RECONCILIATION IN SRI LANKA: HARDER THAN EVER Asia Report N°209 – 18 July 2011 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. DEALING WITH THE PAST ......................................................................................... 3 A. TAMILS ........................................................................................................................................ 3 1. Anti-Tamil attacks, the civil war and intra-Tamil violence ......................................................... 3 2. Up-country Tamils ....................................................................................................................... 5 B. SINHALESE: LTTE TERROR, THE CIVIL WAR AND INTRA-SINHALESE VIOLENCE ......................... 6 C. MUSLIMS: ANTI-MUSLIM ATTACKS, EXPULSION AND INTRA-MUSLIM VIOLENCE ....................... 8 III. THE GOVERNMENT’S POST-WAR AGENDA ........................................................ 10 A. DENYING THE ETHNIC CONFLICT ............................................................................................... 11 B. ELUSIVE PROGRESS IN THE NORTH AND EAST ............................................................................ 13 1. Resettlement and development: centralised, militarised, without consultation ......................... 13 2. Militarisation and insecurity ...................................................................................................... 15 3. Detention, “rehabilitation” and “reintegration” ......................................................................... 17 C. CO-OPTING OPPONENTS AND CONSOLIDATING POWER .............................................................. 18 1. Repressing dissent ...................................................................................................................... 18 2. Buying elections......................................................................................................................... 20 3. Rewriting the constitution .......................................................................................................... 20 4. The Rajapaksas: dynasty in the making? ................................................................................... 21 D. THE “LESSONS LEARNT AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION” ................................................... 22 E. AFTER THE UN PANEL OF EXPERTS’ REPORT ............................................................................. 26 IV. COMMUNITIES’ POST-WAR VIEWS ....................................................................... 31 A. SINHALESE ................................................................................................................................. 31 B. TAMILS ...................................................................................................................................... 32 C. MUSLIMS ................................................................................................................................... 33 V. WHAT REAL RECONCILIATION WILL REQUIRE ............................................. 34 A. TRUTH ....................................................................................................................................... 34 B. RESTORING THE RULE OF LAW AND ENDING IMPUNITY ............................................................. 35 C. MEETING VICTIMS’ PRACTICAL NEEDS ...................................................................................... 38 D. DISTRIBUTION OF POWER AND MINORITY RIGHTS ..................................................................... 38 E. DONORS AND SUPPORTERS ........................................................................................................ 39 VI. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 40 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SRI LANKA ......................................................................................................................... 41 B. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, REPORT OF UN PANEL OF EXPERTS ON ACCOUNTABILITY IN SRI LANKA ... 42 C. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 47 D. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA SINCE 2008 ......................................................... 48 E. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 50 Asia Report N°209 18 July 2011 RECONCILIATION IN SRI LANKA: HARDER THAN EVER EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Two years since the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil general, judiciary and various “independent” commissions. Eelam (LTTE), Sri Lanka is further from reconciliation Northern areas once ruled by the LTTE are now domi- than ever. Triumphalist in its successful “war on terror”, nated by the military, which has taken over civil administra- the government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa has re- tion and controls all aspects of daily life – undermining fused to acknowledge, let alone address, the Tamil minor- what little remains of local capacity. Democratic political ity’s legitimate grievances against the state. The regime activities in the north and east have been suppressed through destroyed the Tigers by rejecting the more conciliatory ap- the use of violent and corrupt ethnic Tamil proxies and proach of prior governments and adopting the insurgents’ other Rajapaksa loyalists. Development of those areas has brutality and intolerance of dissent. Now, contrary to the been conducted without local consultation; indeed many image it projects, the government has increasingly cut mi- Tamil residents feel that it is more like the extraction of norities and opponents out of decisions on their economic the spoils of war than a real effort to improve livelihoods and political futures rather than work toward reconcilia- and build trust. tion. As power and wealth is concentrated in the Rajapaksa family, the risks of renewed conflict are growing again. To deflect criticism of its unlawful conduct in the final stages Partners, especially India, Japan, the U.S., UK, European of the war the government established a Lessons Learnt Union (EU) and UN, should send a strong message against and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC). Promoted as a increasing authoritarianism, condition aid on transparency mechanism for both accountability and reconciliation, it and restored civilian administration in north and east and will produce neither. In April 2011, a UN panel of experts support accountability, including an international inquiry found that the LLRC lacks the independence, mandate and into alleged atrocities by both sides in the war’s final stages. witness protection capacity to serve as an accountability process for the many credible allegations of war crimes and Much has improved with the end of the war in May 2009. crimes against humanity committed by both sides and rec- The paralysing threat of suicide attacks on civilians in the ommended an international investigation. Correcting the south has ended with the destruction of the LTTE, while LLRC’s flaws would require not only a new commission Tamil families no longer fear the Tigers’ forced recruitment or other mechanism but also a reversal of the Rajapaksas’ of their children and other abuses. Economic and political core post-war policies. While the LLRC has served as a security is better for some segments of society. But dec- platform for airing some grievances, it has failed to win ades of political violence and civil war have polarised Sri confidence domestically and can do little to aid reconcilia- Lanka’s ethnic communities and undermined institutions, tion. Sri Lankans know better than anyone that such a particularly those involved in law and order. Each of the commission is ultimately powerless. major ethnic groups – Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims – has suffered immensely. Conflicts have not just left hun- Despite Sri Lanka’s long history of failed and ignored ad dreds of thousands dead, injured or displaced but have also hoc inquiries, the international community seems willing entrenched fears and misunderstandings in each community. to gamble on another. While India, the U.S. and UK have recently signalled greater scepticism of the government’s Progress toward reconciliation in this environment was al- efforts, so far they and other supporters are repeating the ways going to be difficult. It has been made much more mistake they made during the war. There was little real ef- so by the post-war policies of President Rajapaksa and his fort to prevent the atrocities at the end of the fighting, in powerful brothers. With emergency and anti-terrorism laws part because the LTTE was so reviled but also because it still in place, they continue to violently repress the media was convenient to believe President Rajapaksa’s assur- and political opponents, while manipulating elections and ances that there would be political reform and conciliatory silencing civil society. Constitutional reforms strong-armed policies after a military victory. Now they risk falling again through parliament have removed presidential term limits for the government’s delaying tactics and promises of ac- and solidified the president’s power over the attorney countability through the LLRC