In November 1941, following his 94th official victory, he was chosen by Hermann Göring to command 's fighter force as der Jagdflieger, succeeding renowned ace Oberst.Werner Mölders who had just died in an air crash (having himself just succeeded another German aviation legend, ). In November 1942 a promotion to Generalmajor made Galland the youngest officer to attain General rank in Germany. Galland was now responsible for deciding the ongoing tactical and operational doctrine of the 's fighter strategies. No longer flying operationally, one of his first tasks was organising the successful air protection for the of the German battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and the cruiser Prinz Eugen. In February 1942 the Germans determined to bring the battle cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen from Brest, where the RAF regularly bombed them, to better protected anchorages in . On the night of February 11, the big ships slipped out of Brest. While the British had the harbor under close watch, a series of accidents and mistakes allowed the German ships to get out undetected.

By dawn, they were off Cherbourg where German fighters began to escort them. Further British misjudgements hindered accurate identification of the warships until mid-day. By that time, they were nearly at the Straits of , under heavy escort by Fw 190's and Bf 109s of JG.2 and JG.26. Few British strike aircraft were ready and they launched a pitifully small group of Swordfish biplane torpedo bombers, led by Lt. Cdr. Eugene Esmonde. Despite Spitfire fighter cover, the Focke-Wulfs and Messerschmitts destroyed all seven Swordfish; Esmonde earned a posthumous . As put it in The First and the Last, "For two hours in full daylight German warships had been passing along the English coast, following a route which in the history of British sea supremacy no enemy has dared to take since the seventeenth century." Later that afternoon, many more British bombers went after the battle cruisers, but the German fighters and bad weather prevented them from hitting their targets. The three ships made it to German ports that evening, in no small way thanks to the Fw 190.

Walter Krupinski was born on 11 November 1920, in the town of Domnau in , and grew up in Braunsberg. Kuprinski had two younger brothers, Paul and Günther. Paul joined the and entered the Unterseeboot service. He was killed in action on 11 November 1944 while serving on U-771, which was sunk off the Norwegian coast by HMS Venturer.

With the outbreak of the Spanish , Trautloft was one of six pilots sent aboard the Ursaramo to Cadiz to secretly aid General Franco. With them, the pilots had six crated Heinkel He 51 biplane fighters. The men and machines arrived in Spain on 7 August 1936. Originally, they were intended to act as instructors, but the Spanish pilots struggled with learning to fly the He-51, so the German pilots soon took up combat duties. On 25 August Trautloft scored his first victory, shooting down a Republican fighter. A few days later, shortly after scoring his second victory, Trautloft was himself shot down. This was the first Luftwaffe pilot to be shot down in Spain. Trautloft escaped capture, however, and continued flying combat missions. As the war dragged on, the Soviets sent better planes to aid the Republicans. Among these were the agile monoplane Polikarpov I-15 and Polikarpov I-16 fighters. The He-51 proved no match for these new aircraft, and after pressure from the German pilots, four of the new prototype Bf-109V3 were dispatched to the theater. Trautloft flew one of these new fighters, and scored a further three victories in Spain.

The Rudel Scandal of 1976 (German: Rudel-Affäre) was a political affair in Germany concerning the German Army's dealing with the traditions of the and its political implications. In the spring of 1976, businessman and former Luftwaffe Colonel Hans-Ulrich Rudel, who had returned from Paraguay and earlier been a leading member of the Neo-Nazi German Reich Party, was invited by high ranking Bundeswehr officers to a tradition meeting of the Aufklärungsgeschwader 51 "Immelmann". Rudel was considered a persona non grata by the Ministry of Defense because of his undiminished admiration of , but finally he was invited, and attended as the last commander of Schlachtgeschwader 2 "Immelmann", after an intervention of the opposition's spokesman for Defense, Manfred Wörner. Present at the meeting, where Rudel signed his books and gave autographs to soldiers, were the Luftwaffe Generals Karl Heinz Franke and Walter Krupinski. Later on, the Generals publicly compared Rudel's past as a Nazi and Neo-Nazi supporter to the career of prominent Social Democrat leader Herbert Wehner, who had been a member of the German Communist Party in the 1930s and who had lived in Moscow during World War II, where he was allegedly involved in NKVD operations. Calling Wehner an extremist, they said that Rudel, after all, was an honourable man, and "hadn't stolen the family silver or anything else". When these remarks became public, the Federal Minister of Defence Georg Leber ordered them into early retirement as of 1 November 1976. Leber, himself a member of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), however, was heavily criticised for his actions by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) opposition, and the scandal contributed to the Minister's retirement in early 1978.

Hans-Ulrich Rudel On September 23, 1941, he sank the Soviet battleship Marat, during an air attack on Kronstadt harbor in the Leningrad area, with a hit to the bow with a 1000 kg bomb.

There were no Allied fighters to accompany the stream, as none at the time had the range. The bombers had to protect themselves from the German fighters.

The next development was the special Pathfinder squadrons, whose tasks were to mark the significant points on the route and over the target areas. The Pathfinders used a variety of flares and coloured markers.

On the eve of Nuremberg “Bomber Streams”of up to 1,000 aircraft were attacking at night, without much fighter support, following a set route to and from the objective. The objective was marked by the Pathfinders.

“Spoof’s”

Another tactic meant to fool the German night-fighters was the “spoof’ or diversionary attack. When a raid was mounted a certain number of aircraft would be used on spoofs. Each spoof would be intended to divert the German fighters away from the .

Wild Boar

In addition to facing the Luftwaffe’s Tame Boar night-fighters swimming in the Bomber Stream, aircraft also had to contend with attacks from faster, more manoeverable single-engined fighters. These fighters were not equipped for night fighting, but could be utilized under specific circumstances. For the most part the ’s and Focke-Wulf 190’s operated over or near targets in order to take advantage of the illumination afforded by flares, searchlights and fires started by the incendiaries and high explosives dropped by thea ttackers. Together with reflections from cloud cover, the searchlights and ground fires silhouetted the bombers enabling the nimbler fighters to swoop in from above in traditional attack fashion. They had to be very careful not to be hit by their own anti-aircraft guns, so they usually operated at altitudes of 30,000 feet or more, well above the bombers.

Code named (Wild Boar), the single-engined attackers, entered the battle when the target had been determined. Piloted by less experienced, comparatively undisciplined pilots the Wild Boar squadrons achieved relatively minor returns in relation to their losses. They were often brought down by their flak, accidents, and fuel shortages. Mother Nature’s Defences

Bombing was dependent on a number of variables associated with Mother Nature, such as the season, the weather, the winds, the clouds and the moon. Because the bombing took place at night it was necessary to have the correct hours of darkness. Therefore targets deep inside Germany could only be bombed on long winter nights.

Severe weather could ground a mission. So could too much cloud or too little or the wrong type of clouds. No cloud would give enough cover for the bombers to conceal themselves from the fighters. Low cloud would obscure a target, sometimes causing an operation to be called off. Consequently the weather forecast was crucial to the success or failure of a raid.

The phases of the moon were also important as the high moon was considered too bright, and would give the night-fighters an advantage. All these items would have to be taken into consideration as to whether a raid was a “go” or was “scrubbed”.

Learning From The Past: A Fighter Pilot's Obligation CSC 1984 SUBJECT AREA Aviation LEARNING FROM THE PAST: A FIGHTER PILOT'S OBLIGATION Submitted to Mr. Berens In Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for Written Communications The Marine Corps Command and Staff College Quantico, Virginia Major E. W. Hacker Marine Corps April 6, 1984 OUTLINE Thesis Statement: Although there have been significant tech- nological advances in the capabilities of since , the basic tactics of aerial combat have not changed.

One cannot leave the subject of fighter tactics with- out mentioning 's four principles, which sup- port Boelcke's Dicta: See--Decide--Attack--Reverse. Seeing the enemy first allowed Hartmann to decide how the action would begin. He carefully evaluated the enemy, always looking for the element of surprise. He, like Barkhorn, estimated that 90% of the pilots he shot down never saw him coming. When Hartmann attacked, he used superior speed and pressed his attacks to minimum range, maximizing the destructive fire- power of his guns. The last principle was a pause in combat. He would not reattack immediately but would survey the situa- tion to determine if the advantage remained. If the advantage had disappeared, he would patiently search for another unsus- pecting target.32 A fighter is as good as his tactics, no better. Tactics are utilized for only two purposes: victories and survival.

The Battle can be roughly divided into four phases:

 10 July - 11 August: , the Channel battles.  12 August - 23 August: Adlerangriff, the early assault against the coastal airfields.  24 August - 6 September: The Luftwaffe targets the airfields. The critical phase of the battle.  7 September onwards: The day attacks switch to .

Title: German Fighter Tactics Against Flying Fortresses By: Author Unknown Date: 1999-08-08 4812

Office of the Assistant Chief of Air Staff, Intelligence. Washington, D.C.

This report reproduces a study dated 11 November, 1943 by the Third Bombardment Division, VIII Bomber Command, covering German fighter attacks against Flying Fortresses. The tactical diagrams and conclusions are a result of an analysis of more than 2,500 separate encounters covering a period of 6 months.

An analysis of this information has revealed that enemy tactics can be divided into a number of standard patterns. While there are minor variations of these patterns, the tactics presented here are the standard attacks in use at the time of the study.

The accuracy of the diagrams has been verified by several hundred experienced bomber crews as well as by numerous operations officers. Their reliability has also been checked by a number of fighter pilots who have escorted B-17 formations. It is emphasized that individual crews may have seen attacks which vary from these standard patterns. The Hun is an opportunist and is quick to change his approach. It is also emphasized that the ranges at which attacks begin and end may vary from those shown here. Ranges given on the diagrams are representative and should be considered as averages.

Although American heavy bombers were unescorted by fighter aircraft in the opening months of the campaign, Luftwaffe interceptor pilots still had to contend with the massed firepower of the "" formation. In attempting the most basic of attack approaches, from the rear or the "six o'clock" position, a German flier would not only be facing the twin .50 caliber guns mounted in the tail of his intended target, but potentially dozens of others from within the group of bombers.

Methods of Engaging the Combat Box

With the hazards associated with attacking the enemy from the tail position firmly in mind, Luftwaffe pilots logically shifted their focus to the lesser defended front of the formation. Upon interception, fighters would loiter outside of gunnery range, either abeam or behind, to estimate the speed and altitude of the bomber stream.

The German would then accelerate his aircraft to a point two miles ahead of the enemy and 1000 yards above before turning back towards his foe. With closing speeds approaching 500 mph, there was but a few scant seconds to line up a shot, squeeze off a short burst and break away to avoid a collision. A successful frontal attack required superior flying ability, skilled marksmanship and an iron will on the part of the Luftwaffe pilot. Aside from the benefit of confronting fewer guns, the nose approach afforded an opportunity to fire directly in the bomber cockpits. A few well placed cannon rounds could at least disable, if not kill, an American flight crew. Later versions of both the B-17 and B-24 featured powered nose turrets to counter this threat.

The tail attack was not totally abandoned. Small numbers of less maneuverable, more rugged twin-engined aircraft such as the Messerschmitt Bf-110 and Junkers Ju-88 were fitted with a 37, 50 or even 75 mm cannon to permit engagement from outside the range of the heavy bombers tail guns. A single round from these weapons was capable of downing any Allied bomber. The appearance of Allied escort fighters later in the campaign chased these plodding aircraft from the skies.

Breaking the Combat Box

If the tightly maintained American formations could be forced to disperse, then the bombers could be dealt with individually. In July 1943, a new weapon was introduced to achieve that end.

Contained within simple launch tubes affixed to the outer wing sections of Luftwaffe interceptors, the 21 cm Werfergranate rocket propelled mortar shell was intended to be fired from distances beyond the range of bomber defenses. If the pilots aim was true, the unguided projectile's trajectory would place it within the combat box and its detonation would compel the bombers to scatter. By autumn, Werfergranate armed Focke-Wulf Fw 190's were being used as the first wave of a German attack, to be followed up by standard interceptors.

The tactic was successfully employed during the Luftwaffe's defense of Schweinfurt on October 14, 1943, contributing to the destruction of 60 American bombers. The staggering loss of aircraft on that day resulted in the temporary suspension of unescorted daylight raids into Germany. When American bombers resumed daylight missions in early 1944, they were accompanied by escort fighters for the duration of their flight.

Attacking Bombers with Fighter Escort

With American fighter aircraft now providing round trip protection for the bomber formations, German interception tactics were once again modified.

Recalling prior experiences with the during the , Luftwaffe fighters were deployed in "Big Wings" to engage the enemy en masse. Modified Fw -190's with additional frontal and cockpit armor joined standard B-f109's in formations of up to 100 aircraft, referred to as Sturmgruppen. The lighter, more agile Bf- 109's would occupy the American escorts as waves of Fw-190's, in tightly spaced vee's of a dozen or more, assaulted the bombers.

The appearance of the Messerschmitt Me-262 jet fighter allowed circumvention of the defending escorts altogether. In a technique pioneered by Luftwaffe pilots of the , a Me-262 would approach the rear of an American formation at top speed (nearly 600 mph), bypassing the fighter screen. The German jet would then dive to a position roughly a mile behind and a quarter mile below the bombers, pull up into a high-g climb to scrub off airspeed and level off when even with the enemy formation. Now inside the screen of escorts and with a relatively slow closing speed with the bombers, the interceptor pilot could select a target, trigger a short burst from his four 30 mm cannon, roll inverted and dive away.

Brig. Gen. Curtis Le May, commanding the Third Bombardment Division, states that he considers this study as "an excellent example of a thorough collection of intelligence data bearing on the employment of fighter aircraft by the enemy during the progess of combat operations."

One intelligence officer in each group has been appointd to specialize in the collection of information covering enemy tatics. This report is the result of the work of these officers. Final compilation was completed by the A-2 staff at Third Bombardment Division under the direction of Lt. col. Carl Norcross, Assistant Chief of Staff, A-2.

It is believed that this material will be of value to operations officers, intelligence officers, and gunnery officers in training air crews. TACTICS DESCRIPTION This attack was first employed on the Schweinfurt mission, 14 October. In Line- abreast, the single-engine e/a approach on level or slightly higher position. Aircraft A, V C, and D after firing their projectiles, peel off as indicated in dieagram. Aircraft E and F, which are not equipped with rocket armament, close in to attack any Fortresses which may have been crippled by the rocket projectiles or which may, for any other reason, seem to straggle. How close aircraft E and F press home their attacks depends upon the prospect of the "kill".

Note.- This same line-abreast formation is used by twin-engine e/a when firing rocket projectiles. After the projectiles are fired, the twin-engine e/a often close in for the cannon attack.

TACTICS LESSON

It's a two-to-one bet that the e/a which will close in for attack is or are located in the center of the formation. THE STRAGGLER'S NUMBER IS UP. KEEP IN FORMATION AT ALL COST AFTER EXPLOSION OF ROCKET PREJECTILES. The tail gunner (officer) in Fortress No. 1 must be alert to this attack and warn formation leader when e/a are jockeying into position.

DON'T BE LED AWAY FROM MAIN ATTACK BY E/A PEELING OFF.

DON'T WASTE AMMUNITION ON LONG SHOTS.

The best defense against rocket attacks from the rear is slight weaving of the fromation. Due to high trajectory and low velocty of rockets, slight weaving will carry the formation out of the effective range of bursts.

THE TRIPLE THREAT

Lead Squadron of High Group, Any Combat Wing

TACTICS DESCRIPTION

This maneuver, as practically all other head-on attacks, is performed by single engine aircraft. The fighters, flying parallel to Fortresses as indicated in the diagram, pull ahead into positions at 11, 12, and 1 o'clock for commencment of their respective dives. At this time they are approximately 2,000/2,500 yards ahead and 500 yards above the level of the squadron to be attacked. They appear to be converging as they come head-on.

Break-aways are made as follows:

 C does wing up break away to left at 800 yards.  B does slow roll and belly-up dive (the Split "S") at 500 yards.  A does wing up break away to left at 300 yards, and dives until out of range.

Sometimes (as was done by "Goering's Kids" in the Stuttgart mission on 6 September 1943), the dives are extended as indicated by the black lines in diagram, with slow rolls and belly-up dives (Split"S") underneath the squadron. The same diving attacks are often made from the rear of Fortress formaations. FW- 190s and Me-109s can and do make these angular attacks, singly and head-on or from astern. Such attacks can be made from any clock position from 10 to 2 or from 4 to 8.

TACTICS LESSON

A slight turn will make all of these attacks a deflection shot. A slight dive or climb will uncover more turrets.

DOUBLE QUEUE

Low Squadron of Lead Group, Usually of First Combat Wing Over Target

TACTICS DESCRIPTION

On either side of the squadron and at a distance of approximately 2,000 yards, the single-engine fighters queue up for attacks in trains. They are about 500 yards above the level of the lead squadron, flying a parallel course. These formations vary, but at points X and Y the fighters are in trains of two or three to the side, ready for alternating dives, with from 5 to 10 seconds intervals between. In other words, two or three e/a, in train, dive from point X, then two or three e/a, in train, from point Y. The procedure is repeated until all planes (sometimes 18 or more to the side) have taken their turns in diving.

Fighters diving from point X pass under the lead squadron, while the e/a from point Y do a shallow dive, a slow roll, then a belly-up dive (Split "S") when within 500 yards (or less) of the lead element of the squadron. The low squadron can be attacked in the same manner.

The same tactics are employed in dives through the formation, i.e., between the lead and low squadrons or between the lead and high squadrons.

TACTICS LESSON

If these attacks are not properly coordinated, it is a gamble to take evasive action against either of them; if they are coordinated, the nose attack with no deflection is most dangerous. Don't give the fighters a no-deflection shot.

Because of the decoys, this maneuver more than any other, has a tendency to draw fire from Fortress gunners. The group or squadron showing poorest combat formation is usually the one to come under attack. THE SCISSORS MOVEMENT

Low Squadron of High Group, Any Combat Wing TACTICS DESCRIPTION

This maneuver is conventional and designed to break up the Fortress formation. The trailing e/a (on top) pulls up at about 500 yards range and does a fast climb over the squadron. The leading e/a (on bottom) comes in closer (usually to 400 yards) and, with wing up, dives away to the right.

Other single-engine ea can often be observed lining up for similar attacks from other clock postions: sometimes from high, sometimes from level. If from level, the attack is often suicidal for the fighter which tries to pull up and climb over the squadron.

The Scissors Movement can be commenced from clock positions ranging from 10 to 2. It could be used against the lead squadron, with leading e/a diving away to left.

TACTICS LESSON

Avoid giving fighters a no-deflection shot. Make slight turn into the attack. wing a/c must hold formation on this attack and not take individual evasive action to avoid fire.

Gunners must be alert to targets in their respective sectors. One of these fighters will be available to the top-turret gunners, while the other will be available to the ball-turret gunners.

SNEAK ATTACK (TAIL)

Low Squadron of Low Group of Any Combat Wing

TACTICS DESCRIPTION

This attack, known as the "sneak" (tail), can be made against No. 5 and No.6 Fortresses as well as against Fortress No. 4. The approach is from slightly low to level and, almost invariably, is from "out of the sun" or from a cloud position. How much below level the attack is commenced will depend upon the position of the sun or the cloud with respect to the Fortresses.

The same type of attack is often made from the 5 o'clock position, slightly low.

The lead squadron is not immune to attack of this type, but seldom experiences one. However, the high squadrons of groups have known fighters to sneak up on them from 5 and 7 o'clock positions, slightly low. It seems to be the gereral practice for sneak attacks from astern positions, slightly low, to be made agaisnt low squadrons of groups.

TACTICS LESSON Attacks by individual airplanes are not dangerous and this one can be shot down, if all gunners are alert and cover their sectors properly.

BEWARE OF THE HUN IN THE SUN; LIKEWISE, IN THE CLOUD! S NEAK ATTACK (HEAD-ON)

Lead Squadron of Any Group. Any Combat Wing

TACTICS DESCRIPTION

This attack is known as the "sneak" and is made against the lead element planes of the formation. Almost invariably, the fighter will attack " out of the sun" or from a cloud position, when it comes head-on from low. How much below level the attack is commenced will depend upon the position of the sun or the cloud with respect to the Fortresses.

The attack is often made against the No. 2 Fortress from the 1 o'clock, slightly low, position. From this position, the No.1 and No.2 Fortresses of the high squadron are often attacked.

The same type of attack is often made against the No.3 Fortress of the lead and low squadrons from the 11 o'clock, slightly low, position but the breakaway is the same, i.e., there is a slow roll, followed by a break-away in a belly-up dive.

TACTICS LESSON

The same old song: BEWARE OF THE HUN IN THE SUN, LIKEWISE IN THE CLOUD!

Attacks by individual airplanes are not dangerous and this one can be shot down, if all gunners are alert and cover their sectors properly. THE SISTERS ACT

High Squadron of Low Group, Any Combat Wing

TACTICS DESCRIPTION

The Me-110 and Ju-88 attack simultaneously, as indicated in diagram. At point Y, the Ju-88 breaks away to the right, wing-up, while the Me-110 does a slow roll and a break-away to the left in a rather steep dive. Sometimes this maneuver is performed by a pair of Me-110s.

TACTICS LESSON

Each gunner must cover his sector. Coordinated attacks are common. Tail gunner in Fortress No. 5 must be alert to this type of attack. Top-turret gunners in rear of Fortress formation should watch e/a attacking from high, astern. THE SWOOPER

Lead Squadron of Group, Any Combat Wing

TACTICS DESCRIPTION

In the diagram above, the single-engine aircraft makes a diving attack from 10 o'clock, high, swooping down under the squadron. Seldom is the fighter closer to the Fortress squadron than 500 yards, and in this type of attack the fighter comes down from an angle of between 30 and 40 degrees, without rolling over. The fighter pulls out of the dive when clear of the squadron.

IMPORTANT: This type of diving attack can be and often is made under the high and low squadrons, as follows:

(1) Under low squadron, from any position between 6 to 12 o'clock, high.

(2) Under the high squadron, from any position between 12 to 3 o'clock, high.

The diving attack under the lead squadron is often made from any position between 9 to 1 o'clock, high.

VARIATION

While in the majority of these swooping attacks the figher goes under the squadron formation, sometimes it goes over the formation. If the combat formation is bad, the fighter may dive and go through the formation, i.e., between the lead and high squadrons or, if diving from the 12 to 3 o'clock positions, between the lead and low squadrons. Almost invariably, when the fighter dives and pulls up over the formation, the pull-up is over the high squadron.

TACTICS LESSON

Diving attacks with deflection are what we like. The fighter is at a disadvantage. He has a hard shot and can get in only a short burst. Gunners have plenty of time to shoot him down. THE TWIN-ENGINE TAIL-PECKER

Low Squadron of High Group, Usually of Last Combat Wing Over Target

TACTICS DESCRIPTION

The twin-engine fighter approaches from 6 o'clock, level or slightly higher, and at points 1,2, and 3 takes slight evasive action by weaving. Evasive action can be expected to follow almost every burst of cannon fire.

The twin-engine fighter, equipped with rocket armament, fires from 1,200 to 2,000 yards. It may close in for cannon attack after exhausting supply of rocket projectiles. In making the closure, evasive action is taken as indicated above.

Bf109 on B17's in B17 II

At point X, the fighter peels off to right or left and does a shallow dive until out of range of .50-caliber M/Gs of Fortresses. This attack occasionally is made against No. 5 and No. 6. The attack is seldom closed to less than 800 yards behind Fortress No. 4.

TACTICS LESSON

The twin-engine tail-pecker can be expected to return to its 6 o'clock position after evasive action is taken. Hold fire until fighter is within range, then nail him to the cross on his straight-and-level flight, not when he is taking evasive action.

THE SINGLE ENGINE TAIL-PECKER

Low Squadron of High Group, Usually of Last Combat Wing Over Target

TACTICS DESCRIPTION

Fighter flies on level (300 yards below horizontal plane of Fortress No. 4), but at points 1,2, and 3 lifts nose and fires a few bursts of shot. The peel-off is to the right or the left at point X which is approximately 800 yards behind Fortress No. 4.

This typical tail-pecking attack is sometimes made against Fortress No. 5 or Fortess No. 6.

TACTICS LESSON

Although quite common, this type of attack is not too dangerous. The ball turret gunners can have a lot of fun with the tail-pecker which comes in from below, but should avoid long shots.

I have read many reports filed by Allied bombers that state that German fighters waited until after bombs were released to attack. I can see why the Germans would want the bigger machines to have to fight their way home, possiblya gainst the wind when fuel was getting lower, but weren't they concerned about the damage that the bombers would inflict by dropping their payloads on the target? Also, I would think that with the bombs dropped, the bombers would be lighter and somewhat more maneuverable, and better able to defend themselves. Any thoughts?

I am no expert on German or any other nationality's aerial tactics but while we are speculating, here is my contribution.

Aerial tactics would appear to depend primarily on opportunity - the decision to attack or not to attack would depend more on being in the right position vis-a-vis the target. Position of sun and clouds, relative altitude, numbers of aircraft on each side, location, relative direction of flight, the orders and objectives of the the mission etc. These far outweigh the status of the enemy's bomb load. If those factors are promising you might attack, if not you don't (sweeping generalisation, of course). Maybe a "lone stalker" with time to evaluate their target might take it into consideration when choosing their time to strike?

Anyway, how easy is it to see whether bombs are still being carried or have already been dropped, other than by direction of flight? Surely, aviators have many more things to look at and think about before taking that factor into account?

I believe the primary factor was that the German units stationed this deep in German lines were reactionary; that is, they were specifically for home defense and their main duty was not to conduct random patrols, but to respond to any bombing formations sent into "Hunland."

The bomber formations of the IAF primarily operated between 13,000 and 19,000 feet. It required considerable time for the German fighters to get into the air and attain that altitude in preparation for attack. So generally, an alert would come in as the Allied formation penetrated German lines and the intercepting flight of fighters would rush into the air to meet them as fast as they could gain combat altitude, which was generally upon their return. It had little if anything to do with wind, maneuverability or or fuel capacity... they just couldn't get there any sooner.

It is a fact that most air to air combat took place on the return, not going toward, the target... at least according to my old pal Captain Charlie Heater of 55 RAF and the 11th Aero. He and I were pen pals in the late 80's and he told me of many raids when they had a quiet trip in and a terrible trip out, including specific details on 20 July 1918, 12 August, and several other dates.

Hope that helps. Anyone who can better explain the German fighter reaction time please feel free to correct me.

This is the Nazi version of the Japanese "Baka" bomb. It is driven by a typical V-1 jet engine. Carrying a load of explosive in the nose of this craft, Nazi suicide pilots planned to wreak destruction among our D-day fleet with this weapon. Although the weapon was developed, the plan went astray through official indifference and bungling among the higher echelons of the Nazi command.

Enough of these, the idealists believed, could completely wreck any seaborne invasion with an expenditure of less than 1,000 volunteer pilots. The members of this strange group were ready to volunteer. They asked only that they be given a weapon which would be certain to achieve its end, and they felt there were personsa mong their membership who had the skill to design such a weapon.

By October 1943, under the leadership of the woman flyer, a doctor of the Institute of Medical Aeronautics at Rechlin, and a first lieutenant of theLuftwaffe , organizational plans had advanced to a point where it was necessary to obtain official recognition and cooperation in conducting the project further. Because of her unique position in German aviation circles, this duty fell to the aviatrix.

The woman first presented the idea to the Luftwaffe High Command, and met with immediate rebuff. The German Air Force was not interested in an idea they considered to be the unstable reasoning of a group of psychopaths. After much delay, theLuf twaffe was by-passed, and the aviatrix went directly ot Field Marshall Milch, at that time the head of the German . Again no progress was made.

After more weeks had passed, the woman determined to exploit her position and reputation in German aviation circles, and succeeded in gaining a hearing ebfore the German Academy of Aeronautics. This Academy had the power to assemble the necessary scientists, technicians, and air tactical authorities, and eventually a meeting was called by the Director of the German Aeronautical Research Council. After a lngte hy conference, the committee of authorities decided that the idea was indeed operationally sound.

With this authoritative evidence in hand, the next step before the group of idealists was to obtain official support and leadership for the suicide plan.Ap plication was made for an interview with Hitler, and in February 1944, the woman leader of the project was summoned to Berchtesgaden for a 3-hour discussion with the Fuehrer.

INTERVIEW WITH HITLER

Hitler did not approve. He objected to the philosophy of suicide entailed in the plan, and pointed out that there was no precedent in German history like it. Therefore, he said, the whole idea was not in keeping with the character of the German people. The woman countered this with the argument that never before in German history had the fate of the country been in such a precarious position. This, apparently, was the wrong thing to say, for Hitler replied emphatically that the position wasnot precarious, and that if it ever became so, then he, Hitler, would personally give the orders for such desperate measures to be taken.

The interview was anything but successful, but before she left, the aviatrix did obtain Hitler's permission to continue with the development and planning so that the organization would be ready to operate if ever the Fuehrer felt the time had come to take such desperate steps. His parting remark was to the effect that he did not want to be bothered with the idea again until the time for action was ripe.

About this time, the Allies took a hand in things by staging their invasion in Normandy. Neither the suicide weapon, nor adequately trained suicide pilots were available, greatly because of the mishandling the whole program had received from its selfish or uninterested directors. The disappointment of the volunteer group was profound. Within 6 or 7 days after D-day, they realized that the invasion was a success, and that the moment for which they had been preparing had passed.

But, several days after the invasion had started, and all other efforts to halt it had failed, Herman Goering suddenly remembered that somewhere in hisLuf twaffe there was a group of pilots who had volunteered for a suicide mission. In due course, Goering reached the commander of the bomber wing under whom the volunteers had originally been placed. The commander, a colonel, immediately declared that the group was ready for action. The volunteers were astounded. They knew that no planes or "buzz bombs" were available, and that only a few of the men had any more than the rbiefest of preflight training. Nonetheless, the commander and his technical assistants, without consulting the volunteers, set to work on plans to use a Focke Wulf 190, carrying a 4,000-pound bomb, to crash into selected targets. Now no one in the German Air Force had ever flown this plane with such a large bomb load, and it was highly doubtful that the plane would be able to get off the ground without crashing. Consequently, regular test pilots declined the honor of testing this experimental makeshift. Undaunted, the commander announced that his suicide pilots—none of whom had ever flown an FW 190, if any other plane—would within the next few days conduct the test flights themselves. If they were killed, he said, their names and loyal sacrifice would be recorded in German history with the same honor they would have received if they had crashed their plane onto the deck of an enemy ship. Any enthusiasm that had remained among the volunteers disappeared completely at this point.

Fortunately for these men, Hitler heard about the plans for using the FW 190, and ordered the project abandoned. The bomber commander was removed, eventually, and his successor set about trying to salvage some of the finer ideas of the original project. But by then it was too late. The Allies were established in force on the continent, the hour to strike had passed, and so the group of suicide volunteers was disbanded.

"And so," to quote the woman flyer, "did an idea that was born of fervent and holy idealism, only to be misused and mismanaged at every turn by people who never understood how men could offer their lives simply for an idea in which they believed."

CONCLUSION

Were it not for the grievous damage done to our fleet units a year later by the Japanese Kamikaze corps, this German project might be passed off as just another unconventional tactical venture which the German leaders were smart enough to recognize as nothing but foolishness. But in the light of our later experience with the Japanese, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the Nazi command failed to realize they were being offered an impressive counterweapon to seaborne invasion. It is useless, in retrospect, to attempt a reconstruction of what might have happened off Normandy on D-day, if the Nazi command had recognized the potentialities of these volunteers and their piloted bomb.

Contrary to what many people believe, Polish Air Force was NOT destroyed on the ground in the first few hours of the conflict and, despite being numerically and technically inferior to the German Luftwaffe, managed to put on a brave defence. German Quartermaster General’s reports admitted the loss of 258 planes throughout the Polish Campaign, and it can be stated with absolute certainty that more than 100 of these aircraft were shot down by Polish fighter pilots. Here’s a brief history of this gruelling battle against all odds…

Luftwaffe order of battle included Luftflotte 1 and Luftflotte 4 which on September 1st consisted of 1538 combat aircraft. Of these, 339 were Messerschmitt Bf 109 fighters, mostly the 109E (Emil) variant, 82 twin-engine fighters and 258 Stuka dive-bombers. The remaining number were various subtypes of and bombers, there was also a Staffel of Henschel Hs 123 ground attack planes. Additionally, some 102 Bf 109 fighters formally assigned to the were also used, though on limited scale. 202 reconnaissance aircraft were assigned to the army units involved in the assault, which brings us to the total of 1942 combat aircraft used operationally against . Replacements and reinforcements of over 100 aircraft in total were brought in at various stages of the campaign.

Polish Lotnictwo Wojskowe order of battle included two large units, the Pursuit Brigade (Brygada Poscigowa) and the Bomber Brigade (Brygada Bombowa), both under the command of the General Staff, as well as the Army Air Force (Lotnictwo Armijne) which consisted of individual wings (dywizjony) and squadrons (eskadry) assignedi n groups to seven different Polish Army commands. The Pursuit Brigade, comprised of five fighter squadrons with the total of 53 aircraft (43 PZL P.11a and P.11c, and 10 P.7a), was given the task of defending Warsaw and its environs. The Bomber Brigade, wthi 36 excellent PZL P.37 Los medium bombers, and 50 PZL P.23 Karas light bombers constituted a considerable force, but outdated concepts of air warfare adhered to by the Polish command severely limited its effectiveness. In total, in its hour of need, Poland was able to muster 404 first-line aircraft, of which only 308 had any combat value. Of these, 128 were PZL P.11 fighters, all 3 to 5 years old which, sturdiness and maneuverability notwithstanding, had very limited performance compared to their German ounterpac rts. The rest of the fighters in first-line units – 30 PZL P.7a aircraft – were totally obsolete. The 36 P.37 Los bombers were the only equipment on par with the Luftwaffe, and the 114 P.23 Karas reconnaissance/light bomber aircraft could be considered barely adequate for the time.

The first clash between Luftwaffe and Polish fighters took place on September the 1st, shortly before 7 am over the secret Polish airfield of Balice, near Cracow. A three- airplane section of 121 Eskadra was surprised during take-off by three Ju 87s and Capt. Medwecki, the Commanding Officer of the Cracow Army Fighter Wing was killed. His victor was Franck Neubert of StG2 Immelmann. 2nd Lt. Wladyslaw Gnys managed to evade the attack, and damage one of the Stukas. A few minutes later, having climbed, he attacked two Do 17s returning from a raid on Cracow, scoring several hits on each of them. After his second dive, he lost visual contact with them and returned to the airfield not knowing that he had just scored the first two victories over Luftwaffe in World War 2. The two German bombers collided after his attack and fell to the ground near the village of Zurada.

Meanwhile, a far bigger engagement was to take place over the outskirts of Warsaw. Alarmed by the well-organized network of observation posts, the Pursuit Brigade in full force (52 aircraft) intercepted a large formation of He 111 bombers from KG27 escorted by Bf 110s of I/LG1. As a result of well-executed attack, six He 111s were shot down at the expense of one P.11c, which crashed during a forced landing. What was supposed to be Der Spaziergang uber Warshau – a ’stroll over Warsaw’ – turned into a bitter escape for the Luftwaffe bomber crews. During the fighting, 2nd Lt. Borowski of 113 Eskadra shot down a stray Bf 109, which became the first aircraft of that type destroyed in World War 2.

Heavy fighting over Warsaw resumed in the afternoon, when second large German raid, escorted by both Bf 110 and Bf 109 fighters, was intercepted by the Pursuit Brigade. This time the escorts were able to engage Polish fighters before they reached the bombers, and soon first German bombs fell on Warsaw. Before they were able to enter the fight, four P.7s of 123 Eskadra were shot down in a surprise attack by Bf 110s of I/LG1. Capt. Olszewski, the C/O was killed and the other three pilots bailed out, two of them shot at and heavily wounded by the Germans after opening their parachutes. These were the first victories for German fighter pilots in World War 2.The fighting was fierce, and Gemrans lost two Bf 109s, one of them shot down by Lt. Col. Leopold Pamula, deputy C/O of the Brigade, who himself had to bail out soon afterwards. Polish losses amounted to three P.11s.

In the following days, the Luftwaffe changed its tactics. Taking advantage of the superior characteristics of its aircraft (German twin-engined bombers were faster than Polish fighters), it used small groups of bomber aircraft approaching the target from several directions at different altitudes, while Bf 109s and Bf 110s flew sweeps in the area. These tactics proved quite successful – despite its valiant efforts, the Brigade was unable to prevent German bombs from falling on Warsaw. Its pilots managed to shoot down 47 German planes from 1 to 6 September, but combat attrition was very high, and on September 7 the remnants of the Brigade were moved to the Lublin area, leaving the capital virtually defenseless against heavy Luftwaffe raids (Warsaw was never captured by the Germans – it was to be bombed into submission during 20 days of successful defence against German assault).

In other parts of the country the Army fighter units fought with varying degrees of success. As they were lacking the observation facilities of the Pursuit Brigade, they either flew sweeps, or detached small formations of fighters to improvised airfields with the task of intercepting sighted German aircraft. The latter tactic, called ‘ambushes’, was soon abandoned, as the P.11 fighters were usually unable to intercept their targets, no matter how quick the take-off.

The often desperate situation of Polish ground units sometimes resulted in equally desperate measures taken by the supporting air forces. On September 2nd, the Pomorze Army Fighter Wing was ordered to strafe a German motorized column making a quick advance into Polish territory near Grudziadz. As the P.11 fighters were totally unsuitable for the task, armed only with two (a few aircraft had four) 7.92mm machine guns and offering no armor protection, the C/O, Capt. Florian Laskowski decided that while he would lead 141 Eskadra to attack the troops, 142 Eskadra would fly a regular fighter sweep. When nine P.11s of 141 Eskadra approached the target, they were met by heavy machine gun fire and soon three planes were shot down, their pilots killed. Among the casualties – and first to be downed – was Capt. Laskowski. Another pilot had to make a forced landing; all the other planes took scores of hits. Needless to say, the effect of the attack on the Germans was marginal at best. Meanwhile, 142 Eskadra intercepted two unescorted German raids in succession and claimed 7 victories, with no losses on its par t.

Not surprisingly, combat attrition proved high for Army fighter squadrons, and by September 10 all but one Army fighter wings were moved east of Vistula, where a futile attempt to rebuild the Pursuit Brigade and charge it with the defence of Lublin area was being made. Faced with fuel and spare parts shortages, devoid of any organized observation network, these pilots fought only isolated skirmishes with het Luftwaffe, claiming but 5 victories till September 17th. On that day the crossed Poland’s eastern borders, and all the remaining aircraft were ordered to fly to Romania. The only Dywizjon that remained with its Army was the Poznan Army FighterWi ng. Under the excellent command of Mjr. Mieczyslaw Mumler, it was able to fight effectively, up to September 17th, scoring no fewer than 36 kills throughout the campaign. This in spite of the fact that on 9th September Mjr. Mumler was forced to disband 131 Eskadra and transfer its remaining aircraft to 132 Eskadra, (it was also reinforced by three pilots from the disbanded unit, and the rest simply had no aircraft to fly).

While their colleagues of the fighter squadrons were busy trying to fight off swarms of enemy aircraft, the crews of the Bomber Brigade spent the first two days of September in readiness, waiting for orders to take-off – which never came. There was a great deal of confusion in the Brigade headquarters, and aside from reconnaissance no missions were flown. As the Polish command had promised their West-European allies not to bomb any targets on German territory, it was decided that the Brigade would support ground troops by attacking enemy motorized and Panzer columns. Little thought was gvien to attacking enemy airfields or supply lines, which would definitely have been more effective in delaying German advance. Thus, beginning on September 3rd, the Brigade’s P.23s and– on the next day – P.37s started flying bombing missions against advaninc g German troops. Surprisingly enough, these actions enjoyed a reasonable success. Attacks on German Panzer columns near Radomsko on September 3rd, carried out by some 30 P.23s of the Brigade, and stopped their advance for about two days. While other actions weren’t nearly as successful, over all the attacks proved enough of a nuisance that the Luftwaffe was forced to provide fighter patrols for covering the advancing troops. However, the tactics of nuisance attacks in small formations (usually of three arcri aft) and the columns after dropping the bomb load (crews had specific orders to do so) in aircraft unsuitable for the task quickly proved very costly. Devoid of fighter escort, many bombers fell to the guns of patrolling Bf 109s, while more yet were shot down or heavily damaged by anti-aircraft fire. Even so the missions were carried out till the Brigade was left with virtually no aircraft. On September 17th only 17 P.37s of Brigade’s initial strength of 86 aircraft flew to Romania, all the P.23 Karas bombers having been either destroyed or damaged beyond repair.

Life wasn’t much easier for Army reconnaissance squadrons which, armed with the same P.23 light bombers as the Brigade, often took up ground support missions, trying to relieve at least some of the relentless pressure experienced by the ground units. Again, these actions did enjoy a limited success. On September 2nd, P.23s of 24 Eskadra escorted by 6 P.11s from 122 Eskadra – an extremely rare comfort for Polish bomber crews – totally surprised a German column near Czestochowa, causing many casualties and heavy confusion. On the next day crews from the same Eskadra successfully bombed German Panzer column near Rabka, scoring direct hits on several tanks. Only one P.23 was lost in these attacks, but that, again, was to prove an exception rather than the rule. In a similar attack on September 3rd, 31 Eskadra– even though its six P.23s caught Germans unaware during a rest and caused heavy casualties– lost two aircraft; the remaining four were more or less seriously damaged. Reconnaissance missions, usually flown by single aircraft, were also dangerous – Luftwaffe’s dominance in the air was evident and the crews could rarely count on help from Polish fighters. In general, combat attrition was extremely high and only 16 of the initial 64 P.23s from the army reconnaissance squadrons made it to Romania on September 17th. Of about 2000 aircraft used against Poland Luftwaffe lost 258 to all causes, and of additional 263 damaged only 40% made it backt o the front-line units after repairs. An estimated 230 aircraft were destroyed in action, primarily by Polish fighters and an-ti aircraft artillery. About 400 aircrew were killed or missing, and an additional 120 wounded. Of 217 German tanks destroyed and 457 seriously damaged in the campaign, a significant proportion can be attributed to the Bomber Brigade and P.23s of the Army reconnaissance squadrons.

Lotnictwo Wojskowe lost 333 aircraft, 260 as the result of enemy action. Of these, around 100 were destroyed in combat, and a further 120 as the result of sustained damage. Only 25 combat aircraft (as opposed to many training and civilian airplanes) were destroyed on the ground. Aircrew killed numbered 61, 110 were missing and 63 wounded. When comparing the combat potential of both sides, this is by no means a bad result for the Polish Air Force.

An interesting observation is that, throughout the campaign, more than 30 Polish aircraft were shot down by Polish anti-aircraft fire. This sad testimony to the effciei ncy of Polish AA gunmen (who also took a heavy toll – considering the minute number of AA guns available – of the Luftwaffe) is easy to explain. Constantly harassed by the Luftwaffe, mauled by the horrifying Stuka attacks, Polish ground troops fired ata nything that flew. Polish aircraft were indeed a rare sight those days, thus, when they did appear, they were almost automatically assumed to be German. Probably the worst incident happened on September 8th. When P.11s of III/2 Dywizjon were chasing a He 111 formation near Pulawy, Polish AA opened fire, and shot down four aircraft, killing two pilots– one of them the C/O of 121 Eskadra – and wounding one. More frequent, though, were cases of downing Polish liaison and reconnaissance aircraft, which, because of German mastery of the air, usually kept close to the ground and were often hit by own machine gun or even small arms fire.

Another interesting statistic is the number of defensive kills by Polish bomber and reconnaissance crews – 14 – as compared to the number of these aircraft shot down by German fighters, which is 31. As Polish bombers had relatively weak defensive armament (three 7.92mm guns) and no armor, even assuming to-pquality gunnery on part of the Polish crews, there is no escape from the conclusion that many German fighter pilots were only learning their trade (for comparison: the Pursuit Brigade claimed 38 victories over German bombers and lost only 4 fighters to their defensive fire).