston proved himself a master of Sherman determined to try to break through McPherson's Army of the Tennessee was to The occupation of Atlanta prepared the way for defensive strategy. With his smaller army, how- assault the Confederate center at the south end the movement that was to take the Federal ever, he was unable to prevent the Federal of Little Kennesaw Mountain. Both assaults Army across the State to Savannah- "the March Gen. Joseph Eggleston Johnston, Com- were to be made at the same time, on June 27, to the Sea." mander of the Confederate Army of the so that troops from one part of the Confederate The success of the Atlanta Campaign, and of Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman, Com- Tennessee and the Army of the Mississippi line could not be used to reinforce any other the events in the lower South which subse- mander of the Federal forces in the Atlanta which opposed Sherman during the Atlanta part of the line. The Federal troops bravely as- quently derived from it, made the collapse of Campaign (Signal Corps, U. S. Army). Campaign (Signal Corps, V. S. Army). saulted these points, but were repulsed with the Confederacy almost inevitable, the exact heavy losses. Sherman lost 2,500 men and date depending upon the success of Grant's Johnston 800 in this final phase of the battle. operations against Lee in Virginia. FALL OF ATLANTA THE PARK After this repulse, Sherman resumed his Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield flanking tactics, which caused the Confederates Park has been administered since 1933 by the to retire from the Kennesaw Mountain position National Park Service. As a result of congres- to the vicinity of Atlanta. At this critical sional action in 1935 and 1939, the area has moment, on July 17,Johnston received a tele- grown from a small reservation of 60 acres at gram from Richmond which relieved him of Cheatham Hill, acquired by a group of Union command and substituted Gen. John B. Hood soldiers in 1899 and accepted in 1917 by the in his place. Crucial and decisive action fol- United States Government as a battlefield site, lowed immediately. Four major battles were to a battlefield park of about 3,000 acres. The fought around Atlanta, in each of which park includes the principal points of combat in Sherman was the victor. After these engage- the vicinity of Kennesaw Mountain. Many of the Federal and Confederate earthworks con- also available at this point. Organizations and structed during the battle are well preserved. groups are given special service if arrangements are made in advance with the custodian. HOW TO REACH THE PARK The park is located 2 miles north of Marietta, ADMINISTRATION Ga., and is reached by United States Highway Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield No. 41, which traverses its northern end. The Park is a part of the National Park System museum is situated near the point where United owned by the people of the United States and States Highway No. 41 passes the northern tip administered for them by the National Park of Big Kennesaw Mountain. The park is about Service of the United States Department of the 20 miles northwest of Atlanta, Ga., and is on Interior. Communications should be addressed the main highway between that city and to the Superintendent, Kennesaw Mountain VICINITY MAP Chattanooga, Tenn. National Battlefield Park, Marietta, Ga. FEDERAL A IT ACK SERVICE TO THE PUBLIC xv CORPS JUNE 27. '864 The Atlanta Campaign featured trench war- A 16-page illustrated booklet giving addi- fare. Well-preserved earthworks, typical of those tional information regarding the history used in the entire campaign, may be seen to and meaning of Kennesaw Mountain particularly good advantage in the Cheatham National Battlefield Park and the Atlanta Hill area. From the top of Big Kennesaw Moun- Campaign may be obtained at the park or DALLAS tain an excellent panoramic view of the battle- ~TO DALLAS from the Superintendent of Documents, 1-8 MILES field is obtained. Roads and trails are being con- Government Printing Office, Washing- structed, and trail-side exhibits of maps, photo- ton 25, D. c., at a cost of 10 cents a copy.
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