Appendix 3 The Iranian and Russian Armies

Scholars point out that was totally unprepared to face the Russian onslaught. After the fall of the Safavids, Iran had lived in relative isolation, with few or no diplomatic ties with the West and was largely removed from the currents of global events. The early Qajars, therefore, had little knowledge of the scientific, military and economic changes which had propelled Russia into a world power.1 The Iranian army of the height of the Safavid era had become extinct. Nader had to create a permanent army by uniting the various Turkic and and by recruiting Arabs, Afghans and Indians. He had also instituted military ranks and a disciplined , and, with the help of European officers, had created a light artil- lery. His military victories against the Ottomans and the Mughals had restored Iran to the condition it had attained during the first seven decades of the seventeenth century. After his death, however, the army had split into its former tribal groups, whose leaders fought each other for supremacy.2 Although Aqa Mohammad Shah did not have a permanent army, his personal sense of discipline and his attention for the welfare of his gained him their loyalty, and enabled him to defeat his rivals and to reestablish Iranian control over the South Caucasus. His infantry was disciplined, could march long distances without fatigue and could exist on meager provisions. Although he had no artillery save for the zanburaks, his was excellent and their horses could climb mountains easily and travel through snow.3 Aqa Mohammad, however, did not have to face a Russian army in battle and his as- sassination left his army in disarray. Unfortunately, his heir, Fath-ʿAli Shah, who did not have his uncle’s personality, had to face a modern Russian army with an inferior Asian force. Moreover, between 1797 and 1803, the new Shah had to contend as well with

1 See Rudi Matthee’s admirable analysis, “Historiographical Reflections on the Eighteenth Century in Iranian History: Decline and Insularity, Imperial Dreams, or Regional Specificity?” M. Axworthy, ed. Crisis, Collapse, Militarism and Civil War: The History and Historiography of 18th Century Iran (Oxford, 2018), 21–42. 2 Lockhart, Nadir Shah, 266–269. 3 Louis-Francois de Ferrières-Sauveboeuf, Mémoires historiques, politiques et géographiques des Voyages faits en Turquie, en Perse, et en Arabie depius 1782, jusqu’en 1789, II (Paris, 1790), 68– 70. For the conditions in Iran in the last year of Aqa Mohammad Shah’s reign, see Guillaume Antoine Olivier, Voyage dans l’empire Othoman, l’Egypte et la Perse, vols. V–VI (Paris, 1807). Malcolm states that Aqa Mohammad had 60,000 horsemen during his 1795 campaign across the Aras River, John Malcolm, History of Persia, II (London, 1819), 190.

© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2021 | doi:10.1163/9789004445161_013 George A. Bournoutian - 9789004445161 Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:53:22PM via free access 266 Appendix 3 a number of challengers and rebels, a fact which helps to explain the ease by which Russia annexed Georgia. Figures for the number of Iranian troops in any battle are extremely unreliable. The Iranian chroniclers estimated the number by sight and assumed that the reader would subtract a certain amount. Iranian primary sources do not provide much infor- mation on the composition of their army and the type of weapons used during the First Russo-Iranian War. Such information as we have comes mainly from French and English sources, whose governments viewed Iran as a valuable ally during the Napoleonic pe- riod. Between 1800 and 1813, members of the French and English missions to Iran left various accounts on the state of the Iranian military. The French accounts start in 1806 and end in the beginning of 1809. Their accounts, therefore, portray the state of the Iranian army on the eve of the reforms initiated by ʿAbbas Mirza. The British accounts begin with Malcolm’s notes in 1800 and continue after the arrival of their envoys between 1809 and their departure following the Golestan agreement.4 The most de- tailed account is by Gaspard Drouville, a French in Russian service, who went to Iran at the end of the First Russo-Iranian War.5 Fath-ʿAli Shah’s army was composed of regular and irregular troops. The irregular troops formed the infantry. Because they were recruited from among the peasants they were greatly despised by the cavalrymen. Their pay was extremely low (hence their tendency to loot) and they returned to their villages at the end of a campaign. They were dressed in blue linen pantaloons and a jacket of sheepskin They were armed with out-of-date muskets, daggers and sabers.6 The cavalry was composed of some 40,000 cavalry units, led by tribal chiefs, who were summoned to Tehran at the start of a campaign in late spring and who would re- turn home in late fall. In addition, the Shah could call upon his sons to assemble their

4 The main French accounts are by P.A. Jaubert, Voyage en Arménie at en Perse (Paris, 1821); P.A. Gardane, Journal d’un voyage dans la Turquie d’Asie et la Perse (Paris, 1809); and J. Tancoigne, A Narrative of a Journey into Persia (London, 1820). The main British accounts are by J. Malcolm, A History of Persia and his Sketches of Persia (London, 1845); J. Morier, A Journey through Persia, Armenia and Asia Minor to Constantinople (London, 1812) and his A Second Journey through Persia, Armenia and Asia Minor to Constantinople (London, 1818); H. Jones (Brydges), Account of the Transactions of His Majesty’s Mission to the Court of Persia in the Years 1807–1811, 2 vols. (London, 1834); and W. Ouseley, Travels in Various Countries of the East, 3 vols. (London, 1821). 5 G. Drouville, Voyage en Perse fait en 1812 et 1813, II (Paris, 1825). 6 For further details, see U. Rabi and N. Ter-Oganvov, “The Military of Qajar Iran: The Features of an Irregular Army from the Eighteenth to the Early Twentieth Century,” Iranian Studies, vol. 45, no. 3 (May 2012), 333–354. For a full color illustration, see ibid., 90–95. Drouville’s information on the Iranian army and his color illustrations have been translated and repro- duced in an article in the Russian military magazine Tseikhgauz (from the German term “Zeughaus” for arsenal) by Kibovskii, A. & Egorov, V. “Persidskaia reguliarnaia armiia pervoi polovine XIX v.,” Tseikhgauz (5, 1996), 20–25.

George A. Bournoutian - 9789004445161 Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:53:22PM via free access The Iranian and Russian Armies 267 troops in Soltaniyeh or Ujan in case of a major war. For example, the prince-governor of Khorasan could bring 20,000 horsemen, while Mohammad-ʿAli Mirza, the governor of Kermanshah and Kurdistan, had 15,000 horsemen at his disposal.7 The Shah’s personal army was composed of his cavalry of gholams, who were armed and maintained at his own expense. They were led by Esmaʿil Beg of Damghan, num- bered between 3,000 and 4,000 and were armed with outdated muskets.8 They escort- ed the Shah when he appeared in public or went on a hunt. In addition, the Shah had between 8,000–12,000 tofangchis, known as janbaz,9 composed of fusiliers from the Qajar stronghold of Mazandaran and Astarabad. They were better armed and clothed than the rest of the infantry and formed his royal bodyguards.10 With the exception of the Yerevan campaign of 1804, the Shah and his army did not take part in the war.11 Realizing the Russian threat to his northern border, he had given the revenues from the rich province of Azarbayjan to ʿAbbas Mirza, in order for him to arm and equip the necessary force to drive out the Russians from the South Caucasus. Both Iranian and European sources agree that the Shah and ʿAbbas Mirza hoped to use European military skills to modernize his army. After witnessing the disciplined advance and retreat of the Russian infantry and cavalry, as well as the superior fire power of the Russian artillery in his early encounters, ʿAbbas Mirza recruited to a num- ber of Russian deserters to help modernize his army. The best known among them was a staff sergeant, named Samson Makintsev.12 Initially the few Russian deserters were

7 Kotzebue, 245. 8 For a full color illustration, see Drouville, II, 102–103. 9 For a full-color illustration, see ibid., 108–109. 10 J. Tancoigne, A Narrative of a Journey into Persia and Residence at Teheran (London, 1820), 245–252. James Morier, Journey, 239–242. See also Steven Ward, Immortal: A of Iran and Its Armed Forces (Georgetown, 2009), 64–65; Kaveh Farrokh, Iran At War, 1500–1988 (Long Island City, 2011), 179. 11 See Chapter 4. Although the Shah crossed the Aras in 1805, the Russian threat to Gilan, forced him to retreat, see Chapter 5. 12 Russian sources mention Samson Makintsev (known as Samson ) a sergeant from the Nizhnii-Novgorod Dragoon , who in 1802 fled to Iran and was put in charge of a battalion composed of Russian deserters. Another document states that he was from the Borisoglebsk Dragoon Regiment, Akty, VI/1 doc. 630. Other Russians, like Solomon Yenikolopov and David and Zaal Saginov deserted in 1809, A. Berzhe, “Samson Yakovlevich Makintsev i russkie begletsy v Persii, 1806–1853 gg,” Russkaia Starina, 4 (1876), 773. The main source in English is Stephanie Cronin’s, “Deserters, Converts, and Revolutionaries: Russian in Iranian Military Service, 1800–1920,” Middle East Studies, Vol. 48, n. 2 (March 2012), 152–160. Professor Cronin’s informative article contains little information on the role of the Russian regiment during the first Russo-Iranian War (ex- cept for erroneous data on the battle of Aslanduz; see note below). Although Drouville states that following the battle of Aslanduz, the regiment ceased to exist, another Russian sources state that the deserters fought well against the Ottomans in 1821–1823 and in the siege of Herat in 1838, Drouville, 127; Aleksandr Kibovskii, “(Bagaderan) Russkie dezertiry

George A. Bournoutian - 9789004445161 Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:53:22PM via free access 268 Appendix 3 employed to train ʿAbbas Mirza’s troops. They were, however, mistrusted and resented by the Iranian . By 1807, after the number of deserters and especially Russian prisoners increased, ʿAbbas Mirza asked Makintsev to form a separate Russian regi- ment, half of which were stationed in Yerevan.13 Neither Russian nor Iranian sources mention the role of the Russian regiment during the second siege of Yerevan or in the battle of Soltanbud.14 However, the main Iranian source, accuse some of the Russian deserters, who he refers to as bahadoran, of going over to the Russians during the bat- tle of Aslanduz.15 According to the main Russian source, the Russian deserters also abandoned the Arkevan fort during Kotliarevksii’s march on Lankaran.16 The Russian deserters, therefore, did not prove their worth during the First Russo-Iranian War.17 After the arrival of the French officers, ʿAbbas Mirza utilized their expertise in form- ing his new units, known as the nezam-e jadid. Captain Verdier trained three of infantry, numbering between 4000 and 6,000 troops, called sarbaz. The sarbaz wore French style uniforms together with wide pantaloons and the traditional Iranian black sheepskin hat.18 The Frenchmen Tabvier and Reboul established a cannon foundry at Esfahan and a gunpowder factory in . French engineers, under the direction of Captain Lamy, constructed barracks and fortified Tabriz, Yerevan and other towns.19

v persidskoi armii, 1802–1839,” published in the Russian military journal, Tseikhgauz (5, 1996), 26–29. 13 Cronin, 152. According to Cronin, in 1822, the regiment numbered between 800 and 1,000 men, but after the Second Russo-Iranian War it had increased to 3,000, ibid., 153. 14 The Russians credit the French engineers for strengthening the ramparts of the Yerevan fortress and to the British officers for the Iranian victory at Soltanbud; see Chapters 6 and 8. 15 Donboli, 397. Khavari, I, 348. Cronin, citing Mark Conrad’s English translation of Kibovskii’s article, states that during the battle of Aslanduz the Russian “deserters first surrounded and then in a terrible battle practically annihilated the soldiers of General P.S. Kotliarevskii,” Cronin, 153. Unfortunately, Conrad’s translation is inaccurate. The original Russian text reads, “the deserters were surrounded and then in a terrible battle were practically annihilated by General Kotliarevskii’s troops.” It goes on to say that some of the survivors returned to Russia after the Golestan treaty, “Bagaderan,” 26. See also Article VI of the treaty in Appendix 4. 16 Dubrovin, VI, 92. See also Chapter 8. 17 All evidence suggests out that the Russians did not wish to fight their own countrymen, for they did perform well in the campaigns of Khorasan and Herat in the early 1830s. Emperor Nicholas, during his meeting with the Iranian heir, Naser al-Din Mirza, in 1837 in Yerevan, asked for the return of the Russian deserters. On January 1, 1838, the Emperor granted amnesty to the Russian deserters and, on March 5, 1839, 597 bahadors, 206 wives and 281 children, returned to Tiflis. The rest, including Samson Khan, remained in Iran, “Bagaderan,” 27–28. 18 For full-color illustration, see Drouville, II, 110–111. 19 Tancoigne, 251. Lamy also drew the plans for the ʿAbbasabad fort, which was completed by the British in 1810.

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The French also started to organize the formation of a modern artillery unit under the command of a Georgian prince.20 According to Morier, ʿAbbas Mirza could raise some 40,000 troops from among the tribes in Azarbayjan. The cavalry numbered some 22,000 and his infantry 12,000. The foot soldiers recruited were from among the peasants, through quotas in lieu of rent. They were instructed in the use of arms and were paid, clothed and fed by the prince during the campaign.21 The tribal cavalry units acted independently and de- spite their superiority in numbers, would retreat after their initial charge, choosing to loot instead.22 According to most sources, the number of troops that crossed the Aras to do battle with the Russians during the First Russo-Iranian War, ranged between 30,000 to 45,000.23 After the exit of the French in 1809, ʿAbbas Mirza relied on British officers and ar- tillerymen. Between 1810 and 1813, a good number of British officers including Major Christie, Major Lindsay, Major Mackintosh, Captain Hart, Captain Monteith, Captain Willock, as well as a number of Indian sepoys, continued to train the sarbaz. They not only supplied them with English muskets and sabers, but also modified their uniforms and began forming artillery units.24 By 1813, ʿAbbas Mirza had a European-trained army of some 13,000 infantry, cavalry and artillery stationed in Tabriz, Orumiyeh, Khoi, Maragheh, Marand, Ahar, Yerevan, Nakhjavan, and .25 The sarbaz, who were paid better, were resented by the regular troops and were distrusted by the religious hierarchy.26 Despite ʿAbbas Mirza’s efforts at modernization, many Iranians did not trust the infidel foreigners to command Iranian troops. In addition, the prince’s de- tractors rallied around Mohammad-ʿAli Mirza, whose cavalry had proven so effective against the Ottomans, while the heir’s new troops suffered defeat at the hand of the Russians. Both the French and British military advisors stayed for a very short time and could not alter the centuries-old habits of their host.

20 S. Cronin, “Building a New Army,” War and Peace in Qajar Persia, R. Farmanfarmaian, ed. (London, 2008), 56. Cronin mentions his name as Tahmuras Khan; he was, in fact, Prince Teimuraz, who had fled to Iran and who returned to Russia in 1810 (see Chapter 2). 21 Morier, A Journey, 277. 22 The account of the battles is detailed in the text. 23 The number increased to 60,000 when the Shah in 1804 and 1805 ventured north of the Aras River. 24 M. von Kotzebue, Narrative of a Journey into Persia, in the Suite of the Imperial Russian Embassy, in the year 1817 (London, 1819), 162. The original German edition was published in Weimar that same year. 25 Drouville, II, 126. According to von Kotzebue, except for Christie, who had died at Aslanduz, the rest were in Tabriz in 1817. Two English physicians, Dr. Cormick and Dr. Campbell attended ʿAbbas Mirza and the Shah respectively, 155. 26 Cronin, “Building,” 57.

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Harford Jones, who was present at the Ujan Meadow, did not think much of the French efforts to modernize Iran’s army. As an Englishman and as someone who was instrumental in Gardane’s departure from Iran, he mocked ʿAbbas Mirza’s new infantry units. He considered them as an awkward militia regiment whose clothing “was not very much better than that of the which Falstaff marched towards Coventry.” However, his view that ʿAbbas Mirza’s artillery was at the first stage of infancy and his fear that the new recruits could not face a regular Russian force, were not far from the truth. He also felt that the Iranian campsites were not secure and that a small body of Russians could ambush the camp at night and cause havoc. He added that the Iranians had no scouts along the Aras River to warn the Shah or ʿAbbas Mirza if and when the Russians decided to cross it and that the Iranian ministers had little knowledge of the location of the Russian army. He even wondered why General Tormasov had never at- tempted to take advantage of this lapse of military procedure.27 Unfortunately for the Iranians, his observations were proven true in the Russian attack on Aslanduz.28 James Morier, who had returned to Iran with Sir Gore Ouseley, and who, in 1812, had witnessed the efforts of the British artillery and infantry officers, Lieutenant Lindsay and Major Christie in modernizing ʿAbbas Mirza’s army, complained of the lack of dis- cipline among the troops, their tribal loyalty and their habit of running away at the first sign of defeat.29 Moritz von Kotzebue, who accompanied Yermolov’s embassy to Iran in 1817, states that ʿAbbas Mirza continued to pursue his intention of modernizing the army. His in- fantry units had blue and red jackets of English cloth, while his cavalry had blue jackets trimmed with cotton lace. The officers had gold or silver lace and, like the English, wore silk sashes. Both wore the Persian-style wide pantaloons and the national cap of Persia, which von Kotzebue felt did not look good. Instead of the customary papush (moccasins), they wore boots, which they did not want to use until ʿAbbas Mirza him- self wore them. The muskets were sent from England, but they had a cannon foundry in Tabriz and made good gunpowder. The cavalry was provided with English sabers, while the infantry had no side arms, except for an occasional .30 Sources also agree that the Iranians had little or no knowledge of artillery. They had some large cannons captured from the Portuguese in the Persian Gulf and some cap- tured from the Russians, but they did not know how to use them. They were either dis- mounted, placed on clumsy carriages, or stationed in the court of the imperial palace. The zanburak, a small swivel gun on a pack saddle of a camel, that fires a ball weighing

27 Jones, I, 252–255. 28 See Chapter 8. 29 Morier, Second Journey, 212–215. 30 Kotzebue, 161–162. For full-color illustrations, see Drouville, II, 114–115.

George A. Bournoutian - 9789004445161 Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:53:22PM via free access The Iranian and Russian Armies 271 one pound, was the main artillery.31 The camels advanced in a confused and haphaz- ard quick trot and returned after discharging the guns. In battle, such a gun was more destructive to the zanburakchi than to the enemy. Jaubert, who, in 1806, arrived in Iran as ’s envoy, had advised ʿAbbas Mirza that a light artillery and an organized infantry was the secret of the success of European and Russian armies. He added that France was ready to assist Iran in forming such units.32 The French did not have time to organize a modern artillery for Fath-ʿAli Shah; that task was left to the British officers. By 1813, ʿAbbas Mirza had 66 pieces of artillery: Three 12-pounder; one 9-pounder; forty 6-pounder, four of which were in Yerevan and four 4-pounder cannons; 3 howitzers with 6- and 8-inch guns and ten howitzers with 4-inch guns.33

Russia

The Russian infantry units were composed mostly of peasants, who were conscripted based on a quota system and who had to serve for 25 years. Although the high-ranking officers serving in the Caucasus had been trained and had participated in campaigns against other European armies, as well as that of the Ottomans, many of the lower- level officers stationed in the Caucasus were young men from among the lesser no- bility and gentry who had just completed their training. The Russo-Austrian crushing defeat at Austerlitz was a signal for military reform. The formations and guns used in the late eighteenth-century, which had been successful against the Ottomans could not compete with Napoleon’s armies. Between 1806 and 1810 the army was com- pletely reorganized on the French model.34 The Russian infantry included regiments composed of jägers, that is, riflemen, who, by 1810, were armed with a 16.51-mm caliber rapid-firing , weigh- ing some 10 pounds. Each jäger carried sixty cartridges in a leather pouch and was equipped with a bayonet. The jägers were trained to engage the enemy in skirmishes. The infantry also included regiments of and sharp-shooters. The strongest regiments in the infantry were the grenadiers, who were chosen from among the taller and sturdier men. They were armed with rifles, affixed with , and were used for storming a breach in a fort or a picket line.

31 For a full-color illustration, see Drouville, II, 130–133. 32 Jaubert, I, 188–189. 33 Drouville, II, 139–141. Full color illustration in ibid., 140. 34 Peter the Great’s fourteen military ranks, introduced in 1722, remained the same.

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The cavalry was composed of dragoons35 and Cossacks. The dragoons serving in the Caucasus were generally from the Narva, Nizhnii-Novgorod and Borisoglebsk Regiments. They had long , , and pistols. The Cossacks, either from the voiskos (“hosts”) along the Caucasian Line or the Don River, carried the same weapons, but used sabers, which sliced better and deeper than swords. The Don Cossacks were independent units, named after their commanding officer. By 1811, there were eight Cossack regiments in the South Caucasus and six regiments stationed along the Line. Although Russian sources indicate that Georgian horsemen and Tatar riders from Qazzaq and Shams al-Din were present in a number of campaigns, they were generally kept in reserve.36 Despite the crushing defeat at Austerlitz, the Russian artillery units had performed relatively well against the French in that battle. This was thanks to the efforts of General Alexei Arakcheyev, who served as the general inspector of the artillery and who, between 1802 and 1805, was responsible for the introduction of new guns. The artillery used in the South Caucasus were muzzle-loading howitzers that could fire shells, as well as grapeshot and canister. The one-half pud (18 pound) yedinorog (uni- corn) had a caliber of 152-mm while the ¼-pud had a 120-mm caliber. The first was drawn by eight horses, the second by four. On muddy roads or mountainous terrain, the guns were drawn by a double or even a triple team of horses. The Russians also had 6- and 12-pound cannons. The smaller was a 95-mm caliber gun and the larger a 120-mm gun. The first was drawn by four horses and the second by six. The artillery units had two or three caissons carrying ammunition for each gun.37 Russian military records indicate that the total number of men stationed in the South Caucasus rarely exceeded more than 20,000, of which only between 5,000 and 7,000 would face the Iranians in major battles and a much smaller number in vari- ous skirmishes. The Russians deployed the European tactic of using their light infantry and Jäger units in rigid formations. They advanced and retreated in good order. The first column would fire together at the Iranians, move back to reload, while the second column took their place and continued to fire. Cannons and light field artillery would be placed in the middle, as well as the left and right side of the formations. In order to drive back the large Iranian cavalry, the Russians would form square formations around the ammuni- tion wagons. The Iranian troops, most of whom were disorganized tribal horsemen did not have the chance to get close enough to use their swords, spears or muskets. They also withdrew in an unruly fashion and did not take advantage of their victories by

35 No served in the South Caucasus. 36 A very small number of Armenians also volunteered. 37 For more details, see L.G. Beskrovnyi, Russkaia armiia i flot v XIX, v. (, 1973).

George A. Bournoutian - 9789004445161 Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:53:22PM via free access The Iranian and Russian Armies 273 pursuing the Russians. This explains the relatively small number of Russian casualties versus the large number of Iranian fatalities listed in the text. The greatest disparity between military forces of the two nations was on the sea. Throughout the nineteenth century, Iran had no navy on the to challenge Russia. In the previous century, Nader, in order to provide for his troops during his campaigns in Daghestan, had to rely on Russian merchants, who charged great sums for transporting the necessary provisions. Although the Iranians had a number of ves- sels on the Caspian, they were small boats, which were built by Russian deserters or rebels. Since had already acquired several ships in the Persian Gulf, he asked the Russian government to loan him ten ships. Realizing the danger of hand- ing the Shah a ready-made navy, Russia refused. Nader then seized a merchant ship in Anzali, which belonged to the British Russia Company and which was manned by British and Russian sailors, and sent rice to his troops in Darband. Although the cap- tain of that ship, John Elton, soon built one vessel for Nader, Russian and British reac- tion, as well as Nader’s death, ended the Iranian attempt to have any naval presence in the Caspian Sea.38 The Russian Caspian flotilla in the second decade of the eighteenth century was a far cry from the Russian fleet in the Baltic. It was composed mostly of galleys, frigates, semi-galleys or skampareis, brigantines, shnyavas or light two-mast ships, and strugs or flat-bottomed boats used to transport troops and cargo, as well several ships with small cannons.39 The total number was 47 vessels using sails and 38 using oars.40 Its poor performance41 was not lost on the military chiefs of Catherine’s era. In 1778, the Caspian Fleet was provided with larger ships and more firepower with the intention of invading Iran in 1780. Although the invasion did not materialize, the Caspian Fleet remained in and, as indicated in the text, was used with some success dur- ing the First Russo-Iranian War. 38 For details, see Lockhart, Nadir Shah, 204–222. 39 See V.P. Lystsov, Persidskii Pokhod Petra I, 1722–1723 (Moscow, 1951) and I.V. Kurukin, Persidskii pokhod Petra Velikogo (Moscow, 2010). 40 L.G. Beskrovnyi, Russkaia armiia i flot v XVIII v. (Moscow, 1958), 50. 41 See Chapter 1.

George A. Bournoutian - 9789004445161 Downloaded from Brill.com09/26/2021 03:53:22PM via free access