TRUMP, THE ALT-RIGHT AND MODERN POPULISM IN AMERICA

By

CHOEETA CHAKRABARTI

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF THE UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA

2018

© 2018 Choeeta Chakrabarti

To Baba and Hellobeta

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research would not have been possible without my advisor Christopher McCarty’s constant availability, support, encouragement, and guidance. Despite being the department chair, director of the Bureau of Economic and Business Research (BEBR) and an advisor to several students, he has always made himself available for the slightest of concerns. I am also indented to him for giving me the confidence when I doubted myself the most, and for opening up opportunities and resources at every point during this research. As department chair, his dedication to students and his unwavering stance on ethical practices in academia, are admirable.

I am immensely grateful to H. Russell Bernard for the insights and encouragement at the most challenging turns in my PhD career. My research and completion stands on his invaluable suggestions. I am also grateful for the advise and mentorship my other committee members: Jeff

Johnson, Peter Collings, and Raffaele Vacca. The training I received through classes with Jeff

Johnson and Peter Collings have been crucial in the design and presentation of this research.

Alyson Young, a dear friend and mentor’s advise and much needed help with statistics was pivotal in analyzing my data.

My father, Sukhendu Chakrabarti’s unapologetic confidence and generosity made it possible for me to move to the U.S. Although he left this world before he could see me achieve this milestone, the person he raised me to be helped me through the worst parts of my PhD life, including his own demise. Dr. P.M. Bhargava, renowned scientist and fearless public intellectual to the world but "Hellobeta" to me, was the other pillar of support I lost less than a year back.

His dedication to science and ethics, and his mentorship, will always guide me. His one wish- to live to see me graduate- was not granted, but the values he raised me with is why I am here today. I would also like to thank my mother Chandana Chakrabarti for her constant strength, rationality and support. She is the strongest woman I know, and her daughter is only one among

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the thousands she continues to inspire. I hope I can one day be the person she is. My brother,

Samrat Chakrabarti, a journalist, a terrific writer, and the wittiest man I know, has been my strongest advocate and critic. My constant attempt at bringing to light much-needed nuance in cultural research is thanks to his unrelenting prods and insights. I thank Joshua Crosby, my colleague and partner, for his intellectual engagement, his unwavering support and patience, and- most importantly- for keeping a sense of humor every time I lost mine. I am extremely fortunate to have Quynn and Kendyl, who are too little to realize their impact, but were a magical respite to “Chocho”.

There are several people at the department that I am indebted to. Karen

Jones, for the countless times she has gone above and beyond to help me through grant applications, job applications, and numerous other equally arduous paperwork that comes with being an international graduate student, Juanita, for all the last-minute registrations and administrative procedures, and Pat and Pam for their equally endless work for our students- be it filing out documents, working with HR, or organizing departmental parties. Without Karen, Nita,

Pat and Pam, this department could not function.

Finally, I would like to thank the Bureau of Economic and Business Research and the staff for conducting the survey, and Mark Girson for the initial cross-tabulations.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ...... 4

LIST OF TABLES ...... 8

LIST OF FIGURES ...... 9

ABSTRACT ...... 11

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION ...... 13

2 BACKGROUND ...... 18

Overview of Political Anthropology ...... 18 Right-wing Populism and the Alt-right in America ...... 20 Central Tenets of the Alt-right ...... 31 Race Realism ...... 31 Political Correctness ...... 31 Common Sense Appeal, Red Pilling, Meme Magic and Slang ...... 33 Trolling ...... 35 Fear Mongering and Victimhood Narratives ...... 36 Women's Roles ...... 38 Men’s Rights Movement ...... 38 Identitarianism ...... 40

3 METHODS ...... 42

Cognitive Anthropology ...... 42 Methods of Data Collection ...... 45 ...... 45 Interviews ...... 45 Alt-right Adherence ...... 48 Alt-right Adherence Survey ...... 49 Free Lists ...... 51 Personal Network Analysis: ...... 52 Florida Survey ...... 58

4 RESULTS I ...... 60

In-Depth Interviews and Personal Networks ...... 60 Participant Observation and Unstructured Interviews ...... 60 Semi-structured Interviews ...... 61 Free Lists ...... 61

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What Would Make America Great Again? ...... 62 Interview Coding ...... 68 White Victimhood, White Dispossession, and the Ethnostate ...... 69 Race Realism and The Red Pill ...... 77 and Double Standards ...... 81 Minority Appeasement, Free Handouts, and Political Correctness ...... 83 Women's roles ...... 84

5 PERSONAL NETWORKS ...... 89

Media Exposure ...... 102 Alt-right Adherence ...... 107

6 FLORIDA SURVEY ...... 110

Demographics ...... 112 Descriptive Statistics ...... 113 Cultural Diversity ...... 113 Discrimination ...... 115 Political Correctness ...... 120 Prejudice Against Minorities ...... 121 Alt-Right Support ...... 126

7 CONCLUSION...... 131

APPENDIX

A FREE LIST ITEM DESCRIPTION ...... 134

B SELECTED QUESTIONNAIRES ...... 136

C FLORIDA SURVEY QUESTIONS ...... 150

D INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS ...... 151

LIST OF REFERENCES ...... 153

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH ...... 160

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LIST OF TABLES

Table page

3-1 Forcher and Kteily Study: Selected Scales and Measures...... 51

4-1 Core Items, Alt-right Free Lists ...... 66

4-2 Core Items, Non-alt-right Conservative Trump supporters ...... 68

5-1 Association between Media Exposure, Network Properties and Political Beliefs ...... 104

6-1 Age and Race Crosstabulation ...... 113

6-2 Is cultural diversity a strength or a weakness in America? ...... 113

6-3 Distribution of those that reported having faced discrimination, by race ...... 116

6-4 Correspondence of Race and PC variables ...... 120

6-5 Alt-right Support by Race ...... 126

6-6 Distribution of alt-right supporters by age ...... 129

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LIST OF FIGURES

Figure page

2-1 Exit Polls, 2016: Trump voters by education...... 24

2-2 Exit Polls, 2016: Trump voters by income ...... 24

2-3 Percentage of Trump supporters that follow white nationalists on Twitter ...... 25

3-1 Research Design...... 59

4-1 Survey Free List Salience of Entire ...... 63

4-2 Combined Free list Salience of Entire population ...... 64

4-3 Combined Free-list Salience of alt-right supporters ...... 65

4-4 Combined free lists of non-alt-right conservative Trump supporters ...... 67

4-5 Aaron Schiff, Gun enthusiast ...... 88

5-1 Emily’s personal network. Darker colored alters have “similar” or “very similar” political views. Size represents closeness...... 94

5-2 Emily’s network, showing two alters with “similar” or “very similar” political views. ...95

5-3 Simon’s network of discussion partners, displaying heterogeneity in political belief by color...... 96

5-4 Jason’s Network: Discussion partners ...... 97

5-5 Jason’s closest friends ...... 98

5-6 Kevin Dwight’s network of discussion partner with whom he political conversations “rarely”, “often” and “very often”...... 99

5-7 Kevin Dwight’s personal network composition of alters with whom he has political conversations "often" and "very often"...... 100

5-8 Aaron Schiff’ personal network- of political discussion partners ...... 101

5-9 Aaron Schiff’s personal network of political discussion partners with whom he has political conversation “often” and “very often” ...... 101

6-1 Race and Opinions on Cultural Diversity ...... 114

6-2 Correspondence Plot of Race and Cultural Diversity ...... 114

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6-3 Age of people that reported having faced discrimination ...... 115

6-4 Discrimination by Race...... 116

6-5 Correspondence Plot of Race and Perceived Discrimination ...... 117

6-6 Alt-right support among whites who reported having faced discrimination ...... 118

6-7 Age group of whites that reported having been discriminated ...... 119

6-8 Responses to prejudice against minorities by whites that reported having been discriminated ...... 119

6-9 Political Correctness by Race ...... 120

6-10 Correspondence plot of Race and PC ...... 121

6-11 Prejudice Against Minorities by Sex ...... 122

6-12 Correspondence Plot of Race and Opinions on Prejudice Against Minorities ...... 123

6-13 Prejudice Against Minorities by Race ...... 124

6-14 Prejudice Against Minorities by Education. X2= 0.031 ...... 125

6-15 Correspondence Plot of Race and Alt-right Support ...... 127

6- 16 Correspondence Plot of Education and Alt-right Support ...... 128

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Abstract of Dissertation Presented to the Graduate School of the University of Florida in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

TRUMP, THE ALT-RIGHT AND MODERN POPULISM IN AMERICA By

Choeeta Chakrabarti

December 2018

Chair: Christopher McCarty Major: Anthropology

This research is an attempt to understand variation among Trump supporters in their adherence to alt-right beliefs. In-depth interviews among supporters and a personal network analysis of supporters of president Trump in Florida revealed correlations between media exposure, socio- political beliefs and personal network properties. Results showed that selective media exposure is a consequence of heterogeneous networks, indicating that people who have more conversations with those that have opposing social and political beliefs subscribe to a wider range of media channels and have low level of adherence to alt-right values. In-depth interviews with alt-right supporters indicate that they make deliberate efforts to keep their networks fragmented, for fear of being victimized in social circles or getting fired from their jobs. The constant insecurity about having their identities revealed adds to pre-existing notions of white victimhood, which in turn solidifies their alt-right beliefs.

This study uses tools in cognitive anthropology and personal network analysis to understand what motivates people to adhere to far-right ideologies, and how those views are influenced, sustained and reinforced by their immediate social context. With the rise of modern right wing populism in America, unhelpful dialogues and demonization of opposing groups only serves to strengthen support for extreme ideology. As a discipline, anthropology is well-suited to develop a better understanding of these movements through an insider perspective. It is

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imperative then, to attempt a qualitative, yet empirically sound research on struggles and resentment among American citizens that lead to populist or far-right support.

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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

There is a wave of extreme ideology around the world as citizens reject the status quo. As

I sat watching take the presidential oath, I relived emotions from the 2014 elections in . In two years I had witnessed two countries go through what has now become a familiar backlash. While liberals watched in disbelief, the “silent majority” fought against the established order across the globe. Typical patterns of polarization, volatile (lack of) dialogues and indignant outcries followed the U.S. elections, just like it had in India. Six months before

Trump’s victory, the world had seen yet another example of this right-wing force when the voted to leave the European Union in the infamous 2016 Brexit vote.

Populism in the had its own precursor in the Tea Party movement that was founded in 2009, but its recent re-emergence was accompanied by another alarming element; the alt-right movement. As another parallel with Indian populism- the rise of Hindu nationalism- America saw the emergence of under a new name. The alt-right movement had been around since 2009, albeit mostly in the dark web1. However, during Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, the alt-right made its way into mainstream conversation, accelerating its support base.

Whistleblowers from all sides of the political spectrum have called public attention to the emboldening of racists as a direct result of the simultaneous rise of Trump and the alt-right

(Belluz, 2017). A survey of 2,000 K-12 teachers supported this concern, indicating an increase in racial slurs and fear among immigrant children 2. Others have welcomed this change as a sign of progress for white middle-class Americans that feel left behind by globalization. As reactions

1 The dark web is a hidden part of the internet that can only be accessed through software programs that ensure anonymity of the user.

2 This was a survey conducted by the Southern Poverty Law Center. By their own admission, the survey was based on a skewed sample of respondents who constituted those that visited the SPLC website. The survey can be found here: https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/splc_the_trump_effect.pdf

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and counter-reactions to the white nationalist rhetoric gained traction, so did polarization. One national poll found that 7% of voters ended a relationship over the 2016 presidential race. 3

Trump’s ascendancy to political power has been unprecedented in many ways. His oratory style and dismissal of presidential etiquette were successful in creating the image of a true outsider, determined to make changes others only paid lip service to. Although Trump did not win the popular vote, his victory- through whatever political mechanism- is indicative of how broad his nationalistic message is. Following populist rhetoric, Trump appealed to mainstream public by speaking to their everyday struggles. The alt-right adopts similar narratives. During the time that public interest in the alt-right peaked 4, popular Figures in the movement sought to reclaim power for mainstream whites that had been denied a voice. Alt-right’s support base grew as a result of its populist rhetoric that disguises much of its extreme beliefs.

Social scientists and journalists alike have increasingly focused on economic instability as the main cause of modern right-wing populism in America. Articles and debates in the news are centered around the “working-class” Americans that got Trump elected (Walley, 2017). The resulting onus that is laid on working-class Americans (Ginsburg, 2017) to explain the rise of bigotry and hate is problematic for reasons more than one. First, treating working-class

Americans as a separate political category itself is flawed, given the diversity within this group

(Lucas and Bessire, 2017). Second, to credit poor Americans for Trump’s victory is to force a simplistic causal link where none exists. Consider for example the following income demographics. The median household income for Trump voters is $72,000, while the national

3 Poll by Monmouth University, “2016 Brought Out the Worst in People”: https://www.monmouth.edu/polling- institute/documents/monmouthpoll_us_092816.pdf/

4 According to Google Analytics, the search term “alt-right” peaked on Google’s search engine right after the speech: (link to statistic)

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median is $65,000 (Silver, 2016). In Florida, the same Figure is $70,000 for Trump supporters and $48,000 for the entire state (ibid).

There are several such examples of misinformed arguments among both conservatives and liberals. Scholars have argued (Willer and Fienberg, 2015) that the rising hostility between the left and is based on a moral split between the groups. Patriotism, loyalty, and values of authority appeal to conservatives more than to liberals, while values of equality, and fairness appeal to liberals to a greater degree as compared to conservatives (Graham et al. 2007). A study by Willer and Fienberg (2015) asked liberals to write an essay to persuade conservatives to support Simone-sex marriage, and asked conservatives to write a similar essay, in support of making English the official language of the U.S. The study found that a majority of liberals espoused values of equality and fairness, while only 9% invoked conservative values despite knowing that their audience is conservative. Similarly, for conservatives, a majority invoked classically conservative values of patriotism and only 8% used liberal values in their essay.

Although anthropologists have unique tools and perspectives to present better informed arguments, much of our scholarship has focused on the “white working class” narrative to make sense of Trump’s rise (Lilla, 2016; Bessire and Bond, 2016). While any narrative that claims to explain the sole cause of Trump’s support should be dealt with skepticism (Butler, 2017), the narrative of a white working-class leads readers away from what is really happening- “it lets off the hook an entire class of voters who are at least as responsible for Trump’s victory: middle- class and white suburbans whites” (Sasson, 2016). The condescending rhetoric of “poor, uneducated voters” is also refuted by evidence with polls consistently indicating that most

Trump supporters are college educated (ibid).

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Some endeavors such as Hochshild’s (2016), has advanced a nuanced understanding of populist support. In Strangers in their Own Land, Hochschild spent 5 years among Tea Party supporters in Louisiana, to understand why people support causes that perpetuate their social conditions. Through an ethnographic approach, Hochshild climbs the “empathy wall” to counteract some of the polarizing elements that interfere with our ability to understand the other side. If resentment against the established order and insecurities about the future (Standing,

2011) are at the heart of populist support, it must be understood (Janssen, 2016) through an insider’s perspective to prevent escalation of resentment into other reactionary movements that have historically been part of this trajectory. In America, the rise of the alt-right should serve as an urgent call for extensive anthropological attention to modern right-wing populism in America.

Reiterating Smith’s (2016) assertion, anthropologists as both researchers and critics, must be open to empathetically represent opposing political groups, and refocus their academic attention to field sites in the U.S. Both these principles- cultural relativism and reflexivity- that are integral to anthropological research, must be applied to political phenomena to understand motivations behind support for populist ideologies, however uncomfortable.

Thus, this research is an attempt to understand the origins of populist and far-right ideological positions, the motivations for sustaining them, and how they influence everyday interactions. It employs a mixed-methods approach, using tools in cognitive anthropology and personal network analysis, to understand how perceptions and social context together influence belief and behavior. The association of the alt-right to Trump has fuelled already heated debates between his supporters and those who oppose him. sites have become places of performance for a growing “call-out culture”5. Public name-calling and generalizations on social

5 “Call-out culture” is a term used for the public shaming or name-calling of individuals for problematic statements or actions.

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media not only widen the gap between the two political sides, but also ignore nuance and an emic understanding of either side. By focusing on a group of conservative Trump supporters, this research aims to shed light on diversity within the movement. Through ethnographic interviews, it also aims to determine whether variables in a person’s personal network can predict their adherence to far-right beliefs.

This research will provide valuable insights on fundamentalism, crucial for American policy decisions and more effective conversations. Right-wing reactionary forces are increasingly influencing policy decisions all around the world. The past decade has seen several such changes, be it reactions to the Syrian refugee crisis, Brexit, or the anointment of right-wing world leaders. Many of these changes are influenced by nationalistic narratives that resonate with current insecurities of ordinary citizens, while using false narratives that prey on their vulnerabilities. Understanding the process through which this rhetoric is circulated and maintained, and the effect it has on social behavior, is crucial for influencing policy decisions that may prevent the violation of human rights.

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CHAPTER 2 BACKGROUND

The alt-right movement in America is a new manifestation of white nationalist movements that have long existed in the United States. Therefore, to understand the rise of the alt-right, it is important to first trace the influence of other white nationalist and white supremacist movements in the country. The literature covering spans multiple disciplines. Chapter 2 i) provides a background to right-wing populism and the alt-right movement in America, ii) describes the central tenets of alt-right ideology, and iii) concludes with a discussion of other far-right fringe movements often inaccurately clumped together under the alt-right umbrella.

Overview of Political Anthropology

The breadths of sub-disciplines that have covered political anthropology make it difficult to provide a succinct overview. Like much of other anthropological sub-disciplines, political anthropology arose out of of colonized societies. In a path-breaking work, Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard (1940) laid out the foundations of what came to define political anthropology for the next decade: system’s theory. Evans-Pritchard’s analysis of Nuer political systems is considered to this day, a crucial framework for cross-cultural comparative studies.

Influenced by Evans-Pritchard and other British structural functionalists, Gluckman (1963) extensively studied conflict resolution in African societies. Building on critiques of systems theory that pointed to its narrow scope and disregard for individual agency, Leach (1954) developed a framework that took into account individual behavior in relation to power structures, thus formulating action theory, that would mark the next phase of political anthropology.

Debates around this period were centered around structure and individual action (Vincent,

1978). While one approach focused on behavior as a product of individual manipulation of

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structural resources, the other emphasized structural functionalism. The most prominent scholarships that formulated action theory came out of the works of Bailey (1960), Turner

(1957), Boissevain (1965) and Cohen (1965) (see Vincent, 1978 for a concise history).

Following debates between structural-functionalists and its critics, Firth (1964), in another defining publication, developed a framework that took into account both structure and organization (Vincent, 1978).

Later scholarship in political anthropology, and much of what influences the anthropology of political thought today, is defined by scholarship in postcolonial theory and transnationalism. Decolonization of countries around the world was accompanied by a paradigm shift in the scholarship of history and anthropology. Academic discourses were heavily criticized for being a form on neocolonialism that misrepresented the histories of oppressed societies. It is during this time that subaltern studies, or the studies of the oppressed, emerged. Using history and culture as analytical tools, and consolidating them in one framework through which the colonial experience can be studied, arose as an alternative to dominant literature that was based on a colonial mindset (Sivaramakrishnan, 397). At a time when mainstream historiography did not recognize peasant politics as being autonomous, scholarship during this era shed new light on peasant uproar through subaltern perspectives, instead of relying on dominant western theories.

Anthropological contributions to the literature on nationalism followed emerging postcolonial theories. Gellner (1983) analyzed tactics used by nationalistic movements to ensure cultural homogeneity. Anderson’s (1983) influential theory of “imagined communities” complemented Gellner’s work by looking at how nationalist movements reconstruct the past in selective ways to inculcate a utopian image of the (Chatterjee, 1986). As I discuss below,

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the rhetoric of the ‘Golden Age’ is extensively used by alt-right activists and attests to

Anderson’s (183) imagined idea of America.

The concept of symbolic power is useful in understanding how the alt-right uses various symbols to represent itself. Social life is organized through cultural symbols that represent and reinforce power (Bordieu, 1984). These symbols work together to reproduce and maintain social structure that reinforces hierarchy, and is accepted by the dominated population. Although symbolism has been traditionally studied in the context of and rituals, symbolic form and function do not weaken in developed societies; instead, they adapt to new forms of symbolic power (Cohen, 1969). The use of memes, appropriation of popular cultural references as mascots, and adaptation of older emblems as alt-right symbols are examples of these. Messages of white genocide, liberal hypocrisy, and the biological reality of race and gender that are continuously spread through memes, hashtags and symbols, work to insidiously reinforce alt- right ideology.

Right-wing Populism and the Alt-right in America

In May 2014, Narendra Modi, a Hindu nationalist accused of orchestrating the Gujarat riots in 2002, won the prime ministerial seat in India’s general elections. Two years later, the

United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union in the infamous Brexit vote, a year before presidential elections in revealed a strong support base for Le Penn, the leader of a far- right nationalist party. In May 2018, 2 Italian leaders from an ant-immigrant and anti- establishment party formed a coalition to govern the country, a year and a half after Donald

Trump, the outsider-candidate and reality TV star, won the U.S. presidential elections. The newest wave of modern populism seemed to have reached the United States during its most recent elections, although with the founding of the Tea Party, modern populism in America seems to have existed at least since 2009. Reasons for this are several; from economic

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frustrations, anxiety about immigration, to resentment against the established political system

(Galston, 2017). The most widely circulated theory behind the rise of populism is economic instability. However, a focus on socio-economic status as the cause of alt-right support ignores the several other elements that add to a sense of insecurity. Similarly, a focus on a reaction to cultural change is too simplistic. Instead a combination of economic inequality and cultural backlash serve as a more accurate model to predict populist support (Inglehart and Norris, 2016).

The broad use of the term populism has made defining it a challenge (Gidron and

Bonikowski, 2013: 3). Canovan (1999:3) defines populism as “an appeal to `the people' against both the established structure of power and the dominant ideas and values of the society”.

Following this aim, populist rhetoric often revolves around calls for an anti-elitist and anti- establishment government. Evidently, a broad definition such as this allows for the classification of movements across the political spectrum as populist. Indeed, left-leaning politics, and leaders such as Bernie Sanders have also been labeled as populist, given their ant-establishment platform. However, in recent times, the rise of right-wing populism has seen an unprecedented comeback, and that is the focus of this study.

Populist movements are rooted in a reactionary force, mobilized by those that feel left behind by globalization. It is a resistance to an established order that has not favored “the silent majority”1. In America, populist parties on the left like "Occupy Wallstreet" and those on the right like the "Tea Party" claim to speak for this silent majority. Their slogans- "We are the 99

Percent" and "Silent Majority No More!" attest to it. While populism claims to “cash in democracy's promise of power to the people” (Canovan, 1999:2), their allegiance to serve the

“people” is realized through alienating others (Oliver and Rahn, 2016: 191). Modern populism

1 This term was first used by Richard Nixon in a speech about the Vietnam war in 1969

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over the last decade reveal some common themes. Several studies have focused on economic and socio-cultural characteristics of populist supporters. One study (Bagley, 2017) that looked at the rise of populism in a northeastern village in England over a period of 3 years found recurrent feelings of abandonment, dispossession, disillusionment and resentment against the government among the white working-class population. Further, social ties in this community served as exclusive groups that saw members outside their network as culprits of their socio-economic condition (Bagley, 2017). Bonikowski (2016) challenges widely held assumptions of populism being a new right-leaning ideology. He rightly notes that populism should instead be seen as a

"discursive frame"" (2016: 14); a rhetorical strategy used by leaders from all sides of the political spectrum, as evident from the number or Bernie supporters that voted for Trump2. The 2016 U.S. elections saw the efficacy of populist rhetoric that resonated with familiar insecurities and pre- existing fears among rural white . Features of populist speech- anti-elitist, pro-people appeal, and institutional distrust (Boniskowski, 2016: 11)- are all evident in Trump's speeches.

What the U.S. has seen is not an unprecedented rise of anti-immigrant belief, but a combination of populist rhetoric and nationalism (Bonikowski, 2016: 21). While the appeal to nationalist sentiments is evident in Trump's campaign speeches, public presence of the alt-right accelerated its reception. Trump's slogan "Make America Great Again" has a nationalistic appeal with its reference to a golden age (Smith, 1989) Alt-right speeches often use the same golden age rhetoric in talking about American cultural decline. Feminism, dispossession of whites, destruction of , threat of multiculturalism, and cultural takeover by immigrant

2 This is based on Brian Schaffer's analysis of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study that showed that 12% of Bernie Sanders supporters voted for Trump, as reported on NPR: https://www.npr.org/2017/08/24/545812242/1- in-10-sanders-primary-voters-ended-up-supporting-trump-survey-finds

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populations, are all accompanied by a nostalgic “Golden Age” when none of these threats existed.

Trump's campaign message had many populist arguments. Corruption among the elites, loss of jobs, slow growth, and raw international deals were some. With the free trade policies, the working-class in many towns seem to be left behind. The emphasis on economic inequality in the media and during campaign speeches fueled further resentment among the working-class. But if this is true, what explains the enormous support for Trump among the well-to-do whites? A study by the University of Pennsylvania found that Americans who otherwise enjoyed a high societal status, felt threatened by globalization and racial diversity during Trump's presidential campaign (Muntz, 2018). The study (Figure 2-1) in fact found no relationship between economic hardship and support for Trump. Additionally, while education is a strong predictor of racial attitudes, it no longer matters once perceived threats to status due to globalization is controlled for (Muntz, 2018:8).

Figure 2-1: Study conducted by Muntz (2018), showing low predictive strength of education when status threat indicators are taken into account.3

3 Published by PNAS. Supporting information available at: www.pnas.org/lookup/suppl/doi:10.1073/pnas.1718155115/-/DCSupplemental.

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The tendency to group populist supporters as a “poor working class” suffers from great inaccuracies. Exit polls for Trump showed that neither wealth nor education could alone explain his support base (Figures 2-1 and 2-2). More than half of Trump supporters have a college degree, and an income of $100,000-199,999. From these figures, an educated rich class seems to be a stronger support base than rural working class Americans.

Figure 2-1: Exit Polls, 2016: Trump voters by education

Figure 2-2: Exit Polls, 2016: Trump voters by income4

4CNN Exit Polls, 2016

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The left's almost exclusive focus on celebrating racial differences has managed to make whites feel left behind (Lila, 2016). When identity politics calls attention to specific groups, the ones that aren't mentioned feel left behind (ibid). The "whitelash thesis" (ibid) contends that angry white men were manipulated to think that their falling economic conditions are a result of racial diversity. What's most problematic about this is that it allows liberals to condescendingly ignore real struggles faced by Trump supporters, further legitimizing their belief of being disadvantaged (ibid). Some studies suggest that more than a third of Trump supporters follow white nationalists on Twitter5. However, the overlap between Trump supporters and alt-right supporters (Figure 2-3) needs to be dealt with some care. Indeed, branding all Trump supporters as white nationalists succumbs to the same stereotyping that white nationalists seem to engage in. It must be noted that following certain twitter accounts may not necessarily be indicative of being a supporter of white nationalism. However, as I lay out in the following pages, the broad reach of the alt-right and its recent permeation into mainstream visibility are a product of strategic tactics used by the alt-right.

Figure 2-3: Percentage of Trump supporters that follow white nationalists on Twitter

Intellectual figures in the alt-right have claimed Trump's ascendancy to power as a step towards their goal. As , the founder of white nationalist think tank "American

5 Study done by Demographics Pro: http://www.demographicspro.com/insights/trump-supporters-follow-white- nationalists-on-twitter

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Rennaissance" and an influential figure in the alt-right states, "Donald Trump has not thought through questions of race in a any depth at all, so far as I can tell. He just has instincts. His instinct, I'm guessing, are opposed to having to press 1for English when he turns on the telephone. His instincts are against walking into a 7/11 and being surrounded by people that he can't understand. His insticts are against walking down a street in New York City and finding more people from Asia, or Africa, or the middle-east than people of European origin."6

Richard Spencer coined the term alt-right after a speech by in 2008 where he rejected mainstream and called for an alternative right in its place. While the rise of the alt-right can be explained by looking at the foundations laid by older white nationalist groups, discord among conservatives in the last 4 decades have played an equally important role in the emergence of the alt-right. In the 1970s, a faction of people in disagreement with the

Republican Party on issues such as race formed the neoconservative movement. They pushed for more military intervention, and influenced many policies in the Bush era. Many neoconservatives were in fact leftist liberals who felt disillusioned by the democratic party’s passive approach. Paleoconservatives, a group most often associated with the alt-right formed as a pushback against . However, paleoconservatives differ with the alt-right in one important way; they do not want to end the conservative movement. They want to instead change it. At present, the paeloconservative movement has mostly dwindled and is far removed from the alt-right agenda, although some paleoconservatives have influenced well-known alt-right figures.

Paul Gottfried is one such paleoconservative, whose ideas were popularized by Richard Spencer.

The failure of the paleoconservative movement’s ability to garner support comes from their failure to connect with people. Radical programs advocated by paleoconservatives did not

6 Jared Taylor Interview on Vice. "The Movement That's Fueling Donald Trump's White Nationalist Supporters" : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w6l0Qb6Xlaw

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resonate with many, and in the mid-2000s, the far right started to decline. (Michael, 2017). The rise of Richard Spencer filled this void. In a speech in 20087, Paul Gottfried called for an alternative right geared towards American youth. Inspired by the speech, Richard Spencer, then a

30-year old graduate and editor of The American Conservative, took on the challenge of reaching a wider audience (Hartzell, 2018:19) and launched a website called

AlternativeRight.com. One year later, he took leadership of The National Policy Institute; a white nationalist organization founded by William Regnery II in 2005. Reaching a broader audience required a few key strategies. First, following the unpopularity of radically racist notions, Spencer has categorically rejected the term . Second, the term alt-right has been purposefully broad. The absence of a rigid definition made the movement more flexible. Third, the anonymity provided by the dark web allowed people to freely express their support, and spread white nationalist ideas without repercussions. Discussion boards like and are most densely populated with alt-right sympathizers. As these discussion boards in the dark web spread, visibility of alt-right supporters began to emerge in mainstream media and in the comments sections under newspaper articles, videos and blog posts.

The anonymity that the alt-right worked under started changing drastically since Donald

Trump’s candidacy announcement. Mainstream media saw a sudden surge in people openly expressing white nationalist ideas. In some ways the alt-right is nothing more than a modern face of older white nationalist movements, but scholars argue (Hawley, 2017) that apart from its white nationalist agenda, there is very little similarity between the two. Despite their common goals, tactics like humor, internet competency, and trolling used by the alt-right are drastically different from other white nationalist organizations (Hawley, 2017). Another significant

7 The title of the talk was “The Decline and Rise of the Alternative Right”, found here: https://www.unz.com/article/the-decline-and-rise-of-the-alternative-right/

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difference is that unlike other white nationalist movements, the alt-right is not an organized group with an official leader. Richard Spencer is a figure most associated with the alt-right, but he does not represent all of the movement. In fact, many alt-right supporters disagree with several views Spencer propagates, including the call for an ethnostate. In order to get support from people who were sympathetic to far right ideology but uncomfortable with white supremacy, advocates of the movement had to distance themselves from white supremacy and white nationalism (Hatrzell, 2018) Spencer and other alt-right figures did this by backing arguments with “intellectualism and pseudo-science” (Hartzell, 2018: 17)

The permeation of the alt-right into mainstream media was energized by Donald Trump’s presidential campaign and his subsequent victory. According to Spencer, who now heads the

National Policy Institute, "Trump definitely energized the alt-right. He was elected because of the immigration issue, which is fundamentally an identity and race issue, let's be honest. Because we have this connection with them, we can inflect his policies. We are really trying to change the world, and we are going to do that by changing consciousness and by changing how people see the world and how they see themselves."8 Support for Donald Trump grew in far right discussion boards around June 2015 with the famous neo-Nazi calling his supporters to

“make Donald Trump president” (Berger, 2016). Many of Trump’s actions- both accidental and intentional- were seen by the far right as an endorsement. For example, his re-tweet of false crime statistics was welcomed by alt-right supporters who themselves admitted to the inaccuracy of the numbers (Berger, 2016). This post along with many others were traced to white nationalist accounts. Following Trump’s win, Richard Spencer in a widely circulated video ended his

8 Interview with Richard Spencer in "Rebranding White Nationalism: Inside Richard Spencer's Alt-right. : https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kVeZ0_Lhazw

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speech at an NPI meeting with “Hail Trump, hail our people, hail victory!” to a group of white nationalists offering Nazi salutes.

The alt-right’s prominence escalated further during the infamous “Unite The Right” rally at Charlottesville and ’s appointment at the White House. In August 2017, a rally was organized by the right to protest the removal of confederate statues around the country.

Protestors attended the rally from various far-right organizations as well as counter-protestors.

James Alex Fields Jr., a white nationalist associated with , drove into a crowd of counter-protestors, killing 25 year old Heather Heyer. A few months before this incident, president Trump appointed his long time campaign advisor Steve Bannon as his chief strategist.

Steve Bannon, was at the time the executive chairman of , and called the media outlet “a platform of the alt-right”9. These two incidents sparked further outrage and fears of alt- right permeation into American politics. Richard Spencer who was growing in popularity and was increasingly known as the face of the alt-right, continued his campus tours.

Several known figures in the alt-right vehemently reject the term white supremacy arguing that their movement does not support the superiority of whites and subjugation of other races. “Each is race is different and unique, and each race is proud of their people….It doesn't mean I want to exterminate and enslave other races”, says , a well-known alt-right woman who runs an alt-right YouTube channel called “”. However, discussions of the alt-right are more often than not, synonymous with white supremacy, although this is dependent on how white supremacy is defined. Some have been critical of the careless use of the term

(Chait, 2017), while others argue that the alt-right is just modern form of white supremacy

(Kriess and Mason, 2017). White supremacy has been an integral part of U.S. history. Several

9 Interview with Mother Jones, 8/22/2016: https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/08/stephen-bannon-donald- trump-alt-right-breitbart-news/

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organizations have risen and fallen through the decades. The most well-known of these is the Klu

Klux Klan. Founded in 1865, the KKK was the most influential white supremacist organization in the U.S. Although its presence is now diminished, most white supremacist and white nationalist groups in U.S. history were established as a result of KKK’s influence. The history of white supremacy in America is a point of contention, with many scholars arguing that America was founded on racist principles and has always been a white supremacist nation (Hawley,

2017:21), and others claiming that the founding fathers were against but only allowed it as a trade off for unity. As the support base of the KKK declined, William Pierce who formerly lead the , founded the National Alliance in 1974. His novel, The Turner

Diaries is perhaps one of the most inspirational books among neo-Nazis. Based on the overthrow of the Jewish controlled U.S. Government by white patriots, this novel was widely used as justification for fear and animosity against non-whites. The most violent inspiration directly related to the The Turner Diaries was the Oklahoma City Bombing that killed 168 people in

1995. Together, these white nationalist organizations laid the foundation for the birth of a brand of new and revamped form of white nationalism, unprecedented in America. While older nationalist movements were typically angry, serious and propagated by older men, the alt-right speaks to a young population (Hawley, 2017). It manages to package the same ideology in a way that resonates with the youth. They are also internet savvy, jovial, largely anonymous, and they refrain from saying anything blatantly racist. This kind of a repackaged white nationalism is much easier to affiliate with, as opposed to organizations that openly propagate violence

(Hawley, 2017: 25).

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Central Tenets of the Alt-right

Race Realism

“Race is the foundation of identity”. This is arguably the foundational principle of the alt- right. While anti-Semitism, call for an ethnostate, and views on homosexuality differ between alt-right supporters, the idea that race is a biological reality and is integral to identity is universally accepted in the al-right. Figures like Richard Spencer, Jared Taylor and Andrew

Anglin, agree that the core of the ideology is race realism; the idea that race is the foundation of identity. A widely held belief among alt-right supporters is that if given a choice, people would rather live and works among their own race. Race is considered a biological reality, with intrinsic capabilities and race-realism a common sense. Educational organizations are seen centers of liberal indoctrination where students are taught to ignore obvious differences between races. In a video on race realism, Jared Taylor cites scientific studies and common observations to justify race-realism. African-Americans are better at running, Asians are smarter, and whites have a higher IQ than blacks. Intelligence, says Jared Taylor is genetically controlled such that Asians and whites have a better combination than blacks. He uses graphs from David Piffer’s (2015) study to explain allele frequencies to give further strength to the argument. The biological difference between races are seen as obvious knowledge that the left are trying to suppress.

Racial equality is seen as a liberal myth perpetuated by a political agenda. Borrowing evolutionary theories and new statistics from contemporary “race science” (Evans, 2018), race realists put forth common sense arguments that would seem like natural conclusions to viewers.

Political Correctness

Political Correctness is arguably the most unifying element of the alt-right. The “PC police” is seen as a silencing strategy by the liberals to prevent inferences based on common sense and science that don’t fit their political agenda. Conservative attachment to an anti-PC

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culture has long preceded the alt-right. Many scholars point to the resistance to PC culture as the overarching sentiment that brought all of these loose groups together under the umbrella of the alt-right. The anti-PC crowd stresses victimhood of the white male,- shunned and ridiculed for saying something non-PC. Language that was otherwise normal talk has become taboo. Worse still, people are publicly shamed for the harmless use of terms, making it difficult to discuss anything for the fear of being humiliated. At the core of it, PC is antithetical to freedom of speech, and is used as a tool to suppress dissent. In reality, the term was in fact used by the left to criticize people in their own political group who take liberal ideas to an absurd level (Wilson,

1995: 4). It was only in the 1980s that conservatives used the term against liberal values. It permeated public discourse even more after President Bush’s speech in 1991, condemning political correctness.

The presidential attention to PC culture coincided with the publication of a popular survey by Times Mirror, according to which 48% of American adults had heard about PC.

Immediately following this, media channels, TV shows and newspapers featured long discourses criticizing PC culture. Thus, what was once used as a sarcastic term by the left to criticize extreme behavior of a few individuals became a term that symbolized victimhood of the right and silence of dissent from the left.

Anti-PC discussions in mainstream media were paralleled by the growth of a similar movement in the safe comfort of internet anonymity. The dark web, came to be known as a “safe space”, where anonymity allowed for an open dialogue between far-right groups, without the threat of being stigmatized. Through common distaste for political correctness, several groups came together, making the alt-right a diverse set of subgroups that all share an “anti-PC impulse and a common aesthetic sensibility” (Nagel, 2017: 19).

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Common Sense Appeal, Red Pilling, Meme Magic and Slang

A significant difference between the alt-right and its precursors (Hawley, 2017), is its appeal to common sense. Provocative statements made by alt-right proponents are often disguised in edgy memes while exposing the common sense ‘logic’ behind the claims. “Race realism” is a good example of this. Alt-right figures are often seen fighting the denial of race reality. They claim to expose the illusion of racial equality through a well thought out appropriation of science, philosophy and intellectual figures. Through flawed arguments disguised in intellectual verbosity, alt-right figures appeal to a ‘common sense logic’ of racial differences that the rest of the world is too ‘politically correct’ to accept.

Like many buzzwords invented by the alt-right, “red-pill” is a term with a pop culture reference. Red pilling someone means to enlighten them in a way that opens their eyes to the real world. The reference here is a scene from the movie “Matrix”, where Neo, the main character is given a choice between a red and a blue pill. The red pill will make him see the truth. While it may be uncomfortable, he will be more aware of the world. The blue pill on the other hand signifies comfort and security that comes from ignorance. To red pill someone then, is to make them see the world as it really is. Apart from alt-right discussions, red pill makes a prominent appearance in another partly related group; the men’s rights activists. The men’s rights movement is a fringe anti-feminist group that claims to fight against traditional gender roles that do more harm to men than women. Red pilling is used very often among men’s rights groups to refer to the same eye-opening experience when someone realizes the true state of affairs against men, and the vicious nature of feminism.

A crucial step in the appeal to common sense, is to frame alt-right ideas in a way that is palatable to people who don’t identify as being in the far-right. Many call this tactic the gateway drug to the alt-right. There are many avenues that work as gateway drugs. Among the most

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common are anti-PC talks, the Men’s Rights Movement explained below, right wing news outlets like Breitbart News, and memes.

Memes- funny images or videos that are circulated to get a point across- are now popular among most internet users as a satirical instrument, but it was in 1976, in his book “The Selfish

Gene”, that Richard Dawkins coined the term. He defines it as a “cultural unit of transmission”, a counter part to genes in biological evolution that explains the spread of ideas in a culture. Images with a short caption are very effective ways of spreading messages. Memes have been widely used, from spreading awareness on serious issues, to humorous opinions on pop culture news.

Several movements, causes, and political campaigns have used memes as communication tools to shed light on issues and point out injustices that the movement is fighting against. It’s brevity and rapid spread make it particularly successful in gaining traction.

The alt-right has mastered the use of memes to spread its messages. It’s meme archive is diverse, and selectively used depending on the audience. By using humor and pop culture references, the alt-right is able to attract young internet users that may not be in the far-right, but show an interest in any of the broad range of topics covered by the memes. For whites that are confused by white privilege because they feel disadvantaged, there is a meme that “debunks” white privilege. For those that feel stifled by political correctness and are often called out or publicly shamed for using a politically incorrect word, there’s a meme that satirizes PC, and for those that have been having a hard time finding a partner even though they are taught that being males comes with certain advantages, there’s a meme that points out the double standards of feminism or the real agenda behind “feminazis”.

Part of the young appeal of the alt-right is the numerous slang words either invented or popularized by the alt-right. “” is a term that is used to refer to mainstream

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conservative sellouts. It is a combination of the words conservative and “cuckhold”; a popular genre in pornography that refers to men whose wives have sex with other men while they watch.

A “normie” is a related term referring to ignorant, ordinary people who are not part of the alt- right, and a “beta male” is an emasculated, insecure man. Many of these terms emerge out of inside jokes in discussion boards. For instance, the term “kek” has its origins in video gaming.

Some video games like “World of Warcraft” that use Korean translations, translates the word

“lol” (Laugh out Loud) to “kek”. Hence in discussion boards, kek is used as an alternative to lol.

It also so happens that Kek is the Egyptian god of darkness, usually depicted with a frog’s head.

And a frog is a popular character in Matt Furie’s comic, Boys Club. The alt-right icon “Pepe the

Frog” was born out of these associations. Kek became the satirical god, Pepe the icon, and

“kekistan” a country for kek followers. But the usage of kek doesn't end there. More recently, kek has been used as an acronym for “Kill every kike”- kike being a slur for Jews- and kekistan stands for “Kill all kikes immediately start the Aryan nation”10 While it would not be inaccurate to label the entire movement as anti-Semitic, a significant faction within the movement definitely espouse anti-Jewish sentiments. A commonly used code to indicate Jewish control of institutions is to use an (((echo))) around their names.

Trolling

Another strategy, internet trolling, soon became a tool widely used by the alt-right

(Hawley, 2017). Aggressive comments combined with satirical memes by anonymous alt-right supporters are now commonplace on the internet; you only have to scroll down to the comments section of any well-viewed video or article about a cultural topic to see trolling in action. A self-

10 As reported by Al Jazeera: https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/10/dictionary-understand- 171002123412523.html

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proclaimed neo-Nazi, Andrew Anglin founded , a website dedicated to spread white supremacist ideas in 2013. The website celebrates its “troll army” that was first launched by Anglin on a resident of White fish, Montana. The target, Tanya Gersh, had written to Richard

Spenser's mother to ask her to condemn his statements. When Anglin unleashed his "troll army",

Tanya Gersh was attacked with anti-Semitic messages, threats, and other kinds of harassment including publicizing her address for trolls to attack. In April 2017, the Southern Poverty Law

Center filed a suit against Anglin on behalf of Tanya Gersh. Anglin has since been in hiding.

The intention of alt-right trolls is far less to convince the author of the article being trolled, than to red pill others who are watching the comments. Twitter maybe the most useful tool for the alt-right; alt-right content on twitter has a far broader reach than other social media platforms that limit conversation to friends (Hawley, 2017).

Fear Mongering and Victimhood Narratives

Another effective strategy used by not just the alt-right, but also other populist movements, is fear-mongering. The reason fear-mongering is such an effective tool lies in its appeal to middle-class insecurities and promising answers to socio-economic frustrations. An illustrative example of this is the fear of immigration and white displacement. White genocide is central to their crisis narrative. An ongoing genocide of native whites is underway. This argument is often validated by fabricated figures of white displacement by minorities, or phony statistics against minorities (Figure 2-5). An anonymous author illustrates the effect of these tactics:

This, I think, is where YouTube’s “suggested videos” can lead you down a rabbit hole. Moving on from Harris, I unlocked the Pandora’s box of “It’s not racist to criticise Islam!” content. Eventually I was introduced, by YouTube algorithms, to and various “anti-SJW” videos (SJW, or , is a pejorative directed at progressives). They were shocking at first, but always presented as innocuous criticism from people claiming to be liberals themselves, or centrists, sometimes “just a regular conservative” – but never, ever

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identifying as the dreaded. For three months I watched this stuff grow steadily more fearful of Islam. “Not Muslims,” they would usually say, “individual Muslims are fine.” But Islam was presented as a “threat to western civilisation”. Fear-mongering content was presented in a compelling way by charismatic people who would distance themselves from the very movement of which they were a part. At the same time, the anti-SJW stuff also moved on to anti-feminism, men’s rights activists – all that stuff. I followed a lot of these people on Twitter, but never shared any of it. I just passively consumed it, because, deep down, I knew I was ashamed of what I was doing. I’d started to roll my eyes when my friends talked about liberal, progressive things. What was wrong with them? Did they not understand what being a real liberal was? All my friends were just SJWs. They didn’t know that free speech was under threat and that politically correct culture and censorship were the true problem.11

The alt-right movement is unique owing to its diversity of supporters. The challenge in labeling the movement as a white supremacist conservative movement comes from the fact that white supremacists, homophobes, ant-feminists, racists and anti-Semites, all make up the support base of the alt-right, along with homosexuals, Jews, and people who oppose Trump, the neoconservative movement, and the ethnostate. The commonality between its supporters are far fewer than the differences between their views. Yet, this is a movement growing in solidarity among its supporters. Despite vast heterogeneity among its supporters, the roots of the alt-right movement can be traced back to precisely those white supremacist groups that it is now evidently different from.

Like many nationalist movements, the alt-right uses rhetoric of the oppressed to bring light to their issues. Postcolonial narratives of silencing, voiceless-ness and discrimination, historically part of language on the left are consistently used to empower who they perceive as being long ignored; the whites.

11 Excerpt from “’Alt-right online poison nearly turned me into a racist” published in The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/nov/28/alt-right-online-poison-racist-bigot-sam-harris-milo- yiannopoulos-

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Women's Roles

Similar to the idea of race realism, gender roles are seen as a reflection of the biological differences between males and females. Traditional gender roles are natural and should be reinforced and feminism is a denial of the biological difference between men and women.

Richard Spencer believes that “women deep down inside want to be taken by a strong man”12

Asked why the alt-right hasn’t been able to garner more women supporters, Spencer further states that all radical movements are characterized by male leaders and the alt-right is no different; the movement provides women the opportunity to fulfill themselves and “offers them a chance to be a mother”. 13 A Scottish alt-right activist known as “Millenial Woes” said this about women’s roles: "Women shouldn't have the vote, because if you do give them the vote, they will mess up your psychological defenses and your legal systems, your protocols, your culture, and make it vulnerable." Despite beliefs about women’s limited role in radical movements, there have been several women that have gained popularity. Two of the most popular figures are Lana

Lokteff and Ayla Stewart, also known as “Wife With a Purpose”. Women in the alt-right articulate a two-fold role within the movement; as supporters to their male counterparts and to contribute to the white population.

Men’s Rights Movement

Emerging beliefs about gender roles in the alt-right coincided with another movement that preceded the alt-right and has similarly been hidden from mainstream visibility. The Men’s

Rights Movement is a network of subgroups, websites and activists that believe that men have been largely oppressed by society, and that feminism is a denial of their subjugation. There are several groups that come under the umbrella of the MRA, all together known as the

12 Richard Spencer podcast:

13 Spencer press conference: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0V9n0rgawdY

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“”. The most notable of these in recent news has been the “”, or the involuntarily celibate- a group of young men who are “not in a relationship nor has had sex in a significant amount of time, despite numerous attempts”14 and believe they have been denied their right to sex by women. As “socially awkward” and “ugly” men, they believe women are too shallow to be attracted to personalities as opposed to looks. Successful, good-looking men who have sex are known as “Chads” and women who reject the socially awkward men are known as

“Stacys”. Incels came into prominence in the media after two killing sprees that were committed by their members. In 2014, Elliot Rodger killed 6 people in Santa Barbara, California after recording a video expressing his anger at women. Four years later, inspired by Elliot Rodger, a man in Toronto killed 10 people after posting the following: “The rebellion has already begun! We will overthrow all the Chads and Stacys!”

A new fringe group related to the men’s right movement is the “”. Founded in

2016 by Gavin McInnes, the co-founder of Vice media, the Proud Boys are self-declared male chauvinists who “refuse to apologize for creating the modern world”. Although many of their tenets correspond with mainstream conservative ideology, what caught media attention is their commitment to “venerating the housewife”. A man who wants to become a proud boy goes through four degrees of initiation. The first step is to publicly announce allegiance, the second is a vow to abstain from masturbation and a beating ritual where the new member takes a beating from at least 5 proud boys till he can name 5 breakfast cereals (McInnes, 2016). The third is to get a proud boy tattoo, and the fourth, according to McInnes, involves a “major fight for the cause”; “you get beat up, kick the crap out of ” (Aquilina, 2017).

14 Taken from the Incels.me, a men-only discussion board for incels.

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Identitarianism

It is difficult to distinguish between the alt-right and identitarianism, since many of the central figures in the alt-right including Rochard Spencer identify as identitarians.

Identitarianism originated in France and in 2012 gave rise to Generation Identity (GI). The movement is based on a stance against multiculturalism and an advocacy for “”.

GI is often called Europe’s alt-right given the parallels between beliefs. They became infamous during their “Defend Europe” operation where they attempted to stop refugee rescue boats from bringing in migrants. GI has inspired groups like in the U.S. that adopt many of

GI’s tactics. As self-declared Amercian identitarians, Identity Evropa calls for an ethnopluralist society where all racial and ethnic groups have an exclusive homeland. The similarities between the alt-right and Identity Evropa, and their involvement in similar activitism has made distinctions between the two blurred. However, identitarians are a well-organized, structured group unlike the fragmented alt-right. Members of Identity Evropa represent themselves in strict accordance with their image. Tattoos, piercings and shabby clothing are not allowed if one is affiliated with Identity Evropa. Whereas the alt-right, lacking any specific leadership, has no control over its followers, Identity Evropa disowns anyone that espouses violence or anti-Semitic views. Recruitment and activism among Identity Evropa happens mainly through flyers and social networking in college campuses. Barring cosmetic and organizational differences, the alt- right and the identitarians seem to have very few differences. In fact, Richard Spencer in 2017, launched an organization called “Operation Homeland”, that would be “dedicated to building a professional identitarian activist movement”15.

15 As announced by Richard Spencer in “Introducing Operation Homeland”: https://altright.com/2017/12/02/introducing-operation-homeland/

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The new far-right fringe movements discussed here constitute a growing reactionary subculture, fed up with conservative politics. It is also a reaction to globalization, multiculturalism, femininity, and open borders. These liberal sentiments, are seen as being responsible for denigrating and replacing white culture. Most of these groups espouse nationalistic sentiments with nostalgic references to a “golden age” before their country was corrupted by liberal ideas. While there is great diversity among these groups and even incompatibility between their beliefs, they all seem to share an anti-PC solidarity. In Chapter 3, I discuss the methods, framework, and research design employed in tis study

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CHAPTER 3 METHODS

This research necessarily employs a mixed-methods approach to answer the overarching research question: how are variations in levels of adherence to alt-right values maintained and mediated by personal networks, media exposure and individual experiences?

Mixed-methods research uses a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods to answer research questions and test hypotheses that require insights of both paradigms (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004: 17). Because of the multiple levels at which contemporary nationalistic ideology operates, a mixed-methods approach is best suited for this research. As an approach to research design, data collection, and data analysis, mixed-methods allows for balanced research that brings together the merits of both qualitative and quantitative methods

(Cresswell and Plano Clark, 2011). This is especially true for theoretical explanations of phenomena that would be too simplistic if a single approach was used (Tashakkori & Teddlie,

1998). Thus, the weakness of each method can be minimized by adopting this complementary approach to problem solving (Arnon and Reichel, 2009). The systematic approach of quantitative methods allows for easy replication, while qualitative methods are crucial in understanding context and subjective meanings (Rinne and Fairweather, 2012).

Cognitive Anthropology

To gain an emic perspective on how people come to believe in far-right values, this research uses tools in cognitive anthropology, as it provides the researcher a systematic method to measure cultural phenomena using an insider’s perspective. While the roots of cognitive anthropology can be traced to the 1950s movement of trying to understand how culture is organized as knowledge (Wallace, 1956), research on how cultural schema relate to action goes back about 2 decades (D’Andrade, 1995: 248). The basic premise of cognitive anthropology

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remains the same- an understanding of how people cognitively organize cultural knowledge

(D’Andrade, 1995:248)- although major advances in systematic research methods to determine shared cultural knowledge (Romney, Weller, and Batchelder, 1986; Borgatti, 1993), and in linking thought and behavior (Dressler, Balieirio, and Santos, 2002) are still being developed.

Culture as a set of patterned behavior emerged in anthropological literature during the

1950s paradigm shift from behaviorism to a cognitive perspective (D’Andrade, 1984). Cognitive anthropology emerged in the 1950s, during the paradigm shift in how we understand culture

(D’Andrade, 1984). Cognitive anthropology, or , focused on treating culture as a knowledge system that one has to acquire, to live in a way acceptable to other members of one’s group (Goodenough, 1964:36).

The shift in focus from culture as behavior to culture as knowledge, coincided with an interest in language and thought (Brown, 2006: 98). Anthropological studies in the “cultural part of cognition” (D’Andrade, 1981:57) were mostly concentrated in linguistic anthropology, with scholars like Sapir and Worf’s work on language and thought (Brown, 2006). Following that, kinship studies (Lounsbury, 1956 ) adopted prototype theory to understand kinship classifications and its relation to cognition.

The rise of ethnoscience was followed by anthropological debates among cultural materialists and ethnoscientists. Disagreements between the two sides revolved around what the subject of anthropological study should be, how theoretical approaches help forward our understanding of social evolution, and what research methods are appropriate (Newman,

1979:45). In this research, I take the stance of Newman (1979) with regard to the flawed perception of an ethnoscience versus cultural materialism divide, and treat both theoretical approaches as complementary to each other. Much of the arguments and approaches adopted by

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ethnoscience is cultural materialist in nature (Newman, 1976). A helpful way of looking at the relationship between the two is one proposed by Newman, where cognitive anthropology is treated as the study of the “superstructure”; the third layer in the cultural materialism framework proposed by Marvin Harris (1968). If cultural materialism focuses on the “etic” understanding of social change, cognitive methods contribute by investigating the “emic” process of social change

(Newman, 1979: 46).

Another approach of cognitive anthropology has focused on cultural models, or the study of knowledge organization as schemas; a set of ideas about a domain, shared by members of a cultural group (Quinn 1997:4). Schema theory in combination with consensus theory marked the

1980s development of cognitive anthropology (D'Andrade, 1995). Three main types of schema are discussed in this framework; object schema, orientation schema, and event schema.

Anthropological sub-disciplines like ethno-botany analyzed object schema through the study of taxonomies. These included investigating color and (Berlin, 1969), kinship (Lounsbury, 1956) terminologies. Orientation schema are “cultural maps” organized in a hierarchical manner, while event schema are “a wide range of activities and interactions” (Casson, 1983: 444).

This study uses cultural domain analysis as a tool to gain deeper insights into how Trump supporters organize their perceptions of important political issues. A cultural domain is “an organized set of words, concepts, or sentences, all on the same level of contrast, that jointly refer to a single conceptual sphere” (Weller and Romney, 1988:9). Social scientists use this technique to understand how different cultural groups understand and organize different categories

(Borgatti, 1994). To begin a cultural domain analysis, the researcher may make a list of items to analyze through existing literature, or through respondents themselves through an exercise called

"free lists" (Borgatti, 1994: 264). The list of items are then analyzed with a cultural consensus

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algorithm which is related to factor analysis. The resulting frequency data reveals a set of core items which may be used to for further tests to determine if they all fall under the same domain

(Borgatti, 1994: 265).

For this research, free lists are used as an elicitation technique under the domain; “What

Would Make America Great Again?” The items were analyzed under ANTHROPAC to detect salience and frequency distribution of items. The core items generated by ANTHROPAC are then discussed in the context within which they were listed.

Methods of Data Collection

Three major methods of data collection employed were participant observation, ethnographic interviews, personal network analysis, and a survey.

Ethnography

Ethnographic data were used to i) determine the focus of subsequent interviews, ii) to triangulate survey data to measure adherence to alt-right values, and iii) to gather free list data on

“What Would Make America Great Again?”.

Interviews

 RQ: How do Trump supporters vary in their adherence to alt-right sentiments?

 Objective 1. To develop a list of alt-right adherence values based on content on alt-right media channels on the internet.

 Objective 2. To conduct in-depth interviews on Trump supporters to understand their political beliefs and stance on specific political issues

In-depth interviews were conducted to understand respondents' political ideology, and to determine their adherence to alt-right values. As a starting point, respondents were asked to describe their political ideology, and responses were used as further probes on their life experiences, political views, disagreement with others in the conservative movement, and perceptions of contemporary politics.

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This research uses a grounded theory approach to understand what attracts Trump supporters to the alt-right movement. Grounded theory, developed by Glasser and Strauss (1967) is based on principles that have been long part of ethnography. In the grounded theory approach, researchers develop hypotheses as they collect data. It is an inductive approach that uses data to inform hypotheses which in turn affect how the data is collected. As such, data analysis takes place during data collection. The development of grounded theory was considered revolutionary at a time when debates about methods and theories were abound. Sociologists Glasser and

Staruss (Ibid), in recognizing the dearth of new theories, suggested a grounded theory approach to theory building. Since the emergence of grounded theory as a formal approach, there have been many debates about how best to practice it. However, some key elements have remained the same. The following paragraphs give a brief explanation of the methods, the key elements that form grounded theory, and how it has been used in this study.

The foundational element of grounded theory is constant comparison, in which the researcher constantly compares data to check for patterns and linkages. This comparison happens at several levels. First, the researcher compares data from different sources to check for similarities. The patterns that emerge out of different data inform further data collection. For a comparative analysis, the data first needs to be coded. Hence, the first step after initial data collection is coding. Coding data from interviews or any other material happens when the researcher analyzes each unit- a sentence, paragraph, line or section- and assigns them a descriptive code that is defined by the researcher. Once the entire data set has been coded, the codes are compared and grouped into categories and sub-categories. These categories are then compared and analyzed to determine linkages between them in a process called axial coding.

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The second element of grounded theory is theoretical sampling. As the researcher looks for themes that relate categories to each other, the emerging linkages influence further data collection. Thus, participants are selected based on the hypothesis that emerges through coding.

Recruitment of participants and coding of data continues until theoretical saturation is reached and no new categories emerge from the data. It should be noted that at every step during the process, the researcher is constantly looking for deviants that could contradict emerging hypotheses. Once theoretical saturation is reached, the researcher is in a position to create a model or theory that explains the phenomenon under study. The last step in this process is building a storyline to explain the new theory.

The adoption of grounded theory in this study was guided by methodological frameworks that informed the research methods; cognitive anthropology and personal network analysis.

Following a grounded theory approach, I use both these paradigms as a lens to develop a model to understand how extreme ideologies are formed, and what influences the sustenance and reinforcement of these beliefs among Trump supporters. While grounded theory is discussed primarily as a qualitative approach, I use mixed-methods to guide my hypotheses. In-depth interview coding allows for the emergence of relevant categories, and quantitative analysis of network variables allow correlational analyses. As a starting point, personal networks were used as a variable to understand the spread of alt-right beliefs. Do people adhere to alt-right values as a consequence of compositional properties in their network, or do they select their network members based on pre-existing beliefs? Using emerging data from interviews, other variables such as media exposure and experience with liberals were explored.

Coding of in-depth interviews served two purposes; to discover new categories that would inform further data collection, and to measure adherence to alt-right beliefs. Coding of

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initial interviews guided questions and probes in subsequent interviews. For example, after coding the first two interviews, it became clear that media exposure and distrust in mainstream media was an important theme among Trump supporters. Further interviews included probes on what kind of media exposure the participants have, and their perceptions on different news outlets. Subsequent coding from new interviews suggested that past experience with liberals played a major role in strengthening their beliefs.

Alt-right Adherence

Respondents' adherence to alt-right values was determined by their beliefs on key issues that are most commonly cited by the alt-right. Adherence to alt-right values were determined through a combination of interview coding and responses to a survey explained in below.

Interviews were coded for alt-right values, selected from prior research on the movement. In a popular and well-cited article "What Does It Mean to be Alt-right”1, Richard Spencer states 20 key alt-right principles. Popular statements such as these form the article and beliefs on other core issues were coded for, to determine participants’ adherence to alt-right believes.

Qualitative analyses of interviews in conjunction with survey responses are necessary to determine the accuracy of far-right beliefs. Triangulation of interview and survey data was especially important because of a major obstacle in alt-right research; the definition of alt-right ideology. Being a loose movement without an established doctrine of principles or a recognized leadership, quantitative research of the alt-right movement becomes a challenge. Ideally, a consensus analysis of alt-right beliefs among a representative sample of alt-right supporters would solve this problem, but given logistical limitations, this research used available material from alt-right channels in the media and the internet to determine alt-right values.

1 This article has now been taken down, but can be accessed through internet archive programs

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Alt-right Adherence Survey

 RQ: Do people with higher adherence to alt-right values have similar scores on Forchser and Kteily’s alt-right scales?

 Objective: Determine levels of adherence to alt-right values Trump supporters using Forscher and Kteily’s (2017) scales

The most recent study (Forscher and Kteily, 2017)2 of the alt-right, conducted by two psychologists developed a psychological profile of alt-right supporters. They conducted surveys on a group of 447 alt-right supporters, and 382 non-supporters to understand the psychology behind supporters and on-supporters. Specifically, the study looked at friendships, personality characteristics, intergroup orientation, prejudice, dehumanization, aggression, attitudes about the economy, perceptions about disadvantage, concern about political issues, police support, media trust and “race-based collective action” (Ibid: 11). Results of this study revealed that alt-right supporters as a whole perceived whites and men as being less advantaged, expressed more hostility towards minorities, and reported higher levels of aggressive behavior (Ibid: 22).

However, two subgroups were identified in the alt-right sample; one that reported extremists tendencies, and another that had lower extremist behavior, but were marked by populist concerns

“about government corruption” (Ibid, 22). The authors conclude that the two clusters may indicate 1) a linear path of alt-right support, going from populist concerns to extremist beliefs and 2) a difference in personalities of the two groups, since dark triads scores- traits that indicate manipulative and insensitive behavior- were higher among the group with extremist beliefs (Ibid:

8). Findings from Forscher and Kteily’s (2017) study on the alt-right was used to measure alt- right adherence. However, like any study that relies on anonymous online surveys, the lack of context or variation in interpretation of questions can compromise the accuracy of the data. This

2 This study is yet to be published in a peer-reviewed journal. A pre-print and data are available at:

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is especially problematic in studies of the alt-right, since members of the community are known to be disingenuous with journalists and researchers as a form of humor (Hawley, 2017). Hence, the data from surveys were triangulated with coding from in-depth interviews to measure adherence to alt-right values.

Selected questionnaires from the above study were administered along with the in-depth interviews to triangulate survey responses with interview data. Thus, quantitative and qualitative data were together used to determine adherence. A mixed-methods approach here was necessary to limit inaccuracies that are inevitable in using a single approach. As stated in Chapter 3,

Forscher and Kteily’s (2017) study was based on 12 measures that were determined through 7 questionnaires. In this study, measures of psychological traits, intergroup orientations, attitudes about the economy, media trust, and friendship were omitted. With the study population in this project being Trump supporters, some of the questionnaires from the above study would be inappropriate and offensive to non-alt-right supporters. Measures from the above study that were replicated were motivations towards prejudice, self-reported behavior, perceptions of disadvantage, beliefs about political issues, and collective action.

Individuals were considered as adhering to alt-right values if their scores fell within the confidence interval from Forcher and Kteily’s study, and if in-depth interviews revealed adherence to alt-right values. An examination of a diverse group of Trump supporters with varying levels of alt-right adherence would provide valuable insights on what attracts people to the alt-right, and who is more susceptible to recruitment by the movement. Personal networks and media exposure were closely examined to understand if properties in networks and selective exposure to media explain adherence to alt-right values.

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Table 3-1: Forcher and Kteily Study: Selected Scales and Measures.

Measure Scale Confidence Alt-right Mean Interval Motivations IMP 3.52-3.97 3.74 EMP 2.87-3.27 3.07 IMS 4.92-5.36 5.14 EMS 3.66-4.10 3.88 Self-Reported Behavior Harassment 1.85-2.11 1.98 Offense 2.53-2.84 2.69 Perceptions of Ingroup 2.98-3.14 3.06 Disadvantage Outgroup 2.81-2.99 2.9 Political Problems Corruption 5.25-5.55 5.4 Ingroup Discrimination 4.08-4.4 4.24 Security 5.45-5.67 5.56 Liberal Issues 3.28-3.55 3.41 Collective Action White Collective Action 4.9-5.21 5.06 Opposition to Black Lives 5.44-5.7 5.57 Matter Police Attitudes Police Respect 4.69-4.96 4.83

Note: The “Alt-right Mean” refers to means recorded by Forcher and Kteily on corresponding scales. Confidence Intervals were calculated from the means, standard deviations, and sample size of the study

Free Lists

 RQ: How do Trump supporters vary in their perceptions of “What Would Make America Great Again”?  Objective: Conduct a free list analysis of “What Would Make America Great Again?” Free lists were collected to determine salient categories under the question, what would make America great again. The exercises were conducted twice; once during semi-structured interviews, and a second time through a survey. This was done for several reasons. First, free lists exercises during interviews helped collect contextual data and guide further probes. Second, participants would often launch into other discussions during free lists before being reminded to complete the exercise. Three, in-person free lists may inhibit responses if participants feel hesitant to list sensitive items. Survey free lists with the same participants allowed accounted for these limitations, while allowing them another chance to add items they had missed during the

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interview. The lists were analyzed separately and together to determine if there were any relevant differences between the two.

Personal Network Analysis

 RQ 1.Can structural and compositional variables in a person’s personal network mediate the influence of other materialistic conditions on a person’s adherence to alt-right sentiments?

 RQ 2. Can personal networks and media exposure together explain variation in beliefs?

 Objective 1. To conduct a personal network analysis of the same 10 Trump supporters and use their network maps qualitatively, in order to get a deeper insight on their network composition.  Objective 2. To conduct a survey on a representative population of Floridians to understand patterns in alt-right sentiments With alt-right adherence as the outcome variable, socio-cultural factors of respondents were treated as independent variables. As with typical grounded theory approaches, data analysis during the study indicates what independent variables need to be explored. However, using social networks as a lens, this research uses personal network analysis as a starting point to explain the spread of extreme ideology. Personal network analysis provides researchers a method to understand the immediate social context of an individual (McCarty and Molina, 2015:644) through an emic perspective. This study uses EgoNet program developed by McCarty, Killworth and Rennell (2007), to collect personal network data. The EgoNet program uses four prompts

(McCarty et al. 2007: 148); ego prompts, name generator, alter prompts, and alter-tie evaluation.

Ego prompts are questions that collect socio-demographic data on respondents. Here, respondents were asked for their level of education, whether they have social media accounts, their financial situation, and their race. Typically, respondents are asked other demographic questions, but much of that data was collected during the in-depth interview preceding the personal network interview. The second prompt- the name generator- is a free list exercise where the respondent is asked to name people in their lives that fit a given description. Depending on

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the research context, researchers may be interested in gathering data on certain types of people the respondent knows, or their entire personal network (McCarty, 2013: 264). An important concern for network researchers is respondent burden (McCarty, 2007; Burt, 1984). Eliciting too few alters can compromise variation within a network, while eliciting too many can add to the already tedious survey (Burt, 1984). McCarty et. al (2007) compared two sets of data to determine a minimum number of alters that could both reveal the necessary structural properties, but also reduce respondent burden. A free list of 25, and in some cases 10 alters, were determined to reveal a personal network structure of 45 alters (McCarty et. al, 2007).

The free list criteria used for this study to generate alter names, was developed by

McCarty et al (2007) - "You know them and they know you by sight or by name. You have had some contact with them in the past two years, either face-to-face, by phone, mail or e-mail, and you could still contact them if you had to." A modified elicitation technique (McCarty and

Govindaramanujam, 2005) was used to reduce respondent burden and is discussed in detail in

Chapter 5. Following data collection, NETDRAW (Borgatti, 2002) was used to conduct qualitative interviews using network maps (McCarty et al. 2007).

If individuals are believed to be influenced by their social environment, a study of its constituents becomes crucial in understanding variation in beliefs. In this regard, previous research on networks reveal a consistent pattern of both status (ascribed) and value (achieved)

(Lazersfeld and Merton, 1954) homophily (McPhersonth et al., 2001). Homophily is defined as

“the tendency for people to like people who are similar to themselves on socially significant attributes” (Borgatti et al. 2013). A central question in discussions about homophily in networks is whether individuals develop the homogeneity as a result of selection or influence (Noel and

Nyhan, 2011). Is homophily a function of people’s selection of particular network members, or is

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it a function of the influence personal networks have on individuals? Several factors under selection and influence have been discussed to explain recurrent patterns of homophily in whole and personal networks. While earlier research (Cohen 1954,) suggests selection as a stronger causal factor for homogeneity, more recent studies (Levitar and Visser, 2006) cast doubts on this inference. For example, in an experiment (Visser and Mirabile, 2004) that measured attitudinal change, participants that perceived to have a network of diverse attitudes on an issue were more open to attitude change than the control group. While diversity in exposure to varied opinions through media, news, and other channels may have an impact on openness to attitude change

(Mutz and Martin, 2001), it has also been noted that social networks have a unique and stronger influence on attitudes (Levitar and Visser, 2004). Indeed, people can choose to switch off media channels, but interactions with network members and casual political conversations are not easily avoided (Lazersfeld, 1968)3. However, other research suggests that the power of media on political polarization is undeniable. Iyengar and Hahn, (2009) in a research experiment, demonstrated the selective exposure to media channels through choices people make in selecting news outlets that are perceived to have similar political leanings. They further showed that the strength of such selection is stronger with people who are more politically engaged. Another study (Stroud, 2008) that used large survey data inferred that people’s political beliefs dictate what kind of newspapers, radio, cable news and websites they chose to subscribe to. Research

(Levitar and Visser, 2004) also indicates that people with a diverse social network are more persuaded by quality rather than quantity of arguments- that is, people in diverse networks consider the merit of opposing arguments instead of avoiding scrutiny. This poses compelling questions on whether a third variable may influence a person’s vulnerability to attitudinal

3 The same study also notes a waitress’ change of vote based on parts of conversations she overheard.

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change, as questioned by Levitar and Visser (2004). In reality, homophily is likely to be a result of both selection and influence (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1987). However, when both selection and influence are at play, separating the two are a major challenge (Manski, 1993) in a cross- sectional study. Longitdinal studies can help disentangle the two processes. The most notable in longitudinal studies of homophily are those conducted by Christakis and Fowler (2007; 2008) to demonstrate the influence of social networks, more specifically called the “contagion effect”

(ibid).

If tendency to have networks of similar people is so consistent, what are the factors that may cause this homogeneity? Patterns of homophily have been explained by several theories, spanning two major groups of causal factors variously named endogeneous and exogeneous factors, or selection and influence. Discussion partnerships tend to form between politically similar people (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1987). When homophily is the result of selection, it occurs as a result of a conscious choice to form ties with others who are perceived to be similar.

However, when there is disagreement between members of a network, it causes a cognitive discomfort (Heider, 1958) that is relieved by misinterpreting the disagreement as in fact complementary views (Huckfeldt and Sprague, 1987). This has a counter effect on social influence because discussion partners perceive to have similar views (Ibid). Another way to restore cognitive balance (Heider, 1958) is to adjust one’s beliefs to reflect a similar position, thus demonstrating social influence of network members. A third factor of homophily relates to exogenous factors in the environment. People, by virtue of having similar tastes, beliefs or opinions may meet during a common activity- a club, a common hobby or other leisure activities- that attracts people of that group. Here it is not direct selection that results in homophily, but an opportunity structure (Lazer et al., 2008) that allows for interaction between

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similar people. With the permeating effect of social media, opportunity structures have expanded well beyond geographical boundaries. Through social network sites, people connect, interact and spread ideas to groups that would be impossible had they depended on face-to-face ties. Viral videos and memes on the internet are testament to the power the online world has on social influence.

These theories of selection, influence and the effect of media exposure provide a strong explanatory power in the spread of far-right populism in America. As discussed in Chapter 2, the alt-right- and other contemporary populist movements- have increasingly used trendy internet subcultures to spread their message, reach a wider audience and thus recruit new members. But who is more likely to be recruited is dependent on other factors outside their online life. Pete

Simi, a sociologist who has worked with former neo-Nazi members for more than 20 years compellingly demonstrated (2015) key themes that are recurrent among those that are attracted to far-right movements. Through life histories with 44 former violent extremists, Simi et. al (2015) found three key themes; childhood trauma, mental health issues, and high risk behaviors; 45% reported being abused during childhood, 62% reported attempting or seriously considering suicide, and 72% reported having some form of substance abuse in the past. White power movements provided them a sense of belonging that they were otherwise deprived of (Picciolini,

2015; Simi et al., 2017). In his memoir (2015), Christian Picciolini- a former Nazi skinhead- documents his attraction to the white power movement, violent participation within it, and his subsequent de-radicalization. Resonating Simi’s (2015) findings, Picciolini states that it was not ideology that primarily recruited new members, but the sense of belonging it provided to insecure and vulnerable children. What stimulated his and many others’ departure from the white

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power movement was meaningful interactions with minorities that were their supposed enemies.4

Similar themes are evident in alt-right recruitment. Being that the movement is fragmented and loosely defined, various subcultures (Nagle, 2017) with different foci come together under the umbrella of the alt-right because it gives them a mobilizing force. A common anti-PC sentiment, a sense of belonging, and selective exposure to alternative media seem to glue these fringe groups together. Given the vast evidence we have of the role social networks play in identity formation, it is compelling to examine how personal networks may reinforce or weaken the power of alt-right recruitment tools.

Here, personal network data is used to understand variation in adherence to alt-right values within Trump supporters. Specifically, network analysis is used to determine if those with similar adherence levels have similar structural and compositional properties in their network.

Qualitative interviews using network visualizations provide invaluable insights that would not otherwise be revealed (McCarty, et.al 2007). After the personal network survey, personal network maps generated by the computer program NETDRAW were used qualitatively during follow-up interviews to gain further insight on structural and compositional properties of their networks.

Coupled with a network analysis is another important variable; selective media exposure.

Although the direction of causality between networks and selective exposure to media is difficult, a co-occurrence of the two can inform how the two may reinforce each other. Does network diversity mediate media exposure? Do people who have political discussions with those who have opposing views subscribe to a more diverse selection of media outlets?

4 Interview with the National Public Radio, January 18, 2018: https://www.npr.org/2018/01/18/578745514/a-former- neo-nazi-explains-why-hate-drew-him-in-and-how-he-got-out

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Florida Survey

 RQ 1. How do Floridians in general align with common alt-right values?

 RQ 2. What variables characterize of alt-right supporters, and are they different from other commonly used variables like socio-economic condition and education?

 Objective 1. To conduct a survey of a representative population of Florida residents to gather data on 6 key issues relevant to alt-right ideology.

 Objective 2. To conduct statistical analyses to check for correlations between alt-right supporters and other variables.

The Bureau of Business and Economic Research at the University of Florida is an applied research center that produces the state’s official reports on population estimates and economic trends, besides conducting a monthly consumer sentiment index survey. BEBR’s monthly survey is conducted over using the Computer-Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) program, on a representative population of approximately 500 Florida residents over 18 years of age.

Respondents are chosen through random digit dialing.

The survey for this study was conducted by BEBR, to gather data on 6 questions. The questions (Figure 4-3) were reflective of key issues that are the focus of the alt-right, and were an add-on to BEBR’s monthly phone survey. Having been conducted on a representative population of Floridians, the insights from the survey data can be applied more generally. Correlations of variables from the survey were explored qualitatively, to gain deeper insight on how beliefs are spread. Specific questions and analyses are detailed under Chapter 6.

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The following chart summarizes the mixed-methods research design I have used:

Beliefs, Motivations, and Influence of Social Research Question Context in adherence to alt-right ideology

Type Qualitative Quantitative

Alt-Right Adherence Data Collection Interviews Survey Free Lists Florida Survey Personal Network Personal Network Interviews Survey

Correlational Analysis Coding Correspondence Data Analysis Salience Analysis Analysis PNA PNA

INTEGRATION AND TRUANGULATION

Figure 3-1: Research Design

Note: PNA (Personal Network Analysis) has been used in both qualitative and quantitative methods

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CHAPTER 4 RESULTS I

In-Depth Interviews and Personal Networks

Participant Observation and Unstructured Interviews

The initial stage of this study involved participant observation and unstructured interviews with both moderate and alt-right Trump supporters. Having meals together, going over to participants’ houses, visiting workplaces, and informal phone calls together helped build the interview guide for semi-structured interviews (Bernard, 2011: 158). Needless to say, this stage was far more challenging among alt-right supporters. Interviews with alt-right supporters followed weeks of building rapport online. Every single far-right supporter was extremely guarded and suspicious at first, and most of them refused speaking to me at all. After sending a project description of my research, informed consent forms, and an assurance that I am not a journalist, I would get responses with a “Yeah right” GIF or “You’re CNN? Lol. Yeah, no”. I was also vetted in several ways. My social media platforms were scrutinized and I was tested on my responses to provocative messages. It was only after my first interview with an alt-right supporter that it became a little easier to speak with others. It was clear that they had done their research and had spoken about me in their gatherings. My first interview was to be a litmus test, based on which others would make their decision. Fortunately, my persistent effort at keeping the study and my objectives as transparent as possible helped gain their trust. As one gatekeeper to the alt-right community said after the interviews: “Choeeta, you are lovely. Ron (name changed), I hope Choeeta gets approval for a video interview because you will be blessed by talking to her. (Choeeta), Thank you for your commitment to honesty”.

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Semi-structured Interviews

There were 15 semi-structured interviews in total, 7 of which were conducted in person in Gainesville, Florida, 1 in Lake City, Florida, 1 in Waldo, Florida and 1 in a city 3 hours from

Gainesville1. Two interviews were conducted over video calls, and the rest over the phone. An

IRB revision was submitted and approved a few months into fieldwork when it was clear that in- person interviews with alt-right members would not be feasible in the given time frame of this study. 2 Participants were recruited through snowball sampling. Two alt-right supporters were contacted on social media and the rest snowballed from them. The interviews started with open- ended grand tour questions (Spradley, 1979),the first one being: Could you explain to me what your political ideology/beliefs are? Answers to this question typically led to follow-up probes and questions (interview guide is attached) For the sake of privacy, all names are pseudonyms.

Free Lists

As Chapter 3 indicates, free lists were carried out twice; once during the interviews and a second time in a survey. Free lists were collected under the domain “What would make America great again?” and were asked at the end of the interview. Survey free lists were conducted along with the Forscher and Kteily (2017) scales explained in Chapter 3. The two lists were analyzed separately, but also as one combined list. This served three purposes: i) it allowed comparison of the two lists to detect relevant differences ii) survey free lists allowed the analysis of rank orders, and iii) the combined list allowed for a more comprehensive analysis, as it contained all the participants, including those that were only available for one free list exercise. Although free lists during the interview allowed “ethnographic cross-checking” (Quinlan, 2005) and provided the

1 The location of this city cannot be disclosed to maintain participant confidentiality, This person is an alt-right supporter and the main organizer of alt-right gatherings in her city.

2 The alt-right supporters willing to participate were far dispersed. One was in Asia, and others were spread across South Florida.

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context within which to understand each item, it had its limitations. Most significant of these is the compromise on rank order. Literature suggests the importance of using both frequency of items and the rank order to measure salience (Smith, 1993). While the free lists were conducted in the form of a structured exercise at the end of the interview, many participants pointed to arguments they made during the semi-structured interview as things “that would make America great again”. Often they would repeat some of those points and add a few more. Although I tried to stay as true to the order as I could, the relevance of rank order was inevitably compromised in the interview free lists.

What Would Make America Great Again?

Figure 4-1 shows the frequency of items listed by 12 participants in the survey free lists.

The three most salient items from the survey free lists are unity, self-reliance and moral values.

However, this analysis is based strictly on typed answers in the survey free lists. Interview free lists included many more items because participants would often expand on their answers. For example, one participant listed “extremely reduced immigration”, but in the interview free list, he explained it in greater detail This is an important difference, as almost all participants- moderates included- mentioned controlled immigration, but alt-right supporters called for a halt on non-white immigration. Therefore, Figure 4-2 displays the salience for combined free lists. A closer look at the salience chart (Figure 4-2) indicates the presence of subsets with high salience.

Although extracting a subset would decrease sample size, small samples can provide high salience if it is done in conjunction with interviewing and probing (Weller et. al 2018). The combined free lists of alt-right supporters (Figure 4-3; Table 4-1) reveal drastically different salient items. Free lists of non-alt-right supporters are shown in Figure 4-4 and Table 4-2.

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Items' Salience 50.00%

45.00%

40.00%

35.00%

30.00%

25.00%

20.00%

15.00% Frequency 10.00% Smith Index 5.00% Sutrop Index

0.00%

Unity

Anti-PC

Security

Populist

Revamp

Freedom

Patriotism

Martial_law

Self-reliance

Rule_of_law

More_troops

Individualism

Moral_values

Anti-feminism

Honest_media

Build_the_wall

Anti-non-white

Re-elect_Trump

Better_alliances

Shame_Muslims

Religious_values

Healthy_lifestyle

Strong_economy

Crime_Reduction

Good_healthcare

Environmentalism

Change_aesthetics

Control_population

Equal_opportunities

Shame_homosexuals

Freedom_of_association

Strong_immigration_laws

Less_racial_discrimination Halt_non-white_immigration

Extremely_reduced_immigration

Figure 4-1: Survey Free List Salience of Entire Population

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Items' Salience 60.00%

50.00%

40.00%

30.00%

20.00% Frequency Smith Index 10.00% Sutrop Index

0.00%

Unity

Anti-PC

Security

Populist

Freedom

Patriotism

Ethnostate

Martial_law

Self-reliance

Rule_of_law

White_pride

More_troops

Individualism

Moral_values

Ant-feminism

Anti-feminism

Honest_media

Ant-non-white

Build_the_wall

Anti-non-white

Re-elect_Trump

Better_alliances

Shame_Muslims

Religious_values

Healthy_lifestyle

Strong_economy

Crime_Reduction

Good_healthcare

New_constitution

Environmentalism

Change_aesthetics

Control_population

Equal_opportunities

Shame_homosexuals

Freedom_of_association

Strong_immigration_laws

Less_racial_discrimination Halt_non-white_immigration

Extremely_reduced_immigration

Figure 4-2: Combined Free list Salience of Entire population

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Items' Salience 90.00% Frequency 80.00% Smith Index 70.00% Sutrop Index 60.00%

50.00%

40.00%

30.00%

20.00%

10.00%

0.00%

Figure 4-3: Combined Free-list Salience of alt-right supporters

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Table 4-1: Core Items, Alt-right Free Lists

Average Smith Item Occurrence Number Frequency rank Index

Ethnostate 4 80.00% 6.750 0.287 Extremely_reduced_immigration 4 80.00% 2.250 0.683 Halt_non-white_immigration 3 60.00% 1.667 0.560 Freedom_of_association 3 60.00% 4.667 0.376 White_pride 3 60.00% 8.667 0.098 Anti-non-white 2 40.00% 6.000 0.178 Strong_economy 2 40.00% 5.000 0.214 Moral_values 2 40.00% 5.500 0.205 Self-reliance 2 40.00% 7.500 0.143 Unity 2 40.00% 3.500 0.276

Honest_media 2 40.00% 5.500 0.161

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Items' Salience 70.00%

60.00%

50.00%

40.00%

30.00% Frequency Smith Index 20.00% Sutrop Index

10.00%

0.00%

Figure 4-4: Combined free lists of non-alt-right conservative Trump supporters

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Table 4-2: Core Items, Non-alt-right Conservative Trump supporters Average Smith Item Occurrence Number Frequency Rank Index

Unity 5 62.50% 1.200 0.600

Populist 4 50.00% 3.750 0.306

Self-reliance 3 37.50% 3.667 0.194

Equal_opportunities 3 37.50% 3.000 0.221

Moral_values 3 37.50% 3.000 0.225

Strong_economy 3 37.50% 2.667 0.238

Honest_media 3 37.50% 2.333 0.264

Good_healthcare 2 25.00% 4.500 0.108

Strong_immigration_laws 2 25.00% 6.000 0.059

Interview Coding

Open coding, the first stage of data analysis in grounded theory, happens during data collection. Since this study uses an inductive approach, similar to the Gioia method (Gioia et al.

2013) of qualitative data analysis. In this framework, 1st order analysis codes raw data with minimal changes to informant terms (Gioia et al 2013: 20). As interviews are coded, similarities and differences between the numerous codes emerge, allowing 1st order terms to be distilled into

2nd order themes, and are given descriptive labels before looking for patterns- a process similar to axial coding (ibid). As themes and relationships between categories emerge, theoretical sampling is used to collect relevant data (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Once theoretical saturation has been reached (Glaser and Strauss, 1967)- that is, no new themes or categories emerge from

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the data- 2nd order themes are distilled into 2nd order aggregate dimensions before “building a data structure” (Gioia et al. 2013). For this study, I have adapted methods from Gioia et al (2017) and other classical methods in grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Forcefully fitting themes and categories into a rigid data structure, and using a “cookbook” method compromises on rigor in qualitative analysis (Gioia et al. 2013: 26).

In the following sections, I discuss core items in the free lists, and relevant themes from the interviews.

White Victimhood, White Dispossession, and the Ethnostate

Only white heritage is considered free for all…we all need ethnostates and everyone needs to go back because this is our homeland – Emily, 43 Alt-right activist

Given several successful attempts at infiltration by journalists, the alt-right are now extremely wary of interviews. My initial contact was with Jared Taylor. After a short description of my research, Taylor was welcoming of my request for interviews. He agreed to help without much hesitation, and offered to post my research on the “American Renaissance” website to attract more participants. He also invited me to the American Renaissance annual conference the next month. But a few emails later, I stopped getting any response from him. He had indicated hesitation from his colleagues and I guessed, owing to the suspicion against journalists and researchers, he had been advised against speaking to me.

A few months before I spoke to Taylor, Richard Spencer had visited the University of

Florida for a speech. UF had initially rejected his request for space, but gave in after being threatened with a lawsuit. A state of emergency was declared by governor Rick Scott, and UF spent over $500,000 on security. Protestors from all over the state had gathered to organize demonstrations at UF. Several rumors made the rounds days before his arrival, and Antifa groups

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had spread around the town to disperse a supposed rally rumored to suddenly appear the night before. On the day of the speech, I got tickets for his speech and made my way inside the Phillips center. The number of protestors that also got the tickets, and their loud protests made it impossible for Spencer and his colleagues to deliver their talks. While most of the hall was full of protestors, there were a significant number of non-alt-right supporters there to hear both sides.

Many of these people heard the protestors and were waiting to listen to the other side. By the end of the speech, the fence-sitters who seemed interested in arguments by both the side were now infuriated by the protestors. A young woman and her friend next to me repeatedly asked the protestors to let Spencer answer their questions. Towards the end of the speech, they started clapping at everything Spencer said. I saw a few people come in as curious spectators, but leave as sympathizers, because the alt-right looked like the victims. I approached a man seated in the row in front of me, who had identified as an alt-right supporter. A woman he had been talking to had her back faced to me, and nodded as I spoke. A minute later she turned around, realized I was brown, gave me a disgusted look, before saying: “I don't want to talk to you. I don’t want any part of this”. The man, happy to discuss his views, talked about the lies behind the holocaust, whites being wiped out, and the need to end immigration, and added: “What are you, Indian?

Your parents came here to start a business and own gas stations? Your people are everywhere.

Your people should prepare to leave the country. Because there is going to be conflict.”

After weeks to trying to get access to alt-right supporters, I was finally given an opportunity. An organizer of the alt-right community on one of the social media platforms agreed to speak with me and asked other members to give me a chance. Suspicious at first, we spent a few days conversing online. I explained my research, and told them I knew about the biased representations in the media. A week later, a note was sent to other supporters:

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I've been in conversation with a grad student who seems sincerely interested in genuinely representing the supporters of the Alt Right, as opposed to the superstar public figures. More or less, she seems to be doing a study of the Right, how the media's false portrayals of the Right have destroyed the public's ability to understand the Right, and how this is ruining public discourse. She really wants to speak with Alt Right supporters. She does have academic approval for her research with human subjects and has an abstract for her work. She is willing to speak to you in any way that you want. She would prefer a face to face -- but is willing to do skype or phone. You will remain anonymous. She's a Gainesville student. She told me that she's talked to Jared Taylor and he invited her to AmRen and has stated that he will publish her final work on the AmRen site. I can't personally vouch for her. But I will say that I've talked to her several times and feel that she's sincere in her desire to give our people a fair hearing and a fair reporting. I'm planning on speaking to her. Are you interested in speaking with her also?

Speaking about other contacts, she said:

I can pretty much assure you that to get any more from anyone who isn't a strange media whore kook (not representative), you're going to need some personal contacts -- like this kind of thing. The only reason my friend is willing is because he trusts my judgment. It sucks that it's so difficult -- but with basic conservatives being spit on at the movie theater and people being fired from their jobs for even going to an Alt Right function, I'm sure you understand…. I hope you're sincere and we're not putting ourselves out for a snake.

We had planned to meet at in a town a few hours away from Gainesville. Arriving at the restaurant we were supposed to meet, I looked around to spot a white man in his mid-20s. There was one sitting alone at a booth, but I decided to text instead of approaching him. No response. A few minutes later, a woman walked up and introduced herself to me as the person I was expecting. I had clearly stereotyped this alt-right supporter. I knew from research that most followers in the alt-right are men, although several more women are now joining the movement. But I had assumed the organizer would be male, and this was somehow reinforced in my conversations online. The person

I had been talking to was willing to drive a few hours to meet me with their fellow alt- right friends. The language they used was nothing like my understanding of women in the

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alt-right. It turned out that the one I was speaking to was Emily Johnson. She along with another man are the organizers of the alt-right community online.

Emily was warm from the very beginning. A 43-year old woman and a mother of two, she has been in the alt-right for 3 years, long before the movement had gained media attention. A radical feminist in her undergrad years, Emily majored in sociology and women’s studies before she was “wooed into a graduate program in sociology”. Her

Master’s thesis was “rape myths from the radical Marxist perspective”. She was trying to argue that, as she puts it, “it is through empowering women to stop reifying rape myths, that we would be able to be safe”. Her disillusionment with academia started soon after.

I wasn’t getting any help (with my topic). It was all theory. They hated practical stuff. It was all theory this and theory that. I had specific policies and recommendations but they didn't support me. They didn't like practical things, only theory. I thought social science was about implementation. I didn’t know why they wouldn’t help me. Someone else in the department, after six months, came to me quietly and se said: ‘Nobody likes your idea because your idea won't work.’ Then I started thinking, it’s because it WILL work. I was naïve. Feminists don't want women to be empowered. They want women to complain and be outraged. They don't want to empower women because once you do, you no longer need women’s studies programs. It was all political. Even in anthropology, if you look at the history of Boasian anthropology, people who got published were people who were permitted. I’m sure you know this. Or maybe you don’t.

Disgruntled with the lack of support, Emily left her Master’s program to go into law school, which had always been her dream. Emily says she is now “a mother. Because the greatest thing a woman can do is to raise children.” In law school, she saw a “liberal agenda” in the classes that were “supposed to be unbiased”.

Once I removed myself from this bizarre world of academic feminists, I went to law school where the academics weren’t that split. There were some that infiltrated, but there were many who believed law is color blind. Getting out of that environment and looking around at normal people and normal things- it felt like I had been in a fugue created by the fact that I started college at a very young age.

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In law school you have to take Torts. It’s personal injury law. That’s the layman term for it. My boyfriend at the time, who is my husband now, and I were taking Torts but with two different teachers. He had come in from a conservative college. He had a STEM background. I came in as a liberal feminist. His teacher spent all Summer pushing forward her radical feminist, brown perspective. That’s all they learnt. I was seeing this as a liberal feminist. I knew the things she was talking about. I had learned it. But she was there to teach Torts. All she was trying to do was indoctrinate them. When I saw it playing out is really when I started saying there is something afoot here.

Bush was in office then. It used to be that people had no idea who was on the Supreme court. They didn’t know about politics. You could live your life without knowing political things and without having your college career ruined because you didn’t think right.

While still in law school, Emily got married and had her first child. When her daughter was 5 days old, she decided she was not going to go back. But she also quickly qualifies that with her love for work. She wasn’t “one of those women in the alt-right that didn't like working”.

Emily loved being an attorney. She loved her job and thought she would go back one day, but after giving birth to her second daughter, she chose a different path.

On the fifth day after my daughter was born, I looked at her and realized: this is my life. My daughter was a terrible kid. Hahaha. After five days, I was ready for a drink. How can I trust someone else to take care of her, when I, her mother, is ready to strangle her after 5 days?

I sat there wondering how a woman with her education and experience entertained ideas so against her own principles of fairness and honesty. She simultaneously challenged my stereotypes of women in the alt-right, while also making claims I had only heard in reports of the alt-right. She was well-spoken and had a good sense of humor. Over four hours, she told me stories of her past, her struggles in academia, and the attacks she faced in her own community. I connected with her, while at the same time had moments when I could not help but break eye contact while she said the most repelling things. Her response to my question about the ethnostate, and the rights of Native Americans and African Americans is an example:

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I am a native American, they are not native Americans. You can call them indigenous Americans. The United Sates was created by and for Europeans while they (Native Americans) were having babies in Palmetto lean-tos. We are the true inheritors of this nation. No one was dying with malaria so some Hondurans could come here in 2018. There was a conquest and we won. We all need ethnostates and everyone needs to go back because this is our homeland. I think the Native Americans, the blacks and the whites have a right to live here. But we say that not because they lived here, but because of the mercy of our people. Other colonizers would have killed Indian populations. But they still exist. So it’s mercy. I don't think that Blacks should have ever been brought here. I don't support slavery. But I’m not going to forever apologize. We stopped slavery by our own conscience, not by conquest. It is for my people’s mercy that we ended slavery. It is for my people’s mercy that we provided reparations. It is for my people’s mercy that they still live here. Mercy is a very white character trait. We didn’t kill everybody and we’ve been doing things for generations to help them. People need to start considering the goodness of our people. White people are not evil. If we were, there would be no more Native Americans, and slavery would still go on.

Other alt-right supporters did not echo Emily’s urgent call for the ethnostate. While all of them supported a white homeland, some thought of it as an uncomfortable necessity and others regarded it as an ultimate goal after other crises are taken care of. Discussions about the ethnostate always accompanied narratives about white victimhood, variously conceptualized as white dispossession, voicelessness, discrimination against whites, and white guilt- a term used to refer to whites being made to feel guilty for what their ancestors did. Almost all the participants who spoke of white displacement saw it as a consequence of uncontrolled non-white immigration. “The white man is becoming an endangered species”, as one participant told me.

Jason is a doctoral student in clinical psychology and a newly converted alt-right supporter. Until 2015, his political beliefs were “center or center-left”. He always had “a left- leaning bias”. Never vocal during his undergrad, Jason now finds it difficult to bite his tongue when “blatant anti-white, anti-white rhetoric is being passed”. He tells me about his experience with a mandated diversity class he had to take last year:

We have to take this mandated diversity course by APA. We had a book called ‘Clinical Competency in Culture’ or diversity. The entire book went through each

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group, talking about stereotypes and how they were oppressed. But there was nothing about whites. Not all of this (oppression) is caused by whites. (It claimed that) educational differences between groups were pretty much because of racism.

He has at times tried to speak up, but immediately realized he was in the minority:

There was one instance- in the same class- when we were talking about LGBT. There was a girl in class that said everybody should be able to go to the bathroom based on how they feel. There were twelve people in this class, and just two guys. I said something about it and everybody pushed back. After that, I don't talk anymore.

According to Jason, a grand futuristic vision like the ethnostate is necessary, but there are more current issues like “forced immigration” that needs to be tackled at the moment. He thinks

“some people in the alt-right throw the baby out with the bath water”. He agrees with alt-right principles of placing identity first, because “populations have to be homogenous”, but takes a softer stance on LGBT issues:

I think people should be able to do what they want. Gay marriage should not be illegal. It should not be legal to get sex change surgeries and obviously no trans in the military.

When asked to expand, he says is not completely hard against sex change surgeries, but that transgender individuals should not serve in the military because “the military is the face of the country and we don't want that to be the face of our country”. Throughout our conversations,

Jason went back and forth between agreeing and disagreeing on certain alt-tight beliefs. It seemed clear that he was either just starting to articulate his beliefs, or was not completely convinced of alt-right ideology.

Jackson is 30. Jackson was born in Minneapolis Minnesota, but spent his formative years in North Dakota and now works as a translator in South Korea. We had been communicating through text messages, and after a good word from Emily, he prioritized our interview despite

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being in the middle of moving apartments in Korea. He lives with his partner, a part Iranian, part

Kurdish woman, who he alternatively refers to as his girlfriend and fiancée. He is wearing a wedding ring, but I resist probing him on it. Jackson moved to Korea 13 years back, after serving in the army for 9 years.

His views on immigration and the ethnostate stand out in relative contrast to Emily’s:

There should always be some amount of foreign people in the country. It is a cartoon to say that you should never inter-marry or never do anything like that. That’s like what the really dumb bone-head Nazis do where like the only acceptable person for you to be friends with or for you to meet or marry is someone from Northwester Europe, right. Like even marrying someone from Itlay is sketchy or something, right. These are ridiculous people. But I’m like, look: My, you know, my buddy who’s alt-right- he has a wife who I think is Punjabi. It’s like, why would I criticize him?

His views, conservative as they are, lie in stark contrast to others I spoke to in the alt- right. I wondered if the discrepancy between his beliefs and those of the larger movement is rooted in his personal life and partnership with a middle-eastern woman. I ask him weather his views are a contradiction, given that the ethnostate would not allow non-whites into the white homeland.

The reason why we have to have such an extreme stance now is because of 50, 60 years of bullshit policy. If it was the year 1955, I think you’d even find British and American people with the right attitude of ‘Oh, you know, John was in Korea and he found a very lovely Korean woman and they’re married. That’s fine’, or even, you know, even if some woman found some lovely Chinese, or dare I even say it, a guy from Congo she falls in love with and wants to marry him- blocking that, messing with that is silly. It’s utterly inconsequential if 2 or 3% of the people have inter-racial marriages. But imagine this: Imagine a Native American person. There’s only like a million Native American people in all of existence who are pure Native American. Let’s say I meet a pure Native American girl, I lover her, we have a good relationship, and suddenly she said: ‘I’m sorry, there’s almost no Native Americans left. I want to have a Native American husband ‘cause Native American husbands can do something you can never do for me. You can’t give me a Native American kid’. You know what I mean? I would accept that. You gotta accept these things, and as a result of that, like, I would tell someone, like: ‘You’re alt-right and you’re single. You should probably stick to a white European lady. Not ‘cause you should dislike other people, but because we’re facing a little bit of a

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crisis. You know what I mean? That’s what I would say. And, so, like, it’s only an issue now because of all this.

The only non-alt-right supporter that had similar views on white dispossession was Matt, a

Cuban, born and raised in Key West:

They (whites) are starting to feel like they no longer have a voice. They are feeling that, Ok, there's a lot of things bad in the past, but it wasn't me. I can't justify what they did, but on the other hand, they feel like they are being punished- in entertainment, in reporting. White people are being punished for what their ancestors did...The average Joe of America feels like- "Who represents me? What creeps in then is fear...They've played by the rules and done the best for my country, church, whatever, but someone can come here illegally and the government- whose job it is to protect me- given them free healthcare and other stuff.

Race Realism and The Red Pill

To me, what I find scary is an educated black woman. Why? Man, once you give them education- oh man, their shit don't stink and they control the world – Matt, 62 Cuban Trump Supporter

In Chapter 2, I discussed the notion of red pilling, or an eye-opening realization that converts people into alt-right supporters. A central part of this realization is race realism. All of the people in the alt-right that I spoke with, were self-admittedly red pilled through the internet, either through podcasts or YouTube videos. Emily, who I introduced earlier, used to be a traditionalist, a supporter of an “America that could be recognizable in the 1960s when homosexuality was forbidden, immigration was limited, people went to church, where not all kinds of (sexual) degeneracy was celebrated on TV and pride parades, when women were afforded respect for being caretakers and men for being providers, protectors and leaders”. She was sent a video of RamzPaul, a “basic conservative, nothing very alt-right”- which led her to an interview where she heard the term “alt-right” for the first time. For 18 months of “extremely active consumption of alt-right material”, she was successfully redpilled.

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There’s this whole racial understanding that I wasn’t understanding. Race is real. Real racial difference is based in people evolving separately over thousands of years and the idea that melatonin content is what makes us different is wrong. There’s no way people have evolved in different environments without having different capabilities. It is a common sense idea that products of different environments are different.

The appeal of race realism seems to be two-fold: a common sense logic and the backing of pseudoscience. The IQ debate between races was never contemplated among the people I spoke to. It was a given, backed by their experiences and the prevalence of research studies.

After being introduced to , recollection of their past experience with people of different races nearly always served as a confirmation bias of what they now believed.

Studies claiming significant racial differences in IQ scores have made a major impact among race realists. I had heard the same figures being circulated in various alt-right forums, and heard it again during my interviews; Asians have an IQ of 105, average Americans score 100,

Somalis 68, and Africans score 70 or 80. Africans have the lowest IQ but they are good runners thanks to their evolution in African plains. There are a few studies that are cited more than others. Among the people I spoke to, there were two major sources that were referenced. (Add scientific racism studies). With the backing of these “scientific” facts a reinterpretation of past experiences seemed to further reinforce their belief in race realism.

Jason, for example, talked about his experiences with minorities growing up:

The high school I went to was 33% black. The area was maybe 10% black. These kids- they did not wanna be in school. They were disruptive and violent in terms of fighting all the time. They took away from other students who were there. And not just the whites- the Asians too. I played basketball growing up. I played in a team that was 70 to 75% black. They were completely different. There were not interested in school. Academic interests were not talked about at all. At the end of the day, when you make policies, you need to be kept these in mind.

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Consider Jason’s- the alt-right supporter who has been living in Korea for the last 13 years- experience. Raised as a conservative Christian family, was never interested in politics. His parents are republican, but mother “a little liberal”. Jackson grew up in the “quintessential whitetopia”; a white utopia, which he describes as low poverty, no drug abuse, low average of pre-marital sex, and no fist fights or murders, people who appreciated education. By how own admission, his experience growing up in such an environment pushed him to the right. When he joined the military at the age of 17, Jackson thought most white people in America were like him. He tells me he used to think racial differences are cultural and “in 50 years black and white

America would be indistinguishable”. In the army, he “learnt that there are lot of trashy white people who come from a bad situation”. He had a racist uncle Jim, who he whole-heartedly disagreed with, but after being exposed to “the standards of behavior” while he was in the army, he lost “every liberal idea (he) had about race”. Thinking back to his first few weeks of training, he says he can hear REM’s “Losing My Religion”; a song that epitomizes his experience. After being in a “morally difficult daze for 6 months”, he finally realized that “we are all different”.

The last thing that pushed him was one night in California, when he and some other friends from the army were in a car, going back to the army base camp. They had been drinking a lot, and the driver, a Californian, had tuned into a pop music station. When a hip-hop song came up, a person in the back seat remarked: “What are you doing playing coon tunes?”, launching a drunken but candid conversation about race. It was the first time in Jackson’s life that someone articulated racist arguments in a very matter of fact way. Jackson picked his brains about it, and the man explained to him that southerners typically think this way, but are scared to talk about it. It is a known fact that

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Black people are fundamentally different than us. We cannot live well together. We are just waiting for a time we could be a little separated. We don’t want to hurt them, but it would be better to live separately.

The man’s arguments were highly persuasive, and it led Jackson to actively investigate racial differences. The alt-right didn't exist back then, and Jackson knew his newly-formed ideas would be unacceptable. It was only when he got out of the military that he was open about it. For

Jackson, race realism is an ugly, “inconvenient truth that we all have to live with”.

Similarly, Simon, a 22-year old who works in retail operations in South Florida, explained how race realism helped articulate his own observations:

I notice most difference (between races). But I realized them when somebody on the internet pointed it out. I had noticed the trends and most of the things but then I realized they were factual. I’m not the type to refute facts. There are more genetics at play with IQ differences than we realize.

The people I met were not the typical demographic of alt-right supporters you read about in the news. They were educated, articulate, well-versed in prevalent debates about the alt-right, and full-time employees or graduate students. I was interested in how they came to associate with an ideology that would otherwise repel such a demographic. I was hoping to find a common theme across the participants that could explain what attracted them to the alt-right. Could it be childhood trauma and past abuse, and a longing for a sense of belonging that studies (Simi,

2015) of former far-right supporters indicate? Did all of them have a similar upbringing? Or could it be that all of them were pushed to the right after an alienating experience with the left, like in the case of Emily? What I found instead was a variety of life experiences that crystalized into alt-right activism when they were red pilled during their college years. While the people in the alt-right that I spoke to had different, and often the opposite upbringings, they all seemed to have a sheltered and privileged upbringing.

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Simon grew up in rural town in Florida, in a well-to- do Christian family. Although his family was comfortable, he lived in a low-income neighborhood with “mostly Mexicans and

Puerto Ricans”. After entering college in a populated city, he “noticed the differences (between races) much more and understood why there was so much conflict”. His observations turned into a proactive search- for the reasons behind what he thought were racial differences- after the

Pulse shooting in Orlando where his friend was “personally connected”1. He started questioning why “these people (Muslims) are disproportionately likely to commit crimes”. His search for answers led him down a rabbit hole and a realization that racial differences are what stratify society.

Diversity brings more conflict. For a society to prosper, there needs to be homogeneity, or an overwhelming majority. Race is a biological fact. There are countless studies that show significant differences between the races. Racial differences are the most obvious. It informs distinct cultural preferences. Typically, at least in modern times, east Asian IQ is 105; the highest IQ bracket. A high IQ functioning society is able to maintain more prosperity. If you look at Japan- their average IQ is 105 and (look at) the society they’ve built. Africans have an average IQ of 70 or 80. They never built anything worthwhile in their society. Everything worthwhile that was built there was built by Europeans. It’s not about who is better. It’s about these differences.

White Pride and Double Standards

I teach my children to be proud everyday. I am teaching my people to take our side. We have been taught over generations not to take our own side. We have been told we have no people. ‘What is white culture?’ That is always the gas lighting question. – Emily, 43 Alt-right activist

Double standards were an underlying theme, across free lists and interviews, and in interviews with all participants, irrespective of their political beliefs. For non-alt-right Trump supporters it mostly came up with illegal immigration and double standards by which they are

1 On June 12 2016, 49 people were killed in a gay nightclub in Orlando, by Omar Marteen, an American citizen whose parents, also US citizens, emigrated to the US from Afghanistan.

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treated as compared to citizens. For the alt-right, it was most visible in societal attitudes towards white culture as opposed to any other non-white culture.

Some, like Emily, believe there is never going to be peace between blacks and whites:

The only path to safety at this point is separation. If you’re oppressed and I’m continuing to oppress you, go, be black. Somebody, one of my normies, asked me: “Are you a white nationalist? I asked her: Who would want their child to be discriminated against because of their race?”

For Emily, to live in a society with blacks is to be forever scared of “humiliation rape or

“retributive rape. Emily teaches her children everyday to be proud of white culture because at the moment, “only white heritage is considered free for all”, whites whites are being constantly attacked for being oppressive. When whites dress as Santa Lucia, they are attacked for culturally appropriation, but when a black woman dresses as Joan or Ark- a “cultural hero” who has been

“for centuries been a little girl picked by little French villages”- it is celebrated. “I don’t want to live in a world where everything I do is annoying”. A viral video that had been doing the rounds on twitter, and the various responses to it is for Emily “a perfect illustration of why we need to separate”- of “why everyone would just be happier if you (blacks) could do what you want without making us (whites) feel unsafe”. A video taken in Washington DC of a group of blacks riding dirt bikes had gone viral on social media two years back. It shows black bikers “roaring through downtown, doing wheelies, and going in between cars”. Whites who responded to the video commented about how dangerous and aggressive that act was. In contrast to that, “the black tweets said: ‘This is just us being black’”. She adds on:

If you want to play degenerate music at 27000 decibels, be free. Just not by me and my children in, in my space. I remember even as a leftist, telling people- and wanting it to be different- that it is not egregious that people like to live with each other. But I was naïve.

When defending the need for an ethnostate, alt-right supporters would always bring up developing countries- most often Japan, China or Korea- as examples of ethnostates. To them,

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when the rest of the world practices it, liberals are fine with it, but it is only when it comes to whites that they think it is unacceptable.

Simon tells me it is double standards that justifies all of his alt-right arguments:

If you look at Japan or African countries, it is almost a super majority of one people. As soon as white countries want the same, it becomes an issue. It’s a double standard that comes into play

Minority Appeasement, Free Handouts, and Political Correctness

Minority appeasement, free handouts, denial of racism, and political correctness were themes that emerged together in the following way. Free handouts- what is coded as “self- reliance” in the free lists- were thought to have been championed by liberals and the government to appease minorities who are not disadvantaged anymore. Politically correctness has stifled people from exposing the double-standards. The moderates that I spoke to always listed self- reliance, or the end of welfare programs and “free hand outs” as a major step towards “making

America great again”. They were also brought up appeasement of minorities in relation to immigration, as the following excerpt from Sharon indicates:

The illegal immigrants that are using our resources and not paying taxes at all, or the people that are taking from the government instead of giving to the governemnet, sitting on their butts, getting welfare when they can go out their and get a job...we are so close to falling off the cliff with this liberal philosophy of enabling people. Because of the way the tax codes are written, the more kids you have, the more dependents you have, the more you can take off your taxes. Well these people can't afford to have these kids to begin with. So then they become the part of the welfare system. We enable the. We encourage them to have large families for tax write-offs. And then they can't afford to raise them....We the make it too easy for people to get sit on their butts and not work. They need to do something. But they're too lazy or they think they're just too good to do this- garbage pick up job or whatever they think is beneath them, but it's not beneath them to get a hand out from the government- which means from us.

In other cases, like that of Matt, minority appeasement by the government came up along with a denial of racism in contemporary America:

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I think the white man is becoming an endangered species. I really do. Is the white man cruel? Yes the white man's cruel. Has the white man had slavery? Yeah the white man had slavery. But let me tell you something. For me, what I find scary is an educated black woman. Why? Man, once you give them education- oh man, their shirt don't stink and they think they control the world...The blacks think they deserve more of everything- more respect, more money, more political power, more right- " 'cause I'm black and I've been discriminated against. I want, want, want". No. Your lucky ass is voting. You can vote.

Women's roles

The greatest thing a woman can do is to raise children –Emily, 43 Alt-right Activist

Alt-right perspectives on gender are clear. Men are care-takers and providers, while women are naturally inclined to be nurturers. Further, as emotional being, women are not hard- wired to be decision makers. Therefore, for a well-functioning, efficient society, women must dedicate their lives to rear (white) children, and men to fight and protect. These roles have become even more crucial, given the vast white dispossession in America. The greatest way a woman can contribute is to bring more white children into this world. By the end of my interviews, I had heard all of these arguments, although they were not shared by everyone. What most agreed on was that men and women are fundamentally different in their capabilities.

Obvious biological differences aside, men and women differ in their skills. Traditional gender roles were at threat because of feminist agendas and needs to be reinforced. Feminists and liberals alike have also stigmatized housewives and other “womanly” instincts so much that women are being forced to ignore their true calling. Simon for example, said: “Women are born into this world knowing what they have to do. Men have to figure it out”. Matt, the Trump supporter who has never heard of the alt-right had this to say:

I respect women, but I believe they should be in the kitchen, cooking for the man...Back in the old days, women couldn't vote. I like the Muslims- women don't drive. They have to have their face covered. That's the kind of mentality I am. They don't drive. They can't meet men...I'm hardcore that way...That's what I wanna see

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today. I don't want women to vote, I don’t want them to be able to drive a car...to me that's extreme, but deep down in my heart I like it....Back in the cave days, didn't the men drag their women out by their hair? I mean it's the animalistic in the humans- males in particular...The women that control their husband- they cheat on them, they abuse them...and so to make the long story short, the male who allows that to happen is a lost soul. They get what they deserve.

Asked about his feeling on presidential candidates, he said:

I was pissed off that we had a black president. Hell, I'm probably gonna be pissed off when we get a woman president. Why? Because that's the old-fashioned thinking...it broke a rich mold that I thought only white rich dudes should be president....I just felt that it was out of place...I was not in favor of having a black president but it's done.

Contrary to stereotypes about Trump supporters, several individuals I spoke to were either moderates or fiscal conservatives. A resident of Lake City, Kevin Dwight is a 62-year old man born and raised in Montana. Despite being legally blind, he works in telecommunications company that he started during the workdays and is a musician in his free time. He joked that an advantage of being legally blind is that he can't "see color in people". Asked about his political beliefs, he said most of the conservatives do not really understand what conservatism is. For him, valuing the individual and respecting each person's capability is central to conservatism. His main frustration with the political system comes from outdated programs. The original intent of many of the government program were noble he said, but “they don’t work anymore”. Taking the example of desegregation of schools, Kevin points to its redundancy today. According to him, welfare programs are the reason for the "breakdown of the family unit" in African

American communities, where there is a “serious lack of nurturing men”. "Welfare moms" have children outside of marriage, and get paid for it. Kevin reluctantly voted for Trump, because the other option- Hillary Clinton- was a far worse option. His major concern, and one that he thinks

Trump is most likely to address, is illegal immigration. As a man who has worked hard his whole

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life- sleeping 3 hours a night for several years, while working 3 jobs and taking 26 college credits- watching illegal immigrants get "free stuff when they did not work for it”, is particularly frustrating. Kevin and his family was part of Mountaintop Ministries, a fundamentalist church in

Lake City. He left with his family after years of increasingly abusive practices, but he continues to live with the trauma is children went through. Although Kevin clearly believes that a lot of whites in America feel like they don’t have a voice, and are disadvantaged because immigrant populations are promised "free stuff", he strongly disagrees with common far-right beliefs about other communities. He is critical of fellow conservatives that label minorities, like calling

Mexicans lazy, or of those who deny white privilege. A family man at heart, his family- wife, children, and grandchildren- are his life. Both of Kevin's siblings are liberal. His brother, with whom the rest of the family has cut ties, has had problems with drug addiction. He is now terminally ill. Kevin tells me his sister has had a hard life, and a lot of her experiences have made him approach opposing beliefs more "gently". As an example, he tells me he has always viewed a union between a man and a woman to be ideal, but when his sister's children came out as gay, he had to reconsider his thoughts, as his "baby sister has gone through a lot" and is very important to him.

Aaron, a Jewish gun enthusiast who lives in a rural town in North Florida, is registered as an independent, but voted for Trump. After acquiring a degree in agriculture, he worked as a school teacher in Gainesville, to support his blueberry farms. Years of teaching and several frozen farms later, he decided to pursue his interest in guns. Today he runs a business importing, restoring, and selling antique guns. Seven months ago, Aaron lost everything as he watched his house burn down in the 30 minutes that it took the fire fighters to get to his property. Now he lives in a trailer. “Everything I own is 7 months old” he jokes. “It was weird to watch everything

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burn down, but worse things have happened to me”. Aaron lost three of his closest friends in a span of 5 years. He was married twice before, and has a daughter from his first marriage. Talking about politics, he remarks: “I don't understand why Jews don’t like guns. If anything, after the holocaust, they should be all for it”. He is a conservative when it comes to the economy, military, welfare programs, and illegal immigration, but is pro civil rights, pro women, and pro- choice. Aaron voted for Trump because “he spoke like a normal person”. However, as a person

Trump according to him is “a jerk. I’d never want to hang out with him. He seems like an asshole. But he’s good for the country”. Perplexed by the contradictions in his beliefs and his support for Trump, I asked him whether he thought Trump’s beliefs would not influence his presidential policies. To that, Aaron points out that:

“Trump said some terrible things. I was not for the Muslim ban. When he said that, I cringed. But has he done any of it? Today, if you look at the things he said and what he did, he hasn’t acted on those beliefs. I didn't know that then. I know it now. Had he gone on about the Muslim ban, perhaps I would have changed my mind”

Aaron cannot stand the media. He does not watch the 6pm news, instead gets most of his news through the internet and social media. He watches fox news not for the news stories, but for the talk shows. From time to time, he switches to MSNBC “for a laugh because they’re crazy”.

Aaron has had a rough patch with his daughter, whom he filed a restraining order against. A few years ago, his daughter who was at the time a drug addict, broke into his house and stole his guns. When Aaron called the police to report the missing guns, she told the police that Aaron had a lot of weed in his house. As a result, he lost his gun license. After 2 years of avoiding contact,

Aaron is now working on his relationship with his daughter, who lives in Miami and is a liberal.

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Figure 4-5: Aaron Schiff, Gun enthusiast Photo courtesy of the author

It is clear from the above descriptions of varying beliefs, that there is significant diversity among Trump supporters. If childhood trauma, past drug abuse, a search for a sense of belonging or conservative upbringing cannot alone explain why people are attracted to the far-right beliefs and how they sustain their them, can personal networks do so? The next section examines the effect of personal networks and media exposure on reinforcing political beliefs.

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CHAPTER 5 PERSONAL NETWORKS

Analysis of personal networks in this study looked at structural and compositional properties including homogeneity, subgroups and cliques, density measures of alters with opposing political beliefs, and political ideology of close alters. A clique is a formal term used in network analysis to refer to highly connected alters. One type of clique called the maximally complete sub-graph, is one where each alter is connected to all other alters in the group. Cliques can be either qualitatively discussed during data interpretation, or quantitatively analyzed through clique analysis. Here, I qualitatively discuss maximally complete cliques and independent components. A higher number of components that have no ties to each other

(independent components) indicates lower density (McCarty, 2002). Thus, a fragmented network will have more independent components compared to a dense network. Conversely, the more number of cliques a network has, the higher its density (ibid). Homogeneity is measured here by political affinity with respect to the ego, and density is the percentage of ties in the network. In this Chapter, I discuss the patterns and correlations between in-depth interviews, personal network properties, and media exposure. The level of alt-right adherence was measured by data from ethnographic interviews, not the alt-right adherence survey. The reasons for this are discussed at the end of Chapter 5.

Structural properties of networks are powerful tools not only in analyzing the influence of specific alters, but also in conducting qualitative interviews with network maps. However, studies on personal networks disproportionately rely on compositional variables because of the enormous respondent burden involved in tie evaluations in a large networks (McCarty, 2005).

Name generators are free lists questions that are used to elicit alters that fit a given set of criteria, defined by the researcher. Alter prompts are questions that gather data on each alter. These can

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be demographic variables, or any other property the researcher is interested in exploring. The later-tie evaluation questions ask the respondent to evaluate ties between each pair in the network. This is the most time consuming part of the survey and respondent burden increases exponentially with the number of listed alters (McCarty, 2005). In this study, I have used a modified elicitation technique developed by McCarty and Govindaramanujam (2005) to capture a wide structure while also reducing respondent burden. Respondents were asked to name two alters that knew each other but who were also not very close to the respondent. Then they were asked to name another pair of alters who knew each other, but not the two already listed. Once the respondents could not think of anyone else that did not know the names already listed, they were asked to complete the list with people they would not want to leave out. Initially, the number of alters were set at 45, but owing to the inability of some respondents to name more than 20, it was changed to give them a range of 20-45 alters. There was one exception to this: a respondent who struggled to name more than 5 alters and simply could not think of any other people after he had reached 10. All but one network survey were conducted by me to ensure validity. Alter prompts were: i) gender, ii) how close the respondent felt to the alter on a scale of

1 to 5 (5 being best friend or someone they would call to share a personal matter with), iii) how similar the alter’s political ideology is to the respondent; “very different”, “different”, “similar”,

“very similar” and “I don't know”, iv) how often they with the alter about politics; “never”,

“rarely”, “often”, “very often”, and “I consciously avoid talking to them about politics”, and v) race.

Although analysis was primarily based on inductive approaches in grounded theory, a materialist approach (Harris, 1968) is adopted here to understand whether people are more likely to adhere to alt-right values if certain materialistic of personal networks and media exposure are

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present. Marvin Harris (1968) adapted the Marxist model of materialism to develop a framework of “infrastructure”, “structure” and “superstructure”, to understand thought and behavior. While diverging from Marxism in important ways, cultural materialism offers a quantifiable framework of understanding cultural beliefs and behavior. The theory of cultural materialism follows as such: Human beings cross-culturally adopt practices that are appropriate to environmental conditions and resources available to them. These subsistence practices inform how groups organize themselves socio-politically, forming the structure of that society. This organization leads to cultural values and beliefs that reinforce the legitimacy of their structure. The resultant cultural beliefs are called the superstructure. According to this model, cross-cultural variation is explained by changes in environmental conditions and resource availability (Barfield, 1997:232).

Furthermore, changes in cultural beliefs and practices happen because of changes in the

“infrastructure”. While much of the criticism against cultural materialism comes from the rejection of a scientific approach to culture, some cultural materialists have pointed to an important critique. The unidirectional explanation (Harris, 1996: 277-288) of cultural materialism falls short when it is universally applied to all cultural phenomena. Instead, if one was to accept that culture change can occur not just solely through the influence of environmental conditions, but also through “structural” and “superstructural” influence

(Ferguson, 1995: 24), other cultural phenomena that don’t seem to fit the cultural materialism model, can be explained. If materialistic conditions are seen as the sole agents of cultural change, many modern movements seems to have infrastructural causes yet to be revealed. Globalization has further problematized the unidirectional approach of cultural materialism. As cultural groups move back and forth between their native environment or infrastructure, beliefs and values or

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“superstructures” are increasingly diffusing. The spread of ideas then can’t solely be seen as a reaction to material conditions.

Material conditions influence thought (Harris, 1979). If people’s immediate social context- and access to knowledge- is seen as materialistic variables, can personal networks predict thought? In the least, can it motivate people to seek out new information that can change beliefs? Recent emergence of American populism and the alt-right movement have relied heavily on internet subcultures and alternative platforms to spread its values. People that are internet savvy, and access much of their news from online sources and social media, are vulnerable to being “red pilled”. But how can one predict a person’s motivation to seek such information out?

Can the type of political conversation a person has on a regular basis, determine the type of media exposure a person is subjected to? Social media platforms and internet websites have often been critiqued for being echo chambers where people’s pre-existing beliefs are only resonated and amplified through internet discussions. With growing media distrust among American citizens, people are increasingly resorting to either limit their news consumption to a news outlet they trust, or seeking out information on the internet. The latter becomes tricky when you consider the extensive misinformation circulated by extremist groups from both sides of the political spectrum.

Personal networks of non-alt-right participants reveal two characteristics: i) they display higher heterogeneity of political beliefs among political discussion partners, and ii) close alters have "very different" political views. Through qualitative interviews, "very different" political ideology was determined to be liberal political ideology. In the following sections, I discuss the findings through a few illustrative examples in the population.

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Participants with a lower level of alt-right adherence reported subscribing to a diverse set news sources, while those with the highest number of alt-right beliefs reported watching one or a highly selective list of news outlets. However, while media exposure seems to have an obvious effect, a direct causal link would be too simplistic. For instance, in one case a non-alt-right

Trump supporter reported watching only Fox news, but his beliefs were moderate. His personal network had three important alters that had "very different" political beliefs. Follow up interviews indicated that these three people were liberal friends through church and family relations. The effect of media exposure is necessarily mediated by personal networks and vice versa.

Networks of alt-right supporters on the other hand, were characterized by two different properties. First, the networks were more fragmented than non-alt-right supporters. They reported distinct subgroups in their network that do not have ties to each other. This is intentional. Alt-right activists try hard to hide their political beliefs from some circles. In most cases, it was their workplace. Given the number of people who have been fired after their alt- right association was exposed, they are extremely careful about not revealing their activism in the alt-right. For example, one participant told me he wears sunglasses and a hat while attending events. They “blend into the crowd” so as not to be recognized, and attend events that have high security to ensure they will not be identified. As a result, their networks have subgroups that have deliberately not been introduced to each other. During the personal network interview,

Emily predicted this pattern with most alt-right supporters. The second distinct property among alt-right supporters is homogeneity. As stated, homogeneity here is measured by political affinity. Close alters and political discussion partners showed a high degree of homogeneity.

However, this varied depending on how extreme their far-right beliefs are. One such example is

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Simon, discussed later. Below is Emily’s network map (Figure 5-1), which shows two distinct groups and one isolate.

Figure 5-1: Emily’s personal network. Darker colored alters have “similar” or “very similar” political views. Size represents closeness.

In the interviews, she states why this is so.

If I brought a normie to our meeting, people would be mad. My alt-right friends are a respite from the other group. Hanging out with the other group is exhausting because I feel a sense of duty to make them see the truth.

Emily’s network of political discussion partners (Figure 5-2) has people with either

“similar” or “very similar” political ideology. She does not have any liberal friends. She no longer has contact with previous left-leaning friends she used to know. Educational institutions according to Emily, are biased institutes of liberal indoctrination. Hence, she homeschools her children. She says the homeschool community that she has been part of for 4 years, is “very polarized”. After a particularly defining moment, when a left-leaning woman “tried to destroy her life”, Emily has refrained from engaging in political activism in the homeschool community.

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Jane, a new addition to the homeschool community responded to Emily’s Facebook posts and publicly declared to their online friends that Emily is a “white supremacist”. Emily respond, also publicly, by reviewing all her posts in the last 30 days and organized them into about 12 categories to explain how white nationalism is different from white supremacy. Jane responded by resigning her position at the co-op and sending out messages to board members saying Emily had infiltrated the community to convert people into alt-right supporters. She arranged one-on- one meetings with other board members to compel them to remove Emily as a fellow board member. Emily says out of the 6 women she spoke to, one left the community. The incident made Emily who was already wary of having liberal friends even more resistant to them.

Figure 5-2: Emily’s network, showing two alters with “similar” or “very similar” political views.

Simon, introduced in Chapter 4, has a similarly fragmented network, but his network of discussion partners (Figure 5-3), has higher heterogeneity. One group constitutes co-workers and friends he met while travelling that do not know about his political beliefs. The pair of alters with

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“very different” political beliefs (alters 1 and 9) are his liberal friends, one of whom he has regular conversations with; they meet up to have 3 to 8 hour long discussions. Expanding on their discussions, Simon says: “We are the greatest friends but we disagree. We are completely intolerant of each other’s beliefs but completely tolerant of each other”. However, most of his discussion partners have “similar” or “very similar” views. Talking about the need to hide his political beliefs at work, he says:

I work for a very big company and the ideology there is very different. I would get fired. I completely hide it (beliefs) at work. I only talk about it on anonymous surveys.

I don't have social media. No anonymous accounts either. I don't necessarily go on twitter. I’m also kind of careful in public. I wear sunglasses, a hat- to make it less obvious. I blend into a group

Figure 5-3: Simon’s network of discussion partners, displaying heterogeneity in political belief by color.

Note: The subgroups shown here are disconnected even in his entire network Simon’s network has 5 disconnected subgroups, and one clique. Alter 11 has the highest degree centrality (3) and closeness centrality (6.667). Betweenness centrality is 0 for everyone,

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indicating no connections between the subgroups. These groups have no ties to each other even in his entire network, even when political discussion partners are not controlled for.

Jason is an alt-right supporter with the least radical views, as gathered from interviews.

Evidently, he has fewer subgroups and higher heterogeneity of political beliefs (Figure 5-4).

Figure 5-4: Jason’s Network of discussion partners

Jason’s network has 4 components. Alter 13 is one of his closest friends has the highest degree centrality and closeness centrality. Alter 13 is not an alt-right supporter. Only two of

Jason’s friends know that he is alt-right. A closer look at his closest friends (Figure 5-4) shows all the alters as having “similar” or “different” political views. His “alt-right buddies” are a distinct group and are not as close.

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Figure 5-5: Jason’s network of close friends

You would recall from the discussion of his interviews, that Jason criticized the alt-right for “throwing baby out with the bathwater”, and was not for the banning of homosexuality.

Non-alt-right Trump supporters show similar patterns in their networks. Those with more radical beliefs had lower heterogeneity and a more fragmented network. Consider Kevin’s network (Figure 5-6). His network is far denser than the ones above. The isolates seen in his network are business clients who he met through work. The rest of his network has a lower number of alters with “very similar” views than “similar”. One alter with “very different” views is number 23- his liberal brother who now has a terminal illness. His sister, who he is very close to, is also liberal and has two openly gay children. Kevin said he has learnt to be more open and

“gentle” about his beliefs because of his sister’s life experiences.

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Figure 5-6: Kevin Dwight’s network of discussion partner with whom he political conversations “rarely”, “often” and “very often”.

His views were one of the most moderate among the people I spoke to, and from his network map, it is evident that the alters with opposing political views seem to have an important position in his personal life. Figure 5-7 shows a map of his diverse network of discussion partners.

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Figure 5-7: Kevin Dwight’s personal network composition of alters with whom he has political conversations "often" and "very often". Note: lighter colors represent "different" and "very different" political ideologies.

Aaron, the gun enthusiast I introduced earlier, has 3 sub-groups (Figure 5-8), each of which have at least one alter with "different" or "very different" political views, 2 of whom are very close alters. When political conversations are controlled for, his network shows (Figure 5-9)

2 of those subgroups, and they still have the alters with different political views. As discussed earlier, Aaron Shiff is a Jewish Trump supporter with many liberal social values.

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Figure 5-8: Aaron Schiff’ personal network- of political discussion partners

Figure 5-9: Aaron Schiff’s personal network of political discussion partners with whom he has political conversation “often” and “very often”

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During follow-up interviews, Aaron explained his interaction with the liberal friends.

While for some of his friends, political conversation is always avoided, the ones represented in the Figures above are ones he has regular conversations with.

Previous research Previous research (Bienenstock, Bonacich and Oliver, 1990; ) has shown that network density and homogeneity influence political attitudes. In a study on homogeneity and political attitudes in Detroit, Laumann’s (1973) showed that networks with a high level of homogeneity “foster and sustain more extreme, clear-cut and consistent attitudes than heterogenous groups” (1973: 98). While several replications, many of which discussed in

Chapter 2, have strengthened this theory, with respect to contemporary far-right ideologies, the influence of media channels is crucial. As you will note from the discussion of ethnographic data, red pilling almost always happened through various alt-right media channels on the internet. Thus, the networks were analyzed in conjunction with data on media exposure.

Media Exposure

Participants were asked to name all the sources they got their news from. In examining personal networks and media exposure indicates an association between the two. People with highest adherence to alt-right values had distinct subgroups in their networks, homophily of political beliefs among discussion partners and close friends, and had a very selective media exposure. For example, Simon, whose network is discussed above, has a high heterogeneity in is network. However, his media exposure consists of only alt-right media outlets. His self-identifies as alt-right.

Data about where the participants get their news from reveal a clear association between media exposure, personal networks and far-right beliefs. The higher the combination of selective exposure to news media and high network homogeneity, the more extreme their political beliefs.

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Among the alt-right participants, most got their news either from exclusively alt-right channels, or social media. Jason, the clinical psychologist doctoral student and alt-right supporter, some of whose views were at odds with typical alt-right beliefs was the only person with who listed non-alt-right media outlets.

The same pattern was seen among non-alt-right conservatives. Those with more moderate beliefs had a much wider range of news sources than those with more extreme beliefs. In all these cases, media exposure alone did not predict far-right support, as much as a combination of network homogeneity and news sources did. For example, Matt- the Cuban Trump supporter with extreme far-right views- reported watching “Fox News 24/7”, and had a highly homogenous network. On the other hand, Kevin, who also reported following a highly selective list of news sources- Fox news, conservative talk show and National Review- had a heterogeneous network.

His political beliefs in contrast, were moderate.

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Table 5-1: Association between Media Exposure, Network Properties and Political Beliefs Network Properties ID Media Exposure Type Components Cliques # of alters with Beliefs different political views KM62 Fox News Mainstream Moderate conservative National Review Mainstream conservative Rolling Stone Mainstream Liberal Conservative Talk Mainstream Shows conservative TM62 Fox News Mainstream 2 3 3 Moderate Bible Broadcasting conservative Facebook Religious Social Media SF64 Fox News Mainstream Unknown Unknown Conservative conservative Conservative Talk Mainstream Shows conservative Mainstream Republican conservative

Committee Meetings Mainstream conservative AF45 Smart News Mainstream media Unknown Unknown 5 Fiscal conservative, socially liberal Local ABC Network News NPR Network News

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Table 5-1. Continued Network Properties ID Media Exposure Type Components Cliques # of alters with Beliefs different political views AM60 FOX News Mainstream 3 2 5 Fiscal conservative, socially libearal conservative

Mainstream liberal MSNBC MM60 Fox News Mainstream 3 0 0 Far-right leaning conservative

Mainstream Fox Business conservative JM30 AmRen Alt-right Unknown Unknown 1 Alt-right supporter, Alt-right.com Alt-right moderate views Fox News Mainstream conservative CNN Mainstream liberal NYT Mainstream liberal Twitter Social Media BF59 Facebook Social Media 2 2 4 Fiscal conservative, socially liberal Aljazeera Mainstream Liberal BBC Mainstream liberal CNN Mainstream liberal Fox News Mainstream conservative Gainesville Sun Mainstream media

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Table 5-1. Continued Network Properties ID Media Exposure Type Components Cliques # of alters with Beliefs different political views CF43 Drudge Report Alt-right 3 0 0 Alt-right, extreme Twitter Social Media SM22 Amren Alt-right 10 1 3 Alt-right Free Domain Radio Alt-right RedIce TV Alt-right The Golden One Alt-right James Allup Alt-right

JM26 Facebook Social media 4 16 4 Alt-right, moderate Twitter Social media Breitbart Alt-right Voice of Europe Alt-right

Alt-right Note: “Unknown” refers to cases where the participant did not complete the personal network survey. They did, however, discuss people in their lives that have different of very different political views. Hence, the table has numeric values for those network properties even if they did not complete the formal survey

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Alt-right Adherence

Forscher and Kteily’s (2017) study findings were i) used to tests for validity, and ii) used as a measure of alt-right adherence of other participants if the test was found to be valid. Scores from alt-right participants were compared against confidence interval of alt-right respondent scores in the original study. The results are displayed in Table 5-2. Evidently, none of the alt- right participants that completed this survey had scores that fit the supposed alt-right range.

Reasons for this are many. The original study was conducted anonymously, through Amazon’s

Mturk service. As some (Hawley, 2017) have noted, alt-right supporters often report inaccurately as a joke on researchers that attempt to study the movement. Additionally, survey questions may have been differently interpreted. It should be noted however, that the original study had a far higher number of respondents (n=447). While it is possible that the participants recruited in this study happened to be atypical, some of the participants were known organizers and activists in the movement. The fact that none of them had scored within the standardized range is suspicious.

Finally, given that the surveys were conducted after in-depth interviews, there was a much lower likelihood of dishonest answers.

Analysis of interviews, free lists, and personal networks indicates an association between media exposure, network homophily, and sheltered or privileged upbringing. Most alt-right supporters reported having a comfortable upbringing, ignorant of vast cultural differences that they noticed once they moved out of their homes. They were “red piled” through alt-right platforms at a time when they had just started contemplating cultural differences. When introduced to concepts of race realism, their observations of other races and ethnicities crystalized into a coherent argument seemingly validated by scientific racism. For some, active engagement with alt-right material online, fuelled by alienation and accusations by liberals seemed to have pushed them even further to the right. These experiences combined with

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homogeneous personal networks serve to reinforce extreme beliefs. Discussion among those with similar political beliefs act as echo chambers that solidify their ideology. Added to this, the need to hide an important part of their identity from co-worker and the constant feeling of having to defend and protect their beliefs from public humiliation, serves to strengthen their worldview.

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Table 5-2: Scores on Forscher and Kteily’s (2017) Survey

Harrassment Offence Ingroup Outgroup Corruption Ingroup Security Liberal Police WLM BLM ID discrimination Issues Respect

Alt-right 1 1.4 1.75 5 5.33 7 7 3.4 2.2 7 3

Conservative 0.8 1.6 3.25 2.6 7 1 7 4.4 4.6 2.8 3

Conservative 0.8 1 3.25 2.83 6.33 3.5 6.33 5.4 4.6 2.2 3.33

Alt-right 0.8 1.4 1.5 4.5 4.33 5.5 7 2.2 2.33 7 3

Alt-right 0.8 1 2 4 5.33 7 5.33 3.8 4.66 6.8 4

Conservative 1.4 2.2 3.25 1.6 6 1.5 5.66 4.2 5.66 4.4 3.66

Alt-right 0.8 1.8 1.75 6.25 4.66 4.5 6.33 3.8 5 6.2 3.66

Conservative 0.8 1.2 3.25 2.16 1.33 3.5 7 2.8 4.66 1.6 3.33

Conservative 0.8 1 2.75 2.16 5.33 3 6 4.4 3 5.2 4.33

Conservative 0.8 1.8 2.5 2.83 6 2 7 3.6 3.66 2.2 4

Alt-right 4.69- range 1.85-2.11 2.53-2.84 2.98-3.14 2.81-2.99 5.25-5.55 4.08-4.4 5.45-5.67 3.28-3.55 4.96 4.9-5.21 5.44-5.7

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CHAPTER 6 FLORIDA SURVEY

In previous Chapters 1 and 2, I discussed the role anti-PC culture has played, in unifying far-right fringe groups. Many have argued that dislike for PC can be a gateway into alt-right groups. YouTube videos and podcasts on political correctness quickly lead to right-leaning channels, which in turn lead viewers to alt-right channels. Participants during ethnographic interviews, talked in great length about how they got “red-pilled” through these videos that ranged from moderate conservatives like RamzPaul or even liberals like Sam Harris. What the videos had in common was an opposition to political correctness. Videos on alt-right channels revolve around the dispossession of whites as a result of welcoming cultural diversity, the myth of minority prejudice, and white disadvantage among many others. As participants explained to me, once they had come across the videos, each of these issues spoke to a common-sense logic that, according to them, society and PC culture represses. While in some cases individuals are introduced to new ideas, in others, alt-right narratives function to reinforce and validate pre- existing ideas. Therefore, the combination of anti-PC attitudes and negative attitudes on certain social issues make individuals highly vulnerable to recruitment by the alt-right. Chapter 7 focuses on a state-wide survey of a representative population of Florida on six key issues that were consistent with codes from interviews with members of the alt-right.

A 2017 survey by CATO institute reported that 71% of Americans feel that political correctness silences freedom of speech and only 28% felt that it helped sensitize people on offensive language (Ekins, 2017). In another alarming statistic, the same poll reported that 61% of Hillary Clinton voters said it is hard to be friends with Donald trump voters, while only 34% of Trump supporters said the same about friendships with Clinton supporters. This statistic, along with another that says 51% of strong liberals think it is morally acceptable to punch a Nazi,

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is concerning given the effect it has on pushing right-leaning individuals further to the right.

While the sample size of ethnographic interview participants in this study is not representative, insights from qualitative analysis of the interviews suggest that people who are newly introduced to ideas on the far-right, but remain relatively undecided, are often pushed to the right through what they consider as intolerance from the left. This survey focused on 6 key alt-right issues

(questions attached as an appendix) in order to determine level of agreement among people in

Florida

Florida is the third largest state in the U.S. with a population of 21,312,2111. The state also ranks second for the most active hate groups, according to the Southern Poverty Law

Center, but also ranks 6th among the most diverse states in America2. The population size and cultural diversity that Florida represents makes it a compelling state to examine. The data discussed here refer to i) demographic variables of the sample, and ii) opinions on 6 questions that were add-ons to BEBR’s May 2018 survey, discussed in Chapter 2.

Analysis of survey data was aimed at answering several questions:

1. Do people in Florida consider cultural diversity a strength of America?

2. What percentage of whites feel that they have faced discrimination?

a) Is there a correlation between whites that have faced discrimination and demographic variables?

b) Is there an association between whites that feel that they have faced discrimination, and how they answered other questions?

3. Do people consider political correctness a threat to freedom of speech, irrespective of their political affiliation, race, age and other demographic variables?

1 According to the 2017 United States Census Bureau. The population estimate from that report in 2017 was 20,984,400. World Population Review estimates that number to be about 21.3 million for 2018.

2 According to a 2017 WalletHub poll. Cultural diversity was measured using three variables; racial and ethnic diversity, linguistic diversity, and birthplace diversity.

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4. Do racial groups have different perceptions of how serious a problem prejudice against minorities is?

5. How many people are willing to state that they are alt-right supporters?

a) How are alt-right supporters distributed across demographic variables?

b) How did they answer the other questions on social issues?

c) Do those who answered “unsure” fall under the same profile of those who said they were supporters?

d) How did those who answered “unsure” answer other questions? Were there any similarities between this group and alt-right supporters?

6. Do a majority of people feel that the alt-right movement is a threat to America?

Before analysis I cleaned the data by recoding race variables to include Hispanics and categorize mixed race and other races under an “other” category3

Steps of Data Analysis

The following steps were taken for analyzing the data on SPSS:

1. Frequencies tests on all variables were conducted to examine their distribution. Skewness and Kurtosis were used to measure distribution, and normal curves were used to visualize distribution on histograms

2. Non-parametric tests for all variables that did not have a normal distribution

3. Correspondence analysis and exact tests for variables where chi-square tests were not viable

Demographics

The total number of respondents that answered all the questions were n=412 ; 55% were males and 45% females; 71% were white, 12% Black, 3.4% were mixed race, 3.2% Asian or

Pacific Islander, 1% Alaskan or Native American, and 5.8 % responded as “Other”. The income level ranged from less than $10,000 to over $150,000, with the income ranges of over $30,000

(39,000- 10.4% and $150,000- 10.4%) having the highest number of individuals. Most of the

3 Since Hispanic is an ethnic category, it was asked as a separate question from race.

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respondents fell in the age group of 35 to 59 years. Table 6-1 displays the age and race frequencies of the population.

Table 6-1: Age and Race Crosstabulation Age No Data White, Black, Hispanic Other/Unknown Total non- non- Hispanic Hispanic <35 2 43 15 9 21 90 35-59 9 113 18 23 21 184 >60 5 99 8 13 13 138 Total 16 255 41 45 55 412

Descriptive Statistics

Cultural Diversity

Table (6-2) represents the distribution of those that responded to the question, “Is

Cultural Diversity a strength or a weakness in America?”. Overall, a majority of the population

(60.68%) felt that cultural diversity is a strength of America. The rest of the 18.45% considered it a weakness. The same percentages after omitting non-responses are 76.69% for strength and

23.32% for weakness with a low margin of error of 2.48%.

Table 6-2: Is cultural diversity a strength or a weakness in America? Category Frequency Percent Refused 5 1.21 Don't know 4 0.97 Strength 250 60.68 Weakness 76 18.45 Unsure 77 18.69

Non-responses Omitted:

Frequency Percent Strength 250 76.69 Weakness 76 23.31 Although a majority of the population irrespective of race considered cultural diversity a strength, chi-square tests showed significance at X2= 0.001. As Figure 6-1 shows, when

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distributed by race, 46% of blacks said cultural diversity is a strength while 60% of whites said the same. 19% of whites said it is a weakness as opposed to about 32% of blacks.

Figure 6-1: Race and Opinions on Cultural Diversity

Figure 6-2: Correspondence Plot of Race and Cultural Diversity

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Discrimination

Most of those that said they faced discrimination were between 35-59 (87 out of 184) years of age, but it was not statistically significant (X2= 0.139).

Most whites and Hispanics said that they did not face discrimination (Figure 6-4). Among other groups, a higher percentage said they faced discrimination. However, a notable percentage of whites (32%) said they faced discrimination (n=82). Chi square results were significant (X2=

0.000). A compelling question from this statistic- how did whites that feel discriminated against respond to the question about alt-right support?- is discussed in a later section.

Figure 6-3: Age of people that reported having faced discrimination

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Table 6-3: : Distribution of those that reported having faced discrimination, by race Race Refused Unkno wn Yes No Unsure Total No data 2 0 5 7 2 16 White, non-Hispanic 0 2 82 159 12 255 Black, non-Hispanic 0 0 25 14 2 41 Hispanic 0 0 18 25 2 45 Other/Unknown 1 0 32 20 2 55 Total 3 2 162 225 20 412

Figure 6-4: Discrimination by Race

It is also interesting to note that among Hispanics, a larger proportion reported having not faced discrimination than those who said they did. This might be surprising until you consider the demographics of Florida. In 2010, Miami-Dade county of Florida has a 70% Hispanic or

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Latino population.4 The largest proportion of Hispanics in this survey are from Broward, Miami-

Dade, and Palm Beach; counties in south Florida. These three counties form the Miami

Metropolitan area, typically used as a geographical category by U.S. Census Bureau. According data from the 2012 census, Hispanics make up the largest minority in Florida, and among them,

Cubans are the largest Hispanic group. Given these demographics, the patterns of responses seen in this survey and data from ethnographic interviews are consistent. The tendency of Cubans to be right-leaning has been written about extensively. Many of conservative sentiments in this population stem from anti-Castro resentment.

Figure 6-5: Correspondence Plot of Race and Perceived Discrimination

Among whites that reported having faced discrimination, over half (54%) said they were

4 Taken from the 2010 census data by World Population Review: http://worldpopulationreview.com/us-cities/miami- population/

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unsure about being alt-right supporters. As discussed below, the “unsure” category may indicate hesitation to respond honestly, given the sensitive nature of the question. If that is so, a significant portion of whites that perceive to have faced discrimination are sympathetic to alt- right ideology in the least and alt-right supporters at most.

Figure 6-6: Alt-right support among whites who reported having faced discrimination

The age group of the majority of whites that reported having been discriminated against is the same as the age group of most alt-right supporters: 35-59 (Figure 6-7).

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Figure 6-7: Age group of whites that reported having been discriminated

The percentage of those who considered prejudice against minorities a “not so serious problem” is much among this group (Figure 6-8).

Figure 6-8: Responses to prejudice against minorities by whites that reported having been discriminated

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Political Correctness

The only group in which a majority considered PC a threat was whites. Among other groups, unsure was the highest category. Almost equal number of Hispanics thought it was an asset and a threat. But among blacks, more considered PC a threat than those that considered it an asset. Figure 6-9 displays this distribution.

Table 6-4: Correspondence of Race and PC variables Race Threat Asset Unsure Active Margin

White, non- Hispanic 138 38 74 250 Black, non- Hispanic 13 10 18 41

Hispanic 16 17 44 44

Other/Unknown 15 13 23 51

Active Margin 177 77 132 386

Figure 6-9: Political Correctness by Race

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Figure 6-10: Correspondence plot of Race and PC

Prejudice Against Minorities

Among females (n=184), a majority stated that prejudice against minorities is a “very serious problem” as opposed to a majority of males (n=228) that stated it is a “somewhat serious problem” (Figure 6-11). Among those who said it is “Not a problem at all”, 20 were males as opposed to just 6 females. Chi square test was significant at X2= 0.000.

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Figure 6-11: Prejudice Against Minorities by Sex

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Figure 6-12: Correspondence Plot of Race and Opinions on Prejudice Against Minorities

Among whites, most said prejudice against minorities “is a somewhat serious problem”.

Among Blacks and Hispanics, most said it is a very serious problem. In the group “other”- which included other races, mixed races and those that refused to answer or said they did not know- almost equal numbers said it was a somewhat serious problem (n=19) and very serious problem

(17). No blacks said it was not a problem at all, as opposed to about 6% of whites that said so.

Chi-square tests showed significance at X2=0.000.

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Figure 6-13: Prejudice Against Minorities by Race

Figure 6-14 displays a correspondence plot of responses to this question across education.

Education levels were directly proportional to belief that prejudice against minority is a serious problem. Almost equal numbers of college graduates said prejudice against minorities is “a somewhat serious” and “a very serious problem”, but among high school graduates, most said it is a “somewhat serious problem” (X2= 0.031).

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Figure 6-14: Prejudice Against Minorities by Education. X2= 0.031

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Alt-Right Support

As expected, a majority of alt-right supporters were white (n= 16). Another 4% (n=11)

refused to answer the question. Among all groups, the unsure category was highest. Almost

equal number of Hispanics said they were supporters (n=9) and opponents (n=10). Chi-square

test showed significance at X2= 0.001.

Table 6-5: Alt-right Support by Race Refused Don’t know Supporter Opponent Unsure Total

Race No data 4 2 0 2 8 16 White, non- 11 11 16 84 133 255 Hispanic

Black, non- 2 4 2 6 27 41 Hispanic

Hispanic 3 3 9 10 20 45 Other/ 1 5 4 17 28 55 Unknown Total 21 25 31 119 216 412

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Figure 6-15: Correspondence Plot of Race and Alt-right Support

Again, correspondence analysis of these results (Figure 6-15) show that a relatively higher proportion of Hispanics support the alt-right, than any other race.

Most alt-right supporters (n=12) had 4 years of college or some college education (n= 8).

These two groups also showed similar percentages in the unsure category. Similar percentages of people with college degree, some college education, and graduate or professional degree refused to answer the question. This may be an indication that those responded “unsure” were undecided; they were not unaware of what the alt-right is. The results were significant at X2= 0.021.

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Figure 6- 16: Correspondence Plot of Education and Alt-right Support

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The highest percentage of alt-right supporters fall between age groups 35-59 (14 out of

31), as shown in Table 6-6. The majority of those in the “unsure” category are in the same 35-59 age group, another indication that those who answered “unsure” were either undecided or did not want to state their support. Younger populations typically know what the alt-right is. From ethnographic interviews, it was clear that the only people unaware of what the alt-right is were those above 60.

Table 6-6: Distribution of alt-right supporters by age Alt-right Supporter <35 35-59 >60 Total Refused 4 9 8 21 Don't know 4 14 7 25 Supporter 3 14 14 31 Opponent 30 44 45 119 Unsure 49 103 64 216 Total 90 184 138 412

Data from the survey were analyzed to answer specific research questions stated at the beginning of the Chapter 6. Findings indicate that most Floridians, irrespective of race, regard cultural diversity as strength of America, but political correctness as a threat to freedom of speech. About 32% of whites feel that they have been discriminated against. More than half of these individuals stated they were “unsure” about being supporters or opponents of the alt-right.

The “unsure” category for sensitive questions pose a challenge to interpretation, as it is unclear whether their answer truly reflects indecision, whether they were hesitant to answer in the affirmative, or whether they were unaware of what the alt-right is. However, analysis of the

“unsure” category provides justification to disregard the last possibility- that they were unaware of what the alt-right is. People who answered “unsure” were majority white and in the age group

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of 35-59 years. This is the same age group of alt-right supporters. Additionally, ethnographic interviews indicate that those unaware of the alt-right are over 60.

Distribution of whites that reported having been discriminated against were analyzed to examine whether this may indicate alt-right adherence. The majority of these whites were again

35-59, the same age group as alt-right supporters and the “unsure” category. A higher percentage of these whites also reported that prejudice against minorities are “Not so serious a problem” than whites that did not report being discriminated against.

The Hispanic population were consistently right-leaning in their responses. Not only did a majority of Hispanics report not having faced discrimination, they were more likely to sympathize with the alt-right. Additionally, distaste for PC was also high among this group. As discussed earlier, the Cuban population of South Florida, and their traditionally right-leaning beliefs account for this pattern.

The analysis above, along with insights from ethnographic data, indicate the possibility that perception of discrimination, ages 35-59, and a distaste for PC may be predictors of attraction to alt-right ideology. Further, the results indicate that given historical anti-Castro sentiments, Cubans- more than any other non-white category- are likely to sympathize with far- right ideology. Chapter 7 sums up the qualitative and quantitative data in this study, to discuss triangulated findings.

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CHAPTER 7 CONCLUSION

Data analysis of personal networks and in-depth interviews reveal some clear patterns.

Levels of alt-right adherence, structural and compositional properties of networks and media exposure have a clear association.

All of the respondents that had a low adherence to alt-right beliefs had either heterogeneous networks of political discussion partners, or had alters with opposing views display high centrality measures. Their networks were also relatively non-compartmentalized.

Follow up interviews with network maps confirmed assumptions that alters with "different" or

"very different" political values are liberals. In some cases, respondents indicated either directly or indirectly, that interaction with these alters caused them to seek out new information about political issues to strengthen their conversations. In cases where a close liberal alter was not someone they had political conversations with, follow-up interviews indicated that these alters still had an influence in their thinking. An example is Kevin Dwight's sister who is a liberal and has two gay children. In later interviews, Kevin reported being more empathetic and accepting of her beliefs.

In-depth interviews with all the respondents also revealed a pattern of media exposure.

Those with higher number of radical right, or alt-right beliefs watch subscribe to highly selective list of news sources, and their networks are more homogeneous than others. Qualitative interviews with network visualizations with non-alt-right Trump supporters suggested that these alters were not selected by the respondent, but were part of their personal network because of occupation, family ties, or a recreational hobby. Although this is not evidence of a causal link, it is indicative of the possibility that personal network composition influence selective exposure to media, which further reinforces far-right beliefs. Homogeneous networks serve as powerful echo

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chambers that further reinforce far-right beliefs. For alt-right supporters many of their alters were selected by them because of affiliation with alt-right activism. However, alt-right members work hard to hide their identity from certain circles like workplace contacts. Being in a defensive position and feeling vulnerable to public doxing, serves to strengthen their beliefs and increases solidarity between their alt-right circle. For alt-right members that have a more cohesive network, this effect is not as powerful. Interaction with a diverse set of groups that are not completely separated seems to mitigate the sustenance of extreme beliefs.

Trump supporters, contrary to public perception especially in liberal circles, have a vast diversity of beliefs. Several conservatives that supported president Trump in fact have socially liberal values. A survey of a representative population of Floridians indicates that most people- including Trump supporters- view cultural diversity as a strength of America. However, political correctness is seen across class, gender and race categories, to be a threat to freedom of speech.

Anti-PC culture, as I have demonstrated, unifies various sub-groups in the right. Distaste for PC, combined with selective media exposure and fragmented or homogeneous networks serve as fertile ground for the origins and spread of far-right beliefs. Given this trajectory, public name- calling, labeling, and misrepresenting Trump supporters without a genuine attempt at understanding their positions can push people further to the right and thereby by unproductive in

the least and dangerous at most.

There are several possible future directions to validate or advance these findings. First, a similar ethnography on a representative population is crucial for a generalized applicability of these results. Snowball sampling, while effective for hidden populations, has one drawback- it is not representative of the population at large. Although grounded theory approach tries to limit this as much as possible through theoretical saturation, a larger study through random sampling

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is irreplaceable. Second, the alt-right movement is a loose ideology without a clear structure and organization. Cognitive anthropology provides invaluable tools to develop a model to understand the alt-right more accurately. A cultural consensus analysis of the alt-right (Dressler, 2002) would serve as a useful method to not just operationalize alt-right ideology, but to also represent it through an 'emic' perspective. While a cultural consensus among alt-right supporters was not part of this study, I have taken steps to define alt-right values as accurately as possible, by using material directly from alt-right channels. Finally, a longitudinal study to understand the effect of personal network composition on media selection, and the effect of media exposure on sustenance of these beliefs would provide rigorous empirical evidence of the causal direction this study indicates. With growing polarization and lack of dialogues between opposing groups, such a study would be crucial for the prevention of extreme beliefs and violence that has historically been part of similar movements.

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APPENDIX A FREE LIST ITEM DESCRIPTION

Alt-right Trump Supporters Item Examples Item Examples

 “Understanding one  “Ethnostate” another” Unity  “Respecting people” Ethnostate  “Treating people how they want to be treated”

 “Extremely  “Less corruption” reduced  “Fresh faces in Extremely immigration -- Populist government” reduced only immigration  “Informed electorate” immigration that occurs due to high skilled labor or marriage”   “Halt to nonwhite  “Taking responsibility immigration” for one’s own problems”  “Encouraging self-  “Ending reliance” immigration  “Stop enabling people” Halt non- (both legal and  “Shift social welfare white illegal) except for immigration White people” Self-reliance programs more & more towards charity; make finding a job more easy & make it increasingly difficult to depend on any form of government welfare as reliable income”

Freedom of  “Unqualified  “Opportunities for Association right to freedom people of different of association” Equal_opportunities backgrounds to achieve levels of success that are unparalleled”

White Pride  “Protect white  “Moral foundations heritage” Moral_values and value of the family unit”

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 “Desire to be better person everyday”  “Integrity”  “Everyone is working Anti - non-  Ending and healthy” white Affirmative Action Strong_economy  “Insisting on balanced trade with other  Ending forced countries” integration of schools   “Unbiased media”

Honest Media  “If we actually had real News that was not commercially/ideologic ally programmed”

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APPENDIX B SELECTED QUESTIONNAIRES

Forscher and Kteily’s 2017 A Psychological Profile of the Alt-right

We're interested in learning more about American populism and the contemporary conservative movement. This is a chance to ensure that diversity within the conservative movement is represented accurately in the mainstream media or other outlets.

The following are a set of questionnaires that measure a wide range of beliefs, from moral and political values, to personal beliefs about social issues. Please remember that all your responses are confidential. We'll never reveal who you are. In order for us to understand your views accurately, it's important that you answer these questions honestly.

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Motivations to inhibit and express prejudice: motiv The following questions concern various reasons or motivations people might have for responding in positive and negative ways toward Black people. Some of these ways of responding reflect internal (personal) motivations whereas others reflect more external (social) motivations. Neither source is better than the other – we are simply interested in why people respond the way they do towards Black people. Please indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with each of the following statements using the scale below.

Strongly 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) 7 (7) 8 (8) Strongly disagree agree 9 1 (1) (9) I express negative thoughts about Black people to avoid          negative reactions from others. (emp_1) I minimize my contact with Black people in order to          avoid disapproval from others. (emp_2) I avoid interactions with Black people because of          pressure from others. (emp_3) Avoiding          interactions

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with Black people is important to my self- concept. (imp_1) Minimizing my contact with Black people is          personally important to me. (imp_2) My beliefs motivate me to express negative          views about Black people. (imp_3) Because of today’s PC (politically correct) standards I try to appear          non- prejudiced toward Black people. (ems_1) I try to hide any negative          thoughts about Black people in

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order to avoid negative reactions from others. (ems_2) I attempt to appear non- prejudiced toward Black people in          order to avoid disapproval from others. (ems_3) I attempt to act in non- prejudiced ways toward Black          people because it is personally important to me. (ims_1) I am personally motivated by my          beliefs to be non- prejudiced toward

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Black people. (ims_2) Being non- prejudiced toward Black people is          important to my self- concept. (ims_3)

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Self-Reported Aggressive Behavior behavior We are interested in your online and offline behaviors toward other people. Please read each of the following behaviors and rate how frequently you have done each of them in the past month using the scale below. Not at all 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) Very frequently frequently 1 (1) 7 (7) Online, called another person a name that they        found offensive (online_name) In person, called another person a name that they        found offensive (offline_name) Online, physically threatened        another person (online_threat) In person, physically threatened        another person (offline_threat) Online, contacted another person after they asked        you to stop (online_harrass) In person, contacted another person after they        asked you to stop (offline_harrass) Online, made a statement because others find it        offensive (online_statement) In person, made a       

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statement because others find it offensive (offline_statement) Made public personal information about        another person without their consent (dox) Shared a meme because others        find it offensive (meme)

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Perceptions about disadvantage: We're interested in your views about discrimination in the United States -- that is, the degree to which people in the United States are treated differently by others because they belong to a particular group.

Some groups may receive advantages due to discrimination, some may receive disadvantages. Some groups may receive neither advantages nor disadvantages.

Please read over the following groups and rate the extent to which they currently receive advantages and disadvantages due to discrimination. Strong Moderate No advantage Moderate Strong disadvantage disadvantage or advantage (4) advantage (5) (1) (2) disadvantage (3) White people      (white) Black people      (black) Muslim people      (muslim) Hispanics      (hispanic) Men (men)      Women      (women) Democrats      (dem) Republicans      (rep) Members of the alt-right      (altright) Immigrants      (imm)

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People have different opinions about the problems facing the United States. We're interested in your opinions about what issues you consider to be the biggest problems in the United States. Concern about political issues: Please read the following issues and rate the extent to which you consider each one an issue for the United States. Not at all 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) A big a problem problem 7 1 (1) (7) Discrimination against White        people (disc_white) Discrimination against Black        people (disc_black) Discrimination against men        (disc_men) Discrimination against        women (disc_women) Government corruption        (corrupt) The gap between Washington        elites and common folk (elite_gap) The gap between the rich and the        poor (rich_gap) Crime (crime)        Access to healthcare        (health)

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Climate change        (climate) Illegal immigration        (imm) Islamic terrorism        (terror) Political correctness        (pc)

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Race-based collective action: Whites Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements. Strongly 2 (2) 3 (3) 4 (4) 5 (5) 6 (6) Strongly disagree 1 agree 7 (1) (7) I think there are good reasons to have organizations        that look out for the interests of Whites. (1) More needs to be done so that people        remember that "White Lives" also matter. (2) Whites need to do more to remind the world about the        challenges that White people face. (3) Whites should lobby to repeal laws that give minorities an        advantage on the basis of their race, at the expense of Whites. (4)

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Whites need to start looking out        more for one another. (5)

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Race-based collective action:

I support the Black Lives Matter movement.  Strongly agree (7)  Agree (6)  Somewhat agree (5)  Neither agree nor disagree (4)  Somewhat disagree (3)  Disagree (2)  Strongly disagree (1) blm_harm I think that the Black Lives Matter movement has been very harmful to our country.  Strongly agree (7)  Agree (6)  Somewhat agree (5)  Neither agree nor disagree (4)  Somewhat disagree (3)  Disagree (2)  Strongly disagree (1) blm_divide I think that the Black Lives Matter movement is racially divisive.  Strongly agree (7)  Agree (6)  Somewhat agree (5)  Neither agree nor disagree (4)  Somewhat disagree (3)  Disagree (2)  Strongly disagree (1)

Police Support: police_respect Police officers don't get the respect they deserve in this country.  Strongly agree (7)  Agree (6)  Somewhat agree (5)  Neither agree nor disagree (4)  Somewhat disagree (3)  Disagree (2)  Strongly disagree (1)

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police_disc I think that Black and White people are treated very differently by the police.  Strongly agree (7)  Agree (6)  Somewhat agree (5)  Neither agree nor disagree (4)  Somewhat disagree (3)  Disagree (2)  Strongly disagree (1) police_racist I think that racism is deeply woven into law enforcement.  Strongly agree (1)  Agree (2)  Somewhat agree (3)  Neither agree nor disagree (4)  Somewhat disagree (5)  Disagree (6)  Strongly disagree (7)

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APPENDIX C FLORIDA SURVEY QUESTIONS

The next set of questions are about race and politics. These questions are part of a research study by a graduate student at the University of Florida. We understand some of the questions may be sensitive, and want to remind you that you don’t have to answer any question you do not want to. Email address: [email protected]

1. Is cultural diversity a strength or a weakness of America?

Strength Weakness Unsure

2. Do you think political correctness is a threat or an asset?

Yes No Unsure

3. How serious a problem do you think prejudice against minority groups is in the United States today: very serious problem, somewhat serious problem, not so serious problem, not a problem at all?

4. Was there ever a specific instance when you felt discriminated against because of your race?

5. From what you have heard or seen about the alt-right movement, would you say you are a supporter or an opponent of the movement?

A supporter An opponent Unsure

6. Do you think the alt-right groups pose a threat to United States?

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APPENDIX D INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS

Grand Tour Questions  Can you describe to me what your political beliefs are?  Why did you vote for Trump?  What are the biggest problems facing America today?

Personal History  Where were you born and raised?  What was your childhood like?  What kind of friend circles did you have?  When did you start articulating your political beliefs?

Beliefs  What are the biggest misconceptions people have about supporters?  How do races differ?  What are the differences between men and women?  What are your thoughts on political correctness?  Does everyone in your life know about your political beliefs?

Demographics  Sex  Age  Education  Employment status  Single or married  Children

Media Exposure  What are all the sources you get news from?

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Specific to Alt-right Supporters:

 What is alt-right ideology?  When did you come out as alt-right?  How did people around you react when you came out as alt-right?  Can you explain to me how you got red pilled?  What happens when races intermix?  What are your thoughts about the ethnostate?  What is your response to people who say Native Americans and African Americans also have a right to this land?  What is your response to people who say everyone in the US except Native Americans are immigrants?  What are your thoughts on homosexuality?

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Choeeta Chakrabarti’s academic career has included a mix of natural and social sciences.

With a bachelor's degree in biotechnology from Hyderabad, she went on to earn an M.A. in sociology from University of Hyderabad in India. Her previous training and research has included work in a genetics diagnostic lab at the Center for Cellular and Molecular Biology

(CCMB), and ethnographic fieldwork among single-mother Somali refugees in Hyderabad,

India.

After completing her master's, Choeeta enrolled in a PhD program at the University of

Florida to advance her interest in human rights. Her 6 years at UF has included training in a variety of sub-disciplines, ranging from courses in gender-based violence, social network analysis, to several courses in research methods taught by Jeffrey Johnson and Peter Collings.

Choeeta has taught several courses for the Department of Anthropology as both a teaching assistant and instructor of record, and for the department of biology as a teaching assistant for labs. Her courses include Human Sexuality and Culture, General Anthropology, and

Anthropology of Religion.

Over the course of 6 years, Choeeta has designed several research projects, including one in India. She has also collaborated with sociologists at University of Mississippi for a 3-year pilot project on refugee resettlement in France and India. As part of her previous project, she briefly worked with middle-eastern refugees in Jacksonville.

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