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Durham E-Theses A clash of civilisations? Culture and ideology in US-Iran relations since 1979 Paterson, Annabel Christina Mary How to cite: Paterson, Annabel Christina Mary (2002) A clash of civilisations? Culture and ideology in US-Iran relations since 1979, Durham theses, Durham University. Available at Durham E-Theses Online: http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/3972/ Use policy The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that: • a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source • a link is made to the metadata record in Durham E-Theses • the full-text is not changed in any way The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders. Please consult the full Durham E-Theses policy for further details. Academic Support Oce, Durham University, University Oce, Old Elvet, Durham DH1 3HP e-mail: [email protected] Tel: +44 0191 334 6107 http://etheses.dur.ac.uk 2 Title: A Clash of Civilisations? Culture and Ideology in US-Iran Relations Author: Annabel Christina Mary Paterson Degree: MA by Research (Middle Eastern Studies) Year: 2002 This thesis explores US-Iran relations since 1979, emphasising the cultural and ideological aspects of the relationship. It aims to examine why, despite opportunities, a constructive dialogue has not yet been achieved. It challenges the . US's stated view of Iranian foreign policy and argues that it is the preponderance of ideology in the relationship, not the US's strategic concerns with Iranian behaviour, that has thwarted rapprochement. It uses Gramsci's ideas on hegemony to examine firstly, the ideological conflict between the two since 1979 and secondly, the remarkable consensus of attitudes towards Iran in Washington. Within the thesis, the impact on relations of the 'Track 2' process, President Khatami and the Israeli lobby in Washington are also examined. The thesis concludes that, until the ideological aspects of the relationship are addressed and until perceptions and attitudes are challenged, there can be no way forward for relations. A copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without his prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged. A Clash of Civilisations? Culture and Ideology in US-Iran Relations Since 1979 Annabel Christina Mary Paterson MA by Research (Middle Eastern Studies) Institute of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies University of Durham 2002 - iJ DEC 2004 CONTENTS Introduction 3 1. A Framework for Analysis 7 1.1 Realism 8 1.2 Ideology 10 1.3 The concept of hegemony as a useful tool for analysis 11 1.4 The Washington policy monopoly 18 1.5 The Case Study 18 1.6 Methodology 19 2. Iranian Foreign Policy Analysed 20 2.1 Iran as a Patron of International Terrorism 21 2.2 Opposition to Israel 26 2.3 Iran as a Pursuer of Weapons of Mass Destruction 30 2.4 Iran and the Region 36 2.4 Human Rights 42 3. The Cultural and Ideological Conflict 43 3.1 The Origins oflran' s Animosity 44 3.2 The US View 49 3.3 The Lasting Effect 64 4. The Washington Policy Monopoly 72 4.1 The Mechanics ofthe American Foreign Policy Making System 75 4.1.2 The Defence Department 80 4.1.3 The Israeli Lobby 82 4.2 Challenges to the Status Quo 97 4.2.1 The 'Track 2' Process 97 4.2.2 Khatami and Domestic Politics in Iran 99 5. Case Study: the Aftermath of September 11 111 105 1 Conclusion 115 Appendix: Documents 119 Bibliography 120 Figures Fig 1. 91 Fig 2. 103 I confirm that no part of the material contained in the thesis has previously been submitted for a degree in this or any other university. Material from the work of others has been acknowledged and quotations and paraphrases suitably indicated. The copyright of this thesis rests with the author. No quotation from it should be published without their prior written consent and information derived from it should be acknowledged. 2 INTRODUCTION 3 INTRODUCTION As the Clinton Administration drew to a close it seemed as if the thaw in US-Iranian relations was well under way. No direct dialogue between the two governments had been established but impromptu meetings and discussions behind the scenes were taking place and numerous positive statements were being made. In August 1998 US Secretary of State, Madeline Albright and Iran's foreign minister, Kamal Kharazi both attended a UN meeting to discuss Afghanistan. Officially they did not speak to each other but officials admitted that there was "symbolic significance in the fact that Ms. Albright and Mr Kharazi are likely to be in the same room for hours." 1 Encouraged by the Reformist's overwhelming parliamentary victory in February 2000, Madeline Albright's speech soon after to the American-Iranian Council sounded an even more positive note. "My hope is that both in Iran and in the United States, we can plant the seeds now for a new and better relationship in years to come."2 American sanctions on products such as food, medicines and luxury goods were also lifted. Such overtures were not one sided. President Khatami announced in 1997: "we are in favour of relations with all countries and nations who respect our independence, dignity and interests."3 Furthermore, in his now famous CNN interview in 1998, Khatami called for increased cultural relations between the US and Iran in what he termed 'a dialogue of civilisations'. There were encouraging signs that Iran was reforming, both domestically and in its foreign policy. Attitudes to the Middle East peace process were becoming less defiant. Iran was improving relations with many former adversaries including the Gulf countries. Support for Islamic extremists was declining and Iran was playing a constructive role in conflicts such as those in Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. There was strong evidence in 2000 to suggest that the new American administration would continue on the same line of cautious rapprochement. Both the incumbent President Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney were closely associated with the oil industry and were therefore under pressure to lift sanctions to allow American companies into Iran. The security and economic interests of America and Iran continued 1 Shenon, P., 'US and Iran in Further Thaw, Will Join in Afghan Talks', The New York Times. (19 September 1998), [www.nyt.com] 2 Albright, M., 'American-Iranian Relations', Remarks before the American-Iranian Council, ( 17 March 2000), [ secretary.state.gov/www/statements/2000/000317] 3 Khatami, M., Hope and Challenge: the Iranian President Speaks, (Binghampton University Press, New York, 1997), p.96 4 to converge suggesting that improved relations would be inevitable. Mutual concerns over Afghanistan continued to deepen and mutual economic benefits from trade and investment, especially in the oil and gas sector remained. Furthermore Iran was building constructive relations with many of the US's allies including Japan, Europe and Russia, leaving America more and more isolated in its stance. Despite all of the above, recent decisions and statements by the current US goverrunent have reiterated the hard line of the dual contairunent policy. The most recent US Patterns of Global Terrorism Report of 2001 states: "Iran remained the most active state sponsor of terrorism. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) continued to be involved in the planning and support of terrorist acts and supported a variety of groups that use terrorism to pursue their goals . Iran continued to provide Lebanese Hizballah and the Palestinian rejectionist groups - notably HAMAS, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the PFLP-GC - with varying amounts of funding, safehaven, training and weapons. It also encouraged Hizballah and the rejectionist Palestinian groups to co-ordinate their planning and escalate their activities."4 In June 2001 the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) was extended until 2006. 5 A State Department press statement justified the extension, saying: "We continue to be deeply concerned about Iran's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction and missile delivery systems, its support for terrorism, including groups violently opposed to Middle East peace, and its poor human rights record. We continue to oppose investment in Iran's petroleum sector and the ILSA remains US law."6 Likewise in Iran, whilst relations have been normalising with many other former enemies, suggestions of relations with America remain unacceptable to the conservative faction in the government, which includes Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks in America, there were again some signs of improving relations. There was a general consensus in Washington that Iran was co-operating very constructively in Afghanistan, applying diplomatic pressure to the Northern Alliance, providing considerable aid and even offering to rescue downed US pilots. However any hope of this leading to direct 4 US State Department, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, (May 2002), [ www .state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/index] 5 This Act, first established in 1996, excludes any company that invests over $20 million in Iran from operating in Iran 5 communication was shattered with President Bush's 'State of the Union' address in January 2002. In it Bush declared: "Iran aggressively pursues these weapons and exports terror, while an unelected few repress the Iranian people's hope for freedom" and along with North Korea and Iraq, Iran "constitutes an 'axis of evil', arming to threaten the peace ofthe world."7 The aim of this thesis is to explore, why in the face of these numerous opportunities, rapprochement has consistently failed.