DOCSLIB.ORG

How to Fix Europe's Monetary Union

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text

Load more

R EBOOTING E U R OPE This eBook collects essays from a broad range of leading economists on a simple question: “What Fixing the Monetary Union Rebooting Europe: more needs to be done to fix the Eurozone?” Although the authors disagree on solutions, there is a broad consensus on the list of needed fixes. These include: • Completing the Banking Union; How to fix Europe’s • Breaking the ‘doom loop’ between banks and their sovereigns; • Ensuring EZ-wide risk sharing for Europe-wide shocks; • Cleaning up the legacy debt problem; monetary union • Coordinating EZ-level fiscal policy while tightening national-level discipline; • Advancing structural reforms for a better functioning monetary union. Views of leading economists Each chapter presents solutions to one or more of these challenges. Taken together, they are the most complete catalogue of solutions to date – representing views that range from calls for sharp increases in European integration to those that favour national, market-based solutions. Edited by Richard Baldwin The authors, drawn from a wide geographic range and all schools of thoughts, are: Thorsten Beck, and Francesco Giavazzi Agnès Bénassy-Quéré, Peter Bofinger, Giancarlo Corsetti, Paul De Grauwe, Barry Eichengreen, Lars Feld, Daniel Gros, Refet Gürkaynak, Matthew Higgins, Yuemei Ji, Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Stefano Micossi, Tommaso Monacelli, Elias Papaioannou, Paolo Pesenti, Jean Pisani-Ferry, Chris Pissarides, André Sapir, Isabel Schnabel, Christoph Schmidt, Guido Tabellini, Volker Wieland, and Charles Wyplosz. ISBN 978-1-907142-96-3 Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX A VoxEU.org Book Tel: +44 (0)20 7183 8801 Fax: +44 (0)20 7183 8820 Email: [email protected] www.cepr.org 9 781907 142963 How to fix Europe’s monetary union: Views of leading economists A VoxEU.org eBook CEPR Press Centre for Economic Policy Research 2nd Floor 33 Great Sutton Street London, EC1V 0DX UK Tel: +44 (0)20 7183 8801 Email: [email protected] Web: www.cepr.org ISBN: 978-1-907142-96-3 © CEPR Press, 2016 How to fix Europe’s monetary union: Views of leading economists A VoxEU.org eBook Edited by Richard Baldwin and Francesco Giavazzi CEPR Press Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) The Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) is a network of over 1000 research economists based mostly in European universities. The Centre’s goal is twofold: to promote world-class research, and to get the policy-relevant results into the hands of key decision-makers. CEPR’s guiding principle is ‘Research excellence with policy relevance’. A registered charity since it was founded in 1983, CEPR is independent of all public and private interest groups. It takes no institutional stand on economic policy matters and its core funding comes from its Institutional Members and sales of publications. Because it draws on such a large network of researchers, its output reflects a broad spectrum of individual viewpoints as well as perspectives drawn from civil society. CEPR research may include views on policy, but the Trustees of the Centre do not give prior review to its publications. The opinions expressed in this report are those of the authors and not those of CEPR. Chair of the Board Sir Charlie Bean President Richard Portes Director Richard Baldwin Research Director Kevin Hjortshøj O’Rourke Policy Director Charles Wyplosz Contents About the contributors vii Foreword xx Introduction 22 Richard Baldwin and Francesco Giavazzi Part 1: Complete reform plans Minimal conditions for the survival of the euro 33 Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz Maastricht 2.0: Safeguarding the future of the Eurozone 46 Lars P. Feld, Christoph M. Schmidt, Isabel Schnabel and Volker Wieland A sovereignless currency 62 Agnès Bénassy-Quéré The Eurozone’s Zeno paradox – and how to solve it 75 Jean Pisani-Ferry Part 2: Focusing on completing the Banking Union, and financial markets Completing the Banking Union 87 Daniel Gros Safeguarding the euro – balancing market discipline with certainty 99 Thorsten Beck The EZ Crisis: What went wrong with the European financial integration? 107 Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan Part 3: Focusing on fiscal and monetary policy Building common fiscal policy in the Eurozone 117 Guido Tabellini Rebooting Europe: Closer fiscal cooperation needed 132 Christopher Pissarides How to reboot the Eurozone and ensure its long-term survival 136 Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji Policies and institutions for managing the aggregate macroeconomic stance of the Eurozone 150 Giancarlo Corsetti, Matthew Higgins and Paolo Pesenti Asymmetries and Eurozone policymaking 160 Tommaso Monacelli ECB in Eurozone policymaking: Going forward 176 Refet S. Gürkaynak Part 4: Focusing on structural and institutional reform The Eurozone needs less heterogeneity 179 André Sapir Balance-of-payments adjustment in the Eurozone 188 Stefano Micossi Needed: A European institutional union 207 Elias Papaioannou vi Part 4: Focusing on structural and institutional reform The way forward: Coping with the insolvency risk of member states and giving teeth to the European Semester 227 Peter Bofinger Epilogue: Future history – how the crisis might have been handled How the Euro Crisis was successfully resolved 240 Barry Eichengreen and Charles Wyplosz vii About the contributors Richard Baldwin is Professor of International Economics at the Graduate Institute, Geneva since 1991, a part-time visiting research professor at the University of Oxford since 2012, Director of CEPR since 2014, and Editor-in-Chief of Vox since he founded it in June 2007. He was Co-managing Editor of the journal Economic Policy from 2000 to 2005, Policy Director of CEPR from 2006 to 2014, and Programme Director of CEPR’s International Trade programme from 1991 to 2001. Before that he was a Senior Staff Economist for the President’s Council of Economic Advisors in the Bush Administration (1990-1991), on leave from Columbia University Business School where he was Associate Professor. He did his PhD in economics at MIT with Paul Krugman and has published a half dozen articles with him. He was visiting professor at MIT in 2002/03 and has taught at universities in Australia, Italy, Germany and Norway. He has also worked as consultant for the numerous governments, the Asian Development Bank, the European Commission, OECD, World Bank, EFTA, and USAID. The author of numerous books and articles, his research interests include international trade, globalisation, regionalism, and European integration. Thorsten Beck is Professor of Banking and Finance at Cass Business School in London. He was Professor of Economics and founding chair of the European Banking Center at Tilburg University from 2008 to 2013. Previously he worked in the research department of the World Bank and has also worked as consultant for – among others - the IMF, the European Commission, and the German Development Corporation. His research and policy work has focused on international banking and corporate finance and has been published in Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Monetary Economics and Journal of Economic Growth. His research and policy work has focused on Eastern, Central and Western Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. He is also Research Fellow at CEPR and a Fellow at the Center for Financial Studies in viii How to fix Europe’s monetary union: Views of leading economists Frankfurt. He studied at Tübingen University, Universidad de Costa Rica, University of Kansas and University of Virginia. Agnès Bénassy-Quéré is a Professor at the Paris School of Economics - University of Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne, and the Chair of the French Council for Economic Analysis. She worked for the French Ministry of economy and finance, before moving to academic positions successively at Universities of Cergy-Pontoise, Lille 2, Paris-Ouest and Ecole Polytechnique. She also served as a Deputy Director and as a Director of CEPII and is affiliated with CESIfo. She is a Member of the Commission Economique de la Nation (an advisory body to the Finance Minister) and of the Cercle des Economistes, and a columnist at France Culture. She is a former member of the Shadow ECB Council. Her research interests focus on the international monetary system and European macroeconomic policy. Peter Bofinger is Professor for Monetary Policy and International Economics at the University of Wuerzburg, member of the German Council of Economic Experts and a Research Fellow at the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). He received his doctorate from Saarland University. Previously he was economist at the Bundesbank, visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and at the IMF, and Professor at the Universities of Kaiserslautern and Konstanz. He is author of textbooks on macroeconomics and monetary economics (Monetary Policy: Goals, Institutions, Strategies, and Instruments) as well as general interest books on economic issues. Giancarlo Corsetti is Professor of Macroeconomics at the University of Cambridge. His main field of interest is international economics and open-economy macro. His main contributions to the literature include models of the international transmission mechanisms and optimal monetary policy in open economies; theoretical and empirical studies of currency and financial crises and their international contagion; models of international policy cooperation and international financial architecture; quantitative and empirical analyses of the multiplier and fiscal policy. He has published articles in many international journals
Recommended publications
  • The Econometric Society European Region Aide Mémoire

    The Econometric Society European Region Aide Mémoire

    The Econometric Society European Region Aide M´emoire March 22, 2021 1 European Standing Committee 2 1.1 Responsibilities . .2 1.2 Membership . .2 1.3 Procedures . .4 2 Econometric Society European Meeting (ESEM) 5 2.1 Timing and Format . .5 2.2 Invited Sessions . .6 2.3 Contributed Sessions . .7 2.4 Other Events . .8 3 European Winter Meeting (EWMES) 9 3.1 Scope of the Meeting . .9 3.2 Timing and Format . 10 3.3 Selection Process . 10 4 Appendices 11 4.1 Appendix A: Members of the Standing Committee . 11 4.2 Appendix B: Winter Meetings (since 2014) and Regional Consultants (2009-2013) . 27 4.3 Appendix C: ESEM Locations . 37 4.4 Appendix D: Programme Chairs ESEM & EEA . 38 4.5 Appendix E: Invited Speakers ESEM . 39 4.6 Appendix F: Winners of the ESEM Awards . 43 4.7 Appendix G: Countries in the Region Europe and Other Areas ........... 44 This Aide M´emoire contains a detailed description of the organisation and procedures of the Econometric Society within the European Region. It complements the Rules and Procedures of the Econometric Society. It is maintained and regularly updated by the Secretary of the European Standing Committee in accordance with the policies and decisions of the Committee. The Econometric Society { European Region { Aide Memoire´ 1 European Standing Committee 1.1 Responsibilities 1. The European Standing Committee is responsible for the organisation of the activities of the Econometric Society within the Region Europe and Other Areas.1 It should undertake the consideration of any activities in the Region that promote interaction among those interested in the objectives of the Society, as they are stated in its Constitution.
  • Should Europe Become a Fiscal Union?

    Should Europe Become a Fiscal Union?

    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Keuschnigg, Christian Article Should Europe Become a Fiscal Union? CESifo Forum Provided in Cooperation with: Ifo Institute – Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich Suggested Citation: Keuschnigg, Christian (2012) : Should Europe Become a Fiscal Union?, CESifo Forum, ISSN 2190-717X, ifo Institut - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung an der Universität München, München, Vol. 13, Iss. 1, pp. 35-43 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/166470 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu Focus SHOULD EUROPE BECOME A problems that have led to the current crisis. The final section offers some conclusions. FISCAL UNION? Economic and fiscal imbalances CHRISTIAN KEUSCHNIGG* Prior to monetary unification, the guiding principle of Introduction European unification was the notion of subsidiarity.
  • Personal Information Education Professional Positions Other Affi

    Personal Information Education Professional Positions Other Affi

    CURRICULUM VITAE: PHILIP RICHARD LANE, April 2015 Address: Economics Department, Trinity College Dublin, Dublin 2, Ireland Tel.: 353-1-8962259 Email: plane at tcd.ie Home Page: http://www.philiplane.org Personal Information Date of Birth: 27th August 1969 Citizenship: Ireland Education PhD, Economics, Harvard University, 1995. Thesis Title: “Essays in International Macroeco- nomics.” A.M., Economics, Harvard University, 1993. B.A. (Mod.) (Econ.), First Class Honours and Gold Medal, Trinity College Dublin, 1991. Professional Positions Whately Professor of Political Economy, Trinity College Dublin, 2012- Professor of International Macroeconomics, Trinity College Dublin, 2004-2012 Director, Institute for International Integration Studies (IIIS), Trinity College Dublin, 2002-2008 Associate Professor of Economics, Trinity College Dublin, 2000-2004 Lecturer in Economics, Trinity College Dublin, 1997-2000 Assistant Professor of Economics and International A¤airs , Columbia University, 1995-1997 Other A¢ liations Research Fellow, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 2002-. (Research A¢ liate, 1997- 2001). International Research Fellow, Kiel Institute of World Economics, 2005-. Member, Royal Irish Academy, 2007-. Selected Honours, Awards and Grants Irish Research Council Research Project Grant, “External Imbalances and External Adjustment: Lessons from the European Crisis,”2013-2016. Institute for New Economic Thinking Grant, “Financial Globalisation and Macroeco- nomic Policy,”2012-2015. Bhagwati Prize 2010 (best paper in Journal of International Economics; joint with Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti). Fondation Banque de France Grant, “International Leverage,”2009-2010. NoeG Lecture, Austrian Economics Association, Vienna, May 2008. 1 Keynote Speaker, European Economics and Finance Society, Prague, May 2008. Scienti…c Leader, NORFACE Seminar Series Grant “Economic Globalisation and Eu- rope”, 2007-2009.
  • The Missing Pieces of the Euro Architecture

    The Missing Pieces of the Euro Architecture

    Policy Contribution Issue n˚28 | October 2017 The missing pieces of the euro architecture Grégory Claeys Executive summary This policy contribution describes the institutional flaws of the single currency Grégory Claeys (gregory. revealed by the euro crisis and the institutional reforms that were put in place during and [email protected]) is a in the aftermath the crisis, and evaluates the remaining fragilities of the architecture of the Research Fellow at Bruegel European monetary union. In order to achieve a more resilient monetary union in Europe, we propose: 1) to A version of this paper was form a ‘financing union’ through the completion of the banking union and the promotion of prepared for the conference an ambitious capital markets union to provide private risk sharing between the countries of ‘20 years after the Asian the monetary union; and 2) to improve the defective macroeconomic policy framework to Financial Crisis: Lessons, avoid a repeat of the mistakes of recent years. Challenges, Way Forward’, Tokyo, 13-14 April 2017, The latter involves: reforming the European Stability Mechanism / Outright Monetary organised jointly by the Asian Transactions framework to clarify its functions and improve its governance system, reforming Development Bank and the the European fiscal rules to make them more effective to achieve the two desirable objectives Asian Development Bank of sustainability and stabilisation, and creating a small-scale euro-area stabilisation tool to Institute, and was published provide public risk sharing in case of significant shocks that members of the monetary union as ADBI Working Paper No. cannot deal with alone and to help manage the euro-area aggregate fiscal stance.
  • Payments and Market Infrastructure Two Decades After the Start of the European Central Bank Editor: Daniela Russo

    Payments and Market Infrastructure Two Decades After the Start of the European Central Bank Editor: Daniela Russo

    Payments and market infrastructure two decades after the start of the European Central Bank Editor: Daniela Russo July 2021 Contents Foreword 6 Acknowledgements 8 Introduction 9 Prepared by Daniela Russo Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, a 21st century renaissance man 13 Prepared by Daniela Russo and Ignacio Terol Alberto Giovannini and the European Institutions 19 Prepared by John Berrigan, Mario Nava and Daniela Russo Global cooperation 22 Prepared by Daniela Russo and Takeshi Shirakami Part 1 The Eurosystem as operator: TARGET2, T2S and collateral management systems 31 Chapter 1 – TARGET 2 and the birth of the TARGET family 32 Prepared by Jochen Metzger Chapter 2 – TARGET 37 Prepared by Dieter Reichwein Chapter 3 – TARGET2 44 Prepared by Dieter Reichwein Chapter 4 – The Eurosystem collateral management 52 Prepared by Simone Maskens, Daniela Russo and Markus Mayers Chapter 5 – T2S: building the European securities market infrastructure 60 Prepared by Marc Bayle de Jessé Chapter 6 – The governance of TARGET2-Securities 63 Prepared by Cristina Mastropasqua and Flavia Perone Chapter 7 – Instant payments and TARGET Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) 72 Prepared by Carlos Conesa Eurosystem-operated market infrastructure: key milestones 77 Part 2 The Eurosystem as a catalyst: retail payments 79 Chapter 1 – The Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) revolution: how the vision turned into reality 80 Prepared by Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell Contents 1 Chapter 2 – Legal and regulatory history of EU retail payments 87 Prepared by Maria Chiara Malaguti Chapter 3 –
  • SIMULATING an OIL SHOCK with STICKY PRICES by Francesco Giavalli Mehmet ODEKON and Charles WYPLOSZ N° 81/26

    SIMULATING an OIL SHOCK with STICKY PRICES by Francesco Giavalli Mehmet ODEKON and Charles WYPLOSZ N° 81/26

    SIMULATING AN OIL SHOCK WITH STICKY PRICES by Francesco GIAVAllI Mehmet ODEKON and Charles WYPLOSZ N° 81/26 Directeur de la Publication : Jean-Claude THOENIG Associate Dean: Research and Development INSEAD Imprimé par l'INSEP), Fontainebleau France SIMULATING AN OIL SHOCK WITH STICKY PRICES Francesco Giavazzi University of Essex and Università di Venezia Mehmet Odekon INSEAD, France Charles Wyplosz INSEAD, France Revised Version: November 1981 Abstract: This paper extends recent work by J. Sachs about the response of a two country plus OPEC neo-classical model to an oil shock with full inter-temporal optimization and perfect foresight. Here, the role of imperfectly flexible prices is studied under the assumption that firms are output constrained. The presence of expected inflation is shown to be pervasive. It affects the real interest rate term structure and therefore the valuation of all components of wealth, as well as the exchange rate and the attending distribution of world expenditures. Inflation also enters the wage adjustment mechanism and therefore the path of unemployment and capital accumulation. Address: Charles Wyplosz, INSEAD, Boulevard de Constance, 77305 Fontainebleau, France I - INTRODUCTION As recently pointed out by Krugman (1980), the proper study of the effects of an oil shock on the exchange rate requires two essentiel fea- tures. First, because the exchange rates which are interesting are those linking the non-OPEC countries, the minimal set up consists of a model including two such countries and OPEC. The exchange rate then reflects how differently the two countries react to the shock. Second, there are two aspects in which the countries reactions may differ: trade and finance.
  • ECB Policy and Eurozone Fragility: Was De Grauwe Right?

    ECB Policy and Eurozone Fragility: Was De Grauwe Right?

    ECB Policy and Eurozone Fragility: Was De Grauwe Right? ORKUN SAKA*, ANA-MARIA FUERTES and ELENA KALOTYCHOU Cass Business School, City University London, U.K First draft: November 2013; This draft: May 2014 Abstract De Grauwe’s Eurozone fragility hypothesis states that member countries of a monetary union are highly vulnerable to a self‐fulfilling mechanism by which the efforts of investors to avoid losses from default can end up triggering the very default they fear. We test this hypothesis by applying an eclectic methodology to a time window around Draghi’s “whatever‐it‐takes” pledge on July 26, 2012 which was soon after followed by the actual announcement of the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) program. The principal components of Eurozone credit default spreads (CDS) validate this choice of break date. An event study reveals significant pre‐announcement contagion from Spain to Italy, Belgium, France and Austria. Furthermore, the analysis of time‐series regression residuals confirms frequent clusters of large bad shocks to the CDS spreads of the above four Eurozone countries but soley during the pre‐announcement period. Our findings support the Eurozone fragility hypothesis and endorse the OMT program. Keywords: Sovereign debt; Eurozone; European Central Bank; Outright Monetary Transactions; Self-fulfilling panic. JEL classification: E44, F36, G15, C52. _____________________________________________________________________ * Corresponding author. Cass Business School, 24 Chiswell Street London, EC1Y 4UE United Kingdom; Tel: +44 (0)75 9306 9236; [email protected]. † We are grateful to Paul De Grauwe, José-Luis Peydró and Christian Wagner for their useful comments and suggestions. We also thank participants at the Young Finance Scholars’ Conference and Quantitative Finance Workshop at the University of Sussex (May 2014), and seminar participants at Cass Business School, Keele University and Brunel University.
  • Risk and Regulation Monthly November 2020 Contents

    Risk and Regulation Monthly November 2020 Contents

    CENTRE for REGULATORY STRATEGY EMEA Risk and Regulation Monthly November 2020 Contents CONTENTS HIGHLIGHTS COVID-19 BANKING CAPITAL MARKETS INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT CENTRAL BANK OF IRELAND OTHER CONTACTS Highlights In Ireland, the Central Bank published the outcome of its thematic review of fund management companies. It was found that a significant number of firms have not fully implemented the framework for governance, management and oversight in fund management companies. The European Commission published a consultation on AIFMD. This ask respondents whether fund delegation rules should be accompanied with quantitative criteria or a list of core functions that cannot be delegated. For a full list of COVID-19 related regulatory, monetary and fiscal policy initiatives, please see our report available here. COVID-19 Speech by Pablo Hernández de Cos, Governor of the Bank of Spain, on EU Spain's experience with risks and ECB vulnerabilities in the corporate sector as a result of the COVID-19 crisis Speech by Philip R. Lane, Member of the Executive Board at the ECB, on the Speech by Luigi Federico Signorini, ECB’s monetary policy in the pandemic Deputy Governor at the Bank of Italy on mobilising private finance for a Interview of Christine Lagarde, green recovery and hence “building President of the ECB on the role of the back better” ECB in non-normal times Macroprudential bulletin covering the Speech by Randal K Quarles, Vice usability of capital buffers Chairman for Supervision of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve ECB -
  • Four Essays on Capital Regulation of Banks

    Four Essays on Capital Regulation of Banks

    Four Essays on Capital Regulation of Banks Schriftliche Promotionsleistung zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades Doctor rerum politicarum vorgelegt und angenommen an der Fakultät für Wirtschaftswissenschaft der Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg Verfasser: Eva Schliephake Geburtsdatum und -ort: 01.02.1983, Karl-Marx-Stadt (heute Chemnitz) Arbeit eingereicht am: 20. Juni 2013 Gutachter der schriftlichen Promotionsleistung: Professor Dr. Roland Kirstein Professor Dr. Abdolkarim Sadrieh Datum der Disputation: 24. September 2013 The Essays This collection of essays analyzes optimal capital requirement regulation and its effects on the incentives of stakeholders. The first essay, written together with my supervisor Roland Kirstein was recently published in the Journal of Money Credit and Banking. It analyzes under which conditions a binding capital requirement reduces the incentives of banks to undercut in prices. Based on the strategic capacity commitment model of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) we show that if the immediate recap- italization insufficiently costly, capital requirement regulation induces banks that compete in Bertrand competition to behave like Cournot competitors. Formally, the binding capital regulation changes the strategic price setting Bertrand game into a two stage game, where banks first have to commit to a loan supply capacity before they compete for loan interest rates. This de- creases the loan supply and increases loan interest rates, resulting in higher profits for banks compared to the unregulated case. In this thesis, I add the online appendix to the published version that provides all the proofs of the propositions. This appendix was not part of the publication due to capacity limits within the journal. The second essay builds on the results of the first essay and analyzes the impact of reduced competition on the efficiency of capital requirement regulation in establishing financial stability.
  • The Banking Union, Under Way and Here to Stay

    The Banking Union, Under Way and Here to Stay

    www.pwc.es www.ie.edu The Banking Union, under way and here to stay A report by the PwC and IE Business School Centre for the Financial Sector. This report has been coordinated by Luis Maldonado, managing director of the PwC and IE Business School Centre for the Financial Sector February 2014 Contents Introduction 4 Executive summary 10 The Single Supervisory Mechanism, the key to the entire process 14 The entrance exam. Crossing the gorge. 22 The SSM from the inside 24 The Single Resolution Mechanism, a crucial component 26 Operations. This is how the SRM will work 32 A Safety Net with Loopholes 34 Emergency liquidity assistance, the taboo last resort 38 The ESM, a cannon of limited use 40 A Single Rulebook to prevent fragmentation 42 Learning from mistakes 47 Conclusions and recommendations 48 References 51 3 Introduction The European Union’s progress towards Since then, spectacular progress has integration has always been marked by been achieved in a little more than a firm steps and inconsistent political year and a half. Today there is impulses, guided to a large extent by considerable consensus on the developments in the international components that should constitute the economic environment. The banking union: a Single Supervisory implementation of the Economic and Mechanism (SSM) for the entire euro Monetary Union (EMU) and the creation area; a Single Resolution Mechanism of the euro constitute a key – and (SRM), with a single European authority fortunately irreversible – advancement, able to take over a bank’s management, as the European Central Bank reiterated restructure it and even wind up its at the height of the sovereign debt crisis operations if necessary, and a Single in 2012.
  • Coronavirus and the Cost of Non-Europe

    Coronavirus and the Cost of Non-Europe

    Coronavirus and the cost of non-Europe An analysis of the economic benefits of common European action IN-DEPTH ANALYSIS EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service European Added Value Unit PE 642.837 – May 2020 EN European integration has been key to driving economic growth for half a century, generating significant gains in gross domestic product (GDP) for EU Member States both collectively and individually. This EPRS paper focuses on the economic benefits of common action, and what is at risk if the current coronavirus crisis and its aftermath were to stall or reverse the process of European integration. It attempts to quantify the losses entailed if the economic downturn caused by the pandemic were to result in the gradual dismantling of the EU project and a parallel failure to take advantage of the unexploited potential of collective public goods that could yet be created. In this respect, the study makes use of two complementary concepts: European added value, which attempts to identify the benefit of existing collective action at European level, and the cost of non-Europe, which assesses the benefits foregone by not taking further action in the future. Even cautious estimates suggest that dismantling the EU single market would cost the European economy between 3.0 and 8.7 per cent of its collective GDP, or between €480 billion and €1 380 billion per year. In parallel, the potential cost of non-Europe in 50 policy fields was identified by EPRS in 2019 as around €2.2 trillion or 14 per cent of EU GDP (by the end of a ten-year running-in period).
  • CURRICULUM VITAE Career

    CURRICULUM VITAE Career

    17 January 2019 CURRICULUM VITAE Name: Charles Richard Bean Birth Date: 16 September 1953 Nationality: British Career 1965-71 Brentwood School, Brentwood, Essex. 1972-75 Emmanuel College, Cambridge University. BA, 1975 (First in Economics and Mathematics; MT Dodds prize). MA, 1979. 1975-79 HM Treasury Economic Assistant, Short-Term Forecasting Division. 1979-81 Massachusetts Institute of Technology. PhD, 1981 (Essays in Unemployment & Economic Activity); Harkness Fellow. 1981-82 HM Treasury Economic Adviser, Monetary Policy Division. 1982-2000 London School of Economics Department of Economics: Lecturer (1982-86); Reader (1986-90); Professor (1990-2000); Chair of Department (1999-2000). Centre for Economic Performance: Deputy Director (1990-94). Academic Planning and Resources Committee (1995-98). 1990 Stanford University, Visiting Professor. 1999 Reserve Bank of Australia, Visiting Professor. 2000-14 Bank of England Executive Director for Monetary Analysis & Statistics (2000-08); Deputy Governor for Monetary Policy (2008-14). Monetary Policy Committee (2000-14, Vice-Chair, 2008-14); Financial Policy Committee (2011-14) G7 Deputies (2008-14; Co-Chair, 2013); G20 Deputies (2008-14; Co-Chair, 2009); OECD Working Party 3 (2002-14; Chair, 2010-12). 2014- London School of Economics Professor of Economics (part-time). 2017- Office for Budget Responsibility Member, Budget Responsibility Committee (part-time) Honours President, Royal Economic Society (2013-15) Knight Bachelor (Queen’s Birthday Honours, 2014) Journal Responsibilities Assistant Editor, Economic Policy (1985-86). Editor, special issue of Economica on Unemployment (1986). Managing Editor, Review of Economic Studies (1986-90). Assistant Editor, Economic Journal (1996-2000) Editorial Boards: Review of Economic Studies (1984-96, Chairman 1992-96); Moneda e Credito (1987-97); Journal of Applied Econometrics (1991-2003); Economica (1996-2000); World Economics (1999-2000); International Journal of Central Banking (2004-10, Chairman).