Monetary Policy in the Confederacy
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RF Fall2005 v10 revisedpg40.ps - 10/17/2005 4:25 PM ECONOMICHISTORY MonetaryOpportunity PolicyCost in the Confederacy BY ERIC NIELSEN ars may be won or lost on repercussions long after the war Unable to finance the battlefield, but gener- ended. The conduct of monetary poli- Walship, bravery, and cy in the Civil War is not simply of the war effort organization are of little use to an interest to historians. The era also pro- army if its government can’t pay its vides important lessons for monetary through taxation, expenses. The ability of a government policymakers and researchers. The to finance a war is often critical to the experience of the Confederacy in par- the South turned to war’s outcome, even if the effects of ticular illustrates the consequences of financing seem far removed from mili- poor financial infrastructure and gov- the printing press, tary action. In turn, a government’s ernance. It also shows the power of a voracious appetite for resources to generally monetarist explanation of and the result was fund its military and the peculiar inflation. strain on production that characterize At the start of the war, the hyperinflation times of war further complicate good Confederacy faced many daunting monetary and fiscal policymaking. barriers to the conduct of sound mon- These tensions clearly played a signifi- etary policy. Perhaps most important cant role in the conduct of the of these was the decentralized power American Civil War. structure of the Confederate govern- The need for wartime funding in the ment. The Southern states had North and South led to policies that seceded under the banner of states’ illustrate basic tenets of monetary rights and were reluctant to obey the economics while precipitating a dra- economic policies of President matic restructuring of the national Jefferson Davis or Secretary of the financial system, changes that had Treasury Christopher Memminger. The South also lacked a well-devel- oped financial infrastructure since in the antebellum period most large banking operations were in the North, where most of the gold was held. Each state could charter banks, and there was considerable heterogeneity in banking and regulatory practices across the Southern states. Since each bank could issue its own currency notes, the government had limited ability to conduct coordinated mone- tary policy. Further, the absence of a central bank to act as a lender of last resort made the banking industry prone to liquidity crises. The only source for centralized economic policy After the fall of Atlanta in July 1864, was the Confederate Treasury under the Confederacy’s Memminger, but this office was sub- prospects looked dim. ject to the vagaries of the executive Southerners started and legislative branches of govern- spending their ment, meaning that policy could be Confederate notes influenced for political, not economic, rapidly, increasing reasons as argued by economist money velocity — and with it, prices. Eugene Lerner. PHOTOGRAPHY: LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PRINTS & PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION [LC-B8171-2715] PRINTS & PHOTOGRAPHS OF CONGRESS, LIBRARY PHOTOGRAPHY: 40 Region Focus • Fall 2005 RF Fall2005 v10 revisedpg41.ps - 10/17/2005 4:25 PM The structure of the Southern econ- As more and more tax bills were Confederacy. So rapid was the expan- omy also impeded effective monetary passed, the tax code became increas- sion of the Confederate money supply policy. Heavily dependent on agricul- ingly complicated, further hindering that at one point during the war, the ture, the South had little industrial collection efforts. Indeed, the only orders for new currency exceeded the capital and few liquid assets. The lack taxes that could reliably raise revenue printing capacity of the Treasury’s of liquidity made tax collection in the were taxes-in-kind, which meant that presses. To fill the order, the Treasury rural South very hard, while the lack of goods were confiscated directly. But began to accept counterfeit currency economic diversification made the Lerner argues that this practice ulti- as valid to further expand the supply of economy prone to adverse shocks in mately led to a decline in market money. its few export goods such as cotton. activity, as farmers began to produce The enormous increase in the quan- Finally, the South had a relatively only enough to support themselves, tity of currency precipitated an era of uneducated population which led to fearful that their surplus crop would hyperinflation in the Confederacy as constant worker shortages in the be captured by taxation agents. more dollars chased fewer goods. The Treasury’s office in Richmond and in Jefferson Davis and Secretary price level in the South rose by rough- other posts requiring a high degree of Memminger were also stymied in their ly 10 percent per month during the literacy. attempts to raise revenue through bor- conflict and by the end of the war, the The combination of these structural rowing. Though their initial bond price level had increased in the problems coupled with shortsighted offering of 50 million Confederate Confederacy by a factor of 92, though policymaking by the Confederate dollars sold well, subsequent issues did imports tended to inflate more quick- Congress meant that taxation and bor- not sell well except in some foreign ly and exports more slowly. At the rowing ultimately failed to raise markets. One problem with these later same time, the blockade, military sufficient funds to conduct the war. So bond issues was timing — the war destruction, and the loss of workers to the Confederacy had to finance itself started in April just as farmers were the war caused real wages and output through the excessive printing of planting and strapped for cash. Also, to fall dramatically, with per-capita money, which led to hyperinflation. the 6 percent to 8 percent coupons consumption falling by 50 percent in Increased taxation, the most direct paid by most of these bonds were real terms. Indeed, if banks had not and obvious way of raising additional more than eaten up by high inflation. sharply increased their reserve ratios revenue, failed to finance a significant Throughout the entire course of the for fear of bank runs, the inflation cre- portion of the war for the war, the South managed to secure only ated by excess money in the South Confederacy. Only 8 percent to 11 per- one overseas loan, from Erlanger & would likely have been even more cent of all wartime revenue in the Co. in Paris. The loan had a face value severe. South came from taxation, despite the of $15 million and was issued at a time Hyperinflation had a number of introduction of many new taxes on when things looked bright for the negative effects on the Southern income, professional licenses, and South, on the eve of the battles of wartime economy. As currency property. In addition, a new excise tax Vicksburg and Gettysburg. The became useless as a store of value, the on cotton, the most significant export Confederacy’s defeats at these two rate at which people spent their cash crop in the South, also failed due to pivotal battles caused the value of the reserves — the velocity of money — the surprisingly effective naval block- loan to plummet so that after commis- increased, driving prices still higher. ade orchestrated by the Union. sion, Erlanger likely netted the South In many areas of the South, Prior to the Civil War, the Southern only $3 million in real terms, not Confederate dollars became worth- states enjoyed one of the lightest tax enough to make much of a difference less unless accompanied by some burdens in the world; when the war to the war effort. valuable underlying commodity such started there was thus no infrastruc- With no other avenue open, as cotton or leather, impeding the ture in place to efficiently levy and Secretary Memminger reluctantly smooth economic exchanges on collect taxes except for duties on turned to the printing press to meet which healthy economies depend. In imports and exports at major ports. the Confederacy’s financing needs. border areas, the Union greenback Many state governments were very Memminger was aware that such a currency became the preferred medi- hostile to collection efforts by the move would likely cause a rise in the um for exchange due to its superior Confederate government and actively price level and warned the government stability. Faced with the danger of aided their citizens in tax evasion as repeatedly about this danger, to no imminent invasion and the burden of documented by Lerner in his classic avail. The Treasury bills issued during supporting and hosting the military, study of Confederate economic policy. the war had a peculiar feature: They the border areas tended to be partic- For instance, only South Carolina paid were redeemable for gold two years ularly harmed by the war. for the Tax of 1861 by collecting duties after the war ended, which meant that The Confederate government from its citizens; the other states sim- the value of the bills was partially tied passed the Currency Reform Act of ply took out loans to pay their share. to expectations of victory for the 1864 in an effort to stem the rampant Fall 2005 • Region Focus 41 RF Fall2005 v10 revisedpg42.ps - 10/18/2005 9:54 AM inflation ravaging the South. The Act tising effort presaged the modern era underlying commodity, was used as effectively removed one-third of all in which bond issues to the general legal tender. A year later the Union currency in the South from circula- public were used to help pay for wars. government passed the National tion by mandating that all large During the war, the Union also man- Banking Act of 1863 which created a denomination bills be converted to aged to expand its tax base and revamp system of nationally chartered and reg- 4 percent Treasury bonds before its collection system.