<<

10 November 2010

Tamil Perspectives on Post-war , the LTTE and the Future

Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe FDI Associate

After nearly two decades of suppression of dissident Tamil parties by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil (LTTE), the re-emergence of plurality in Tamil politics since the May 2009 defeat of the LTTE has altered the political landscape for . In a series of exclusive interviews conducted in Sri Lanka in June 2010, FDI Associate Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe speaks with Mr Thirunavukkarasu Sridharan, leader of the Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front, Padmanaba faction (EPRLF-Naba) and Mr Dharmalingam Siddharthan , leader of the People’s Liberation Organisation of (PLOTE) and, by correspondence in October 2010, with Dr Muttukrishna Sarvananthan , Principal Researcher at the Institute of Development, about the situation facing Sri Lankan Tamils after the civil war, the implications of the LTTE’s demise and Tamil aspirations for the future.

FDI: Following its defeat in May 2009, what is the general sentiment of the civilian population towards the LTTE or, for that matter, the ?

Muttukrishna Sarvananthan: There is deep resentment towards the LTTE among a significant share of the population, due to their callous disregard for human life, recruitment of children and the immense misery that befell the general population during the final stages of the war.

There is a lot of antipathy towards the LTTE, which will last for a long time. The LTTE forced civilians to flee along with them – as human shields – right up to the beaches of northern Mullaitivu. Once the civilians vacated their homes, the LTTE cadres looted the household goods and building materials such as asbestos sheets, roof tiles, window and door frames. Civilians, particularly women, were forced to part with the jewellery they were wearing. General Sarath Fonseka revealed in Parliament recently that, during his tenure in 2009, about 200 kilograms of gold belonging to the LTTE was unearthed in the Vanni region after he retired from service, although he does not know what has happened to it since.

The young and old were randomly conscripted to work for the LTTE: either to fight or do subsidiary duties such as manning sentry points or carrying arms, ammunition and cargo. For

the first time, the LTTE deployed male and female cadres together in the same bunker and that resulted in underage pregnancies. There are numerous underage single mothers in the North as a result.

Unfortunately, the Rajapakse Government has failed to capitalise on the resentment of Tamil civilians towards the LTTE. The priority of the Rajapakses1 was the consolidation of political power, rather than winning the broken hearts and minds of northern Tamils. The Rajapakses were more interested in pandering to the parochial euphoria of the majority community – playing to the gallery – rather than bonding a fractured nation.

The bitterness towards the LTTE has not, therefore, translated into goodwill towards the Government, partly due to pampering of the likes of 2 and the remnants of the LTTE hierarchy, such as Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (alias ), Kumaran Pathmanathan (alias KP), Velautham Thayanithi (alias Thaya Master), and others, by the Government.

While the bulk of the returning internally displaced persons (IDPs) live in squalor and some are expected to be given 500,000 rupees ($4,512.00) at the most under the World Bank’s North-East Housing Reconstruction Project (NEHRP) or the Indian Government’s 50,000 Houses project, those who were complicit in crimes against humanity, such as the recruitment of child soldiers, forcible displacement of civilians, the conscription and killing of civilians attempting to flee the clutches of the LTTE, are pampered and living in relative luxury. “What justice is this?” is the thought lingering in the minds of the population.

Thirunavukkarasu Sridharan: The LTTE is a fascist organisation which dismantled Tamil society, which hates Sinhalese and Muslim people and even hates other Tamil parties that hold a different view. Now, most Tamils realise that confrontational politics is not good. The Tamil people, particularly in the Vanni [in northern Sri Lanka] utterly hate the LTTE, as do people. Generally, this is what the people are thinking. I do not think the LTTE can revive; I doubt even in 15 years from now that there will be any form of Tamil militant movement. There might be political violence, but I doubt there will be militancy. The extremists are a small minority. In Sri Lanka now, only about 15 per cent of Tamils would support the LTTE. The Vanni people, in particular, are very angry and wary of the LTTE, as they were exposed to their brutality at the end of the war. I was told by a number of Tamil civilians who escaped from the LTTE in the final months of the war, that the LTTE were forcibly recruiting and shooting Tamil civilians.

When civilians were put into IDP camps more than 8000-10,000 people escaped and a number of LTTE fighters, about 500 hardcore members, also ran away. The pro-LTTE Tamil diaspora reported about these camps in a very exaggerated way. We know this because we visited the camps much earlier. Some people in the Tamil diaspora said that the IDP camps were like concentration camps; this was an exaggeration of the conditions. The pro-LTTE Tamil diaspora have a different psychology from the Tamils in Sri Lanka. In Sri Lanka, our

1 Mahinda Rajapakse, President of Sri Lanka; Gotabaya Rajapakse, Defence Secretary; Basil Rajapakse, Minister of Economic Development and Chamal Rajapakse, Speaker of the Sri Lankan Parliament. 2 Douglas Devananda is the leader of the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP) and is Minister for Traditional Industries and Small Enterprises in the current government of President Mahinda Rajapakse.

Page 2 of 10

people are more worried about their children’s education, housing and employment. But the pro-LTTE Tamil diaspora thinks about separatism and militancy – while their children are being educated.

Dharmalingam Siddharthan: At the beginning many Tamil civilians were unsure whether to complain about the LTTE, because LTTE top rankers were co-opted by the army. The Tamil civilians are very angry with these people because the men who forcibly conscripted their children are free, but many of the children are still in detention; because of this they are very angry with the Government. These LTTE people put them [child soldiers] in the frontline, and a large number of them were killed as a result, so that makes them very angry. Whoever goes there asks, “Can’t we get our child out?” That is their main demand. That is why they did not want to complain to the army because they know that those people are now close to the army, so they might get into trouble. The LTTE cadres who are working with the Army might purposefully identify the people who were opposed to them previously. There was one girl who was forcibly recruited by the LTTE and, when released, took refuge at someone’s house. She didn’t go to her own village because the man who recruited her is working with the army and is going around and identifying child soldiers; because of the fear she has for him, she is now in hiding.

Recently in district, the (TNA) [the largest Tamil political alliance in Sri Lanka, which has pro-LTTE affiliations] won the Parliamentary election by only 4000 votes. Even in Jaffna North, the Government lost only by 20,000 votes. So a large number of Tamils voted for the Government. If the Government committed serious war crimes, as some suggest, many Tamils would not have voted for it.

When [President] Mahinda Rajapakse speaks the some people criticise him. I say, ‘No. At least that man had the courage to learn. We must appreciate that. He is not very good at speaking Tamil, but at least he tries.’ We realise that is at least a good gesture.

FDI: There have been reports that thousands of Tamil-speaking police officers have joined the Police in the Northern and Eastern Provinces To what extent do Tamils in Sri Lanka have confidence in the restitution of law and order and good governance in Sri Lanka after the civil war?

MS: According to my knowledge, 500-600 Tamil-speaking police officers have been recruited from the this year and are currently undergoing training in Police Training College, which is commendable. In the Eastern Province this has been going on for a while, but I do not know the number.

This does not mean that the law and order situation or governance in general has improved in the North or beyond. Deteriorating law and order and poor governance have been hallmarks of the Rajapakse Government in the past five years throughout the country, which continues even after the end of the war. For example, a journalist went missing in (a suburb of ) a few days before the Presidential election and remains “disappeared”. One Municipal Council member belonging to the Thamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) political party (a constituent of the ruling alliance), is reported as missing since late-August 2010. In spite of the public appeal by the Chief Minister of the

Page 3 of 10

Eastern Province for his release, the police have not been able to trace this person. A couple of months ago, two young married ladies – resettled IDPs – were gang-raped by uniformed army personnel in Visvamadu (in ). Though the local police have apprehended the culprits and produced them in court, the have been trying their best to get the suspects released on bail. A high-profile Deputy Minister tied a public official to a tree for coming late to a meeting in in August 2010, but no legal action has been taken against the Deputy Minister.

These examples are hardly reassuring to the people (in the North and beyond), as regards the restoration of law and order or good governance in the aftermath of the civil war.

TS: The police have already started recruiting Tamils now. I heard 600 were recruited from Jaffna. That is good. Even if Tamil-speaking policemen are Sinhalese, there is no problem, as long as they understand the Tamil language. In the North and the East, however, the balance of Tamil representation in the police should be 50-60 per cent; the other remaining 40-50 per cent should be Sinhalese and Muslim.

DS: It is important that Tamils are recruited into the police, and later the army. Before May 2009, nobody would have joined. Only a few Tamils joined the police before May 2009 out of fear of assassination by the LTTE. If there are 40 policemen in a police station, and there are at least 20 Tamils and 20 Sinhalese, that way we can manage. If a Tamil policeman hits me, everyone will see it as a Tamil versus Tamil. In the past, the whole thing started partly because of the police excesses.

FDI: Describe the relationship between the military and the Tamil civilian population in the North. What are the negative and positive attributes of this relationship? What has the military done to alleviate the plight of the Tamil civilian population since the end of the war?

MS: The relationship between the civilian population and the armed forces (including the police), in the North has improved tremendously since June 2009, because security check- points have been drastically reduced and high security zones cut back. Having said that, very young armed forces personnel on the streets of the North and East still pose a real and perceived threat to young women; the scale of sexual violence against women has been reduced, but still remains.

The negative effect of scaled-down security check-points is the increased criminal activities of pro-government militias and common criminals. In fact, the pro-government militias are undoing the goodwill built-up between the armed forces personnel and the civilians. Disarmament and disbanding of the pro-government militias is sine qua non for winning the hearts and minds of the civilian population in the North and East.

The Army is actively involved in clearing landmines and building homes for the displaced population both in Jaffna and the Vanni. In the business world, it is said that it could take a long time to win a customer, but it would take just a second to lose a customer. In the same way, the Army may do one hundred good things for the welfare of civilians, but one horrific incident like the rape of the women in Visvamadu has the potential to obliterate the entire goodwill built up over the months/years with the civilian population. The business principle

Page 4 of 10

above should be inculcated into the hearts and minds of the armed forces personnel. I do not, however, foresee demilitarisation to any significant extent while the Rajapakses are in power. Militarisation is indispensable for the perpetuation of the Rajapakse “dynasty”.3

TS: The presence of large numbers of troops in the north and east is intimidating and needs to be reduced. As for the emergency laws, after decades some crucial laws have been lifted. The has only the Omanthai checkpoint, which is not checked heavily, but randomly, and in a polite and professional way. Civilians can now travel throughout the Vanni region, with some exceptions where restrictions apply and permission is required from the Army. There are no problems between the Army and the civilian population, definitely not. The Army has been very polite and is also helping to build homes. In the future, we think the must be organised as a multi-ethnic army consisting of Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim youth – that way we’ll establish a united Sri Lanka.

DS: In the North, there is very good communication between the public and the Army. If there’s any problem, the people don’t hesitate to tell the Army, and the Army tries their best to do it. I’ve never come across any serious complaint about the Army. In certain areas, the Army sends groups of soldiers who rebuild houses for the civilians. That is quite a good thing they are doing. In line with this, another reason Tamil people voted for the Government at the presidential elections in January this year is because some of them felt that at least the Government has helped them to recover.

FDI: How would you describe the conditions and treatment of the Tamil civilians who were placed in IDP camps at the end of the civil war? What were the problems and how were they alleviated over the last 12 months? How many are currently remaining in IDP camps?

MS: The conditions and treatment of Tamil civilians in the IDP camps were pathetic. Sri Lankan public services or the non-governmental organisations were, or are, not capable of handling such a large number of IDPs at any one place. Although I would blame the LTTE for instigating such a huge internal displacement, my view is that the Government need not have brought them all to Vavuniya or Mannar districts. The Government could have allowed the IDPs from Jaffna, , Mannar and Vavuniya to go to their places of origin within a month after the end of the civil war. The problem of landmines has been overplayed to my knowledge and had been used as an excuse to delay the release of civilians from welfare camps.

While innocent civilians languished in squalor in welfare camps, many people with money and/or influence (including LTTE personnel), got out of the camps and fled abroad – to , for instance. I know of at least two Cabinet Ministers and many Armed Forces personnel involved in making big money out of the misery of the IDPs. Overcrowding and lack of bathroom and toilet facilities were longstanding problems in the camps. Food supply was also inadequate at times.

3 In current terms, referring to the Rajapakse brothers and Namal Rajapakse, Member of Parliament for District and son of Mahinda Rajapakse, and Shashindra Rajapakse, Chief Minister of and son of Chamal Rajapakse.

Page 5 of 10

Currently there are about 36,000 IDPs remaining in camps throughout the North, according to government statistics; the actual number could be more.

TS: At present, IDPs are being gradually resettled in their own areas; only a small proportion of IDPs are remaining in camps. Within three to six months, everybody is likely to be resettled in their home areas. From 300,000 odd people, there are only 30,000 people left in the IDP camps, who have full freedom of movement and voluntarily chose to live in the camps. Resettled IDPs are given paddy seed to plant in their fields and 20,000 rupees ($180.00) as a package to help them restart their lives. I also heard the World Bank was providing an additional Rs. 20,000 to them. There are over 100,000 Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in Tamil Nadu, southern India, that want to return to Sri Lanka now that the war is over. Definitely the majority of the people want to return to our country. They need housing infrastructure and employment opportunities then, definitely, they will come. The reconstruction phase after resettlement is also very important. Things have slowly improved. For example, along the Mullaitivu coastline in the Nanthi Kadal area, new facilities have been built and are available now for use by fishermen. At the moment there is extensive de-mining going on throughout the North, new roads are being built, but electricity is not always available. There is also a problem with wells where the water must be purified. Educational facilities also must improve. In the heath sector also; some surgical theatres are opening in Kilinochchi and also other areas.

DS: At the end of the civil war, the conditions in IDP camps were very bad. That is accepted. I feel what should be done is, after the resettlement of all the civilians, only then can we get a reasonably, at least 90 per cent, accurate figure of how many people were killed. When I go and talk to the villagers in the Vanni they say, “In that house two were killed, in that house four of them were killed.” Only then can we know the names and collect the figures.

FDI: Even though the war has ended and the civilians held in IDP camps have either been released or allowed to continue to live within the camps with the freedom to leave at will, the situation related to the flight of civilians and former LTTE fighters from Sri Lanka still continues to have currency. What do you think are the causal factors which have led to the continued outflow of Tamils seeking asylum in Australia and the West?

MS: Enduring human insecurities in the North, East and beyond, and the absence of a political resolution to the protracted ethnic conflict could be identified as the two prime reasons for the continued outflow of refugees from Sri Lanka to the West.

Two of the high-risk categories of people who would want to flee the country illegally or migrate lawfully are ex-combatants and supporters/sympathisers of the LTTE. There are media reports and anecdotal evidence that some released ex-combatants and resettled supporters of LTTE have been re-arrested or harassed by law enforcement authorities or pro-government militias. The Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP), for example, has recruited some ex-combatants and LTTE supporters (Thaya Master being the most prominent one), for whatever purpose. Some of these people joined the EPDP – or any other pro-government militia such as PLOTE – not as a choice, but as a necessity, because it would provide them security from continued harassment by law enforcement authorities or these same pro-government militias. Some others may decide to quit the country either legally or

Page 6 of 10

illegally. Hence, one of the preconditions to stem the outflow of refugees abroad is for the law enforcement authorities and pro-government militias to stop harassing ex-combatants or sympathisers.

In addition to the above, a survey undertaken among youths in 2009 throughout Sri Lanka (including the North and East) revealed that about 50 per cent of youths wished to go abroad for good; unfortunately the reason for this urge was not explored by the survey. Thus, right across the country (irrespective of ethnicity), there is a craze among Sri Lankans to migrate abroad. There appears to be a crisis of confidence among the younger generation of Sri Lankans about their homeland.

DS: Out of the 280,000 people in the camps, definitely about 50 per cent were genuinely sympathetic to the LTTE. After the Army searched and found many LTTE fighters, many of them bought their freedom and escaped. Definitely not less than 5000-6000 people fled the IDP camps. Out of that, at least 500 hardcore LTTE would have fled overseas. Possibly 50 to 60 could have been - rank, others were civilians or LTTE families and supporters. It is quite possible that more than 50 per cent of the IDPs that fled the camps are likely to be connected to the LTTE because they had the money and the help of the expatriate LTTE community in the West. They did not necessarily flee to Tamil Nadu, they also went to , Malaysia and Thailand, and they mainly found Australia to be the easy way to go. Even from Canada, the LTTE might help them to go to Australia.

FDI: How would you describe and differentiate between Tamil grievances and aspirations since the end of the civil war? Looking further into the future, how important is a political settlement and what form do you think it realistically should take?

MS: Tamil grievances in terms of human security, selective discrimination and a lack of use of the Tamil language in public administration persist in the aftermath of the civil war. However, political settlement does not seem to be the priority for the Tamils in the short term, as reflected in the very low turnout at the presidential and parliamentary elections early this year. Instead, economic emancipation appears to be the thirst of Tamil people in the immediate future.

Such economic emancipation does not mean just rebuilding their homes and livelihoods, but also includes non-interference by Colombo as regards the type of economic development activities they would like to undertake. Local governments and provincial governments should be empowered to take decisions through consultations with the local communities. An equal opportunities law should also be enacted to outlaw discrimination in terms of gender, ethnicity, religion, caste, or place of origin like in countries such as the or Australia. In addition, an affirmative action programme could be instituted for a limited period of time to increase the representation of minority communities in public administration and services in proportion to their population share.

In the medium and longer terms, economic and political power sharing between the centre and the provinces is indispensable for establishing a durable peace in Sri Lanka. My hunch is that economic freedom and an equal opportunities law (in the short-run) will satisfy sixty

Page 7 of 10

per cent of the aspirations of the Tamil community in Sri Lanka and political power sharing (in the long-run) will satisfy the remaining forty per cent.

But the Rajapakse Government does not seem to be interested in any of that. Instead, the Government is very keen to see that no single political party – headed by Tamils – dominates politics either in the North or East. As part of the divide-and-rule grand strategy of the Rajapakses, while the EPDP is given a free reign in the Jaffna peninsula, Kumaran Pathmanathan is promoted in the Vanni; in the East, while the TMVP is pampered in Batticaloa and districts, Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan is allowed to have bases in the district.

TS: At the least, a minimum level of credible devolution is very important, meaning at least the implementation of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution. 4 The Tamil and Muslim people must feel that they are also a part of the Sri Lankan governing system with some kind of political arrangement. We think that the President should also form a committee to interpret the Thirteenth Amendment, specifically areas such as administrative power, finance, police and the security forces. I think there should be two kinds of police: a federal police force, as well as a provincial police force directed by the Provincial Council. The Provincial Councils must run local administration, taxation, public transport and public health. If this can be implemented, the people will feel that they are also part of the Sri Lankan governing system.

I have also heard some good things about the implementation of Tamil as an official language; there has been a lot of improvement. In 1987, Tamil was introduced as an official language in Sri Lanka and it has since been slowly implemented. At least President Rajapakse can also speak Tamil. Now, in the south of Sri Lanka, the Sinhalese youngsters also have a better knowledge of the Tamil language. Earlier, there was no knowledge.

Also, the Tamil people want development, they want employment and to establish their children’s education. The only main industries in the North were the Kankasanthurai Cement Factory, Valaichenai Paper Factory and Paranthan Chemical Factory. These have been defunct for decades and need to be restarted due to the destruction during the war.

Although the LTTE and some in the Tamil diaspora claim that Tamils and Sinhalese don’t get along, the reality is that there are many Tamil people living from , and up to , among . In the greater Colombo area alone, I think 250,000 to 300,000 people are north-eastern Tamils. In , there are also a lot of Tamils. Sinhalese people also visit the North. Over the last 15-20 years, Jaffna has been a quiet town, but now people are visiting and suddenly everything is booming. For reconciliation, this process is a good thing; where people visit, the fear psyche also becomes reduced. I think Tamil people are not fearful of this. I don’t think this is a tense situation, it is a good situation.

DS: The Thirteenth Amendment must be properly implemented. I think the Government has made a mistake and they feel that from Head to Point Pedro, their rule must be

4 The Thirteenth Amendment represents the grant of limited autonomy and decentralisation of power to Sri Lanka’s Provincial Councils.

Page 8 of 10

there. That attitude must change. In Jaffna, if the Tamil National Alliance wins, they should let them rule it, then half the problem is over. I believe we have to implement the Thirteenth Amendment, I don’t think India is interested in anything else and we have been told by them very clearly. As far as I’m concerned, if the Thirteenth Amendment is implemented properly, it can be a good start and we can see if it works. However, many Sinhala people think that federalism is the first step to separatism.

Tamils want an ethno-federalist state like in Tamil Nadu or something similar. I would like to see a Tamil-speaking province. The Government says that they have implemented the Thirteenth Amendment, but even Pilliyan is complaining [Pilliyan is a former LTTE commander who broke away from the LTTE in 2004, was co-opted into the political mainstream and elected Chief Minister of the Eastern Province]. There’s no need to give police powers to the provinces now, that part we understand. There are a lot of positive things being done in the Eastern Province by the Government which is true. I have seen it for myself. But the local people are often not consulted which makes them feel like they do not have influence over what is happening in their home areas. Most Tamils want provincial level autonomy. Then only the hearts and minds can be won over. Our fear is justified because of the colonisation by the Sinhalese in the past. We fear that if the land is not under the provincial setup, what will happen is they will bring new people into these areas; we are talking about control over the land. We want recognition; that is, demarcation of land, something like a province. Why can’t we develop those areas?

*****

Dr Muttukrishna Sarvananthan Ph.D. (Wales), M.Sc. (Bristol), M.Sc. (Salford), B.A. (Hons) (Delhi) hails from Point Pedro, in northern Sri Lanka, and is a Development Economist by profession. He was a Fulbright Visiting Research Scholar at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University, Washington DC (October 2008 – July 2009), and has worked as a consultant to the Sri Lankan Ministry of Finance and Planning, various private research institutions and international consultancy firms, the Canadian International Development Agency, German Development Co- operation (GTZ), the International Labour Organisation, United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank. He has published widely and is the Principal Researcher of the independent Point Pedro Institute of Development. He is currently writing his next book, From Liberation to Terrorism: the Rise and Demise of the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka .

Mr Thirunavukkarasu Sridharan is the General Secretary and leader of the left-leaning, moderate Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front, Padmanaba faction (otherwise known as the EPRLF- Naba). He has been involved in Tamil politics since the late 1970s, initially through the General Union of Eelam Students. EPRLF-Naba was significant Tamil militant group until it was outlawed by the LTTE, which forced it to seek the protection of the Sri Lankan state. Among Tamil militants, the EPRLF maintained a more progressive platform which, at one time, was characterised by the inclusion within its ranks of ethnic-Sinhalese Marxists. In more recent times, the EPRLF split into two groups, when an ultra-nationalist faction chose to adopt a pro-LTTE platform and broke away. Since then, the original

Page 9 of 10

EPRLF, known as EPRLF-Naba, has functioned under the leadership of Thirunavukkarasu Sridharan and has a core support base located throughout Sri Lanka’s north and east.

Mr Dharmalingam Siddharthan leads the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), which is among the largest Tamil militant groups to have entered the political mainstream. The PLOTE was outlawed by the LTTE and branded as traitors after it became a signatory to the Indo-Lanka Accord, an agreement sponsored by India in 1987, which rejected Tamil separatist ambitions and instead sought to provide a framework for regional autonomy within Sri Lanka. Subject to a campaign of persecution by the LTTE, the PLOTE was forced to seek the protection of successive Sri Lankan Governments in order to survive. It has traditionally maintained a small support base in the Vavuniya locality, the Vanni district in Sri Lanka’s northern hinterland, and the Jaffna Peninsula.

About the author: Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe is an analyst who has published widely on South Asian and political and security issues.

*****

Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual contributors, unless stated to be those of Future Directions International.

Published by Future Directions International Pty Ltd. Desborough House, Suite 2, 1161 Hay Street, West Perth WA 6005 Australia. Tel: +61 8 9486 1046 Fax: +61 8 9486 4000 E-mail: [email protected] Web: www.futuredirections.org.au

Page 10 of 10