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A Theory of moralobjectivity.net: home page 'A Theory of Moral Objectivity' Moral contents page Objectivity: quick links to A Theory of Moral Objectivity other sections (Chapter 8 - Contents The ethics of the 1. introduction Middle Way) 2a. Psychology of belief By Robert M. Ellis, originally written as a Ph.D. thesis 'A Buddhist theory of moral objectivity' 2b. Heuristic in 2001. This html version copyright 2008. process A hard­copy paperback book of this thesis is 2c. Psychology & now available from lulu.com and also on philosophy Amazon, price UK£25 (or equivalent). This relatively high cost is necessary because it is A4 3ab. Eternalism size and has 487 pages (296,000 words). This print version includes an index. 3cd. Plato 3e. Stoicism 3f. Christianity A downloadable pdf version of this thesis is available from the British Library at http://ethos.bl.uk (you will need to search the original title 'A 3g. Kant Buddhist theory of moral objectivity', and register with the ethos site, but registration is open and the download pdf is free for researchers). 3h. Hegel Alternatively you can download a pdf for a small cost from lulu.com. 3i. Marx Join discussion or ask questions on any aspect of the thesis on the new phpbb discussion board 3j. Schopenhauer 3kl. Utilitarianism This page contains the whole of Chapter 8. Alternatively 4a. Nihilism click on the links below for specific sections: 4b. Scepticism & Aristotle 8a. Moral Authority (how deontological sources of moral information can be used in a provisional way) 4c. Hume 8b. Issues in the application of precepts (discussion of the practical 4d. Analytic problems involved in using provisional moral rules) Philosophy 8c. Political authority (how the Middle Way as ethics can be 4e. Wittgenstein applied to political judgements) 4f. Pragmatism 4g. Nietzsche 8. The Ethics of the Middle Way 4hi. Existentialists 5. Integration If you find a wise man who points out faults and shows what is to be avoided, 6. Philosophical you should follow him as you would a guide to hidden treasure. It is always Problems better, and never worse, to follow such a man. Dhammapada (76)[1] 7. Normativity One major issue now remains in presenting non­dualism as an alternative to 8. Middle Way dualism: that of its practical application in relation to the content of Ethics moral judgement. In 5.e. I suggested practical ways of developing the quality of moral judgement, but I can still conceivably arrive at a particular point of 9. Conclusion psychological integration, confident that my judgement will be justified to a given extent by that integration, yet still unsure as to what that judgement 10. Appendix should actually be in order to be thus justified. The grounds of specific judgement, in fact, cannot be completely distinguished from the grounds of Bibliography confidence in my judgement, so that unless I have some specific prescriptive guidance my confidence may turn out to be formalistic and dogmatic. The question thus remains of how non­dualism can offer better specific guidance in the sphere of conscious moral decisions than the dualist Other books: alternatives I criticised in part 1. An answer to this requires an argument, such as I will offer in this chapter, that the normativity of non­dualism can be used as A New Buddhist a basis of justification, not merely for the quality of the judgement itself, but for Ethics the specific content of moral judgements. The Trouble with The specificity of moral judgement I shall be discussing here is something Buddhism which must be imported deliberately by making it part of the requirements sought in a moral theory and in its justification. In a situation where I have some quite specific and relatively well­justified knowledge and some much vaguer and less well­justified knowledge, I give priority to gaining specific grounds of List of all books moral judgement in relation to the vaguer and less well­justified areas of the and papers conditions I experience, by deliberately seeking such specific grounds in preference to knowledge of all the less­known areas. I thus proceed by taking account of my ignorance in relation to moral judgement as much as my specific Objections & knowledge, in pursuit of an adequate basis of judgement. responses In this chapter I shall be applying this approach both at the levels of individual and of political moral judgements The first two sections here will be concerned with individual moral judgements, the third with judgements made in Comment on relation to political authority either by governments or by individuals. the blog a) Moral authority Home page i) Ignorance and the need for moral authority Confidence, as I suggested in 5.d.iii, consists not merely in a dogmatic certainty which attends belief in a theory, but a recognition of the degree of ignorance that one has in relation to it. Whilst ones positive confidence in a theory is sufficient to make it the basis of effective action, then, it is ones recognition of ignorance which enables subsequent modification of the theory. The basis of a judgement which is maximally adequate to the conditions of ones context, then, is one of balance between positive confidence in a theory and recognition of ignorance about the conditions. The more that balance has been achieved, the more justified one’s moral judgements. The specific content of one’s positive moral judgements, then, may come from a confidently­held theory which specifies the priorities of value in a specific case. But part of the condition for the theory being held confidently is the recognition that this priority of values may not be correct. If we have no other source of positive guidance we can do no better than following the theory which we believe to be correct to the extent that the practical situation demands. Yet often other sources of guidance are available, which a proper recognition of ignorance may lead us to acknowledge may offer superior judgement in estimating the best values to apply to a particular set of conditions: such sources of guidance consist in persons whom I shall describe as possessing moral authority. As I have argued that there is no justification for applying a metaphysical dualism between moral objectivity and other forms of objectivity, likewise there is no justification for metaphysical division between moral and other forms of authority. Authority in any case offers a guide to action (and is thus “moral”), but does not exercise power to coerce particular actions[2]. The distinction between the type of authority offered by, say, a weather­forecaster, and that offered by a friend who is more integrated than I am, is entirely to do with the specificity of conditions in relation to which advice is offered. On the basis of the weather­forecaster’s authority I may change my plan to climb a mountain at a certain time, because I know that he has specific knowledge and understanding of the type of conditions I am chiefly interested in when making my decision. A broader type of authority may be offered, though, by a person who is more psychologically integrated than I am. Such a person may lack specific knowledge of specific conditions which I may possess myself, but she will be more advanced both in recognising her own degree of knowledge or ignorance of conditions and in estimating that knowledge or ignorance in others. Such an authority will be able to offer advice[3] on the objectivity of judgements I make on the basis of understanding of my degree of psychological integration. My justification for accepting or rejecting such authority (by accepting or rejecting its advice) will depend, like the acceptance or rejection of a theory (which may be a theory offered by the authority), on a judgement, the adequacy of which depends on my degree of integration. At lower levels of integration I am more likely to understand such authority dogmatically, accepting or rejecting it on the egoistic basis of my identifications rather than through balanced judgement. I may follow authority, for example, through a sense of duty which leads me to override resistant areas of my psyche, or through a sense of fear at disobedience. At higher levels, though, I am more likely to accept such authority provisionally because I am aware that it can provide illumination in areas where I am ignorant, whether these are specific areas of conditions or the general estimation of my psychological integration itself. At these higher levels a genuine confidence in authority can begin to develop to replace a dogmatic faith. At a lower level of integration, then, we are more likely to choose the wrong authorities just as we are more likely to believe in the wrong theories. The choice can be inadequate either because the authority selected does not actually possess superior understanding of conditions in the relevant area, or because we nevertheless project power onto that authority and relate to it in terms of a dualism which prevents the advice of that authority from supporting maximally objective judgement. An adequate choice of authorities, then, depends on reason casting ahead of our general level of integration, making a judgement both that an authority represents some aspect of superior objectivity for us and that we are capable of following the authority in a balanced way. If we are able to cast ahead in this manner, the authority selected becomes a source of moral objectivity, and thus the selection of the authority and the following of it, within the bounds of the commitment implied by the judgement, becomes a matter of moral normativity. We should follow moral authorities insofar as doing so enables us to be more morally objective.

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