1 Scalarity, Exclusivity, Miraticity / Evaluativity: What (And What Doesn't

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1 Scalarity, Exclusivity, Miraticity / Evaluativity: What (and what doesn’t) make ‘only’ a mirror image of ‘even’ 1 Yael Greenberg, Bar Ilan University [email protected] (Version of 28.1.2019) Abstract An intuition that can be found in the literature on the focus sensitive particle ‘only’ is that there is a sense in which it is a scalar antonym or mirror image of ‘even’. This intuition, though, is not captured by the entries most often assigned to this particle, namely ‘non-scalar’ and ‘scalar’ entries, asserting the falsehood of all / all stronger alternatives to the prejacent, p, in C, respectively. An entry which gets closer to capturing this mirror imaged relation is what I call a ‘hybrid’ entry (cf. Guerzoni 2003) presupposing all alternatives to p in C to be stronger than it and asserting all distinct alternatives in C to be false. In this paper I supply novel arguments for preferring this entry over the more commonly used entries. I show that using the ‘hybrid’ entry allows a straightforward explanation of the infelicity of ‘only’ in the presence of some discourse salient material, and the fact that this infelicity parallels infelicity of ‘even’ in mirror imaged cases. In contrast, neither ‘non-scalar’ nor ‘scalar’ entries can capture this infelicity, crucially not even when augmented with ‘mirativity/evaluativity’ (or ‘non-vacuity’) constraints. I argue that this is because, unlike ‘even’, which is a true evaluative particle (presupposing a ‘higher than the standard’ degree for both p and its alternatives), mirativity / evaluativity (indicating ‘lower than expected’ / ‘lower than the standard’) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the felicity of ‘only’, and should not be hardwired into its semantics. Instead I suggest a way to derive mirative / evaluative effects of ‘only’, as well as cases where these effects disappear, from the ‘hybrid’ entry and some assumptions about accommodation of alternatives into C. Thus, besides the mirror imaged scalar ordering (between p and its all distinct alternatives in C), ‘only’ and ‘even’ should not be seen as ‘mirative / evaluative’ mirror images. Neither should they be taken as mirror images in terms of exclusivity vs. additivity, due to independently made claims indicating that ‘even’ is not a true additive particle. I show that adopting the ‘hybrid’ entry of ‘only’ (but not the ‘non-scalar’ or ‘scalar’ entries), where scalarity and exclusivity are separated components, allows us to capture this limited mirror imaged picture, and take ‘only’ to be a member of the typology of scalar particles cross linguistically. Finally, I discuss parallel challenges for the universal quantification over alternatives in the scalar presuppositions of both ‘only’ and ‘even’, and argue that they can be uniformly solved by appropriately constraining the balance between the contribution of discourse salient material vs. lexicon for constructing alternatives in C, though the precise way to do that still requires research. 1 Acknowledgements: To be added later. 2 0. Introduction The semantics of the English focus sensitive particle only has been under considerable attention and debate for a long time, with a relatively large number of lexical entries suggested in the literature for this particle, and a large number of arguments for and against these entries. In this paper I take a new perspective in examining this particle, focusing on three schematic types of entries suggested for it in the literature. The first is a classical non-scalar entry, asserting the exclusion of all distinct focus alternatives to the prejacent of only, p, in C, the set of contextually supplied focus alternatives to p. The second is a scalar entry, asserting the exclusion of all ‘stronger’ such alternatives on a scale. And the third is a less commonly used entry, which I will call hybrid, as it includes both a scalar component - presupposing that all distinct alternatives in C are stronger than p - and a non-scalar one - asserting that all distinct alternatives in C are false.2 The new perspective to look at the choice between these entries concerns the relationship of only to another well-studied focus sensitive particle, namely English even. The idea that the two particles are related is also rather old. In particular, an intuition that can be found in the literature regards only and even as some sort of scalar mirror imaged particles or scalar antonyms. This intuition, though, is not captured by the entries which are most often assigned to only in the literature, namely the non-scalar and scalar entries. The hybrid entry of only, on the other hand, gets closer to capturing this ‘scalar antonymy with even’ intuition. The main part of the paper is devoted to provide other, novel arguments in favor of this hybrid entry of only, which although still related to the relationship with even, are more empirical in nature. As we will see below this will also help us make the ‘antonymy’ intuition more precise, and in particular help to get a clearer about what does and what does not make only a mirror image of even. The paper is structured as follows: In section 1 I briefly review the intuition about the scalar antonymy of even and only and show why neither the non-scalar nor the scalar entries capture it. In section 2 I examine a more concrete challenge for these two entries, namely observations about cases where only is infelicitous in the presence of some discourse salient material. I show that adopting some reasonable assumptions about the way alternatives are constructed (cf. Fox & Katzir 2011, Katzir 2014), the infelicity of only in such cases constitutes a real puzzle for both the non-scalar nor the scalar entries, and neither can explain them, not even when augmented with independently suggested constraints on non-vacuity or mirativity / evaluativity. In particular, I bring new arguments showing that mirativity / evaluativity is not a necessary condition for the felicity of only and should not be hardwired into its 2 For all entries I will adopt the assumption that the prejacent, p, is presupposed. This assumption is debated in the literature, but as it is not the focus of this paper I will not dwell into the debate here. 3 lexical entry, and that neither it nor a constraint on non-vacuity are sufficient conditions for the felicity of only either. In section 3 I examine a solution to the infelicity puzzle. I start by reviewing a version of the scalar entry of only, in Orenstein & Greenberg 2013, Orenstein 2016, which provides a local fix of the puzzle. I then turn o the hybrid entry, which provides a more general explanation of the infelicity of only, and in doing so parallels the way the classical entry of even accounts for parallel cases of infelicity with this particle. Section 4 I examines challenges for the universal quantification over alternatives in the hybrid entry of only, namely the felicity of only in cases where potentially relevant weaker alternatives are assumed to be part of C. I point out that precisely the parallel challenge has been independently raised against the universal quantification in the scalar presupposition of even. I argue that maintaining the universal quantification in the scalar presuppositions of both particles, while constraining the C sets they operate over, is preferable over weakening the quantification over alternatives in C (although the precise constraints on C still need to be further clarified). Two more indirect supports for the hybrid entry are examined in sections 5 and 6. In section 5 I suggest a way to derive mirativity/evaluativity effects of only, as well as cases where such effects disappear, using the hybrid entry and constraints on accommodating alternatives into C (based on ideas raised in Krifka 2000). An implication of the discussion in this section is that while only and even are indeed antonyms in terms of the scalar ordering between their prejacents and all their alternatives in C, they are not ‘mirative’ or ‘evaluative’ antonyms, and more generally that scalarity and mirativity / evaluativity should be treated separately. In section 6 I examine existing reports of scalar – even-like and only-like - particles cross linguistically, which were claimed to vary along parameters like scalar ordering, additivity vs. exclusivity, etc.. I argue that given these reports scalarity and exclusivity of scalar particles are independent components, as in the hybrid entry of only, but not as in the non-scalar entry (where scalarity is not captured) or the scalar one (where exclusivity is a special case of scalarity). Thus adopting the hybrid entry of English only makes it easier to view it as part of the typology of scalar particles as well. In that section I also argue that only and even should not be taken to be mirror imaged particles along the exclusivity vs. additivity parameter, given challenges for the claim that even triggers an additive presupposition. Section 7 summarizes the ways only can (and cannot) be considered a mirror image of even and points out some directions for further research. 1. Background: Two popular entries for only and the ‘scalar antonymy with even’ intuition The intuition that only and even are in some sense opposites, or express some mirror imaged relation has been expressed in various theories studying these particles. Zeevat 2013 writes that: 4 Only (and other exclusive particles like just or merely) expresses that the size of something is disappointingly small: one expected more. Similarly, even expresses that one expected less. (p. 301) Beaver & Clark 2008 write that: in considering the meanings of only and even, one is tempted to say that they are, in some sense, opposites. Yet is hard to put one’s finger on the nature of this intuitive antonymy.
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