DOCSLIB.ORG

2002 CERT Advisories

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
2002 CERT Advisories 2002 CERT Advisories CERT Division [DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A] Approved for public release and unlimited distribution. http://www.sei.cmu.edu REV-03.18.2016.0 Copyright 2017 Carnegie Mellon University. All Rights Reserved. This material is based upon work funded and supported by the Department of Defense under Contract No. FA8702-15-D-0002 with Carnegie Mellon University for the operation of the Software Engineering Institute, a federally funded research and development center. The view, opinions, and/or findings contained in this material are those of the author(s) and should not be con- strued as an official Government position, policy, or decision, unless designated by other documentation. References herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trade mark, manu- facturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by Carnegie Mellon University or its Software Engineering Institute. This report was prepared for the SEI Administrative Agent AFLCMC/AZS 5 Eglin Street Hanscom AFB, MA 01731-2100 NO WARRANTY. THIS CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY AND SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE MATERIAL IS FURNISHED ON AN "AS-IS" BASIS. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY MAKES NO WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, AS TO ANY MATTER INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR PURPOSE OR MERCHANTABILITY, EXCLUSIVITY, OR RESULTS OBTAINED FROM USE OF THE MATERIAL. CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY DOES NOT MAKE ANY WARRANTY OF ANY KIND WITH RESPECT TO FREEDOM FROM PATENT, TRADEMARK, OR COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT. [DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A] This material has been approved for public release and unlimited distribu- tion. Please see Copyright notice for non-US Government use and distribution. This material may be reproduced in its entirety, without modification, and freely distributed in written or elec- tronic form without requesting formal permission. Permission is required for any other use. Requests for per- mission should be directed to the Software Engineering Institute at [email protected]. CERT® and CERT Coordination Center® are registered in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office by Carnegie Mellon University. DM17-0052 2002 CERT ADVISORIES | SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE | CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY [DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A] Approved for public release and unlimited distribution. Table of Contents CA-2002-01: Exploitation of Vulnerability in CDE Subprocess Control Service 1 CA-2002-02: Buffer Overflow in AOL ICQ 4 CA-2002-03: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Many Implementations of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) 7 CA-2002-04: Buffer Overflow in Microsoft Internet Explorer 114 CA-2002-05: Multiple Vulnerabilities in PHP fileupload 118 CA-2002-06: Vulnerabilities in Various Implementations of the RADIUS Protocol 121 CA-2002-07: Double Free Bug in zlib Compression Library 130 CA-2002-08: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Oracle Servers 140 CA-2002-09: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft IIS 147 CA-2002-10: Format String Vulnerability in rpc.rwalld 151 CA-2002-11: Heap Overflow in Cachefs Daemon (cachefsd) 154 CA-2002-12: Format String Vulnerability in ISC DHCPD 158 CA-2002-13: Buffer Overflow in Microsoft's MSN Chat ActiveX Control 163 CA-2002-14: Buffer overflow in Macromedia JRun 166 CA-2002-15: Denial-of-Service Vulnerability in ISC BIND 9 168 CA-2002-16: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Yahoo! Messenger 174 CA-2002-17: Apache Web Server Chunk Handling Vulnerability 178 CA-2002-18: OpenSSH Vulnerabilities in Challenge Response Handling 187 CA-2002-19: Buffer Overflows in Multiple DNS Resolver Libraries 198 CA-2002-20: Multiple Vulnerabilities in CDE ToolTalk 210 CA-2002-21: Vulnerability in PHP 217 CA-2002-22: Multiple Vulnerabilities in Microsoft SQL Server 222 CA-2002-23: Multiple Vulnerabilities In OpenSSL 229 CA-2002-24: Trojan Horse OpenSSH Distribution 236 CA-2002-25: Integer Overflow In XDR Library 240 CA-2002-26: Buffer Overflow in CDE ToolTalk 247 CA-2002-27: Apache/mod_ssl Worm 254 CA-2002-28: Trojan Horse Sendmail Distribution 261 CA-2002-29: Buffer Overflow in Kerberos Administration Daemon 265 2002 CERT ADVISORIES | SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE | CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY i [DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A] Approved for public release and unlimited distribution. CA-2002-30: Trojan Horse tcpdump and libpcap Distributions 272 CA-2002-31: Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND 275 CA-2002-32: Backdoor in Alcatel OmniSwitch AOS 289 CA-2002-33: Heap Overflow Vulnerability in Microsoft Data Access Components (MDAC) 291 CA-2002-34: Buffer Overflow in Solaris X Window Font Service 294 CA-2002-35: Vulnerability in RaQ Server Appliances 299 CA-2002-36: CERT® Advisory CA-2002-36 Multiple Vulnerabilities in SSH Implementations 302 CA-2002-37: CERT® Advisory CA-2002-37 Buffer Overflow in Microsoft Windows Shell 310 2002 CERT ADVISORIES | SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE | CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY ii [DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A] Approved for public release and unlimited distribution. 1: CA-2002-01: Exploitation of Vulnerability in CDE Subprocess Control Service CA-2002-01: Exploitation of Vulnerability in CDE Subprocess Control Service Original release date: January 14, 2002 Last revised: -- Source: CERT/CC A complete revision history can be found at the end of this file. Systems Affected . Systems running CDE Overview The CERT/CC has received credible reports of scanning and exploitation of Solaris systems run- ning the CDE Subprocess Control Service buffer overflow vulnerability identified in CA-2001-31 and discussed in VU#172583. I. Description Since CA-2001-31 was originally released last November, the CERT/CC has received reports of scanning for dtspcd (6112/tcp). Just recently, however, we have received credible reports of an exploit for Solaris systems. Using network traces provided by The Honeynet Project, we have confirmed that the dtspcd vulnerability identified in CA-2001-31 and discussed in VU#172583 is actively being exploited. The Common Desktop Environment (CDE) is an integrated graphical user interface that runs on UNIX and Linux operating systems. The CDE Subprocess Control Service (dtspcd) is a net- work daemon that accepts requests from clients to execute commands and launch applications re- motely. On systems running CDE, dtspcd is spawned by the Internet services daemon (typically inetd or xinetd) in response to a CDE client request. dtspcd is typically configured to run on port 6112/tcp with root privileges. There is a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability in a shared library that is used by dtspcd. During client negotiation, dtspcd accepts a length value and subsequent data from the client without performing adequate input validation. As a result, a malicious client can manipulate data sent to dtspcd and cause a buffer overflow, potentially executing code with root privileges. The overflow occurs in a fixed-size 4K buffer that is exploited by the contents of one of the attack packets. The signature can be found at bytes 0x3e-0x41 in the following attack packet from a tcpdump log (lines may wrap): 09:46:04.378306 10.10.10.1.3592 > 10.10.10.2.6112: P 1:1449(1448) ack 1 win 16060 <nop,nop,timestamp 463986683 4158792> (DF) 2002 CERT ADVISORIES | SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE | CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY 1 [DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A] Approved for public release and unlimited distribution. 1: CA-2002-01: Exploitation of Vulnerability in CDE Subprocess Control Service 0x0000 4500 05dc a1ac 4000 3006 241c 0a0a 0a01 [email protected].$..... 0x0010 0a0a 0a02 0e08 17e0 fee2 c115 5f66 192f ...f........_f./ 0x0020 8018 3ebc e1e9 0000 0101 080a 1ba7 dffb ..>............. 0x0030 003f 7548 3030 3030 3030 3032 3034 3130 .?uH000000020410 0x0040 3365 3030 3031 2020 3420 0000 0031 3000 3e0001..4....10. 0x0050 801c 4011 801c 4011 1080 0101 801c 4011 ..@...@.......@. 0x0060 801c 4011 801c 4011 801c 4011 801c 4011 ..@...@...@...@. ... The value 0x103e in the ASCII (right) column above is interpreted by the server as the number of bytes in the packet to copy into the internal 4K (0x1000) buffer. Since 0x103e is greater than 0x1000, the last 0x3e bytes of the packet will overwrite memory after the end of the 4K buffer. This is the same compromise vector identified in VU#172583. It is important to note that several Internet-enabled games may also use port 6112/tcp as a legiti- mate part of their normal operation, therefore, not all network activity involving this service may be malicious. Network administrators monitoring this type of activity may wish to verify whether probes of this type are actually attempts to exploit VU#172583. Many common UNIX systems ship with CDE installed and enabled by default. To determine if your system is configured to run dtspcd, check for the following entries (lines may wrap): in /etc/services dtspc 6112/tcp in /etc/inetd.conf dtspc stream tcp nowait root /usr/dt/bin/dtspcd /usr/dt/bin/dtspcd Any system that does not run the CDE Subprocess Control Service is not vulnerable to this prob- lem. II. Impact An attacker can execute arbitrary code with root privileges. III. Solution Apply a patch VU#172583 contains information from vendors who have provided information for this advisory. We will update the vulnerability note as we receive more information. If a vendor's name does not appear, then the CERT/CC did not hear from that vendor. Please contact your vendor directly. 2002 CERT ADVISORIES | SOFTWARE ENGINEERING INSTITUTE | CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY 2 [DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A] Approved for public release and unlimited distribution. 1: CA-2002-01: Exploitation of Vulnerability in CDE Subprocess Control Service Vendor information can be found in the "Systems Affected" section of VU#172583 http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/172583#systems Limit access to vulnerable service Until patches are available and can be applied, you may wish to limit or block access to the Sub- process Control Service from untrusted networks such as the Internet. Using a firewall or other packet-filtering technology, block or restrict access to the port used by the Subprocess Control Service.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Securecrt 7.3.6 Crack for Mac >>>
    Securecrt 7.3.6 Crack For Mac >>> http://shurll.com/77o35 1 / 5 2 / 5 hash,,47850D6A1C717CEC4534B14525ED9BF2292DD905,,... VanDyke,,SecureCRT,,and,,SecureFX,,7 .3.6,,[Mac,,Os,,X],,[MAC599],,DOWNLOAD,,TORRENTSecureCRT,,for,,Mac,,OS,,X,,7.1... VanDyke,,Secu reCRT,,and,,SecureFX,,7.3.6,,[Mac,,Os,,X].torrent,,내부,,파일,,..Turn,,,your,,,computer,,,into,,,a,,,terminal,, ,server,,,using,,,Serial,,,to,,,Ethernet,,,Converter,,,with,,,its,,,amazing,,,capability,,,to,,,share,,,serial,,, devices,,,in,,,... Free,,,Download,,,SecureCRT,,,for,,,Mac,,,8.1.3,,,Build,,,1382,,,-,,,A,,,fully-featured,,,te rminal,,,emulator,,,as,,,well,,,as,,,a,,,SSH,,,and,,,Telnet,,,client,,,with,,,advanced,,,session,,,mana... Do wnload,,,VanDyke,,,SecureCRT,,,and,,,SecureFX,,,7.3.6,,,[Mac,,,Os,,,X],,,[MAC599],,,torrent,,,or,,,any,, ,other,,,torrent,,,from,,,Mac,,,category. SecureCRT®,,,7.3.6.963,,,for,,,MAC,,,|,,,40.7MbUsers,,,with,,,PCs,,,installed,,,with,,,Windows,,,8. Secu reCRT,,,provides,,,rock-solid,,,terminal,,,emulation,,,for,,,computing,,,professionals,,,,raising,,,product ivity,,,with,,,advanced,,,session,,,management,,,and,,,a,,,host,,,of,,,ways,,,to,,,save SecureCRT,,,for,,, Mac,,,,free,,,and,,,safe,,,downloadSecureCRT,,,supports,,,SSH2,,,,SSH1,,,,Telnet,,,,Telnet/SSL,,,,Serial, ,,,and,,,other,,,protocols..It,,,has,,,been,,,designed,,,to,,,be,,,used,,,during,,,the,,,high,,,stress,,,produc tion,,,... Torrentz,,,-,,,Fast,,,and,,,convenient,,,Torrents,,,Search,,,EngineApowersoft,,Screen,,Capture, ,Pro,,1.3.1,,InclTurn,,your,,computer,,into,,a,,terminal,,server,,using,,Serial,,to,,Ethernet,,Converter,,
    [Show full text]
  • SUN COBALT Qube 3 Appliance
    SUN COBALT™ Qube 3 Appliance - TAKE CONTROL OF YOUR INTERNET PRESENCE SUN COBALT Qube 3 Appliance SUN COBALT SIMPLE TO INSTALL AND EASY TO MANAGE, THE SUN COBALT™ QUBE 3 APPLIANCE ENABLES YOU TO LEVERAGE THE POWER OF THE INTERNET ON YOUR OWN TERMS. THE SERVER APPLIANCE THAT REVOLUTIONIZED Secure, Flexible and Shared Internet Connectivity THE MARKET by providing companies with a simple External analog modem? ISDN? LAN connection? and affordable way to leverage the Internet is better DSL router? Cable modem? PPPoE? Leased-line than ever. Out of the box, the Sun Qube 3 appli- connection? It doesn’t matter how you connect to ance is ready to turn your organization into a truly the Internet: the Sun Qube 3 appliance supports connected workplace. them all. And the connection can be securely shared across an entire organization. The Most Potent Appliance on the Market The Sun Qube 3 appliance offers unparalleled func- No Network Administrator Required tionality at a fraction of the cost of a general-purpose Not only has it been designed to fit easily within an server. To put it simply, all of the tools and services existing network, the Sun Qube 3 appliance is necessary for a powerful Internet presence are inte- intended to remove the need for a dedicated net- grated right into the Sun Qube appliance. All you work administrator. The minute you power up the have to do is turn it on. Imagine the ability to Sun Qube 3 appliance, the DHCP client or the instantly launch a Web site full of rich content, auto-configuration utility will take care of the setup securely share your Internet connection across (network and services).
    [Show full text]
  • Feature List Secure Shell
    Feature List Secure Shell SSH1 and SSH2 support Both SSH1 and SSH2 are supported in a single client, providing the maximum in flexibility when connecting to a range of remote servers. User authentication SecureCRT supports Password, Public Key (RSA, DSA, and X.509 including Smart Cards), Kerberos v5 (via GSSAPI), and Keyboard Interactive when connecting to SSH2 servers. For SSH1 servers, Password, Public Key, and TIS authentications are supported. Public Key Assistant Support for Public Key Assistant makes uploading public keys to an SSH2 server simple and safe for end users. Support for GSSAPI secured key Mechanisms supported depend on GSSAPI provider. exchange SFTP in a tab You can open an SFTP tab to the same SSH2 session without having to re-authenticate to perform file transfer operations using an interactive, text-based SFTP utility. Encryption ciphers: Strong The maximum 2048 bits length of DSA keys under SSH2 provides strong encryption. SecureCRT supports AES- encryption 128, AES-192, AES-256, Twofish, Blowfish, 3DES, and RC4 when connecting to SSH2 servers. For SSH1 servers, Blowfish, DES, 3DES, and RC4 are supported. Password and passphrase SSH2 session passwords and passphrases can be cached, letting SecureCRT and SecureFX share passwords and caching passphrases while either application or the Activator utility is running. Port forwarding Tunnel common TCP/IP protocols (for example, POP3, IMAP4, HTTP, SMTP) via SecureCRT to a remote Secure Shell server using a single, secure, multiplexed connection. Port forwarding configuration has been integrated into the tree-based Session Options dialog allowing easier configuration for securing TCP/IP application data. Dynamic port forwarding Dynamic port forwarding simplifies how TCP/IP application data is routed through the Secure Shell connection.
    [Show full text]
  • Secure Configuration and Management of Linux Systems
    Secure Configuration and Management of Linux Systems using a Network Service Orchestrator Vijay Satti A Thesis in The Department of Concordia Institute for Information Systems Engineering Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Applied Science at Concordia University Montréal, Québec, Canada May 2019 c Vijay Satti, 2019 CONCORDIA UNIVERSITY School of Graduate Studies This is to certify that the thesis prepared By: Vijay Satti Entitled: Secure Configuration and Management of Linux Systems using a Network Service Orchestrator and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Applied Science complies with the regulations of this University and meets the accepted standards with respect to originality and quality. Signed by the Final Examining Committee: Chair Dr. Walter Lucia Examiner Dr. Anjali Agarwal Examiner Dr. Amr Youssef Supervisor Dr. J. William Atwood Approved by Dr. Chadi Assi, Graduate Program Director Department of Concordia Institute for Information Systems Engineering 2019 Dr. Amir Asif, Dean Faculty of Engineering and Computer Science Abstract Secure Configuration and Management of Linux Systems using a Network Service Orchestrator Vijay Satti Manual management of the configuration of network devices and computing devices (hosts) is an error-prone task. Centralized automation of these tasks can lower the costs of management, but can also introduce unknown or unanticipated security risks. Miscon- figuration (deliberate (by outsiders) or inadvertent (by insiders)) can expose a system to significant risks. Centralized network management has seen significant progress in recent years, result- ing in model-driven approaches that are clearly superior to previous "craft" methods. Host management has seen less development.
    [Show full text]
  • Sun Cobalt Raqtm 550 Server Appliance
    Preconfigured services: Data-center reliability and Manage your managers: Flexible development SunTM ONEready: On the Web | http://www.sun.com/cobalt/ Integrated Web-serving security: Maintain data Multilevel administration platform: The ideal frame- By integrating Sun ONE software, e-mail services, integrity with RAID levels helps enable your IT work for maintenance-free and JavaTM technology, the name- and IP-based virtual 0 and 1, XFS journaling file professionals to manage service delivery, it features Sun Cobalt RaQ 550 server site support, and intuitive system for fast recovery, additional administrator a full suite of development appliance helps enable the Web-based administra- and Web-based backup accounts and delegate tools, programming lan- delivery of smart Web ser- tion—it all comes factory- and restore utility; it also system management. guages, text editors, debug- vices today on a rock-solid installed and ready to go. features rock-solid data gers, libraries, and more. standard Linux distribution center security protection. with the ease of use expected from a server appliance. Sun Cobalt RaQTM 550 Server Appliance With tight integration of applications, tools, and management, it’s the ideal server appliance for today’s data center. Data center computing with an edge. Whether you’re a small- or medium-sized enterprise building out your network edge to deliver Web services, an Internet service provider needing a reliable hosting system, or a developer looking for a flexible platform for fast, integrated development, look no further than the Sun Cobalt RaQTM550 server appliance. This preconfigured appliance is the perfect solution for data center edge applications such as Java-based Web tier applications and SunTM ONE Web services to critical network services like e-mail, FTP, DNS, and Web serving.
    [Show full text]
  • Tunneling with Secure Shell (SSH) Secure Shell Tunneling with Secure Shell
    White Paper Tunneling with Secure Shell (SSH) 4848 tramway ridge dr. ne suite 101 albuquerque, nm 87111 505 - 332 -5700 www.vandyke.com Tunneling with Secure Shell Remote access to network resources is increasingly a business requirement, but external network threats must be neutralized. A Secure Shell (SSH) capability called port forwarding allows nonsecure TCP/IP data to be tunneled across public and private networks through a secure, encrypted connection. The benefits of port forwarding are illustrated by a series of concrete examples. VanDyke Software's clients and servers provide an end-to-end tunneling solution to secure client/server applications, which may serve as a lightweight alternative to a Virtual Private Network (VPN). With today’s increasingly mobile and distributed workforce, providing remote access to travelers and teleworkers is no longer a “nice to have” option. In many corporations, remote access to business applications has become mission critical. At the same time, Internet access is now cheap, fast, and readily available. Leveraging the Internet to extend the local area network (LAN), provide real-time communications, and immediate file transfer and sharing is a scalable, cost-effective soluti on for corporate network remote access. However, Internet-based remote access also adds significant risk. Sensitive data can be intercepted, modified, or replayed anywhere between remote workers and the corporate firewall. Broadcast access technologies like cable and wireless are especially vulnerable. Whenever a computer is connected to the Internet, it becomes a potential target for intruders. "Always on" broadband greatly increases this exposure by giving intruders a fixed target to attack repeatedly over time.
    [Show full text]
  • SUN COBALT R Aq XTR Server Appliance
    SUN COBALT™ RaQ™ XTR Server Appliance XTR Server RaQ Appliance SUN COBALT HIGH-PERFORMANCE, EXTENSIBLE HOSTING APPLIANCE WITH CUTTING-EDGE DESIGN, IT’S THE FIRST 1RU SERVER APPLIANCE TO OFFER UP TO FOUR FRONT-REMOVABLE, RAID HARD DISK DRIVES IN ADDITION TO THE SUPERIOR EASE OF USE & SIMPLICITY THAT SUN COBALT APPLIANCES HAVE BEEN KNOWN FOR. INTRODUCING THE NEW, HIGH-PERFORMANCE SERVER The RaQ XTR server appliance also offers DNS service, APPLIANCE FROM SUN COBALT. Born out of the pro- management and monitoring via SNMP, bandwidth duct that revolutionized the hosting market, Sun management capabilities, and support for a number Cobalt server appliances are a new class of infra- of third party backup packages. To ensure the server structure built specifically to deliver feature-rich net- is always running at its best, it comes with BlueLinQ™ work based applications. The Sun RaQ™ XTR repre- technology which keeps administrators informed of sents a new era for servers; easier to use, more reli- new software and updates that become available. able and better suited to generate a greater return on investment. Out of the box, it offers a complete solution that combines hardware and integrated software that is uniquely designed toward an increased focus on networked client-server environ- ments. Complete, Turnkey Hosting Platform for Service Providers Open Access. Sun RaQ XTR server appliance features a unique front The Sun Cobalt RaQ XTR server appliance is pre- panel which opens to allow easy access to your Hard Disk Drives. configured with all the necessary tools and services Increased Performance and Expandability for to deploy content-rich Web sites in just minutes.
    [Show full text]
  • Inside: Special Focus Issue: Security
    THE MAGAZINE OF USENIX & SAGE November 2001 • Volume 26 • Number 7 Special Focus Issue: Security Guest Editor: Rik Farrow inside: BEST PRACTICES No Plaintext Passwords by Abe Singer & The Advanced Computing Systems Association & The System Administrators Guild no plaintext passwords Introduction by Abe Singer Compromise of a user password is one of the most difficult intrusions to Abe Singer is a com- ORENSICS detect. Historically it has been difficult or impossible to avoid transmission puter security man- | F ager at the San Diego of passwords in the clear. But the technology now exists to make this possi- Supercomputer Cen- ble, albeit not trivially. The San Diego Supercomputer Center (SDSC) has ter, and occasional consultant and expert ETECTION managed to eliminate plaintext password transmission, while continuing to witness. His current D work is in security deliver services to a widely distributed user base. While it took some techni- measurement and security “for the life cal effort, overcoming the human hurdles proved to be more challenging. NTRUSION of the Republic.” |I This article discusses what solutions we provided and how we managed to do it without annoying too many people. We have actually added value to [email protected] RACTICES the environment, instead of reducing it. P EST At SDSC, we have to deal with some interesting issues of scale. We have thousands of B users and very few support staff. We have a wide variety of operating systems, high- speed networks and high-performance storage systems. Our users expect to be able to move large amounts of data (terabytes) around, in a reasonable amount of time.
    [Show full text]
  • An Overview of the Secure Shell (SSH) Secure Shell Secure Shell Overview
    White Paper An Overview of the Secure Shell (SSH) 4848 tramway ridge dr. ne suite 101 albuquerque, nm 87111 505 - 332 -5700 www.vandyke.com Secure Shell Overview Overview of Secure Shell ................................................................................................... 2 Introduction to Secure Shell............................................................................................ 2 History of Secure Shell ................................................................................................... 2 Functionality of Secure Shell.......................................................................................... 3 Secure Command Shell............................................................................................... 3 Port forwarding ........................................................................................................... 3 Secure File Transfer.................................................................................................... 4 Protocol Basics of Secure Shell ...................................................................................... 5 User Authentication .................................................................................................... 5 Host Authentication .................................................................................................... 7 Data Encryption .......................................................................................................... 8 Data Integrity .............................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Safezone Browser Download Cent Safezone Browser Download Cent
    safezone browser download cent Safezone browser download cent. NOT REGISTERED YET? RETRIEVE YOUR PERNUM FOR BETA TESTERS--> PLEASE ENTER YOUR REGISTERED EMAIL. Your PERNUM will be sent to your registered email account. REQUEST PASSWORD FOR BETA TESTERS--> PLEASE ENTER YOUR PERNUM. Your temporary password will be sent to your registered email account. RESET YOUR MASTER PIN FOR BETA TESTERS--> PLEASE ENTER YOUR REGISTERED EMAIL AND SAFEZONE PASSWORD. RESET YOUR MASTER PIN FOR BETA TESTERS--> YOUR REQUEST HAS BEEN RECEIVED. An email has been sent to our Support Team and they will contact you at your registered email for assistance. Please allow up to 48 hours for a response, emails are processed in the order they are received. SET UP YOUR MASTER PIN FOR BETA TESTERS--> PLEASE ENTER YOUR REGISTERED EMAIL AND SAFEZONE PASSWORD. SET UP YOUR MASTER PIN FOR BETA TESTERS--> Your SafeZone Pass is protected by two-step authentication. For every login process, or if you need to change your profile data, you need a one- time pin which has been randomly generated from your 6-digit Master Pin. SET UP YOUR MASTER PIN FOR BETA TESTERS--> Oops! There is already a Master PIN set up for this account. Please either login using your existing Master PIN or you may reset your Master PIN. SET UP YOUR MASTER PIN FOR BETA TESTERS--> Your Master Pin has been set up successfully! Let us test your first One-Time Pin, which is randomly generated from your Master Pin. Please enter the matching digits of your Master Pin: SafeZone APK. SafeZone app is only available at organizations using the SafeZone solution .
    [Show full text]
  • Hacking Attacks and Examples Test.Pdf
    Y L F M A E T Team-Fly® The WILEY Dear Valued Customer, advantage We realize you’re a busy professional with deadlines to hit. Whether your goal is to learn a new technology or solve a critical problem, we want to be there to lend you a hand. Our primary objective is to provide you with the insight and knowledge you need to stay atop the highly competitive and ever- changing technology industry. Wiley Publishing, Inc., offers books on a wide variety of technical categories, including security, data warehousing, software development tools, and networking—everything you need to reach your peak. Regardless of your level of expertise, the Wiley family of books has you covered. • For Dummies—The fun and easy way to learn • The Weekend Crash Course—The fastest way to learn a new tool or technology • Visual—For those who prefer to learn a new topic visually • The Bible—The 100% comprehensive tutorial and reference • The Wiley Professional list—Practical and reliable resources for IT professionals The book you hold now, Hack Attacks Testing: How to Conduct Your Own Security Audit, allows you to perform your own security audit by providing step-by-step guidance on how to build and operate a security analysis/monitoring system. Covering both Windows and UNIX—in a dual boot configuration—the book covers building and operating your own vulnerability analysis system, using only the top-quality tools available today. You’ll find these tools on the book’s CD-ROM. This book will be very valuable to anyone who needs to regularly conduct network security audits while staying within a limited budget.
    [Show full text]
  • Assurance Activity Report (MDFPP31/WLANCEP10) for Google Pixel Phones on Android 11.0
    www.GossamerSec.com Assurance Activity Report (MDFPP31/WLANCEP10) for Google Pixel Phones on Android 11.0 Version 0.4 02/04/2021 Prepared by: Gossamer Security Solutions Accredited Security Testing Laboratory – Common Criteria Testing Catonsville, MD 21228 Prepared for: National Information Assurance Partnership Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Scheme Document: AAR-VID11124 © 2020 Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc. All rights reserved. Version 0.4, 02/04/2021 REVISION HISTORY Revision Date Authors Summary Version 0.1 12/11/20 Tammy Compton Initial draft Austin Kimbrell Version 0.2 01/21/21 Austin Kimbrell Address comments Version 0.3 01/29/21 Austin Kimbrell Address comments Version 0.4 02/04/21 Austin Kimbrell Address comments The TOE Evaluation was Sponsored by: Google LLC 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway Mountain View, CA 94043 Evaluation Personnel: Justin Bettencourt Tammy Compton Austin Kimbrell John Messiha Raymond Smoley Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc. Catonsville, MD Common Criteria Versions: Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 1: Introduction, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 2: Security functional components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017 Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation Part 3: Security assurance components, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017 Common Evaluation Methodology Versions: Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Evaluation Methodology, Version 3.1, Revision 5, April 2017 GSS CCT Assurance Activity Report Page 2 of 182 © 2020 Gossamer Security Solutions, Inc. Document: AAR-VID11124 All rights reserved. Version 0.4, 02/04/2021 TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................................................... 7 1.1 Device Equivalence .....................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]