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COMPARING ARTWORKS DISSERTATION Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for The Degree Doctor of Philosophy in the Graduate School of The Ohio State University By Henry John Pratt, B.A. ***** The Ohio State University 2005 Dissertation Committee: Approved by Professor Lee B. Brown, Advisor Professor Robert Kraut ___________________________ Professor Diana Raffman Adviser Philosophy Graduate Program Copyright by Henry John Pratt 2005 ABSTRACT Judgments about the comparative value of artworks, both within and across categories, are central to art criticism. Some philosophers, however, have thought that not all such comparisons are legitimate. Certain artworks might simply be too different for comparison, or perhaps the very practice of artistic comparison rests upon a mistake. It is crucial, then, to examine and validate current critical practice concerning artistic comparisons. Despite various arguments to the contrary, I argue, there are no compelling reasons to abandon or substantially revise the ways in which artworks are customarily compared. This justification of art-critical practices has a startling implication: the methods by which normative comparisons actually proceed license the comparison of any artworks whatsoever, regardless of category. One competing view, the uniqueness approach, entails that no artworks can ever be rationally compared. Though it is endorsed by several prominent aestheticians, I argue that the uniqueness approach relies on faulty assumptions and does not provide good reason to revise critical methodology. ii A more plausible and widely received alternative to my view is that some but not all artworks are comparable: only artworks of the same kind, which are valuable for the same reasons, can legitimately be compared. I show that even these restrictions are too severe. Though appealingly moderate, this view has internal conflicts and also rules out many of the very comparisons it is intended to preserve. The only other option is my own, the idea that all artworks are comparable. The legitimacy of artistic comparisons is grounded in what I maintain is the best available theory of artistic evaluation. In practice, critics consider not only the degree to which artworks have artistically valuable properties, but also the relative merits of these properties themselves. We arrive at overall judgments about artistic value by combining the degree to which specific artistic properties are valued and the degree to which those properties are present in each artwork under consideration. The apparatus of artistic evaluation makes this process applicable to all artworks, whatever their artistic category. Comparative judgments among any artworks whatsoever are legitimized, vindicating art criticism as an evaluative practice. iii Dedicated to my parents, John and Mary Pratt. iv ACKNOWLEDGMENTS There are many people without whom this dissertation would have been a very different and vastly inferior document. I owe an extraordinary debt to the members of my dissertation committee: my advisor, Lee B. Brown, for his scholarly experience, wisdom, and enthusiastic and timely critiques of my ideas big and small; Robert Kraut, who continually urged that my philosophical concerns connect to the realities of artworld practices; and Diana Raffman, for emphasizing the need for careful execution of both philosophical argumentation and writing. I am grateful to my many graduate colleagues at The Ohio State University, for their willingness to offer productive comments and challenges even outside their own areas of expertise. Particular thanks are due to all of the participants in the Dissertation Seminars, Philosophy 999A, in the spring quarters of 2003-2005; and to Andrew Arlig, Julian Cole, William Melanson, Bill Roche, Joshua Smith, Cathal Woods, and, especially, Richard Groshong. v I also wish to thank Ian Hummel for providing me with so much data and comic relief, Andrew Arlig for much practical advice, and Gloria and Perry for their kind encouragement. Finally, I am grateful to the members of the American Society for Aesthetics for the questions asked and advice offered about previous incarnations of some of this material, particularly the participants in the Eastern Division Meetings of 2004 and 2005 and the Annual Meeting of 2003. vi VITA September 7, 1973 ........... Born – Burlington, Vermont 1995 ........................ B.A. Philosophy and English, The University of Vermont. 2000-present ................ Graduate Teaching Associate, The Ohio State University PUBLICATIONS 1. Hayman, Greg, and Henry John Pratt. “What Are Comics?” in Aesthetics, 2d ed. Ed. David Goldblatt and Lee B. Brown, 419- 24. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, 2005. 2. Pratt, Henry John. Review of An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art, by Richard Eldridge. American Society for Aesthetics Newsletter, 24 (Summer 2004): 5-7. FIELDS OF STUDY Major Field: Philosophy vii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Abstract .................................................... ii Dedication .................................................. iv Acknowledgments .............................................. v Vita ....................................................... vii Chapters: 1. Introduction ............................................ 1 1.1 What Is Comparability? .............................. 5 1.2 The Definitions Applied ............................ 10 1.3 The Structure ...................................... 13 2. A Quasi-Institutional Account of Artistic Value ........ 17 2.1 Experientialism and Anti-Experientialism ........... 20 2.2 Intrinsic/Inherent Value Theories About Experiences of Artworks ........................................ 25 2.3 Instrumental Value Theories About Experiences of Artworks ........................................... 31 2.4 The Mixed Value Theory About Experiences of Artworks ........................................... 35 2.5 Formalism and Referentialism ....................... 36 2.6 The Institutionalist Theory of Artistic Value ...... 39 2.7 Putting It All Together: The Quasi-Institutional Theory of Artistic Value ........................... 44 2.8 Objections to Quasi-Institutionalism and Responses .......................................... 47 3. Against the Uniqueness Approach ........................ 55 3.1 The Relevant Sense of “Unique” ..................... 58 3.2 The Argument from Aesthetic Interest ............... 65 3.3 The Argument from Expression of Emotion ............ 68 3.4 The Argument from Expression of Meaning ............ 72 3.5 The Argument from Formulization .................... 77 3.6 The Argument from Substitutability ................. 92 3.7 A Diagnosis of the Uniqueness Approach ............. 98 viii 4. Against the Moderate Approach ......................... 104 4.1 Vermazen’s First Thesis ........................... 105 4.2 Vermazen’s Second Thesis .......................... 110 4.3 Vermazen’s Third Thesis ........................... 112 4.4 Dickie’s Expansions of Vermazen’s Theses .......... 115 4.5 Three Unexpected Limits on Comparison ............. 119 4.6 The Zero Assignment and the Zero Method ........... 129 4.7 Rejecting the Pareto Condition through Critical Scenarios ......................................... 137 5. The Universal Comparability Approach .................. 144 5.1 The Theoretical Apparatus ......................... 147 5.2 Some Technical Elaborations ....................... 152 5.3 Theory and Practice ............................... 159 5.4 The Universal Comparability Approach .............. 168 6. Supporting and Applying the Universal Comparability Approach .......................................... 172 6.1 Evidence for the Universal Comparability of Artworks .......................................... 173 6.2 Some Final Objections ............................. 183 6.3 Comparability and Objectivity ..................... 190 6.4 Connections, Directions, and Conclusion ........... 196 Bibliography ............................................... 201 ix CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Seminole Sam: It’s true, Owl, your big splash has raised a thousand ripples of thought––now, here’s a handful of corn that I toss out to see if a bird of paradise will give it a passing peck. I’m rifling this into the dark, into an off-season shooting gallery, mind you, but it has a chance of ringing the old bell... we may win a kewpie doll with this... I’m not going to fancy this nugget up with a Sunday suit... I’ll just toss it into the fire, raw, an’ see if it spits back, see if it simmers into a broth of Oh Boy! or if it curls its tail and... Churchy La Femme: What is you talkin’ about?! Seminole Sam: Don’t you dig the mother tongue, or do you need another ear? Walt Kelly, Pogo Evaluation is central to art criticism: critics explore the relative value of artworks within the same category (e.g., two jazz compositions) and across categories (e.g., a novel and a film). We judge that some artworks are very good, some very bad, and many are somewhere in between very good and very bad. On the face of it, these evaluative judgments are comparative. A very good artwork is better than a mediocre artwork, not to mention a very bad artwork. However, the situation is not quite that simple. Some philosophers have thought that not all such comparisons are 1 legitimate. It might be thought that certain artworks are simply be too different from each other for comparison. Or, it might be supposed that the very practice of artistic comparison rests upon a mistake. The main questions I wish to address

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