Special Warfare the Professional Bulletin of the John F

Special Warfare The Professional Bulletin of the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School

PB 80–98–4 Fall 1998 Vol. 11, No. 4 From the Commandant Special Warfare

In 1962, President John F. Kennedy said, “There is another type of warfare — new in its intensity, ancient in its origin — war by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of by combat, by infiltra- tion instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him … It preys on unrest.” Thirty-six years later, the kind of warfare Kennedy described still challenges us. Joint Vision 2010 and the visions of the various service components, including ARSOF Vision 2010, recognize that while war-fighting will remain the central mission of the United States’ armed forces, operations other than war will be increasingly important. OOTW fig- mented by dedicated conventional forces from ure prominently in the U.S. strategy of peace- various service components. time engagement, an interagency effort to Regional-engagement operations consist of shape the strategic environment. The mili- three functions: Situational awareness, per- tary’s role in the effort is regional engagement. formed by regional-engagement forces serving The joint operational concept of regional as global scouts, permits early identification of engagement presented in this issue of Spe- potential crises. War avoidance, performed by cial Warfare offers the U.S. an efficient way of regional-engagement forces serving as strategic resolving future threats with our increasing- shapers, consists of actions taken with indige- ly constrained resources. Regional engage- nous forces to resolve potential crises before ment is only one aspect of a military strategy they escalate to crisis. Battlespace preparation, that includes war-fighting and defense of the performed by regional-engagement forces serv- homeland. Taken together, the three activi- ing as operational combat outposts, consists of ties encompass all military missions, from actions taken to create favorable conditions for peace through conflict to war. the forced entry of U.S. combat forces. The regional-engagement concept proposes a Regional engagement, in combination with core group of “engagement professionals” who war-fighting and homeland defense, will allow would form the basis for, and provide command us to take a comprehensive approach to future and control of, regional-engagement activities. military operations. Regional engagement will These soldiers would possess skills and attrib- minimize risks, maximize the use of our con- utes that can be described as “SOF-like.” Using strained resources, and ensure our operational existing SOF to form the basis of both the core and strategic flexibility in meeting future group of engagement professionals and the symmetric and asymmetric threats to the engagement force structures presents the most United States. efficient means of implementing the regional- engagement concept. The structure suggested for a typical regional-engagement force, or REF, is a standing joint headquarters formed around a nucleus from the CINC’s special-operations command. Core Major General Kenneth R. Bowra forces assigned to the REF would be SOF, aug- PB 80–98–4 Contents Fall 1998 Special Warfare Vol. 11, No. 4

Commander & Commandant Major General Kenneth R. Bowra Features Editor 2 Regional Engagement: An ARSOF Approach to Future Jerry D. Steelman Theater Operations Associate Editor by Major General Kenneth R. Bowra and Colonel William H. Sylvia W. McCarley Harris Jr. Graphics & Design 24 Protecting U.S. National Interests: The Role of the Bruce S. Barfield Ambassador and the Country Team Automation Clerk by Jon Gundersen Gloria H. Sawyer 32 Academic Preparation: Sharpening the Tip of the MOOTW Spear by Captain Paul Shemella, U.S. Navy (ret.)

V E AS R I RT T A E S LI B E T

Special Warfare is an authorized, official quarterly of the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Its mission is to promote the professional development of special- operations forces by providing a forum for the examination of established doctrine and new ideas. Views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect official Army position. This publication does not supersede any information presented in other official Army publications. Articles, photos, artwork and letters are invited and should be addressed to Editor, Special Warfare, USAJFKSWCS, Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000. Telephone: DSN 239-5703, commercial (910) 432-5703, fax -3147. Special Warfare reserves the right to edit all material. Published works may be reprinted, except where copyrighted, provided credit is given to Special Warfare and the authors. Official distribution is limited to active and reserve special-operations units. Individuals desiring private subscriptions should forward their requests to: Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Special Warfare is also available on the Worldwide Web (www.usasoc.soc.mil/swcs/dotd/sw-mag.htm).

By Order of the Secretary of the Army: Dennis J. Reimer Departments General, United States Army Chief of Staff 36 1998 Index 37 Letters Official: 38 Enlisted Career Notes 40 Officer Career Notes Joel B. Hudson Administrative Assistant to the 43 Foreign SOF Secretary of the Army 46 Update 04972 48 Book Reviews Headquarters, Department of the Army Regional Engagement: An ARSOF Approach to Future Theater Operations

by Major General Kenneth R. Bowra and Colonel William H. Harris Jr.

oint Vision 2010 recognizes that war activities.” AV 2010 refers to the totality of and war-fighting are central to the peacetime-engagement activities as a Jmission of the armed forces of the dimension of influence that serves to United States. It also expresses the impor- strengthen the nation’s position.3 tance of the military’s role in operations The imperative of engagement resonates other than war: throughout the National Security Strategy To protect our vital national interests we for a New Century, which stresses the need will require strong armed forces, which are for enhancing our security through innova- organized, trained, and equipped to fight tive, effective and integrated approaches and win against any adversary at any level that will allow the nation to shape the of conflict. Concurrently, we must also be international environment. able to employ these forces in operations As these three publications make clear, other than war to assist in the pursuit of there is a general recognition that war- other important interests.1 fighting, while it will remain the central Other “futures” documents take a simi- focus of military activity, will not be the lar viewpoint. In Army Vision 2010, the only function expected of our forces in the U.S. Army lists three principal missions future. Following the 1998 spring war for the Army: to fight and win the nation’s game of the Army After Next, or AAN, wars; to provide a range of military war-game participants proposed a para- options short of war; and to deter aggres- digm that uses three overlapping opera- sion.2 AV 2010 also refers to the role of tional concepts — war-fighting, regional land forces in the U.S. strategy of preven- engagement and homeland defense4 — to tive defense, stating, “Through peacetime encompass the uses of military power. engagement, land forces are active and This article will focus on regional engage- dominant players in preventive defense ment, referring to war-fighting and homeland defense only to provide context to the Regional engagement is planned as a discussion. major topic of discussion during the 1999 Special Forces Branch Conference, to be Peacetime engagement held in April. Readers are encouraged to Neither the imperative of engagement provide comments to Commander, nor the responsibility for the national secu- USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DT-CD, Fort rity of the U.S. rests solely with the mili- Bragg, NC 28307-5200; or fax them to (910) tary. Engagement intended to enhance U.S. 432-2117 or DSN 239-2117 — Editor.

2 Special Warfare national security is often referred to as vehicle and the context for the military’s “peacetime engagement.” Although the strategy of preventive defense — proactive term is commonly used, it lacks a formal efforts to shape the strategic environment definition. For the purposes of this article, and to create conditions favorable to U.S. peacetime engagement is defined as: national interests.5 Activities of the U.S. government, under- taken unilaterally or in cooperation with Regional engagement other national or non-nation-state entities, Regional engagement is a military oper- to influence international conditions in ational concept for implementing the strat- such a manner as to protect or advance U.S. egy of preventive defense. Regional national interests abroad. engagement is defined as: Peacetime engagement may therefore be Regionally oriented military informa- considered an interagency operational con- tion-gathering activities and proactive cept for implementing U.S. national-securi- measures taken to influence international ty strategy. There are other ways by which conditions in such a manner as to protect or the interagency community implements advance U.S. national interests abroad. U.S. national-security strategy, but peace- This definition emphasizes two signifi- time engagement is the aspect that leads cant aspects of regional engagement: its to regional engagement. regional orientation and its proactive Peacetime engagement is conducted with- nature. Regional orientation means that in a global strategic environment character- the military recognizes that each region or ized by a number of actors. These include subregion has distinct requirements; mili- nation-states; international organizations; tary forces organize their structure and transnational businesses; criminal organi- conduct their operations accordingly. zations; humanitarian-relief organizations; The proactive nature results from the regional-security organizations; and reli- fact that regional-engagement actions are gious, ethnic and cultural groups. part of a plan that is sequenced and Peacetime engagement provides the

A Holistic Paradigm for Military Operations MILITARY OPERATIONS

HOMELAND DEFENSE

REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT WAR-FIGHTING

Fall 1998 3 Context of Regional Engagement GLOBAL STRATEGIC CONTEXT

PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT (INTERAGENCY)

REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT (MILITARY)

resourced to achieve the theater-strategic peace. The balance between the two objectives of the regional commanders in dynamics varies as situations escalate chief, or CINCs. These objectives and their from peace through conflict to war. Home- implementing plans are developed and land defense is an integrated and interde- executed in coordination with other gov- pendent concept throughout. ernment agencies, or OGAs, in support of It is important to note that war-fighting, the national-strategic objectives for the regional engagement and homeland region. defense are not mutually exclusive. A single situation or area of operations may Operational dynamics employ all three concepts simultaneously. Like its complementary operational con- The regional-engagement concept repre- cepts of war-fighting and homeland sents a radical shift in the military defense, regional engagement is applicable approach to non-war-fighting tasks. The in all environments. combination of war-fighting, homeland War-fighting employs coercion, applying defense and regional engagement produces military power directly to compel an adver- a holistic approach that recognizes the con- sary to accede to the will of the U.S. Region- tinuity and interdependence of activities al engagement, however, employs influence, performed across the continuum of mili- applying military power indirectly and dis- tary operations. criminately to influence adversaries, allies Four aspects of regional engagement can or neutrals to act in a manner consistent enhance the ability of the U.S. to meet with U.S. national interests. future global challenges and symmetric While coercion may characterize aspects and asymmetric threats: of U.S. foreign policy in any environment, it First, regional engagement is part of a is the predominant dynamic in war. Simi- comprehensive approach to operational larly, influence, which may characterize art. This approach establishes the idea certain aspects of operations in any envi- that the military’s non-war-fighting activi- ronment, is the predominant dynamic in ties are not merely a means of employing an otherwise idle asset, but are valid uses

4 Special Warfare of the military element of national power. professional force for dealing with opera- The regional-engagement concept recog- tions other than war. Regional engagement nizes that the military is continuously on is a distinct requirement, not a lesser- an operational footing. Regional engage- included case. While our force structures ment may provide identification, warning can be sufficiently versatile to serve in and understanding of impending threats to multiple roles, there are aspects of region- national security. It can provide a means al engagement that require dedicated either of early warning to contain emerg- assets and specific doctrine, training, ing crises or, if containment fails, of shap- leader development, organizations and ing the battlespace to facilitate war-fight- materiel. Professional war fighters may ing. By warning of external threats and by provide a pool of talented and capable containing those threats, regional engage- resources, but they cannot be fully pre- ment becomes part of homeland-defense pared for the unique requirements of activities. regional engagement. Shifting their focus Second, in concert with the deterrent from war-fighting would have a negative effect of a credible war-fighting capability, impact on their combat readiness. If the regional engagement helps manage the U.S. is to become as dominant in regional global situation in order to avoid war. The engagement as it is in war-fighting, U.S. ability of the military to influence conflict military forces will require specific capabil- conditions has been demonstrated through- ities centered on a core of professionals out history. with an engagement focus similar to the Third, regional engagement provides a war fighter’s battle focus. Ideally, such

Operational Environments and Dynamics

INFLUENCE

WAR-FIGHTING

SUPPORTING SELECTIVELYSELECTIVELY

DOMINANT

PEACE SUPPORTING

SUPPORTING MUTUALLY MUTUALLYMUTUALLY

SUPPORTING CONFLICT SUPPORTING SELECTIVELY DOMINANT DOMINANT SUPPORTING WAR

REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

COERCION

Fall 1998 5 engagement professionals would be drawn will undoubtedly enhance our technical- from forces with unique war-fighting roles intelligence capabilities, HUMINT remains and missions closely paralleling those the only platform capable of placing required for regional engagement. human judgment at the point of collection. Fourth, regional engagement, war-fight- The ability to gather impressions, discern ing and homeland defense may be conduct- intentions, and convey them to persons ed concurrently. The AAN war games, as removed from the AO is indispensable both well as recent operational experiences, in developing plans and in implementing have shown that it is neither politically actions designed to influence conditions acceptable nor operationally wise to halt and third-party actions. HUMINT also pro- regional-engagement activities in order to vides context and background for inter- reallocate their assets to a regional contin- preting data gathered by technical means. gency operation or major theater war, or Global scouts provide a HUMINT capa- MTW. The requirement for regional- bility that is sensitive to the military-relat- engagement activities is significant in its ed nuances of situations, attitudes and con- own right. Even though a crisis may arise, ditions in areas of national interest. They necessitating a contingency operation, the supplement, but do not replace, other regional-engagement requirements remain. HUMINT assets. Their effectiveness and Moreover, failing to remain engaged may value to the information-gathering appara- give rise to a second escalating crisis. The tus are rooted in two advantages: multinational character of modern war, First, global scouts are part of the armed combined with increasing pressures to forces’ war-fighting culture. They perceive limit collateral damage, to maintain limit- and report information from a military ed but achievable goals for the involvement perspective. No other HUMINT asset is as of U.S. combat troops, and to extract U.S. well-prepared to support the information combat elements as early as possible, indi- needs of military commanders. Second, cates that regional engagement is likely to global scouts have access. In the U.S., the continue simultaneously with war-fighting uniformed services are, by law, subordinate activities, even in the crisis area of opera- to the civil leadership of the government. tions, or AO. In many lesser-developed nations and in a number of developed nations, the military Regional-engagement concept is involved in the political, social and eco- Regional engagement comprises three nomic aspects of government and society. mutually supportive functions: situational The global scouts’ association with a host awareness, war avoidance and battlespace nation’s military gives them access to preparation. Forces conducting regional- activities, institutions and thought proc- engagement hand-off operations perform esses that are usually unavailable to other three corresponding roles — global scouts, sources. strategic shapers and operational combat The global scout’s mission may not outposts. The functions and roles may be always be intelligence-collection. The glob- performed concurrently and by the same al scout may be forward-deployed to con- forces. duct multinational exercises, to establish Situational awareness. Performing as military-to-military-contacts, to provide global scouts, regional-engagement forces pro- training assistance, or to conduct any of a vide a military capability for collecting myriad of peacetime military activities. On human-intelligence, or HUMINT (observing such missions, the global scout’s informa- and interpreting conditions, attitudes, and tion-gathering activities will be passive in actions); and for providing ground truth to nature and incidental to the mission. commanders and to other interested parties. Critical to effective regional engagement Another function of the global scout is to iden- is the continuous presence of global scouts tify threats and exploitable opportunities. throughout the geographic CINC’s area of While future technological developments responsibility, or AOR, even where concerns are minimal. This is because access

6 Special Warfare Regional Engagement Functions and Roles REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS GLOBAL SCOUTS

WAR AVOIDANCE BATTLESPACE PREPARATION STRATEGIC SHAPERS OPERATIONAL COMBAT OUTPOSTS

and region- or country-specific orientation gic shapers to identify functions and activi- is neither automatic nor rapidly generated. ties that are best performed by military War avoidance. Using the situational forces and to avoid those that are best per- awareness provided by global scouts, the formed by other organizations. Effective CINC will develop plans to defuse poten- employment of strategic shapers permits the tial crises and to exploit opportunities to geographic CINC to influence his theater advance national interests. All actions during peacetime engagement to avoid crises taken under these plans must be carefully and to conserve his war-fighting capabilities. synchronized with, and supportive of, the Battlespace preparation. Not all wars objectives of interagency activity. are avoidable. When influence fails to The regional-engagement concept calls achieve circumstances acceptable to the for core regional-engagement profession- U.S. political leadership, the coercive war- als, supported by designated war-fighting fighting capability must be applied. forces, to act as strategic shapers to exe- Regional engagement provides a forward cute these plans. Strategic shapers are the presence that the geographic CINC can use experts in applying military capabilities to in shaping the battlespace to provide favor- conditions that may represent either a able conditions for his initial combat forces threat or an opportunity to advance U.S. and actions. In this function, regional- national interests. Critical to the concept is engagement professionals and their sup- the strategic shaper’s ability to act as a porting forces perform the role of opera- force multiplier, working with foreign mili- tional combat outposts. tary, paramilitary and civilian counter- Fundamental to the concept of regional parts, to achieve results disproportionately engagement is the concurrent performance large in comparison to the investment in of all three roles (global scout, strategic resources. shaper and operational combat outpost) and The value of the strategic shapers, like that all three functions (situational awareness, of the global scouts, is rooted in their military war avoidance and battlespace prepara- background and in their links to the war- tion). The operational combat outposts inte- fighting force. Their expertise permits strate- grate the roles of global scout, strategic

Fall 1998 7 shaper and war fighter. They also provide exploit opportunities to advance U.S. inter- ground truth and a means of influencing ests, provide the justification for this for- conditions in the AO before and during the ward presence. The forward presence of arrival of deploying combat forces. nonescalatory capabilities provides politi- Some battlespace preparation must cally nonthreatening and unique military begin early, before conditions escalate to a assets that OGAs and nongovernment crisis requiring war-fighting capabilities. organizations, or NGOs, cannot replicate. An early application of battlespace prepa- From the viewpoint of the host nations, the ration involves stripping away adversary regional-engagement professionals and capabilities. By establishing clear objec- their supporting forces provide a wealth of tives for regional-engagement forces, the expertise, resources and capabilities that geographic CINC can target certain capa- the host nations do not possess. Key to host- bilities of potential adversaries for elimi- nation acceptance is the establishment of nation prior to escalation to war. Thus bat- professional trust and confidence and the tlespace-preparation tasks are not reserved maintenance of a perception of mutual benefit between the host nation and the U.S. The operational combat outposts serve as A final aspect of forward presence is that it visibly demonstrates U.S. commitment. Forces the eyes and ears of both the geographic conducting regional-engagement operations provide tangible symbols of U.S. commitment CINC and the operational-level combat com- to the host nation and to the region. mander. … In this capacity, regional-engage- Regional engagement and homeland defense. Regional engagement is linked to ment forces serve as the ‘tip of the spear’ for homeland defense in much the same way that it is linked to war-fighting. Global scouts war-fighting forces. can provide warnings and indications from outside the continental U.S., or OCONUS, until war avoidance has failed, but may required for effective defensive operations at actually be performed concurrently with home. They can also provide insights into the the tasks of strategic shapers. culture, intentions, methods and capabilities The operational combat outposts serve of OCONUS threats that may attempt to as the eyes and ears of both the geograph- operate in or against the U.S. Strategic ic CINC and the operational-level combat shapers may be able to influence or intercept commander. In support of the operational a potential threat, acting unilaterally or and tactical plans of the combat command- through foreign forces. In some cases, resolv- er, the operational combat outposts act in ing the underlying causes of the emerging concert with indigenous forces to facilitate threat may serve the strategic purpose of the entry and the operations of combat preventive defense with respect to security of forces. In this capacity, regional-engage- the homeland. Operational combat outposts ment forces serve as the “tip of the spear” may be able to identify imminent threats and for war-fighting forces. determine their intentions or their approach. Most future scenarios posit a continuing They may be able to strip away certain decline in the size of forward-based combat adversary capabilities that are difficult to forces and a reduction in the number of attack domestically. available overseas bases in which to position these forces. Regional engagement pro- Characteristics vides a means of maintaining a low-cost for- Regional-engagement operations have ward presence, sustainable in terms of the following characteristics: resources and political considerations, that • Operationally offensive. Regional-engage- will facilitate continued access to foreign ment operations are inherently offensive. bases in the event of contingencies. They are conducted to create conditions The war-avoidance aspects of regional favorable to U.S. national interests, rather engagement, particularly those actions to

8 Special Warfare than to simply contain an action by a required to perform these tasks make potential adversary. This offensive mindset regional-engagement efforts inherently is crucial to the overall concept. Geograph- joint. Considerations such as distance, ic CINCs undertake regional-engagement infrastructure and sustainability require activities to seize the initiative before con- examination from a joint perspective; specif- ditions escalate to war. Because this opera- ic tasks may also require a blending of serv- tionally offensive concept supports a stra- ice-specific expertise into a joint concept. tegically defensive posture, it may include • Multinational. Because the prevailing a blend of offensive and defensive tactical dynamic of regional engagement is influ- actions. ence, success is determined as much by the • Continuous. Unlike war-fighting, which actions and the reactions of allies, neutrals provides an opportunity for detailed plan- and adversaries as it is by the actions of ning supported by battle-focused training, U.S. forces. Each action requires full con- regional engagement must be conducted sideration of the way it will be perceived based on a time-driven, political opera- and reacted to by all interested parties. tional tempo.6 Planning, control and tacti- While some regional-engagement activities cal execution must proceed concurrently are unilateral, most are accomplished by, and without interruption. As the speed, through or with surrogates, host nationals knowledge and lethality associated with or other third parties. Even though the war-fighting increase, and as the typical multinational characteristics of regional- duration of the combat phases of wars engagement activities impose difficult declines,7 war-fighting staffs will have lit- requirements on the core regional-engage- tle time and few resources to devote to ment professionals, they result in force- regional-engagement operations. Addition- multiplication and economy-of-force effects ally, plans covering regional-engagement that make regional engagement operations operations will evolve as conditions change an efficient and desirable use of limited or as the U.S. redefines its objectives. resources. • Synchronized. Geographic CINCs under- • Interagency. Regional engagement rep- take regional engagement as part of their resents the military’s participation in the overall campaign to advance and protect interagency activity of peacetime engage- U.S. national interests. Regional engagement, for which the Department of State, or ment must be planned and conducted to DoS, is normally the lead agency. DoS per- optimize the potential gain of its own activ- forms the majority of the diplomatic and ities as well as those of war-fighting. political tasks associated with peacetime • Joint. The various tasks involved in engagement and is responsible for coordi- regional engagement and the capabilities nating all U.S. government activities.

Military, government and nongovernment workers assemble during Opera- tion Noble Response in March 1998. Regional engagement represents the military’s participation in the interagency activity of peacetime Photo by R.A. Ward engagement.

Fall 1998 9 Within DoS, there is no organizational occurred, is occurring, or remains immi- equivalent of the military geographic CINC. nent. The theory is that this RMA is the The basis of DoS operational structure result of advances in technology — in par- OCONUS is the country team, a task-organ- ticular, information technology. Regional- ized interagency working group, which is engagement activities represent an excep- internal to an embassy and under the direct tion to this postulate. While advanced control of an ambassador. Each ambassador technologies will undoubtedly enhance cer- is a personal representative of the president tain regional-engagement capabilities and of the United States and has a degree of increase certain vulnerabilities, human independence unknown in the armed forces. factors and the human dimensions of con- The country team and the ambassador are flict will continue to dominate. The excep- focused on a specific country, not on the tion to this statement would be situations entire region. The power to synchronize the involving weapons of mass destruction, or activities of the various country teams and WMD. The increasing availability of WMD ambassadors within a specific region and their enhanced means of delivery have resides in DoS headquarters and in the introduced new dynamics into these types interagency process. of operations.8 The potential prevalence of There is no doctrinal publication describ- WMD, however, actually serves to increase ing how the interagency process works. the criticality of regional-engagement There is no procedures manual, and there is operations, particularly as a complemen- no single office that is chartered to establish tary concept to homeland defense. procedures. This is not to say that a process • Economical. Because regional engage- does not exist. In fact, on an issue-by-issue ment is largely conducted by, through or basis, there is usually a designated lead with indigenous or surrogate forces, it agency. For foreign affairs (and by exten- requires a smaller quantity of U.S. military sion, peacetime engagement) the lead human resources. agency is normally DoS. There are also generally accepted procedures for accomplish- Requirements ing tasks. While some are codified in law, in The characteristics of regional-engage- presidential decision directives, or in inter- ment activities dictate certain require- nal agency policies and procedures, most ments for future change if the U.S. is to exist as mutual understandings of workable ensure the existence of a force that is opti- methods. mally configured and fully prepared. In spite of the difficulties in developing These requirements generate issues for military-style plans to support such an future armed forces in the areas of doc- unstructured approach, effective regional trine, training, leader development, engagement requires precisely such plans. organization, materiel and soldiers, or Regional-engagement plans and activities DTLOMS. Training, leader development must be synchronized with the operations and soldiers (selection of appropriate mili- of OGAs. These plans and activities must tary personnel) are of particular impor- also support the plans, objectives and tance because they deal with human fac- intentions of the lead agency.This presents tors, the predominant dimension of mili- challenges for those charged with creating tary operations in regional engagement. and maintaining regional-engagement While the DTLOMS solutions are inter- plans and for those charged with imple- dependent, it is not feasible to sequence menting them. them so that we complete one before work- • Access-dependent. Regional-engage- ing on the next. It isn’t possible to wait until ment operations are characterized by an doctrine has been developed to begin leader unusual degree of access to host-nation development and training — these func- institutions and locations. tions may require decades for full imple- • Human-factors-dominated. Most fu- mentation. The Army battalion commander tures documents postulate that a revolu- of 2010 is already a mid-grade captain and tion in military affairs, or RMA, either has

10 Special Warfare will soon attend the Command and Staff College. It is therefore reasonable to begin advancing in all areas concurrently, particularly in the long-term areas of doctrine and organization, making adjustments as related areas are developed. Doctrine. While all aspects of the regional- engagement concept require refinement and expansion in doctrine, several issues need to be incorporated into joint and service doctrine in order to effectively implement the concept: • A dedicated core of regional-engagement professionals must be identified and assigned to perform the three roles9 and the three integral functions10 of regional engagement. • Geographic CINCs require operational control, or OPCON, or a similar tasking authority, over organizations containing the core regional-engagement professionals oriented to the CINCs’ AORs. • Doctrine must stress the continuous and long-term nature of regional-engagement operations. It must develop and incorporate provisions for sustaining regional engagement. Doctrine should sim- plify, consolidate and modify tasks, missions and programs in order to enhance the geographic CINC’s ability to conduct such operations. Doctrinal changes may entail attendant structural changes. • The military must promulgate clear doctrinal guidance for the conduct of and the exploitation of information-gathering activities, ensuring an understanding of, and compliance with, limits imposed by Photo by Theodore Warren law and policy. Most of this doctrine exists independently. The following are core region- A U.S. Special Forces in fragmented form, but it is spread al-engagement training considerations: captain advises a Hun- throughout various classified and unclassi- • Frequent immersion in the AOR. garian platoon leader fied doctrinal and policy documents. • Regional orientation of individuals and how to perform map- • The services must establish and promul- units. route reconnaissance during an exercise at Fort gate procedures and guidance for the conduct • Regular exercises with designated sup- Polk, La. Training with of regional-engagement campaign planning. porting forces, to form habitual relationships. other countries requires This could be done by adapting current war- • Training programs that emphasize language, cross-cultural fighting operations-planning procedures to language proficiency, and cross-cultural and interpersonal skills. regional engagement. and interpersonal communications skills. Training. Training and leader develop- • Training that incorporates techniques ment often overlap, particularly in regional for sustained operations in austere environ- engagement, which, owing to the nature of its ments and in unusual climatic conditions. operations, its dispersion and the distances Techniques should include the ability to involved, will require small elements or indi- operate with little or no contact with other vidual soldiers who can operate relatively U.S. forces or personnel, including OGAs.

Fall 1998 11 • Regular training in interagency activi- agency process and interagency environ- ties; roles and functions of OGAs; capabili- ment. One of the suggestions from ARSOF ties and limitations of NGOs and interna- War Game 2 was that the U.S. needs an tional security organizations; and ways by interagency university on the level of the which to interface with these organizations. National Defense University. The inter- • Extensive training in nontraditional mil- agency university would be attended by itary skills necessary in negotiating with, service members designated as regional- establishing rapport with, and working effec- engagement professionals, among others.11 tively with indigenous forces and popula- • Thorough schooling in joint-staff proce- tions. These nontraditional skills include dures; joint war-fighting doctrine; and advanced medical capabilities; engineer top- applicable service doctrine, procedures and ics, such as sanitary systems and minor con- capabilities, especially for regional-engage- struction; and civil administration. ment leaders and staff officers. • Training in U.S. war-fighting skills, • Regional-orientation assignments and tactics and doctrine. schooling, with appropriate dispensations • Training in AOR-specific skills. granted when those conflict with service- Leader development. In addition to train- unique advancement requirements. ing requirements, there are requirements • Modification of traditional career pat- for leader development. These are critical terns to accommodate the operational for core regional-engagement professionals demands of regional engagement. assigned to higher-level headquarters: Organization. Planning for, and resourc- • A thorough understanding of the inter- ing of, regional-engagement organizations

Engagement Focus and Battle Focus REGIONAL ENGAGEMENT WAR-FIGHTING

Capability and ENGAGEMENT FOCUS Applicability

Capability and BATTLE FOCUS Applicability

12 Special Warfare will require extensive study by a multidis- and linguistic skills and should possess the ciplined group to ensure optimal design of following universal traits: the force structure. Listed below are some • Above-average intelligence. of the organizational imperatives that • Language aptitude. must be observed: • Acceptance of other cultures. • Each geographic CINC requires a ded- • Tolerance of ambiguity. icated standing headquarters to perform • Problem-solving skills. continuous planning and to control region- • Tolerance for austere living conditions. al-engagement operations. The commander • Ability to function in groups and in and key staff of this headquarters should isolation. be core regional-engagement professionals. • Emotional and mental stability. These headquarters should be joint and • Tolerance for stress. should include senior interagency repre- • Self-discipline. sentatives from OGAs.12 • Self-confidence. • Forces of core regional-engagement pro- • Flexibility. fessionals should be organized and assigned In ARSOF War Game 2, the term “SOF- doctrinal regional-engagement roles and like” was used repeatedly by participants missions. They should be trained, equipped from the various services, branches and and apportioned for such operations. OGAs to describe the desirable character- • Supporting forces from the war-fight- istics of forces engaged in regional-engage- ing elements of the armed forces should be ment operations. Similarly, the desired pro- designated as having habitual relation- fessional development of leaders of such ships with specified regional-engagement forces was also described as “SOF-like.”13 forces. The Special Operations Posture Statement • Forces should be apportioned to the lists the following characteristics of SOF:14 regional CINC based upon the require- • Maturity and leadership ability. ments of both regional engagement and • Specialized skills, equipment and war-fighting. tactics. Materiel. Although human factors are • Regional focus. dominant in regional engagement, some • Language skills. materiel requirements could increase • Political and cultural sensitivity. capabilities: • Small, flexible, joint-force structure. • Secure, real-time systems for data SOF can: transfer. These include visual, audio and • Be tasked to organize quickly and to automated capabilities. These systems deploy rapidly in order to provide tailored would allow global scouts to pass ground responses to many different situations. truth in real time; they would permit stra- • Gain access to hostile or denied areas. tegic shapers to rapidly access specialized • Provide limited security and medical data in response to emerging require- support for themselves and for those ments; and they would facilitate coordina- they support. tion between operational combat outposts • Communicate worldwide with unit and war-fighting forces. equipment. • Communications systems that are • Live in austere, harsh environments fully interoperable with those of war-fight- without extensive support. ing forces. These are necessary to ensure • Survey and assess local situations, and synchronization. report these assessments rapidly. • AOR-specific equipment, either in-the- • Work closely with regional military and ater or at locations inside the continental civilian authorities and populations. U.S., or CONUS. Access to such equipment is • Organize indigenous people into work- required to ensure competence. ing teams to solve local problems. Soldiers. Regionally apportioned forces • Deploy at low cost, with a low profile will complement their core war-fighting and with a less intrusive presence than skills with an appropriate mix of cultural larger conventional forces.

Fall 1998 13 The SOF Posture Statement also lists the engagement is complex. On the positive following principal SOF missions and collat- side, the RC bring capabilities and skills eral activities. Note the many correlations that traditionally are not found in the to regional-engagement activities.15 active components, or AC, but that are of SOF principal missions: great value in regional-engagement opera- • Counterproliferation. tions. On the negative side, public law lim- • Combating terrorism. its the accessibility of RC units for the • Foreign internal defense. multiple deployments and extended time • Special reconnaissance. frames that characterize regional-engage- • Direct action. ment operations. • Psychological operations. RC units with appropriate supporting • Civil affairs. capabilities (predominantly combat sup- • Unconventional warfare. port/combat-service support) should have • Information operations. directed habitual affiliations with specified SOF collateral activities: REFs. The value of such an arrangement is • Coalition support. limited by the difficulties in accessing such • Combat search and rescue. units for extended periods. Unless struc- • Counterdrug activities. tural changes, including legislative relief, • Humanitarian demining activities. can be enacted, RC units must be consid- • Humanitarian assistance. ered supplements, not alternatives, to des- • Peace operations. ignated AC units. • Security assistance. RC units can be apportioned to REFs, pro- • Special activities. vided there is sufficient redundancy to In his Annual Report to the President ensure their availability. For example, if a and the Congress, 1998, Secretary of geographic CINC has a standing require- Defense William S. Cohen points out that ment for an Army engineer company, it may the missions and collateral activities of be necessary to apportion a full battalion (or SOF reflect a dual heritage composed of larger unit) to meet the nonmobilization their roles as “key penetration and strike requirements of regional engagement. This forces” and “warrior-diplomats capable of approach is similar to the way in which the influencing, advising, training, and con- Navy apportions SEAL platoons on a basis ducting operations with foreign forces, offi- of three to one, allowing for continuous cials, and populations.” He cites the com- employment of a portion of the forces, while plementary nature of these dual missions, concurrently conducting training and other pointing out, “One of these two generic SOF required activities with the remainder of roles is at the heart of each of … the … spe- the force. Although in some situations RC cial-operations core missions.” Cohen’s re- units could be mobilized for regional- marks reflect his conclusion that SOF “are engagement activities, this would likely be the forces of choice in situations requiring the exception rather than the rule. regional orientation and cultural and political sensitivity.”16 Regional-engagement force The report’s conclusion, taken with an The REF is a task-organized element examination of SOF’s missions, character- unique to each theater, but it has certain istics and capabilities, make clear that standardized aspects. It is composed of a SOF provide the logical basis for develop- dedicated standing joint headquarters ing the regional-engagement force, or REF. with designated SOF and conventional The similarity of SOF’s war-fighting roles forces. REFs are organized around core and missions permits them to develop an regional-engagement professionals, with engagement focus while retaining the supporting assets assigned or attached as capability to perform their specialized required. REFs are organized on the basis wartime missions. of one per theater. Reserve-component issues. The role of the The REF serves as the geographic reserve components, or RC, in regional

14 Special Warfare The Regional Engagement Organization

STANDING One JTF (REF) per Regional CINC JTF (REF)

AFFOR ARFOR JSOTF *AEF *INF

JOINT NAVFOR MAGTF POTF LOG CMD *ARG/NTG *MEU

Assigned Forces Habitual Relationships * Assigned Forces

CINC’s headquarters for planning, control REF on the basis of the mission. These and execution of the regional-engagement assignments should not normally be ad hoc: supporting plan to the CINC’s theater cam- It is important to establish a standing-force paign plan. Given the gray area that dis- list of units that will be habitually assigned tinguishes the transitions between peace, to the REF.While other forces may be added conflict and war, forces need a rule of to the REF in response to emerging require- thumb for distinguishing when command ments, assigned forces will perform the bulk authority will pass from the REF to anoth- of the regional-engagement missions. Regu- er joint task force, or JTF. A proposed rule lar exercises will allow the REF and its of thumb is as follows: Whenever activities assigned units to form habitual relation- require less than an Army corps headquar- ships. The geographic CINC should also ters or its equivalent, the REF will retain have CONUS forces apportioned specifically command and control. For major contin- for regional engagement, and he should gencies and major theater war, or MTW have tasking authority over them. (defined herein as corps and corps-equivalent in scope), command and control will SOC pass to a specially constituted JTF. The REF must maintain a theater-wide perspective, and it may establish subordi- Structures nate JTFs for specific missions, based upon The typical geographic CINC’s REF is a the size, command-and-control require- standing JTF.The size and the composition ments, and complexity of the specific oper- of the headquarters and its subordinate ation or activity. A typical REF should be components, both service and functional, capable of forming three or four such sub- will depend upon the situation. The REF ordinate headquarters. By creating a sub- must be sufficiently robust, even in its sup- ordinate REF, the theater special-opera- porting infrastructure, to perform the tions command, or SOC, can remain required functions on a continuous basis. engaged in the CINC’s war-planning proc- Service components are assigned to the ess and war-fighting activities while per-

Fall 1998 15 Theater SOF Organization

THEATER SOF (JSOTF)

ARSOTF Joint Support HHC PSYOP SOAC (Army NAVSOC Organization Component)

NOTE: Forces are assigned, OPCON, or under similar command arrangements, with the JTF (REF) commander holding mission tasking authority.

forming regional-engagement activities. ponent for SO, will normally provide a sep- The REF headquarters, usually located arate JSOTF to the JTF commander for with the geographic CINC, will not nor- the MTW or major contingency. mally deploy from its forward-deployed location. Instead, it will rely on its subordi- Theater SOF organization nate headquarters to exercise the required Under the REF, a theater-SOF structure functions of forward tactical control. would be organized into the JSOTF. The The SOC, a subunified command that JSOTF comprises a joint special-opera- serves as each geographic CINC’s function- tions air component, or JSOAC; a naval al component for special operations, pro- special-operations component, or NAV- vides the nucleus for, and exercises SOC; a joint support element; a headquar- OPCON of, the REF. Similarly, the psycho- ters; and an Army component (the Army logical-operations task force, or POTF, and Special Operations Forces Task Force, or the joint special-operations task force, or ARSOTF). Ideally, these forces would be JSOTF,17 provide the nucleus of core assigned to the JSOTF, but as a minimum, regional-engagement professionals and they must be OPCON or have a similar forces who are OPCON to the JTF and who command relationship that permits direct perform regional-engagement activities as mission tasking, regardless of the forces’ global scouts, strategic shapers and opera- geographical location. tional combat outposts. The POTF is the forward-deployed ele- Some forces committed to the REF may ment of the global force structure for Psy- be reallocated during war or major contin- chological Operations, or PSYOP. This ele- gencies, but more commonly the REF comment is relatively small, relying on its abil- mander will act as a supporting command- ity to “reach back” to the strategic PSYOP er, performing missions in support of the group in CONUS for much of its capability. MTW or major contingency. The REF com- Tactical PSYOP detachments are embed- mander will retain OPCON of his forces, ded in the SOF service components. passing tactical control, or TACON, if The permanently assigned forces of a required. The SOC, as the functional com-

16 Special Warfare typical ARSOTF consist of a number of bat- regional-engagement forces are forward- talions of Special Forces, or SF, with an deployed Army special-operations forces, or embedded capability for Civil Affairs, or ARSOF. As with joint SOF, ARSOF reflect the CA, and PSYOP. Other Army conventional capabilities and the characteristics desired in forces are OPCON as required. Depending regional engagement. ARSOF Vision 2010 upon the apportionment and the mission lists the following traits of ARSOF:18 analysis, forces OPCON to the ARSOTF • Above-average intelligence. may be a mix of elements from the AC and • Ability to deal with complex issues and RC. situations. Supporting forces from the Army’s con- • Ability to tolerate ambiguity. ventional force structure may include the • Emotional stability. following: • High tolerance for stress. • Aviation, both special-operations and • Flexibility. general-support. • Self-discipline. • Infantry. • Self-confidence. • Engineer. Within ARSOF, regionally oriented and • Medical. specifically tasked SF, PSYOP and CA per- • Service and transportation. sonnel have primary missions and collater- • Military Police. al activities that prepare them for regional • Signal. engagement. • Military Intelligence. The second principle is that ARSOF can The precise mix of these forces will be provide the core of regional-engagement determined by the mission. In the case of professionals who will perform the region- AC forces, the geographic CINC should have al-engagement roles and who will exercise OPCON, or an equivalent command rela- command and control of the supporting tionship, to permit direct mission tasking. conventional forces. This principle reflects The organization of the ARSOTF reflects the vision of General Dennis J. Reimer, two principles: First, the bulk of the core Chief of Staff of the Army: “To me, small

Psychological Operations Task Force

POTF

PSYOP PSYOP STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT DISSEMINATION STUDIES Interagency Media Development Sociological and Military Integration and Distribution Understanding

NOTE: In-theater PSYOP assets have “reach back” capabilities that allow them to draw upon CONUS-based strategic PSYOP assets.

Fall 1998 17 Army Special Operations Forces Task Force

ARSOTF (The Army Component of Theater SOF)

IIII II II II SF * Aviation HHC PSYOP (With Embedded * Support * Engineer (SOA & GS) CA Support)

* CA I

SFODB FOB I

* MP

SFODA * S&T

* MED

Reserve Component I Mixed AC/RC Composition * * SIG

Assigned Forces I

* MI Habitual Relationships

18 Special Warfare ARSOF units … could serve as the nucleus ize his command-and-control arrangements of a command-and-control element for in different ways. If war encompasses the Army After Next. They could well be the entire AOR, the REF commander and all of Army element of a standing joint task force his forces will normally be subordinated and could serve as a command and control (OPCON) to the war-fighting JTF. platform upon which we could hang capa- If the contingency is of significant propor- bilities we need.”19 tions but does not encompass the entire Supporting forces should have a habitu- AOR, the REF commander may be OPCON al relationship with the ARSOTF, based on to the war-fighting commander in the affect- a careful mission analysis. The habitual ed AO, but retain his previous relationship relationship is critical to effective regional- to the geographic CINC in all other areas. engagement operations; it should be reinforced by regular exercises. Operational combat outposts The first way regional-engagement Transition to war forces support the transition to war is by There are four ways by which the REF providing operational combat outposts that will participate in and support the transi- perform battlespace preparation. Battle- tion to war: space-preparation activities establish the • By providing operational combat out- conditions that enable or facilitate the posts that perform battlespace prepara- entry of the supported war-fighting com- tion (tip of the spear). mander and his subsequent combat opera- • By supporting war-fighting. tions. Key to this portion of the regional- • By transitioning its forces to war-fight- engagement concept is the idea that, even ing roles. if the shift in roles between supporting and • By providing operational and strategic supported commander has not yet force protection. occurred, the REF commander must tailor These activities are fully synchronized his operations to facilitate the execution of with the geographic CINC’s war plans and war plans created to deal with possible integrated into the CINC’s overall mili- contingencies. As the transition between tary-operations campaign. commanders occurs, and as strike forces The REF functions as the command-and- flow into theater, deployed elements of the control headquarters for engaged forces in REF increasingly focus on facilitating ini- a geographic CINC’s AOR during the peri- tial forced-entry operations. od prior to escalation of a crisis to a major During this transition, the deployed REF contingency or an MTW.20 In this role, the elements can provide the war-fighting com- REF commander is the supported commander with reconnaissance, surveillance mander. In a major contingency or MTW, and target-acquisition functions; direct- command-and-control responsibility for action or unconventional-warfare/coalition war-fighting would normally pass to a JTF activities to strip away specified enemy commander or a CJTF commander. capabilities; coalition-enabling to ensure When the war-fighting JTF/CJTF deploys early integration of a multinational force; in-theater or establishes his headquarters, and advanced weapons control. This latter the war-fighting commander becomes the support provides discriminating target- supported commander and the REF com- selection, terminal guidance, and engage- mander becomes a supporting commander. ment decision-making at the point of The point at which this transfer of authori- impact. ty takes place should be predicated upon As advances in technology increase the conditions specified in theater war plans, range at which lethality can be precisely and the REF should therefore be fully inte- applied, the difficulty in ensuring that grated into the war-planning process. fleeting targets are identified and engaged Depending on the size and the scope of will increase. The presence of trained and the crisis, the REF commander may organ- competent war fighters at the point of

Fall 1998 19 REF elements engaged in multinational training, FID or security assistance may be able to transition to the combat role of coalition support. Photo by Thomas Witham information-collection, coupled with an tion-dominated environment of the present integrated global system of secure commu- and of the future, the commander’s legal and nications and fire control, will permit war- moral obligations to the affected civilian popu- fighting commanders to begin engaging lation take on even more significance. targets while still in the initial stages of As the level of violence escalates and as deployment. the threat to persons operating in the com- The forward presence of trained war bat zone increases, the presence and efforts fighters empowered to detect, decide and of OGAs and NGOs will decline. The mili- deliver extended-range munitions will per- tary assets of the war-fighting commander mit the war-fighting commander to apply will provide the only mechanism for coercive power even before closing with the addressing the shortfall. The presence of a enemy. The presence of these supporting supporting REF will enable the war-fight- operational REF elements will ensure that ing commander to deal with the civilian war-fighting commanders at all levels will population without disrupting his combat receive ground-truth intelligence in real focus. time. The result will be a combat force opti- mally positioned and prepared at the earli- Transition to war-fighting roles est point possible. The third way regional-engagement forces support the transition to war is Support of war-fighting through their transition to war-fighting The second way regional-engagement forces roles. REF operational elements will accom- support the transition to war is through their plish the transition from engagement activ- support of war-fighting. There are two reasons ities to war-fighting roles in two ways: By why regional-engagement activities do not diverting forces for more immediate combat cease with the transition to war. First, region- requirements; and by performing engage- al-engagement activities enable U.S. war ment activities that can evolve into combat fighters to hand off responsibility for post- roles. combat operations to indigenous forces at the Diversion of forces is feasible in the area earliest possible time. Second, in the informa- of combat operations because, while region-

20 Special Warfare al-engagement activities may reasonably be may affect the availability of forces. expected to continue during war, the scale of As strategic shapers, REF elements may regional-engagement activities will proba- protect the flanks in an operational equiv- bly decline. Diversion frees regional-engage- alent of the tactical “guard” mission. They ment forces to perform their war-fighting accomplish this mission by containing missions. Supporting elements participat- crises and by halting escalation. On a stra- ing in regional-engagement activities may tegic level, control of potential crisis situa- find that their experience prepares them for tions not directly related to the major con- war-fighting missions as well. For example, tingency or the MTW avoids diversion of a medical unit’s familiarity with region-spe- committed assets or reserves. Crisis-con- cific medical concerns or an engineer unit’s tainment is an economy-of-force measure, knowledge of indigenous transportation sys- permitting a concentrated effort in the tems can enhance combat operations. existing crisis area. Certain regional-engagement activities As operational combat outposts, REF may also evolve into war-fighting roles. elements can protect the force by detecting, Elements engaged in multinational train- delaying and shaping imminent threats ing, FID or security assistance may be able from the operational flanks or rear. They to provide coalition support. A survey team allow the war-fighting commander to react that had previously been granted access to and to gain and maintain the initiative. areas that are denied or threatened may find that its mission has evolved into an Justification SR mission. An element engaged in infra- In a time of constrained resources, any structure construction may see its mission new concept requiring commitment of evolve into a DA mission to destroy or neu- resources must be justifiable either in tralize what it was building. terms of cost-and-resource savings or in terms of value-added. The regional-engage- Operational force protection ment concept is justified in both areas, as a The fourth way the REF supports the summary of its advantages will show. war-fighting commander is by screening • Low-cost forward presence. While for- and protecting the commander’s opera- ward presence has long been part of the tional flanks. Force-protection is largely an U.S. approach to military operations, economy-of-force mission, but it includes resource constraints and political consider- an element of reconnaissance, since it pro- ations are causing a reduction in the num- vides warnings and indications of potential ber of forward-based units. Regional threats outside the area of combat opera- engagement maintains a forward presence tions. These outside threats may have at a cost lower than that of forward-basing direct implications for the war-fighting large conventional units. commander, or they may be independent of • Global strategic economy of force. Imple- his particular crisis. menting a proactive concept of regional As global scouts, REF operational ele- engagement would permit the U.S. to man- ments can provide warning of emerging or age and contain potential crises at relative- impending threats to the war-fighting ly low levels in other regions while war- forces in the area of combat operations. On fighting forces are engaged in a specific a strategic level, global scouts employed MTW or major contingency. Managing those outside the area of combat operations can crises would reduce the probability that the provide warning of emerging threats that U.S. would have to fight a two-front war. may or may not be escalating. This warn- • Force multiplication. By maximizing ing permits early reaction, avoids surprise, the effect of coalitions and surrogate forces, and may avoid unnecessary diversion of and by increasing the capabilities of other assets. At a minimum, it increases the sit- countries to solve their own problems, the uational awareness of the war-fighting U.S. would reduce demands on its force commander with respect to conditions that structure.

Fall 1998 21 • Early crisis-identification and crisis- ment provides an appropriate response to resolution. The proactive nature of regional many asymmetric threats that cannot be engagement permits the U.S. to resolve effectively or efficiently countered with conflict at a stage when the resources large-scale, war-fighting capabilities. required are relatively minimal. • Asymmetric threat. Regional engage- • Maximum use of force versatility. The ment creates an asymmetric threat to U.S. would need to dedicate only a small adversaries and potential adversaries. percentage of its force structure to an • Enhanced war-fighting. Regional engage- engagement focus. The bulk of the military ment enhances war-fighting during the con- assets involved in regional-engagement duct of MTW and major contingencies. would be conventional forces performing their traditional functions in a regional- Conclusion engagement context. The regional-engagement concept is • Decreased probability of war. By proac- not a proposal that America’s armed tively engaging emerging threats, the forces should be optimized exclusively for regional-engagement concept decreases regional-engagement operations. As the Quadrennial Defense Review points out, The regional-engagement concept is not a the U.S. needs a military force with a full set of operational capabilities to execute proposal that America’s armed forces should our national-security strategy. Although some would argue that “the most likely be optimized exclusively for regional-engage- use of military forces in the next five to ment operations. As the Quadrennial Defense 10 years will be in the ‘nontraditional’ category or ‘unconventional combat,’ ”21 Review points out, the U.S. needs a military we cannot afford to optimize the U.S. armed forces for only one band of strate- force with a full set of operational capabilities gic requirements. Experience has shown to execute our national-security strategy. that a “prevent and deter” capability has no meaning unless it is balanced by a “deter and fight” capability. Neither is the the threat of MTW, making it possible for regional-engagement concept an argu- the U.S. to achieve the smaller war-fighting ment for a bifurcated force: one part that force structure dictated by our limited fights wars and one part that executes resources. OOTW. The regional-engagement concept • Unity of effort. The regional-engage- is an argument for a force structure that ment concept and its supporting structures recognizes the interdependence of opera- provide a mechanism for coherent manage- tions across the continuum. ment of the multiple efforts and programs Regional engagement provides policy- associated with peacetime engagement, makers and commanders with the capabil- eliminating duplication and achieving a ities to meet the challenges of the future. synergistic effect through the synchroniza- Developing regional-engagement forces is tion of military, government and non- a critical step in implementing the concept. government activities. Tapping existing SOF to form the basis of • Human intelligence. Global scouts pro- a core of regional-engagement profession- vide geographic CINCs with a ground als is the most efficient and the most expe- truth HUMINT asset that has a war-fight- ditious method for implementing the con- ing perspective. cept. Long lead times, particularly for • Battlespace shaping. Through battle- leader development and training, dictate space-preparation operations, combat that implementation should begin as soon forces enter an MTW or a major contin- as possible. gency on a battlespace that has been The concept of regional engagement, in shaped to facilitate their operations. combination with the concepts of war- • Appropriate response. Regional engage-

22 Special Warfare fighting and homeland defense, presents Notes: a holistic approach to future military 1 Joint Vision 2010,p.4. 2 operations. This approach will minimize Taken from the section headings on pp. 2 and 3 of the “Introduction” to Army Vision 2010. future risks, employ constrained 3 Army Vision 2010,p.3. resources most efficiently and maximize 4 See 1998 Army After Next spring war game ple- our operational and strategic flexibility nary session, briefing slides. in meeting symmetric and asymmetric 5 William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, “Chapter threats. 1,” Annual Report to the President and the Congress, 1998,p.6. 6 Chairman’s Peace Operations Seminar and Game, 1997 Executive Report (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Major General Kenneth R. Peacekeeping Institute). Bowra is commander of the 7 “Futures” games in the Army and in other services John F. Kennedy Special War- indicate that the pace of war will be accelerated by evolving technologies, particularly increased lethality. fare Center and School. In 8 See the integrated analysis reports for ARSOF War previous assignments, he Game 1 and ARSOF War Game 2 and insights from served as commanding gener- Colonel Glenn Harned, green-team leader for the al, U.S. Army Special Forces 1997 AAN summer war game. 9 Command; as deputy commanding general Global scouts, strategic shapers and operational combat outposts. and chief of staff, U.S. Army Special Opera- 10 Situational awareness, war avoidance and battle- tions Command; and as commanding gener- space preparation. al, U. S. Special Operations Command- 11 See ARSOF War Game 2 integrated analysis South. He has commanded Special Forces report. 12 units from the A-detachment level to the bat- This recommendation is drawn from “Senior Semi- nar Emerging Impressions,” from ARSOF War Game talion and group levels. Major General 2, as cited in the integrated analysis report. Bowra is a graduate of the Army War Col- 13 See the ARSOF War Game 2 integrated analysis lege. He holds a bachelor’s degree from the report. Citadel and a master’s degree from the U.S. 14 Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 1998,p.2. 15 Army Command and General Staff College. Special Operations Forces Posture Statement 1998, pp. 3, 4. 16 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Annual Colonel William H. Harris Report to the Congress, 1998, Chapter 4, p. 1. Jr. is the Director of Training 17 The SOTF is a joint headquarters. Special-opera- and Doctrine, JFK Special tions forces, or SOF, are assumed to be joint unless Warfare Center and School. otherwise specified. This reflects the unique role of the U.S. Special Operations Command as a joint-force His previous assignments provider with service-like responsibilities for SOF. include SF-detachment com- Civil Affairs functions are performed by structures mander, 3/7th SF Group; and personnel integral to the Army component of the operational detachment commander, 1/4th SOTF. 18 PSYOP Group; company commander, ARSOF Vision 2010,p.2. 19 From an e-mail response dated 10 Jan 98 to a Pre- 1/508th Infantry, 82nd Airborne Division; command Course question relating to the future of commander, Group Support Company, and ARSOF. battalion S3, 10th SF Group; chief, Ground 20 Recall that for purposes of this article, a major con- Plans Branch, SOJ5, Special Operations tingency or MTW is one requiring forces of Army- Command-Pacific; commander, 9th PSYOP corps size (or its equivalent from other services). 21 James M. Bubik, “Sacred Cows Make Good Shoes: Battalion; chief, Joint and Army Doctrine Changing the Way We Think About Military Force Division, DOTD, JFKSWCS; and G3, U.S. Structure”; Landpower Essays Series, No. 97-1, Feb- Army CA and PSYOP Command. Colonel ruary 1997. Harris is a graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College for Joint Professional Mili- tary Education, and of the U.S. Army War College. He holds a bachelor’s degree from Appalachian State University and a master’s degree from the Army Command and General Staff College.

Fall 1998 23 Protecting U.S. National Interests: The Role of the Ambassador and the Country Team

by Jon Gundersen

he mission of the United sailors and airmen report to and least 162 nations. States Special Operations support the regional CINCs. The military chain of command TCommand is to “prepare spe- It is the third customer — the flows from the president to the sec- cial-operations forces to successful- American ambassador — who is retary of defense to the CINCs. ly conduct worldwide special oper- perhaps least understood by the While both the secretary of state ations, civil affairs, and psychologi- SOF community. This article and the secretary of defense are cal operations in peace and war in addresses the role of the ambassa- charged with promoting and support of the National Command dors and their country teams: how defending U.S. national-security Authorities, regional combat com- the ambassadors fit into the interests, particularly overseas, manders, and American ambassa- national chain of command, how there is perhaps a natural tension dors and their country teams.” The the Department of Defense and the between their respective depart- command’s first goal is “to meet the Department of State chains of comments. Understanding the assigned needs of the National Command mand work together, how the roles of the ambassadors and the Authorities, the regional combat American Embassies and the coun- CINCs may require a little digres- commanders, and the American try teams work, and how SOF oper- sion about the approaches of DoD ambassadors and their country ators fit into the picture. and DoS, particularly regarding the teams.” The national-chain-of-com- use of force in U.S. foreign policy. In other words, special-operations mand chart shows the organiza- forces, or SOF, answer to only three tional structure of the ambassa- Use of force customers: the president of the U.S.; dors and the regional CINCs and America’s armed forces do not view the regional commanders in chief, how they fit into the national the use of force as an abstract concept; or CINCs; and the American ambas- chain of command. to them, it means putting young sadors. SOF operators, prompted by There are two distinct chains of Americans in harm’s way. And when instinct and training, understand command: the foreign-policy the use of force does not achieve the the first two lines of authority. As chain of command and the mili- stated objectives, the military often U.S. citizens and as members of the tary chain of command. The for- bears the brunt of both burden and armed services, SOF operators have eign-policy chain of command criticism for a failed national policy,as taken an oath of allegiance to flows from the president (in his the Pentagon became painfully aware defend the U.S. Constitution role as the nation’s commander in during the Vietnam era. After an ago- against all enemies, foreign and chief), to the secretary of state, to nizing post-Vietnam doctrinal debate, domestic. In this capacity, they are the ambassador (the President’s the military-security community con- sworn to follow the orders of the representative in each country cluded that Washington should com- president of the U.S. and the where the U.S. has diplomatic mit U.S. military assets only when National Command Authorities. representation). At this time, the there is a national consensus and When assigned overseas, soldiers, U.S. has a representative in at

24 Special Warfare National Chain of Command

PRESIDENT

SECRETARY SECRETARY of STATE of DEFENSE

AMBASSADOR CINC

DEPUTY CHIEF FIELD of MISSION COMMANDERS

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSULAR USAID INTELLIGENCE COMMERCE CONSULATES ECONOMIC POLITICAL USIA/USIS TREASURY PEACE CORPS

DAO LABOR AGRICULTURE

MAAG, FAA, GAO, SMITHSONIAN, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE

when the use of force is overwhelming icy-makers must have more the massacres in Rwanda, the (the so-called Weinberger Doctrine, as options than committing over- world becomes paralyzed, and mil- later amended by Colin Powell). whelming force or doing nothing. lions of innocents suffer. Many in the military contend This is particularly true when an that policy-makers in the White objective is well-defined: for exam- Pessimists and optimists House and in the State Depart- ple, feeding the hungry or pre- The Pentagon and the State ment are too eager to commit venting a refugee flow. And when Department have fundamentally American forces around the world. there is a clear exit strategy, the and perhaps necessarily different In the Pentagon’s view, these policy- introduction of American military conceptual approaches to the makers apply too literally Clause- forces in situations short of war is world. The core mission of Ameri- witz’s dictum that war is “politics necessary to support U.S. national ca’s armed forces is to fight and carried out by other means.” objectives. Finally, the U.S., as the win military conflicts. Our armed On the other hand, the State remaining world superpower with forces must prepare for uncertain- Department argues that most con- unchallenged military capability and worst-case scenarios when flicts in the post-Cold War world ties, has a special responsibility to diplomacy has failed. SOF must require a more nuanced under- lead. When Washington fails to train for everything from hostage standing of the extent and the assume this responsibility, as it situations to noncombat evacua- limits of U.S. engagement, mili- did during the initial stages of the tion operations, or NEOs. In other tary and otherwise. American pol- civil war in Yugoslavia and during

Fall 1998 25 words, military personnel are paid president’s representative to a military-to-military programs, to to be pessimists. given country. In that capacity, the achieve a peaceful solution to the State Department personnel, on ambassador exercises “full respon- Tamil Tigers’ rebellion. If policy- the other hand, are paid to be opti- sibility for the direction, coordina- makers were to unilaterally (and mists. They are expected to resolve tion, and supervision of all U.S. unnecessarily, according to the conflicts and to promote national government personnel,” including ambassador) change the rules of interests without recourse to the DoD personnel, under his authori- engagement or cancel all future use of force. When war threatens ty. Furthermore, the ambassador’s exercises, larger American inter- (as it did prior to Desert Storm) or sole responsibility is to promote ests would be jeopardized. when conflicts escalate (as they did and protect U.S. interests in a sin- In the case above, both the region- prior to the Dayton Peace agree- gle nation. al CINC and the ambassador had a ment), the president invariably Regional CINCs, on the other responsibility to make a tough judg- sends in the secretary of state to hand, are responsible for anywhere ment call and to arrive at a decision adjudicate disputes or to negotiate from 19 countries (CENTCOM) to both could live with. The ambassa- agreements. Thus, a good diplomat 83 countries (EUCOM). The CINCs dor and the CINC negotiated a com- is paid to keep hope alive. assess competing priorities before promise: U.S. exercises would be The foregoing discussion should assigning in-country missions to allowed to continue after a delay, not be perceived as advocacy of SOF operators. They do this and SOF operators would be either position. Clearly, both the through, inter alia, a yearly plan- allowed to deploy without weapons. DoD and the DoS must learn how ning conference in which all In Cambodia, on the other hand, to operate in a new multipolar embassies are invited to submit USCINCPAC and the ambassador strategic environment. They must their country plans for military agreed to allow weapons in-country find a realistic middle ground deployments. to be stored at a central facility and between undue optimism and self- Sometimes, an ambassador’s and to be issued with the approval of the fulfilling pessimism. And, general- a CINC’s priorities will initially ambassador. Local authorities con- ly, DoS and DoD have been able to differ. For example, in Sri Lanka in curred with both arrangements. reconcile any differences of ap- 1997, after receiving threats to U.S. proach on the use of force. Reconcil- military personnel made by the American ambassadors iation efforts, of course, occur at the Tamil Tigers (the local guerrilla All American ambassadors re- higher levels. Often the troops on movement), USCINCPAC post- ceive a letter of instruction from the ground, whether they are poned future joint-combined-exer- the president outlining their roles junior officers at U.S. Embassies or cise-training events, or JCETs, and responsibilities. Among the on A-detachments in the field, are pending a review of the security numerous points of instruction, the the last to know. situation. Furthermore, in light of most pertinent are that the letter: the Khobar Towers bombing, SOC- • Charges the chief of mission, or CINCs and ambassadors PAC recommended that all COM, with exercising full responsi- The need to reconcile differences deployed personnel in selected bility for the direction, coordina- of approach is also imperative at countries, including Sri Lanka, be tion and supervision of all U.S. gov- the next level of the chain of com- allowed to carry weapons. The ernment personnel under the mand: the regional CINCs and the CINC believed that the safety of COM’s authority. American ambassadors. Regional his troops warranted such a step. • States the crucial importance of CINCs and American ambassadors The ambassador, on the other ensuring the security and protection coordinate, sometimes on a daily hand, argued that the security sit- of the mission and its personnel. basis, everything from missions of uation had not changed, that the • Instructs the COM to review foreign internal defense, or FID, to rebellion was localized, i.e., it was regularly and, if necessary, to potential NEOs, and they do it qui- not near U.S.-Sri Lankan exercises, adjust programs, personnel and etly and effectively. As with any and that other U.S. personnel funding levels; and to ensure that two powerful institutions and play- (diplomats, among others) did not all agencies attached to the mis- ers, even those serving the same carry side arms. Furthermore, the sion do likewise. commander in chief, there are nat- overriding national interest was • Specifies that agencies must ural points of tension. for Washington to work quietly obtain the COM’s approval for An American ambassador is the with the Sri Lankan government, changes in the size, composition or including continuing low-keyed

26 Special Warfare it?” And like a good governor, a good ambassador can ill afford to ignore the comments or com- plaints of any of his constituents. Many of those constituents, in fact, may well be good friends of Senator so-and-so. Approximately two-thirds of all ambassadors are career foreign- service officers, or FSOs. In other words, they have probably worked for the government for more than 25 years, and like good soldiers, they have worked their way up the chain of command, from stamping visas as a new vice counsel to managing an embassy as the deputy chief of mission, or DCM. In areas where SOF are likely to be Photo by Paul R. Caron deployed (for example, the Third The U.S. Ambassador to Mali, David Rawson (center), talks with Captain Berry Duplantis of the World), almost all ambassadors are 3rd SF Group. The U.S. Ambassador is responsible for all U.S. government personnel in the career FSOs. country who are not under the command of a U.S. area military commander. mandate of their elements in the ambassador’s watch, it will be the Country team mission. ambassador who is called to task. The ambassador-and-country- • Affirms the COM’s right to see If the ship goes down, e.g., if the team chart depicts the ambassador communications to or from all mis- embassy must be evacuated, the and the country team at a typical sion elements, except those specifical- ambassador will probably be the embassy: ly exempted by law or executive order. one who carries the American flag The country team consists of the • States that the only authorized into that last helicopter. ranking representatives from the channel for instructions to the COM In the role of governor, the embassy sections and from other is through the secretary of state or ambassador represents the U.S. at U.S. government agencies operat- directly from the president countless diplomatic events, from ing in the country. The country First and foremost, the ambassa- trade shows to ship visits to open- team meets regularly to review dor is the president’s representative ings of traveling Broadway shows. current developments and to in a given country. This titular role The ambassador takes care of end- advise the ambassador on what can be compared to a combination of less visitors, from congressional steps the embassy is taking, or roles: captain of a ship and governor delegations to the inspector gener- should be taking, to promote U.S. of a state. In the role of captain, the al (DoS’s internal audit on the interests in the country. The am- ambassador is responsible for all operation of the embassy). bassador or the DCM chairs those U.S. government personnel in the Ambassadors must also be meetings. country except those under the com- aware that their most important As a rule, the country team mand of a U.S. area military com- constituent is the average Ameri- operates as just that — a team mander. The ambassador’s authori- can citizen. The embassy is re- with common interests and objec- ty thus extends to all DoD person- minded of this on a daily basis, tives. However, as could be expect- nel on the embassy’s staff, and to usually after hours, by callers who ed from any team with strong- others not directly under the begin their conversation with the willed players representing pow- CINC’s command. These personnel line: “I am an American taxpayer erful agencies, differences do report to the ambassador, as well as and I’ve lost my passport/I have occur regarding how best to pro- to their normal chain of command. no money/I’ve been (unfairly) mote U.S. national interests. The ambassador is required to know thrown in jail/I’m a good friend of Country-team meetings, under the what everyone on the ship is doing. Senator so-and-so/My husband got ambassador’s direction, are the If something goes wrong during the lost. What are you gonna do about

Fall 1998 27 way those differences are the embassy.The manner in which range of issues, from security to resolved. consular officers relate to embassy human rights. In some embassies, The DCM is a key player on the visitors often leaves the visitors a priority of this section may be country team. Generally a senior with their most enduring impres- building or maintaining alliances; FSO (flag rank), the DCM is sec- sion of how the U.S. government e.g., promoting NATO enlarge- ond in the embassy’s chain of com- operates. The consular section ment or U.S. base rights in Japan. mand and is charged with stand- issues both immigrant and nonim- In other embassies, the priority ing in for the ambassador during migrant visas. A consular officer, might be promoting democracy his or her absences. As temporary in effect, determines whether a and human rights in the former chief of mission, the DCM is desig- family can immigrate, or whether Soviet Union, Nigeria or Haiti; or nated the chargé d’affaires, with a student can study in the U.S. countering narcotics in Columbia. all the rights and responsibilities Consular officers also handle SOF teams conducting JCETs, for of the ambassador. In everyday American-citizen services, from example, should be briefed by the operation, the DCM, under the issuing passports, to visiting political section, so that they ambassador’s direction, manages American citizens in jail, to con- understand local conditions and the embassy. In addition to fulfill- tacting next of kin and shipping personalities. ing his other obligations, the DCM the remains of Americans who The U.S. Foreign Service includes prepares the mission program have died overseas. personnel from four other agencies plan, coordinates the emergency- SOF operators should contact related to the State Department: action plan, and reconciles the this section if they lose their pass- • The U.S. Information Agency/ sometimes different and differing ports or if they experience an emer- U.S. Information Service: USIA/ agendas of the various embassy gency while in-country.The respon- USIS handles information, cultur- sections. sibilities handled by the consular al affairs and libraries. The public- The other sections of the embassy section can be daunting, and the affairs officer will have expertise in carry out functions somewhat analo- person who oversees them must dealing with the local press. gous to the military J1, J2, etc. The demonstrate sound judgment. • The U.S. Agency for Interna- four state sections — administrative, Most consular officers are relative- tional Development, or USAID: consular, economic and political — ly junior officers (comparable to O1 Administers the U.S. foreign-aid are headed by career foreign-service through O3 in the military), who program. officers, usually counselors of the work long hours at these some- • The Foreign Commercial Service, embassy (equivalent to an O6). times thankless tasks. or FCS: Supports American exports. The administrative section con- The economic section is charged • The Foreign Agricultural Serv- sists of a personnel office, a finan- with advancing U.S. economic and ice, or FAS: Supports exports of cial-management office; a general- commercial interests and report- American food products. services office, or GSO; an informa- ing on the host nation’s economic Most embassies have at least tion-systems office; a medical office; developments that affect those some U.S. military representation: and a security office, or RSO. SOF interests. Promoting American • The defense attaché’s office, or warriors, who justifiably pride goods and services is becoming an DAO: The ranking officer of the themselves on their self-sufficiency increasing priority. For example, DAO is either an O5, O6 or O7 and who normally report through a the economic section works to (from any service). He reports military chain of command, nor- ensure that any local tariffs or through Defense Intelligence mally do not work directly with the other restrictions are fair and con- Agency channels about the host embassy’s administrative section. sistent with international laws. In country’s military capability and However, in extremis, SOF opera- other words, the economic section military leaders. Given its experi- tors may wish to coordinate with ensures that American businesses ence and expertise, the DAO is an the GSO on transportation mat- can operate on a level playing important source of background ters, with the medical office on field. The economic section also knowledge for the SOF operator. medical emergencies, and with the deals with bilateral and multilat- • The military mission (called RSO on physical-security or force- eral environmental, science, and the military assistance advisory protection issues. technology issues. group, or MAAG; the joint United The consular section is often the The political section reports on States military advisory group, or first contact that a foreign nation- local political issues and repre- JUSMAG; or the security-assist- al or an American citizen has with sents American views on a wide ance organization, or SAO): Pro-

28 Special Warfare The Ambassador and Country Team

AMBASSADOR

DEPUTY CHIEF of MISSION

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSULAR ECONOMIC POLITICAL

LAW FCS USIA/USIS FAS DEFENSE ENFORCEMENT

vides military aid and facilitates U.S. Embassy personnel before tary and State Department person- military sales. working directly with local FSNs. nel serve the same National Com- • The U.S. Marines provide secu- mand Authorities, and both are rity at most U.S. Embassies. SOF’s role charged with the mission of protect- Other agencies, from the Feder- As noted above, often the first ing and promoting American inter- al Bureau of Investigation to the stop that SOF make after arriving ests. The more the SOF warrior and Central Intelligence Agency, can in-country is at the U.S. Embassy. the State Department diplomat also be represented at various This experience may prove to be as understand each other’s missions, posts. The Justice Department, much of a cultural clash for the SOF methods of operations, and even which oversees all law-enforce- soldier as encountering indigenous culture, the better their working ment agencies, is the fourth people. relationships will be. The first step largest presence at U.S. Em- On one hand, some military per- should be to establish close and con- bassies after DoS, DoD, and sonnel may consider State Depart- tinual contact between the SOF USAID. SOF operators, especially ment officers as Ivy League dilet- unit and the appropriate embassy those who deal with counternar- tantes who have no military experi- section. cotics, may wish to coordinate ence and who have more interest in In a time of need, whether it be a with local law-enforcement repre- abstract human rights than in real- hostage situation or an NEO, a sentatives at the embassy. life security issues. On the other SOF presence will always be wel- Finally, often more than half of hand, some foreign-service officers come. After all, SOF’s role may be all employees at any U.S. Embassy still perceive the military as latter- key in resolving a most delicate are foreign-service nationals, or day Rambos, or as short-term inter- and high-profile diplomatic crisis FSNs. Because of their long-term lopers who have little understand- or even in preventing the loss of experience, local expertise and ing of local conditions or of long- American lives. The ambassador language capability, FSNs are a term American interests. The reali- will most likely welcome SOF and unique asset for the embassy. SOF ty, of course, is that both the mili- take a personal hand in coordinat- operators should work through ing their activities. The ambassa-

Fall 1998 29 dor is in command until an actual ence and exceptional professional- local military command authority, to operation starts, and he or she ism. Listed below are comments respond to those comments. resumes command as soon as the from the ambassadors, which suc- operation is over. cinctly express why SOF is often Lessons learned SOF programs — from JCETS to the “force of choice” in many A number of recommendations civil affairs and psychological oper- regions of the world. have emerged as a result of the diplo- ations — often constitute the back- • Panama: “The (U.S.) Special matic-customer survey, discussions at bone of bilateral military-to-mili- Forces are true professionals in USSOCOM, and after-action com- tary cooperation. They promote every sense of the word … truly ments from SOF operators: long-term national-security inter- one of our country’s great Cross-training. Everyone con- ests and establish a legitimate resources.” nected with the SOF community, American presence in- country. • Ecuador: “I’m proud of the dis- from the regional CINCs to the SOF Nevertheless, these programs play of dedication and professional- warriors in the field, should have a sometimes touch on delicate issues ism exhibited by members of the full understanding of the role of involving national sovereignty and special-operations community … both the ambassador and the country team. Much of this information Both the military and State Department personnel is covered in the ambassador’s ori- entations and in ad hoc briefings. serve the same National Command Authorities, and However, the message needs to be both are charged with the mission of protecting made more systemic and consistent. Therefore, a standardized briefing and promoting American interests. The more the about the role of the ambassador and the country team should be SOF warrior and the State Department diplomat integrated into SOF-operator, pre- understand each other’s missions, methods of command, and senior-service courses, as well as into briefings for new- operations, and even culture, the better their work- comers and briefings for the regional CINCs. The responses from the ing relationships will be. diplomatic-customer surveys should be integrated into USSOCOM’s local politics. It is therefore impor- truly the cream of the crop of our public-outreach programs to Con- tant to coordinate activities with military.” gress, to the State Department, and the appropriate embassy repre- • Indonesia: “It is difficult to to other interested and affected sentative(s), most likely in the exaggerate the success and impor- agencies. Finally, through an political section or the military sec- tance of USSOCOM training activ- enhanced ambassador’s orientation tion of the embassy. ities in the support of national and program, U.S. ambassadors and DoD goals in Indonesia.” their country teams could be made How are SOF doing? • Hungary: “They (SOF) epito- more aware of the role of SOF and Recently, the U.S. Special Opera- mize the ideals that we hold so dear the way SOF support the missions tions Command, or USSOCOM, in our military.” of the embassies. conducted a diplomatic-customer • Morocco: “I am pleased to In-briefs and back-briefs in-coun- survey of 65 key American ambas- inform you that the USSOCOM try. One of the most useful cross- sadors. The survey requested feed- forces have performed superbly training tools is the requirement for back from the ambassadors regard- and have fully supported our SOF teams to visit their relevant ing the quality of SOF support for efforts to enhance military-to-mili- embassies before and after under- their respective embassies. The tary relations with Morocco.” taking their in-country activities. responses were overwhelmingly Naturally, some responses con- Upon entering a new country, the positive and reflected satisfaction tained constructive criticism. Most of team will benefit greatly from an with SOF at all levels. Special those recommended more exercises embassy briefing about local condi- emphasis was placed upon SOF’s or better coordination and communi- tions, whether it be a briefing by the regionally oriented cultural sensi- cation. USSOCOM is working with DAO on the state of the local mili- tivities, flexibility, low-profile pres- the regional CINCs and the ambas- tary, or an assessment by the politi- sadors, and through them, with the

30 Special Warfare cal counselor of the presence of eth- U.S. national-security policy. Our nic tensions. methods may sometimes differ. In Upon leaving the country, SOF such cases, we should coordinate can provide the embassy with up-to- on a constant and consistent date insights on local military and basis. However, if we keep in mind political conditions. Both DoS and that we are all on the same team, DoD personnel will benefit from the we should have no trouble fulfill- relationships that can be forged ing our common objective: to pro- through this iterative process. Of mote and protect U.S. national course, SOF teams must be cleared interests. by the ambassador before their in- country mission begins; most SOF teams check with the embassy Jon Gundersen, a before they go to the field, and some member of the senior SOF teams back-brief the embassy foreign service, is before they depart; however, the deputy chief of mis- practice of briefing is still more sion in the American episodic than regular. Embassy in Oslo, Nor- Briefs before going to the field. way. He was formerly Although this article is intended to political adviser to the commander highlight the role of both the in chief, U.S. Special Operations ambassador and the country team, Command. Gundersen’s diplomatic it can be used as a basis for brief- assignments include coordinator ing everyone from ambassadors to for Bosnian affairs in the Bureau of regional CINCs to the SOF war- Political-Military Affairs in Wash- riors in the field. The relationship ington, D.C.; chargé d’affaires in between DoD and DoS should be Tallinn, Estonia, and in Reykjavik, symbiotic: Each group should bene- Iceland; and deputy director for fit from the other. Just as SOF policy in the Bureau of European operate as a force multiplier for the and Canadian Affairs. A graduate regional CINCs, they also should of the National War College, Gun- operate as a force multiplier for the dersen holds a BA in international local ambassadors, projecting affairs from George Washington American influence, protecting University and an MA in soviet American values and increasing affairs from Stanford University. American options in-country. Of He has also attended the Universi- course, the regional CINCs control, ty of Oslo in Norway. Gundersen as they should, the actual opera- served in the U.S. Army from 1966 tions and priorities of SOF in the to 1970 and saw service in Vietnam, field. Nevertheless, all key players, where he was awarded the Bronze from the CINCs to the ambassa- Star. He speaks Russian, Norwe- dors to the A-detachments, share a gian, Swedish, German and Viet- mutual interest in assuring that namese and has published articles both DoD and DoS personnel are on a wide range of topics, including fully oriented regarding the rela- arms control, Russian affairs and tionship between SOF and the national service. country team. We’re all on one team. As should be clear from this article, all of us, whether it be CINCs, ambassadors and their country teams, or SOF diplomat-warriors in the field, are interested in protecting

Fall 1998 31 Academic Preparation: Sharpening the Tip of the MOOTW Spear

by Captain Paul Shemella, U.S. Navy (ret.)

f you want peace,” a wise Roman has prepared SOF — including SEALs and once said, “prepare for war.” The Air Commandos — to take on offensive “Ispecial-operations community has roles in the drug war, should the policy of mastered that paradox. A more contempo- the United States change. rary piece of sage advice tells us to be care- We are learning to operate at the mar- ful what we wish for. We wished for peace. gins of war, but we must do a better job of We prepared for war. We got peace. Now forecasting where SOF skills might be what? needed in the future. Think, for instance, Foreign-internal defense, or FID, has how much better prepared SF and SEAL become the bread-and-butter mission for personnel would have been for operations special-operations forces, or SOF. And mili- in Bosnia if FID programs in Slovenia, tary operations other than war, or Croatia and Macedonia had been initiated MOOTW, have become SOF’s most com- right after independence. When SOF final- mon battlefield. The paradox that the SOF ly arrived in Bosnia, SOCEUR could field community has not mastered is this: War is only a handful of Serbo-Croatian speakers, the most important thing we do — but it is none of whom were truly fluent. Like war, the least likely. Unfortunately, we cannot operations other than war are a come-as- lock ourselves in a glass case and hang a you-are affair. How many of our officers hammer next to it with a sign that reads, understand what is happening in the Cau- “In case of war, break glass.” To do so would casus? In Colombia? In Indonesia? In Alge- be programmatic suicide. How, then, do we ria? It’s a long list. What impacts do these maintain our preparedness to wage war situations have on the planners and the while waging peace? shooters of the SOF community? We must FID — especially in its broadest sense — be able to anticipate those impacts so that is a major part of the answer. Every time we can prepare for them. SOF units work with military personnel Field work is only part of the prepara- from other nations, we are bridging the gap tion process. Every day, we recite the between peace and war. FID in the Middle mantra, “SOF are regionally oriented, lan- East led us to coalition support teams, or guage-trained, and culturally attuned.” CSTs — the glue that held the Desert Our personnel do not come to us that way; Storm coalition together. FID also led our they must be trained over a long period of Special Forces, or SF, soldiers to more effec- time. If our officers and troops are to tive special reconnaissance in Iraq, and to become all of those things — in addition to a brief return to their unconventional-war- being warriors — SOF leaders will have to fare roots in Kuwait. FID in Latin America triage the community’s excess commit-

32 Special Warfare ments, specialize units to a greater degree, he tries to conduct FID. Too often, leaders and focus more thought on the world’s assume that the legendary SOF warrior geopolitical future. The tip of the MOOTW can learn FID while he is in the field, but spear must be just as sharp as the tip of this is simply not the case. There is much the wartime spear. Much of that sharpen- the operator must have learned before he ing, however, places our people where they goes to the field. least want to be: in the classroom. Language, regional orientation and cul- Language training is difficult and is tural awareness can be learned in a class- becoming more difficult. We have many room-training environment, but there is a excuses, but we do not have enough legiti- fourth component of the peacetime-prepa- mate speakers of most languages. The lan- ration equation that cannot. Critical think- guage of war is ordnance; the language of ing is an absolute requirement for SOF peace is persuasion. It is a lot easier to officers who must choose courses of action shoot than to talk, but language is the sine from the civil-military swamps in which we qua non of peacetime SOF. In the absence now operate. Critical thinking is the skill of war, language is often what distinguish- that allows our forces to be guided by doc- es us from other troops with whom we have trine without becoming doctrinaire. Criti- shared many of our tactics, techniques and cal thinking cannot be taught at a war col- procedures. Regional orientation and cul- lege where the emphasis is on learning to tural awareness cannot be mastered until fight. It is best taught at universities a target language has been mastered — where the emphasis is on learning to and then practiced. But, increasingly, SOF think. We must give our officers ample unit commanders are relying on host- time to attend both military and civilian nation interpreters. institutions. General Wayne A. Downing SOF classrooms, whether they belong to used to say, “Who thinks, wins.” Classroom the Joint Special Operations Institute or to training gives our officers a chance to unit commanders themselves, offer the learn. But where do we send them to learn training material necessary for basic to think? regional orientation and cultural aware- The strategy of the U.S. Special Opera- ness. Courses are continually reviewed and tions Command, or USSOCOM, for mas- updated to ensure that the most relevant ter’s-level education has centered around information is available to the operator. dedicated programs at two universities — But the operator is deployed so frequently the Naval Postgraduate School and Troy that he is often not available to attend such State University. The Naval Postgraduate courses. When the operator is in the field, School administers a curriculum designed

Some leaders assume that SOF operators can learn everything they need to know in the field, but there is much they must learn before they File photo go to the field.

Fall 1998 33 for all SOF, while Troy State attempts to overtaken by events. The special-opera- meet the needs of Civil Affairs and Psycho- tions officer who is fortunate enough to be logical Operations officers stationed at Fort selected for study in Monterey does most of Bragg. Occasionally, a young officer has an his or her critical thinking in the language opportunity to attend one of the nation’s of mathematics, attending classes largely other universities. Too often, however, such populated by other SOF officers. The stu- an opportunity is driven by service policies dents of SO/LIC are neither required nor and individual pleading rather than by a encouraged to attend classes pertaining to SOF strategy for higher education. A well- area studies and government. Graduation bestows upon them a master’s of science in defense analysis. The SO/LIC curriculum is evolving into a quantitatively weighty SOF war college. At best, students will learn the art of special operations without understanding the geopolitical environment within which those operations take place. At worst, they will learn to think only in terms of what is best for SOF. Troy State offers the classes in area studies and government that the SO/LIC program does not. Approximately 40 Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations officers are selected each year to attend Troy State. And, for the least cost, Troy State appears to address the legitimate needs of CA and PSYOP. Coupled with the language training available at Fort Bragg, Troy U.S. Air Force photo State is a good package for the majority of In the equivalent of a conceived plan would include all three CA and PSYOP officers. But that is true SOF war college, stu- options, but USSOCOM should seek new only if those officers are allowed to concen- dents might learn the art developments in academia that can help trate on their studies exclusively, if they of special operations SOF thrive in its unique position at the con- are able to mingle with their civilian peers, without learning to understand the environ- fluence of civilian and military activities. and if they are allowed sufficient time for ment in which those If FID is now SOF’s bread-and-butter language training. operations take place. mission, we should ask ourselves which But Troy State is not the only package academic program best prepares our offi- available to CA and PSYOP officers. As the cers to plan and conduct it. Once identified, operational environment changes, we that university program could be consid- should not limit the possibilities for SOF ered SOF’s bread-and-butter master’s cur- higher education. riculum. In fact, the Naval Postgraduate American and foreign colleges and uni- School’s curriculum for special operations versities are brimming with programs and low-intensity conflict, or SO/LIC, was that give our officers the opportunity to designed to fill just such a role. This cur- consider why military activities must be riculum was conceived as a framework for understood by civilian officials, why mili- providing SOF officers with the area stud- tary operations have been subordinated ies and the government framework that to interagency and multinational impera- enable them to think their way through tives, and why military personnel must real-world, politico-military problems. Cou- understand the political impact of their pled with the language training at the operations. SOF officers who understand Defense Language Institute, the SO/LIC what they need (usually those fortunate curriculum was destined to become SOF’s enough to have been stationed overseas master’s curriculum of choice. early in their careers) are requesting But the SO/LIC program risks being enrollment in political-science programs

34 Special Warfare at civilian colleges and universities. ities around the world. These excellent programs are disadvan- Whichever higher-education options taged, however, because they are outside USSOCOM chooses to pursue, the fact the curricular control of USSOCOM. remains that academic programs are, and The missed opportunity for SOF officers will continue to be, an essential element in is not just the study of political culture. It the preparation of SOF personnel for is the classroom connection with civilian peace, war and everything in between. If students and military officers from other we do not acquire the capability to under- countries. Because the majority of today’s stand the people, governments and foreign American civilian officials have had no mil- countries more thoroughly than other military experience, military officers are chal- itary forces do, SOF personnel will become lenged almost daily in the struggle for something less than special. We must con- sound political decisions regarding the use stantly seek new opportunities for develop- of force, rules of engagement, public-affairs ing special-operations officers who can guidance, and exit strategies for contin- forecast where our soldiers will be sent in gency operations. Our officers must under- the future and the specific capabilities stand how their civilian masters and other- these soldiers will need. Identifying a mas- agency counterparts think — and what ter’s program for SOF personnel is a policy they think about the military. decision based upon a long list of require- But what about foreign military stu- ments. The study of what Clausewitz called dents? Shouldn’t there be a master’s pro- the “trinity” of people, armies and govern- gram that mixes American military officers ments should be near the top of that with their counterparts from around the list. world? The Naval Postgraduate School has developed a master’s degree program called Civil-Military Relations and Inter- Captain Paul Shemella is national Security. This 15-month curricu- an adjunct professor of civil- lum, which is based upon area studies and military relations at the government, emphasizes civil-military Naval Postgraduate School relationships within democratic systems. in Monterey, Calif. A Navy The program provides a forum in which SEAL for more than 20 students from all regions of the world are years, Shemella served in a able to explore the ways that civilian and number of Navy special-warfare assign- military organizations can combine their ments, including platoon commander and efforts to prevent or resolve conflict — department head in both UDT-21 and either by negotiation, or with combined SEAL Team Two; instructor in the Basic military force. Underwater Demolition/SEAL depart- Currently, there are 20 officers and two ment; executive officer, Special Boat Unit civilians from 17 countries enrolled in the Eleven; and commander, Naval Special Civil-Military Relations and Internation- Warfare Unit Eight in Panama. He also al Security program. served as the chief of policy for the U.S. Spe- SOF leaders should see the advantages cial Operations Command and as chief of of enrolling a number of PSYOP and CA staff for Special Operations Command- officers in the new curriculum. Those spe- Europe. Shemella holds a bachelor’s degree cial operators are often at the tip of the from the U.S. Naval Academy and a mas- MOOTW spear. They would learn — along ter’s degree from the Naval Postgraduate with officers and civilians from such coun- School. From 1986 to 1987, he attended the tries as Bosnia, Ukraine, Malaysia and National Security Fellowship Program at Colombia — to think their way through Harvard University. He retired from the peacetime security problems they are des- Navy in November 1996. tined to help solve. This academic program is a crucible for critical thought about the issues that affect our field activ-

Fall 1998 35 1998 Index Special Warfare

Articles Alexander, CPT Mark T.; “Getting the Word Out: The Role of PSYOP in the ACRI”; Summer, 18-21. Beres, Louis René; “Terrorism, Law and Special Operations: Legal Meanings for the SOF Commander”; Winter, 28-36. Bowra, MG Kenneth R. and COL William H. Harris Jr.; “Regional Engagement: An ARSOF Approach to Future Theater Operations”; Fall, 2-23. Boyatt, COL Mark D.; “Special Forces: Who Are We and What Are We?”; Summer, 36-37. Butcher, MAJ Bill; “Civil Affairs in Support of the African Crisis Response Initiative”; Summer, 14-17. Cable, Larry; “Getting Found in the Fog: The Nature of Interventionary Peace Operations”; Spring, 32-40. Crews, MAJ Fletcher; “PSYOP Planning and the Joint Targeting Process”; Winter, 16-21. Erckenbrack, MAJ Adrian; “Vital Interests vs. Budget Constraints: Planning the Force Structure of the Future”; Spring, 7-13. Eyre, LTC Dana P.; “Working with NGOs: What Every SOF Soldier Should Know”; Spring, 14-23. Gundersen, Jon; “Protecting U.S. National Interests: The Role of the Ambassador and the Country Team”; Fall, 24-31. Harned, COL Glenn M.; “The Nature of Insurgency: Melting the Iceberg”; Summer, 34-35. Marley, LTC Anthony D., U.S. Army (ret.); “SOF in Conflict Resolution: Operational Capabilities vs. Political Constraints”; Winter, 10-15. McCallie, Ambassador Marshall F.; “The African Crisis Response Initiative: America’s Engagement for Peace in Africa”; Summer, 2-7. McCracken, COL David E.; “ACRI: Establishing a New African Paradigm”; Summer, 8-13. Passage, Ambassador David; “Africa: New Realities and U.S. Policy”; Summer, 22-33. Pedrozo, LTC (P) Frank; “OPMS XXI: Implications for SOF”; Winter, 22-27. Schoomaker, GEN Peter J.; “U.S. Special Operations Forces: The Way Ahead”; Winter, 2-9. Shelton, GEN Henry H.; “Quality People, Selecting and Developing Members of U.S. SOF”; Spring, 2-6. Shemella, Captain Paul, U.S. Navy (ret.); “Academic Preparation: Sharpening the Tip of the MOOTW Spear”; Fall, 32-35. Yarborough, LTG William P., U.S. Army (ret.); “The Power of Persuasion: Some Historical Vignettes”; Spring, 24-31. Book reviews Breaking the Phalanx: A New Design for Landpower in the 21st Century; by Douglas A. Macgregor; Reviewed by LTC Robert B. Adolph Jr., U.S. Army (ret.); Spring, 52-53. Civil Military Operations in the New World; by John T. Fishel; Reviewed by LTC George Pogge; Winter, 45. Dark Moon: Eighth Army Special Operations in the Korean War; by Ed Evanhoe; Reviewed by COL Scot Crerar, U.S. Army (ret.); Summer. 49. Elements of Military Strategy: An Historical Approach; by Archer Jones; Reviewed by LTC Robert B. Adolph Jr., U.S. Army (ret.); Fall, 49. Night of the Silver Stars: The Battle of Lang Vei; by William R. Phillips; Reviewed by COL J.H. Crerar, U.S. Army (ret.); Fall, 48-49. Silent Warriors of World War II: The Alamo Scouts Behind Japanese Lines; by Lance Q. Zedric; Reviewed by Dr. Joseph R. Fischer; Summer, 48-49. Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces; by Susan L. Marquis; Reviewed by COL J.H. Crerar, U.S. Army (ret.); Winter, 44-45. U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse: Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies;by Andrew S. Natsios; Reviewed by LTC Kenneth H. Pritchard; Spring, 53.

36 Special Warfare Letters Special Warfare

‘Tailwind’ affair had silver interests. Often these stories lining must remain untold, as was the case with the details of Operation (This letter was written by GEN Tailwind. The only “silver lining” Shelton to Harold Jacobson, pres- in this otherwise sorry affair is ident of the Special Forces Associ- that many Americans now have a ation. — Editor) much more complete picture of Now that some of the dust has the heroic efforts of Colonel settled, I’d like to thank the Spe- McCarley’s team, and the contri- cial Forces Association for its butions of SOG in general. You superb efforts in knocking down should also be justifiably proud of the terribly inaccurate reports by the Association’s role in making CNN and Time magazine about that possible. Operation Tailwind. As you know, no one was more concerned than I GEN Henry H. Shelton about the unfounded accusations Chairman these news organizations made Joint Chiefs of Staff about our Special Operations Group soldiers in Vietnam. Please let the members of the Special Forces Association know that I am very proud of their professional conduct, forthrightness and quick response in countering the irresponsible allegations. The actions taken by the Special Forces Association to get the facts in front of the American public greatly supported my own efforts to set the record straight, as well as those of my public affairs office and other DoD spokesmen. Over the years, members of Army Special Forces and all military special-operations forces have risked their lives in defense of our great nation and its global

Special Warfare is interested in receiving letters from its readers who would like to comment on articles they have read in Special Warfare or who would like to discuss issues that may not require a magazine article. With more input from the field, the “Letters” section could become a forum for new ideas and for the discussion of SOF doctrinal issues. Letters should be approximately 250 words long. Include your full name, rank, address and phone number. Address letters to Editor, Special Warfare; Attn: AOJK-DT-MDM; JFK Special Warfare Center and School; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000.

Fall 1998 37 Enlisted Career Notes Special Warfare

AIMC incorporated Advanced International Morse Code, or AIMC, is no longer being taught as into SFQC a separate course for Special Forces communications sergeants, or 18Es. AIMC will be incorporated into the 18E curriculum of the SF Qualification Course, or SFQC, beginning with SFQC 1-99, which starts Oct. 14, 1998. The consolidation of AIMC into the SFQC is expected to maximize training resources and to improve the success rate of 18E students. The change will extend the MOS phase of the 18E curriculum from 13 to 22 weeks. Under the new arrangement, an 18E student will begin the SFQC in one class but will attend Phase III and graduate with the following class (e.g., 18Es beginning in SFQC 1-99 will graduate with SFQC 2-99).

Army raises MOS 18E The selective re-enlistment bonus, or SRB, for MOS 18E is being raised re-enlistment bonus from 1A/1B to 2A/2B for FY 1999. This action places MOS 18E on the same for FY 99 re-enlistment-bonus level as MOS 18D. MOSs 18B and 18C will continue to receive 1A/1B SRBs.

New SF soldiers must serve Soldiers who complete the Special Forces Qualification Course and language 36 months in CMF 18 training must now serve 36 months in a CMF-18 duty assignment before they will be eligible for other Army career programs. These soldiers will be able to apply for other Army career programs (e.g., commissioned officer, warrant officer or physician’s assistant) after 24 months, but they will not be released from CMF 18 duty nor scheduled for training prior to the end of the 36 months. The change was effective June 1, 1998, and it applies only to soldiers who apply for SF after that date.

CMF 18 SFC-selection rate The CMF 18 selection rate for the 1998 sergeant-first-class board was exceeds Army average 40.8 percent, vs. the Army average of 26.6 percent. Of 571 CMF 18 soldiers in the primary zone, 309 were selected. Of 226 CMF 18 soldiers in the secondary zone, 16 were selected. CMF 18 soldiers selected for promotion to SFC were generally younger and had less time in service than the Army average.

More soldiers complete As a result of proponent management initiatives and the efforts of the SFQC in FY 98 1st Special Warfare Training Group, 377 soldiers completed the Special Forces Qualification Course during FY 1998. That number represents a significant increase over the 241 soldiers who completed SFQC in FY 1997. The projection for SFQC graduates during FY 1999 is 420. Also significant is the fact that there are 177 active-component students in the training pipeline for the Special Forces medical sergeant. While not all of these trainees will graduate, the number of trainees is encouraging because it represents 23 percent of the force’s authorizations for SF medical sergeants.

38 Special Warfare SWCS tour lengthened The commanding general of the JFK Special Warfare Center and School has to 48 months approved lengthening the tour of duty for CMF 18 soldiers assigned to SWCS from 36 to 48 months. The intent of the new policy is to provide the 1st Spe- cial Warfare Training Group with greater personnel utilization and to minimize personnel turbulence. The SF Enlisted Branch at PERSCOM is implementing the policy; exceptions are being considered on a case-by-case basis.

Enlisted Branch points Staff members of the Special Forces Enlisted Branch, Enlisted Personnel Man- of contact agement Directorate, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command, are as follows: MAJ Kerry M. Barry SF Enlisted Branch chief MSG Randy Earp Senior career adviser SFC Lance Glover CMF 18 professional-development NCO; NCOES manager SFC Timothy Prescott CMF 37F career adviser; USACAPOC; 4th POG; 96th CA; schools manager; drill sergeants; recruiters Mrs. Faye Matheny Career-branch integrator Mrs. Rhonda Ruano 1st, 5th and 10th SF groups; JRTC; USSOCOM; SFOD-K; SOCPAC; SOCEUR; SOCCENT Ms. Pam Wilson 3rd and 7th SF groups; JFKSWCS; USASOC; USASFC; ROTC; JOTB; SOCSOUTH Ms. Dyna Amey SFAS; SFQC Assignment-related questions should be directed to the assignment manager. Career-development questions should be directed to either the PDNCO or the senior career adviser. SFQC students who have questions about assignments should get in touch with their student PAC, company first sergeant or sergeant major. NCOES questions should be directed to the unit’s schools NCO. For telephone inquiries, call DSN 221-5395 or commercial (703) 325-5395. Address correspondence to Commander, U.S. Total Army Personnel Command; Attn: TAPC-EPK-S; 2461 Eisenhower Ave.; Alexandria, VA 22331-0452. The e-mail address is epsf@hoffman- emh1.army.mil. The SF Enlisted Branch homepage can be accessed through PERSCOM Online (http://www-perscom.army.mil).

Fall 1998 39 Officer Career Notes Special Warfare

New policy masks WO1 The Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel has signed a memorandum OERs of CW3s, CW4s authorizing warrant officers’ WO1 OERs to be placed in the restricted portion of their Official Military Personnel File, or OMPF, once those warrant officers have been selected for CW3. WO1 OERs for current CW3s and CW4s will also be placed in the restricted portion of their OMPF. The initiative, similar to the Army’s second-lieutenant masking program, is intended to facilitate the development of junior warrant officers. The new policy will be implemented during the first quarter of FY 1999. The PERSCOM commander announced the policy in MILPER message 021405Z Sep 98.

Board selects 24 FA 39 The FY 1998 lieutenant-colonel promotion-selection board considered 80 officers for LTC FA 39 officers (22 above the zone, or AZ; 29 in the promotion zone, or PZ; and 29 below the zone, or BZ). Twenty-four officers were selected for promotion: five AZ, 18 PZ and one BZ. Fifteen of those selected are FA 39Bs; nine are FA 39Cs. Although the FA 39 PZ selection rate was five percentage points below the Army average, FA 39 exceeded the Army average AZ selection rate and matched the Army average BZ selection rate.

SF LTC selection exceeds Statistics from the FY 1998 lieutenant-colonel selection board are as follows: Army average Considered Selected Percent Selected Above the zone (AZ) SF 17 2 11.7 Army 878 53 6.0 Promotion zone (PZ) SF 40 30 75.0 Army 1393 945 67.8 Below the zone (BZ) SF 35 2 5.7 Army 1476 52 3.5

The overall SF select rate was 85 percent — the sum of 2 AZ, 30 PZ and 2 BZ divided by 40 PZ considered. This was 9.6 points higher than the overall Army select rate of 75.4 percent. An analysis of the board results yielded two important lessons: 1) Whether or not majors serve in TO&E or TDA assignments makes little difference. Five of the 30 PZ officers selected had completed their branch-qualification in TDA assignments. 2) Even though the Branch and USASOC encourage the SF groups to put their majors into two branch-qualifying jobs, on the FY 1998 board, having had only one branch-qualifying job was not a disadvantage. Of the 30 PZ officers selected, eight had only one branch-qualifying job: SF company commander. Other interesting statistics regarding the PZ officers selected are: average branch-qualifying time as a major — 23.8 months; number of majors who commanded an SF company —

40 Special Warfare 24/30; and resident vs. nonresident CSC — 15/15. Under OPMS XXI, the SF Branch requires an operating inventory of 206 lieutenant colonels in order to be fully integrated into the Army and joint communities. With 215 lieutenant colonels, not including promotable majors, the Branch exceeds that requirement. However, because of severe attrition among the year-group officers who will enter the promotion zone in FY 1999, the excess will be reduced.

Programs, positions open The SF Branch is soliciting applications for the following positions and to SF officers programs for the summer of 1999: • ROTC: Assistant professor of military science at both the Citadel and Virginia Military Institute. • Tactical officers: One each at the U.S. Military Academy and at Officer Candidate School, Fort Benning, Ga. • Graduate School: Officers in year-groups 1990 and 1991 should submit their applications for SO/LIC, Olmsted, and Harvard/DCSOPS not later than November 1998. Applicants should include their latest GRE scores and DA Form 1618-R. Applicants should also ensure that the Branch has their undergraduate transcripts on file. For more information, telephone CPT(P) Mark Schwartz at the SF Branch, DSN 221-3175; or e-mail [email protected].

One-time waiver The Department of the Army has approved a waiver that will give selected offi- granted for CAS3 cers credit for attending the Combined Arms and Services Staff School, or CAS3. The waiver, designed to reduce the current backlog of captains waiting to attend CAS3, is a one-time measure that will not be granted again. A list of officers who have not been granted the waiver can be accessed through the SF Branch homepage (http://www-perscom.army.mil). CAS3 is a prerequisite for enrollment in both the resident and nonresident Command and General Staff Officer Course. Captains who are not CAS3 graduates and have not been granted a waiver should schedule themselves for attendance as soon as possible. Those in year group 1990 must complete CAS3 during FY 1999, and they will have first priority for attendance. Captains in YG 1991 will also be given priority, and they should make every effort to attend during FY 1999. Captains who have been granted a waiver may still request attendance in resident CAS3, and commands may direct certain officers to attend. Requests for attendance should be directed through the branch assignments officer or the installation training officer.

CA officers may apply Skill identifiers identify specialized occupational areas not normally relat- for skill identifiers ed to any one particular branch, functional area or area of concentration. They may require significant education and training or experience, but they do not require repetitive tours, nor do they provide progressive career-developmental assignments. Officers may be awarded skill identifiers through one of the following procedures: • Completion of a required skill-qualification course certified by the school commandant or by the officer’s commander. • Completion of civil schooling. • Three to five years of work experience. There are 11 skill identifiers reserved strictly for Civil Affairs officers. They identify functional skills deemed critical by the Army during CA operational deployments. All CA officers should strive to complete the training or to gain the experience necessary to be awarded one of the following skill identifiers:

Fall 1998 41 agricultural officer, 6U; archivist, 6W; civil defense officer, 5Y; cultural affairs officer, 6V; economist, 6C; public education officer, 6D; civil supply officer, 6E; public transportation officer, 6F; public facilities officer, 6G; public safety officer, 6H; or public communications officer, 6R. A description of each title and the qualifications necessary for the awarding of each CA skill identifier are provided in Army Regulation 611-101, Commissioned Officer Classifica- tion System, with Notice of Future Change, dated November 1995. Interest- ed officers should submit their SI request on DA Form 4187 through their chain of command to Commander, U.S. Army Special Operations Command; Attn: AOPE-RPD; SSG Lietz; Fort Bragg, NC 28305-5200. Officers must include a copy of their Personnel Qualification Record, a copy of their college degree and proof of their work experience. For more information, telephone MAJ Jim Berenz, Special Operations Proponency Office, Civil Affairs Branch Manager, at DSN 239-6406 or commercial (910) 432-6406.

FA 39 has new field-grade MAJ Jeff Feldman has replaced LTC Tom Knight as the FA 39 field-grade- assignments officer assignments officer. Feldman can be reached at DSN 221-3115; commercial (703) 325-3115; or e-mail: [email protected].

OPMS XXI update Beginning Oct. 1, 1998, all officers in year groups 1980 through 1991 should request a change of functional area if they have FA 41 or FA 54. Officers should submit the request through their assignments officer, either on a DA Form 4187 or a memorandum. Officers should list more than one of the new or remaining FAs, with a short justification of their qualifications. In deter- mining the new FA, PERSCOM will consider the officer’s preference assignment, professional and academic background, rater and senior-rater input on DA Form 67-9, manner of performance, previously designated functional area, training or prior utilization, and the needs of the Army. Officers who have not requested a change by Sept. 30, 1999, will receive a new FA designation in accordance with the needs of the Army. Officers in YG 1993 will be the first to select from the new list of OPMS XXI functional areas. Officers should submit their functional-area preferences to PERSCOM not later than Nov. 30. The results will be released in April 1999. For information about the new functional areas, officers may access PERS- COM online (www-perscom.army.mil/opmd/faaac.htm). All SF captains must have a FA. All FAs can have an impact on SF. FA designation does not determine the results of career-field designation. The records of officers in YGs 1980 and 1986 will go before a board for career-field designation, or CFD, March 16-April 2, 1999. YG 1989 will undergo CFD June 1-11, 1999. Officers will submit their preferences elec- tronically through a CFD internet site that will be operational in the fall of 1998. The FY 1999 board schedule has been published and is available on the Worldwide Web (http://www-perscom.army.mil/). The revised DA Pamphlet 600-3, Officer Professional Development, will be available on the Worldwide Web (http://www-perscom.army.mil/) this fall. It should be available in hard copy by December 1998.

42 Special Warfare Foreign SOF Special Warfare

Russian special-ops unit A little-known and relatively new special-operations unit that served during marks fourth anniversary Russia’s military debacle in the Chechen conflict continues to exist in the post-conflict period. The 8th “Rus” Spetsnaz Detachment of the Separate Division of Special Designation, Ministry of the Interior, or MVD, observed its fourth anniversary in August 1998. The detachment — distinguished by the red berets that characterize some MVD spetsnaz units — served in Chechnya from November 1995 through October 1996. During that period, the detachment participated in special operations in the Chechen capital, Groznyy, as well as in Argun, Bamut and Pervomayskoye. The detachment also provided bodyguards for MVD Internal Troops General Anatoliy Romanov, who served for a time as the Russian commander in Chechnya. In the fall of 1995, Romanov was critically injured by a Chechen-detonated bomb and remains comatose. According to press reports, Rus detachment casualties numbered 14 men killed and 110 wounded during the Chechen hostilities. One soldier was posthumously awarded the title of Hero of Rus- sia. The Rus detachment also served in Nagorno-Karabakh (site of hostilities between Azeris and Armenians). The detachment’s fourth-anniversary commemoration was said to have been a somber one.

Colombian Urban As a consequence of strong guerrilla activity in various regions of Colombia, Counterterrorist Troops threats of insurgent actions within the capital, Bogota, have risen. For that Focus on Capital reason, forces of the Colombian Urban Counterterrorist Command have been tasked to patrol Bogota and its periphery and to conduct surveillance operations. The counterterrorist units can be air-delivered by U.S.-made Blackhawks and by Soviet/Russian-model Mi-17 transport helicopters of the Colombian Army Air Services.

Iranian exercise highlights In September 1998, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan conducted a border tensions three-day exercise in northeast Iran near the Afghan border. Code-named Ashura-3, and covering some 600 square kilometers of terrain, the exercise involved 70,000 ground and air elements of the Islamic Revolution’s Guards Corps, or IRGC; many hundreds of personnel in the basiji (Volun- teer Resistance Forces) from other provinces; and 30 fixed- and rotary- wing aircraft. The IRGC commander emphasized the exercise’s role in “acquainting commanders with geographical and tactical conditions of the operational area in northeast Iran, and practicing heliborne and airborne operations by paratroop units in the area”; testing new weapons; and practicing rapid force-deployment. Because of Iran’s hostility toward Taleban forces across the border in Afghanistan, the exercise has been seen as a possible preparation for actual military engagements. Iranian media specifically linked the exercise to concerns over Taleban, noting that “this is the logic behind the Ashura-3 war games, especially when the situation is tense in Afghanistan, and the Taleban’s military operations in northern Afghanistan have disturbed security along the eastern Iranian frontiers.”

Fall 1998 43 Kosovo Liberation Army Conflict in Kosovo has focused considerable attention on the Kosovo Lib- promises independence eration Army (UCK in Albanian), which vows to create an independent Kosovo for the Albanian majority living there. Serbian denunciations of the “terrorist UCK” include detailed assertions that the organization’s support and direction are provided by Albanian heroin and arms traffick- ers, abetted by Croatians. Regardless of the truth of these assertions, the UCK has gained a new prominence in regional-security affairs. A June 1998 interview with UCK representatives gave insight into the way UCK wishes to be perceived. The representatives insisted that because of the continued oppression by Serbs, the UCK was formed as an army of liberation, and that the UCK believes it can never succeed except by force of arms. They described the UCK’s armaments as light infantry weapons and quantities of anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns. Tactics were described simply as “getting up close, to within a few meters of the Serbian special forces, opening fire, and then rapidly withdrawing.” The UCK claims that its membership is rapidly increasing because of an influx of volunteers, but the representatives did not provide any strength figures. The UCK representatives expressed the hope that the U.S. would intervene, but they do not foresee that happening “until there has been a bloodbath.”

Russian helicopter has The Russian aviation firm Kamov has developed a light-helicopter prototype special-ops potential capable of performing multiple missions. The experimental model — designated the Ka-60 — was exhibited in the summer of 1998 and is expected to take its first test flight in the near future. The Ka-60 is tagged for eventual deployment in Army aviation units, and it may also see service with the Bor- der Troops and with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Ka-60 is to be used for reconnaissance, for transporting air-assault forces, and for various light- transport missions. With advanced avionics and electronics added, the Ka- 60 can also be used for radio-electronic jamming and for special-operations missions, which have the most demanding requirements for navigation and security.The Ka-60 may also operate as part of “mixed strike groups,” in con- junction with Ka-50 Black Shark helicopters. The Russians are developing new tactics for the helicopter, which likely will become operational early in the 21st century. The Ka-60 is powered by two 1,300-horsepower engines. It has one four-blade main rotor and an 11-blade tail rotor; a 245 kilometer/hour cruising speed; a 2,100-meter hovering ceiling; and a range of 700 kilometers, which can be extended by adding fuel tanks. Its maximum take-off weight is 6,500 kilograms. Variations for foreign sale are expected.

Reorganization to transform As part of a broader restructuring of the Russian security establishment Russia’s Internal Troops announced in August 1998, the Internal Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or MVD, will be reorganized over the next few years. As an early step, these internal-security forces, who have been active in most areas of ethno-national conflict in Russia and around its periphery, will no longer be required to guard state buildings or to escort convoys. During the period 2001-2005, the Internal Troops are to be transformed into the Federal Guard, which is characterized as a “Federal internal security police.” Fed- eral Guard forces will be assigned to regional commands and directorates that will replace the current MVD districts where Internal Troops are deployed. The force will be manned on a professional basis — personnel will be recruited on a volunteer contract basis rather than being con- scripted. It has been suggested that the Federal Guard may also contain forces from the other “internal power departments,” though this is far from

44 Special Warfare clear. In fact, elaborate proposals to transform Internal Troops into a national-guard-type force that could better respond to Russia’s domestic security concerns were advanced years ago without result. Given Russia’s enduring economic problems and other turmoil, any fundamental change in structure is likely to be more in name than in substance.

Serbian Counterterrorist Three years ago, Serbia created the Serbian Police Special Counterterrorist Police grow to 500 personnel Units, or SAJ, as a component of the much larger Serbian Special Police Forces. Initially thought to number about 200 personnel, the SAJ are now believed to constitute two units (one in Vojvodina and the other in Kosovo), with an estimated strength of 500. Organized into brigade- and battalion- sized components, the two units have helicopter transport available and are expected to operate as paramilitary forces in urban situations that may approach regular combat. One report has estimated the size of the overall Serbian Special Police Forces to be 7,000 personnel; that number could be expanded by drawing personnel from other police formations.

Colombian guerrilla The continuing spillover of Colombian guerrilla activity into Venezuela led operations affect Venezuela to an early September ambush on an 11-man Venezuelan patrol. The attackers were believed to be combatants of the Colombian National Lib- eration Army, who, together with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, have raised tensions along the Colombia-Venezuela border. In the ambush, a Venezuelan National Guard transport vehicle was struck by 15 rounds. Even though there were no casualties, the encounter under- scored growing Venezuelan concerns about escalating border incursions. The ambush was said to be the third such clash this year. Venezuelan border-protection posts and bases have been reinforced in case the guerrillas plan larger actions. At the same time, the leader of the Colombian Self- Defense Units, or AUC, has asserted that 35 Venezuelan and 25 Ecuadori- an paramilitary members were training with the AUC in order to prepare themselves to fight guerrillas in their respective countries. The 35 Venezuelans are said to be patrolling the Colombia-Venezuela border as part of a 70-man force. The Venezuelan government has denied that there are paramilitary forces operating along the border and has stated its intent to deal “rigorously” with any paramilitary activity detected. The Colombian AUC has been particularly forceful in stating its intention to permit no establishment of guerrilla buffer zones or autonomous areas within Colombia, a development sometimes raised as a peace-accord bar- gaining option.

Articles in this section are written by Dr. Graham H. Turbiville Jr. of the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. All information is unclassified.

Fall 1998 45 Update Special Warfare

USASOC announces NCO, Affairs Brigade Support Team and Soldier of the Year a Civil Affairs Tactical Support Team. The MTP is being revised The U.S. Army Special Opera- and is scheduled for publication in tions Command has announced the the second quarter of FY 1999. winners of its competition for NCO and Soldier of the Year. New handbook will provide The NCO of the Year is Staff FOB planning procedures Sergeant Robert M. Nichols of Company B, 3rd Battalion, 75th The Joint and Army Doctrine Ranger Regiment. The Soldier of Integration Division of the Special the Year is Specialist Mark N. Warfare Center and School is Waldenmaier of Company A, 1st developing a handbook to replace Battalion, 4th PSYOP Group. Special Forces Operational Base Runners-up were Staff Sergeant Standing Operating Procedures Deardeary R. Sutton of Company C, (ST 31-184, dated January 1976). Support Battalion, 1st Special War- The handbook will include recent fare Training Group; and Private lessons-learned; message proce- First Class Ethan Eddy of Company dures; and tactics, techniques and C, 3rd Battalion, 160th Special procedures. Procedures detailed in Photo by Barbara Ashley Operations Aviation Regiment. the handbook will complement USASOC CSM Richard Efird (left) presents the USASOC other SF operational procedures. Other competitors were Staff NCO of the Year award to SSG Robert M. Nichols. Sergeant William M. Langley of Head- The handbook will play an Center and School is revamping important role in helping SF sol- quarters and Headquarters Company, Civil Affairs mission-training 3rd Battalion, 160th Special Opera- diers plan operations: FOB proce- plans, or MTPs, to more accurately dures are the heart of preparing, tions Aviation Regiment; Staff reflect the functions being per- Sergeant Brian K. Speakman of Com- planning and executing SF mis- formed throughout the Civil sions. In exercises conducted at the pany B, 2nd Battalion, 5th Special Affairs, or CA, community. Forces Group; Sergeant Thilo S. Glan- Joint Readiness Training Center There are currently eight MTPs and at the National Training Cen- der of Headquarters and Headquar- for the various Army CA units, but ters Company, 4th PSYOP Group; ter, soldiers often demonstrate a the tasks actually performed by CA lack of knowledge and training in Sergeant Vasant Hayatuk of Company units, even though trained for under A, 112th Signal Battalion; Specialist staff procedures; they often have different MTPs, are often similar. To poorly developed or nonexistent Ricky J. Lawson, Company C, Support minimize the MTP redundancy, the Battalion, 1st Special Warfare Train- SOPs; and they often fail to follow CMO Division has reduced the CA SOPs. For many officers, the bat- ing Group; Specialist Robert W.McMa- MTPs to three. One MTP covers the hon of Headquarters and Headquar- talion level represents their first headquarters elements and func- exposure to branches other than ters Company, 1st Battalion, 75th tions of all CA units — from battal- Ranger Regiment; and Specialist their own, and they must learn to ion, to brigade, to command. The apply basic staff procedures. Jonathan D. Walker, Group Support second MTP covers CA generalists Company, 7th Special Forces Group. Compounding the problem for in the brigade and in tactical-sup- SF soldiers are SF-peculiar opera- Revised CA MTPs port teams. The third MTP covers tional techniques, such as isola- CA functional-specialty teams. to eliminate redundancy tion; planning at the operational The first MTP to be produced level vs. planning at the tactical The Civil-Military Operations will be ARTEP 41-701-10-MTP, level; and planning within joint Division of the Special Warfare Mission Training Plan for a Civil

46 Special Warfare and combined environments. Close Quarters Battle; and FM 31- instructors at SWCS. The coordinating draft of the 23, Special Forces Mounted Opera- The SGI concept demands the FOB handbook is scheduled to be tions. Drafts of these manuals are very best officers, and SGIs will staffed this fall. For more informa- scheduled for publication during represent the entire SF communi- tion, telephone Steven E. Cook or FY 1999. ty, not Fort Bragg only. Experi- Ed Sayre at DSN 239-8689/5255 or The final draft of FM 31-19, Mil- enced senior captains, including commercial (910) 432-8689/5255. itary Free Fall, has been approved captains in the primary zone of by the SWCS commanding gener- consideration for major, will be the Revisions planned al, and the manual is scheduled to main focus of the SGI initiative. for PSYOP manuals be published in December 1998. Captains selected for SGI duty The Psychological Operations The SF Division is also taking should be in the top 25 percent — Training and Doctrine Division of the lead in developing the Com- those who are expected to be select- the JFK Special Warfare Center bined Arms Training Strategy, or ed for senior service college on and School recently completed a CATS, for SWCS. CATS is a rela- their first or second look. They subject-matter-expert review tional database that will allow should have received above-center- board for the revision of FM 33-1, commanders at all levels to plan of-mass block-checks on their com- Psychological Operations. The unit training requirements and to mand OER. board discussed key issues, program the necessary resources. These officers will provide a pool including proposed changes and CATS is scheduled to be opera- of 15 to 20 officers each year from recommendations for inclusions tional by 2004. For more informa- which to select SGI officers. The into the initial draft. tion, telephone Major Gregory J. SWCS commanding general must The PSYOP Division will begin McMillan at DSN 239-5333 or com- approve officers recommended for planning for the revision of FM 33- mercial (910) 432-5333. SGI duty. There are six SGI positions in 1-1, Psychological Operations Tech- SWCS to host niques and Procedures, during the the 1st Special Warfare Training second quarter of FY 1999. The SF Conference in April Group: four in Company A, 1st Bat- revision is scheduled for comple- The JFK Special Warfare Center talion; and two in Company F, 1st tion by the third quarter of FY and School will host the 1999 Spe- Battalion. The tour of duty for SGI 2000. Persons who have corrections cial Forces Conference in April. officers will be 12-24 months. Offi- or suggestions for revision of FM The conference theme is “Special cers will report three months prior 33-1-1 should submit them to the Forces — The Path Ahead.” Activi- to their start date to complete the PSYOP Training and Doctrine ties will include three symposia, SWCS Instructor Training Course, Division. For more information, several working-group sessions, an to gain knowledge from the incum- telephone the PSYOP Division at exposition displaying equipment bent SGI officer, and to prepare DSN 239-7259/7257 or commercial from the special-operations indus- themselves to instruct. (910) 432-7259/7257. trial and technological base, an air- To ensure that officers selected borne operation, a family-readi- for SGI duty will be recognized by SWCS to update ness conference, a golf tournament, promotion-selection boards, the SF cornerstone manuals a dedication to fallen comrades, new DA PAM 600-3, Officer Profes- sional Development, will note that The Special Forces Training and socials, and the Special Forces Ball. For more information, telephone SGI duty is a key developmental Doctrine Division of the Special assignment for SF captains follow- Warfare Center and School is pro- Master Sergeant Phil Provencher at DSN 239-7510 or commercial ing their branch-qualification. ducing new cornerstone manuals For more information, telephone for SF doctrine. (910) 432-7510; or send e-mail to [email protected]. Major Mark Lowe at DSN 239- Initial drafts of FM 31-20, Spe- 2496/1672 or commercial (910) cial Forces Operations; FM 31-20- 1st SPWAR Training Group 432-2496/1672. 2, Unconventional Warfare; and FM 31-20-4, Direct Action, are takes SGI initiative scheduled to be released during The Special Warfare Center and the fall of 1998. School’s 1st Special Warfare Train- Also in production, either as ini- ing Group is using the Small tial or final drafts, are FM 31-24, Group Instructor, or SGI, initiative Special Forces Air Operations;FM to identify high-quality SF cap- 31-27, Pack Animals; FM 31-28, tains to serve as small-group

Fall 1998 47 Book Reviews Special Warfare

Night of the Silver Stars: The direct relationship to ODA 101, Battle of Lang Vei. By William R. they did provide some warning Phillips. Annapolis, Md.: Naval intelligence. Institute Press, 1997. ISBN: Lang Vei’s final difference was 1-55750-691-4. 179 pages. $29.95. that, when the attack came, it was spearheaded by Soviet PT 76 The history of the Second tanks: the enemy’s first employ- Indochina (or Vietnam) War was ment of armor in South Vietnam. marked by numerous attacks on These differences alone, irrespec- isolated Special Forces camps. The tive of the valor of the defenders, newspapers of the time often called recommend this fight ahead of oth- them “sieges,” but this was news- ers as a subject for careful research men’s hyperbole. The attacks could and a detailed account. be more accurately described as Night of the Silver Stars is not miniature battles. the first account of Lang Vei’s tra- Because of the enemy’s justified vail. An earlier effort was David fear of American air power, the Stockwell’s Tanks in the Wire, pub- attacks occurred almost universal- lished in 1989 and incisively ly at night, although fighting some- reviewed by Bill Burgess in the times dragged into the daylight winter 1990 issue of Special War- hours. Extended attacks lasting fare. Unfortunately, Night of the two or three nights were not excep- took place at dozens of camps now Silver Stars has many of the faults tional. The opponents were most forgotten by most, save the partici- of the earlier effort and some that often a multiregimental enemy pants, including Nam Dong, Kan- are uniquely its own. force. They were pitted against an nack, Polei Krong, Dak Seang, Plei Phillips justifies his retelling of understrength Special Forces A- Me, and A Shau. the Lang Vei story by indicating detachment and the members of its Lang Vei, the camp of 5th Special that he addresses the larger pic- 200- to 300-man strike force who Forces Group’s ODA 101, located in ture, while his predecessor limited happened to be present at the time the farthest northwest corner of himself to the camp battle. While of attack. South Vietnam, was in many there are certainly some major dif- The opening event was usually respects an exception to the attack ferences in the two efforts, Phillips’ an intense and often accurate mor- pattern. Lang Vei’s most notable contention of greater inclusiveness tar attack. The successes of the difference was that, unlike most does not stand up well. defense were mixed: Some camps camps, it was not isolated. It was Night of the Silver Stars puts nei- fell, some held without assistance relatively close — within artillery ther the defense of Lang Vei nor the and some barely held until the fol- range — to the Marine combat larger defense of Khe Sanh in the lowing day’s sun brought effective base at Khe Sanh. In fact, the context of the war, or even in the air support and often reinforce- Marines had coordinated the context of the campaign in northern ment by the Special Forces-led details of an attack to relieve the South Vietnam. The relationships Mike Force. camp should it be attacked. between the various commands in Win or lose, the defense of the Also near Lang Vei were a Laot- the area are left largely to the read- camps was marked by courage, ian outpost a short distance across er’s assumptions. Phillips’ descrip- tenacity and the exemplary leader- the border, and a Studies and tions are crippled by the absence of ship needed to hold, control and Observation Group forward opera- a map to show the reader the loca- inspire minority troops who had tional base at Khe Sanh. While nei- tions of numerous places that are little stake in the war. Such fights ther of these organizations had any central to the story: the camp, the

48 Special Warfare previous camp (old Lang Vei), Khe to have been well-chosen. “calvary of the air,” for instance, Sanh, the Laotian border, the Laot- The author takes care in his to describe modern air forces. ian unit’s location, roads and the preface to tell the reader that the There are bright spots: Jones’ location of the involved forces. The book will address strategy at “an chapter on the WW II Pacific book’s only graphic presentation is a elementary level.” This is true. campaign is particularly interest- sketch of the camp, which is pre- Jones covers strategy with a very ing. And in his examination of the sented next to an aerial photo. The light touch, and his focus appears Vietnam War, Jones does make sketch and the photo were appar- to be mainly explanatory. some good points about the way ently made at different times and Jones also tells us that he will the U.S. Marines in the early part from different directions. Even after deal “with only some of the ele- of that conflict actually trumped carefully studying the included road ments of military strategy.” This the Viet Cong by using well- patterns and making allowances for is also true. His book jumps from organized civic action. Unfortu- later construction, it is impossible to chapter to chapter, held together nately, Jones glosses over the con- orient the two presentations. only by chronology — the early tributions made by Army Special Phillips’ account is further dis- Indian Wars in the United States; Forces, Psychological Operations abled by his lack of understanding of World War II submarine warfare and Civil Affairs personnel. the Vietnam-era Special Forces and in the Atlantic; air warfare over As a professor at the Command of the various programs and organi- Europe; the Pacific campaigns of and General Staff College, Jones zations that they developed and Nimitz and MacArthur; the Kore- held the Morrison Chair of Mili- manned. For instance, he makes an Conflict and Vietnam; and the tary History. Elements of Strategy excessive distinctions between mem- Persian Gulf War. may be a loose collection of some bers of the Civilian Irregular Essentially, Jones is a story- of his lectures, but his effort lacks Defense Force’s camp strike force teller. Other than the fact that all a central guiding light. Other and its Mike Force, repeatedly char- the discussion is generally about than the fact that some parts of acterizing the latter as “mercenar- American military campaigns, the book make reasonably good ies.” The role of the SOG personnel is the book appears to have no reading, there is little to recom- even further beyond his ken. thread of purpose. mend this volume. In summation, other than some Unfortunately, Jones some- of the individual interviews that it times blurs the line between tac- LTC Robert B. Adolph, Jr. includes, Night of the Silver Stars tics, operational art and strategy. U.S. Army (ret.) has little to recommend it. Certain- He seems far removed from any Fayetteville, N.C. ly it does not deserve a place in the serious discussion of modern Special Forces soldier’s professional strategy and the use of its Book reviews from readers are library. Possibly, if read in conjunc- nomenclature, using the term welcome and should address sub- tion with Stockwell’s book, John jects of interest to special-opera- Plaster’s SOG, and some of the tions forces. Reviews should be from accounts of the Khe Sanh siege, it 300-500 words. We encourage sub- may assist in forming a better missions on disk or by e-mail. overall picture. Include full name, rank, daytime phone number (preferably DSN) COL J.H. Crerar and mailing address. Mail reviews U.S. Army (ret.) to: Editor, Special Warfare; Attn: Vienna, Va. AOJK-DT-MDM; USAJFKSWCS; Fort Bragg, NC 28307-5000 or Elements of Military Strategy: e-mail to [email protected]. An Historical Approach. By Archer Jones. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishing, 1996. ISBN: 0-275-95527-3 (paper). 264 pages. $24.95. Elements of Military Strategy is well-written — the author is clear and concise in his tech- nique, and from the perspective of strategy, his case studies seem

Fall 1998 49 Special Warfare

This publication is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited ■ Headquarters, Department of the Army

Department of the Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School ATTN: AOJK – DT – MDM Fort Bragg, NC 28307 – 5000

PIN: 076668–000