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Paul DE GRAUWE Date of Birth : July 18, 1946 Place of B 1 C U R R I C U L U M V I T A E : P A U L D E G R A U W E Name : Paul DE GRAUWE Date of Birth : July 18, 1946 Place of Birth : Ukkel, Belgium Mother Tongue : Dutch Foreign Languages : English, French, German Address - office : European Institute London School of Economics and Political Science Houghton Street London WC2A 2AE Tel : +44(0)20 7955 6464 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Education Degree obtained 1952-1964 St. Jan Berchmans-College, Brussels Humaniora 1964-1969 Catholic University of Leuven Licentiaat-Doctorandus Department of Economics 1970-1973 The John Hopkins University, Baltimore Ph.D. Department of Political Economy Employments Status Jan. 1969-March 1969 European Economic Community Trainee Oct. 1969-Aug. 1970 Center for Economic Studies Research-Assistant Catholic University of Leuven Oct. 1973-Sept. 1974 International Monetary Fund Economist March 1978-Sept. 1978 Université de Paris IX-Dauphine Maître de Conférence Oct. 1979-Sept. 1980 Université Catholique de Louvain Charge de Cours invité 1975-1980 Centrum voor Economische Studiën Research Director Jan. 1981-May 1981 University of Michigan Visiting Associate Professor 2 1982 Université Libre de Bruxelles Professeur Visiteur Tilburg University Visiting Professor 1974-1982 Katholieke Universiteit te Leuven Associate Professor Belgium 1983 Wharton School - University of Visiting Professor Pennsylvania 1984-1986 College of Europe, Bruges Professor 1986 Institut für Weltwirtschaft Visiting Professor University of Kiel 1986 International Monetary Fund Visiting Scholar 1987 Bank of Japan Visiting Scholar 1988 Chaire Francqui Visiting Professor Université Libre de Bruxelles 1988-1991 Institut für Weltwirtschaft Visiting Professor 1994, 1996, 1998, 2004 University of Kiel 1988-1991 Centre for European Policy Studies Senior Research Fellow Brussels 1990-1998 University of Saarbrücken Visiting Professor 1991-1992 Francqui Leerstoel Visiting Professor Rijksuniversiteit Gent 1994-1998 Universidade Católica Portuguesa Visiting Professor 1994-1995 Freie Universität Berlin Professor Bundesbank Lehrstuhl 1997 Board of Governors of the Federal Visiting Scholar Reserve System, Washington 1997-1998 2000-2005 University of Amsterdam Visiting Professor 1999-2000 Humboldt Universität Berlin Visiting Professor 1999-2001 Norwegian School of Management Professor 2003 European University Institute Schumann Fellow 2000-2005 Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore Milano Visiting Professor 1991-1995 Belgian Parliament Senator 3 1995-1999 Belgian Parliament Member of the House 1999-2003 Belgian Parliament Senator and Chairman of the Economic and Finance Committee 2007 European Central Bank Wim Duisenberg Fellow 1974-2011 Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Professor Belgium 2002-2016 CESifo Research Area Director Munchen Presently London School of Economics Professor John Paulson Chair in European Political Economy Fellowships and Honors N.F.W.O. Aspirant 1970-1972 (Belgian National Science Foundation) Fulbright Travel Grant, 1970 Honorary Woodrow Wilson Fellow, 1972 Brookings Research Fellow, 1972-1973 Prize of the European Communities, 1976 Amex Bank Review Award, 1990 Doctor “Honoris Causa” of the University of Sankt Gallen, 1999 Doctor “Honoris Causa” of the Turku School of Economics and Business Administration, 2000 Doctor “Honoris Causa” of the University of Genoa, 2005 Doctor “Honoris Causa” of the University of Valencia, 2012 Doctor “Honoris Causa” of the Maastricht University, 2016 Member of Board of Editors of the following journals Open Economies Review Empirica The World Economy International Journal of Finance and Economics Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv International Finance Nonlinear Dynamics and Econometrics German Economic Review Other Activities Chairman of Task Force preparing Belgian profit sharing legislation (2000) Chairman of Task Force preparing Belgian Corporate Governance legislation (2000) Member of the Group of Economic Policy Analysis advising the European Commission President Barroso, 2005-10 4 PUBLICATIONS 1. Speciale trekkingsrechten : arme landen te weinig, De Financiële Economische Tijd, 1970. 2. Determinanten van de exportprestatie van België en Nederland, Tijdschrift voor Economie, 1971. 3. Regionale inkomens- en prijselasticiteiten van de Belgische buitenlandse handel, Economisch Statistische Berichten, 2829, 1971. 4. Regionale inkomens- en prijselasticiteiten van de Belgische buitenlandse handel - Naschrift, Economisch Statistische Berichten, 2863, 1972. 5. A Cross-Section Model of Economic Growth : Comment, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 1972. 6. Monetary Interdependence in Europe under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates, Tijdschrift voor Economie, 4, 1974. 7. The Interaction of Monetary Policies in a Group of European Countries, Journal of International Economics, 5, p. 207-228, 1975. 8. International Capital Flows and Portfolio Equilibrium : Comment, Journal of Political Economy, 83, p. 1077-1080, 1975. 9. The Development of the Euro-Currency Market, Finance and Development, 3, 1975. 10. Conditions for Monetary Integration. A Geometric Interpretation, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, 111, p. 634- 646, 1975. 11. De olieëxporterende landen en ontwikkelingshulp, Intermediair, 18, 1975. 12. Vers une relance de l'Union Monétaire Europèenne, Textes et Documents, 1975 (co-author with D. Heremans, E. Van Rompuy). 13. Monetary Interdependence and International Monetary Reform. A European Case Study, Saxon House, D.C. Heath Ltd., London, 1976. 14. The Oil Prize Increase, Stabilization Policies and Less Developed Countries, in : D. Leipziger, The International Monetary System and the Developing Countries, 1976. 15. Monetary Interdependence among Major European Countries, in : Aliber, The Political Economy of Monetary Reform, 1976. 16. The Belgian Dual Exchange Market System : An Inequitable and Ineffective System, Kredit und Kapital, Heft 3, p. 389-402, 1976. 17. De recente inflatie : Een structureel of monetair fenomeen, Leuvense Economische Standpunten, 2, 1976 (co-author with T. Peeters). 18. De wisselkoers en structuurproblemen in België gedurende 1970-1976, Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management, 1, p. 107-120, 1977. 19. Korporatisme en werkloosheid, Leuvense Economische Standpunten, 4, 1977. 20. Bedenkingen over Industrieel Beleid, Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management, 4, 1977. 5 21. Vicious and Virtuous Circles. A Theoretical Analysis and a Policy Proposal for Managing Exchange Rates, European Economic Review, V.X, 3, 1977 (co-author with G. Basevi). 22. State Interventions and the Economic Crisis in Europe, Toyo Keizai Shinposha (The Oriental Economist), 1978. 23. Monetary Policy and the Exchange Rate, Monetary Policies in Open Economies, SUERF Series, 19A, 1978. 24. Vicious and Virtuous Circles and the Optica-Proposal : A Two-Country Analysis, in : M. Fratianni and T. Peeters, One Money for Europe, 1978 (co-author with G. Basevi). 25. On the Effectiveness of a devaluation in the E.C.-Countries, Tijdschrif voor Economie en Management, 1, 1978 (co-author with C. Holvoet). 26. Trade Expansion with the Less Developed Countries and Employment. A Case Study of Belgium, Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, Band 115, 1, 1979 (co-author with W. Kennis, T. Peeters and R. Van Straelen). 27. The 1978 Annual Report of the B.I.S. or the Economics of International Fine Tuning, Journal of Monetary Economics, 1979. 28. The EMS, Europe and the Dollar, The Banker, 1979 (co-author with T. Peeters). 29. Het Europees Muntstelsel. Een stap naar monetaire stabiliteit ?, Bank- en Financiewezen, 1, 1979 (co- author with T. Peeters). 30. Arbeidsduurvermindering en Tewerkstelling, Leuvense Economische Standpunten, 13, 1979. 31. Salaires, Emploi et Durée de Travail, Récherches Economiques de Louvain, 1979. 32. The Dynamics of Intervention in Foreign Exchange Markets, Kredit und Kapital, 6, 1980 (co-author with G. Basevi, A. Steinherr). 33. Financial Policies in the Industrialized Countries and the Volatility of Exchange Rates, Kredit und Kapital, 6, 1980. 34. Le Taux de Change, l'Emploi et la Banque Nationale, La Revue Nouvelle, 2, 1980. 35. Aspecten van de economische achteruitgang van Wallonië, Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management, 2, 1980. 36. Monetary Policies and the Exchange Rates in the E.C.-Countries, European Economic Review, 13, 1980. 37. Policy-Induced Rigidities in the Market Economies, International Chamber of Commerce, Paris, 1980. 38. Integrating Capital Markets in the E.C.-Countries, Problems and Prospects, Thema, Inst. Bancario San Paolo di Torino, 1980. 39. Symptomen van een overgewaardeerde munt. De Belgische frank gedurende de tweede helft der zeventiger jaren, Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management, 3, 1980. 40. De wisselkoers, het budget en de lopende rekening, Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management, 3, 1980 (co-author with M. De Wachter). 41. Versus the G.A.T.T. on the Source of Inflation, The World Economy, 2, 1981. 6 42. Overheidsparticipaties, Economisch Statistische Berichten, 1981. 43. Economie en Politiek, Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management, 4, 1981. 44. Loonkosten, energiekosten en kapitaalkosten. België gedurende 1970-1980, Leuvense Economische Standpunten, nr. 22, 1981. 45. Capital Movements, Financial Integration and the EMS, Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia, 9-12, 1981. 46. Foreign Exchange Market Intervention using an ECU-indicator, in : M. Sumner and G. Zis, European Monetary Union, 1982 (co-author with P. Van den Bergh). 47. Alternative Intervention Rules in the Exchange Markets
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