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SRI LANKA

A diplomatic compromise hastily devised on July 28 defused tension between the governments of India and Sri Lanka and narrowly averted the military confrontation which had appeared likely earlier in the month. Relations between the two countries had deteriorated sharply since June 1, when President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka had demanded the withdrawal of the 45,000-strong Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) by the second anniversary of the Indo-Sri Lankan agreement on July 29 [see p. 36735; for agreement itself see pp. 35312-17].

Letters were exchanged between President Premadasa and India's Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, during the first half of July, both leaders trading accusations over the non- implementation of the 1987 agreement. On July 14 Ranjan Wijeratne, the Sri Lankan Foreign Minister, reportedly announced that the IPKF would be forcibly ejected if they were not withdrawn voluntarily by the July 29 deadline. Premadasa adopted a more conciliatory tone in a letter to Gandhi on July 19, his sixth in seven weeks. In the letter he made no reference to the July 29 deadline, although he did indicate, for the first time, the possibility of the Sri Lankan government abrogating the 1987 agreement.

After three days of intense diplomatic negotiation in Colombo and New Delhi, a joint Indo-Sri Lankan communiqué was issued on July 28. This provided for the symbolic withdrawal of some 600 IPKF soldiers on July 29 and for the initiation of talks the same day between Wijeratne and his Indian counterpart, P. V. Narasimha Rao. The negotiations, held in New Delhi, centred on the subject of a time schedule for the withdrawal of the remaining IPKF contingent and on the progress of the implementation of the 1987 agreement.

The days leading up to the July 29 deadline were particularly violent, with about 150 people, mainly civilians, being killed throughout the country. The government had imposed a curfew beginning on July 28, but the militant Sinhala JVP were reported to have ordered civilians to participate in anti-Indian demonstrations.

The government imposed tough emergency measures on July 5–6 in an attempt to counter the intensifying threat from the JVP. Towards this end the government had re-imposed in mid- June the state of emergency which had been lifted in January 1989 [see p. 36395]. The government was prompted primarily by a JVP-promoted bus-strike, which had started in mid-June [see p. 36735] and had added considerably to the country's already chronic economic problems.

Measures imposed by the government on July 5 included the general mobilization of the country's 15,000 armed forces reservists, the imposition of press censorship on the local media and the closure of all schools. The next day Wijeratne announced that troops were being deployed at full strength and had been given “full powers to deal with all types of subversion in the most ruthless manner”. These included the power to shoot on sight saboteurs and anyone inciting workers to strike. In addition, press censorship was extended to include foreign journalists. The level of censorship was tightened on July 10, when the government banned reports of violence, anti-government activities and security operations.

On July 11 a government communiqué was issued claiming that more than 1,000 suspected JVP rebels had been arrested. Two days later reports claimed that the JVP-sponsored bus strike had ended after a government offer of an immediate pay rise was accepted by workers of the state- owned Sri Lanka Transport Central Board.

A number of prominent Sri Lankans were among the hundreds of people killed during July.

Appapillai Amirthalingam, secretary-general of the moderate Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), was shot dead in Colombo on July 13. Vettivelu Yogeswaran, a former TULF MP, was also killed in the attack, and Murugesu Sivasithamparam, the party's president, was seriously wounded.

The (Indian) Hindu of July 22 claimed that the assassination had been carried out by “hard-core” activists of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers), Visu and Aloysius. In early June, the LTTE had entered into talks with the government and a few weeks later had announced a permanent halt to hostilities [see p. 36735]. According to some reports, LTTE representatives acknowledged to the Sri Lankan government that a rogue “Tiger” cell had carried out Amirthalingam's assassination. This admission apparently prompted the government to adjourn talks with the LTTE.

Uma Maheswaran, former leader of the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) was reportedly assassinated in Colombo on July 16. In August 1988 Maheswaran had been sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment for robbery [see p. 36283]; he was subsequently implicated in an attempted coup in the Maldives in November 1988 [see p. 36350].

Thevis Guruge, chairman of the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation and the government's chief censor, was assassinated in Colombo on July 23. The next day Wijeratne announced that the government had decided to lift censorship measures on all local and foreign news media.

Reports in the Indian and Western press in late July alleged that Velupillai Prabakharan, leader of the LTTE, had recently been assassinated by his deputy, Mahattya. The Aug. 15 edition of India Today stated that Prabakharan and another leading LTTE figure, Sadasivam Krishnakkumar (“Kittu”), had been shot by Mahattya during an argument over the July 13 assassination of Amirthalingam [see above]. The reports of Prabakharan's death were denied by the LTTE, but reports from the northern provinces described scenes of public mourning in a number of towns and villages. On Aug. 25 the LTTE released a videotape intended to prove that he was still alive.

REFERENCE. Last roundup article pp. 36282-87; June 1989 intensified pressure for indian troop withdrawl p. 36735; August developments pp. 36850-51