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PALM OIL PROJECT INSTALLATIONS Yambéring Gaoual

OTouba

Labë

'apaya

Télimélé

Pt. Victoria

Doiaba

Boffa

Souguéta Ouassou

Kobba

CONAKRY

Forecarioh. LEGEND

(T) Kagbele Pilot Plabt iPamelap (D 'Kanderiah Plant (D Yogoya Plant

(4) Bentimódiah Plant DRAFT

PALM OIL EXTRACTION PROJECT

REPUBLIC OF GUINEA

Prepared for the

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Checchi and Company 815 Connecticut Avenue, N. W. Washington, D„ C„ 20006

December, 1966 Checchi and Company

BIS CONNECTICUT AVE., N.W. WASHINGTON, D.C.20005

TELEPHONE CABLE AOORE55

ESQ- B G 3 □ "CHECCHI"

December 2, 1966

Mr. Murray Gray, Chief Contracts Staff Bureau for Africa Agency for International Development Department of State Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Gray:

We herewith transmit five copies of the draft final report on the Guinea Edible Oil project. This document has not yet been finally reviewed by a company principal, therefore, it must be considered a draft. This report will be supplemented by a section by Mr. Manly, who, as you have been informed, is seriously ill.

We will appreciate your prompt attention to this report so that we may prepare and submit the final version as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours

Thomas H. Lamoureux

Encs. Checchi and Company

B I 5 CO N N ECTI CUT AVE., N. W. washington, 0.0.20006

TELEPHONE CABLE AOORE55

"CHECCHI"

December 2, 1966

Mr. Murray Gray, Chief Contracts Staff Bureau for Africa Agency for International Development Department of State Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Gray:

We will appreciate your prompt attention to this report so that we may prepare and submit the final version as soon as possible.

Sincerely yours

Thomas H. Lamoureux

Encs. CONTENTS

I THE PRELIMINARY STUDY . . I- 1 II THE PROJECT AGREEMENTS II- 1 III CONCLUSIONS III- 1 A. Has the Project a Future in Guinea? Ill- 2 B. Is the Guinean Experience Useful Elsewhere? . . • III- 8 IV RECOMMENDATIONS IV- 1

A. Recommendations to the Government of Guinea. . . IV- 1

B. Recommendations to AID ...... IV- 3 V THE FULFILLMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE OBLIGATIONS V- 1 A„ GOG Project Administration

1963-1964 . . V- 1 1964-1965 V- 5

1965-1966...... V-18 B. Local Currency Financing V-36 C. Technical Assistance V-40

VI THE TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS ..... VI- 1

A. The Installation and Operation of Plants ..... VI- 1 B. Improvements in Technique VI-11 1. Palm Fruit Processing . VI-14 a. Training. . VI-14 b. Improvement of plant performance VI-16 c. Bunch processing VI-18

d. Loose fruit processing . . VI-20 2. Kernel Recovery VI-23 a. Nut Separation VI-24 b. Kernel recovery ...... VI-25 VII PLANT OPERATIONS VII- 1 A. Pilot Operations --1964 VII- 1 B. Plant Operations -- 1965 . VII-24 C. Plant Operations --1966 . . . VII-34 VIII PROBLEMS VIII- 1

A. Problems of USAID/G Logistic Support . , . . . VIII- 1

B. Problems with the Government of Guinea (GOG) . . VIII-12 C. Problems of Peace Corps Participation VIII-23 APPENDICES

A. The Social, Administrative, and Political Structure

in Guinea . .. o ...... A- 1 B. The Cooperative Operation B- 1

C. The Exchange of Commodities for Fruit . C- 1 D. Financial Exhibits of Average Plant Requirements ... D- 1

TABLES

1964 1. Deliveries to Kagbele Pilot Plant ...... VII-21 2. 1964 Deliveries Broken Down by Political Sections . . . VII-23 3. 1965 Deliveries of Fruit to Plants in Bentimodiah,

Yogoya, and Kanderiah . VTI-30 4. Comparative Weekly Palm Fruit Deliveries in the

Wonkifong Area -- May thru July, 1964 and 1965 .. VII-31 5. 1965 Output of Three Plants VII-33 6. Comparison of Deliveries to Kanderiah, Yogoya and Bentimodiah Plants During the 1964, 1965, 1966 Seasons VII-3 9 7. 1966 Output of Three Plants VII-41

MAP

Palm Oil Project Installations . . Frontispiece THE PRELIMINARY STUDY 1-1

I. THE PRELIMINARY STUDY

The palm oil project was born following a request from the

President of the Republic of Guinea to the President of the United States of America for the assistance of the United States to increase the pro¬ duction of vegetable oil in Guinea,,

USAID retained Checchi and Company to make a rapid study to determine the type of industry which could be established in a short time to increase the production of vegetable oil. The results were sub¬ mitted to the Government of Guinea at the beginning of 1963 under the title, "The Prospects for Edible Oil Production in Guinea. " The study concluded that:

9 The installation of large-scale mills for the

extraction of peanut or palm kernel oil would

not be economic at that time, and that their

establishment would take a long time.

• The installation of an industrial palm oil mill

could only be based on a supply of fruit from a

selected oil palm plantation because all attempts

elsewhere in West Africa to supply oil mills

exclusively from natural groves had failed. At

that time, the existing plantations in Guinea

were insufficient to supply a mill, and the con¬

ditions of supply based on natural groves were

even more negative. 1-2

o To take a first step forward it was advisable

to aid existing producers to process their

fruit in greater quantity with higher efficiency

and lower cost and effort. This could be achieved

by the use of small hydraulic hand-presses already

developed and tested in Nigeria.

could be set up in villages for use by small groups

of producers or by cooperatives which could easily

amortize them and even obtain a sizeable profit.

Their distribution could bring about a considerable

increase in national production.

In order to implement these conclusions the report recommended that:

test the machines under Guinean conditions and

to train personnel.

Guinea and the forest region if the pilot plant proved

viable and if the cooperatives or other type of

fruit supply organization could be set up and

personnel trained. 1-3

At the same time, the GOG should begin a program to encourage the establishment of selected palm plantations with the aim of attaining the area neces¬ sary to assure a supply to an industrial oil mill.

II-l

II. THE PROJECT AGREEMENTS

The conclusions and recommendations of the study were accepted

in their entirety by the GOG which signed a one-year agreement with

USAID on February 1, 1963, to assure the financial and technical assis¬

tance of the United States for the realization of a project that would:

e Increase the production and harvesting of

palm fruit.

and sellers of vegetable oil through cooperatives

or some other appropriate form of organization

if cooperatives should not prove feasible.

of palm fruit either near Conakry or in the Boffa-

Boke region.

required for the installation and operation of the

presses and for the organization of the producers,

collectors, processors, and sellers.

For the implementation of the above aims the agreement provided that:

o USAID would purchase the presses, auxiliary

equipment, and vehicles, and would furnish tech¬

nical assistance by means of a consulting contract. II-2

o The GOG would provide buildings for the oil

mills, personnel to be trained in project

operations, working capital, offices, and

logistic support. In addition, the GOG agreed

to establish with the help of the contractor an

appropriate organization for the collection of

raw material, operation of the plants, and

marketing of the product. This organization

could be either a governmental, cooperative,

private, or mixed enterprise.

At the expiration of the above agreement a new agreement was signed on March 31, 1964, which included certain modifications sug¬ gested by experience to that date. In particular, it provided additional dollar financing by USAID to prolong the technical assistance. Among other things, the GOG agreed especially to:

o Designate a full-time project manager with the

authority necessary to carry out project

operations.

organism to take over the operation of the project.

local currency financing on request of the project

manager. II— 3

On November 23, 1964, another agreement prolonged the finan¬ cing of the project by both sides for one year. This agreement was modified by an amendment signed on March 23, 1965. In this, the GOG agreed specifically to:

of project manager.

9 Develop an organization to assure the regular

operation of the plants and the supply system.

0 Assure local currency financing by releasing

the necessary counterpart funds to the Trust

Fund.

o Provide for the participation in the project of

Peace Corps volunteers,

o Furnish in the localities of the plants lodgings and

offices for the personnel of the project including

the contract technicians and Peace Corps volunteers. CONCLUSIONS III-l

; III. CONCLUSIONS

The palm oil project was a qualified success. This may seem a

strange conclusion in view of the outcome, but it becomes less so when

one considers the purposes and accomplishments of the project.

The purpose of the project in concrete terms was to build and op¬

erate a pilot plant to determine the conditions needed for economic via¬

bility of the small edible oil production scheme in Guinea. If the economic

performance of the pilot operation justified an expansion, additional plants

were to be installed in appropriate locations.

After the first season of pilot operation, the process had been

improved to a state of efficiency which, though not great, would enable

commercial production under conditions which were reasonable and possible

to achieve within Guinean means.

We are not suggesting that the project was a success at this point.

The production process and the fruit collection organization were still

crude and offered many opportunities for improvement. However, even

at that state of development, oil could be produced at a cost covered by its

price if the plant got enough fruit to operate at 80 percent of capacity.

This amount of fruit could be easily provided by the area of plant operations if producers could be induced to harvest and sell to the project at a reason¬ able price. We were able to identify the inducements which would do the job; these asked only that the GOG do in the case of the palm oil project what it was already doing in other cases. By any measure, the project lived up to its specifications at that point. III-2

The next logical step would have been to continue the pilot phase

to give us time and experience to improve plant economics by mechaniz¬

ation and relocation and to work out the rudimentary cooperative collection

organization begun near the end of the first season. These were the ob¬

jectives of our recommendations at the end of the first year.

The increased mechanization of the process would have lowered

the breakeven level of production and made the plant more flexible in its

response to fluctuating fruit supply. The relocation of palm oil operations

closer to the source of fruit aimed at reduced transportation costs and,

coupled with the organization of cooperatives, participation in plant

operations and management by the producers. These improvements would, we believe, have made the project an unqualified success and given it a

sound basis on which to expand.

The Minister of Rural Economy, however, was interested only in

proliferating palm oil plants for political profit. He was uninterested in

arguments to the contrary. His insistence that plants be built in Boffa

and Boke robbed us of the time and the focus of attention necessary to

carry forward the development work. With respect to the goal of develop¬ ment and adherence to economic viability as the basis for expanding the project, the project was not permitted to meet its specifications.

A. Has the Project a Future in Guinea ?

The part of the project concerned with palm oil was a commercial failure because of conditions imposed by the GOG. Restrictions on prices, III-3

commodities, and marketing could not have been more devastating had it been the GOG intention to devise means to throttle the activity.

In its present state of development the palm oil project can op¬ erate in Guinea and pay its costs and investment if the GOG will do what is necessary to increase the amount of fruit supply. This can be done only by giving the fruit harvesters incentives to deliver. The incentives consist of paying the harvester a price for his fruit which bears a reason¬ able relationship to the free market price for oil, and making commod¬ ities available in the villages so that the harvester's earnings have purchasing power.

A reasonable price for fruit consistent with the free market price for oil and with commerical plant operations can only come about by freeing the project of its artificially low fixed price for oil or by giving a subsidy to allow the project to pay the harvester an adequate price with¬ out itself losing money. The GOG conception, demonstrated in other

Guinean agricultural processing industries as well, is to keep consumer prices low by keeping agricultural prices low. The implication of the price controls is that either the project or the fruit supplier is expected to subsidize the consumer. In the case of this project, it was not the consumer who was subsidized; he paid the free market price for palm oil. It was ALIMAG,'the mandatory middleman, that absorbed the margin that should have gone to the project and, through it, to the fruit supplier.

* The state trading agency for foodstuffs. III-4

(See last paragraph, p. VI-6, Section VI-A). The result, as demon¬ strated by our experience is that the fruit supplier does not supply more than will satisfy his small cash needs and the project loses the production efficiency it needs to break even. The Russian built and operated canning plant at Mamou suffers from the same problem. The GOG price of 25 GF for 50 GF tomatoes has that plant operating at nine percent of capacity.

The other part of the incentive package--commodities--can be provided, as it is elsewhere in Guinea, by allowing the fruit harvesters to organize in cooperatives and recognizing them in the periodic commodity allocations. It was a constant enigma to us why the successive Ministers of Rural Economy refused to do this. President Toure in his Circular

No. 33/PRG of 11/2/65 stipulated that "y°u must harmonize the purchase of agricultural products with the distribution of consumer goods in such a way that the producer will be encouraged to produce more. " Our sug¬ gestions in this respect were welcomed and supported by regional govern¬ ors, Ministry technicians, political officers of all sections and committees, that is, by those who lived in direct contact with the producers, and finally by the producers themselves.

To have any success with the project it is essential that the pro¬ ducers be organized. When Guinea became independent, the GOG estab¬ lished a distribution system of state stores in parallel with the existing system of Lebanese traders, who were considered exploiters. Regardless III-5

of the merits of this attitude, it effectively eliminated trade beyond the district towns. The state store did not fill the vacuum left when the

Lebanese trader no longer could go to the villages with his truckload of merchandise to trade on the spot. It was this lack that the project hoped to compensate by organizing producer-consumer cooperatives. It is the only administratively practical way to distribute commodities to the vil¬ lages without great cost, and it is the only way to collect fruit efficiently.

In addition to all its other advantages, the cooperative kind of organization

suggested by us has the advantage, from the project point of view, of

avoiding the negative effect of dissatisfaction and hostility on the part of

some villagers toward their political committees.

We had only limited acceptance of the cooperative idea and no

support. The Minister tolerated cooperatives associated with the proj¬

ect but would not recognize them officially. The negative attitude towards

the formation of producer cooperatives derived from the desire to dis¬

courage the creation in the village of an independent economic organization free of political control. The refusal to furnish commodities to exchange for fruit derived from the stated intention to avoid setting an economic

precedent. This is completely irrational since commodities were being

allocated to support other national objectives and the activity was encouraged

by the President. Finally, the persistent will to entrust fruit collection

to the village committees derived from the desire to prove that the III-6

political ideology and organization of the Democratic Party of Guinea

have a power of persuasion superior to personal interest.

Once having created the basic condition for increasing fruit supply,

another move by the GOG that would enhance project success is to place

operating responsibility closer to the scene of action. The Ministry of

Rural Economy has the enormous task of planning and executing a revolu¬ tionary change in Guinean agriculture. It is short of personnel and time,

and under these conditions it should not be burdened with the responsibil¬ ity for running a multitude of small operations. The Minister recog¬ nized this by assigning the organization of fruit collection to the regions.

He should do the same with the plants. The regional administrations from the governor down to his officials in charge of production, cooper¬ atives, public works, and maintenance are closer to the scene and better able to serve the plants. If the regions were to be given the plants they would see the possibility of a return on their efforts. As it was, they were little involved and less interested in what was going on beyond getting a plant installed in their areas for the political advantage of having in¬ creased production according to the latest plan.

The value of operating the four existing installations is unquestion¬ able if the conditions for an adequate raw material supply are met. The investments are already made and all that is required is working capital and maintenance. With enough fruit to process, each of the three palm III-7

oil plants can produce economically on a single shift basis 18 metric tons

of oil per season and about the same amount of palm kernels. The oil

represents an import substitution of about $6, 000 and the kernels can

either be exported to earn approximately $2, 000 or be processed in the

* MICROS unit to yield 7 metric tons of oil and 10 metric tons of animal

feed, representing an additional import substitution of about $5, 000.

Thus, the three palm oil plants and the MICROS plant can save

Guinea approximately $33, 000 annually, exclusive of the MICROS output

from raw materials coming from sources other than the palm oil plants.

It would be more nearly correct to say that these plants will produce oil

and animal feed that otherwise would not be on the market. Guinea's

foreign exhange resources do not permit importation of all the edible

oil and feed it needs.

The value of building new plants in Guinea, duplicating those al¬

ready installed, is clearly not economically justified at present because

it depends on the comparative efficiency of investment in alternative

applications. Since food production is Guinea's most critical problem,

it is justified to limit the alternatives here to agricultural applications.

One need go no further than oil palm culture to find a more productive

investment. The capital investment required to build a s.ingle small plant

if applied to maintaining the neglected existing plantation areas surroundin the Boffa and Boke plants would result in an increased oil yield of about

* Unit for the extraction of oil from palm kernels, peanuts, and copra. III-8

107 metric tons as compared to the 18-ton output of a new plant. Because

the existing plants are operating only one shift on fruit of meager oil con¬

tent, plantation maintenance could absorb the investment required to

build two new plants before existing processing capacity would be exhausted.

The comparative investment yield in terms of oil would be about 215 tons

in the case of plantation maintenance and only 36 tons in the case of the

two new plants. The existing plants would operate more efficiently and

transportation costs would be very much reduced.

Only after existing capacity is completely engaged would the

question of efficiency of additional investment in palm oil come up again.

Then there would be no choice between plantation investment and plant

investment. Since existing capacity would be exhausted, it would be necessary to do both. It is obvious that regardless of existing unused capacity, other kinds of agricultural investment opportunities might be better candidates for consideration.

B. Is the Guinean Experience Useful Elsewhere?

The small plant scheme has much to recommend it to any country with oil palm groves sufficiently dense to minimize transportation of the fruit bunches to the plant:

the economic life of the nation. Large in-

I dustrial mills minimize the participation of III-9

the peasant, and although industrial effici¬

ency is important, they leave rural life

relatively unchanged,

o It is an excellent interim production facility

during the period of plantation development

and industrial construction,

o It requires only small capital investment,

which, although not as efficient as invest¬

ment in industrial oil production, may al¬

low a start toward increased and improved

production where industrial culture and pro¬

cessing are not yet feasible.

Natural growing conditions in Guinea are among the worst in all

the West African oil palm belt. The same variety of wild oil palm yields

about half the amount of oil in Guinea that it does in Nigeria. Yet we be¬

lieve the present small plant scheme would succeed in Guinea if the GOG

wished to cooperate. If the scheme can succeed in Guinea, that is, cover

its costs and pay out its investment in a reasonable time, then it would

be a profitable venture in places with better raw material.

Some such small production operations, based on the hand-press,

already exist in Sierra Leone and Nigeria. The Sierra Leone officials say their operation pays for itself. Of the Nigerian experience we know III-10

nothing other than that some fifty of the presses have been sold out of the Nigerian Government stock of 1, 000. These are presumably being

used by individual family groups, but we have no information about the

results. Nevertheless, from what we know about the Guinean experience

and the current trend of development at WAIFOR,* we doubt that the 50

presses can be amortized in a reasonable time, say ten years, or that

they contribute more than minimally to an increase in production.

The reason for our pessimism about a family affair is that if the

press is used in a cottage production set-up relying on family labor, it

is not possible to get enough production to amortize the equipment and still

make the operation financially attractive. If the press owner hires outside

help and processes fruit other than his own family harvest, then he must

pay his labor, and to do this he must operate more efficiently than the

cottage set-up would allow. For this kind of operation the production

must be on a small industry basis, and this has not yet been developed in

Nigeria. It is toward this goal that current WAIFOR work is directed,

but we know that this has been going on for years and might suffer from

lack of sufficient concentration of attention, inadequate financing, and

the recent unsettling of Nigerian conditions.

The small plant scheme in Guinea represents the furthest develop¬

ment along these lines anywhere in the world. It is still rudimentary

compared to what it could be with mechanical improvements. The press

* The West African Institute for Oilpalm Research. III-11

has been motorized with great success by Unilever in the Congo as an expedient for use during the construction of an industrial mill. Other mechanical improvements in the process are already fully conceived and need only an interested party to execute them. When these are realized, the small plant scheme may approach the industrial plant in overall per¬ formance with much greater flexibility of operation.

IV-1

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Recommendations to the Government of Guinea

We recommend that the Government of Guinea:

1. Turn over the three existing palm oil plants to the adminis¬

tration of the respective regions in which they are located.

Being closer to the plant operations and having at their disposal the I technicians needed to operate and maintain the plants, we believe that

the regional administrations are in a better position than the Ministry of

Rural Economy to take charge of these installations.

2. Extend working capital loans to the regions when necessary for

for the purpose of operating the plants.

To assure the operation of the plants, the GOG should not rely on the

financial resources of the region which are often unsure and subject to

other demands. These loans can be secured by the oil and palm kernels

produced at the plants.

3. Require the regions to amortize the GOG investment in the

plants at a rate of seven to ten percent per year. This would

amount to a yearly return to the GOG of GF 123, 400 to

GF 176,300 per plant.

The need to make amortization payments will impress on the regional administrations the need to operate the plants in a serious manner and to take the necessary measures to increase the supply of fruit to a level

Which will allow the plants to repay their costs. The suggested rate of IV-2

amortization is reasonable and within the ability of a well-run operation

to pay. The amortization payments might be made in the form of oil and palm kernels.

4. Apply any additional GOG investment in palm oil development

solely to the cleaning, maintenance, and fertilizing of the

existing plantation areas near the plants.

Until the existing plants are being utilized to capacity, that is, 12 hours per day for 20 weeks, an investment in plantation regeneration will yield six times more oil than an investment in new plants. The Yogoya and

Bentimodiah plantations should have 60 hectares each regenerated before any consideration is given to the building of additional plants. Then, if new plants are to be built on a rational economic basis, they should be built in Boffa and Boke only after an additional 60 hectares each have been in the process of regeneration for two years.

5. Maintain a stock of spare parts in a central location to assure

the continued operation of the STORK presses.

There a is stock of such parts now at the Kabele plant sufficient for five years or more of press maintenance. The project mechanic, Conde Nabi, is thoroughly familiar with the press and can serve as an advisor and supplier of parts to the regions.

Additional recommendations concerning the MICROS unit for the extraction of oil from palm kernels and other seeds will be made in a supplement to this report. IV-3

B„ Recommendations to AID

If AID maintains any interest in the future of palm oil activity

in Guinea, we recommend that AID:

1. Give no further U. S. financed support to the project for the

present.

The GOG now has three operating palm oil plants and the presses for

two more. It has been given all the technical assistance it was willing

to absorb. Before any new plants are built, the problems of the existing

plants should be solved, and this is uniquely dependent on the GOG. No

additional U. S. support can affect the results.

2. Agree to the use of counterpart funds for working capital loans and

plantation regeneration if the GOG follows our recommendations

in this respect and submits a well organized project for con¬

sideration.

We doubt that the GOG, even with the best intentions, can arrange for funds from the national budget in time to continue operations next season. If the project loses its momentum, it will be difficult to start up again.

3. Provide for expert follow-up after the next two processing

seasons to observe results.

It is important to the evaluation of this project and others like it to have a feedback of results which can be critically examined to see what lessons can be learned and to serve as a basis for future support if necessary.

4. Consider additional U. S. aid to the project if the GOG results

show progress and promise. IV-4

Regardless of the continuing interest of AID in Guinea, we recommend that AID:

5. Keep and open mind about small vegetable oil production

possibilities in other areas.

The disappointing results in Guinea are a function of the Guinean conditions, economic and administrative, and should not obscure the possibility of progress elsewhere or prejudice consideration of other opportunities.

6. Give contractors the maximum responsibility and authority

for providing their own logistic support.

Unless the AID mission has logistic support items surplus to its needs or on order, and reserves these for the contractor prior to his appear ance in the field, we believe the contractor can provide for his own re¬ quirements more efficiently than AID.

V-l

V. THE FULFILLMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE OBLIGATIONS

The contract scope of work provided for the establishment of a

pilot plant, the economic and technical results of which were to decide

the construction of the other plants of the same or modified type. This

required that the pilot plant develop an optimum small production unit

and test its economics at an efficient level of production, that is, at or

near full capacity, for one entire production season from February to

August, 1964. Decisions on the construction of additional plants were

to be made between September and November, 1964, to permit the in¬

stallation of the new plants in time for the following production season,

that is, before February, 1965.

Several difficulties impeded the maintenance of these terms of

implementation, notably the slowness of Guinean officials to make de¬

cisions, their changes of opinion, and their transfers of position. The

history of 'the various phases of execution brings these difficulties to

light.

A. GOG Project Administration

1963-1964

According to the agreement of February, 1963, the GOG with the

help of the contractor was to establish an appropriate organism to ad¬

minister the project, manage the plants, assure the raw material supply, and market the product. V-2

The GOG assigned responsibility for he project to the Ministry of Rural Economy (MER), which in turn entrusted the project to the

Office du Cafe et des Oleagineaux (OFFICAO), an autonomous state

enterprise controlled by the Minister of MER, Barry Sory. Its Director,

Sekou Soumah, became director of the project with great autonomy. No sooner had the pilot plant construction at Kagbele been completed in

October, 1963, than OFFICAO was abolished and Mr. Soumah was named

Inspector General of Agriculture in MER. He retained direction of the project, which was thereafter administered directly by the Ministry.

Pilot plant operations began in November, 1963, with the instal¬ lation and testing of the hydraulic hand-press and its auxiliaries. Be¬ cause Mr. Soumah had never been directly involved in the daily operations of the project and in his new position could not be expected to devote much time to it, USAID requested that a full-time manager be assigned to the pilot plant. MER provided Ohiami Hilaire, a Togolese national trained as an agricultural field technician and working in Guinea to dis¬ charge an obligation to the GOG for his schooling.

In May, 1964, Mr. Soumah was transferred to the governorship of the region of Youmou, leaving the project without overall GOG direction.

It was not until two months later that the new Inspector General of

Agriculture, Diallo Cellou, took up his duties. In the interim, Mr.

Ohiami attempted to fill the gap, but the production season was in full V-3

swing and his efforts were seriously divided. Under Mr. Cellou, the project received less attention than before, mainly because of his pre¬ occupation with learning his other responsibilities. This left project affairs in the hands of Mr. Ohiami, who was entirely without authority, status, and, indeed, without talent for this kind of position.

The results of the first season of operation clearly indicated the need for an additional season of the pilot phase to allow the full de¬ velopment of village organization, fruit collection and transportation, processing techniques, and project organization. These results were presented in an interim report dated July 13, 1964, recommending that the pilot phase of the project be continued by transferring palm oil pro¬ duction from Kagbele to two small pressing centers in the Wonkifong and

Cabitail sections of Dubreka region. The reasons for this recommenda¬ tion were briefly as follows:

o The fruit supply to the pilot plant had polar¬

ised at these two locations in opposite

directions from the plant beyond economic

transportation distance.

a These locations provided approximately

60 percent of the total first-year supply of

fruit. It was our opinion that this could

be increased and that economic operations

could be sustained. V-4

o We had established twelve cooperatives

near the proposed plant sites resulting in

great enthusiasm and improved fruit

deliveries.

Along with the shift of palm oil production, we recommended that the Kagbele plant be converted to a processing station for palm kernels, peanuts, and copra by the installation of a MICROS unit, and that it house central management headquarters including storage and marketing operations. We also recommended further expansion of the cooperative organization.

The translated report was submitted to the GOG on August 27.

Two days later, at a meeting between USAID and MER, the Minister was informed that the report, which he had not yet received, had been sub¬ mitted under cover of a letter from the Director/USAID, outlining responsibilities and possibilities for the future. In response, the Minis¬ ter stressed the importance of beginning work on the six possible locations suggested in the original Checchi report of January, 1963, "The Prospects of Edible Oil Production in Guinea, " with priority given to Boffa and Boke regions where there were selected palm plantations. He pointed out that the report had been adopted by the Council of Ministers and had been included in the Seven-Year Plan. V-5

1964-1965

Substantive planning for the 1965 season awaited the return from

leave of our contract team, then made up of Morrison and Laure, At the

initial meeting with MER officials on October 10, 1964, the first order

of business was the question of GOG's acceptance of the recommendations

of the interim report. The Minister stated that he had not seen the

report. Roger Soumah, GOG's liaison man with USAID, admitted that for lack of a secretary he had not transmitted it. This was six weeks

after the GOG had it in hand, and during this time neither Diallo Cellou nor Ohiami Hilaire, both of whom had received working copies, felt the necessity of discussing it with the Minister.

The Minister was provided with a copy of the Director's covering letter which summarized the findings of the report and discussed the future of the project. After a cursory reading, he set it aside, com¬ menting that it was out-of-date and by implication no longer worth con¬ sidering. It was difficult to understand his point of view because the letter, though six weeks old, was still as pertinent as the day it was written. Nothing had occurred in the intervening period to nullify its intent or substance. Nevertheless, the Minister accepted the report recommendations indifferently, emphasizing that the establishment of plants in Boffa and Boke had higher priority. V- 6

In response to repeated USAID objections to the lack of a full-time project manager with authority to act, the Minister appointed Ohiami

Hilaire, until then manager of the Kagbele pilot plant and a man of un- proven and unpromising ability, to the position, asserting that Mr.

Ohiami would have complete operating authority. In practice, the pro¬ ject was no better off than before. Despite his official appointment as project manager, Mr. Ohiami's powers, by his own statement, were of the order of bookkeeper and supervisor of labor. No autonomy outside the simple day-to-day supervision of the pilot plant was allowed him.

All decisions, even the least important, remained until the end under the jurisdiction of MER, if not the Minister himself.

The lack of legal form of the palm oil enterprise had posed several problems and promised increasing difficulties as the project expanded.

When informed of this, the Minister instructed Mr. Ohiami to investi¬ gate and draw up plans for the creation of an autonomous vegetable oil center along the lines of an existing center at Seredou which extracted orange oil. The purpose was ostensibly to have such an organization take over the administration of the project much in the way OFFICAO had done. This would have freed the project from direct MER control which could not be effective, if only for lack of time and- personnel. Also, it would have relieved MER of the constant bother of routine decision¬ making and the onus of holding back project activities. Mr. Ohiami did V-7

the planning with the assistance of the contract team and submitted a full proposal to the Minister in November, 1964. That was the last we heard of it.

Pursuing the problem of GOG personnel to handle the expanded project, we brought up the question of plant managers for the requested high priority plants at Boffa and Boke and of an engineering counterpart to help with and to be trained for the work of developing equipment and building new plants. The Minister dismissed the idea that the new plant managers should be available to help establish the plants, stating that they would be assigned when USAID began construction. He promised to try to obtain an engineering counterpart from a group of technical school graduates due to return from France in some months. This appointment never materialized.

To our request for warehouse space in which to accumulate con¬ struction materials, the Minister stated that this was a problem for

USAID to solve. He pointed out that the Russians and the Chinese im¬ ported and constructed their own warehouses and said USAID should do the same and not place burdens on Guinea. For the stocking of commod¬ ities for cooperatives, he authorized renting space in Dubreka and marking up prices accordingly.

At the beginning of the first season the Minister had directed that all palm oil be stocked at the pilot plant for sale en masse to V-8

ALIMAG, the state trading agency for foodstuffs. This was not possible because,, despite several requests, the project did not have and never

obtained enough drums to operate properly. We now requested 300 drums for future operations and explained that about half the 1964 pro¬ duction had been sold to obtain exchange drums in which to store the other half. Furthermore, the remaining oil had been taking up needed space at the pilot plant for the past three months. The Minister said that he would offer the 30 remaining drums of oil (6, 000 It. ) to ALIMAG for half payment in cash and half in commodities needed for trading with cooperatives. Later, ALIMAG accepted the oil but declined to provide the commodities, claiming that this would have to be arranged with the

Minister of Commerce because several trading agencies would be in¬ volved. Full payment was accepted in cash by our counterparts, but they never followed through on the attempt to obtain commodities.

On the final question of housing for Peace Corps volunteers who would be working on the project at various locations, the Minister in¬ formed us that this presented no problem. As the PCV's were supposed to live like Guineans, grass huts would be provided for them.

After the October 10 meeting our field team prepared the finan¬ cing and procurement aspects of an expanded project and drafted the changes that would be needed in the project agreement and the contract with Checchi and Company in order to carry out the recommendations of V- 9

the interim report and to construct the two additional plants at Boffa and Boke without reliance on the GOG for human, material, and finan¬ cial resources. The work plan was based on the idea that Guinean per¬ sonnel and PCV's would be trained in plant construction by building the

Wonkifong plant first. This location was chosen for the training exercise because it was the nearest to Conakry and could be closely supervised by our field team without paralyzing absences from the office work of planning, procurement, and supply. Project planning and procurement work continued through December, 1964, and field work began in late

December with the mapping of the Wonkifong and Cabitail areas by two

PCV's. By early January, 1965, orders were placed by Ohiami Hilaire for the four steel sheds required for the four new installations.

Following the appointment of Mr. Ohiami as project manager, the Minister assigned a newly graduated agricultural technician, Tolno

Faya, to take over direction of the Kagbele pilot plant. Some months later, Mr. Tolno appeared on the scene and, later still, he moved to

Kagbele. Beginning in January, 1965, the Kagbele plant changed char¬ acter in keeping with the recommendation of the interim report and became a pilot center for the new MICROS unit. With the arrival of Mr.

Tolno, processing operations began on the separation of kernels from palm nuts in preparation for the coming of the MICROS, which had just been shipped from the manufacturing plant in Holland. V-10

On January 11, we again met with the Minister. He had been provided with a new comprehensive supplementary report on the first season of operations; we now wished to inform him of our work plan for the coming season and to repeat our October 10 request for locally available construction materials.

The Minister denied having approved any additional installations in the Dubreka region, although this was our explicit recommendation in the interim report accepted by him on October 10, and he restated that the Boffa and Boke plants had highest priority. We pointed out the need to continue the pilot experience and the wastefulness of abandoning an area where so much work had been done with promising results. He re¬ lented to the extent of agreeing to a new installation in one area of

Dubreka but only after the plants in Boffa and Boke were operating. We explained the need to construct the plant at Wonkifong (Dubreka) first to train Guineans and PCV's to construct the Boffa and Boke installations.

The Minister remained adamant, stating that if our team leader,

Morrison, could not go to Boffa and Boke to build the plants, then USAID should get someone who could.

Responding to a request by the Director/USAID, we agreed that the Boffa and Boke plants could be constructed without previously training personnel if it were possible to contract this work to regional enterprises.

The Director proposed this to the Minister, who agreed and requested V-ll

that we all meet again that afternoon with the Governor of the Boffa

region, then in Conakry to press his demand for an oil mill in his region.

The Governor proved to be a very energetic man and one not to be sty¬

mied bvr the impossible. There were no construction contractors in the

region, but he promised that the full services of the regional public works

department would be at our disposal and, in the matter of lodging for resident project personnel, that housing would be available. With these assurances we agreed to start construction on the Boffa plant as soon as the construction were materials bought and a plant manager was on the site.

We stated that the Boke work could begin when the Governor of Boke assured us of the same cooperation. The Minister reaffirmed, reluc¬ tantly, that a plant could be installed in the Wonkifong section of Dubreka after the other two plants were ready to begin production. But he de¬ clined to start the time-consuming personnel action to recruit new plant managers for the three plants until USAID started the field work. He rejected finally the idea of the second proposed palm oil plant in the

Dubreka region, and we were thus forced to abandon plans for the

Cabitail section despite its previous development and future potential.

After two site surveys in Boffa and Boke, during the latter of which the Boke regional officials promised essentially the same cooper¬ ation promised by Boffa officials, the locations of the two new plants were chosen in the Yogoya (Boffa) and Bentimodiah (Boke) plantation V-12

areas. The site surveys confirmed our two original estimations, both vigorously denied by the Minister, that these plantations--although the

largest in Guinea--could yield only 40 to 50 percent of the fruit needed

to achieve plant capacity production, and that they had not been main¬

tained and fertilized for most of the years of their young life since Guinea

achieved its independence. Nevertheless, there were sufficient surrounding wild groves to yield the balance of the required fruit.

The problem of specific plant location in the Yogoya area hinged on the future maintenance of the plantation, for if it were well cared for it could, in the future, provide the bulk of plant requirements, and any extension of the planted area would further improve the supply. The realization of both of these possibilities would result in the lowest total transportation costs. However, if there were small probability of main¬ tenance and additional planting, it would be better to situate the plant nearer to the main concentration of wild groves and to the only source of firewood and water, 22 and 8 km. , respectively, from the plantation site.

Relying on the assurance of the Boffa Director of Production that

the plantations would be maintained and on the evidence, during a sub¬ sequent inspection, that clearing work had already started, we opted for the plantation location. Construction on the Yogoya plant began during the week of February 15. At this point, two things failed to materialize: V-13

the assistance of the regional public works people and the presence of the promised new plant manager. Anxious to get on with it, we went ahead at the expense of other work, enlisting the aid of two PCV's re¬ cently transferred to the project for the few remaining weeks of their tours in Guinea. No sooner had we gotten substantially committed to the construction work when another thing failed to happen. Plantation clearing stopped and never again was a trail cleared or a fruit-choking frond pruned. It seems that the maintenance work had begun by the means of investissement humaine, a French euphemism for forced labor by political coercion, pending approval of a regional request for funds from the national government. Voluntary labor works more or less well in some cases, but of the several instances we saw in Guinea, few of these demonstrations of mass political consciousness endured beyond the first day of bunting, pep talk, and visiting dignitaries. The building of the Bentimodiah plant in the Boke region started during the week of

March 15, also without benefit of regional public works assistance and a plant manager, simultaneous with the last part of the Yogoya work.

During the construction at Yogoya, the cooperatives organized the previous year in the Wonkifong section saw their fruit begin to ripen in increasing quantities. They became restive at the lack of project acti¬ vity in that area and complained to the Governor of Dubreka, pressing him to intervene in their behalf with the national government and V-14

offering to construct the plant themselves if we would equip it. We re¬ ceived from USAID a request from the Minister that the Wonkifong plant be constructed with no mention of his previous condition that the other two plants be in operation first.

We surveyed the Wonkifong section and selected Kanderiah for the plant site. We also devised a plan to use the labor of the cooperatives to construct the plant and, at the same time, test a cheaper, more rudi¬ mentary construction scheme. Our intention was to build a plant using palm trunks for the framing covered with iron roofing and to reduce paving to a minimum. This method had several recommendations. From the point of view of relationship with the cooperatives, it had the special merit of involving them directly in the plant investment, making them realize that the enterprise was theirs rather than the national government's

From the standpoint of project economics, this scheme would have given us a chance to test a cheaper kind of construction that might have appreciably lowered the investment in future plants and considerably reduced the use of imported materials.

The Minister, at our request, visited the area of the proposed site at Kanderiah to explain the planned operation of the new plant and to en¬ courage the villagers to greater efforts during the upcoming season. He was met by a great outpouring of vocal enthusiasm which he inadvertently demolished by two summary decisions. One, a decision to erect with the V-15

least possible delay a plant identical to those being constructed at

Yogoya and Bentimodiah, ruled out the villagers' building of their own plant. The other, a decision to recognize village committees as the only official fruit collection agencies, withdrew official support and sanction from the creation and operation of cooperatives. Immediately afterwards, in private conversation, the Minister told us that we were free to organ¬ ize as many cooperatives as we wished, but that he would only recognize the committees because they were politically responsible to him and could be controlled. However, our subsequent attempts to continue coop¬ erative work were met with apologetic lethargy by local officials, formerly energetic and helpful, who pointed out that if the Minister had chosen to appoint committees as his agents, there was nothing they could do against his wishes.

Construction of the Kanderiah plant began during the week of

April 13 and production operations began during the week of May 11.

The start of production operations at Yogoya was delayed for one month and at Bentimodiah for two months because the new plant managers were not available. In both cases, production at the peak of the season was lost.

To avoid loss of the entire production season, Mr. Ohiami and Mr. Tolno operated the plants for several weeks until the new managers, Messrs.

Barry and Balde, arrived. V-16

The net result of the GOG delays in decision and action, and the

several changes of decision negating previous agreement and planning,

was the loss of the entire 1965 experience as a basis for meaningful

analysis, the serious delay of work on developing a process for oil ex¬

traction from other materials, and the abandonment of work on the

development of additional mechanical equipment for the palm oil process.

At the end of the 1965 season, in late July, the project had reliable

data only on the pilot plant and the Kanderiah plant, both relatively close to Conakry, where we had frequent contact and surveillance. Records of operations at Yogoya and Bentimodiah, which were entirely under Mr.

Ohiami's control, were either not properly kept as requested, despite the well-developed forms provided, or were withheld from us. In either case, such information as we did receive after repeated requests was irrecon¬ cilable. The gross indications were that the management of these two remote installations was slack. The Plant Managers, Barry and Balde, had been trained by Mr. Ohiami, and the two PCV's, Russel and Edmundsen, who were to assist them, had spent two weeks in training at Kanderiah under our supervision. Quite aside from proficiency in managing the operations, / the task of record keeping was a matter of simple routine well within the capability of the Plant Managers.

Mr. Ohiami explained that the poor showing in management and record-keeping resulted from lack of surveillance and complained that V-17

his contact with these operations was hampered by lack of transportation.

This was not entirely true. He did not have the kind of transportation he

would have liked, but he did have a way to do the job. USAID had ordered

vehicles intended for management liaison, but they were not expected to

arrive for some time. In the interim, the project bought a locally avail¬

able motorcyle for Mr. Ohiami's use. The decision to buy the motor¬

cycle, a frequent means of transport in Guinea, resulted from a joint re¬

quest by Morrison and Ohiami which was approved by both USAID and the

Minister. However, when the time came to go up-country on the motor¬

cycle, Mr. Ohiami declined to subject himself to the discomforts of its

use on Guinean roads, preferring to wait for the occasional project

truck transporting gasoline to the plants. The vehicles intended for

management liaison did not arrive in Guinea until the latter part of the

season, and it was then too late to get them into service in time to

affect results.

During the off season., when the palm oil plants were shut down,

Barry and Balde transferred from Yogoya and Bentimodiah to the proj¬

ect offices in We Conakry. suggested to Mr. Ohiami that they could be

usefully employed in organizing any data they might have collected during the short period of operation of their plants. Up to that time the project had quite complete records of the operations under its control, and Mr.

Ohiami had participated in the keeping of this data. We again stressed V-18

the importance of the data as a means of analysis of project operations and results, and as the only basis on which continuation and expansion

of the project could be justified. This was fruitless. For a period of

seven months, until the start of the 1966 season, Mr. Barry did abso¬

lutely nothing and Mr. Balde was employed on minor administrative

tasks.

Toward the end of 1965, Mr. Ohiami was granted his first leave

in many years to visit his family in Togo. Prior to departure he was

audited by a representative of MER.. The results of the audit showed the

marked deficiency of his record-keeping, especially financial account¬

ability. From the time of his appointment as project manager, we

had cautioned him to the point of mutual boredom about the

need for him to keep at least a journal of expenditures, receipts, and

oil disposals. This fell on deaf ears, although he did have an accomu-

lation of memoranda on scraps of assorted paper which, in the end, even

he could not fathom.

1965-1966

From the time CFFICAO went out of business, project management,

with the exception of production operations at Yogoya and Bentimodiah,

had been largely in our hands by default of the GOG to give the project an

organizational structure and at least one full-time, capable officer. In¬

cluded in our responsibility was the supervision of project Peace Corps V-19

volunteers contrary to Peace Corps practice and GOG sensibilities. In the beginning we accepted this situation as the only means of getting anything done. But, as time passed and the press of construction activity diminished, this overall contractor authority became onerous both to the

GOG and to us and was a prime source of friction and buck passing.

To solve as much of the past organizational difficulty as possible,

to normalize Peace Corps participation in the project, to achieve greater

GOG involvement in and responsibility for project operations, and to pre¬

pare the kind of an organization which could carry on expanded activities

after the end of the technical assistance contract, we began with MER a

series of organization studies. These studies were based on MER views

about the future of the project and the activities in which it would engage,

and on the quantity and quality of personnel most likely to be available.

Out of this came an organization and staffing plan which, though inade¬

quate for the tasks of an expanding project and inefficient in getting the.

most value out of our training capability, did correct some evils and

arrange activities more to everyone's liking. Essentially, it gave the

Guineans control over all features of the project other than those which in

their estimation they were patently incapable of handling or had been

assigned in the project agreement to either USAID or the contractor. Speci

fically, all cooperative, collection, production, and marketing operations

were to be under Guinean management, and all PCV's associated with V-20

the project were made responsible to the project manager. Our tasks

were construction, fabrication, development, control and maintenance

of equipment, and consulting services to GOG personnel. Mindful of the

need to assist Mr. Ohiami in matters of planning, records, and control

of funds, MER transferred Mr. Tolno from the management of the

Kagbele pilot plant to the project office in the capacity of controller.

By the time the final organizational scheme had been agreed to

by project and MER technicians, the post of Minister of Rural Economy

had changed hands. It was more than a month before the new Minister,

Fodeba Keita, was available to discuss the many problems facing the project, and since all power of GOG decision rested with him, the project was stopped cold. Nevertheless, we had high hopes that the new

Minister would renew momentum on rational project development and bring about the changes which would give the project a chance to suc¬ ceed commercially. He had a reputation for organization and decision, the lack of which had hampered our activities for more than two and a half years.

In the first of our meetings with Minister Fodeba Keita on Decem¬

ber 22, 1965, he excused himself from substantive discussion of our problems, stating that he considered the meeting introductory. He listened to a presentation of the history of the project and an identification of its major problems but cut off any discussion of detail, saying that the V-21

briefing papers would be studied as a basis for a future meeting. The

Director/USAID pointed out that rapid action was necessary because the

coming production season would be the last occasion for an evaluation of

the project and the basis for a decision on its future. In reply, the

Minister castigated any thought of abandoning or reducing the scope of the

project, saying that it was considered important by President Toure. His

prescription for the future was to identify the difficulties and find solu¬

tions so that the project could expand. He closed the meeting with a

promise to do his best to make conditions favorable and to make his

decisions by the end of the month.

The second meeting on December 29 took up problems in detail.

The reorganization plan was approved without question, but in the matter

of suggested changes to improve the supply of fruit, we did not fare as

well. We offered a series of remedies, many of which were interdepend¬

ent, dealing with all facets of the supply problem. We suggested fruit

price increases to bring raw material prices more in line with the mar¬ ket price of oil. Coupled with this, we requested a regular allotment

of controlled but common commodities for use as trading incentives to

give the harvesters' earnings a purchasing power then lacking. Using

the price and commodity incentives as an initial attraction, our intention was to extend the organization of producer-consumer cooperatives to im¬

prove the collection of fruit and to bring local participation, and eventually V-22

management, into the operation of the plants. This intention was recog¬

nized and approved in the reorganization plan. Although these were the

principal means by which we intended to improve project performance, there were additional remedies aimed at improving other factors in the unsatisfactory supply of fruit.

The Minister agreed to the rise in fruit prices but rejected the allied provision of trading commodities, despite our cautioning that price alone could not be effective. He based his stand on the fact that the scarcity of commodities was a national problem and would have to be handled on a national basis. The formal promise of a supply of commod¬ ities could not, he warned, be made a condition of the project, and he suggested that the best way to handle this problem was for the governors of the respective regions to include a requisition for cooperative needs in their regular periodic requests for allocation of commodities. This, of course, would be an interesting possibility for the future, but it of¬ fered no alternative for the upcoming season because of the lead time necessary to place such a plan into effect. The Minister was silent in the face of this argument; however, the Inspector General of Agriculture promised, without assurance of success, to try to obtain some commod¬ ities from the state trading agencies as a special, non-recurring conces¬ sion to improved project performance. The balance of suggestions for increasing fruit supply were deferred for decision on the technical level. V-23

On the important question of raising the project selling price of

palm oil, the Minister had been fully briefed about the inequities of our

controlled marketing situation and the absolute impossibility of reaching

a break-even level of operations at the then current official price. The

controlled price of 175 GF/lt. of oil delivered to ALIMAG forced the project and the fruit suppliers to subsidize the profits of ALIMAG. The

Minister informed us that he had discussed the price problem with the

Minister of Commerce, who had jurisdiction in the matter, and would ask him again to reach a decision. In the meantime, he had already in¬ structed the project to raise the fruit purchase price to encourage maxi¬ mum supply without reference to the selling price of oil. This would provide a basis later on for a determination of the necessity and amount of a rise in the official oil price.

Three subsequent meetings in January, 1966, between project and MER technicians resulted in agreement on fruit prices and, at our suggestion, the abandonment of the scheme to organize cooperatives. We pointed out that the lack of an assured supply of commodities denied the producers the sole incentive to form co-ops and placed the future of the scheme in doubt. Rather than form co-ops which we felt sure would not work and which would probably have to be abandoned in six months, it would be better to avoid stigmatizing the co-op idea in the minds of the villagers and to work through some less formal arrangement. The V-24

Inspector General of Agriculture suggested a loose organization based on village participation in the operation of the plants through representa¬ tion on management boards. In an effort to overcome the lack of com¬ modities, he also proposed a change in the nature of the plants from buyers and processors of fruit to straight commission mills which would merely process the villagers' fruit and return the product, less a quantity to cover costs and charges. We accepted this idea. In fact, we had proposed it almost a year before only to have it rejected by the previous Minister. We made the reservation, however, that the villagers would have to be free to sell their oil at the market price or trade it at the official price for commodities similarly priced. The Inspector

General proposed to present the scheme to the Minister and asked for assurances that USAID would accept it as a basis for an expanded proj¬ ect. We told him that we would discuss it with USAID, but that the con¬ tinuation of the project would surely depend on the results of the sea¬ son's operations. The other outstanding problems concerning oper¬ ational changes for the 1966 season had to be discussed with the govern¬ ors. Our suggestions that the governors be called to MER, for a confer- I ence was thought impracticable; the Minister sent them a letter which, we were informed, introduced the project personnel and stated the situation and the Minister's decisions. It solicited the governor's opinions on several matters and asked them to decide on others. Laure V-25

accompanied Tolno Faya, at that time standing in for vacationing Ohiami

Hilaire, on the trip to contact the governors at their respective regional

headquarters.

The results of the regional meetings were, in all major respects,

favorable to the project and in accord with our views. There was unani¬

mous agreement on the form of fruit collection and the prices to be paid.

In addition, all regional officials gave their unsolicited opinion, in the

strongest terms, that the exchange of commodities was the key to suc¬

cess and far more effective than devices such as the commission mill

operation which would place too much of the marketing burden on the villagers. The Governor of Boffa went so far as to write the Minister that the exchange of commodities against local produce was the preferred means of augmenting production and quoted Presidential statements-- chapter, book, and verse--to that effect. However, there was a divergence of views on some important aspects of the operations and a notable lack of personal involvement of the governors in assuring the success of the project. The Director/USAID and the Charge d' Affaires /AmEmbassy prevailed on the Minister to call a meeting of the governors in Conakry where arrangements for the season could be finally hammered out in definite form.

From this point onward the picture becomes clouded and any reasons we may offer are pure conjecture. We were told by Tolno Faya V-26

that the Minister was furious because Laure accompanied Tolno on the

trip to contact the governors. This was the first inkling we had of any

GOG to our direct contact objection with Guinean officials or people. In¬

deed, such contact previously had been encouraged and was, in fact, the

only communication meaningful possible. Our counterparts were for the

most part too inexperienced and timid to discuss problems openly and

with professional authority. We know from observation that Mr. Tolno's

report to the Minister on the results of the regional contacts was in¬

complete, shallow, and fawning. We urged him, to the point of offering

help, to rewrite his report in a more factual manner, but he insisted it

was adequate. We can only surmise that the Minister was embarrassed

when an information copy of our report of the meetings came to him in

support of the need for a face-to-face meeting between him and the

governors.

The confrontation with the governors took place on February 5,

1966. No Americans were invited. Again we are dependent on Mr.

Tolno, a questionable source, at best, for an account of what happened at the meeting. He reported a "sort of anti-American" attitude on the part of the governors which was seconded by the Minister and other officials present at the meeting. According to Mr. Faya, they complained that the American way of dealing with all kinds of projects was purposely to place so many conditions and obstacles in the way of realization that V-27

projects moved very slowly. As an example, the "rice project" (Rice-

land Rehabilitation?) was purported to be delayed probably because the

Americans wanted to continue furnishing rice to Guinea as a means of

political influence.

Whether or not Mr. Tolno's account is reliable, it is not in dis¬

cord with the facts. On February 7, two days after the above meeting,

USAID and project people met with the Minister and the governors or

their representatives. This meeting lasted fifteen minutes during which

the Minister informed us that he had discussed the situation of the project with the governors and had given the problems and suggested solutions

careful consideration. Because of his newness on the job and his scanty knowledge of rural conditions, he considered the entire problem of fruit supply to be one better handled by the regional administrations. Accord¬ ingly* from that time on, the supply of fruit to the plants would be the responsibility of the governors. Contract personnel were to refrain from further contact with the population and to restrict their activities to plant construction and operation and, in the matter of fruit supply, to consultation with the Project Manager. In response to the Minister's invitation we asked several questions of detail concerning how we would dovetail project financing, fruit collection, and data-keeping activities under the new split responsibility. To all our queries came the unvarying neply, is to be worked "This out by the governors. " It was obvious that V-28

the Minister had spoken and would entertain no further questioning that

hinted anything less than complete acceptance of the new scheme of

things. Partly in relief that the governors were finally and officially

charged with a responsibility that had been largely theirs from the be¬

ginning, and partly with hope that they would live up to it more effectively than in the we told the Minister past, that our only concern was to get

an adequate supply of fruit and that who did it was not important.

Subsequent clarification from Mr. Tolno and MER through the

Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed the restrictions and expanded them to forbid contractor contacts with officials of the regional adminis¬ trations and, furthermore, included project PCV's in the same category, making the restriction a blanket exclusion of all American liaison with

Guineans other than project and MER personnel. On the occasion of a

chance, unofficial encounter with the Governor of Boffa some months later in Conakry, he stated that he had expected us to contact him to coordinate supply and collection operations and to get our opinions on supply problems. He showed surprise at the restriction on our contacts and said that this had not been a feature of the discussions between the governors and the Minister.

In any case, the exclusion of all contacts with field supply oper¬ ations denied us the first-hand experience and the source of information ï needed to counsel wisely and effectively. Our counterparts had proven V-29

an unreliable source of information, being inexperienced interpreters

of events and often inaccurate and incomplete reporters. His hands ï thus tied, Laure felt largely surplus, and it was much against his inclin¬

ation to remain with the project. Nevertheless, we decided that he

should be available to advise the Project Manager if the occasion arose

and to avoid the accusation of having prejudged and prejudiced the re¬

sults. Minister was Accordingly, the informed on April 13 that the

services of Laure would be terminated, and arrangements were made

subsequently to end his tour in Guinea on June 21, the day following a scheduled major project review to determine its future. Despite our

misgivings about the chances for a commercially successful season

which would justify continuing the project, as planned, through FY67, we

set about doing that part of the project's work remaining to us. This in¬

volved continuing the testing program for the MICROS unit, setting up a

small fabricating and maintenance shop at the pilot plant, and completing

the construction of the three existing palm oil plants. Our aim was to leave the project, if that was to be the result of this last test season, in a state that would reflect credit on the U. S0 effort and to leave the GOG project personnel able to carry on with run-of-the-mill operations.

In March of 1966 the GOG tightened enforcement of existing regu¬ lations and formalities governing upcountry travel by personnel of all official foreign missions. Up to that time Checchi personnel, by V-30

informal agreement with MER and the governors of the regions in which

the project operated, had the privilege of unrestricted upcountry travel

without formality. We were free to come and go as we wished according

to the needs of our work without obtaining GOG travel authorizations; we

were free of the need to call on regional officials except as dictated by the

need for their assistance; and we were completely without surveillance.

After March, however, Embassy and USAID officials instructed us to

observe the new regulations scrupulously. During a meeting with the

Minister on April 13, we requested a blanket travel authorization per¬

mitting project personnel to travel among the several project installations

for the purpose of completing our construction program and for normal

production and maintenance operations. We pointed out the communi¬

cation and maintenance imperatives of a farflung enterprise with five

locations, four of which were at distances of 40 to 265 km. from Conakry,

operating thirteen vehicles and collecting and processing a perishable

raw material. The Minister countered that blanket authorizations were

a subversion of the intention of the controls and assured us that if a

monthly schedule of travel plans were submitted ten days in advance, the required formalities would be completed in time.

At this point the construction program was in fair circumstances.

The fabricating and maintenance shop had been installed before the im¬ position of travel restrictions, and we were ready to begin prefabricating V-31

the elements needed to complete construction of the processing plants.

Despite the additional delay on top of previous delays, the long standing

PCV vacation plans and the arrangements, and approaching rainy season,

there would still be enough time to complete the work, albeit on a tight

schedule. A schedule of travel for the month of May covering contract

personnel and PCV's, who were essential to the work plan conceived in

cooperation with the Project Manager, was submitted through normal

GOG channels under cover of a letter from the Director/USAID on April

20, with a supplementary copy directly to MER. There followed several

sessions with the Inspector General of Agriculture, by this time a new

man, to explain and justify the travel and personnel requirements of

the construction program. On the basis of his satisfactory understanding

of the request and its urgency, he agreed to take it to the Minister for

approval and action as soon as possible.

Concurrently, in the "Special Report on the Economic Assistance

Program in Guinea" prepared by USAID/G for the Economic Com¬

mission of the Republic of Guinea, dated April 22, 1966, the problems

of the palm oil project were brought to the attention of the highest econ¬

omic policy-making group of the GOG with a specific reference to con¬

tractor and PCV travel difficulties and a request that these restrictions be lifted. V-32

The first of May arrived, as did twenty succeeding days, without

the travel authorizations. In the interim, word filtered back from MER

by way of the Project Manager that the Minister was against authorizing

PCV's to travel outside the regions to which they had been assigned and

was willing to grant permission only to our Chief of Party. We explained

to the Inspector General the impossibility of getting the work done under

such a scheme, pointing out that in only two of the four upcountry locations

were there PCV's in residence and that the skills of the other two project

PCV's were essential at all locations. Apparently, this argument plus

several inquiries by the Director/USAID about the progress of the travel

authorizations were without effect. By May 20 the Director/USAID had

not even had the formality of a denial of his request, and it had become futile to continue the construction program with any hope of completion within the available time. Not only could we not do the construction, we could not leave Conakry for the purpose of normal liaison and surveillance of the instllations and the production operations previously assigned to us by the Minister himself. The only travel authorizations granted were to permit Robert Manly, the third member of the contract team, to modify the MICROS unit installed at the Kagbele pilot plant and conduct the planned production tests.

The exclusion of supply operations from our activities had made

Laure's presence a practical absurdity. The restriction on travel V-33

reduced Morrison's services to the same level. It had become evident that we could expect no relief from the Economic Commission despite the explicit advice that a poor result of the present season would dictate a decision to reduce or terminate USAID support of the project, a decision to be made prior to June 20. Lacking GOG cooperation and powerless to influence the outcome of the project, we advised the Director/USAID to terminate Morrison's services, a process he began with a letter in¬ forming the GOG, dated May 20, 1966.

Eight days later the Director was informed verbally, by Roger

Soumah, that the Economic Commission had decided to terminate the project effective June 30, 1966. To comply with this termination date we presented a close-out schedule for all operations and called the at¬ tention of the GOG to the problems of permanent GOG personnel attached to and paid by the project, of production equipment which would be left for the GOG at the various installations, and of the possibility--if the

GOG so desired--of providing Manly's services for two additional months to relocate the MICROS unit and continue training GOG personnel in its operation. The Director/USAID transmitted the close-out plans and discussion to the GOG in a letter dated June 8, requesting their reactions and any suggestions for changes which might alleviate undue hardship.

The urgency of this situation was underlined by USAID's announced intention to cut off additional counterpart financing, controlled by USAID V-34

through the Trust Fund, two days hence on June 10 which would leave the project with sufficient funds previously advanced to carry on sched¬ uled operations only until June 30.

As so often in the past, the GOG failed to respond in reasonable time considering the circumstances. Interpreting the silence as lack of objection, we proceeded according to the close-out plan, much to the conster¬ nation of Ohiamiand Tolno, who stated that they had been neither informed by MER of the termination decision nor given instructions to close-out production operations. However, they had been kept fully abreast of events as we knew them and had taken part in the planning of all arrange¬ ments.

Finally, on June 29--the day before the announced termination date--

Ohiami presented us, unofficially but with the Minister's approval, a copy of a letter from the Minister of MER to the Minister of Foreign

Affairs dated that day. In it the Minister, after referring to a Foreign

Affairs letter he had received dated June 15, asked the Minister of

Foreign Affairs to inform the Director/USAID that Roger Soumah's com¬ munication (of the Economic Commission's decision to terminate the project effective June 30) was unofficial. In consequence, the authorities of USAID were invited to cease for the moment all execution of the term¬ ination schedule that had been submitted to the GOG. V-35

Just why the Minister, who had shown himself a stickler for

formality where he was concerned, expected us to heed an "unofficial"

look at an interministerial communication, two governments and three

administrative levels away, condemning by implication another unofficial

communication, we do not know. In any case, the request was academic

because the close-out schedule, for all intents and purposes, had been

completed by that time. There remained only a few odd bits and pieces

of USAID-titled equipment and supplies to return to USAID possession.

This we did, and if there ever was an official GOG request following the

lines of the Minister's wishes, we never received it.

Included in the Director's letter of June 8 to the GOG was a request

that he be notified no later than July 7 of their wishes with respect to

additional technical assistance on the MICROS installation. Again there was no timely reply unless one considers the Minister's unofficial invitation to cease and desist. By July 7 the MICROS production tests had been

completed, and a decision had to be made to terminate our third and last field technician, Robert Manly, or to keep him on in the event a tardy

GOG request might be forthcoming. Rather than abandon the expensive and rather specialized MICROS unit to a certain future on the junk heap, both we and USAID favored keeping Manly available through September 30, during which time he would be concerned with the final phase-out of the field work of the contract and could be used on other USAID technical

work if the GOG did not wish him to continue on the MICROS. V-36

B. Local Currency Financing

The original project agreement called for a contribution of local currency equivalent to $89, 300 from the GOG budget. This contribution was not available until August, 1963, more than three months after the arrival of the first permanent member of the contract team. Until then it was not possible to start construction. In fact, the down payment on an order for local fabrication of a steel shed for the pilot plant was ad¬ vanced by OFFICAO on July 24, 1963, through the good will of its Director,

Sekou Soumah, who was also the Project Manager. The regular source of financing, when finally arranged, was a one-year GF 22-million line of credit to OFFICAO from the National Bank for Agricultural Develop¬ ment (BNDA).

Aside from the initial delay in local currency financing, funds were always adequate, if not readily available, during the first year of the contract. Lengthy formalities were required to obtain cash, and it usually took days to arrange for small purchases and payments to indivi¬ dual local contractors. Nevertheless, once production operations began, the large sums needed for working capital were available in a timely manner.

This situation changed markedly for the worse when in May,

1964, Sekou Soumah--by this time Inspector General of Agriculture after the demise of OFFICAO--was assigned the governorship of the Youmou region. Control of the bank account passed to Barry Sory, Minister of V-37

MER, rather than to the new Inspector General, Diallo Cellou, and since the Minister was much less accessible, funds were obtainable only after delays which often ran to a week or more. There were occasions when, to get operating funds, the project had to sell palm oil contrary to the Minister's instruction that it be held for later sale.

The Minister's decision to stockpile oil deprived him of the sales proceeds by which even token loan repayments could be made. The BNDA, which had extended the loan on the-premise that it would be self-liquida¬ ting, was understandably perturbed at the one-way flow of funds.

Approximately GF 8-million had been spent during the construction period, and an additional GF 9-million had been drawn during production operations. The bank reasonably expected that at least the working capital portion of the loan would be repaid during production operations.

In early November, 1964, BNDA blocked the remaining balance of the line of credit and called the outstanding amount. Not only could the project not repay the loan at that time, it had no funds to pay local personnel and continue operations even on the reduced scale of post-pro¬ duction season activities. It had long been evident that a more permanent, longer-term source of financing was required. The Minister arranged for November local salaries to be paid out of the blocked .credit on the basis that the project budget was being presented to the GOG for an appro-

priationwhichwould retire the loan and finance future operations. This V-38

was sweetened by the sale of the remaining stock of oil with the pro¬ ceeds going to the bank.

Concurrently, as a feature of our planning for the expanded pro¬ ject, we requested USAID to arrange for local currency financing from the counterpart fund with the entire budgeted amount to be transferred to the Trust Fund administered by the Controller/USAID. Our intention was to use GOG financing to the extent available but not to have to rely on it. The purpose of using the Trust Fund as a vehicle was to avoid the paralyzing delays inherent in the normal channel of counterpart financing which depended on releases through the Ministry of Planning followed by disbursements from MER.

After payment of the November local salaries, the BNDA again blocked the loan account, forcing the Minister to scurry in search of funds to keep things moving. How he did this we do not know, but in early January, 1965, the on-again off-again credit became available long enough to make a downpayment on the fabrication of four steel sheds for the new construction program. In the meantime, the new project agreement embodying counterpart financing had been signed and followed up with counterpart release documents which the Minister approved in mid-January.

Ministry approval of a counterpart release gives it technical blessing but does not make funds available. The President's final V-39

approval is the critical step, followed by National Bank action which

may or may not be timely. In January, 1965, the President was not

approving. Not only palm oil but all other USAID project counterpart

requests were tied up. The USAID-sponsored technical training school

operated by ánother contractor was in such dire need that it had to threaten to close down if local funds were not made available by a certain

date. This did the trick. One or two days before the deadline, a flood

of funds were released and palm oil was carried along on the tide.

After some internal difficulty in finding a means by which the

contractor could use the funds freely within USAID regulations, the

Controller/USAID advanced to Morrison, «an Morrison's personal responsibility, GF 2-million, justified by the project budget and esti¬ mated cash cycle. With the start of 1965 production operations it be¬ came necessary for Ohiami Hilaire to have working capital. Accordingly, the Minister authorized Mr. Ohiami as his representative to receive an advance from the Controller/USAID sufficient to cover one month of salaries and estimated fruit purchases for those plants under his control.

Expenditures were reimbursed by the Controller after presentation of acceptable receipts and authorizations. At the close of the project all advances were liquidated with the return to the Controller of outstanding cash balances and receipts. This system worked well and from its in¬ ception in March, 1965, availability of local funds ceased to be a problem. V-40

C. Technical Assistance

Technical assistance to the GOG was provided through a con¬

tract with Checchi and Company of Washington, D. C. which had done

the original study of the prospects for the production of edible oil in

Guinea. The first of the contractor's personnel to provide services

under this contract was Ernest Montgomery who in April, 1963, went to

Nigeria to arrange for visits and possible training of Guinean personnel

with the West African Institute for Oilpalm Research located at Benin.

On his return leg Mr. Montgomery assisted USAID/G with the ordering

of the hydraulic hand-presses and auxiliaries.

The first permanent member of our field team was Lawrence

Morrison, an engineer and economist who served as Chief of Party. He

arrived in Conakry on April 29, 1963, after having visited the equipment manufacturer and the Institute de Recherches des Huiles et des Oléagi¬ neux enroute. Completing our field team was Mario Laure, specialist in producer cooperatives and tropical agriculture, who arrived at the post on June 25, 1963.

Messrs. Morrison and Laure conducted the pilot project through its construction phase and first season of processing operations. They were assisted during the latter part of the processing season by Mario

Filippi, an industrial engineer on short-term assignment, who arrived on June 8, 1964, and departed on October 9, 1964. During his stay, Mr.

Filippi assisted Ohiami Hilaire, then manager of the pilot plant, with V-41

processing operations and conducted comparative tests on alternative kinds of equipment and methods.

During the second year of the contract, we prospected for add¬ itional plant sites and built three new palm oil plants. The original plant was converted from palm oil production to oil seed extraction by the installation of the MICROS unit.

A third permanent member of the field team, Robert Manly, also an engineer, arrived on July 14, 1965. Mr. Manly was concerned mainly with the testing and evaluation of the MICROS unit and with the training of Guinean operators.

In the third year of field operations the GOG so diluted our ef¬ fectiveness with delays, changes of decision, and administrative restric¬ tion of our activities and freedom of movement that further progress was impossible within the time allowed. The MICROS testing was the only work permitted to go forward with reasonable facility. Accordingly, we advised USAID that the continued presence of two of our people was futile.

USAID concurred and terminated the services in Guinea of Messrs. Laure and Morrison effective June 21, 1966, and July 31, 1966, respectively.

Subsequently, when the MICROS tests were completed, USAID decided to retain Mr. Manly to be available if the GOG requested assis¬ tance to relocate the MICROS and continue training. The MICROS re¬ mained in the original location, and Mr. Manly conducted supplementary V-42

tests and training until September 30, 1966, the final date for completion of field work set by AID, Mr. Manly departed Guinea on October 18,

1966, terminatin our operation in 'be field.

VI-1

VI. THE TECHNICAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS

The technical and economic aspects of project operations are considered in ; vo parts. The first, the i) allation and operation of plants, is concerned with plant design, s selection, plant construction, processing operations, and marketing. ne second is concerned with improvements in technique.

A. The Installation and Operation of Plants

The preliminary study foresaw a pilot plant with three presses which, with auxiliary equipment, had been ordered by USAID/G prior

to the start of field operations. However, by the time field work began,

late information indicated that the press had a greater capacity than that

claimed by the manufacturer. Furthermore, during three years of

testing at the West African Institute for Oilpalm Research (WAIFOR) in

Benin, Nigeria, the press had never been operated continuously at full

capacity.

The larger press capacity and the lack of experience in continuous

operation raised questions about the ability of the pilot plant area to sup¬

ply a three-press installation and about what constituted a balanced

processing unit. We knew from the preliminary study that the pilot plant

area had sufficient yield of fruit to satisfy the requirements of full cap¬

acity plant operations. But we did not know if the population of the area

would harvest the fruit and sell it to the project, or if the auxiliary VI-2

equipment supplied by the manufacturer could prepare enough fruit to keep the presses operating continuously.

As a measure of prudence, we suggested and USAID/G approved a single press set-up which would permit us to determine the technical and economic factors of a minimum-sized, balanced processing unit. If fruit deliveries exceeded full capacity, the project could rapidly in¬ crease production either by working more than one shift or by installing additional presses, which could be done in a matter of hours.

The design of the single-press pilot plant included a processing area of 10 x 10 meters and two wings of 5 x 6* 5 meters each--one serving as a warehouse and the other as an office and anteroom. The processing area accommodated a truckway, a weighing station, a bunch quartering floor, 12 sterilizers, a concrete mortar, a press, and two clarifiers. The 12 small sterilizers were the full three-press comple¬ ment of equipment provided by the manufacturer for preparing fruit bunches.

The choice of the pilot plant site depended on the following condi¬ tions :

water--a creek or river which flowed

during the dry season when harvesting and

processing would take place. VI-3

o It had to be in the center of a populated

zone of rather dense natural palm groves

extensive enough to assure a fruit supply

within a radius of 20 km. of the plant,

o It had to be close enough to and connected

with Conakry by a good road to facilitate

the rapid transport of construction mater¬

ials and to allow indispensable contacts

with the GOG and USAID during the devel¬

opment phase,

e And, it had to be near a village that could

supply and house the plant labor force.

The choice of the site was carefully studied by a commission formed of the Project Manager, Sekou Soumah; the Governor of Dubreka, Camara

Daouda; the Production Director of Dubreka, Joe-*Louis Toure; and our tech¬

nicians, Morrison and Laure. The conditions of choice were best met at a site near the village of Kagbele about 40 km. from Conakry, and all concerned concurred in the decision to establish the pilot plant at this location.

Pilot plant construction began on July 26, 1963, in the middle of the rainy season. After a series of mishaps involving torrential rains, lack of materials and transport, and disappearing subcontractors, the construction work was essentially completed by the end of October. VI-4

Equipment installation began on November 5 under the supervision of the manufacturer's field engineer, Anthony Klinkert. During the installation,

Mr. Klinkert trained Guinean personnel in the installation and mainten¬

ance of the press until they were able to do these tasks as well as the manufacturer's workers. All processing equipment had been installed by November 13, and the plant was ready for extraction tests.

The first extraction test took place on November 14 using bunches harvested by Kagbele villagers from the nearby wild groves. Mr.

Klinkert demonstrated the use of the equipment and trained the Guinean operators in the extraction process. A second extraction test, conducted on November 25 after Mr. Klinkert's departure, used bunches from the

selected palm plantation at Yogoya in the region of Boffa, giving a com¬ parison of oil yields.

The Kagbele pilot plant was then ready to begin full-scale production operations. The development of a supply of fruit for the plant began during the construction phase. It is discussed in Section VII-A, Pilot Operations--

1964.

Soon after the start of production operations our earlier suspicions of inadequate bunch sterilizing capacity were confirmed. To correct this, we designed and had fabricated locally a prototype large-capacity bunch

sterilizer which could be used in a system of preprocessing in the villages

as well as in the plant. When our attempts to interest villagers in taking VI-5

over this process ran afoul of the problem of fruit price, we abandoned the idea it could be until tried under better circumstances. In plant use the large sterilizer showed substantial economies in fuel and water con¬ sumption and in labor and processing time. We improved the design of the system and ordered the additional equipment to bring sterilizing capacity into line with the press capacity.

Before receiving the new sterilizing equipment, we resolved the fruit price problem in a totally unexpected way. In order to give the fruit suppliers an alternative to delivering bunch fruit at 5 GF/kg. , which they considered low, and to reduce processing costs, we decided to eliminate bunch sterilizing in favor of beginning the plant process with loose fruit. The producers would separate fruit from the bunches by the traditional fermentation method and be compensated for this extra work out of the resulting transportation and processing economies. By elim¬ inating bunch sterilizing, we reduced plant costs by one-third, but as a consequence we produced lower quality oil. However, there was no mar¬ ket discrimination or price differential in favor of higher quality oil, and the project could not afford the added expense if it was to succeed com¬ mercially.

The change from bunch processing to loose fruit processing re¬ moved the problem of unmatched capacity. There remained only the questions of the willingness of the producers to supply the plant at full VI-6

press capacity and the determination of the technical and economic factors of the minimum-sized production unit. To be able to achieve the latter, we needed more fruit than we were getting. Therefore, we set aside for the time being any consideration of breaking even and decided to offer more for fruit than the price of oil would bear and to extend be¬ yond the 20 km. radius of our fruit collection system in the search for new sources of supply. In spite of the best efforts of political officials responsible for fruit collection, it was only by these means that we were able finally in May, 1964, to reach a sustained level of full output. The period of full capacity operation lasted for five weeks.

Fruit purchasing continued until the month of September simply to check the possibility of collection during the rainy season. This test established that, even though palm bunches mature all year long, the economic collection and processing season can only extend from March through July, and this may vary depending on the weather and road con¬ ditions.

The oil produced at the Kagbele pilot plant was assigned by the

Minister of Rural Economy to the state enterprise ALIMAG at a price of

175 GF/lt. delivered in drums to its warehouse in Conakry. ALIMAG, in turn, sold the oil by the drum for 225 GF/lt. FOB warehouse. It might be said that ALIMAG performed an economic function in wholesaling the oil, but this is largely an illusion. VI-7

• The demand for oil was so great that

selling was unneccessary. It was only an

ordertaking transaction.

• ALIMAG performed no work in the dis¬

tribution of the oil. The project delivered

oil to the ALIMAG premises and the buyer

went there to pick it up in the same form

as it had been delivered.

In fact, the one service that ALIMAG may have rendered the buyer of oil was to centralize the invoicing and cash transfer in one place for all wholesale food transactions. With this we have no quarrel. But for this minimal service ALIMAG collected the excessive margin of 50 GF/lt. of oil, a margin that the project needed badly to cover its costs. Indeed, the project without additional expense could have served the buyer better than ALIMAG by delivering the oil to his premises in Conakry or, in the case of upcountry buyers, by selling it to him directly from Kagbele, saving him 80 km. of extra travel.

We can only surmise that the Minister's requirement that the oil be sold to ALIMAG was dictated by GOG policy. In any case, it was a plum. If the official wholesale price was 225 GF/lt., then the decision to sell to ALIMAG at 50 GF/lt. less, in effect forced the project to sub¬ sidize ALIMAG by an amount that would have more than covered normal project operating costs and charges. VI-8

The experience and results of the season of pilot operations (see

Section VII-A) were embodied in the interim report of July 13, 1964.

The fate of this report and its recommendations are described in Section

V-A of this report.

It suffices to say here that after the 1964 season of pilot operations

on palm oil production, no further development of the production process was possible under existing conditions. The only improvement on what

had been developed at Kagbele (see following Section VI-B) was a re¬

duction in the size of the plants constructed at Kanderiah, Yogoya, and

Bentimodiah. This was possible because of the change from bunch proc¬

essing to loose fruit processing, which requires much less space for

preparing bunches and less equipment (four small boiling drums versus

two large sterilizers plus the boiling drums). The covered and paved

area of the three new plants was reduced to 8 x 10 meters. The operation

of these plants during 1965 and 1966 is described in Sections VII-B and -C.

The project agreement also called for the development of oil ex¬

traction from materials such as palm kernels, peanuts, and copra. To

meet this requirement, AID approved our recommendation for the purchas

of a MICROS unit--a small multipurpose motorized press--which was

ordered in July, 1964.

In anticipation of the arrival of the MICROS, we tested the possi¬

bility of air-drying copra during March, 1965. After one month of VI-9

exposure to daylight with protection from nightime precipitation, the resulting copra was still too moist and had begun to rot. To dry the copra sufficiently to obtain a good oil yield required treatment such as smoke-drying, and to introduce this in Guinea required more time and personnel than were then available. This development was deferred until one of a new group of Peace Corpsmen, due to arrive in May, could be

assigned the task. In the meantime, the MICROS would be used on palm

kernels and peanuts.

The MICROS was installed at the Kagbele plant in June, 1965,

after the palm oil equipment had been transferred to the new plants.

Initial mechanical tests of the unit were not satisfactory, and the manu¬ facturer was requested to send an engineer to Guinea to rectify the

trouble. It was not until late October, after Morrison's return from home

leave, that the work of A. Van Mourik, the manufacturer's field engineer,

could be arranged.

The MICROS was again tested during the month of November under

the supervision of our third team member, Robert Manly. Van Mourik

found that the difficulty arose out of local climatic conditions and the

character of local raw materials. He and Manly designed an auxiliary

feed device on the spot. They installed and tested a makeshift prototype

which proved an acceptable solution to the problem. The manufacturer

undertook to fabricate a permanent feed device on the basis of the field VI-10

design. This was finally received in the field in April, 1966, by which time the travel restrictions described in Section V-A were in effect.

The GOG withheld approval of Manly's upcountry travel until May 23, after which he was able to install the feed device and begin MICROS production tests on palm kernels and peanuts. These tests and results will be presented in a supplementary report on the MICROS unit.

The Kagbele plant was enlarged between January and March, 1966, and the following installations were made:

@ A repair and maintenance shop for project

vehicles.

e A fabrication and maintenance shop for

plant equipment.

@ A warehouse for spare parts and tools.

The plants at Kanderiah, Yogoya, and Bentimodia were also to have been enlarged by the PCV's using elements prefabricated at Kagbele.

Water systems, including pumps, piping, and tanks were to have been installed to facilitate operations and improve plant economics. Lack of timely travel authorizations from MER so delayed the start of this work that the approaching rainy season and PCV vacations, planned long in advance, made it impossible to complete the program for the season.

Accordingly, it was abandoned.

An analysis of the training of GOG personnel and the improvement of palm fruit processing technique is presented in the following section. VI-11

B. Improvements in Technique

Efforts to upgrade methods of small-scale vegetable oil production by rural people date back many decades. At first these endeavors aimed ï at providing mechancial aids to reduce the drudgery and improve the yield of familial or small group production. In more recent times the attempt has shifted to the development of complete small production systems organized as small industries with greater capacity and more sophisticated equipment.

The manufacturers of equipment have engineered their large plant schemes down to a capacity that approaches the limit of economic viability. Still, these very small units have a capacity which often ex¬ ceeds the ability of most areas within economic transportation distance to provide raw material. They have the further disadvantage of all the complication of the large industrial unit without the offsetting economies of scale. Industrial oil mills, small and large, depend for success on plantation culture of high-yield oil-bearing materials.

Two diametrically opposed views on the development of small- scale vegetable oil production have evolved. The French, seeking ways to increase production in their territories, abandoned as government policy the upgrading of village processing, and favored instead the es¬ tablishment of large plantations of selected varieties of oil-yielding palms- oil palm and coconut palm. (Peanuts, which are more easily grown by individual farmers, remained unaffected. ) Concurrently, the French VI-12

constructed industrial mills of moderate size which were expandable to keep pace with the extension of the surrounding planted area.

The British, equally anxious to increase the industrial production of vegetable oil, were faced with the problem of Nigeria, the world's largest exporter of palm oil and kernels, where the great majority of production comes from wild palms and family processors. To the

British, the logical, least disruptive development scheme seemed one concerned, at least in the beginning, with upgrading small-scale proces¬ sing as well as industrial production.

The first British attempt was a rather sophisticated small unit called the Pioneer oil mill. This scheme set a Pioneer mill in a natural grove area and depended on the local propulation to carry their harvest of fruit bunches to the mill. The idea did not work well as originally conceived because the distance that people could or would carry fruit bunches limited the mill supply to below the break-even point. There were also problems of management and maintenance of the mill. The

West African Institute for Oilpalm Research (WAIFOR) studied the problems and recommended solutions, but we do not know if these were carried out by the Nigerian Government, by that time independent.

In any case, WAIFOR working with the Dutch firm STORK

Apparatenfabriek NV tried a new tack by developing a small, rugged, modestly-priced, hydraulic hand-press for processing palm fruit with VI-13

the aim. of making them available to individual processors. All the auxiliary equipment for preparing the fruit for pressing could be made locally by modifying ordinary 55 gallon drums. At the WAIFOR station near Benin, Nigeria, the press has been used intermittently for about seven years in test operations to determine its characteristics and to experiment with various designs of auxiliary equipment.

By late 1962, the process had been well enough developed for com¬ mercial operations but had never been operated independently at WAIFOR.

It was this test installation that provided the technical possibility of the palm oil project in Guinea. Its economics had been extrapolated from test results and, as later became obvious, did not include the cost of many services and facilities available from the WAIFOR station. Never¬ theless, it was an established starting point for the further development of a true village industry for palm oil without the great capacity and mech¬ anical complication of former schemes based on the scaling-down of in¬ dustrial units. The WAIFOR people had intended to establish a pilot commercial operation in the years following the start of the Guinea project. As far as we know, they have not yet done this. The experience in Guinea, then, is probably the furthest development of any project of its type and scale.

Although there is room for great improvement which would make the operation commercial, the accomplishments of the palm oil project VI-14

in Guinea are considerable. The project fell naturally into two separate parts according to the kind of raw material and processes involved. The first of these dealt with palm fruit processing, and the second, oil seed processing.

1. Palm Fruit Processing a. Training. Given the technical and financial possibility of establishing

small palm oil mills, the most important requirement is to have people

who can select an appropriate site, specify the materials needed, con¬

struct the mill, set up the equipment, train the operators, manage the

plant, and develop the raw material supply system. We did not have the

number or quality of Guinean counterparts best suited by schooling and

experience for the training we could have given in the work of establishing,

organizing, and managing new palm oil plants. Neither did we have

enough time to give the kind of training required by the people we did get.

The GOG requirements for physical progress did not permit the measured

pace best suited to training. Nevertheless, GOG personnel got the maxi¬

mum of training and experience that conditions and their capabilities

allowed.

The Project Manager, Ohiami Hilaire, took part in the entire

process of establishing two new plants. He assisted in prospecting areas

for possible plant sites; selecting among them possible sites that com¬

bined the necessary characteristics for fruit production, harvesting labor, VI-15

wood fuel, water, and plant labor supply; choosing the best site; orienting the plant building; supervising the construction of the building and the installation of the equipment. Unfortunately these plants were not completed beyond the most rudimentary state that allowed production to begin. The GOG so restricted our travel that the project ended before the plants were finished. But Mr. Ohiami has the experience to dupli¬ cate in other places what already has been done.

In the matter of setting up a supply system and organizing plant operations, Mr. Ohiami also has the experience gained from working closely with our field team for one season of supply organization and the first year of pilot plant management and operation. Subsequently, he was solely in charge of the project operations at Yogoya and Bentimodiah from the time of the installation of equipment. In this work, he trained plant managers and operators, conducted the starting-up operations, and arranged with local officials for the organization of fruit harvesting and collection.

The weakest result of our training efforts was in the area of project administration. Mr. Ohiami was simply not manager material, and we doubt that he will improve much over the years. In an effort to ease the burden of his heavy work load, we suggested--and the Ministry approved--the transfer of Tolno Fay a from the management of the pilot plant to the position of controller at project headquarters. Mr. Tolno VI-16

was a more orderly person, better suited in this respect to the work of

administration. We assisted them in setting up systems for collecting

data and accounting for expenditures; however, when we suggested a

way of organizing the data for ready analysis of project performance,

we were told that they had no need of such information. This followed a

pattern of resistance to suggestion, and we got no further. This is not

as much of a deficiency as it may seem, because we believe that neither

of these men would be given the management of a project on their own.

It was apparent that the Ministry did not regard them highly in this

capacity, and they would not have been given these positions if we had not

been in the background exerting overall control through our relationship

to USAID.

In summation, we believe that the GOG could, on the basis of the

training and experience of our counterparts and the two existing plant

managers, continue to expand the project if overall management and

administration were provided. The knowledge of what is required and

the techniques are there to do what has been done before. However, the

talent is lacking to develop the process beyond its present state,

b. Improvement of plant performance. The initial pilot set-up in Guinea

duplicated, as much as possible, the WAIFOR test installation. Two

problems became evident. First, we soon found that the capacity of the

auxiliary equipment supplied by STORK was insufficient to allow their VI-17

press to work to capacity, and second, neither STORK nor WAIFOR con¬ cerned themselves in this small processing scheme with the recovery of palm kernels from the pressed fruit pulp. The WAIFOR test instal¬ lation was not a complete processing unit. The pressed pulp resulting from their oil extraction unit was fed to the kernel recovery part of their industrial mill. They assumed that the small oil producer, for whom the development of this system was intended, would handle kernel recovery by traditional hand methods. But, in the Guinea project we treated a much greater quantity of fruit than an individual processor ordinarily would and found that the traditional method was too lengthy and expensive.

Thus, we set about modifying the original set-up to establish a complete, balanced, single-press unit that would process bunches fully to yield both oil and kernels. This development work was only partly accomplished by the end of the first season of operations. By that time, the nature of the fruit supply and the market for oil dictated abandoning the processing of bunches in favor of starting with fruit already detached from the bunch. A large part of our development work had gone into the problems of bunch processing. Though these gains are not lost to the

small plant scheme in other areas, they did not in the end contribute to

the situation in Guinea. towaste VI-18

c. Bunch processing. The bunch processing end of the Kagbele pilot plant set-up is shown schematically in Flow Diagram 1.

The improvements made at Kagbele were several. First, a plant in commercial operations has to have a way to weigh the incoming raw material. On large installations this is done by a truck-weighing device, obviously too expensive for a very small plant. We built a weighing box long enough to span the truck-way entering the plant. This box rested on two, 2-ton platform beam balances, one at each end. The incoming dump-truck discharged its load directly into the weighing box, and after balancing both end scales, the total of the two readings less the empty box weight gave the weight of the delivery. The long side of the box opposite to the truck side was hinged to provide a ramp down which the bunches discharged directly to the cutting floor where they were quartered in preparation for sterilizing. This relatively inexpen¬ sive innovation allowed us to verify the total weight of bunches purchased by the collection agent and, thus, his claimed expenditures. The ease of unloading the box directly to the cutting floor eliminated human handling of bunches at this stage which one still finds at some industrial mills.

The second improvement was to increase bunch sterilizing cap¬ acity to match press capacity and reduce costs. Industrial mills sterilize bunches in large quantities, up to several carloads at a time, in autoclaves

VI-19

heated by steam under pressure. The system originally intended for use with the STORK press involved steaming bunches in modified 55-gallon

ï drums; however, this would require ten drums and tenfires--a confusing, expensive, and uncomfortable number to handle. At WAIFOR a single drum of 550-gallon capacity was constructed and worked satisfactorily for the use of an individual, family-based processing operation. It was awkward to load and unload, however, and proved still to be too small to prepare enough fruit to operate the press continuously.

We adopted the idea of the large sterilizer with a different system of loading and unloading. Rather than throw bunches over the top of the seven-foot high unit and discharge it by hand through a door near its base, we made baskets of expanded metal on a structural frame which were lowered into and raised out of the sterilizer by a trolley-mounted chain hoist traveling on a monorail. These baskets were loaded by hand at floor level, lowered into the sterilizer for cooking, then raised and dis¬ charged again at floor level. Furthermore, we abandoned the use of steam in favor of full immersion in boiling water, because the water proved to be a more uniform and reliable cooking medium than atmo¬ spheric steam.

This combination of materials handling and boiling water cooking

resulted in greatly increased capacity and significant savings in labor,

fuel, and water. Two such large sterilizers sufficed to treat enough

fruit to keep the press working continually. STORAGE FlowDiagram2No.LOOSE- FINISHED and FRUIT OILDRUMFILLINGOILPail WEIGHINGCLARIFIER PROCESSING VI-20

d. Loose fruit processing. When processing bunches proved impracti¬ cal under Guinean conditions, we abandoned that part of the operation

and started to purchase loose fruit from the producers. They detach

fruit by allowing the bunches to age after harvesting. After several

days of ageing--or, more precisely, fermenting--the fruit loosens its

attachment to the bunch stem and can be easily shaken free. In those

villages where the producers preferred to sell the fruit in bunch form

rather than bother with the ageing, the plants purchased bunches and

separated the fruit by the same means. The loose fruit thus produced--

either by the villagers or by the plants--became the starting raw

material for the oil extraction process shown schematically in Flow

Diagram 2.

This process represents a large improvement over the instructions

of STORK and the practice of WAIFOR. STORK instructions, which were

probably based on WAIFOR experience, call for the boiled fruit to be

pounded and subsequently reheated before pressing. At WAIFOR the

boiled fruit is pounded in a concrete mortar which is so large that the

fruit cools rapidly during pounding because of the large surface exposed to

air and the mass of concrete. Because good oil recovery depends on high

fruit temperature, it is essential, in the WAIFOR case, to reheat the

pounded fruit.

The WAIFOR scheme had the further disadvantage of requiring a

great deal more handling of materials than seemed necessary to us. Each

transfer of fruit from boiler to mortar to reheat drum to press required STORAGE FlowDiagram2No.LOOSE- FINISHED and FRUIT OILDRUMFILLINGOILPail WEIGHINGCLARIFIER PROCESSING VI-21

unloading one piece of equipment into a container, moving the container,

and charging the next piece of equipment. As fruit progressed from the boiler to the press in the WAIFOR process, it was handled three times

in this manner.

The problems of cooling and excessive materials handling inher¬

ent in the WAIFOR process were eliminated by discarding the concrete

mortar in favor of one made by cutting a 55-gallon drum in half trans¬ versely and fitting the halves with handles. This relatively light, strong

mortar served also as a transporting container. The fruit unloaded from

the boiler into the mortar was moved to an intermediate position between

boiler and press where it was pounded and again shifted, still in the mor¬

tar, alongside the press for loading into the press baskets. This entire

operation requires about ten minutes. The heat loss during this time is

negligible and the materials handling is one-third of that required in the

WAIFOR set-up. Aside from the saving in the fuel for reheating and the

labor of materials handling, additional benefits of this improvement are

noteworthy:

« Plant investment is reduced by the cost of

reheating equipment (eight specially con¬

structed drums at WAIFOR), concrete mor¬

tar, and the additional plant area needed to

accommodate them. The cost of the simple

half drums is modest. VI-22

0 It is easier and quicker to pound the fruit

properly in half drums because their

geometry is more suited to the task than

that of the large concrete mortar, where

the large charge of fruit takes a longer

time to pound than the total time of several

smaller batches in half drums.

0 The half drums are useful for many other

purposes. They serve handily as water

containers, as tubs for the wet separation

of nuts from pressed pulp and of kernels

from cracked mixture, and as tote pans

for nuts, cracked mixture, kernels, etc.

Another improvement at Kagbele was the fitting of removable windscreens to the stands of the fruit boiling drums. As specified by

STORK,, the fireplace area under the drum is completely open. We found that by placing a folded piece of heavy sheet metal around the full height of three sides of the drum stand, the fire was protected from wind and rain, and the chimney effect of the enclosure provided more effective heating. This resulted in a 25 percent saving in firewood and a shorter time to reach boiling. The three-sided windscreen must be fitted with handles to allow its removal when fruit is to be discharged. In this oper¬ ation the drum must be tilted; the windscreen would interfere if left in place. VI-23

The press is the principal item of processing equipment, and al¬

though we had based the pilot plant on the STORK hydraulic hand-press,

there are other manufacturers of small palm oil presses. On the possi¬

bility that competing equipment might be superior to the STORK press

for the Guinean situation, we offered to make competitive tests of the

COLIN hand-operated screw press manufactured by the French firm

SPEICHIM if they wished to make one available at no cost or obligation

to USAID. They accepted and sent us the press and also a small motor-

operated nut cracker for testing in the palm kernel recovery part of the

pilot plant.

The COLIN screw press proved decidedly inferior to the STORK hydraulic press for our purposes. After one week of tests we concluded that to process the same amount of fruit it would require three COLIN presses, which cost more than three times the cost of the STORK press and twice the labor. The COLIN machine gave slightly better oil re¬ covery, but this was offset by a greater quantity of nuts cracked during pressing and by the greater amount of exhausting labor required to op¬ erate it.

2. Kernel Recovery

The pressed fruit pulp is made up of fruit fibers and nuts which contain palm kernels. The kernels represent about 20 percent of the product value of the fruit at Guinean prices, and their recovery, though NutsDry KERNEL STORAGE

BAGGINGKERNEL WEIGHINGand VI-24

more difficult and expensive than palm oil, is essential for the contri¬ bution they can make to improved plant economics.

Kernel recovery falls naturally into two steps--nut separation from pulp and kernel recovery from nuts. This entire process is shown schematically in Flow Diagram 3. a. Nut separation. The Kagbele pilot plant, at first, relied on the traditional method of nut separation as had been assumed in the STORK-

WAIFOR scheme for use of the press by individual processors. This re¬ quired the pulp to be air-dried in the field surrounding the plant, after which a team of women from Kagbele village, using flat baskets, took a few handfuls each of the material and, with kneading and agitation, separated the nuts. The women's productivity was quite low by this means, and separation was slow and expensive. By the time the rainy season arrived, a backlog of 50 to 60 tons of unseparated pulp had ac¬ cumulated and drying was impossible.

Faced with the loss of 40 tons or so of nuts by the run-off of rain and by rotting, we devised a method of wet separation. In this, shown in Flow Diagram 3, the pulp is dumped into a tub of water where, by hand agitation, the pulp and nuts float apart. The nuts tend to sink and the fibers, bouyed by the residual palm oil clinging to them, can be made to float long enough to screen out. The equipment for wet separ¬ ation is simple and cheap. At Kagbele we used a half drum and a screen made from a frying pan with its bottom replaced by wire mesh. NutsDry KERNEL STORAGE

BAGGINGKERNEL WEIGHINGand VI-25

The wet system halves the cost of nut separation, greatly in¬

creases production, and makes it possible to continue this part of the

operation during the rainy season when the nuts in the pulp would other¬ wise mildew and rot. This is an entirely new practice in palm oil plants,

differing from both the industrial and the traditional methods. The tradi¬

tional method is described above. The industrial method relies on an

upward blast of hot air which dries the fiber and separates it from the

nuts. The fiber is then drawn out of the separator by fans for use as boiler fuel.

b. Kernel recovery. The method of kernel recovery devised at Kagbele

imitates, to the extent possible with simple devices, the methods of

industry. A gasoline, motor-driven^ nut cracker was the only piece of

powered equipment in the entire palm oil pilot operation and an absolute

necessity to handle the large quantity of nuts produced.

Kernel recovery by the traditional method involves breaking each

nut by placing it on a stone and striking it with another. This gives an

exceptionally clean separation when the nuts are well dried beforehand,

but the process is painfully slow and the time that village women, who

do practically all of this kind of work, can devote to it is small.

Some villagers are fortunate enough to have in the village--or

more centrally located to serve a larger area--a hand-cranked or motor¬

ized nut cracker. Where these are available, half the job of kernel NutsDry KERNEL STORAGE

BAGGINGKERNEL WEIGHINGand VI-26

recovery is easily done. However, the work of separating the kernels

from the cracked mixture still remains. Village women usually do it

by hand, by picking the kernels from a mass of mixture spread on a

flat surface or by tossing the mixture in a flat basket used for such

separating work as threshing pounded rice.

In a few places the women use the same technique that has been

standard in industry for decades. The nutshells and kernels have a dif¬

ferent specific gravity so that in a liquid of intermediate density the

kernels will float while the shells sink. Both industry and these techni¬

cally advanced women use a mixture of clay and water.

The Kagbele plant used a clay bath separator preceded by a

screen to remove the finely broken material from the cracked mixture.

Without prior screening of the mixture, the clay bath quickly becomes

fouled and the finer particles act to raise the density of the bath to the

point where it will no longer allow the shells to settle.

The screen can be as simple as a piece of 1/4-inch wire mesh at¬ tached toalow-sided frame with handles for shaking. Or, for continu¬

ous operation, a small trommel can be made by fastening the mesh cir-

cumferentially inside and between the end quarters of a 55-gallon drum.

With the ends removed, this assembly can be attached to a pipe shaft

and mounted in a slightly inclined position and rotated by hand. We used

both designs at Kagbele with good results. VI-27

As in the case of the press, there is a COLIN nut cracker com¬ peting with the STORK machine. We tested both units and again found the STORK product superior for project use. Its capacity is double that of the COLIN and it is more rugged. The COLIN has the advantages of greater portability and a directly connected motor, but these were not important to us. If the STORK unit were needed at various places, it could be made mobile without great difficulty, and its belt drive features would be an advantage on a vehicle with power take-off. VII. PLANT OPERATIONS VII-1

VII PLANT OPERATIONS

A. Pilot Operations -- 1964

The supply of palm fruit and bunches to the plants was the most difficult and sensitive phase of the project. No extraction plant can be profitable unless it has a regular and adequate supply. In the prelim¬ inary survey and in all signed agreements, supply difficulties were underlined, and the means to surmount them were suggested several times.

Beginning in July, 1963, our team and Guinean counterpart per¬ sonnel undertook a survey of the most appropriate methods of furnishing a steady supply of raw material to the Kagbele pilot plant. Mr. Soumah, the Project Manager, stated that in this field the principle of state plan¬ ning and control must be strictly followed. Particularly:

• The pilot plant would be a branch of OFFICAO,

a state enterprise. Therefore, it would be

managed by the government which had

granted funds for its construction. No pro¬

ducers or other private people would parti¬

cipate in its management or share in its

possible benefits.

• The relationship between producers and

the plant would be restricted to the pur¬

chase of fruit at a price fixed by the plant. VII-2

Oil output would be marketed through the

government.

• The government and the administrative

and political organization of the party

would deal with the producers and be re¬

sponsible for providing the plant with a

regular supply of raw material.

Given the general situation in the country, the producers' lack of preparation and education in technical and administrative fields, and the total lack of private initiative, government planning and control is often felt to be the most feasible way to establish and operate a new in¬ dustry. This principle has been frequently used in developing several non-socialist countries in Europe and elsewhere, with the corollary, however, that the government establishes at the same time a mass pro¬ gram for technical and administrative education, and transfers the management and ownership of processing plants to producer cooperatives as soon as the plant is consolidated and its producers have improved pro¬ duction and education. Because of our inexperience in Guinea and the strength of GOG convictions, it was useless to suggest an alternative to the plan proposed by the government. Only after one full season of oper¬ ation would we be able to verify the effectiveness of the Guinean principle. VII-3

The organization to supply fruit to the plant had to fit into the

Guinean political and administrative framework starting from the top, that is, from MER to the administrative region and the federal political bureau to the administrative district to the political section and lastly to the village committee. (See Appendix A. )

In August, 1963, our team and the Project Manager made the first contact with the Governor and Federal Political Secretary of the Dubreka region to explain the difficulties usually encountered in other African countries and the need for a sound organization to supply the plant with fruit harvested in wild groves. The regional leaders stated that because of the network of the political party and the strength of political persuasion, it would be easy to convince the population, through the village committees, to deliver the requested amount of fruit. The committee would undertake delivery operations and no other organization would be needed or would, in fact, be recommended. After such strong and unequivocal statements, we again had no recourse but to accept this method of plant supply and go through the harvest season to see if satisfactory results would be obtained.

In the meantime, several decisions had to be made to organize the plant supply, such as the price for fruit, method of payment, delivery schedule, and village delivery quotas. On August 11, 1963, Laure VII-4

addressed a letter to the Project Manager outlining these problems and suggesting a supply scheme. Each village in a well-defined area around the plant should commit itself to deliver a fixed weight of fruit once a week on a given day. The amount would be estimated according to the size of the village palm grove and the number of climbers in the village.

Unfortunately, no information or maps on the size of groves in the Dubreka area was available. We recommended a quick field survey to ascertain the approximate extent of the palm groves serving the plant, the location of the village, the condition of the roads and trails for use by trucks, and the places where the fruit could be collected. We were unable to undertake the survey without the assistance of the Project

Manager and the administrative and political authorities at all levels if cooperation was to be obtained from the village population and leaders.

It was not until September 24, 1963, that the Project Manager arranged for us to meet with the regional officials to discuss the proposed pro¬ gram and make arrangements for the palm grove survey.

The survey started October 8, 1963, and ended the last of the month. The main conclusions were:

• The groves located along the Kindia road

between km. 33 and km. 50 had an area

of about 10, 000 ha. Beginning about 15

km. from the Kagbele plant, this area VII-5

could provide all the fruit needed by the plant. Beginning about 10 km. from the plant in the direction of the town of

Dubreka, there were an additional 2, 500

ha. , including the Island of Dofile, which could also contribute to the plant supply.

The road and trail network connecting al¬ most all points of the groves was in rather good condition and usable by heavy trucks in all sections but Dofile.

Bunches began to ripen by the end of Janu¬ ary or the beginning of February, but the villages had a traditional regulation that forbade the cutting of bunches before the time set by the village leaders. This was around the end of March when the bunches were very ripe. Harvesting ended when the rainy season began at the end of June.

The peak season for cutting palm fruit co¬ incided with the season for cultivating food crops. Therefore, the population was busy and had little interest in harvesting. VII-6

« Young climbers were scarce as they

leave the country and go to Conakry.

0 The people did not appear to be enthusi¬

astic about the idea of having a palm oil

mill in the area or convinced of the need

for supplying it with fruit. They did not

ask for the plant nor were they consulted

about it.

Thus, the survey confirmed that plant supply was possible from the nearby groves but that many difficulties would certainly arise in getting the fruit to the plant. The population would not easily adopt new ways which would mean a deep change in traditional work patterns and in income distribution within the family and village. Producers would have no interest in accepting these changes unless they gained immediate and important compensations. The next problem was to discover the

right compensation, explain it, and have it accepted by the population.

This difficult preparation would undoubtedly take a long time.

The first step, then, was to meet the population and explain in

detail the advantages the plant would bring if it were properly supplied.

How the collection of fruit would be organized also needed to be explained,

that is, how the fruit would be weighed and paid for and how a delivery

schedule would be set up. We suggested that a qualified delegation of VII-7

political section representatives go to the villages for explanatory meetings with the committee leaders and producers. The project would supply the transportation.

The meetings took place in November and December, 1963, mostly in the Sanouyah-Maniah grove, along the national road to Kindia.

This grove was the most important, was closest to the plant, and was supposed to deliver about 60 percent of the plant supply. As a result, a collection schedule was agreed upon by the Sanouyah-Maniah section leaders and presented to the regional leaders on January 7, 1964. Ac¬

cording to the schedule, collection would begin on January 9. The project truck would collect the bunches at a designated point where the village president would have gathered the yield. Scales would be set up in several villages and the truck equipped with a portable scale. The

bunches would be weighed in front of the producers and paid for immedi¬

ately at a price of 5 GF/kg. When one village collection ended, the truck

would move to the next village, according to schedule. At the end of the

tour, the truck would be loaded with five tons of bunches.

The price of 5 GF/kg. was chosen as an experiment based on esti¬

mates related to oil output and operating costs worked out from plant

tests made at Kagbele from November 14 to 25, 1963. The price was

higher than the current price in other countries producing palm fruit. VII-8

In spite of careful preparation deliveries were disappointing from the first day of collection. Committee presidents stated that the harvesting season had not yet begun, and that nobody wanted to climb.

They also stated that they wanted to discuss the selling conditions with the Governor and members of the federal political bureau, not with section representatives. In short, the first political persuasion carried out by the political section secretaries was a failure.

Taking advantage of a visit to the Kagbele plant on January 16,

1964, the Minister of MER held a meeting in Dubreka with the admini¬

strative and political leaders of the region, the sections, and the com¬

mittees interested in fruit deliveries.

At the meeting one of the presidents asked for a higher price for

the bunches, maintaining that producers could gain a higher income from

extracting oil by the traditional operation. The Minister explained that

the plant should serve the interest of the nation which could not sell the

oil at a higher price. He asked us if we could reduce operating expenses

so that a higher price could be paid for the fruit. We answered that the

expenses were estimated after a test in which the plant was working at

very low efficiency, and that the data could be checked and possibly

changed if the plant could test operations at full capacity. We suggested

that for a test the producers make an effort to supply the plant with five

tons of bunches per day for at least two consecutive days. VII-9

The Minister and the leaders decided that the committees would make an effort to supply five tons of fruit on one fixed day, that commit¬ tee representatives would witness the extraction operations, and that all expenses would be publicly calculated, bearing in mind the principle that the selling price for oil would be the official price of 125 GF/kg. , and that the income must cover the expenses without profit to the plant.

The test began January 21, 1964, and ended January 25. Un¬ fortunately, the deliveries amounted to only 1,340 kg. of bunches. The oil extraction operations, nut separation from pulp, nut cracking, and kernel separation from shells were witnessed by the committee and regional representatives. The final result showed that at the low level

of production of 1, 340 kg. , expenses were more than the income from

011 and kernels at official selling prices. In fact, the plant would have lost money, even if the raw material had cost nothing.

To try to achieve production at or near full capacity, we con¬ tinued testing in order to discover under what conditions the producers would be willing to deliver the fruit. They claimed a price of between

12 and 15 GF/kg. based on the following output of oil and kernels, using the traditional extraction system, and calculated according to market prices for oil and kernels:

From 35 bunches weighing an average of 8 kg.

each, 20 litres of oil and 40 kg. of kernels could VII-10

be obtained. The market price for oil was 200

GF/lt. and 35 GF/kg. for kernels. Then, from

280 kg. of bunches the proceeds were:

20 It. oil at 200 GF = 4,000

40 kg. kernels at 35 GF = 1, 400

5, 400

which gave an income of 19 GF/kg. of bunches.

On the other hand, the same amount of bunches sold to the plant

at 5 GF/kg. yielded 1,400 GF. The difference of 4,000 GF, or 14 GF/kg. ,

the producers considered as profit since they did not pay their families for the labor of transportation of fruit, oil extraction, kernel recovery,

and retailing the oil. Regardless of the observations of their leaders, the would not producers believe that the plant had expenses greater than ï theirs, and they would concede to the project only 4 to 7 GF/kg. in recognition of its processing costs. They mistakenly believed the plant should obtain a great deal more oil using a press and that the proj¬ ect wished to profit by offering a low price for raw material.

In fact, the project was required to sell the oil at 125 GF/kg. which made the total proceeds only 3, 900 GF for the end products of the

280 kg. of bunches. At this rate, even if there were no costs of trans¬

portation and processing and the total proceeds were turned over to the producers, the bunch price could not exceed 14 GF/kg. Since it cost VII-11

the project almost 9 GF/kg. to process the bunches, the maximum

price it could pay and still break even was 5 GF/kg. , the price originally

offered.

In order to present alternative solutions to this deadlocked situ¬

ation, we collected the producers' ideas and requests, and classified all factors which appeared to have some negative influence on supply.

The negative factors seemed to be:

the climbers had to spend a great deal of

time finding and cutting the few ripe bunches

available. The climbers preferred to

start later in the season.

• Even when the bunches were ripe, cutting ï

was forbidden by local traditions until a

fixed date set by the village elders. This

date was normally around the end of March,

depending on the weather.

grove, construction work on a textile plant

and on new roads attracted young men from

neighboring villages with the result that

there were few climbers available to col¬

lect bunches. VII-12

The delivery of bunches to the plant de¬ prived the women of the kernels. These were considered their personal and exclu¬ sive income, and more importantly, were the traditional material for barter for com¬ modities usually not sold against money payment.

Bunch delivery to the plant deprived the local commercial circuit of a large amount

of kernels, and tradesmen feared they would lose an important source of this pro¬

duct. Among the tradesmen were some

political leaders, such as the Secretary

General of the political section in

Maniah, who tried to convince the producers

not to deliver fruit to the plant

and urged them to ask for higher prices.

The producers thought that the price of

5 GF/kg. of bunches was inadequate.

The producers were occupied with the

cultivation of food crops which they con¬

sidered more important than bunch col¬

lection. VII-13

• The action taken by the regional and

sectional political leaders through their

representatives to convince and educate

the producers was not effective. Such

persuasion has to be conducted directly

by the leaders because of their prestige,

but they cannot devote the necessary time

to this activity because they are too busy

with political duties to which they give

priority.

In order to overcome these negative factors we suggested that changes be made concurrently on plant operations, on pricing, and on relationships with producers.

Concerning plant operations:

• The plant would stop producing high quality

oil as this could not be sold at a higher

price. The plant would process detached

fruit rather than bunches in order to elimi¬

nate an expensive phase of the extraction

cycle and reduce transportation costs.

• The plant would no longer hold the nuts for

kernel extraction, but would return them VII-14

to the producers. This would be a major

expense for the plant, but it would eliminate

two of the above negative factors.

• The plant would enlarge its collection area

and look for fruit in remote groves in order

to work at full capacity for as long as pos¬

sible. This step became urgent as the

large Sanouyah-Maniah grove stopped de¬

livering fruit because of an insufficient

number of climbers, o The plant would hire a number of climbers

on a permanent basis to collect fruit in

those groves where the people claimed a

lack of climbers.

Concerning pricing:

• The Minister of MER should authorize a

higher price for oil in order to cover pro¬

cessing costs and to pay a higher price for

raw material purchased.

• The plant would buy either bunches or sep¬

arated fruit and would return the nuts to

producers on request at a rate of 60 percent VII-15

of the fruit delivered. If the producer

did not want the nuts returned, he would

be given a compensation of 4 GF/kg. for

loose fruit delivered. In short, the plant

would pay 5 GF/kg. of bunches with no

nuts returned; 14 GF/kg. of detached

fruit with nuts returned; 18 GF/kg. of

detached fruits with no nuts returned.

Concerning relationships with producers;

• MER and the regional authorities should

remove the tradition that cutting in the

village groves could not begin until a date

set by the village elders.

• They should provide an incentive to pro¬

ducers by buying commodities to exchange

against fruit.

• They should establish a permanent pro¬

ducer organization which would be respon¬

sible for collection, delivery, and payment

of fruit and for the exchange of commodities.

This organization could be composed of a

number of village cooperatives which could

later participate in plant management and

share possible profits. VII-16

After a succession of meetings of our team and the Project Mana¬

ger with all concerned in early March, 1964, our recommendations were

only partly accepted. The collection of loose fruit and bunches, the re-

turn of nuts, and the new price for loose fruit were approved. It was

also decided to collect fruit in the more distant areas of the Dubreka

region, e. g. , in the Cabitail and Wonkifong sections about 40 to 50 km.

from the Kagbele plant. Decisions on the permanent organization of

producers and the exchange of commodities were postponed for further

discussion. The hiring of climbers and the withdrawal of compulsory

cutting limitations were rejected because of negative social implications.

The political leaders stated that the new terms of sale would convince

the committees to deliver an abundant supply of fruit.

From March 10 to 30, 1964, a series of meetings with the section

and committee leaders were held to explain the revised conditions. But

deliveries in the following weeks were unsatisfactory even though the peak

season was approaching. (See Table 1, p. VII-21. ) Thus, the adoption of only a part of our suggestions was not enough to guarantee a good sup¬ ply. Consequently, we insisted that the Project Manager consider the

establishment of a producer organization, the exchange of commodities, and a higher price for oil.

On April 8, 1964, our team and the Project Manager met again with the regional authorities. It was decided to start promoting a VII-17

system of producer cooperatives and to create in the plant a permanent

section dealing with fruit collection and assistance to the cooperative organization in the following manner:

• The plant would appoint an agent in every

important grove section. He would help

the committee leaders to organize the col¬

lection of fruit and later to bring producers

together in cooperatives. The agent must i have the following qualifications:

To speak, write, and calculate in

French;

To speak the Sousson language;

To know the area and population

where he was to work; and

To have prestige based on honesty

and past activities.

The agents would be chosen by the section

political bureau in order to bring about

cooperation and understanding between

the political authorities and the newly-born

producer organization. VII-18

• ; . I V

• After surveying and preparation, producer

cooperatives would be promoted in those

villages where production was highest.

• The exchange of commodities against fruit

would be started to test the degree of

interest in this kind of incentive.

As a first step, three agents would be appointed: one for Dubreka, one for Sanouyah-Maniah, and one for Wonkifong.

As a test, Mr. Abou Sylla, local youth leader, was assigned by the Dubreka section on April 10, 1964. Working with project personnel,

Mr. Sylla increased the number of village meetings to explain the ad¬ vantages of raising production and setting up cooperatives. His effectiv- ness resulted in the rapid increase of Dubreka fruit deliveries shown in

Table 2, p. VII-23.

The response of the Sanouyah-Maniah section was weaker. The

Maniah political section proposed an agent who did not write or calculate either in French or Arabic. He was rejected, and no other agent was proposed. Since this section was reducing its deliveries, it was finally decided to stop collecting fruit there.

The Wonkifong section had a late start because its officials were occupied with local elections until mid-April. After the first Wonkifong agent proved unsuitable, also because of language difficulty, the section VII-19

appointed Mr. Abou Foufana whose efforts were as effective as those of the Dubreka agent.

The agents took care of the fruit collections. Each producer's fruit was weighed and paid for separately, and each signed a receipt for the money received. As a rule, every village delivered once a week, and the following week the truck returned the nuts to the village. The nuts were then weighed and distributed to the producers at the rate of 60 per¬ cent of the fruit weight delivered the previous week. The procedure was obviously expensive in time and labor.

After a peak in May, deliveries declined in June by 50 percent because the villagers had to work on food crops. In July, deliveries remained at the June level in spite of heavy rains, probably because of the campaign for cooperatives and the tests on the exchange of commodi¬ ties. In August, deliveries went down badly and were terminated in

September, which was included in the schedule only as an experiment to determine the length of the season.

J . . • 1 . . • The following tables show deliveries of fruit and bunches to the

Kagbele plant during the 1964 season by week, month, and quarter.

Table 1 shows total deliveres by kind; Table 2 shows deliveries by sec¬ tion. The 1964 collection period was from January to September, as follows: VII-20

First Quarter: January to March, or pre-season.

Second Quarter: April to June, or peak season.

Third Quarter: July to September, or end of season.

Since the deliveries were in both fruit and bunches, common denominators had to be calculated called the bunch equivalent and the fruit equivalent.

Loose fruit is estimated in the bunch equivalent with a ratio of 1 kg. of fruit to 2 kg. of bunches; the fruit equivalent is a ratio of 1 kg. of bunches to 0. 5 kg. of fruit.

The next to last column in Table 1 indicates the amount scheduled to be delivered weekly in the different months, according to estimates by our technicians and representatives of the local producers based on grove areas and season.

The last column in Table 1 shows the amount of nuts returned to the producers, beginning in April when the decision was made to return the nuts. From mid-July on, the producers preferred to waive the re¬ turn of nuts and take the 4 GF compensation, probably because they could neither dry them in the rain nor keep them wet without spoilage.

Of the total of 286, 902 kg. of bunch equivalents delivered, 9. 93 percent was delivered in the first quarter, 65. 34 percent in the second quarter, and 24. 73 percent in the third quarter.

Table 2 indicates deliveries in bunch equivalents from the five political section areas which supplied the Kagbele plant. The percentage of the total delivery from each section is as follows: 230 861 966 396 864 140 -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- 3, 6, 2, 5, 3, Nuts 2, 2, 5, 2, 2, Returne 924 377 1,432 750 839 4,227 14,248 4,248 035 719 345 11,347 052 896 2,637 11,589 571 5712, 31,972 14,160 46,132

7, 9, 9, 9, 6, 4, 0002, 2,000 0002, 0002, 0004, 3,000 0003, 3,000 3,000 0006, 30, 30, 30, 30, 000 000 000 000 000 6,000 5,000 000 3,000 82,000 12,000 12,000 00024, 00024, 66.000 30,000 000 000 000 000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 24,000 00018, 00018, 90,000 00018, 12,000 12,000 12,000 00010, 64,000 34,000 24,000 360,000 122,000 564,000 inQuota Bunch Equiv. 150,000 120,000

•

841 698 987 596 259 786 234 -o- -o- -o- 4, 9, 7, 8, 5,387 112 020 2, 3, 2, 2, 1, 2, 2, 3, 462 526 5441, 3651, 764 9831, 1787, 11,968 15,293 45,780 12,273 22,982 29,684 29,514 94,453 292 8,742 616 834 561 555 1,265 155 654 28,508 70,929 Bunch Equiv. 12,271 22,218 16,511 14,967 47,232 - 10,662 11,026 15,962 49,008 10,317 19,267 187,465 286,902 .....

420 349 493 298 130 772 682 393 991 632 577 117 -o- -o- --o 4, 2, 2, 5, 7, 6, 8, 4, 693 056 984 646 510 136 255 3, 5, 4, 7, 1, 5, 1, 1, 1, 9, 1, 1, 3, 6, 7,483 231 Fruit Equiv. 2621, 882 589 135 11,108 22,889 11,491 14,842 14,757 47,226 646 23,615 5,331 513 371 981 308 24,504 158 917 280 277 632 326 14,252 93,730 35,462 143,444 NO.TABLE (Kilograms) 1 816 470 591 116 109 -o- -o- 3,558 4, 4, 1, 8, 7, 3, 4, 5, 4, 7, 4, 7, 85, 1,410 108 681 5,231 043 5,354 254 368 166 202 1, Fruit 3,179 5583, 45,831 646 5,331 513 220 039 392 1,361 1,241 464 QUARTERLY 738 31,585 379■ 16,473 11,190 14,628 14,659 23,434 23,305 TOTALS 120,881 T,......

3 0 0

79 83 16 (Equivalents: 934 602 428 923 1 196 231 130 364 338 538 841 698 987 596 259 786 1964 kg. -o- -o- -o- 7, -o- 759 2, 1, 2, 1, fruit 2, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 567 4,339 5, 606 3, 896 565 022 45,140 = 2, 791 615 21,392 1, 1, 522 2,398 2 1, 533 112 15,989 DELIVERIES 526 544 365 764 983 6,420 913 kg. :4, PILOTKAGBELETO bunches) Bunches 15,102 831 12,834

5 4 3 7 5 PLANT 1 8 12 19 26 10 17 24 31 14 21 28 11 18 25 15 22 29 12 19 26 30

4 6 8 5 6 to 1 9 to to to to 2to to to 9 9 to 3 2 to to 23 to 20 27 20 27 13to to to 11to 18 25to 15to 22to 12to 19to 26to 16to to 13to to to 24 to Period 12 13to 20to to27 9 10to 17to to 8 15 16to 23to 5/ 8/ 19 25 /12 16 23 13/ 22 29 May: 8/30 First Second Third Season January: Total February: Total March: Total April: 3/30to Total Total June: Total July: 6/29to Total August: Total September to Total Quarter Quarter Quarter Total VII-22

Dubreka (Cabitail) 51. 87% Wonkifong 39. 65% Maniah 6. 37% Sanouyah 1. 93% Coyah 0. 18%

100. 00%

Because of the late appointment of a collection agent, the Wonki¬ fong section was not regular in deliveries until after June. Its deliveries fell from 64, 568 kg. in the second quarter to 49, 033 kg. in the third quarter, a reduction of 24. 07 percent. The Dubreka section fell from

112, 646 kg. in the second quarter to 21, 776 kg. in the third quarter, a reduction of 80. 71 percent.

It is also noteworthy that from the time the producers agreed to deliver loose fruit in May, bunch delivery dropped and had almost dis¬ appeared by July. In the Dubreka section, bunch delivery started again in mid-July and continued in August because the plant needed to test large sterilizers constructed by the project to process bunches more economically.

The Kagbele pilot plant produced 13, 720 kg. (15, 245 It. ) of

oil and 87, 360 kg. of nuts during 1964, or yields of 9. 56 and 60. 9

percent, respectively, of fruit equivalents processed. Of the nuts,

46,132 kg. were returned to producers and 41,230 kg. were re¬

tained by the project for kernel recovery and eventual extraction in

the MICROS unit. 0

1 I—H H—I tN3 CO

841 698 987 596 259 786 234 -o- -o- -o- 5, 4, 9, 2, 8, 2, Total 526 5441, 3651, 3,764 1,983 7,178 387 112 020 2927, 8,462 742 616 8343, 5612, 5552, 2651, 1551, 6542, 27112, 22,218 11,968 29315, 45,780 12,273 22,982 68429, 29,514 94,453 16,511 96714, 47,232 66210, 11,026 15,962 49,008 31710, 26719, 50828, 187,465 70,929 286,902

159 159 139 139 742 159 -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- 1,862 7,411 9,754 6168, 2,466 5,600 6,542 7,264 2947, 1,440 7,700 2,228 2,561 1,028 1,028 Wonkifong 12,852 15,868 37,993 26,436 12,234 34,774 13,231 64,568 49,033 113,760

•

336 -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -G -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- - -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- - -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- Coyah 0421, 3781, 1,378 1,378

614 434 151 309 309 290 564 571 178 108 234 520 120 120 120 -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- 1, 1, 1, 1, 6, 1, 2, 8, 9, 1, 3, 3, 7, 370 519 973 588 740 199 334 570 594 Maniah 199 590 472 062 28418, Sections TABLE2NO. - 195 195 171 898 424 920 333 318 139 457 457 -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- ~o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- -o- 4,108 5654, 1, QUARTERLY 069 1671, 2,844 TOTALS (KilogramsBunchEquivalents)of Sanouyah 234 227 264 482 973 596 259 158 362 237 -o- -o~ -o- -o- 4, 6, 1, 1, 3, 2, 9, 8, 9, 6, 6, 4, 2, 3, 1, 1, 2, 1, 1, 2, 8, 036 626 1, 120 155 1, 1, 699 454 995 730 212 757 173 718 628 642 448 176 617 606 813 373 386 065 379 130 38, 15, 16, 54, 29314, 21,776 Dubreka 10,934 13,566 444 007 261 13,646 126 20,276 3,728. 14,114 112,846 148,915

1964 (1kg.

5 7 4 8 5 bunches 9 8 1 22 29 12 26 30 = 21 28 25 15 19 12 19 26 10 17 24 31 14 11 18 1 12 19 26 DELIVERIES kg. 16 23 15 22 29

8/ Bunch 5/ BROKEN 2/ 3/ DOWNBY 1kg.Equivalents= 1 1 3

6 9 4 8 2 to POLITICAL 1 5 6 to loose 9 to to to to to 3 to to to 2to 9to 20 27 22 16 23 13 13 20 27 11 18 25 15 12 19 26 to to to to 20 24 to 13 27 to 10 17 to fruit) 23 to to to to to to to to SECTIONS Period to to to to to to 16to to to 3/30 May: Total 6/29 Total to8/30 Total First Third January: Total February: Total March: Total April: to Total Total June: July: to Total August: September: Quarter QuarterSecond Quarter TotalSeason VII-24

B. Plant Operations -- 1965

Section V-A described the tergiversations of the Minister of MER

about our proposal to continue the pilot phase of the project by building

two small plants in the Cabitail and Wonkifong areas of the Dubreka

region. The Minister approved this proposal in a meeting with USAID

representatives on October 10, 1964, but changed his mind at the next

meeting on January 11, 1965, when he decided that no plants should be

set up in Dubreka. Instead, he wanted them built in the Boffa and Boke

regions on the Yogoya and Bentimodiah plantations. This meeting was

also attended by the Governor of the Boffa region and a representative from the Boke region.

We called attention to the difficulties which would result from the construction of two plants located so far from Conakry, especially since a proper preliminary organization had not been set up. Also, by starting so late, construction of the plants would probably not be finished in time for the peak season. The Governor of the Boffa region answered that he would give all possible assistance through the administrative and politi¬ cal offices of his region and that this would be enough to overcome all obstacles.

It was then decided that the Project Manager, Ohiami Hilaire, would immediately get in touch with the governors of thé two regions and start building the plants, while Laure would survey the Yogoya plantation area to establish its potential fruit supply and that of the nearby wild VII-25

groves. He would also locate possible sites for the plant. The Project

Manager would have complete freedom to organize the construction work and the management of the plants with our assistance if needed.

From January 18 to 23, 1965, Mr. Ohiami met with the Governor of the Boffa region and the Commandant of the Tougnifili district where the Yogoya plantation is located. In the same period, Laure surveyed the plantation and wild groves. From February 8 to 13, Mr. Ohiami met with the Governor of the Boke region and the Commandant of the

Bentimodiah district. At the same time Laure surveyed the Bentimodiah plantation and groves.

The Project Manager ran into all the difficulties we had foreseen as the Yogoya plant could not begin operations before May 27 and the

Bentimodiah plant before June 21. It was not until April 2, 1965, that the Minister authorized the construction of the Kanderiah plant in the

Wonkifong area and the transfer there of the press and equipment from the Kagbele plant. Work started on April 12 on the Kanderiah plant after the Yogoya and Bentimodiah plant constructions were completed, according to the Minister's desire. The Kanderiah plant was ready for operation by May 10, 1965.

As mentioned in Section V-A, management of the Yogoya and

Bentimodiah plants was entrusted to MER employees. In Kanderiah

Laure suggested that the plant be managed by the local agent, Fofonah VII-26

Abou, who had been in charge of fruit collection in the 1964 season and

had helped to organize the cooperatives. This proposition was based on

the following considerations:

• The most difficult part of plant manage¬

ment is the organization of the fruit sup¬

ply. A man who already knew the job and

the committee and cooperative leaders

would be more successful than a new tech¬

nician.

• This kind of activity did not require a high-

level education. Thus MER could find

better use for its employees.

operative season.

A PCV was also assigned to each plant and equipped with a car

from or PC project headquarters. As the Kanderiah plant started oper¬ ations before the two others, the PCV's were rapidly trained in this plant to perform the following tasks:

« To help the plant manager in all extraction

and fruit supply operations, including ac¬

counting and cash transactions. VII-27

ment of the plant and mechanization of

the equipment.

and equipment used in the plant.

At the Kanderiah plant, PCV Dick Spencer, who had participated in the 1964 campaign, started collection operations on May 10, 1965.

He trained his substitute, Jim Bedore, for about 15 days before leaving

Guinea at the end of his tour of duty. PCV Jim Bedore cooperated act¬ ively and efficiently with the Plant Manager in fruit collection and pay¬ ment, return of nuts, and exchange of commodities.

At the Yogoya and Bentimodiah plants two PCV's were placed at the disposal of the Project Manager. Because of transportation problems and misunderstanding of the plant managers about ways to use their ser¬ vices, they did not have an opportunity to make an important contribution to the management.

On April 7, 15, and 16, 1965, the Minister of MER met with the regional governors, political leaders, and producers in Kanderiah,

Yogoya, and Bentimodiah, respectively. These meetings were held for the purpose of establishing procedures for the collection and purchase of palm fruit. The following decisions were made: VII-28

In Kanderiah:

The price for detached fruit would be

10 GF/kg. j including the return of the unseparated pressed pulp. It might be possible to give some bonus to the pro¬ ducers at the end of the season if the plant received two tons of fruit every day from

May to July. The committees would be responsible for fruit collection and pay¬ ment. The cooperatives organized in 1964 would not participate.

In Yogoya:

The price for detached fruit would be

10 GF/kg. , including the return of the unseparated pressed pulp. (The Governor would have liked to pay only 8 GF/kg. )

The villagers around the plantation would have the right to collect fruit within the plantation. The committees would be responsible for fruit collection and pay¬ ment. A delivery schedule was made up on the spot by the Governor and the sec¬ tion and committee leaders without consul- tine either the Project Manager or us. VII-2 9

@ In Bentimodiah:

The price of fruit was set at 8 GF/kg.

after the Director of Production stated

that this was the market price for fruit in

the area. The other conditions were the

same as those for Yogoya.

(these had been ordered but had not yet

arrived), the Boffa region would lend a

tractor and trailer and the Boke region

would lend a truck. The Kanderiah plant

was obliged to rent a truck at a cost of

10, 000 GF/day.

The plants operated during the following periods:

Kanderiah, from May 10 to July 27, or 11 weeks;

Yogoya, from May 27 to July 27, or 9 weeks; and

Bentimodiah, from June 21 to July 24, or 5 weeks.

According to our estimates, the plantations in Yogoya and Bentimodiah should have delivered half of the daily requirement and the wild groves the balance. VII-30

Table 3 below shows the deliveries to each of the three plants which were, in all cases, inadequate. They processed a total of 103, 537 kg. of loose fruit corresponding to 207, 074 kg. of bunches, compared to

175, 840 kg. of bunches delivered to the Kagbele plant in the 1964 sea¬ son during the corresponding period of time, May 10 to July 27. This is only a 15 percent increase in supply for a 200 percent increase in processing facilities.

TABLE NO. 3

1965 DELIVERIES OF FRUIT TO PLANTS IN BENTIMODIAH, YOGOYA, and KANDERIAH (Kilograms)

Weeks Bentimodiah Yogoya Kanderiah Total

MAY

3 - 8 -o- -o-

10 - 15 10,024 17 - 22 5, 657 24 - 30 7, 690 6, 805 TOTAL for May 7, 690 22,486 30,176

JUNE

5/31 - 6/6 4, 302 6, 853 7 - 13 3, 740 8, 978 14 - 20 7, 004 3, 760 21 - 25 3, 578 6, 207 2, 921 26 - 7/3 5, 786 1, 780 2, 090 TOTAL for June 9, 364 23, 033 24,602 56,999

JULY

5 - 10 3, 452 1, 838 1, 341 12 - 17 3, 370 1, 111 1, 931 19 - 24 1, 101 793 813

26 - 31 -o- 99 513 TOTAL for July 7, 923 3, 841 4, 598 16, 362

SEASON TOTAL 17,287 34, 564 51, 686 103,537 VII-31

The only area in which it is possible to compare deliveries between the 1964 and 1965 seasons is the Wonkifong area, because fruit delivered to the Kagbele plant in 1964 from the Wonkifong area came from exactly the same villages which delivered fruit to the Kandariah plant in 1965, Table 4 shows deliveries in the same weeks of 1964 and 1965. It can be seen that deliveries in 1965 were higher than those in the corresponding period of 1964: 51, 686 kg. of fruit in 1965 against 48, 882 kg. in 1964.

TABLE NO. 4

PLANT AT KANDERIAH

Comparative Weekly Palm Fruit Deliveries In the Wonkifong Area -- May through July, 1964 and 1965 (Kilograms of Loose Fruit)

Weeks 1964 1965

MAY 1st week 931 -o- 2nd " 3,705 10,024 3rd " 6, 426 5, 657 4th " 7, 934 6, 805 TOTAL for May 18, 996 22,486

JUNE - 1st week 4, 878 6, 853 2nd " 4, 308 8, 978 3rd " 1, 233 3, 760 4th " 2, 800 2, 921 5th " 3, 271 2, 090 TOTAL for June 16, 490 24,602

JULY - 1st week 3, 632 1, 341 2nd " 3, 647 1, 931 3rd " 6, 117 813 4th " -0- 513 TOTAL for July 13,396 4, 598

QUARTERLY TOTAL 48, 882 51,686 VII-32

Deliveries in the Wonkifong area, although far from satisfactory, were brought about by the efforts of our technicians and the PCV's who urged the political leaders at all levels to persuade the producers to cooperate, and more importantly, by the desire of the producers to ex¬ change fruit for commodities. The increase in deliveries, moreover, was achieved in spite of the fact that the price of fruit was lower in 1965 than in 1964. In 1965 the price was 10 GF/kg. compared to 14 GF/kg. in 1964. Also, in 1965 nuts were returned mixed with processed pulp which required labor to separate, while in 1964 clean nuts were re¬ turned.

Deliveries to the Yogoya and Bentimodiah plants were small and irregular even though they were surrounded by plantations and extensive wild groves. Since no report from the Guinean counterpart personnel or from the plant managers was presented, we could not at the time establish reasons for the failure. By conservative estimate, the plantations alone should have supplied six tons of fruit per week. It was then a matter of bad organization of the cutting by the regional plantation managers.

Laure found out later that a misunderstanding had occurred between

ï the producers and the plantation managers regarding the possession of bunches collected within the plantation. During the meetings in Yogoya and Bentimodiah on April 15 and 16, the Minister had declared that all local villagers were entitled to cut bunches within the plantation provided VII-33

they delivered the bunches to the plants. From the first day of the cut¬ ting, however, while the producers were ready to deliver their harvest to the plants, the plantation managers took possession of the bunches, explaining that all fruit grown on the plantation belonged to the region.

Also, certain committee presidents kept the money paid them by the plants for distribution to the producers for bunches harvested from wild groves. They pretended that the producers must work as voluntary labor for the benefit of the committee. Understandably, most producers stopped cutting bunches from either source.

Finally, at the Yogoya and Bentimodiah plant areas the producers asked for a higher price for the fruit and also wanted to exchange fruit for commodities since they had heard that this approach was being used by the regions as an incentive to increase the production of food crops.

The 1965 output of the three plants is shown below in Table 5.

TABLE NO. 5

1965 OUTPUT OF THREE PLANTS

Oil Produced Extraction Yield Nuts Returned Location Kilograms % of Loose Fruit Kilograms*

Kanderiah 5, 808 11.24 31,000

Yogoya 3, 575 10.34 20,700

Bentimodiah 1,734 10. 03 10,300

TOTAL 11,117 10. 74 avg. 62,000 I

* Estimated amount of nuts contained in the unseparated pressed pulp returned to the producers. VII-34

C. Plant Operations -- 1966

At the end of the 1965 season we drew conclusions from the un¬ satisfactory results obtained in the three plants and proposed measures to ameliorate the low level of fruit supply for the 1966 season. The vicissitudes that followed are exposed in Section V-A and the status report of January 23, 1966. These include discussion of the proposals at the

Ministry, decisions made, change of minister, new discussions and de¬ cisions, meeting of the governors, other decisions, and finally, exclusion of the specialists and PCV's from all contact with the poeple.

The management of the project and the plants was now entirely in the hands of Ohiami Hilaire, the Project Manager, and Tolno Faya, the

Controller. Beginning in April, the Minister imposed new and more severe restrictions on our movements and those of the PCV's, rendering it completely impossible for us to exercise our functions even as simple technical advisors. Moreover, the Project Manager did not seem to need advice since he never asked for any, and neither was he in a great hurry to furnish reports or data on the operation of the plants.

The Director/USAID and we never failed to remind the Ministry

and the Project Manager that a decision on the continuation of the project,

based on the results of the 1966 season, had to be made by June 20. Ob¬

viously, time was required before that date to elaborate the production

data and calculate the performance of the project. VII-35

During a meeting on April 13, the Director/USAID notified the

Minister that since the Cooperative Specialist, Mr. Laure, was no longer able to carry on his activities, his presence had become useless and his services would be terminated June 21, 1966. ^Later, the Director/USAID informed the GOG that the activities of the Chief of Party, Mr. Morrison, were so restricted that his services would also be terminated.

By June 20 the Project Manager had not furnished us with a written report on the operation of the plants. Because of the restrictions imposed on our movements, we were unable to obtain detailed information on the type of organization set up by the three regional governors for the supply and purchase of fruit or on the reactions of the producers. Only statistical data on production and some secondhand information about the collection operations of the Kanderiah plant reached us regularly, thanks to PCV Jim Before who brought them himself to Conakry. In addition, the Plant Manager of Kanderiah sent the Project Manager a weekly report and the Project Manager went to Kanderiah often for inspection. Of

Yogoya and Bentimodiah we received only verbal information from the

Project Manager and tentative figures on the collections up to June 12,

1966. Difficulties of communication and lack of organization on the part of the Project Manager and the plant managers probably caused these delays. According to the information received, collections were organizaed on the same basis as in the preceding years.

* By July 31 final information was not available to us. It was mailed to our offices two months later. VII-36

At Kanderiah, following a preliminary meeting held by the

Governor with the officials of the interested committees in the Wonkifong section on February 23, 1966, the following decisions were made:

o The producers would deliver loose fruit

rather than bunches,

o The purchase price of loose fruit would be

15 GF/kg. without return of nuts to the

producers.

e A bonus would be given at the end of the

season if there had been a profit.

® The organization of the harvest would be

assigned to the committee presidents

according to a schedule which should provide

a supply of three tons of fruit per day to

the plant.

• The Plant Manager would accompany the

truck each day to weigh the fruit and pay

the harvesters individually.

At Yogoya collection procedures were as follows:

e The harvesters would deliver whole bunches,

and the plantation, managed by the region,

would deliver loose fruit. VII-37

! 9 The price would be 25 GF/bunch weighing

more than 6 kg. The price of loose fruit

delivered by the plantation would be 10

GF/kg. In both cases there would be no

return of nuts to the producers.

assigned to the committee presidents ac¬

cording to a schedule and quotas which

should provide a supply of five tons per day

to the plant.

truck each day to weigh and pay for the fruit.

It is not known if this was done individually

for each producer.

At Bentimodiah, practically the same system was adopted

o The producers and the plantation would

deliver bunches. Later, loose fruit was

accepted from the small private plantation

of Katako. o The purchase price of bunches from the

wild groves would be 25 GF each up to 6 kg.

and 30 GF each for larger bunches, without

the return of nuts. V11-38

o The organization of the harvest would be

assigned to the committee presidents

according to a schedule and quotas which

should provide a supply of five tons per day

to the plant.

® The producers would be allowed to cut

bunches in the plantation and split the

30 GF price with the plantation.

The plant at Kanderiah began to collect fruit on April 4 and ex¬ traction operations began on April 5. At Yogoya the delivery of bunches began on April 7, but extraction did not start until the 15th because the separation of fruit by fermentation of the bunches requires about 10 days.

At Bentimodiah deliveries began on April 9, but the first extraction did not take place until the 17th for the same reason.

Table 6 indicates the deliveries to the three plants. The data for

Yogoya and Bentimodiah were calculated in fruit equivalents based on the estimate that a bunch weighs 6 kg. on the average and that the fruit con¬ tained in the bunch represents 60 percent of the total weight, or 3. 6 kg. of fruit/bunch. This reduction to fruit equivalents was necessary to permit comparison with 1965 deliveries which were entirely in loose fruit. It should be noted that the ratio of fruit to bunch weight was estimated at

60 percent, whereas in past years it had been estimated' at 50 percent. On VII-3 9

the basis of tests made in the presence of the Project Manager at Benti-

modiah, the bunches coming from the plantations and the wild groves

produced a bit more than 60 percent of fruit after separation and screening.

TABLE NO. 6

COMPARISON OF DELIVERIES TO KANDERIAH, YOGOYA and BENTIMODIAH PLANTS DURING THE 1964, W 1965, 1966 SEASONS (Kilograms of Loose Fruit) Kanderiah Yogoya Bentimodiah Weeks 1964 1965 1966 1965 1966 1965 1966

APRIL

3 - 8 69 -o- 5, 079 -o- 1,116 -o- 1, 310 10 - 16 -o- -o- 7, 054 -o- 2, 329 -o- 3, 841 17 - 23 -0- -o- 5, 749 -0- 7, 214 -o- 9, 968 ' 24 - 1 5/ -o- -o- 9, 487 -o- 3, 521 -o- 5, 424 TOTAL 69 -o- 27, 369 -o- 14,180 -o- 20,543

MAY

2 - 8 931 -o- 7, 396 -o- 1, 292 -o- 2, 821 9 - 15 3, 705 10,024 5, 682 -o- 3, 133 -o- 3, 236 16 - 21 6, 426 5, 657 3, 554 -o - 3, 282 -o- 5, 461 23 - 28 7, 934 6, 605 4, 332 7, 690 947 -o- 3, 538 TOTAL 18, 996 22,286 20,964 7, 690 8, 654 -o- 15,056

JUNE 4 5/30 - 4, 878 6, 853 1, 990 4, 302 10,475 -o- 5, 542 5 - 11 4, 308 8, 978 1, 878 3, 740 7, 333 -o- 2, 954 12 - 18 1,233 3, 760 4, 362 7, 004 -o- -o- 12,388

20 - 26 736 -o- -o- 2, 800 2, 921 , 6, 207 3, 578 27 - 7/2 3,271 2, 090 120 H 1, 780 -o- 5, 786 -o~ TOTAL ï 16,490 24,602 9, 076 23,033 17,808 9, 364 20,884

GRAND TOTAL 35,555 46,888 57,419 30,723 40,642 9, 364 56,483

1/ During 1964 only the section serving Kanderiah delivered fruit. The other plants did not exist. 2/ One day of collection--June 27. VII-40

An examination of Table 6 reveals that 1966 deliveries to the plants dropped sharply between the months of April and May, despite the fact that May is normally the period of peak production in Lower Guinea.

According to unofficial information, deliveries fell off for several

reasons :

o At Kanderiah food crop cultivation was

intensively pushed in 1966 by political and

administrative propaganda. In addition,

the producers were denied commodities to

exchange for fruit,

o At Yogoya, the harvesters of wild fruit

seemed dissatisfied with the price of

25 GF/bunch fixed by the regional admin¬

istration. While the plantation, the largest

in Guinea, had actually increased deliveries

tenfold from April to May, its total contrib¬

ution during this two-month period was

only 1, 927 kg. of loose fruit out of a total

of 22, 834 kg. delivered to the plant, or

8. 45 percent. Thus the small plantation

increase was completely overshadowed by

the results of the wild fruit harvesters' dis¬

content. VII-41

Table 6 also compares deliveries to the three plants during the processing seasons of 1964 (only for Kanderiah), 1965, and 1966, for the same periods of the year. Note that during 1964 the Wonkifong section actually delivered to the Kagbele plant.

The 1966 output of the three plants is shown below in Table

7. Although the production figures are greater than for the previous

year, this does not represent an improvement in performance. The in¬

crease in production resulted from an earlier start of fruit collection and

processing operations. Except in the case of Bentimodiah, for which

there is no comparative data, it is obvious from Table 6 that per¬

formance in 1966 was not as good as in 1965.

TABLE NO. 7

1966 OUTPUT OF THREE PLANTS

Oil Produced Extraction Yield Nuts Produced Location Kilograms % of Loose Fruit Kilograms

Kanderiah 6, 876 11.91 34,450

Yogoya 4, 500 11.07 20,400

Bentimodiah 7, 380 13. 07 32, 800

TOTAL 18, 756 12. 14 avg. 87,650

We estimate the three plant total to be only 10 to 15 percent higher

than the production of a single plant supplied to capacity. Each area

Í can produce enough fruit to overwhelm the plant. The problem as al¬

ways is to give the harvesters the incentive to supply.

VIII-1

VIIÍ PROBLEMS

A. Problems of USAID/G Logistic Support

Our contract with AID specified that housing, local transportation

within Guinea, office space, office equipment, driver/messenger,

secretarial and office help, translation and interpreting services, and

other administrative services would be provided by USAID/G. By any

standards, USAID/G failed to live up to this responsibility in a manner that contributed greatly to the efficiency of our performance in the field.

There were extentuating circumstances, to be sure, but these did not lessen the adverse effect on our ability to do our work.

Housing was to be provided on a "best efforts" basis, and the contract provided that members of our field team should be paid the current standard per diem in Guinea until USAID/G furnished permanent housing. The purpose of this provision was to eliminate the financial burden on contract field personnel who could not be provided housing within the period normally covered by the AID temporary housing allow¬ ance. As a side effect it might have been assumed that the burden of

per diem for an paying extended period would act as an encouragement to get our personnel housed as soon as possible. In fairness to USAID/G, we recognize that housing was a great problem in 1963, even more so in the high housing allocation categories in which our personnel were placed. Nevertheless, it is difficult to overlook that USAID/G direct- hire personnel often were housed in a matter of weeks, if not immediately, VIII-2

while our people spent five months in one case and three months in an¬ other in the one existing decent hotel during a period when food was a problem and guests were occasionally turned out to accommodate visiting missions or athletic teams. Morrison got housing only when his wife was to return to Guinea after childbirth, and the delay in Laure's housing jeopardized the possibility of his dependents joining him within the time limits specified by AID regulations. Once settled, however, the housing was entirely adequate and ceased to be a personal distraction.

Local transportation was not available when our first field tech¬ nician arrived, The motor pool was inadequate even for the needs of

USAID/G, causing many of the mission employees to use their personal vehicles for official business. Without project vehicles, communications with the GOG counterpart organization, located four kilometers from

USAID/G offices, was difficult and time-consuming, especially so consid¬ ering the quality of local telephone and taxi service. The urgency attached to getting our people into the field seemed wasted when, once there, trans¬ portation to carry out our work was lacking. We resolved the problem by locating two Land Rovers in Monrovia and convincing AID that they should be purchased for the project. The vehicles were driven to Conakry, arriving about mid-June, 1963, six weeks after our first field man.

Trucks for collecting fruit were incorrectly specified by the mission and had to be respecified and ordered after our first field man VIII-3

arrived on the scene. By special efforts of AID the normal delivery

time of vehicle procurement was reduced to six months. The trucks,

which arrived on September 24, 1963, were tied up in the port because

of missing documents until October 4. It was then three weeks before

the USAID garage checked and prepared them for use. Fortunately, the

project had no pressing need for the trucks at that time, other trans¬

portation having been made available temporarily from the GOG. Never¬

theless, the three-week delay indicates the kind of service rendered to

the project by the USAID/G garage which in later times became a strong

rein on our performance. This is discussed below.

At the time the trucks were ordered, USAID/G specified that

spare parts be supplied according to the manufacturer's recommendations

up to ten percent of the value of the vehicles. A series of AID errors and

mishandling of this procurement resulted in the arrival of the parts in

June, 1965. During the 18 months or so that the trucks were operated

before the parts were on hand, they were many times out of service and in need

parts, and at all times proper preventive maintenance suffered. To ease

this condition we used our special purchasing authority--not intended for this purpose--to buy and ship by air those parts essential to place out-of- service vehicles back on the road. However, even a cabled order shipped by air took, on the average, two months from the Conakry requisition to the garage availability. The delay and the greatly increased expense of VIII-4

this kind of procurement could have been avoided had the original order not been mired down with others, all competing for attention.

Dependence on the USAID/G garage for project vehicle mainten¬ ance was an impracticality that caused us many serious delays and difficulties. We were operating an enterprise with upcountry installations,

each totally dependent on automotive transportation. The supply systems

at each plant involved daily fruit collection by truck on an established

schedule. If we could not adhere to the schedule, we alienated our sup¬

pliers and in the end had to purchase fruit which had deteriorated and would produce a reduced oil yield of bad quality. Transportation was

also essential for fuel supplies and management liaison. Under these

imperatives the USAID/G garage was entirely unsuited to our purposes.

First and foremost of its shortcomings in relation to this project was the

low priority assigned to our needs. When it was a matter of whose

vehicle to repair or service, it is understandable that the palm oil proj¬

ect stood low in a pecking order that included the entire embassy and

USAID/G motor pools. Even without reference to priorities, assuming

completely egalitarian first-come, first-served basis, the garage could

not have Served our purposes. When we appeared there, we needed service

and any delay subtracted from our ability to do our job. Moreover, our

maintenance problems often occurred upcountry where it was either im¬

possible or improbable to expect service from the USAID/G garage. VIII-5 ■ ç^jd

We made out as best we could while we were operating only four vehicles. With the certainty of our fleet increasing to 14, we obtained

USAID/G concurrence to recruit a TCN technician to operate a project maintenance shop which would also do light fabrication. Recruiting a

TCN proved difficult and lengthy. We abandoned the effort when a

suitably qualified PCV requested a field transfer to the project from a

job in which he was dissatisfied. This occurred in the latter part of

1965. The project's own shop proved its worth repeatedly during the

final season of processing operations.

Office space was at a premium when we began operations in

Guinea and continued to be a problem for USAID/G as it expanded to its

present size. We were not fortunate enough to get space either in USAID/G

or GOG premises. Attempting to overcome this difficulty, we built

office space into the Kagbele pilot plant. However, the daily use of this

office for project management proved to be impractical because of its

distance from Conakry and the need for frequent liaison with USAID/G

and the GOG. We were dissuaded by USAID/G from exercising the con¬

tract stipulation that office space could be rented on a temporary basis.

Thus, for the first year or so of our time in Guinea, each member of

our field team used his individual residence as his office. The distance

between homes and the interference of family life understandably im¬

peded communications and made this situation less than ideal. When in VIII-6

1964 it was finally arranged for the project to have rented offices which would accommodate both contract and counterpart personnel, USAID/G could not provide office furniture.

Obtaining office furniture proved to be the most consistently maddening problem in our relationship with USAID/G. When at long last we had a place to work together, we had no furniture at which to sit and write, no place to put our books and papers, and no place to seat a typist who might have assisted us to generate the records and reports we should

and were expected to have produced. USAID/G contributed a single table

and three aged wrought-iron chairs from a discarded set of lawn furni¬

ture. Considering conditions in Conakry at the time, we were happy to

have these. However, this left the other half of our team in his bedroom

and our counterparts on the portico of the Ministry of Rural Economy.

In early 1965 the GOG state trading agency for office equipment,

LIBRAPORT, announced an importation of office furniture--an infrequent

occurrence that generates instant response from government and com¬

mercial offices. With USAID/G concurrence we reserved a selection of

furniture and equipment pending final pricing of a pro-forma invoice for

USAID/G approval. When it was presented, the Controller/USAID dis¬

approved because of the inflated dollar equivalent at the official rate of

exchange of this debased currency--of which we had too much and which

had been declared surplus. VIII-7

When the Controller declined to approve local purchase, we again tried USAID/G. The Contract Representative wrote to the Executive Officer.

The Director wrote to the Executive Officer. The Executive Officer, who had two desks in different locations, suggested that he would provide us with orange crates and planks as a field expedient--not a bad offer con¬ sidering the local scarcity of usable wood. To place all this in perspec¬ tive there was not a single low-level local-hire USAID/G clerk who did not have the full complement of office furniture and equipment dictated by his theoretical job description, and there were USAID/G offices other than the executive office which contained desks at which no one sat. A survey of USAID/G premises might have turned up half or more of our needs. The puzzling feature of all this is that from February, 1963, when the project agreement was signed, until February, 1965, when we did it ourselves, no one in USAID/G ordered what we needed and were promised in the contract. As soon as we were able to have our needs for office furniture and equipment included in a Pro Ag, the material was specified. Unfortunately, delivery of the order was delayed by two

successive strikes which disrupted shipping, and the project did not re¬

ceive the furniture until the last days of 1965. That was two years and

eight months after our arrival.

Secretarial and office help were not available to us in a manner

which contributed measurably to our performance. In Guinea, good VIII-8

office help, especially with English capability, is scarce and very much in demand. Competition for office workers is intense among the many foreign missions and business organizations. In order to hire good help, salaries must often be partially in hard currency, and working conditions play a major role. The project could pay only in local cur¬ rency and, until January, 1966, there was no furniture to accommodate office help under satisfactory conditions. USAID/G secretaries were available on a sometime basis, being too occupied, usually, with the heavy load of internal work to give our needs consideration. Consequently, our paper work was generally kept in the raw state; only the most essential material was typed and that very often by the contract technicians.

Partly because of the time involved, we minimized the volume of formal communication, preferring to devote ourselves to substantive pro¬ gress. However, the project did not suffer from lack of communication.

We had almost daily contact with USAID/G and our GOG counterparts.

These meetings kept everyone well informed and were supplemented when necessary by written reports, memos, and studies. It was unfortunately not possible to keep AID/W informed by the same means.

We were less troubled by the problem of translation and inter¬ preting services because our field team members were capable in French.

From time to time we did have access to USAID/G translators, and ï although we could have used them more, we were never seriously VIII-9

hampered. The problem of interpreters we do not weigh heavily merely

because there was nothing much that could be done about it. Our contacts

with our counterparts, project employees, and government officials were

always adequately handled in French. In the more difficult case of com¬

munication with the villagers, whose ability in French is rudimentary or non-existent, we usually depended on the local political leaders whose

presence was required for most of our formal contacts. What we wished

to say to the villagers had to be interpreted by our political hosts and

vice versa. When we visited villages without a local political escort,

our counterparts were usually with us, and they interpreted. Unfortun¬

ately, none of the project staff was of the same tribal group as that of

the area in which we operated. Their lack of Soussou fluency and tra¬

dition was often a drawback and occasionally a source of trouble.

Purchasing of all U. S. -financed project commodities, except for

$10,000 of contractor authority, was the responsibility of USAID/G.

There were several things wrong with the set-up. First, USAID/G did

not have a purchasing agent at the time our needs were to be ordered. The

man occupying the supply advisor's position had never before done this

work and was completely buried by the amount and complexity of what

he had to do. We got a temporary lift from a TDY supply advisor who

knew the job, but that was short-lived. Second, and no less important

when time is a factor, there was little opportunity for effective follow-up VIII-10

of a purchase order from the distance of Conakry. We tried to get in¬ creased authority to purchase which would have permitted us to take care of all project procurement. This, AID/W refused. We tried to get USAID/G approval for us to act as expeditors from our home offices.

At first, there was some resistance to the idea, but when it was approved a month or so later our home office staff was fully engaged in other work. The performance of USAID/G procurement was slow and sloppy.

Specifying what had to be bought was our job; getting the order typed and through the USAID/G approval procedure was the supply advisor's. Our orders took from two to six weeks to pass through the mill, and follow-up was non-existent. The net result was that material originally specified during the first third of 1965 was still enroute a year later, and much of what was purchased arrived too late to be installed and used.

We have no desire to condemn USAID/G for any of the above problems. Generally speaking, we believe the mission was as much inconvenienced as we were by a badly conceived idea of what it was able to provide in the way of logistic support. Unless a mission has a surplus of logistic support items or has them on order prior to the contractor's arrival in the field, it seems to us to be in the best interest of the U.S.

Government to allow the contractor to provide for himself. We believe that with the exception of housing and administrative services such as customs clearance, where a USAID mission has a clear superiority, VIII-11

the contract for a job with the size, scope, and nuts-and-bolts aspect

of this project should give the contractor responsibility and authority Í for his own logistic support. VIII-12

B. Problems with the Government of Guinea (GOG)

Guinea presents a broad range of problems common to all under¬ developed countries. These are well known to people working in this field and need no retelling here. Guinea also offers problems which, though not unique, may not be so familiar. These spring from the fact and manner of Guinea's relatively recent independence and its orientation to east European socialism.

GOG officials are tremendously proud of the accomplishments of the Democratic Party of Guinea and its government. They are proud to have thumbed their noses at President de Gaulle and gone their inde¬ pendent way. They are proud to have survived since then, despite the tribulations of the infant years of independence.

They are supremely confident, despite any evidence to the contrary, of their ability to carry out their designs for revolutionary political, econ¬ omic, and social change. Their denial of political choice and their very extensive organization of life along political lines have given them an impression of popular solidarity and political consciousness--an impression of having transformed the average Guinean into a unique creature who will, in anything and everything, respond to appeals to the national good with revolutionary fervor.

The socialism, the underdevelopment, and the experience of French administration combine in a nightmarish economy, bone poor and controlled almost to a stand-still. The distribution system, which formerly extended VIII-13

to small villages through the medium of Lebanese traders, now stops at the state store in the principal district towns, often a 50 km. round trip from a village. Any time a state store or one of the few remaining pri¬ vate commercial houses has popular consumer goods for sale (rice,

cloth, cigarettes, sugar, soap, raincoats, valises, galvanized buckets

and tubs, to name a few), crowds of would-be buyers congregate, waving

fistfuls of money and vying for attention and the chance to buy what there

is never enough of. Construction materials in any quantity at any time

may be extremely difficult to obtain. To buy a ton of cement, when any

is available, often requires an official request from a minister. To buy

lumber for the formwork needed to pour the concrete may at any time

be an impossibility. For the average Guinean to obtain construction

materials is usually not possible.

Our specific problems with the GOG emanated from the GOG

political and economic orientation as much as from Guinean underdevel¬

opment.

Political considerations always outweighed technical and econo¬

mic requirements, no matter how light the former and how compelling

the latter. The organization of fruit harvesting and collection was

assigned to political committees rather than to existing free cooperatives

which had demonstrated their effectiveness. VIII-14

Proven economic inducements--a fair money return for fruit and goods available to spend it on--were rejected in favor of the political lecture as an encouragement to greater fruit harvesting.

The decision to expand the project before completing the pilot

phase was politically motivated. In fact, the GOG never quite accepted

the concept of pilot operations. From the day it was ready for oil pro¬

duction, the pilot plant was considered a commercial venture. The plants

in the Boffa and Boke regions were built to comply with the Seven-Year-

Plan after the recommendations of the original feasibility report were

distorted and made a part of it. This diverted our attention from the full

development of the collection and production process, and the additional

demands on our time never allowed us to return to the pilot work.

Communications with MER officials were difficult. Partly, this

was because all power of decision rested with the Minister and the Inspector

General of Agriculture and they were difficult to see--either because they

were busy or absent. Partly, it was because of their political orientation

and its effect on their economic thinking. We were seldom on the same

wavelength. Their aim was to proliferate palm oil plants without refer¬

ence to economics. Our aim was to find out if the whole idea made sense

before recommending additional investment. Partly, it was because

Guineans were supposed by their officials to be unique creatures which we

could not possibly understand on the basis of our past experience and VIII-15

present observation. Our suggestions were often negatively received as a result of this and the strong feeling of independence which tended to reject anything that came from white westerners. Our reports were seldom read. Our ideas and discussions were not really heard, or if heard, not heeded. Communications with our counterparts suffered be¬ cause, as representatives of the donors, we had responsibilities and authority over which they had no control. In the mind of someone not far removed from colonial domination, this apparently represented an infringement of their sovereignty and created tensions which, do what we might, we never wholly succeeded in easing.

The turnover of Guinean officials at all levels of contact was a serious problem in trying to maintain continuity of thought, under¬ standing, and interest. In the three and one-half years of the project life, the following changes in personnel occured in the various adminis¬ trations with which we dealt and on which we depended for approval, authorization, support,and action:

and three general inspectors.

an aggregate of 25 times.

in two of four districts. VIII-16

e Of the four sections, the top officials changed six times.

@ And, finally, at the level of the village committee--the

unit primarily responsible for fruit collection--of the

45 to 50 committee presidents, almost all changed yearly.

In another perspective, disregarding annual changes of committee presidents, there were 41 changes of the 22 GOG officials on whom the project depended to one degree or another--an average of one position change per month over the life of the project. One can imagine the great amount of time and energy diverted from substantive work by these turnovers. If an incumbent knew he was to be replaced, which was often the case, he generally was not concerned with his present job. The new man took time to get acclimated and then more time to learn about the specifics of the project. In the interim, the project often had to mark time in the areas affected by the changes.

Lack of professional Guinean staff was a problem second only to obsessive political concern. The GOG failed to provide counterparts with experience in or talent for management and administration. Sekou

Soumah, the original Project Manager and Director of OFFICAO, was an old hand. However, he managed the project only for its first year and did not spend enough time on project affairs. His successor,

Ohiami Hilaire, was very much inferior in training and experience. He was not at all up to the job and attempts to train him were largely fruitless for several reasons: VIII-17

The title, Project Manager, carries an aura of author¬

ity not conducive to learning from others unless on

a voluntary basis. Mr. Ohiami did not wish to be

shown or taught and consistently resisted advice and

suggestion until he found himself in trouble. Even

this would not have been too hopeless a learning de¬

vice if one learned from experience. This was not

always the case with Mr. Ohiami.

The job of manager in this project required a great

deal of liaison with MER and the upcountry plants in

addition to a heavy load of administrative work. Mr.

Ohiami was without local staff and the full burden of

even the meanest tasks fell on him. He was so busy working he did not have time to learn what he was sup¬ posed to be doing.

Our field team, on its side, also had a great deal of upcountry and administrative work. Part of this was work taken over from Mr. Ohiami because he could not do it. We had little time to offer formal training; our tasks and Mr. Ohiami's often kept us apart for days.

We probably erred in relieving him of some of his work rather than assisting him to doit. However, we VIII-18

were expected to produce results if the project was to

continue. Considering the difficulty of training Mr.

Ohiami, we chose to do essential work ourselves,

o Mr. Ohiami was seriously hampered and greatly de¬

moralized by lack of authority. In his own words he

was nothing more than a bookkeeping clerk and super¬

visor of local plant personnel. All decisions had to be

referred to the Ministry. Perhaps the Ministry had not

confidence in him and should have replaced him. He

spoke constantly of what he could and would do if he were

manager in fact. We urged him many times to assume

the authority inherent in his position and let his superiors

in the Ministry check him if they wished. We never suc¬

ceeded in giving him enough confidence to take the

initiative.

The Ministry officials, while retaining the power of decision, did not spend enough time on the project to contribute to its management in a positive way. They are great spur-of-the-moment thinkers and have little patience with discussion and exposition. Even the most detailed study and thoughtful recommendation counted for little if it did not square with their intuition, preconceived notion, or political stance; and, if it did, there was no need for study or thought. Aside from this irrationality, VIII-19

the simple mechanics of getting a decision or ministerial support and action took an enormous amount of our time. Days, if not weeks, passed before appointments could be arranged. Even then, the Minister or

Inspector General might not be present. Time--calendar time--is im¬ portant to the GOG. There are planned objectives to be met by certain dates. After eight years, the old slogans are wearing thin and time to accomplish revolutionary improvements in the Guinean lot may be run¬ ning out. But individual time, the time of specialists and organizations trying to assist in the process, is taken little account of an is cavalierly squandered. Deadlines and, as in the case of this project, technically or seasonally determined time imperatives are ignored until it is too late or uncomfortably close.

Changes of mind--or perhaps changes of decisions previously made without sufficient understanding--caused serious problems, delays, and waste of time. Several instances stand out as landmark decisions:

e We were, at first, given encouragement and official approval

to organize cooperatives. There is no question that the practice

was in favor because the Minister himself must approve and

issue the decree establishing each individual co-op. This he

did for the 12 co-ops organized by the project in 1964. In 1965,

when he found the prospect of dealing with free co-ops not to

his liking, he withdrew recognition and officially assigned village VIII-2 O

committees the responsibility for fruit collection. The co-ops still existed, but the implied disapproval and actual lack of support weakened the basis on which they had been founded.

Some of the co-ops simply ceased to function and the rest re¬ belled at the lack of commodities they had been promised by holding back fruit deliveries. We had invested an enormous amount of time and effort in the promotion, organization, and support of the cooperatives which would have been better spent on other aspects of the fruit supply system had we got an honest, thoughtful evaluation of the GOG attitude in the first place.

The recommendations of the interim report following the 1964 season of pilot operations were accepted by the Minister with the proviso that USAID also build plants in the Boffa and Boke regions. All our planning for the 1965 season--two and one- half months of work--was based on this acceptance, and when the time came for ordering the fabrication of four steel sheds to house the plants, the Minister himself wrote the check for the down payment. Less than one week later he denied having ap¬ proved construction of the plants recommended in the interim report. When he relented and allowed construction of one of the two plants in question, he refused to accept our work plan, in¬ sisting on the prior construction of the Boffa and Boke plants. VIII-21

This so distorted our operations and created such difficulties

that two of the three plants were not ready for operation until

after the peak of the season, two months later than they would

otherwise have been. Also, his refusal to sanction one of the

plants caused us to abandon an area which had had one season

of development work with promising results, o For two years and eight months under Barry Sory, Minister of

Rural Economy, we had been allowed--even encouraged--to

have liveral contacts with the villagers supplying fruit. Our

knowledge of the supply system permitted us to identify de¬

ficiencies in supply, suggest remedies, and in general take or

urge creative action to resolve the supply problems which

threatened project results.

After Fodeba Keita took over the Ministry, we had several

meetings to discuss ways of improving the fruit supply based on

consideration of suppliers' problems and suggestions for im¬

proving deficiencies in their capabilities and incentives. There

was never any question during these meetings about the desir¬

ability of our contacts with the population or their officials. The

discussions, though unsatisfactory from the point of view of

concessions from the Minister, implied that our contacts were

normal and desirable. In a precipitate decision one month later, VIII-22

the Minister forbade us further dealings with the people and

local officials and instructed us to limit our concerns to plant

construction and operation. Our advice was to be available to

the Project Manager when requested--in effect, we were to

speak when spoken to. By this decision the Minister discarded

all we had learned about the supply problem and rejected what

we offered in the way of solutions. It is difficult to find reasons

I for his decision other than that he thought we were a disruptive

influence in the countryside, that our concentration on incentives,

would spoil the villagers and embarrass the government.

Another change in practice, which did not involve a conscious acceptance followed by a reversal, was the Minister's refusal to authorize the upcountry travel necessary to do project work. In place of travel authorizations proposed by us according to a work plan agreed upon by the Project Manager, the Minister arbitrarily decided that our field team could travel but project Peace Corps volunteers could not. Since the

PCV's were essential to the work at all locations, we could do no more construction to complete the existing plants. The exclusion of our work with the fruit supply system and the refusal to authorize travel for plant construction and operation effectively eliminated the usefulness of the field team. VIII-2 3

C. Problems of Peace Corps Participation

Thirteen Peace Corps volunteers worked with the project at various times during its life. In four cases their performance was good, that is, comparable to or better than what could be expected from a salaried man. The service of the majority of the balance of the volunteers was a waste of their time and ours. In a few cases it was disastrous.

The causes for this unfortunate showing are many and varied, but several stand out more than others. These are by no means characteristic only of the unsuccessful; what made the good performers successful was their ability to adapt.

First, a PCV volunteers for a variety of reasons, but whatever the reason, it is not a paycheck at the end of the month. What he is

seeking may or may not be possible to achieve, and he usually has to

redefine what he wants according to the realities or be disappointed. A

disappointed PCV is the worst person to depend on to do a job. He is al¬

most entirely emotionally involved and reacts strongly to deviations from

preconceived notions about what he is supposed to be doing and what the

possibilities are for doing it. More professional types are inured by

experience and are less dependent on success for satisfaction.

Second, the PCV--unless he is a teacher or some other worker

for the long pull--is a man in a hurry. By design he has only about 18

to 20 months overseas in which to do something significant. Unfortunately,

the places and projects served by the volunteer generally do not provide VIII-24

the opportunity for fast starts or continuous achievement. But unless

the new PCV can be plunged into his activity in a very few days and kept

reasonably satisfied that he is accomplishing something, he becomes

quickly disaffected and volunteer rot sets in.

Third, the PCV is generally looking for new experiences with

people5 and except in English-speaking countries, his lack of language

ability frustrates communications. This is especially so in rural Guinea where even rudimentary French is not spoken by large numbers of people.

Thus, projects such as this one, which had need of volunteers in remote locations, can be particularly bad for a PCV not willing or able to accept isolation.

Fourth, the PCV needs to be near the top of whatever it is he is doing. This is a corollary of the need to do something significant. If he can teach school, he is at the head of the classroom. If he is a mech¬ anic or a carpenter in a small project, he looms bigger in the scheme of things than if he is one of a group of many working at the same place.

He is essentially individualistic and does not want to get lost in the shuffle.

Unfortunately, the palm oil project could not provide enough of what most of the assigned PCV1 s were seeking. Project aims became their expectations. Project work plans became their schedules. The need for working together frustrated their individuality, and the isolation

I of the plant locations made several very unhappy. The most successful VIII-25

were the specialists who got the kind of work they knew. Among the

generalists only those who took the long view succeeded.

There were also administrative problems brought about by

PCV affiliation with AID projects. USAID, while depending on the PCV to work seriously, has no authority over him. His boss, big brother,

and benefactor is the Peace Corps representative who is understandably

more sympathetic to the PCV than to the needs of USAID. Once a PCV

is assigned to a project, which takes approval of the GOG^ he is diffi¬

cult to remove short of force majeur despite unsuitable performance.

Very often it is a case of not having any alternative. It is either PCV

"X" or no one. Where and persuasion appeals do not work, USAID is out

of luck.

Despite the disappointing experience with most of the PCV's, ï

those who worked well made considerable contributions to the project.

Indeed, once we had decided to expand on the assurance that PCV's would be available, we could not have operated the project without them. Proj¬ ect administration, project maintenance, and operations in the Wonkifong section were uniquely dependent on the work of the PCV's. APPENDIX A

THE SOCIAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN GUINEA A-l

APPENDIX A

THE SOCIAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, AND POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN GUINEA

For a better understanding of the methods used for fruit supply and the difficulties encountered, the social, administrative, and politi¬ cal framework of Guinea in the agricultural sector is described below.

The elementary social unit is the family. Polygamy is practised; each man has, on the average, two wives and from three to six children,

ï Although the land belongs in principle to the nation, every chief of family owns a concession of cultivated land and a portion of wild palm grove or forest around the village which he farms and exploits. This concession is hereditary. All inhabitants from 14 years of age up, except for women having more than four children, are liable for an individual yearly tax.

The local committees are in charge of collecting the tax, all of which is paid to the regional government. Villagers are frequently called on for forced labor for maintenance of roads, construction of schools and dis¬ pensaries, and cultivation of manioc and rice for the committee's benefit.

In this kind of work, lack of planning and bad supervision result in a waste of time and effort.

The Muslim religion is practised in lower Guinea, and in every important village there is a mosque where education in the Marabout language (that is, the Soussou language written in Arabic letters) is taught to a few boys. In the bush villages, the adult population is illiterate. A-2

Except for the school teacher, it is hard to find anyone able to speak

French. Usually several persons are able to write in Marabout, but they can rarely do simple arithmetic. The new generation, however, attends school, and everywhere children are learning to speak and write

French and do arithmetic.

On the administrative side, villages and hamlets in a determined area form a committee, the so-called comité de base. Committees in a determined area belong to a district or arrondissement, and the dis¬ tricts of a geographic area form an administrative region.

The committee is directed by a popularly elected committee

bureau made up of a president (one or more), a number of vice-presi¬

dents, and several members in charge of enforcing the committee bureau's

decisions on political, administrative, and economic matters. There is

also a member responsible for the political party organization, and re¬

presentatives for youth and women's organizations. The committee

functions are both administrative and political. Thus, the committee is

at the same time the basic unit of the administrative framework of the

government and of the Guinean Democratic Party (there is a one-party

system), and its president is both the mayor of the village and the politi¬

cal chief.

The arrondissement or district administration is headed by a

commandant appointed by the national administration and responsible to

the regional governor. A-3

The regional administration is headed by a governor appointed by the President of the Republic of Guinea to whom he is directly re¬ sponsible. Also, four inspectors are appointed for each geographic

region to supervise and coordinate the governor's activities. They hold the rank and title of minister.

The territorial jurisdiction and the number of committees are

frequently modified by the governors or by the central government. For

example, the Wonkifong section of the Coyah district had 54 committees

in 1964, which were reduced to 12 in 1965, and increased to 25 in 1966.

The political framework is also based on the committees: thus

the committees are grouped in a political section, and the sections in

turn are grouped in a regional federation. The political section juris¬

diction is generally smaller than the administrative district, that is,

several political sections are set up in one district.

The political section is directed by a political bureau, elected

by the committee presidents, and composed of a secretary-general,

political organization secretaries, and several members who supervise

production and the political movements of youth and women.

The regional federation is also directed by a political bureau

elected by the section secretaries-general, and composed of the same

members as the section political bureau. The regional federation is

ï responsible to the National Political Bureau of the Guinean Democratic A-4

Party, part of whose membership is elected by the regional federation secretaries and part appointed.

Political, administrative, and economic decisions are made by the National Political Bureau whose head is the President of the Repub¬ lic of Guinea. Decisions are passed on to the lower echelons of the organization to be explained to the population and carried out.

In a nutshell, the administrative and political structures are parallel at the higher and lower levels, although differentiated in the middle grades. Thus the President of the Republic is both head of the

government and chief of the P. D. G„ , and the committee president is both mayor and head of the political party. All political bureau mem¬ bers --committee, section, and federal--are elected by open ballot.

The committee's political bureau is elected by popular vote. Electors stand back of the candidates they have chosen. Election of political bureaus takes place every year in April, and all members are eligible for re-election.

Regional governors and district commandants are civil servants

and are frequently transferred to other posts. The governor has broad authority and autonomy. He is responsible for law and order and for social and economic growth in the region. He has at his disposal a police force, a public works section, and an agricultural production office. He A-5

administers the regional budget which is intended to be self support¬ ing.

The federal political secretary is responsible for the political

climate and party organization in the region. All administrative decisions

must be previously submitted to him for discussion and approval.

The authority of the committee president and the political secret¬

ary derives for the most part from their personal prestige and social

position. All local political officials are unpaid. Generally speaking,

committee and political section decisions are followed by the population

if self interest is not much of a consideration and no hard statute labor

is requested.

Contact between the levels of the administrative and political

pyramids is slow and difficult. All regional towns are connected by tele¬

graph and telephone to Conakry, almost all district towns are connected

to the regional capital by telephone, and the political sections in the towns

have direct contact with the political federation. The governors and a few

commandants have service cars to use. The regions have a number of

trucks for the maintenance of roads and the transportation of food crops.

Section leaders have to find their own transportation to get in touch with

the committees and vice versa. The road and trail network is generally

in bad condition and becomes partly impassable during the rainy season. A-6

An understanding of the Ministry of Rural Economy and Handicraft

(MER) also requires some explanation. The Ministry headquarters in

Conakry includes three departments concerned with agriculture, husbandry, and forestry. There are special sections for handicrafts, secretarial work, and accounting. Within the agricultural department there is an office for the cooperative movement which includes only collective farm¬ ing cooperatives.

In the regions, agricultural service is provided by a regional production department which is supervised by a production director ap¬ pointed by the Ministry. He has a high school education in agriculture.

The production director is supervised directly by the regional governor.

The budget for agriculture is established by the regional governor who is responsible for reaching the quota for food crops estimated for each region by the central government. The regions inherited the specialized demonstration stations and their equipment and vehicles which belonged to the colonial Ministry of Agriculture. The regional production directors have very little contact with the producers, and little extension work exists.

Extension people have limited transportation facilities: in the region of our operations there was only one tractor available for several oil palm plantations.

The Ministry of Rural Economy has also indirect supervision of state enterprises for marketing agricultural products --OFFIBANANE A-7

and OBETAIL, and for supplying agricultural machinery--AGRIMA.

Several attempts to set up government farms, such as Enterprises

/ Regionales d' Agriculture (ERA), Centres de Modernisations Agricole

(CMR), or cooperatives for collective farming, have all failed. Distribu¬ tion of agricultural commodities, such as machinery, fertilizers, and insecticides, and the collecting and marketing of food crops are organized by the region using private tradesmen under regional control and regional warehouses connected with state marketing enterprises, such as

OFFIBANANE, GUINEAPORT, PRODEX, and ALIMAG. APPENDIX B

THE COOPERATIVE OPERATION B-l

APPENDIX B

THE COOPERATIVE OPERATION

The use of permanent agents for collection operations at the

plants seemed to produce favorable results since from the time of their

employment, deliveries in their respective sections rapidly increased.

Thus, in the Dubreka section, on April 10, 1964, when the agent began

his work, deliveries were down to 2,323 kgs. of bunches per week. The

following week they rose to 9, 995 kgs. and increased regularly during

the month of May. In the Wonkifong section, on May 6 when the agent

was hired, deliveries were only 1, 862 kgs. of bunches per week. The

following week they rose to 7, 411 kgs. and increased during the rest of

the month. On the contrary, in the Sanouyah-Maniah section where no

agent was hired, deliveries were about 4, 000 kgs. of bunches per week

during the month of March. They diminished progressively during the

month of April and stopped completely in May. This decline was also

influenced by industrial work undertaken in the territory.

During village meetings called by the agents and local political

officials, the producers were most receptive to the idea that they join

cooperatives which would handle the collection, delivery, and payment

of fruit. They wanted above all to procure commodities to exchange

against their fruit, particularly commodities of first necessity because

they could not purchase them with money. Thus, the money they earned by delivering fruit lost all practical value. Furthermore, palm oil was more and more sought by consumers who were willing to pay as much as

250 GF/lt. or to pay for it with merchandise. B-2

The producers also wanted the cooperatives to procure a mobile nut

cracker, to market their palm kernels without the intermediary of the traders, and to manage the plants collectively and share the profits.

On their side, the political officials of the section and the region stated that this kind of cooperative would be very useful for the develop - ment of other activities, such as the improvement of natural palm groves, the maintenance of trails and access roads to the groves and the plant, and the planting of small selected palm groves around the villages,

Laure and functionaries of MER studied the type of constitution which could be used for this kind of cooperative, taking into account the laws regulating the formation, management, and control of cooperatives in Guinea. On May 24 Laure met with the Director of Price Control

Services of the Ministry of Commerce to tailor the new cooperatives to that Ministry's requirements for eligibility to obtain commodities. On

June 3 he obtained MER's agreement, and on June 15 he submitted a draft constitution and by-laws to the Minister. This constitution was discussed with the political and administrative officials of the regions, districts, and sections in the course of meetings from June 10 to 26, when the program for the formation of cooperatives was drawn up.

On June 17, 1964, after a five-hour meeting, the first palm fruit cooperative was organized in the village of Massombombo in the Dubreka section. Between July and August, seven other cooperatives were

ï B-3

organized in this same territory. From June 30 to July 10, five coop¬

eratives were organized in the Wonkifong section.

As soon as the cooperatives were formed, they sent their docu¬

ments to MER for official approval, which was received in the months of

July and August by 12 of the 13. The last cooperative, that of the

village of Gbantama organized on August 18, did not receive approval

because of an unexplained lack of interest on the part of the officials

of the Ministry. i

According to the requirements of Guinean cooperative law, each

member must contribute 1, 000 GF to the capital of the cooperative which

must be deposited in a bank account. The members of the cooperatives

decided that they would pay their share of capital by delivering fruit to the cooperative at the mill purchase price. Unfortunately, the harvesting season was approaching its end and several members could not deliver enough fruit to cover their share. Nevertheless, during July and August, nine of the 13 cooperatives deposited their quota at the Banque du Credit

National of Dubreka and the other four deposited it at the beginning of the processing season in 1965.

Thus, in a period of two months, 12 cooperatives had completed their administrative arrangements and were prepared to begin activities in 1965.

The principles adopted to establish the cooperative promotion ï program were as follows: B-4

Two zones of palm groves capable of supplying a minimum of three tons per day would be chosen. In these two zones the project would construct a pressing mill a little smaller than the Kagbele pilot plant.

These zones should be as close together as possible to reduce the cost of the transportation of fruit and to con¬ centrate organization and assistance efforts.

Given the weak cooperative spirit existing among the pop¬

ulation, the intervillage rivalries, and the difficulty of

transportation from one village to another, it was believed

desirable to create small village cooperatives rather than

to assemble in one organization the harvesters of several

neighboring villages. While this method would increase

quantitatively the work of promotion and technical assis¬

tance, it would be more educational and easier to handle.

Furthermore, it would create a contest between villages

in the delivery of fruit.

The base cooperatives could gradually unite in a cooper¬

ative association, also organized along cooperative princi¬

ples. This greater organism would be able to manage the

plant and market the oil and palm kernels produced by the

member co-ops more efficiently. It could also procure

commodities for trading against fruit more easily. B-5

& Members of the co-ops were to be producers of palm

fruit, that is, those who could deliver a minimum quantity

of fruit with regularity. No other type of agricultural or

commercial producers would participate.

e The president and other officers of the co-op should not

be identified with the political or administrative leaders

of the village. This was to underline the independence of

the co-op and its exclusively economic function. At all

times liaison would be possible and desirable between the

co-op and the village committee. Liaison could be accom¬

plished by having the committee president participate in

co-op activities as a voting member of the board of auditors.

He would attend the meetings of the board of directors, and

while he would not have the right to vote, he would be able

to see that the board did not exceed its authority. More¬

over, the frequent changes in the ranks of village political

officers, the dis s entions, and the rivalries would have

negative repercussions on the co-ops if these same political

officers also administered them.

In the territory of Cabital each of the eight co-ops formed included the producers of a single village and its hamlets, at that time a distinct committee. Thus each cooperative operated in one committee. B-6

In the territory of Wonkifong certain large villages included two or three committees. For example, Kiriah was divided into five com¬

mittees. Other villages were close together but belonged to different

committees. In this case, it was decided to create cooperatives which would group the producers of more than a single committee. Thus the

cooperative of Sinkirin grouped the producers of the committees of

Kiriah I and II. These included 13 hamlets. The cooperatives of Pampallo

and Barkonyah comprised two committees and several hamlets each.

The diversification in the formation of the cooperatives in these

two territories was for the purpose of experimenting with the operation

of the two systems.

Although the cooperatives were established late in the pro¬

cessing season, their effect on deliveries was immediate. After a down¬

turn in the month of June, deliveries spurted in the month of July despite

the rains and exceeded those of June. They declined rapidly in the month

of August because of the heavy rains and the impassability of the roads

and trails.

In the beginning of July, the producers received a price of 18 GF/kg.

of detached fruit without the return of nuts because it was difficult and

costly to transport and distribute the nuts in the rain, and they had no way

to dry them to prevent spoilage. Later in July, the project decided to

encourage deliveries during the rainy season by raising the purchase B-7

price of fruit 2 GF/kg. to compensate for the difficulty of harvesting.

The producers, in turn, agreed to leave this small increase with the co-ops to increase their capital.

An attempt to use the co-ops to extend credit to producers was launched in mid-September, 1964, when the officers of the Cabitail co-ops ï asked the project to furnish them 1, 000 GF per member to permit them to pay their regional taxes. They assured us that the benefactors of the credit would continue to deliver at least one ton of fruit per week until the debt had been discharged. On September 21, 1964, the sum of

10,000 GF was advanced to the Massambombo and Kalikoure I cooper¬ atives. The political authorities and the Inspector General of Agriculture, however, declared themselves hostile to this form of agricultural credit, and thé co-ops did not deliver the fruit in the agreed quantities to repay their debt. Consequently, this activity was abandoned after recuperation of the sums advanced.

Unfortunately, the work program we proposed to construct four pressing centers--two in the Dubreka region in the Cabitail and Wonkifong sections, and one each in the Boffa and Boke regions--was rejected by the

Minister of MER on January 11, 1965, despite his acceptance of the principle on October 10, 1964. The Minister insisted that plants be constructed only in the Boffa and Boke regions near the existing selected palm plantations, where, according to him, the plants could be more easily supplied with the required fruit. B-8

We this replied that would mean the loss of the experience ac¬ quired during 1963 and 1964 and the abandonment of the co-ops already-

formed which had received the formal approval of the Ministry. It would

also alienate the population of those areas who had manifested their con¬

fidence in the GOG. Finally, on February 28, the minister agreed to a

compromise: one plant was to be constructed at Boffa and one at Boke

and a third in the territory of Wonkifong where cooperative activity could be continued. The Cabitail group of co-ops was abandoned.

But when the Minister held a meeting of producers and political

officers of the Wonkifong section on April 7 at Kanderiah, he announced

that the committees would be responsible for the supply of the plant, not

the co-ops. The explanation later privately given by the Minister for

this change in was that since policy the committee was a unit of the ad¬

ministrative and political organization, the governor and federal secretary

could more easily put pressure on it than on the cooperative in order to

assure deliveries. Therefore, official approval for the five co-ops of

the Wonkifong section was withdrawn, and they did not function as col¬

lection agencies during the 1965 processing season.

In the course of the following months, deliveries to Kanderiah

were below estimates, but no serious pressure was exercised on the

committees by either the Governor of the region or the Federal Political

Secretary, even though they had been regularly informed of the meager deliveries. B-9

In the Boffa and Boke regions the Governors declared themselves

flatly against the organization of producer co-ops and strongly affirmed

that the regional political and administrative organization through the

village committees would suffice to assure the supply of the plants. Thus,

no co-op activity was considered in these two regions.

In September and October of 1965, meetings were held between

USAID and MER to draw conclusions from the unsatisfactory 1965 pro¬

cessing season. The Project Manager, Ohiami Hillaire, and the

Inspector General of Agriculture, Diallo Cellou, admitted that the sup¬

ply of the plants could not increase if it were not based on an organization

of producer cooperatives. Moreover, they proposed to establish a co¬

operative organization first and to resolve later other problems, such

as the selling price of oil, exchange of commodities against fruit, and

management of plants, which would then be functions of this organization.

Following the statements of Diallo Cellou, the Minister of Rural Economy,

Barry Sory, accepted this thesis.

During the month of November an organization plan was minutely studied. It was decided to establish cooperatives in the zones adjacent to the three plants already operating. These base co-ops around each plant would unite in an association which would control the management of the plant, distribute the eventual profits to the producers, and finally take over ownership of the plant by paying the amortization. B-10

At the time this program was submitted for the Minister's final approval, shifts within the cabinet brought about the assignment on

November 20, 1965, of Fodeba Keita as Minister of MER, replacing

Barry Sory. All discussion was then suspended until the ideas and attitudes of the new Minister were known.

On December 2 2, 1965, a first meeting was held between the

Minister, the Director of USAID, and the project specialists. On Decem¬ ber 29 a more thorough discussion took place. We proposed a program of measures to be taken to assure the supply of the plants. These measures were linked to one another, and for a successful result, had to be applied together. (See Section V-A, pp. V-21 and 22. )

The Director of USAID stated that AID would wait until June 20,

1966, to examine the operating results of the plants and their profitability in order to decide if U. S. support of the project should be continued or abandoned.

The Minister accepted in principle the idea of an organization of producer co-ops, but rejected the proposition that basic consumer com¬ modities be supplied to encourage fruit deliveries. Decision on the other measures suggested was reserved until the governors of the regions could be informed and their ideas received.

We repeated that the partial adoption of the proposed measures could not assure success. For example, an increase in the purchase B-ll

price of fruit could not resolve the problem of using the money earned by the producers if they could buy nothing with it. For the increase in price to be effective, it would also be necessary to supply products for them to exchange. In taking away from the co-ops the basic activity of the exchange of products against fruit, the co-ops would have no ad¬ vantage to offer their members and no immediate purpose to interest them. Moreover, we stated that the Minister's position left small probability that the plants would be supplied and, consequently, faint hope that the project could continue with AID assistance beyond the term fixed.

In this case, the support which the newly created co-ops would need for survival would not be forthcoming. Thus the co-ops risked a new abandon¬ ment like that of the co-ops created in Cabitail and Wonkifong in 1964. The formation^ co-ops, then, was useless if not injurious.

For this reason we suggested that the kind of co-op program previously undertaken be abandoned and that efforts be limited to the organ¬ ization of a form of pre-cooperative. This involved getting the producers' representatives to participate in the management of the plants to the end that they would be able to report its difficulties, costs, and revenues, and assist in the distribution to producers of the operating profits at the end of the season.

At the December 29 meeting, the Inspector General of Agriculture,

Diallo Cellou, also advanced a proposal to form a large cooperative for B-12

each plant, following the principle of returning to the producers the oil obtained less a portion which would be retained to pay the costs of extraction and transportation. The producers would be free to sell or barter their oil. We accepted this idea of an organization which might be able to resolve the problems of the purchase price of fruit, the selling price of oil, and the exchange of products. If accepted by the Minister, such an organization plan for the creation of a co-op system could ac¬ quire a new interest. The Minister's decision on the subject of this new proposal was long in coming, while the processing season advanced rapidly, and a collection organization had to be prepared.

In the meantime, the Minister decided to send Tolno Faya, the interim Project Manager, and Laure to meet with the Governors of

Dubreka, Boffa, and Boke to bring them up to date on the decisions made during the meeting of December 29 and on those which still had to be made, and to ask their ideas. These visits took place from January 21 to 29,

1966. The Governors were surprised at the Minister's refusal to supply the producers with commodities to exchange against fruit, and gave assurances that they were going to insist on an effort to revise this decis ion.

This tour gave Laure the opportunity, thanks to contacts with the population and the officials attached to the regional production offices, to learn the real causes of the meager supply of fruit to the Yogoya and B-13

Bentimodiah plants, which had never been reported to the project by the

Guinean managers of the plants. (See last paragraph, p. VII-32).

On February 5, 1966, the Minister summoned the Governors of

Dubreka, Boffa, and Boke and the Project Manager to discuss in a closed meeting the problems of harvesting and supply. The following day he ï invited the Director/USAID and the project specialists to a meeting to notify them of the decisions made which cancelled all those that had been agreed upon up to that time. In brief, the Minister stated:

plants was to be left to the Governors who

would use the existing political and adminis¬

trative structure.

with this problem unless our advice was

specifically requested.

contact with the producers but must confine

our work to the plants.

Thus, no producer co-op organization would be established for the 1966 season, and the supply would again be entrusted to the political organisms, that is, to the base committees, despite the failure of this same system in the years 1964 and 1965. B-14

Moreover, Laure who had not been able to follow delivery oper¬ ations and had not had, as a consequence, any direct information on supply, was to content himself with the eventual reports of the Project

Manager. These reports were always incomplete and often falsified for political reasons or by fear of exposing the lack of responsibility of his i superiors or of his colleagues. Thus, his judgment or advice would always be of doubtful value.

Ehren the PCV's were no longer authorized to assist with the col¬ lection of fruit and were to remain at the plants to assist with manage¬ ment, collection of statistics, and bookkeeping.

APPENDIX C

THE EXCHANGE OF COMMODITIES FOR FRUIT

Since the beginning of fruit and bunch collection, the producers

had asked us to arrange for them to barter fruit against a number of

commodities which were seldom available in the village markets. Bar¬

ter was traditional in Guinea and since 1963 had been officially accepted

by the government as a means to prevent a slump in delivery of palm

kernels, rice, and peanuts to the state marketing enterprises. Never¬

theless, the Project Manager, Sekou Soumah, and the Minister of MER,

Barry Sory, refused to agree to the barter of palm fruit, alleging that

they did not want to create an official precedent.

In the 1964 campaign, the producers had mainly asked to barter

fruit for rice because the 1963 rice crop was meagre and all reserves

had been used up before the new harvest. Instead of providing rice for

barter, the government countered that producers should grow enough rice to cover at least their personal consumption and should not expect to be helped with imported rice.

Nevertheless, to test the effectiveness of barter action, Laure bought on his own a few sacks of rice, which was freely sold in Conakry, and from the last of May to the first of June, issued it to the producers in the Kalekoure II villages of the Cabitail area. A few kilograms of rice per head was exchanged according to the amount of fruit delivered. C-2

As the results seemed encouraging, Laure and the Plant Manager,

Ohiami Hilaire, decided to test some villages in the Wonkifong area.

Other commodities freely sold in Conakry, such as textiles and pots and pans, were purchased at retail prices and sold to producers with a 10 to 15 percent increase to cover transportation and distribution ex¬ penses. This was to accustom them to paying these expenses when they would handle the purchases by themselves without government support. ï

The distribution of a few commodities and the hope of getting more also facilitated the promotion of cooperatives which were supposed to take care of this activity.

The combined effect of the cooperatives and of commodity incen¬ tives led the producers to deliver more fruit in July than in June, although heavy rains in July made climbing, cutting, and transporting the fruit

more difficult and dangerous. The best example of the effect is shown by

Massombombo village where deliveries of fruit increased quickly after

rice was distributed, and the cooperative was organized.

I C-3

DELIVERY OF LOOSE FRUIT FROM MOSSQMBOMBO 1964 (In Kilograms)

Weeks Total

MARCH 23 500 31 170 670

APRIL 6 41 13 545 20 121 27 276 983

MAY 4 890 11 279 19 364 25 514 2,047

JUNE 2 204 8 177 15 275 22 593 29 676 1,925

JULY 6 962 13 480 20 566 2, 008

Unfortunately the barter experience began just as the collecting season was nearing an end, and by the last of July the exchange of com¬ modities ceased. We hoped to start it again earlier the next season.

In 1965 after the Ministry's decision not to allow the construction of a plant in the Cabitail area and to move the Kagbele press to Kanderiah in the Wonkifong area, the Cabitail cooperatives ceased to function. We C-4

insisted, however, that some commodities be sent to the new plant in

Kanderiah to continue the experience initiated the previous year.

Fruit deliveries to the Kanderiah plant started on May 10, 1965, as

soon as the was construction completed. We reminded the Minister that he

had announced at the meetings held in Kanderiah, Yogoya, and Bentimodiah

that commodities would be given to the producers in exchange for fruit.

But it was not until May 28, 1965, when the plant had accumulated 20

drums of oil for exchange, that the Minister agreed to ask the Minister

of Commerce for commodities.

The reason for this delay was unknown and seemed surprising,

as the previous year the project had delivered 30 drums of oil to ALIMAG, without getting the requested commodities from the Minister of Commerce.

Meanwhile, at the request of the committees at Lebemere and

Bolonta where cooperatives were also located, on May 15 we purchased five bicycles and a number of basins. According to a decision by the political section bureau, four bicycles were delivered to Lebemere and one to Bolonta. Delivery was made in the presence of the section secret¬ ary and entrusted to the respective committees and cooperative presidents.

The leaders were instructed not to deliver the bicycles to the producers until they had paid the full price. The payment period was set at five weeks, purposely taxing the producers to find out how much they could deliver when they wanted to. Because of the difficulty of gathering fruit

' .fAA'A \;A '; C-5

at the latter part of the season, it took eight weeks for them to pay the full amount, but the deliveries of this small group of producers were far greater than any others.

On June 3, 1965, the Project Manager and Laure asked the

Dubreka Governor for various commodities from the region stocks.

They wanted to make at least a token exchange against fruit before the end of the season as a show of good faith. The Governor claimed he had no commodities left and gave them a letter of introduction to the

Manager of SONATEX, a state enterprise for textile distribution. The manager referred them to the Director General of Internal Commerce of the Ministry of Commerce who finally authorized the purchase of five bolts of cloth at retail prices.

Distribution of the cloth was discussed on June 9 by the political section bureau which decided to divide it among the five committees which had delivered the most fruit since the beginning of the campaign.

The selling price was set at the retail price plus ten percent for trans¬

portation and distribution expenses.

Unfortunately, the same cloth was also distributed in the area by

a banana producer cooperative which bought it wholesale and could there¬

fore sell it at a lower price. This fact had a negative effect on the palm

fruit producers because they thought the project was overloading prices. C-6

It was not until June 18 that the Minister of MER sent a letter to the Minister of Commerce announcing the availability of 20 drums of

oil and asking to exchange them for commodities at wholesale to a total

amount of 50 percent of the value of the oil at the official price of 175

GF/lt. The remainder was to be paid in cash. The commodities became

available by the end of June and beginning of July but only after numerous

negotiations with the Ministry of Commerce, various state enterprises,

and banks. By then there were only three weeks remaining of the season.

In short, during the 1965 season the project could have disposed

of a large amount of commodities in exchange for fruit, but the items

were delivered too late and, again, the experiment did not last long

enough to show its effect. Commodities worth a total of 654, 361 GF

were purchased at wholesale prices but because of the late season rains

only 137, 290 GF's worth could be exchanged in the Kanderiah plant area.

At the beginning of the 1966 season on December 29, 1965, the

newly appointed Minister of Rural Economy, Fodeba Keita, decided that

the exchange of commodities against fruits would no longer be considered

as a means of improving fruit deliveries to the plants. The Governors of

the Dubreka, Boffa and Boke regions, in a meeting with the Minister on

February 5, 1966, were not able to change his mind on the subject, although

they had stated during meetings in January, 1966, with project personnel

that they believed the exchange of commodities was essential to the success

of fruit delivery. C-7

On February 7, 1966, we met with the Minister, and from that time on we were relieved of all responsibility for the collection organization. While we were instructed by the Minister to act as technical advisors to the Project Manager, the latter never asked for advice and our previous suggestions were no longer considered. No exchange of commodities was undertaken during the 1966 season.

The undistributed commodities were stocked in the project ware-1 house in Conakry. An inventory of all items was given to Tolno Faya, acting Project Manager, in a memorandum prepared by Laure dated

March 15, 1966. Several times thereafter we suggested that the

Project Manager inform the Minister about the availability of these goods but nothing came of it. APPENDIX D

FINANCIAL EXHIBITS OF AVERAGE PLANT REQUIREMENTS

Plant Operating Statement ...... D-3 Plant Operating Budget for Five-Month Season...... » D-4 Average Plant Investment ...... D-5 Import Component of Plant Investment. D-8 D-l

AVERAGE PLANT REQUIREMENTS

The figures given here derive from project operations during the first half of 1965, the most recent experience in construction and oper¬ ations over which we had control. The money figures reflect Guinean conditions at the time and cannot be translated at the offcial rate to other currencies or other locales without distortion. For this reason, we have given the unit amounts of the various elements used so that they can be priced according to local conditions.

In the case of labor, the quantities employed are a function of productivity. The amounts shown here should be used elsewhere only as an indication to be tempered by local judgment.

The cost of project administration and technical assistance are excluded because they were excessive under the peculiar conditions of project operations in Guinea. Also, the unit cost of these items depend

on the number of plants to be built under a new project.

The cost of training and organizing a fruit collection system does

not appear because it would depend on the kind of organization adopted for

this purpose. Training in plant operations is simple and easily accomplished

on the job during the first few days of processing.

The plant operating statement and operating budget are based on a

production level of 1, 000 kg. of loose fruit per single shift day for a period

of five months. This is only 50 percent of plant capacity, but our experience

indicates that it would be imprudent to expect a greater fruit supply under D-2

existing Guinean conditions. In fact, the assumed level of production implies an improvement in fruit deliveries of about cne-third. As Guinean conditions improve and the fruit supply increases, additional plant labor will be required, but theplantwill operate much more efficiently and unit costs will go down.

The exhibit of average plant investment shows the requirements of the Guinean plants in their present rudimentary state. They are merely

steel sheds with paved floors to provide cover from sun and rain and a

clean, hard, working surface. They lack water systems, offices, storage

rooms, and space to accommodate the nut separation part of the process.

However, they are adequate for the present level of production and for

the pilot phase of a new project. The exhibit also shows the requirements

of the expansions that had been planned for the Guinean project to com¬

plete the plants and bring them to a state of maximum efficiency for full

scale production. D-3

PLANT OPERATING STATEMENT

REVENUE:

Oil Sales to ALIMAG GF 2, 564, 100

Nut Sales to MICROS - 399, 600

TOTAL REVENUE GF 2, 973, 700

DIRECT EXPENSE:

Personnel 734, 000 Fruit 1, 665, 000 Transportation 200, 000 Miscellaneous 15, 000

TOTAL DIRECT EXPENSE 2, 614, 000

GROSS MARGIN GF 359j 700

Less Amortization @ 10% of Investment 299, 570

NET CONTRIBUTION TO OVERHEAD AND MAINTENANCE GF 60, 130

Notes: T7 The Minister of Rural Economy ordered the project to sell its oil to ALIMAG at 175 GF/ liter delivered. ALIMAG resold the oil for 225 GF/ liter without changing it in any way. The 50 GF/liter resale markup compensated ALIMAG for nothing more than making out an invoice. ALIMAG performed no service for either the project or the buyer. The project, without additional effort or expense, could have sold to the buyer in exactly the same manner as ALIMAG at the same price. Thus, the project was in effect subsidizing ALIMAG, and the poor result shown in this statement is the consequence. If direct sales to buyers were permitted, the revenue from oil sales would be GF 3, 296, 700 and the net contribution to overhead and maintenance would be GF 787, 700.

2/ The practice in Guinea, and the assumption here, is that plants sell the nuts either to a central kernel recovery plant or to the MICROS unit, which includes a kernel recovery section, where this part of the process can be done with greater efficiency. Kernel recovery costs are presented in the supplement to this report dealing with the MICROS unit. D-4

PLANT OPERATING BUDGET FOR FIVE-MONTH SEASON Basis: 1000 kg/day of loose fruit, one shift

DIRECT EXPENSES

Personnel

140,000 Plant manager 1 for 7 mo. @ 20, 000 GF GF 66, 000 Foreman-clarifie

GF 734,000

Fruit Purchases

5 mo. = 153 days - 22 wks. 22 wks. x 5. 5 days = 121 work days 121 work days - 10 holidays, etc. = = 111 collection days

111 days x 1000 kg of fruit x 15 GF/kg =

Transportation

10, 000 km x 20 GF/km running cost = 200, 000

Miscellaneous

5 mo. x GF 3, 000/mo. = 15' 000

TOTAL DIRECT EXPENSE = GF 2, 614, 000

REVENUE

Palm Oil Produced = 12% of 111 MT of fruit = 13, 320 kg = 14, 652 liters Palm Nuts " = 60% of 111 MT of fruit = 66,600kg

Oil Revenue = 14, 652It x 175 GF/It = GF2,564,100

Nut Revenue = 66, 600 kg x 6 GF/kg = 399' 600

TOTAL REVENUE = GF 2, 973, 700 D-5

AVERAGE PLANT INVESTMENT a) Plant Construction

Clearing and levelling site 10 m-d GF 2, 700 Laying out foundation lines 2 m-d 540 Digging foundation holes 8 m-d. 2, 200 Pouring foundations 5 m-d 1—1 o O Concrete for foundations: cement 6 sacks 3, 600 gravel 0. 8 eu. M 1, 600 sand 0. 4 cu. M 1, 600 Steel shed fabrication and erection 531,000 Forms for paving 88 sq. M: lumber 0. 3 cu. M 12,300 lumber dressing 2, 500 nails 3 kg 800 labor 6 m-d 2, 100 Paving 88 sq. M: cement 44 sacks 26,400 gravel 6. 3 cu. M 12, 500 sand 3. 2 cu. M 12,500 labor 76 m-d 23,800 Transportation of materials 3RT x 300 miles 54,000

Construction cost of rudimentary Guinean plants GF 691,540

Additional construction planned:

Pipe frame roof extension: pipe - 2" 60 M 120, 000 corrugated roofing 22 sheets 13,200 hook bolts for roofing 64 6, 400 concrete for pipe footings 1, 000 Paving 52 sq. M: cement 26 sacks 15,600 gravel 3. 7 cu. M 7, 500 sand 1. 8 cu. M 7, 500 labor 44 m-d 14, 000 Curtain walls 134 sq. M: concrete block 1, 600 80,000 cement 43 sacks 25,800 sand 4 cu. M 16,000 labor GF 200/ sq. M 26, 800 Water tank and distribution: drums 6 12,000 ï " 12 M pipe - 1 18, 000 fittings and valves 16,000 tank support 20, 000 labor 10 m-d 4, 000 Water supply: pump -- see equipment pumphouse 20,000 pipe - 1-1/2" and fittings 150 M 300,000 pipe supports: cement 6 sacks 3, 600 gravel 0. 7 eu. M 1, 400 sand 0. 5 cu. M 2, 000 angle iron 25 M 5, 000 U-bolts 55 5, 500 labor 50 m-d 17,000 Transportation of materials 4RT x 300 miles 72,000

Construction cost of plant extension, walls, office, and water system GF 828,700

Total construction cost of extended plant with walls, office and water system GF 1, 520,240

Plant Equipment

For fruit collection and processing: 1 / 20) Trade scale - 50 kg capacity 1 y ($ Fruit drums 2 GF 15,000 Hand truck 1 ($ 100) Fruit boilers 4 80,000 Mortars 3 4, 500 Wood pestles 10 3, 000 Press 1 ($ 1,100) Pails 3 3, 000 Clarifier 1 30,000 Cil storage drums 16 32,000 Funnel 1 1, 000 Platform scale 1 145, 000 Wheelbarrow 1 10,000 Nutseparator drums 3 4, 500 Fiber separating screens 3 3, 000 Watering cans 2 2, 000 Shovels 3 1, 500 Broom 1 1, 000 Clock 1 2, 500 For office: Desk and chair 1 75, 000 Storage locker 1 10, 000 Adding machine 1 52,000 Safe 1 ($ 100) For truck service: Fuel drums 5 10, 000 Drum pump 1 ($ 50) Jerry cans 2 ($ 10) Water pump iL' 1 ($ 150)

i Total cost of plant equipment exclusive GF 485,000 of kernel recovery equipment —' + $ 2, 530 D-7

For kernel recovery: Nut cracker 1 ($ 500) Wheelbarrow 1 GF 10, 000 Cracked mixture screen 1 15,000 Clay bath separators 2 3, 000 Kernel washing drum 1 2, 000 Nut separating screens 2 2, 000

Cost of kernel recovery equipment GF 32,000 + 500

Total cost of plant equipment including GF 517,000 + kernel recovery 3, 030 c) Transportation 4/

Truck for fruit collection 5/ ($ 5,000)

Total investment in full plant GF 2, 037, 240 and transportation + $ 8, 030 = GF 4, 016, 635 or $ 16,295

Investment in rudimentary Guinean GF 1, 176, 540 plant and transportation + $ 7,380 (no kernel recovery) = GF 2, 995, 710 or $ 12,153

Notes: 1/ Dollar figures, import duty excluded, are shown for those items which were not available on the Guinean market.

2J Water pump was not part of rudimentary Guinean plant.

3/ More economical kernel recovery is possible if there are several small plants in an area by consolidating this operation at one of the plants.

4/ Transportation is needed only five months of the year during the processing season. Unless a truck is needed for plantation and grove maintenance or co op operations for the balance of the year, it will be more économical to have the use of a truck from the government of the region during the season.

5_/ Average cost of truck. Specific type - dump or box, 4-wheel drive or normal, with or without winch - depends on local conditions and the type of fruit, bunch or detached, to be collected.

6/ m-d = man-days. D-8

IMPORT COMPONENT OF PLANT INVESTMENT

The import component of investment is estimated, for Guinea, to be one-half the local cost of miscellaneous imports plus the landed cost of items shown in dollars in the investment schedule. This will vary- between countries depending on the extent of local manufacturing. In Guinea, most items other than raw materials are imported.

Full Plant Guine an Plant

Guinean Franc investment component GF 2, 037, 240 GF 1, 176, 540 Less local labor and raw materials 249,940 153, 740 Less half of locally made items 511,500 405,500

Est. local cost of misc. imports GF 1,275, 800 GF 617,300

Miscellaneous imports: in GF GF 637,900 GF 308,650 in $ $ 2, 588 $ 1,252 Direct imports by project 8, 030 7, 380

Estimated Import Component of Plant Investment $ 10,618 $ 8, 632

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