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Ranil Wickremesinghe Address the Problems of the Tamil Underwent Dur- People

Ranil Wickremesinghe Address the Problems of the Tamil Underwent Dur- People

Tuesday 12th January, 2010 7 by Jehan Perera to put forward its own Tamil can- Tamil people to boycott the This was to take the decision to Tamil diaspora are espousing the that the President reportedly took didate to contest the elections. Presidential elections that pitted endorse one of the two leading ideals of a transnational Tamil their concerns lightly and not with he decision of the Tamil The other option was to boycott the then Prime Minister Mahinda presidential candidates, either government, and have been con- the seriousness that they expected. National Alliance to endorse the elections entirely. The problem Rajapaksa against the former incumbent President Mahinda ducting elections of their own in The problems that the Tamil peo- Tone of the two leading candi- was that both these options have Prime Minister Ranil Rajapaksa or his main challenger the countries where they are cur- ple have been experiencing in the dates with a real chance of win- been tried before but without Wickremesinghe. There is no former Army Commander rently domiciled, there are other past few years have been very ning the forthcoming presidential yielding benefits to the Tamil peo- doubt that the current TNA leader- Sarath Fonseka. In making this sections of the Tamil diaspora that weighty ones, ranging from thou- election has a significance that ple. The past experience of put- ship was intimidated into going choice the alliance has not only are willing to give the political sands of missing persons to tens of goes beyond those elections. The ting forward a Tamil presidential along for fear of LTTE reprisals. committed itself to taking one side process in another try. thousands of hopelessly displaced delay of the alliance in arriving at candidate in the past had only a During his brief tenure as Prime of the political divide and running The TNA’s decision to neither persons. During his recent visit to a decision itself suggests the symbolic value as the candidate Minister in the period 2002-4, Ranil the risk of being at the receiving boycott the presidential election or , President Rajapaksa was importance of the issues at stake. got very few of even the Tamil vot- Wickremesinghe had signed the end of petty revenge if its choice to support a Tamil presidential shown to be a skilled politician There were three strong points of who rubbed shoulders with others and plucked little children from the arms of their amazed parents. The The President’s inability to take the concerns of the TNA seriously extreme may stem from an abiding suspi- suffering cion that they continue to be sepa- ratist and agents of the LTTE. that Tamil people By way of contrast, opposition The importance of candidate General Fonseka was “especially in the much more responsive to the con- north and east of cerns of the TNA. Shortly after meeting with them he made a dec- the country laration of what he would do to address the problems of the Tamil underwent dur- people. These included disman- tling the high security zones which ing the decades had resulted in Tamil people being of war have Ceasefire Agreement with the fails at the election. It has also candidate was not the only one it evicted from thousands of acres of LTTE. Although the LTTE with- turned back the clock by over 35 had to take. They had also to land and in expediting the release made it difficult drew from the peace talks that years to give up on separatist poli- decide on which of the two main of LTTE suspects through a legal accompanied that ceasefire, Mr tics and make the mainstream presidential candidates they would process. The TNA and many for Tamil politi- Wickremesinghe promised to Tamil parties once again a part support. On the one hand, at the Tamil people appear to see General restart them if he was elected and parcel of national politics. outset of the election campaign, Fonseka in the light of a profes- cal leaders to President. This was a promise he The extreme suffering that President Rajapaksa came across sional soldier who executed his join the govern- could have fulfilled had he won the Tamil people especially in the as the stronger candidate who mission with success. But now elections. The peace process he north and east of the country would most probably win the elec- they see him as a politician who ment and pre- championed was backed by the underwent during the decades of tions. Given the increasingly bru- will do what is necessary to reap international community and he war have made it difficult for tal and ruthless nature of politics the benefits of peace. In addition, serve their legiti- would have been armed with the Tamil political leaders to join the in the country over the past sever- the TNA’s decision to support the macy with the full complement of executive pow- government and preserve their al decades, there would have been candidacy of General Fonseka

ers that he had lacked as Prime legitimacy with the Tamil elec- a reasonable apprehension that the reflects the trust and confidence Minister. torate. The issue of Tamil sepa- price of retribution could be high that members of the ethnic Tamil electorate. If the Tamil boycott had not ratism would have been a psycho- to the Tamil people if the TNA minorities have in the UNP leader, taken place and Mr logically hard one for the alliance failed to endorse the winning can- The issue of Ranil Wickremesinghe.

Wickremesinghe had won those to address. The failure of succes- didate. Much before the TNA took its elections with Tamil votes, the sive Sri Lankan governments to Tamil separatism decision to endorse General Tamil people might have been give the political representatives of Track record Fonseka, members of the Tamil would have been spared the destruction of war. the Tamil people a real decision Prior to deciding whom to “ community in Sri Lanka and The other example of a fateful boy- making within the Sri Lankan sys- endorse, the TNA leadership met abroad had expressed the view at a psychologically cott of elections by the Tamil peo- tem has given justification to this with the two front runner, different forums that they had ple took place in 1931 during the separatist sentiment. Due to the President Rajapaksa and joint hard one for the greater confidence in Ranil British colonial period. The Tamil continuous breakdown in agree- opposition candidate General Wickremesinghe than in any other political leadership at that time ments reached with successive Sarath Fonseka. According to alliance Sinhalese leader. As Prime called for a boycott of the polls as governments, Tamil parties such media reports the TNA’s meeting Minister in the period 2002-4 he to they wished a speedier programme as the TNA took the position that with the President had been a dis- showed himself to be aware and of of self-government for the country. the Tamil people could not expect appointment to them. The the view that a peaceful end to the address. The Tamil boycott led to the legis- justice from Sinhalese-dominated President had declined to make ethnic conflict was necessary for lature becoming overwhelmingly governments in Sri Lanka. concrete commitments to the TNA the country to reach its full eco- Sinhalese, with the result that the Today, it is in the large and and instead requested them to wait nomic potential. He took steps to ers to support him. The obvious ethnic minority voice in it became powerful Tamil diaspora that the until the end of the election and view expressed by the membership deliver on his promise but was inability of a Tamil candidate marginal. The negative fallout of will to resist is greatest. However, the commencement of his second of the alliance which constitutes thwarted by a combination of espousing Tamil concerns to this boycott decision carried over with the exception of the Tamil term. This would have required several Tamil political parties that LTTE recalcitrance and opposi- had come together due to the pres- obtain victory at such an election to the pre-independence negotia- diaspora, the will of the Tamil peo- the TNA to put their trust in the tional politics. But the commit- sures put upon them by the LTTE would have served to discourage tions with the British, which again ple to resist and to fight separately President’s word when their expe- ment he demonstrated at that time when it was the dominant power Tamil voters from casting their worked adversely against ethnic is sapped. Even the Tamil diaspo- rience of the past, and the experi- gave him and his party credibility in the Tamil polity. Two of the votes for a sure loser. On the other minority interests. ra cannot be indifferent to the ence of others who believed they that is helping General Sarath options available to the party had hand, the experience of boycotts of observable desire of the Tamil peo- had reached agreement with the Fonseka’s election campaign as the already been exercised by some elections by the Tamil people has Third option ple in Sri Lanka to rebuild their President, suggested otherwise. common opposition presidential members of the alliance. proved to be even more disadvanta- It was with this historical back- shattered lives now that the LTTE The second disappointment candidate amongst the ethnic One option was for the alliance geous to the community. ground in mind that finally the is no longer there to fight on mili- that the TNA reportedly had was In 2005, the LTTE ordered the TNA exercised the third option. tarily. Although sections of the minorities today.