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Political Killings 4 Wednesday 23rd January, 2008 Politics Continued from Monday wounded about 50 persons includ- By Shamindra Ferdinando ing Gamini Lokuge, Tyronne Fernando and Nanda Mathew. The Those who accuse President attack, the first major incident Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government after the UNP executed JVP leader of complicity in Maheswaran’s Rohana Wijeweera prompted at killing should take a realistic view least a section of the UNP to on political killings. During the believe that some other interested UNP-LTTE honeymoon (May 1989 party would have carried out the to June 1990) the LTTE operated attack. freely.No one wanted to dispute Premadasa whose idiotic handling ‘Tragic but inevitable’ of the negotiations gave a free The JVP could at least shed hand to the LTTE. In the Northern light on mysterious killings by and Eastern Provinces, Premadasa acknowledging the political assas- ordered the army to vacate strate- sinations ordered by the party.It gic camps including Point Pedro would be in the best interests of and Valvettiturai to appease the the country as some faceless LTTE. He also released Manohari Premadasa Dulanjali Lalith Douglas killers or at least their mentors Daniels, an LTTE operative who could be identified. was serving a long prison term for The National Peace Council carrying out a car bomb attack at called Kadirgamar’s assassination Maradana along with over a dozen tragic but inevitable. Would it LTTE cadres. express a similar sentiment on the Political killings: assassination of Maheswaran or Tigers strike in Colomb any other politician allegedly On May 7, 1990 the LTTE killed by the government or any assassinated Batticaloa District party linked to the government EPRLF MP Sam Thambimuttu security forces. The likes of and his wife Kala in Colombo. The National Peace Council wouldn’t UNP did absolutely nothing as do that. LTTE assassin struck at will. Still The recent National Peace the peace caravan continued. Some intriguing Council statement on the assassi- LTTE assassins took the lives nation of Dasanayake was evi- of two more MPs V.Yogasangari dence of its ridiculous thinking and K. Kanagaratnam on June 10 that the government decision to and July 15, 1990 respectively. quit the Oslo-arranged CFA would They were followed by three trigger more violence. Had anyone high profile assassinations which bothered to analyse the LTTE brought the UNP down to its strategy it would be clear that it knees. State Minister for Defence facts would have continued its cam- Ranjan Wijeratne, and President paign of death and destruction Ranasinghe Premadasa died in regardless of the CFA. separate attacks in Colombo. Tigers zero in on Ratwatte Babu and Premadasa’s The recent revelation that for- valet mer SLFP heavyweight Premadasa’s assassin identi- Anuruddha Ratwatte was under fied as Babu had been a close asso- LTTE surveillance highlighted the ciate of P.M. Mohideen, the slain enemy’s mentality. leader’s valet. The assassin had The LTTE is believed to be been with Mohideen for over two targeting former Deputy Minister years and had visited Moneragala, of Defence Anuruddha Ratwatte Kataragama, Kurunegala, who led the Riviresa campaign Pelmadulla, Embilipitiya and which brought the Jaffna peninsu- Ambanpola. He had also been to la under government control in Sucharitha. Although the suicide late 1995-early ’96. cadre who approached the Naval troops, deployed at President on a push cycle had been Ussimukkanthural in Mannar on blocked by police commandos, Wednesday have recovered what a Mohideen had signalled the assas- Nimal Nalanda Susantha Mahinda military official identified as a sin to come. The assassination of satellite image of Ratwatte’s resi- Premadasa guarded by several dence at Aniwatte in Kandy. hundred personnel from the The recovery of the map has Presidential Security Division alerted the government to a possi- (PSD) and the Special Task Force ble threat on the former minister. (STF) highlighted the LTTE capa- bility to change its tactics depend- Call to probe Ashraff ’s ing on the target. Two dozen per- death sons died with Premadasa includ- The recent call by Nazeer ing his chief bodyguard ASP Ahamed, Adviser to President Sarath Mahinda and Chief Mahinda Rajapakse for an inquiry Inspector Upali Silva. into the death of SLMC founder leader M.H.M. Ashraff in Who killed Lalith? September 2000 shouldn’t be Although the PA administra- ignored. The SLMC leader and tion made a ridiculous attempt to another PA candidate contesting link an influential section of the the Digamadulla electorate died UNP with Athulathmudali’s assas- when the SLAF Mi 17 carrying a sination, police investigators had group of civilians crashed onto a Ashraff Lionel Kadiragamar no doubt of the LTTE’s involve- Anuruddha hilltop in Kegalle district. They ment. The then government went were to contest the October 10, to the extent of ‘killing’ a front- the city and its suburbs. sins. Although I couldn’t remem- The assassination of Dr. A gang of JVP men 2000 general elections. page news item in the Daily News ber now, Thangadurai’s assassina- Neelan Tiruchelvam (National ambushed Weerasinghe’s vehicle As highlighted repeatedly we which revealed the LTTE hand in Nimal survives suicide tion fuelled speculation that a List MP) on July 29, 1999, Jaffna as he was on his way home. The have a short memory.Hardly any- the former National Security attack group opposed to the LTTE was District MP A. Nadarajah on MP who got out of the vehicle was one would have remembered the Minister’s assassination. Minister Nimal Siripala was involved. Unfortunately police November 2, 1999, C. V.Gunaratne ordered to raise his hands before LTTE attempt to ambush a minis- But a section of the UNP,too, one of the few politicians to sur- never made a breakthrough. on June 8, 2000, Foreign Minister gunmen shot him. ter or a group of ministers leaving questioned the assassinations of vive a suicide attack. The minister TULF stalwart Thangadurai Lakshman Kadirgamar (National Parliament in March, 2000. Had Athulathmudali and Premadasa. A visiting Jaffna in the aftermath of who publicly acknowledged the List MP) on August 12, 2005, Question mark over the killer squad which took up furious Dulanjali accused of the security forces bringing the entire futility in pursuing four cardinal Batticaloa District MP A. Jayatilleke’s assassination position near the Cotta Road- then government of cleaning the peninsula under their control principles placed at Thimpu name- Chandraneru on May 9, 2005, But the assassinations of Castle Street roundabout escaped scene of the attack at Armour received injuries in the blast trig- ly recognition of Tamils as a dis- Joseph Pararajasingham on Minister Lionel Jayatilleke (late detection, it would have pounced Street. In an interview with this gered by a woman suicide cadre tinct national entity,an identified December 25, 2005 and Nadarajah September 1988) and former on a convoy leaving Parliament. writer, she severely criticised the who came on a push cycle. The Tamil homeland whose integrity Raviraj on November 10, 2006 high- Agalawatte MP Meril government for failing to conduct July 96 blast killed senior police was guaranteed and their inalien- lighted the growing danger parlia- Kariyawasam (late September 89) Thinamirasu editor killed a proper investigation. The recov- and army officials based in Jaffna. able right to self determination, mentarians faced. fuelled speculation of a possible The assassination of EPDP MP ery of a body of youth about 150 was targeted at a school function. Charismatic politician inside job. Although police blamed Arjunarajah Nadarajah who edit- meters away from the political Ministers indicted for The LTTE attack also claimed the Tiruchelvam died near the the JVP for both killings, some ed the widely read Thinamurasu lives of school Principal Rajeswari Rosmead Place-Kynsey Road junc- platform where a lone assassin Ellawela murder believed that they may have been on November 2, 1999 near shot Athulathmudali triggered Thanabalasingham and several tion in a suicide attack carried out assassinated by some other party. Wellawatte Railway Station high- The killing of Ratnapura District other civilians. The MP who had by a male LTTE cadre. speculation that the former PA MP Nalanda Ellawella on Jayatilleke had been on his way lighted the complexity of the situ- National Security Minister was a facilitated government assistance home from Nidangala Viharaya, ation. Despite the paper being February 11 1997 shocked the to the needy people of the East had JVP kills UNP MP victim of a UNP conspiracy.The country.The PA accused the then Kuliyapitiya after participating in funded by the EPDP,Nadarajah earned the wrath of the LTTE. The JVP didn’t specifically tar- recovery of a pistol and a National UNP MPs and Mahinda a pinnacle laying ceremony when took an overtly pro-LTTE stance LTTE gunmen shot dead UNP MP get politicians during its short- Identity Card which was subse- Ratnatilleka of killing the young gunmen attacked his car. on critical issues and this may Mohammed Ehuttar Hadjiar lived first April 1971 insurgency. quently identified as a fake politician. Today,both of them are Kariyawasam who had been a for- have led to friction Maharoof, his six-year-old son and But the second insurgency prompted the DUNF to level a with the SLFP-led ruling coalition, mer Deputy Minister had been The December 1999 attempt the principal of the Van Ella launched in the immediate after- series of allegations against the having secured ministerial portfo- Chairman of the Rubber Research on President Chandrika Muslim School in an ambush on math of the signing of the Indo- UNP.It was alleged that the youth lios. The Attorney General on Board at the time of his assassina- Kumaratunga caused injuries to the Trincomalee-Kuchchaveli Lanka accord on July 29 targeted whose body was found had been Thursday (January 10) served tion.
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