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Protecting Politics: Deterring the Influence of Organized Crime On Protecting Politics Deterring the Influence of Organized Crime on Political Parties Protecting Politics: Deterring the Influence of Organized Crime on Political Parties Political parties are the centrepiece of political representation in democratic systems. Regrettably, political corruption undermines this important role and generates distrust towards politicians, disengaging citizens from public decision-making processes. Organized crime is one of the most conspicuous sources of political corruption. These networks pour money into political parties and forge alliances with politicians and their intermediaries at the national and local levels. This report provides insights into how multiparty democracy has occasionally shaped and extended the linkages between political parties, politically exposed persons and criminal activity. The analysis focuses on specific cases from Georgia, Mali and Mexico to illustrate these threats, as well as potential strategies for preventing and mitigating relationships between criminals and political actors. International IDEA Clingendael Institute ISBN 978-91-7671-068-5 Strömsborg P.O. Box 93080 SE-103 34 Stockholm 2509 AB The Hague Sweden The Netherlands T +46 8 698 37 00 T +31 70 324 53 84 F +46 8 20 24 22 F +31 70 328 20 02 9 789176 710685 > [email protected] [email protected] www.idea.int www.clingendael.nl ISBN: 978-91-7671-068-5 Protecting Politics Deterring the Influence of Organized Crime on Political Parties Protecting Politics Deterring the Influence of Organized Crime on Political Parties Series editor: Catalina Uribe Burcher Lead authors: Ivan Briscoe and Diana Goff © 2016 International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance © 2016 Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael Institute) International IDEA Strömsborg SE-103 34 Stockholm Sweden Tel: +46 8 698 37 00, fax: +46 8 20 24 22 Email: [email protected], website: www.idea.int Clingendael Institute P.O. Box 93080 2509 AB The Hague The Netherlands Tel: +31 70 324 53 84, fax: +31 70 328 20 02 Email: [email protected], website: www.clingendael.nl The electronic version of this publication is available under a Creative Commons Attribute-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 licence. You are free to copy, distribute and transmit the publication as well as to remix and adapt it provided it is only for non-commercial purposes, that you appropriately attribute the publication, and that you distribute it under an identical licence. For more information on this licence see: <http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/>. International IDEA publications are independent of specific national or political interests. Views expressed in this publication, particularly in the individual case studies, do not necessarily represent the views of International IDEA or the Clingendael Institute, or those of their respective Boards or Council members. Cover photograph: ‘MINUSMA Supports Youth Theatre for Peace and Reconciliation in Gao’ (UN Photo/Marco Dormino) Graphic design by Santángelo Diseño ISBN: 978-91-7671-068-5 Printed by Trydells Tryckeri, Sweden Contents Preface ........................................................................................................................................ 7 Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. 9 Chapter 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 10 Political parties: the global context ........................................................................... 14 Crime and transitions .................................................................................................... 15 Chapter 2 Organized crime, corruption networks and the exploitation of state weakness ............................................................................. 18 Chapter 3 Spaces of interaction between political parties and organized crime ..................................................................................................................... 22 Chapter 4 Political parties: triggers for political–criminal influence ............................ 28 Chapter 5 Case study: Georgia ............................................................................................................ 32 Politics, crime, illicit networks and the partisan use of prosecutions ............ 36 External influence and crime under the Georgian Dream ............................... 38 The Russian sphere of influence ................................................................................. 39 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 41 Chapter 6 Case study: Mali .................................................................................................................... 42 Political parties and the accumulation of power .................................................. 45 A lack of enforcement: Mali’s missing rules .......................................................... 48 International IDEA / Clingendael Institute 5 Crime and the north ...................................................................................................... 51 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 54 Chapter 7 Case study: Mexico .............................................................................................................. 56 The political–criminal entanglement: three approaches.................................... 60 Cases of organized criminal influence: local, state and federal levels ........... 63 Political finance: regulations and loopholes ........................................................... 66 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 70 Chapter 8 Conclusions and recommendations ............................................................................ 72 Understanding networks .............................................................................................. 74 References and further reading .................................................................................... 79 About the editor and authors ......................................................................................... 92 About the organizations ................................................................................................... 93 6 International IDEA / Clingendael Institute Preface Political parties play a crucial role in the functioning of democracy. As the intermediaries between political representatives and the citizens, parties hold the keys to ensure that institutions are inclusive and responsive. In essence, the policies and ideologies that parties uphold are designed to mirror the wishes and needs of the people, and the candidates that these organizations support become the voice for those ideas within elected offices. The general distrust of political parties, and their subsequent weak legitimacy, is therefore one of the most pressing problems for democracy today. This phenomenon corrodes the precious relationship between citizens and politicians, thus destroying the basic fabric of representative democracy. The low levels of membership in political parties reflect this disturbing trend. Citizens are seeking alternatives, increasingly turning to the streets and forming citizen movements to voice their concerns. Recent protests in Asia, Europe and Latin America reflect this general dissatisfaction with the way democratic institutions in general, and political parties in particular, are tackling inequality, poor service delivery and, most importantly, political corruption. Indeed, corruption, partly fuelled by illicit money, is arguably one of the root causes of citizen distrust in political parties. The International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), the Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael) and other partners are therefore committed to shedding light on how organized crime corrupts political parties. Injecting dirty money into political parties and pursuing alliances with key politicians and their intermediaries are some of the principal avenues these illicit networks use to penetrate democracy. This report provides insights into these issues, as well as potential strategies for preventing and mitigating relationships between criminals and political actors, by looking at the specific cases of Georgia, Mali and Mexico. International IDEA / Clingendael Institute 7 This report builds on comparative research that International IDEA has conducted since 2011 under the umbrella of the Protecting Politics project, which broadly focuses on the threat that organized crime poses to democracy around the world. In 2015 the Clingendael Institute joined International IDEA in exploring the particular dynamics that organized crime uses to engage with political parties and actors. Three other reports complement this study by looking at the related issues of elections, service delivery and local democracy. Yves Leterme Monika Sie Dhian Ho Secretary-General General Director International IDEA Clingendael Institute 8 International IDEA / Clingendael Institute Acknowledgements We would like to express our sincere gratitude to Catalina Uribe Burcher who edited the report
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