A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan Executing the Obama Plan...And Beyond

Citizen-Centered Approaches to State and Market

A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan Executing the Obama Plan...and Beyond

Ashraf Ghani

April 2009

Institute for State Effectiveness

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A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan Executing the Obama Plan . . . And Beyond

A Report by the Atlantic Council

Ashraf Ghani

April 2009 Th e At l a n t i c Co u n c i l ’s Bo a r d o f Di r e c t o r s

CHAIRMAN Stuart E. Eizenstat Arnold L. Punaro *Chuck Hagel Robert F. Ellsworth Joseph W. Ralston Lawrence P. Fisher, II Norman W. Ray CHAIRMAN, INTERNATIONAL Barbara Hackman Franklin Stanley R. Resor ADVISORY BOARD *John L. Fugh Joseph E. Robert, Jr. Brent Scowcroft Carlton W. Fulford Jeffrey A. Rosen Jacques S. Gansler Charles O. Rossotti t h e t l a n t i c o u n c i l PRESIDENT AND CEO Robert Gelbard Michael L. Ryan A C *Frederick Kempe Richard L. Gelfond Marjorie M. Scardino o f t h e u n i t e d s t a t e s Edmund P. Giambastiani, Jr. William O. Schmieder CHAIRMAN EMERITUS *Sherri W. Goodman John P. Schmitz *Henry E. Catto John A. Gordon Jill A. Schuker C. Boyden Gray Brent Scowcroft The Atlantic Council of the United States promotes constructive U.S. leadership and engagement in VICE CHAIRS Janet Mullins Grissom Patricia Sherman international affairs based on the central role of the Atlantic community in meeting the international *Richard Edelman Marc Grossman Matthew R. Simmons challenges of the twenty-first century. The Council comprises a non-partisan network of leaders who *Brian C. McK. Henderson Ian Hague Kiron K. Skinner aim to bring ideas to power and to give power to ideas by: *Franklin D. Kramer Harry Harding William Y. Smith *Richard L. Lawson Rita E. Hauser *Helmut Sonnenfeldt • stimulating dialogue and discussion about critical international issues with a view to enriching *Virginia A. Mulberger Marten H.A. van Heuven Richard J.A. Steele *W. DeVier Pierson James R. Hogg Philip Stephenson public debate and promoting consensus on appropriate responses from the administration; the Richard C. Holbrooke *Paula Stern Congress; the corporate and nonprofit sectors; the media in the United States; and leaders in TREASURERS Mary L. Howell John Studzinski Europe, Asia, and the Americas. *Ronald M. Freeman Benjamin Huberman William H. Taft, IV *John D. Macomber *Robert E. Hunter Peter J. Tanous • conducting educational and exchange programs for successor generations of U.S. leaders so that Robert L. Hutchings George J. Tenet SECRETARY Mansoor Ijaz Peter Thomas they will come to value U.S. international engagement and have the knowledge and understanding *Walter B. Slocombe William Inglee Paul Twomey necessary to develop effective policies. Jeremy M. Isaacs Henry G. Ulrich, III DIRECTORS Robert Jeffrey *Ronald P. Verdicchio Through its diverse networks, the Council builds broad constituencies to support constructive U.S. *Robert J. Abernethy A. Elizabeth Jones Enzo Viscusi leadership and policies. Its program offices publish informational analyses, convene conferences Timothy D. Adams Paul G. Kaminski Carl E. Vuono among current and future leaders, and contribute to the public debate in order to integrate the views of *Carol C. Adelman Arnold Kanter Charles F. Wald Michael A. Almond Francis J. Kelly Jay Walker knowledgeable individuals from a wide variety of backgrounds, interests, and experiences. Michael Ansari *James V. Kimsey Roger W. Wallace *David D. Aufhauser *Roger Kirk Mark R. Warner Nancy Kassebaum Baker Henry A. Kissinger J. Robinson West *Donald K. Bandler *Geraldine S. Kunstadter Togo D. West, Jr. Susan M. Blaustein Philip Lader John C. Whitehead *Julia Chang Bloch Anthony Lake Maciej Witucki Kathy Bloomgarden Robert G. Liberatore R. James Woolsey Beth A. Brooke Henrik Liljegren Dov S. Zakheim Harold Brown *Roderick K. von Lipsey Dan W. Burns *Jan M. Lodal HONORARY DIRECTORS R. Nicholas Burns John R. Lyman David C. Acheson *Richard R. Burt Wendy W. Makins James A. Baker, III Michael Calvey *Barry R. McCaffrey Frank C. Carlucci, III Sarah C. Carey James P. McCarthy Warren Christopher Michael P.C. Carns Eric D.K. Melby Alexander M. Haig, Jr. *Daniel W. Christman Jack N. Merritt Robert S. McNamara Wesley K. Clark Franklin C. Miller Edward L. Rowny Curtis M. Coward *Judith A. Miller James R. Schlesinger *Ralph D. Crosby, Jr. *George E. Moose George P. Shultz W. Bowman Cutter William A. Nitze William H. Webster Brian D. Dailey Hilda Ochoa-Brillembourg Kenneth W. Dam Philip A. Odeen LIFETIME DIRECTORS Paula Dobriansky Ana Palacio Lucy Wilson Benson Lacey Neuhaus Dorn Mark R. Parris Daniel J. Callahan, III Conrado Dornier Torkel L. Patterson Steven Muller William H. Draper, III William J. Perry Stanley Ebner *Thomas R. Pickering ______Thomas J. Edelman Andrew Prozes * members of the Executive Committee the Atlantic Council of the united states

A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan Executing the Obama Plan . . . And Beyond

A Report by the Atlantic Council

Ashraf Ghani

April 2009 For further information about the Atlantic Council of the United States or its Center on South Asia, please call (202) 778-4957 or visit http://www.acus.org/tags/south-asia.

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t h e At l a n t i c Co u n c i l o f t h e u n i t e d s t a t e s

11th Floor, 1101 15th Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20005 iii Table of contents

Foreword ...... v Executive summary—a second chance to get things right ...... vii Introduction ...... 1 Threats ...... 1 Al Qaeda ...... 2 Insurgency ...... 2 Narcotics ...... 3 Poor governance and corruption ...... 5 Weaknesses ...... 7 International community—a failure to develop a unified strategy ...... 7 The Afghan elite—a failure to articulate a clear agenda ...... 8 Assets ...... 8 Natural capital ...... 8 Location ...... 9 Financial capital ...... 9 Institutional successes ...... 10 Human capital ...... 12 International assets ...... 13 Institution-building ...... 14 First-order core functions ...... 14 Second-order functions ...... 18 Third-order functions ...... 21 Fourth-order functions ...... 22 Strategic justification for medium-term objectives ...... 24 A history of state-building ...... 24 The readiness of the Afghan people ...... 25 A counter-insurgency (COIN) approach embraces state-building ...... 25 International understanding of the centrality of governance ...... 26 iv A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan

Short-term measures to support medium-term objectives ...... 27 Get the elections right ...... 27 Adopt a coherent international strategy for the medium term ...... 27 Prepare new national programs ...... 29 Use the National Solidarity Program as a platform ...... 29 Create eight model provinces ...... 30 Conclusions ...... 30 References ...... 32 v Foreword

The Obama administration’s new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan presented Afghanistan and the region with renewed opportunities for success . The rapid deterioration of security and governance in Afghanistan will force the United States and its allies to focus on urgent and immediate steps to help bring about rapid progress to war-weary publics, particularly before the August 2009 presidential elections in Afghanistan .

However, short-term policies and actions will not be enough to achieve the goals of a self-sustaining, effective, and accountable Afghan government . This report makes the case that for the Obama administration to translate its defined goals and strategy for Afghanistan into achievements on the ground, it must adopt a broad, medium-term framework that responds to the needs and aspirations of the Afghan people .

By diagnosing the threats and opportunities that face Afghanistan and offering a coherent approach to state-building, this report offers an excellent guide for building on the new U .S . strategy and creating a functional state accountable to the needs of its people . It points essentially toward an implementation strategy for the Obama administration, if it is to have longer term success .

This report is the product of the diligent efforts of Dr . Ashraf Ghani, former Afghan Minister of Finance and Chairman (on leave) of the Institute for State Effectiveness . The Atlantic Council has profited enormously from Dr. Ghani’s energies and brilliant insights as a member of both its International Advisory Board and the Program on International Security’s Strategic Advisors Group (SAG) . The Atlantic Council is grateful for Dr . Ghani’s efforts in drafting this report and recognizes the important contributions by his aide Blair Glencorse .

With its important implications for the NATO Alliance and the broader South Asia region, this publication is a joint effort between the SAG and the Atlantic Council’s South Asia Center . The Council wishes to recognize Franklin D . Kramer and Julian Lindley-French for their important contributions to the draft as members of the SAG, Shuja Nawaz for his oversight of the project effort as Director of the South Asia Center, and Assistant Director Jeffrey Lightfoot for coordinating the effort .

Frederick Kempe President and CEO

vii Executive summary A second chance to get things right

Describing the situation in Afghanistan and There are four major threats to securing Af- Pakistan as increasingly perilous, President ghanistan’s future . First, Al Qaeda is a renewed Obama has committed his administration to force moving fluidly between Afghanistan enhancing the military, governance, and eco- and Pakistan . Second, an expanded, well re- nomic capacity of the two countries . On March sourced, and multifaceted insurgency presents 27, 2009, he announced plans to launch a new a continual threat to Afghan and international strategy in the region: actors . Third, a narcotics production, processing, and distribution network fuels corruption To succeed, we and our friends and al- and violence and is becoming concentrated lies must reverse the Taliban’s gains in the hands of a few nefarious individuals . and promote a more capable and ac- And fourth, poor governance, underpinning countable Afghan government . . . Af- all these problems, is now so entrenched that ghanistan has an elected government, many organs of government are seen as the in- but it is undermined by corruption and struments of corruption, not of legitimacy and has difficulty delivering basic services the rule of law . to its people . The economy is under- cut by a booming narcotics trade that These threats have been heightened and per- encourages criminality and funds the petuated by the inability of the international insurgency . The people of Afghanistan community to develop a unified strategy or seek the promise of a better future . Yet coordination mechanism . Securing agreement once again, they have seen the hope of on a joint strategy and on the means for coordi- a new day darkened by violence and nation is a prerequisite for success in Afghani- uncertainty . stan . The tendency of the Afghan elite to support instability rather than institutional reform The Obama administration has thus both defined is another key obstacle. The political field in the problem and set clear goals for American en- Afghanistan must therefore be broadened to al- gagement in the region . Translating these goals low for the recognition and emergence of stake- into achievements on the ground, however, is holders in a stable and prosperous country . going to require understanding the context, the lessons from the past, and the priority actions While there are significant constraints to for the future . Conditions on the ground are now achieving the stated objectives, there are also much more difficult than in 2002 when the Af- significant Afghan and international assets to ghan people overwhelmingly welcomed the in- build on . On the Afghan side, the assets are in ternational intervention . The goals set, however, the natural, financial, and human capital and are still achievable if the needs and aspirations of the institutional successes in areas ranging the Afghan people are the focus of renewed ef- from the national army to rural development . forts . The administration has clearly recognized The success of the political process from 2001 that the achievement of goals requires a medium- to 2004, when the first presidential elections term approach . This report offers an implemen- in the country’s history were held, shows the tation framework for translating the goals into willingness of the Afghan public to engage in feasible processes and actions in Afghanistan . democratic processes . The National Solidarity viii A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan

Program is one example of a novel approach unemployed youth who provide the basis for that was deployed across a number of sectors . the insurgency and the narcotics industry . This The success of its programs indicates that the will involve developing key initiatives in sup- key to institutional success is not context but port of agriculture, through a bold initiative that the design of programs and the nature of part- works from market access backward through nerships between the Afghan stakeholders and value chains, supply chains, knowledge, and the international community . infrastructure and uses trade concessions and innovative financial tools to ensure sustainable A coherent approach to state-building can pro- and profitable production. It involves mining, duce a capable and accountable Afghan govern- through transparent licensing frameworks and ment . This report offers a prioritized approach credible arbitration and judicial enforcement to building state functions sequentially and in of contracts . And it includes construction, a way that creates self-sustaining linkages and which, through a central construction code, a reform processes . With a 10-year timeframe central procurement authority, and a construc- for achieving control of its territory and the al- tion corps, could build on the private capacity legiance of its people, the Afghan government in Afghanistan to truly transform the efficiency can break down state functions into four insti- and sustainability of infrastructure develop- tutional orders. This classification of functions ment across the country . will allow for a method of benchmarking and measurement and allow domestic and interna- Third-order functions include a focus on in- tional actors to move from endless preparation frastructure, to consolidate territory, har- of strategies on paper to the critical task of im- ness space, and release market forces using plementation on the ground . domestic and regional capabilities to build key roads, develop alternative energies and First-order functions include the rule of law, capitalize on new technologies while focus- to ensure that the Afghan state can control its ing on social policy, through rural programs territory through the use of effective security that allow for generating wealth and develop- and police services that use force within a clear ing social and institutional capital from the space defined by strict rules. They also include bottom up . public finance, to ensure that resources, both internal and external, are channeled effectively Fourth-order functions include public borrow- and spent accountably at every level of governing, to ensure that external resources can be ment using robust national accountability sys- channeled effectively in support of the budget tems . These functions involve administrative as the central instrument of policy . They de- control, to turn Afghan territory into a hierar- mand effective management of public, cultural, chically national space in which the functions environmental, and innovation assets through and levels of governance are clearly defined credible contracting and regulation and the for- and coordinated while supported by capable malization of property rights . These functions civil servants . These will include human capital also include second-generation human capital development, to create stakeholders in positive development, through a focus on tertiary and reform that have the skills to support an effec- vocational training as part of a long-term, 20- tive public sector, a legitimate and productive year human development plan . private sector, and a vibrant civil society . These institution-building processes can be Second-order functions include market-build- justified strategically because they build on the ing, creating sustainable jobs that can draw in successful state-building efforts under way in Executive summary ix

Afghanistan between 2002 and 2005 and take approach to simplify the actions of the advantage of the readiness of the Afghan peo- broader international community . ple for good governance, the rule of law, and an end to violence and poverty . • Preparing new national programs with implementation plans in place for immediate The counter-insurgency (COIN) approach that roll-out by the new Afghan administration . is now beginning to guide American military actions in Afghanistan, as it has been in Iraq, • Using the National Solidarity Program, a also emphasizes a coherent and coordinated community-level development program, as approach to good government to win public a platform for rural enterprise and wealth trust—to use force only when necessary in the generation . short term and to avoid its use in the longer term . This is in line with the broader interna- • Focusing on eight model provinces across tional thinking on state-building, which now the country, which provide a demonstration emphasizes the centrality of governance and and multiplier effect for the rest of Afghan- the cost of failure of disparate and piecemeal istan to underpin a slowly broadening area development approaches . of good governance .

The coming months are central to Afghani- The situation in Afghanistan is difficult, but by stan’s future for a variety of reasons . The new no means impossible, and renewed international U .S . strategy can reach the medium-term state- focus combined with shifting internal dynamics building priorities outlined above through provide a real opportunity to change the trajecto- short-term actions: ry of the country and the lives of millions of Af- ghans. The first step has been taken—a coherent • Ensuring a level playing field for the presi- U S. . regional strategy now exists . This must be dential elections in August 2009 and sup- translated into measurable medium-term goals porting a process through which Afghans that support a functional and accountable state . can truly engage in constructive debate These goals must be underpinned by short-term about the country’s future . feasible actions that can generate positive change and a sense of hope, both within and outside Af- • Developing a coherent international strat- ghanistan, that the future will be more prosper- egy, using the COIN manual as a basis for ous and secure than the past . This is essential for military operations and a Marshall Plan Afghan, regional, and global stability .

Key numbers • The potential value of Afghanistan’s opium, morphine, and heroin exports was $3 4. billion, a third of the estimated GDP of $10 2. billion in 2008 . • Initial U S. . support to Afghanistan was $300 million a year . • Afghanistan is at the center of 3 billion potential consumers in China, India, the Gulf, and Europe . • Current spending by NATO and Coalition forces is about $20 billion a month . • Rural incomes per capita have to increase from $1 a day to at least $4 a day, the tipping point for opium production to become unprofitable.

Introduction 1

Introduction approach . The contribution of this report is to offer an implementation framework for trans- Describing the situation in Afghanistan and lating the goals into feasible processes and ac- Pakistan as increasingly perilous, President tions in Afghanistan . Obama has committed his administration to enhancing the military, governance, and eco- The Obama administration’s focus on Afghani- nomic capacity of these two countries . He stat- stan offers Afghans and the international com- ed in his speech launching a new strategy in munity a second chance to support the right the region that: type of state-building and truly secure Afghan- istan’s future . Afghans once again have the op- To succeed, we and our friends and al- portunity to articulate, own, and implement an lies must reverse the Taliban’s gains agenda for building an effective state and a le- and promote a more capable and ac- gitimate economy . And international actors can countable Afghan government . . . Af- become catalysts to help Afghans break the vi- ghanistan has an elected government, cious circle and replace it with a virtuous circle but it is undermined by corruption and of stability and development . has difficulty delivering basic services to its people . The economy is under- Threats cut by a booming narcotics trade that encourages criminality and funds the Afghanistan is now ranked the fourth most insurgency . The people of Afghanistan war-torn, fifth most corrupt, seventh most frag- seek the promise of a better future . Yet ile, and second weakest state in the world .2 The once again, they have seen the hope of vicious circle of narcotics, crime, corruption, a new day darkened by violence and and the erosion of public trust in government uncertainty .1 has prolonged and heightened the conflict, instability, and violence in the country . Secretary The Obama Administration has thus both de- Hillary Clinton, in her confirmation hearings, fined the problem and set the goals for Ameri- described the conditions in Afghanistan as can engagement in the region . Translating those of a “narco-state,” a term I first used in these goals into achievements on the ground, 2002 when warning against the worst probable however, is going to require understanding of outcome of the international intervention in the context, the lessons from the past, and the Afghanistan . Indeed, key threats to progress in priority actions for the future . Conditions on Afghanistan are Al Qaeda, the insurgency, nar- the ground are now much more difficult than cotics, and poor governance and corruption . in 2002 when the Afghan people overwhelmingly welcomed the international intervention . 2 . For corruption and war-torn rankings, see The goals set, however, are still achievable if Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions the needs and aspirations of the Afghan peo- Index 2008 (www transparency. org/policy_research/. ple are the focus of renewed efforts . The ad- surveys_indices/cpi/2008); for fragility rankings, ministration has clearly recognized that the see Foreign Policy’s The Failed States Index 2008 achievement of goals requires a medium-term (www foreignpolicy. com/story/cms. php?story_. id=4350&page=1); and for weakness rankings, see 1 . Speech by U .S . President Obama on March 27, Rice and Patrick’s Index of State Weakness in the 2009 (www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks Developing World (www brookings. edu/~/media/Files/. -by-the-President-on-a-New-Strategy-for-Afghanistan rc/reports/2008/02_weak_states_index/02_weak_ -and-Pakistan/) . states_index pdf). . 2 A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan

Al Qaeda Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India indicate the regional and global dimensions of the threat There is a consensus that a regrouped Al Qaeda and the potential threat to global security . threatens global stability . Its three key objectives, Bruce Reidel argues, are Insurgency

. . . to create and nurture “bleeding The insurgency poses a double threat to peace . wars” that will defeat the United States In unleashing violence against the Afghan peo- just as the mujahideen defeated the So- ple and Afghan and international forces, it also viet Union, to build a safe haven in Pak- pushes NATO and the Afghan security appa- istan for the operational headquarters of ratus to use more force in ever-wider areas of the Al Qaeda leadership and establish the country . Expanding from its initial base in franchises throughout the Islamic world the south, the insurgency is active in the east, to overthrow pro-American regimes, several provinces surrounding the capital city and to conduct more “raids” on the of Kabul, the province of Badghis in the north- West like 9/11 and the Madrid and Lon- west, and the province of Kunduz in the north . don atrocities, someday perhaps with a The insurgency significantly affects the psy- nuclear weapon 3. chological state of the population by disrupting the flow of traffic on the ring road, the com- In the aftermath of 9/11, Al Qaeda leadership munication artery of the country, and by selec- retreated to the tribally administered areas of tively attacking highly visible targets such as Pakistan . Using ideology to gain its foothold, the recent attacks on the government buildings Al Qaeda then used massive funds to consoli- in Kabul and those on the Serena Hotel, the date its hold on the area . It distributed millions Indian embassy, French forces, and U .S . navy of dollars among tribal elders, paid militant seals . The projection of a forward march to- commanders millions more in advance, and ward Kabul also seems designed for maximum hired local fighters, offering wages far exceed- psychological impact, as the encirclement of ing those paid by the national army 4. Al Qaeda the city reminds its inhabitants of the Taliban’s also seems to have invested in purchasing arms conquest of the capital in 1996 . in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2005, when the country was relatively quiet and local strong- Five features of the insurgency are notable . men were liquidating some of their caches . First, it is cash-based, with steadily expand- Witnessing the welcome the Afghan people ing finances from Al Qaeda, narcotics, and accorded to the international forces, Al Qaeda fees imposed on transport, construction, mer- focused on creating a sanctuary in Pakistan . chants, and landowners . With arms and materi- The U .S . invasion of Iraq, however, allowed als widely available in Afghanistan, this ready Al Qaeda to paint the war in Afghanistan as cash makes it possible to engage in destructive part of a larger U .S . attack on Islam and use operations without developing supply lines or it as a means to recruit disaffected young peo- elaborate logistics . Large cash reserves also ple and to justify its actions . Since that inva- allow the insurgency to pay its recruits higher sion, militants have circulated between the two wages than the government pays the national theaters, transferring deadly techniques from army . one country to the other . Continued attacks in Second, the insurgency is multifaceted . Al 3 . Reidel 2008, p . 11 . Qaeda policy pits multiple groups against each 4 . Hussain 2007, p . 148 . other without a unified command and control Threats 3

center, similar to the mujahideen resistance to The insurgents’ narrative of an expanding cam- the Soviets . Evidence suggests that cash is be- paign, however, glosses over the fact that their ing used to recruit disabled people and drug ad- plans in 2006—a push to establish a parallel dicts as suicide bombers . Moreover, given the government in Kandahar, gain control of sev- economic conditions, unemployed youth also eral southern provinces, and turn Kabul into a provide a large recruitment pool . As in insur- second Baghdad—failed . NATO prevented the gencies elsewhere, individual operatives know insurgency from conquering a single province, very little about those giving the orders . though international forces have not cleared the insurgency from any of the southern prov- Third, the insurgency has created an environ- inces . Caught in limbo, the Afghan public has ment of lawlessness that enables the re-emer- become uncertain of the future and is now try- gence of criminal gangs . The identity of these ing merely to cope with the changing dynamics gangs is widely known and their operations by using survival mechanisms developed dur- seem to be made possible through collusion ing the intense conflict of the 1980s and 1990s, with corrupt government officials and the po- as exemplified by their accommodation of drug lice . Even those young insurgents who are mo- cartels . tivated by ideology rather than circumstance are increasingly operating in illegal spheres Narcotics and doing so without coordination with their leaders in exile, engaging in kidnapping, extor- Drugs are a large part of the small Afghan tion and theft on their own initiative . economy . The potential value of opium, morphine, and heroin exports was $3 .4 billion,5 Fourth, the insurgency has a sanctuary and compared with an estimated GDP of $10 .2 bil- base in Pakistan . The presence of the Afghan lion in 2008 6. Heroin is the ugly side of global- Taliban has provided the Pakistani Taliban ization, as evidenced by its escalating price as ideological legitimacy, as the Afghan Taliban it is trafficked to major consuming countries. are seen as engaged in a legitimate struggle The UN Office of Drugs and Crime reports that against international forces . Al Qaeda and the the wholesale price of a gram of heroin is, on Pakistani Taliban have capitalized on this by average, $2 .50 in Afghanistan, $3 .50 in Paki- publicly indicating their allegiance to Mullah stan and Iran, $8 in Turkey, $12 in Albania, $18 Omar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban, and in Slovenia or Slovakia, $22 in Germany, $30 his cause . in the United Kingdom, and $33 in Russia .7 And retail prices can be 10 times the wholesale Fifth, the Taliban component of the insurgency prices, a result of “cutting” that mixes the drug has gained a reputation for rendering impar- with other substances . tial justice in the south . Unlike nationalist and communist insurgencies, the Taliban have nei- This vicious value chain is an example of an in- ther produced a compelling story of how they tegrated global network, combining production, will transform the lives of the poor in Afghani- credit, distribution, and careful inventory man- stan nor provided social services in their areas agement . As with diamonds, there is a differ- of operation . They have, however, stepped into ence between the stock and yearly flows. Opi- the vacuum created by corruption in the judi- um can be stored for long periods, representing ciary, which has been using the widespread disputes over property rights as occasions to 5 . UNODC 2008, p . 29 . extract extortionate bribes, and this has been critical to their support . 6 . UNODC 2008, p . 5 . 7 . UNODC 2007 . 4 A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan a store of value, while heroin is unstable and result, the economic impact of narcotics seems must be consumed within a limited period . The to be rapidly overshadowing sectors of the le- traffickers must thus decide on the amount to gitimate economy . The disproportionate cash grow given their stored stock of opium and the flowing to traffickers, their penetration of gov- amount to convert to heroin. Yearly fluctuations ernment, and their capacity to use force against in the land devoted to poppy cultivation should competitors is turning the marketplace into an therefore be interpreted carefully . uneven playing field. The risk of criminalizing the entire Afghan economy is therefore very The change in the organization of drug dealers real . from a network to a cartel has been critical to the ability of these dealers to balance supply and Narcotics now provide the critical financial demand. The United Nations Office of Drugs basis of the insurgency . Besides collecting 10 and Crime and the World Bank report that be- percent in direct taxes from cultivators, the in- tween 2001 and 2007 a loose network involv- surgents are also involved in the protection and ing hundreds of thousands of small drug deal- trafficking network. The UN Office of Drugs ers evolved into a cartel of 25 to 30 traffickers, and Crime believes that the narcotics network 15 of whom are based in the city of Kandahar .8 could be providing several hundred million While Europe has been their key market, there dollars each year in resources to the insurgen- has been a strong effort to expand the network cy . Narcotics, therefore, pose a dual threat to 10 of distribution to other continents . As early as good governance . By ensnaring the forces of 2005, evidence shows that heroin traffickers law and order in its criminal web and turning have penetrated the West Coast of the United them into its henchman, it weakens public trust States . There has also been speculation about in- in government and in the international community . Simultaneously, its funds provide the fuel creased coordination by heroin and cocaine car- for the insurgency’s expansion . tels to expand and consolidate global markets . A counter-narcotics strategy exists on paper, but While legitimate Afghan agriculture has lan- practice has been entirely different . Ambassa- guished, opium has been fully integrated into dor Thomas Schweich, who led the U .S . coun- the global profit chain. This unbalance clearly ter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan, summed has adverse impacts on governance and devel- up the situation in a 2008 article, arguing that opment—not only corrupting individuals but “an odd cabal of timorous Europeans, myopic undermining the entire system . The narcotics media outlets, corrupt Afghans, blinkered Pen- profit chain produces vested interests in insta- tagon officers, politically motivated Democrats bility, as weak governance enables traffickers and the Taliban were preventing the implemen- to expand their criminal activities into other tation of an effective counterdrug program . And areas of the economy . Opium cultivation and the rest of us could not turn them around .”11 heroin processing and trafficking require col- The article title asked, “Is Afghanistan a Narco lusion with government officials. The UN Of- State?” His answer is a clear yes . To overcome fice of Drugs and Crime and World Bank study the threat of narcotics, lessons from the failure makes a convincing argument that the Ministry of the implementation of the current approaches of the Interior, which until 2008 oversaw both must be learned, internalized, and acted on . police and local government, became an instrument of protection for criminal elements 9. As a 10 . UNODC 2008, p . 128 . 8 . Shaw 2006, pp . 204–06 . 11 . Thomas Schweich, “Is Afghanistan a Narco-State?”, 9 . Shaw 2006, pp . 198–99 . The New York Times Magazine, July 27, 2008 . Threats 5

Poor governance and corruption The rule of law. A government that functions under the rule of law delineates the spheres The threats posed by narcotics and the insur- and responsibilities of its officials through clear gency are heightened by poor governance, rules, as their duty is to provide for the welfare which both enables and perpetuates these prob- of citizens . Justice then becomes the basis of lems . In the post–September 11 environment a legitimate order, as citizens trust the state to Afghan leaders had the opportunity to become settle their disputes fairly . In Afghan political the founding fathers of an effective state and culture justice is foundational . As the sixteenth an inclusive nation . Instead, their widespread century poet Khusal Khan Khattak wrote, “one failures created a vacuum in governance that day of justice by a ruler is the equivalent to 40 led to the ascendancy of the insurgency and years of praying ”. Today, the judiciary is among the loss of the population’s trust . If governance the most distrusted sectors of government, as is understood as the mechanism for translat- disputes among citizens are exploited for pri- ing objectives into measurable outcomes for vate gain by judges and their subordinates . Un- citizens and lasting organizational structures, der good governance, public administration be- Afghanistan suffers from the absence of good comes the vehicle for collective power to solve governance in multiple forms . Five domains of collective problems . In Afghanistan, however, state functions illustrate the declining quality public office is increasingly seen as license for of governance in Afghanistan . predation and personal gain .

Citizen rights. Prominent among them are The delivery of services. A functional govern- the right to movement, the right to property, ment delivers effective and inclusive social and the right to personal security . Where the services . Health, infrastructure, and education government should be a protector of citizen provide good yardsticks for the effectiveness of rights, it is instead a predator . For example, in governance . While there have been advances the southern province of Kandahar, where the in preventive medicine in Afghanistan, cura- insurgency was launched and continues to be tive medicine continues to suffer from corrup- active, a citizen has to pass through multiple tion . Individuals operate as doctors without tolls on the road from the Pakistani border to proper certification, pharmacies routinely sell the city of Kandahar, with various officials de- drugs that have expired or do not meet quality manding illegal payments . Freedom of move- standards, and hospitals meant to be free to the ment for Afghans is thus restricted by the gov- public collect illegal fees from patients . ernment meant to guarantee freedom . More- over, the right to property, enshrined in Islamic While millions of children are enrolled in pri- law and the constitution, has become an area mary and secondary education in Afghanistan, of ambiguity and corruption, as two decades of the lack of investment in vocational and higher war and forced migration have led to multiple education is striking . The under-29 age group, claims on the same assets . Finally, millions of the vast majority of Afghanistan’s population,12 citizens are forced to live in informal or illegal faces an estimated rate of 40 percent unemploy- settlements because municipalities impose ob- ment13 and have little opportunity to acquire solete land management rules from the Soviet the skills or education that allow for upward master-planning era . Meanwhile, hundreds of mobility . Without the requisite capabilities, thousands of hectares of government land are expropriated through force or falsified records, 12 . U .S . Census Bureau, “Midyear population by age depriving the public of both current and future and sex 2008 ”. assets . 13 . CIA 2009 . 6 A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan

they cannot become the leaders and managers Such a strategy could focus initially on areas of the future . Instead, they form the reserve where reform is possible and could gener- pool of the insurgency and the labor force of ate positive momentum for larger, subsequent the drug network . reform—and where the political will and commitment to change exists . These might include Finally, providing infrastructure is now an es- the processes for licensing mines, with new tablished function of the state (either through rules that can be put in place quickly and en- direct managing or creating good conditions forced systematically, or key areas of revenue for public-private partnership), but the Afghan mobilization such as customs . This strategy government allows or ignores corrupt procure- could have clear goals and benchmarks to mea- ment and contracting practices in hundreds sure progress . Some examples: The government of construction projects and does not enforce should agree with the International Monetary adherence to clear rules for construction and Fund on doubling revenue within two years, maintenance . against which financial support would be front- loaded by the international community, given Accountability to citizens. The trend in ac- that the Ministry of Finance recently estimated countability in Afghanistan has been down- that the country is losing about 70 percent of ward . The absence of response from the gov- its potential revenue . The government should ernment to issues of accountability has made form a commission of international experts the availability of public voice an instrument and Afghan civil society to review the award for the expression of frustration rather than a of mining contracts and to subject awards of mechanism for promoting good governance . all future contracts for mining to the standards Corruption in Afghanistan has become en- of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initia- demic and systematic as the public sector has tive . The government should recruit 3,000 civil become privatized and the private sector be- servants in top positions and ensure that the comes politicized . The government has be- top 20 percent of the police force is subject to come the mechanism not for governance but a transparent recruitment, promotion, and pay- for antigovernance, and government positions ment system based on clear criteria . The gov- have become a license for corruption . The po- ernment should create an office of ombudsman, lice, rather than protect the people, are seen staffed by both Afghans and qualified interna- largely as instruments to protect the narcot- tionals, to which allegations of corruption can ics trade . Millions of acres of public land have be credibly brought and investigated . The gov- been expropriated by corrupt government of- ernment should set up a systematic process for ficials. And the country’s natural wealth is be- urban property rights disputes and a computer- ing illegally exploited or given away through ized cadastre of these rights to eliminate any obscure contracting mechanisms . Allegations room for corruption . The government should of the selling of offices are pervasive, and de- encourage the use of scorecards by citizens to mands for payments are seen as a way of re- measure bureaucratic performance, to share the couping the investment in these offices. The results in public, and to take action . routinization of corruption now makes reform considerably more difficult than after the over- Bad governance is not merely a weakness but throw of the Taliban . Because corruption has a threat to stable and legitimate order, which major stakeholders and reform has no visible the population can identify with and use to constituency in the government, Afghans will distance itself from the insurgency . Hence, need to articulate, own, and fight for a coher- the emerging consensus is that it is not the ent anticorruption strategy . strength of the Taliban but the failure of the Weaknesses 7 government to govern that has led to the cur- development task was vastly underestimated . rent crisis . Initial U .S . support to Afghanistan was only $300 million a year; meanwhile, the World Weaknesses Bank estimates that between the Communist coup in 1978 and the overthrow of the Taliban in 2001, the total cost of lost growth, humani- International community—a failure tarian assistance, and military expenditure to develop a unified strategy amounted to around $240 billion 14. When New York Times reporter Thomas Friedman visited Afghanistan was the first major test of the Kabul in early 2002, two-thirds of it in ru- twenty-first century for international organiza- ins, he commented that “it looked exactly like tions inherited from the twentieth century . To Ground Zero ”. 15 It was a reminder of the enor- maintain their relevance in today’s world, these mity of the task . As the Bonn process was im- organizations now have to prove themselves plemented successfully, commitment gradually as effective partners in building institutions of increased, but the invasion of Iraq shifted U S. . good economic and political governance . So far, attention, and in 2005 plans for drawing down this challenge has not been met in Afghanistan . American forces in Afghanistan from 15,000 Taken by surprise in 2001, the international to 5,000 were put into motion . community did not have the opportunity to create and agree on clear objectives for its efforts The insurgency surprised most policymakers in Afghanistan . Instead, the stovepipes of secu- in the West . With the onslaught of the insur- rity, politics, and development operated sepa- gency, the coordination between military and rately, without being unified by a consensus on civilian components of the international effort a larger strategy . The international community’s came to the fore . While the military has been failure to develop a unified strategy produced a able to clear areas of insurgents, the mecha- destabilizing effect, whereby their efforts cre- nisms to govern and develop these spaces have ated organizations parallel to the government failed . As a result the momentum seems to be rather than built Afghan institutions . When UN on the side of the insurgents, who can project agencies acquired $1 6. billion from the initial an image of expanding capacity, control, and Tokyo donor conference in January 2002, the influence. Afghan government received $20 million . As each UN agency and bilateral aid agency set Broader coordination among international up offices, their higher salaries drew the best actors across agencies and sectors is a cen- of Afghan talent and skills away from the gov- tral problem . The myriad of discrete efforts ernment and key public services such as health, launched by actors, which sometimes duplicate education, and police, further weakening the and contradict each other, are now understood government’s ability to function effectively . As to be less effective than efforts unified behind the bulk of the international community’s work coherent collective objectives. Efficiency is also was concentrated on quick impact projects, and bottlenecked by the outsourcing of projects to the national government lacked the resources of contractors, the dominant mechanism for deliv- the international community, the Afghan public ery . While contractors can deliver projects in saw no sustainable results from either the inter- principle, in Afghanistan this involved primary national community or their own government . contractors subcontracting many times, with

From early 2002 onward Afghanistan was cast in Iraq’s shadow, and the scale of the 14 . World Bank 2004 . 15 . NewsHour 2002 . 8 A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan each subcontractor taking a percentage of the of the country and deliver law, order, and ba- funds for overhead costs . The net result of this sic services to the population . Despite some “salami-slicing” was that only 15–20 percent exceptions, the Afghan political elite seem not of the allocated resources were being spent in to have learned from the past . While they are Afghanistan, the bulk remaining with the chain the major beneficiaries of the current political of contractors abroad . The public was left with dispensation, they have not become stakehold- a glaring gap between pronouncements on the ers in articulating a clear agenda that would amount of money allocated for development guarantee both their interests and that of the and the paltry results delivered . International population . Instead, the syndrome of the war actors now agree that unified effort urgently economy seems to be deepening . This failure needs to be addressed, and efforts to do so are of the political elite to cohere is another causal beginning to coalesce . link with to bad governance .

The Afghan elite—a failure to Assets articulate a clear agenda Despite the threats and weaknesses, there are The Coalition ousted the Taliban and Al Qaeda grounds for optimism . Both Afghanistan and with a strategy that combined overwhelming the international community have assets that air power with a limited ground deployment of can be used to create sustainable peace and Special Forces working with fighters from the development . Northern Alliance, who had been locked in a civil war with the Taliban for six years . Dur- Natural capital ing that period the Northern Alliance held the Afghan seat at the UN and both considered and The country is rich in natural capital, with projected itself as the legitimate government of three sets of these resources being particular- Afghanistan . Since the military situation moved ly important . First, the recent U .S . Geological more quickly than the preparation of a political Survey reveals Afghanistan to be rich in min- framework for the country’s future, the forces erals, including copper and iron and precious of the Northern Alliance were able to enter Ka- and semi-precious stones . Mining-based devel- bul and place several hundred thousand people opment is thus a viable alternative to a drug- in both civil and military positions, including based economy . Second, Afghanistan is the those who had previously operated as strong- source of significant flows of water to its neigh- men in control of the provinces . In their provin- bors, yet it harnesses only 10 percent of the cial strongholds, these men had not only taken water supply for irrigation and power genera- over customs revenue, which by law was a pre- tion . In a period of global warming, sustainable rogative of the central government, but also cre- use of water for the generation of energy, the ated their own armed forces and decided the provision of drinking water, and as an input to appointment of officials within a province and agriculture and industry could be a major asset sometimes even within a range of provinces . both to Afghanistan and its neighbors . Third, Afghanistan has immense potential for agricul- These men and other Afghans reflected on the ture and for centuries was the source of famed failure of the anti-Soviet resistance leaders to exports of fruit and nuts to India and the Mid- govern the country in the early 1990s . The dle East . Investing in agriculture to change ru- Afghan people hoped that the mistakes of the ral incomes from $1 to $4 a day—the economic past would not be repeated and that a national tipping point for drug production to become agenda would emerge to define the interests Assets 9 unprofitable—is therefore a realistic objective. amassed massive amounts of money since 2001, The experience of the western United States in and the wealth of Afghans in the diaspora runs the 1950s to 1970s and that of East Asia in the into billions of dollars . The main obstacles to same period provide a range of options that can mobilizing this money are governance and be pursued in Afghanistan . the absence of financial architecture. Afghans in Iran alone remit an estimated at $500 mil- Location lion annually,17 while total remittances reached nearly $2 5. billion in 2006 18. These sums en- Afghanistan’s location can turn it into a land able the recipients to improve their consump- bridge between Central Asia, Gulf countries, tion, but there are few instruments to harness South Asia, and China . Pipelines can deliver the money for improving production . central Asia’s and Afghanistan’s gas, as revealed by the geological survey, to south Asia . Water Afghans living in the Gulf, Pakistan, Russia, transfers could be equally substantial, as Iran is Europe, and the United States have shown seri- interested in developing water and oil exchange ous interest in investing in their country . Cor- systems with Afghanistan and its neighboring ruption, insecurity, and the absence of credible central Asian republics . The potential for transit laws and policies, however, have deprived the is also significant. Uzbekistan produces 800,000 country of the opportunity, and the flow of tons of cotton a year, which currently travels money has instead travelled in the opposite di- through several countries, incurring significant rection . Billions of dollars leave Afghanistan transit fees, to reach the port of Riga for inter- every year for the Gulf and other safer havens . national distribution . Pakistan, by contrast, im- ports around 2 2. million bales of cotton a year The emergence of the construction industry for its expanding textile industry 16. Investing in shows that legitimate wealth can be generated the right supply chains could enhance regional and expanded . Thanks to international spend- integration, increase Uzbek and Afghan governing, Afghan firms have emerged to compete ment revenues, and reduce costs in Pakistan . successfully against regional and international firms. The construction industry is the first Afghanistan could also be the lynchpin for novel manifestation of a sector with specialization in forms of cooperative border management . The an expanding value chain . Leasing and project border with Tajikistan, heavily armed during the design, for instance, have become specialized Soviet period, is now a line of cooperation, with niches for some firms while others specialized bridges built by the Aga Khan Foundation facili- in transport . The availability of money is not tating cross-border trade and other exchanges, confined to Kabul. Exports of dry and fresh including the use of Tajik hospitals by Afghans . fruits are also expanding and becoming more Afghanistan’s topography makes cross-border organized, earning $144 million in the first interactions difficult in places, but this could three quarters of the Afghan fiscal year end- 19 provide the basis for further expansion and a ing March 21, 2009 . Precious stones from model for border management elsewhere . Afghanistan are sold on eBay, with emeralds from Panjshir fetching prices as high as several Financial capital hundred thousand dollars . A unique feature of

The dominance of poverty should not hide the 17 . UN News Center 2008 . money in the country . Many individuals have 18 . IFAD 2007 . 19 . As reported by the Afghanistan Ministry of 16 . USDA Foreign Agricultural Service 2009, p . 1 . Commerce in Rahe-Nejat in March 2009 . 10 A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan

the current situation is the widespread avail- mandate to guide the country toward stability . ability of money across the country . With good The current frustrations result from disappoint- governance and the right financial architecture, ment over the failure to fulfill this mandate. that money can be harnessed for sustainable development . The political process was matched by an ambitious but pragmatic agenda for building the func- Institutional successes tions of the state at the appropriate levels and creating mechanisms for Afghan participation al- Getting the design right has been critical to in- lowing the Afghan people to govern themselves stitutional success . Politically, the relevance of directly . The key innovation was the national this approach has been demonstrated through programs, which brought about a specific design the implementation of the Bonn Agreement . for a social compact between the people and the Developmentally, the proof is in the success of government . The national programs aimed to en- national programs from 2002–04 bearing re- able a government to perform a state function sults in areas ranging from the national army to throughout its territory effectively and transpar- rural development . In both cases the operating ently by mobilizing relevant forces—govern- assumption has been the high demand of the ment, the private sector, and civil society—to ex- Afghan population for good governance . ecute critical tasks . The process sought to deliver results and build domestic capabilities in the light The Bonn agreement, as Ambassador Brahimi, of medium- to long-term goals . the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the UN for Afghanistan at the time, The Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund, repeatedly stated, was arrived at by an unrep- which pooled donors’ funds, was critical for re- resentative group of Afghans to create a le- distributive programs . Managed by the World gitimate government . To ensure a fair process, Bank and created in 2002, the Fund supported temporal benchmarks were set for transferring the Afghan system of national accountability, as power to an interim administration, conven- funds could be used only to reimburse eligible ing an emergency Loya Jirga (grand council) government expenditure and were monitored to elect the head of state and key officials of through robust auditing procedures . Combined a transitional government, convening a con- with an Afghan-driven program of reform that stitutional commission to write a constitution, secured policy loans from the World Bank and convening a constitutional Loya Jirga to debate Asian Development Bank, this led to signifi- and approve the draft constitution, and holding cant reform of the fiscal and monetary insti- direct presidential elections and parliamentary tutions during 2002–04 . Simultaneously, an elections . As each phase involved the participa- International Monetary Fund Staff Monitored tion of a broader range of stakeholders within Program was agreed on for revenue mobiliza- clear rules, the process generated legitimacy tion and the effectiveness of expenditure . and nurtured hope among the population that the government would become more transpar- Afghan public finance thus became the driver ent and accountable . Despite the dire predic- for building good governance across sectors tions of international and domestic observers, and levels of government . Observers agreed the Bonn Process was guided to a successful that the country was making significant prog- conclusion by the collaboration of Afghan and ress on transparency and accountability . The international actors . Participation in the presi- gains through this approach enabled a part- dential elections was both massive and enthusi- nership with the international community to astic, thereby providing President Karzai with a formulate the Securing Afghanistan’s Future Assets 11

strategy20 after thorough evaluation by donors communities to identify reconstruction and and partners . Key to the success of the Af- development priorities and implement proj- ghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund and the ects in response . A key advantage is sim- Afghanistan Compact, arrived at between the plicity . To be eligible for a grant, villages government and donors in London in 2006,21 must fulfill three basic criteria. The women was a well calibrated sequence of reforms de- and men of the village must elect a village livered through national programs and imple- Community Development Council . A quo- mented gradually yet systematically to change rum of the village must meet to reach con- the governance of the country . sensus on priority projects . And accounts must be posted in a public place . The pro- As long as new national programs were being gram is rare in enjoying both uniform pop- formulated and implemented, coordination im- ular support and repeated endorsements of proved because these programs systematically its credibility and accountability by moni- addressed transparency and accountability in toring systems of the international com- managing resources long before the interna- munity . Having reached more than 20,000 tional community demanded them . These pro- villages across every province, it is truly grams include: national in scale . World Bank President Robert Zoellick has drawn attention to the • Afghan National Army. Support for the army success of this program in various speeches exemplifies an integrated approach for men- and pointed to it as a model to be copied in toring, training, and embedding interna- other developing countries 22. tional personnel within Afghan institutions . The Afghan government had hard political • National Telecoms Program. At the heart work of demobilizing a militia estimated at of the National Communications Program 400,000 in 2002, reducing it to 12,000 by was a strategy of transparent licensing of December 2004 . The United States provid- telecoms, which resulted in awards of two ed the funding and assigned an impressive licenses in 2002–03 followed by two further group of senior officers, led by Lieutenant licenses in 2006 . When this program began General Karl Eikenberry, to train and men- in 2002, there were only 100 mobile phones tor the new army. Soldiers and officers were in the country, courtesy of the United Na- recruited using clear criteria and from all the tions . At the beginning of 2009, the number ethnic and linguistic groups. American offi- of subscriptions had risen to about 8 mil- cers continued to be embedded in units to lion, and by the end of 2008 telecoms com- ensure adherence by officers to the consti- panies had contributed a significant amount tutional order and national rules of conduct . to domestic revenue . This program had resulted in more than $1 billion in private • National Solidarity Program. Government- investments by the end of 2008 23. Licens- led, the program provides block grants to ing and procurement can thus be managed villages across Afghanistan, empowering transparently in a postconflict country.

• Health. A national focus on preventive med- 20 . Government of Afghanistan 2004 . icine entailed restructuring the Ministry of 21 . See the Afghanistan Compact agreed on by the Health into a regulator and contracting with Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the international community at the London Conference, January 31 to February 1, 2006 (www fco. gov. uk/resources/en/. 22 . See www nspafghanistan. or. g . pdf/3036656/afghanistan-compact) . 23 . See www .mcit gov. .af/ . 12 A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan

nongovernmental organizations for service appointed rather than elected, could also be an provisions, supported by the European asset in counter-insurgency. Key officials in all Union, United States Agency for Interna- provinces and most districts can be changed tional Development, and the World Bank . by edict . Reform, therefore, is more a matter of The outcome was a double-digit reduction political will for the President and Cabinet than of child mortality and immunization for all detailed subnational negotiations . Perhaps most children across the country . important, the Constitution provides a clear mechanism for orderly changes in leadership . • Fiscal and monetary policy. The National Afghan presidents are elected by direct univer- Accountability and Transparency Program sal suffrage, and the presidential elections set transformed public finances. It began with for August 20 provide the first opportunity for one of the fastest ever changes in currency, the Afghan population to elect an incumbent or followed by overhaul of the budget process, choose a new leader . Parliamentary elections in the treasury, revenue collecting, expendi- 2010 provide the same opportunity for change or ture monitoring, and the banking system . continuity in members of the legislative branch . The changes were driven by timely and detailed reports on revenue and expenditure Human capital to the Cabinet, to the national delegates at the Constitutional Loya Jirgas, and to the The human capital of the country, while media and the public, backed by improved underdeveloped, is sufficient to support accounting and auditing . transformation .

Each program created a network of relation- • National programs provide an arena for ships and stakeholders with a vested interest in leaders and managers to emerge, get sec- moving Afghanistan toward prosperity and sta- toral knowledge, and acquire firsthand bility, simultaneously demonstrating to citizens knowledge of the requirements and organi- that the government was successively and co- zational culture of international partners . herently addressing their needs . Combined, the programs began to create a network of rights • The expanding media—oral, print, and and obligations between citizens and govern- visual—provides a career path for younger ment, citizens and firms, and firms and the Afghans . The technicians attending to the government—giving the country a real chance media infrastructure are all Afghans . at internally generated development . When progress in Afghanistan is cited, reference is • Seeing skills as the key to a career path, inevitably made to the results of the national younger generations are availing themselves program approach . Progress depended on new of every opportunity to acquire or improve programs . But the government abandoned the them . Knowledge of computers and English, approach in 2005, without offering an alter- prerequisites to any job with international native vision and donors reverted to their es- actors, has been expanding steadily . Pri- tablished ways of outsourcing development to vate institutions have stepped in to fill the contractors . Even so, the lessons from the suc- vacuum left by the state’s failure to reform cessful national programs provide a platform higher education . Willingness to pay indi- for launching new programs . cates the value placed on earning potential .

Afghanistan’s unitary system of governance, • The Afghan contracting industry has been with most subnational government officials the outlet for workers to acquire vocational Assets 13

skills and the arena for developing capacity Among the most successful international in- for project management . terventions have been the Oversees Private In- vestment Corporation’s guarantee instruments • Thousands of Afghans working for the ci- for American investors and businesses, which vilian and military sectors of the interna- have led to more than $1 billion in guarantees tional community form a significant talent in Afghanistan since 2001 . Providing guaran- pool, recruited largely through merit rather tees for investment in Afghanistan was a novel than patronage . experiment in 2002, but thanks to its success, the Corporation has extended guarantees to • Thousands of Afghans working for non- five other postconflict countries. governmental organizations or running grassroots civil society organizations have Many other countries and organizations, such as been acquiring both technical and manage- the World Bank, have programs similar to those rial skills . of the Oversees Private Investment Corporation and could encourage firms to mobilize resources So, the absence of skills, a genuine problem in outside the traditional aid system to help solve 2002, is not the issue—it is the deployment of Afghanistan’s problems . An even bolder step skills . National programs owe their success to would be to design financial instruments that design through tailoring and stitching . To tai- would provide guarantees for Afghan investors lor is to take the context carefully into account to invest in Afghanistan . Such a step, truly trans- yet use rules and resources to change the play- formative, would enable Afghan entrepreneurs ing field and empower new actors to become to look at risk management from a completely stakeholders in the system . To stitch is to care- different perspective . Guarantees could also be fully asses the capabilities in the country and used to persuade some of the leading agricultur- to forge partnerships for the maximum use of al, mining, and service firms in Organisation for existing capabilities for achieving a program Economic Co-operation and Development coun- goal . Contracting nongovernmental organiza- tries to invest in Afghanistan or partner with tions to facilitate the formation of elected vil- Afghan entrepreneurs . Groups like Business Ex- lage councils and to deliver public health ser- ecutives for National Security could be the orga- vices are examples of tailoring and stitching . nizational vehicle for mobilizing such firms.24 If the expanded but scattered and fragmented capabilities in the country were used within a Green instruments and financing could also coherent and systematic agenda of reform, mo- mobilize resources to underwrite hydropower mentum could be regained quickly . and alternative energies such as wind and solar power . Trade has immense potential for International assets developing the Afghan economy, with NATO countries an important market for Afghani- The convening power of the international com- stan’s agricultural produce . Translating the pol- munity is an asset . Beginning with Tokyo in icy of buying “Afghan First” into partnerships 2002, international conferences have been host- with major international firms that have intri- ed in Oslo, Brussels, Dubai, Berlin, Bishkek, cate knowledge of quality standards and value London, and Paris . Gathering at the high lev- chains could provide the impetus for export- els of decisionmaking, the Afghan government oriented agriculture . Afghanistan is at the cen- and its international partners have reviewed the ter of 3 billion potential consumers in China, conditions and pledged resources for the country’s development . 24 . See www bens. or. g . 14 A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan

India, the Gulf, and Europe . A systematic ap- of the list of institutional priorities . An Afghan proach developing the physical and human in- state that can control its territory and ensure frastructure to take advantage of these markets that it cannot be used for launching terrorist at- could produce peace and prosperity . tacks is in Afghan, U .S ,. and global interests . This issue has commonly been framed in terms Resources from the aid system are also a big as- of security institutions, but sustainability re- set . The key is not necessarily more aid but more quires that it be framed in terms of law and or- effective aid . If thousands of separate contracts der . The international community must become were regrouped into a series of core programs to the catalyst for an effective security sector . The be jointly managed for maximum transparency argument should not be whether more interna- and accountability by Afghans and international tional troops are necessary (they are) but how staff, there could be a more visible impact from exactly these troops can best train the Afghan spending resources on the ground . National Army to take over responsibilities for security effectively and quickly . Most significant of the international assets is the commitment of NATO troops, reinforced The creation and expansion of the army sets an by the recent commitment of a further 17,000 institutional foundation within the framework U S. . troops . Parents and leaders in troop-con- of law and order . The approach to police, by tributing countries accept the risk of putting contrast, was not based on such principles, and their children and citizens in harm’s way . This investments have actually been counter-produc- is an immense commitment in both value and tive . For the population to rally to the cause of resources—the current spending by NATO and the government and the international commu- Coalition forces is at about $20 billion a month . nity, the Afghan security institutions must em- body the rule of law . A law and order approach, Institution-building as Thompson long ago pointed out in his clas- sic work on counter-insurgency, is essential to Tailoring a strategy to the context requires establishing a government’s credentials for be- 25 Com- breaking institution-building in Afghanistan havior according to norms and rules . mitment to legality amounts not to renouncing into four sequential blocks—focusing on first the use of force but to using it within a clear order, second order, third order and fourth order space defined by strict rules so that both the functions . This differentiation allows for setting government and public understand when and priorities . It does not indicate that functions how force is drawn on . are more or less important, only that given the current context, performing some functions is Within this framework, aligning four institu- more necessary in the near term to ensuring the tions of law and order becomes important . First, basis for further reform over the medium and the success of the army allows for its expansion, long terms . Throughout, donors and the differ- provided there is a 15–20 year international fi- ent levels of government must align to reinforce nancial commitment for meeting its expenses . the whole, carefully considering the rules and If the army is to assume the key role in counter- functions of government at each level . insurgency, its doctrine, training, and capabilities will have to change substantially . A major First-order core functions change will be at the officer rank: appointments and promotions in the future must be based Law and order. The urgent need to contain and eliminate threats puts law and order at the top 25 . Thompson 1966/2005, p . 68 . Institution-building 15 strictly on transparent meritocratic criteria if designed carefully . Security experts agree while adhering to standards that ensure recruit- that the best way to deny the use of Afghani- ment from all linguistic groups in the country . stan’s territory for terrorist activities is to use A latent asset that can ease the army’s expan- international forces to train and mentor the sion and reorientation is the group of 125,000 Afghan institutions of law and order . This ap- demobilized officers, many of them trained in proach addresses sustainability through front- counter-insurgency tactics during the Soviet loading support in the short and medium terms occupation . A careful review of the records of to reduce and eventually eliminate the need for these officers for their professional knowledge long-term international security forces in Af- and adherence to standards of human rights ghanistan . The key issue, yet to be addressed, could result in the recruitment of an officer is affordability . Afghanistan’s current revenue class with excellent first-hand knowledge of the of under $900 million a year is not sufficient to country’s terrain and conditions and that could pay for the operation and maintenance costs of strengthen command and control structures . an army of 134,000, not to mention the police and intelligence forces . With intelligence vital to successful counter- insurgency efforts, investments and upgrades To legitimize the security institutions, the law can produce intelligence service that is trusted must receive equal attention . While consoli- by the population . The director-general of the dating the rule of law will take much time and Afghan intelligence services has the respect of effort, special courts and other mechanisms of a broad spectrum of Afghan and international accountability, such as ombudsmen and citi- actors . But unlike the army and the police, the zen’s committees, could be created to investi- intelligence service has not yet been publicly gate complaints about the security sector and reviewed . A professional review of the orga- offer citizens credible proof that these institu- nization and the creation of mechanisms for tions aim to protect them . Swift responses to civilian supervision to ensure its effectiveness predatory behavior by security institutions and accountability can enable the Afghan state would enhance the legitimacy of the govern- to begin to control its territory . ment . A rule-bound approach to law and order establishes and then honestly maintains “do’s Police reform has been the most problematic and don’ts” for lawmakers, law enforcers, and area of the security sector . If the police are to be law breakers—and supports a clear set of citi- the public face of law and order, radical reform zenship rights and responsibilities that can be is necessary . The army shows what needs to be enacted and if necessary enforced through the done. Both staff and officers need to be recruit- law . Order cannot be consolidated unless the ed using transparent criteria across all linguis- security sector becomes the magnet for chan- tic groups and be subject to intensive training . neling centripetal forces . Failure to articulate Whenever possible, international officers should and implement this goal has made the police an be embedded in police units and joint operations instrument for reinforcing centrifugal forces . conducted with the police and army . While full Framing security in law and order terms will reform of the police will require one to two de- actually mean a decline in the use of force, not cades, the many demobilized officers and the an increase . many young men and women unable to attend universities provide the grounds for recruitment . Public finance. With affordability as the ulti- mate test of feasibility, public finance must also Mechanisms for community policing in urban be dealt with as a first order institutional prior- areas and some rural areas could be feasible ity . Four key sets of actions can institutionalize 16 A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan

public finance as the foundation of a state that revenue and expenditure within a coherent can perform its core functions . framework .

First, customs is the dominant source of rev- The approach to the telecoms sector, described enue for the government, but up to half of the below, increased private investment, made ser- potential revenue is lost through poor manage- vice delivery competitive, and yielded consider- ment or abuse by the police and local strong- able tax revenues for the government . The same men . A systematic approach combining clear mechanism can be pursued in other sectors, and transparent rules, rigorous enforcement, transforming each into an arena for new stake- and a credible mechanism for resolution of le- holders and new forms of cooperation among gitimate claims of merchants can substantially the public, private, and community actors . Li- reduce corruption and enhance public revenue . censes for mining would be the top priority, since the award of contracts for extractive in- Second, implementation of the 2002–04 reform dustries alone could quadruple the government agenda for the national accountability system revenues within 10 years . Enforceable property can make government revenue and expendi- rights, again, will unleash the potential of city ture transparent . Success in reforms, ranging dwellers and rural Afghans to operate in func- from banking to budget, customs, and trea- tioning legal markets . sury, shows that donors are willing to put resources through the government system if they Administrative control. An administrative sys- trust the commitment to accountability and tem turns a territory into a hierarchically na- transparency . tional space. Rules define both the functions of the government and the level of governance Third, following the successful example of the for performing a particular function in a par- National Solidarity Program, budgetary mecha- ticular manner. The rules defining the decision nisms should be devised to provide predictable rights or authority at each level of government resources, with decision rights and clear criteria are critical to efficiency, participation, and le- for accountability, to each level of the govern- gitimacy . Greater effectiveness in performing ment: village, district, municipality, province, these functions at different levels produces and central government . To ensure maximum trust between citizens and the state and con- use of resources, performance at each level of solidates the sense of belonging to a national governance can be benchmarked against the space for upward social mobility . others, with mechanisms for disclosure and citizen-monitoring, such as citizen scorecards . In Afghanistan the administrative sphere is by The widespread availability of cell phones also and large an instrument for the abuse of public allows for a level of citizen participation and authority for private gain . While the institutions scrutiny of revenue and expenditure that was of law and order can clear a space from insur- previously impossible—a major impetus for gents, they alone cannot govern or develop that accountability and effectiveness . space . Creating momentum for governing the country’s territory will require an overhaul of Fourth, a medium to long-term revenue mo- the administrative system . Four sets of changes bilization framework would force the govern- are again important . ment to arrive at clear priorities for growing the economy . The budget must become the First, the state’s core functions must be clearly key instrument of policymaking, bringing the specified, with credible mechanism for peri- tradeoffs between different ways of balancing odic review, and the government organization Institution-building 17 chart must be changed to eliminate bureaucrat- structure and culture of Afghanistan’s unitary ic overlap . state . Due to enormous differences in the pay of international organizations and nongovern- Second, clear criteria for the division of the mental organizations, there has been a steady country into provinces, municipalities, and dis- brain drain from the civil service . Ethnic poli- tricts must be devised, and the type of func- tics and refusals to pursue a systematic agenda tions at each level clarified. Given the differ- of reform have turned corruption into a brazen ences in the intensity of the insurgency and the system . The key to change lies in recruiting nature of threats, a short-term flexible approach 3,000 top civil servants . A fraction of resourc- in the classification of districts and provinces is es currently used on international advisors and important. Approaches tailored to specific con- technical assistance could be used to recruit top texts can win people over from the insurgency civil servants with performance-based salaries and mobilize them to protect their own assets . competitive with nongovernmental organiza- Municipalities in general and Kabul municipal- tions and international organizations . Further- ity in particular (popularly referred to as “the more, social justice and stability require inno- house of loot”) are among the most corrupt vative retraining and retirement of the current organizations in the country . Understandably, civil servants to enable them to earn a decent this fuels discontent with the government . Se- livelihood outside government in the private cure property rights are the lynchpin here . The sector . rights are well enshrined in Islamic law, but in practice have come under severe strain as a re- Human capital. Putting people first is the key sult of disputes from decades of conflicts and to winning the conflict. The Afghan people are outdated urban master plans that have forced a constituency in waiting to be claimed either many people into informal living arrangements . for securing the future or for exploiting ethnic Providing the urban population with firm prop- hatred . The goals and means for forming hu- erty rights, easily verified through computer- man capital will dictate which prevails . ized systems, could unleash hundreds of millions of dollars of investment by the people and The initial goals for human capital need not transform Afghans into stakeholders in good be ambitious . Elevating the standards of seven governance . universities could help them produce people who see their futures as tied to the success Third, the administrative division of Afghani- of global cooperation and dialogue with the stan does not reflect its natural configuration, West . One month of NATO’s current military as neither rivers nor minerals coincide with expenditure could change the prospects of five subnational administrative boundaries . Effec- generations of young Afghan men and women, tive use of the natural capital requires delin- creating agents of stability and prosperity for eating special economic zones to maximize Afghanistan and the region . program and project effectiveness in appropriate administrative divisions within the larger For vocational and higher education, invest- framework . ments need to be part of a systematic 10-year human development plan to develop specific And fourth, the administration needs capable management and leadership capabilities and staff. Most civil servants are in their fifties and the vocational skills to turn latent assets into eligible for retirement within the next 5 to 10 sources of prosperity . Such a human develop- years . This group of civil servants understands ment strategy must meet the needs of the pub- and strongly identifies with the organizational lic, private, civil, and community sectors . Each 18 A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan

has a role in securing Afghanistan’s future . the attention of all stakeholders on this critical And the keys to cooperation are the mental issue and force an examination of all existing models, work ethics, and moral commitments institutional and environmental constraints, al- of the men and women who will staff and lead lowing the formulation of clear approaches that them . Global experience indicates that cross- remove constraints and grasp opportunities . cutting ties formed in schools and universities Creating market institutions geared initially are among the most enduring sources of trust— toward agriculture, mining, and construction or distrust . So, human development should be could provide the impetus to sustainable job treated not just as a technical domain, but as a creation . political vision of hope and trust-building . Agriculture. While the National Solidarity Pro- Second-order functions gram has been a success, agriculture has been neglected . The transformation of agriculture Market-building. Unemployed youth provide in East Asia from the 1950s to 1970s and in the reserve pool for both the insurgency and the the United States from the 1950s to 1980s pro- narcotics industry . A law and order approach is vides models for dynamic and competitive ag- necessary but not sufficient to deal with these riculture . But neither the Afghan government twin threats. The definition of a Talib, accord- nor its international partners have drawn on ing to leading members of Afghan civil society these models to design and implement a com- who several years ago conducted a survey of prehensive agricultural development strategy . around 600,000 Afghans in the country’s south, A bold approach is needed—beginning with is an unemployed youth . Afghanistan has one of market access and working backward through the fastest rates of demographic growth, mak- value chains, supply chains, knowledge or- ing it among the five youngest countries in the ganizations, and infrastructure, both human world . An estimated 71 percent of the popula- and physical, to ensure that rural incomes per tion is below 30 years old, and the country will capita could increase from $1 a $4 a day, the need at least 9 percent annual GDP growth to tipping point for opium production to become merely contain the impact of this demographic unprofitable. growth. With significant unemployment, the burden falls heavily on the youth . Hundreds of Launching Afghanistan’s agriculture on a truly thousands of young people from the north and sustainable path can best be achieved by open- center of the country, which have been relatively ing up the EU market for Afghan agriculture . stable, are flooding cities or desperately seeking As one of the poorest countries in the world, to get into Iran and beyond . Of the estimated Afghanistan is eligible for some concessional 2 5. million Afghan refugees in Iran, nearly 1 5. trade benefits. But to overcome the obstacles million are considered economic refugees and of quality standards and seasonality, a Europe- thus not covered by agreements for the protec- wide policy for Afghanistan could harness the tion of displaced people . Failure of the Afghan ecological diversity of Afghanistan to satisfy government and the international community the demands of the European market . Transport to treat job creation as a task that has multi- is a constraint in the short term . But NATO can plicative effects for security, political stability, help . It has contracted out the transport of its and economic growth has thus had serious im- cargo to non-Afghan firms, whose planes ar- plications . The approach advocated here brings rive in Afghanistan full of goods, then fly back both state-building and market-building togeth- empty . If a portion of the cargo space were er to address this issue . A goal, such as the cre- contracted to Afghan entrepreneurs, they could ation of 1 million jobs in two years, could focus transport agricultural produce to the Gulf on Institution-building 19

NATO planes at nominal or no cost . This would finances and creating the instruments for entre- open access to the global supply network from preneurial activity to focus on agriculture . the Gulf . Poppy is a predominantly male-produced crop, Modern agriculture is a knowledge system, so with women’s labor focused on horticulture, the institutional network ranging from agri- animal husbandry, and textiles . Most female cultural colleges to soil maps for crop and wa- labor is not commoditized, so creating jobs tai- ter management needs to be put in place . The lored to women, such as textile design through U .S . and Canadian experience from the 1950s value chains, could boost rural incomes . A pre- to 1970s and the East Asian experience from requisite for harnessing women’s labor, again, the 1950s to 1980s, heavily supported by the is power, as it reduces the time spent on house- United States, provide models that, with mod- hold tasks such as cooking . ern information management systems, could create the necessary support structures . Land Mining. Mining can be another alternative to grant colleges in the United States and agricul- narcotics . Afghanistan’s geology has immense tural schools in Canada and Europe can be an potential for growth . The country possesses important source of knowledge and support for some of the world’s largest copper and iron such an approach . mines and is rich in natural gas, minerals valuable for industrial and postindustrial uses, and Corporations specializing in agricultural value precious and semiprecious stones . The marble chains have the knowledge of risks and the ca- deposits alone are of such magnitude and di- pacity for devising and implementing risk man- versity that with the right infrastructure these agement systems for value chains and forward could make Afghanistan a significant player in and backward linkages . Special incentives for the global construction industry . these corporations, particularly through drawing on special risk guarantee instruments and A unique feature of the geology is its distri- other tools, could save years of trial and error bution across the length and breadth of the by the agricultural consulting industry . Invest- country . While the natural gas deposits in the ment in power is also critical to export-oriented north are proven, the likelihood of significant agriculture . Given Afghanistan’s immense hy- deposits in the south could avoid pipeline con- droelectric potential, power from small, me- struction and allow for the construction of a dium and large hydroprojects could give rural transport network based on natural gas . Valleys Afghans the ability to create cold storage and along the Hindu Kush, among the poorest areas processing facilities . Such infrastructure would of the country, have rich mineral resources that increase the lifespan of products and change could support sustainable centers of growth . the relationship with the market from one of seasonality to one of supply and demand . The transformative potential of mining cannot be realized without again facing the centrality A new financial architecture can provide cred- of institutions and good governance . Required it, insurance, risk guarantees, and other servic- first is a licensing framework that draws on the es required by a modern agricultural system . best lessons of the Extractive Industries Trans- While microfinance has received justifiable -at parency Initiative, accompanied by credible en- tention, changing rural incomes per capita from forcement mechanisms . Since contracts are le- $1 a day to $2 does not provide a legitimate gally binding, Afghanistan will need dedicated alternative to narcotics. Attention to other fi- legal advice to level the negotiating field with nance is therefore essential for tapping Afghan powerful companies and countries that may be 20 A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan

interested in investing in the short term . In the contracting system, and jointly pooling finan- medium term Afghans with legal skills will be cial resources among donors in general and needed for negotiations and contract enforce- U .S . government agencies in particular . Such ment to ensure the best use of natural capital, a system would remove the current complex- realizing revenue for the state and jobs for the ity and ensure that the contracting chain has no people . more than two links .

To ensure the trust of investors, short-term An Afghan operating enterprise along the mechanisms are needed for binding arbitration models of the UN Office for Project Services and collecting fines or damages in the event or the Singapore Housing Authority should of arbitrary changes in policies or contrac- have the track record and the abilities to quali- tual obligations by the Afghan government . fy for Asian Development Bank, World Bank, In the medium to long term credible mecha- and other donor contracts . To short-cut the nisms of arbitration and judicial enforcement creation of such an organization, the Afghan in-country will be essential . To mobilize do- government could purchase an international mestic and foreign capital, risk guarantee in- construction company managed by qualified struments must cover a range of political and international staff while Afghans are trained financial risks. To manage natural resources rigorously to take management positions as a driver of development, people with the through strict meritocratic criteria . While knowledge to lead and manage a mining-based the Afghan Office for Project Services would economy will have to be identified early. As design large infrastructure projects, between in agriculture, the knowledge institutions that 7 and 10 subnational companies could carry open career paths for the next generation can out project supervision . To ensure that the create stakeholders in the system and increase Afghan construction industry can meet con- Afghan ownership of the process . And again, struction standards, an association of Afghan mining depends on reliable power (see under contractors would ensure quality and enforce infrastructure below) . standards .

Construction. The construction industry is An Afghan construction corps could provide the third driver of job creation and sustainable the labor pool and security arrangements for the growth. Around 2,000 Afghan firms have been infrastructure projects . Afghans have a knowl- registered with the government . About 200 of edge and understanding of labor corps from the them are judged by experts to have the capac- 1950s to 1980s. The demobilized officers could ity to form the core of competitive domestic be the managers of such a labor corps and as- construction . And thanks to special nurturing sume responsibility for security . Today, about by Canadian experts, around 15 Afghan con- half the costs of some infrastructure projects struction companies have made real progress are payments to security firms. A labor corps in road-building, registering substantial growth providing jobs and security would signal that through investments in capabilities . So, few in- the legitimate use of force is being concentrat- stitutional changes by the international com- ed within state institutions, gaining the peo- munity could massively increase the capabili- ple’s trust . With the institutional arrangements ties of the Afghan construction industry . in place, the construction of 200 medium-size dams, 200,000 housing units, and 20,000 kilo- These changes could include agreeing on a sin- meters of roads to link farms to markets could gle construction code for the country, creating provide the visible progress and effective use a central procurement authority and a unified of resources . Institution-building 21

A national urban development program could But its segments have been financed by vari- address urban issues and good governance for ous donors without coordinating standards, metropolitan spaces . Contrary to popular be- efficiency, operation, maintenance, or toll col- lief that Afghanistan is a highly rural country, lection . The cost of construction been several a third of the Afghans live in cities . But those times that in neighboring countries, and the that live in these areas live with uncertain prop- program is yet to be completed . erty rights; cities must become a space of good governance through an urban version of the With a systematic approach, gains could have National Solidarity Program concentrating on been considerable—through better design, sup- neighborhoods . Kabul has received more than ply chain coordination, and contracting against $3 billion in private investment since 2001 . But medium-term delivery of aid . There would have with no coherent approach to property rights been quick recognition of road construction ca- or urban planning, the city remains underde- pabilities in Uzbekistan (14,000 highway engi- veloped and insecure . The heart of the problem neers and $100 million in German-made equip- is a misalignment between property rights and ment) . Mazar and Herat could have been linked housing stocks . A plan to regenerate the city within one year using this capacity, and the must be based on providing housing through government could have struck a deal with Iran public-private partnerships and spatial plan- on asphalt, reducing construction costs . More ning that creates synergies between Kabul and broadly, providing Afghanistan with the infra- surrounding provinces . structure for a competitive economy requires a medium-term planning horizon for the use of The shortage of housing and high prices could key materials through long-term contracts with be mitigated if the government owned land and suppliers and through investments to transform if land classified as agricultural became avail- natural capital into cement and steel . able for the new housing . A program—based on increased citizen participation, urban security, Power can be mobilized through small, medi- and a solid municipality revenue base—could um, and large hydroelectric projects and wind become the ground for tackling corruption and and solar investments . Innovation in design is providing affordable housing, a key to reducing again important, and capacity is needed to im- incentives for corruption . Capacity exists in the plement projects in new ways—through public- construction industry, and this program could private partnerships, for example . Water is the spur a second round of growth . key constraint in agriculture, but inland water can be harnessed, and community assets can Third-order functions be protected . As mentioned, only 10 percent of Afghanistan’s water is currently harnessed Infrastructure. Afghanistan must consolidate for productive purposes, so creating the institu- its territory, harness space, and release market tional capacity to manage water sustainably is forces . Indeed, opening central Afghanistan is part of a coherent human development strategy critical for equity—there is only 1 kilometer and the rule of law . Water has been managed of paved roads in Bamiyan province, breeding for millennia through sophisticated community discontent and a sense of injustice . Progress in management; the key is to build on rather than road building has been significant, though at bureaucratize managerial systems . very high cost due to the preference for a project-based rather than system-based approach . Information and communication technology The ring road, for instance, is the most impor- can both provide jobs and serve as the platform tant means of integrating the country spatially . for growth of other sectors . The telecom sector, 22 A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan

thanks to transparent licensing, has shown that nomads, expelled refugees, and internally dis- the private sector can make handsome profits, placed people require special support mecha- provide services, and generate revenue for the nisms . To ensure sustainability, these programs government . It has also opened a new career will have to be made affordable through careful path for capable Afghan men and women . In- design and implementation, drawing on global vesting in education infrastructure for informa- experience over the past 60 years . tion and communications technologies could, therefore, spur growth in the legal economy . Fourth-order functions With Internet access essential to empowering the population, Afghanistan should become the Public borrowing. Responsible domestic and first to create a cloud over the entire country, a international borrowing will be critical to Af- pioneer in creating the new commons . The rev- ghanistan’s recovery . Donors will not move enue losses from opening access to the Internet away from parallel systems and project imple- would be more than offset by the gains in eco- mentation units and toward support for Afghan nomic growth and social integration . systems if those systems are not robust and sustainable . The budget is the key instrument of Social policy. An estimated 80 percent of Af- policymaking, and funding outside the budget ghans live on less than $1 a day . Redistribu- undermines national stability and effectiveness . tion is necessary to assist this vast but vulner- Donors should thus carry out a comprehensive able segment of the population, but lifting the joint review of the Afghan public finance sys- people out of poverty will require mechanisms tem and agree to fund a national program for that transform wealth redistribution into wealth strengthening the national system of account- generation . The affordability of social poli- ability through specified policies and bench- cy was confronted squarely in the 2002–04, marks. The Office of Technical Assistance in and the model devised was to build the so- the Department of the Treasury, for example, cial and institutional capital of rural Afghani- has the capacity to develop a clear, sequenced stan through the National Solidarity Program plan for creating a credible Afghan public fi- (NSP) . The provision of $20,000–60,000 block nance system, both national and subnational . grants to villages, depending on population This system could be developed through bur- size, has created the institutional platform for den-sharing with other partners, including the more wealth-generating programs . The key is World Bank . Lessons from the Afghan Recon- to use the NSP platform for transforming vil- struction Trust Fund could be shared and used lages into rural enterprises by providing them to develop that system . with the knowledge, property rights, organized credit, and value chain and supply chains to Managing public assets. Afghanistan’s forward link them with national, regional, and global movement will depend on effective manage- markets . Depending on their locations, these ment of public, cultural, and environmental enterprises can focus on sectors ranging from assets . A credible system is needed for award- agriculture and horticulture to mining and ing contracts for natural resources . Competent herbal medicines . international advice on the contractual arrangements for the complex mining, oil, and While the creation of rural enterprises will im- gas sectors will help avoid litigation or corrupt prove the lives of many rural Afghans, attend- practices . The urgency of developing the new ing to some of the most vulnerable categories revenue streams demands wholesale changes of Afghans will require an activist social pol- to the government organizations responsible icy . Widows, the disabled, orphans, uprooted for these sectors and possibly the creation of an Institution-building 23

international ombudsman to credibly investi- interest . A landlocked country burdened with gate allegations of corruption . a history of natural disasters has to tailor its regulatory regime to its context . In some ar- A reputation for innovative and transparent eas the regulatory function of the state has managing of public assets will underpin suc- to be radically simplified, and enforcement cess in using public borrowing in public fi- mechanisms have to be overhauled, with nance . Since the rules of the current systems property rights the most important . Creating of public finance are based on restricted defini- new assets, formalizing informal assets, and tions of revenue and expenditure, they do not settling disputes over titles can reduce cor- provide a true balance sheet of the effective- ruption and create jobs . Rural assets can be ness of public assets . Three examples make the created by bringing fresh lands under irriga- point: tion through water management techniques, dam-building, and irrigation canal improve- • First, the quality of imported fuel in Af- ments . Urban property can be created through ghanistan is among the poorest in the house-building and investments in sites and world, with leaded fuel and gasoline with services, where the people build the structure, an octane level below 60 routinely import- but the government provides the land plots ed into the country . But the public health and infrastructure . Informal settlements can costs, the impact on the lifespan of engines, be formalized by ensuring that communities and the quality of air are nowhere reflected agree on adjusting their existing unplanned in reporting processes or evaluations . plots to allow for construction of infrastructure such as roads and sewage and accommo- • Second, to preserve its forests, the Afghan dation . Practiced in Japan over a century and government banned tree-cutting and the then adopted by several East Asian tigers dur- sell of forest products, but the ban has being their modernization, this method is being come a vehicle for profit-making by a select spontaneously devised by urban communities group of government officials and smug- in Kabul . Global experience shows that for- glers. Government officials obtain exemp- malizing rights can quadruple the investment tions that are then sold to private interests by new owners . or collude with the smugglers to sell the wood to Pakistani dealers . The adverse im- Property disputes, a major factor in corruption pact on soil erosion, the weather cycles, and in the courts and civil service, are exacerbated the frequency of floods or drought is again by lack of finality in decisions. The Supreme nowhere reflected in national accounts. Court has been known to pass as many as six judgments on the same piece of property in Ka- • Third, the potential of spectrum man- bul, reversing itself three times in favor of one agement is another example of the absent party or the other . Binding arbitration of these framework for public assets . While telecom disputes—where in cases of ambiguity par- licensing has been a great success, licens- ties can be compensated from a special fund ing the Internet has been opaque . An In- through a special tax on all such assets—could ternet subscription in Kabul costs around clarify titles and open property to responsible $400, far too expensive for the majority of credit . The computerization of property re- the population . cords and the development of market-based instruments for valuating and assessing property Effective regulation is critical for legitimate would also provide a basis for entrepreneurial wealth creation and protecting the public initiatives and government revenues . 24 A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan

Human development. In 2002 the international up the challenge of growing Afghan capabili- community, led by UN agencies, insisted only ties, by twinning campuses and classrooms, on investment in primary education to support providing technical assistance to educators and progress toward the Millennium Development administrators, and forming a consortium of Goals . In Afghanistan where the human capi- interest groups to generate resources, ensure tal has been decimated by years of war and high quality technical and general education, neglect, primary education is important, but and build on the existing state system . skills-generation among the adults who will support a functioning state are absolutely criti- Strategic justification for cal if the international community ever wants to move away from the substitution effect of medium-term objectives technical assistance . A new phase of training and skill-building will be essential for Afghan- Institution-building of this sort is not merely istan to meet regional and global requirements theoretical. There is much strategic justifica- and compete in the world economy . Vocational tion for such processes in Afghanistan based on training based on Afghanistan’s skill require- early postwar and more modern Afghan experi- ments in secondary and tertiary education ence, the readiness of the Afghan population to would produce a new generation of Afghan accept such an approach, the growing influence leaders and managers . of the counter-insurgency (COIN) doctrine, and the better international understanding of The international community could consider the centrality of governance . State-building is financing Afghans to study in third countries, both feasible and possible . with an emphasis on visa issues, to support partnerships for higher education, engineer- A history of state-building ing, investment, technology, and development . Organized around the U .S -India-Afghanistan. Afghans expressed their consensus on the need axis or the U S. -South. Africa-Afghanistan axis, for an effective state in two Loya Jirgas (grand partners could explore the model pioneered by councils) convened in June 2002 and December universities like Colgate, which provided sup- 2003 to January 2004 . In the June gathering port for sending Afghan instructors for com- more than 1,500 delegates elected through indi- puter science training to the University of rect elections supervised by the United Nations Durbin in South Africa . Another precedent is elected the head of the state and the key offi- the United States Department of Agriculture’s cials of the transitional government . In the sec- funding of Afghans in India . ond gathering, 500 delegates and 50 appointed members debated and approved the constitu- To ensure that Afghan human capabilities tion . The key theme of the discourse among have the leadership, management, and techni- delegates, particularly in the second Jirga dur- cal skills to create a functioning market, state, ing which every delegate spoke for five minutes and civil society, a task force, comprising for- on national television and radio, was the need mer and active university presidents and deans for an effective state that would perform core (Joe Nye, Homayun Qayoumi), could prepare a functions for the citizens of a united nation . 20-year human development plan with recommendations for ensuring that higher education The underpinning of this national consensus in Afghanistan meets international certification comes from notions of justice and the memory standards . Land grant colleges, state systems, of peace. When Afghans in their forties and fif- and leading technology schools could also take ties speak about the state, they remember the Strategic justification for medium-term objectives 25

freedom of movement and security of property has also been in flux—millions fled during the in the late 1960s and early 1970s . The state had 1980s as refugees to Iran and Pakistan, and a legitimate monopoly of force, and its control millions more were internally displaced and extended across the length and breadth of the moved from province to province, depending country . The best indicator of its authority was on the relative peace . More than 4 million refu- that a single unarmed policeman could be sent gees have returned to Afghanistan, with dif- to any village and could bring the most power- ferent standards and expectations of minimum ful landowners and village elders to provincial service provision . These are the new forces and capitals or the capital city . Unlike many devel- faces of an Afghanistan that seeks order, jus- oping countries, Afghanistan has not had any tice, and a working government . In 2001 the separatist movement, and conflict among con- Afghan people expected state-building and re- tending parties in the 1990s was over control of ceived bad governance and corruption . Now, as the capital city . a result of this failure of the government and international community, they are demonstrating The readiness of the Afghan people again the desire for legitimate and accountable state institutions—the basis for state-building There was considerable anxiety on the part if capitalized on in the right ways . of international actors as to how the Afghan population would react to the deployment of in- A counter-insurgency (COIN) ternational security forces in December 2001 . approach embraces state-building The enthusiastic welcome the citizens of Kabul accorded the first troops of the international The costs of disorder and an incoherent coun- security force indicated that the population ter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan are im- accepted the legitimacy of the international mense: NATO expenditure alone is now around forces . Afghans reached a rare consensus on $20 billion a month, and 294 international sol- the legitimate monopoly on the use of force by diers27 and 2,118 Afghans28 lost their lives in international forces to enable the country to 2008 alone . The COIN doctrine indicates that build state institutions . The disenchantment, as the use of force must only be part of a process Sarah Chayes has demonstrated for Kandahar, toward clear political objectives in the medium set in when the population saw the internation- term—and political and developmental instru- al forces and the U S. . Special Forces as instruments that serve as force multipliers are criti- ments for restoring strongmen to positions of cal to the accomplishment of the overall goal . 26 power without public accountability . She ar- The fundamental insight of the COIN doctrine gues that this loss of legitimacy and the failure is that insurgency and counter-insurgency are to learn from the past opened the space for the engaged in a political contest for the allegiance re-emergence of the Taliban . of the people . As a result, the use of force must be judged by how it affects the decisions of The Afghan public is still ready to engage the people to side with the government and the in- international community . Demographically the ternational community against the insurgents . country is becoming younger, and the popula- Robert Thompson outlines the following in- tion under 18 has no memory of the horrors of structive equations:29 Soviet occupation . But it has vivid recollec- tions of the factional wars that followed and the harshness of Taliban rule . The rural population 27 . See www icasualties. org/oef/. . 28 . UNAMA Human Rights Unit 2009 . 26 . See Chayes 2007 . 29 . Thompson1966/2005, p . 68 . 26 A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan

• Legality + Construction + Results = and, in some cases district conditions . With the Government sanctuary in Pakistan essential to the strength of the insurgency, border districts need special • Illegality + Destruction + Promises = attention . Third, a clear process of reaching out Insurgency to the reconcilable and identifying the irreconcilable needs to be mapped out and explained The insight from this and other work on coun- to the public . Fourth, the sustainability of ter-insurgency is that force is only one part COIN depends on whether it is framed within of a broad COIN strategy covering politics, a doctrine of state-building . Whereas the use of economics, and development . In Iraq General force is required in the short term, the rule of Petraeus used this approach to rework what law is required in the medium to long term . seemed to be myriad categories and subcat- egories of the population into just two—rec- International understanding of the oncilable (majority) and irreconcilable (small centrality of governance minority) . With this basic distinction, the U .S . military was then deployed to protect the ma- Donors now understand the price of incoherent jority of the population that were reconcilable engagement in Afghanistan . Failure is best il- and target the irreconcilables . lustrated on the ground with the Afghan police, which after $6 billion of U .S . investment did In Afghan political theory justice is the founda- not have a single unit ready to lead operations tion of order, and a COIN approach provides a in June 2008 30. The waste is the result of the triple advantage . First, it recognizes that cor- failure to follow the programmatic approach ruption and bad governance provide a vacuum pursued in developing the Afghan National for the insurgency to fill. Second, it subordi- Army . Unlike the army, which went through a nates counter-terrorism to the larger doctrine of systematic vetting process and deliberately re- counter-insurgency and demonstrates the price cruited from all parts and linguistic groups of paid in the allegiance of the population through the country, the police force comprised mem- civilian casualties and collateral damage . bers of armed militias, whose commanders be- Third, it suggests complementary instruments came police chiefs in various provinces . The of smart power, ranging from diplomacy to UN Development Programme, the UN agency trade and development, to consolidate military in charge of making payments for the police gains and reduce the use of force . COIN also through the Law and Order Trust Fund, failed highlights the spatial dimensions of efforts to to create a database of officers and as of June gain control over a given territory and thus be- 2008 had not created a systematic payroll sys- comes an intermediate step in a state-building tem to ensure salary payments on time and in approach that we have outlined above through full .31 the four orders of institutional priorities . Success has been possible when players in Tailoring COIN to Afghanistan is going to the international community have understood require four innovations . First, security, gov- governance and supported efforts to generate ernance, and development must be integrated accountability and transparency through ad- parts of the overall approach, and the requisite herence to rules . Currency reform provides an Afghan capacities for each part must be as- sessed and developed . Second, the fragmen- tation of governance and the agility of the in- 30 . U .S . Government Accountability Office 2008, surgency require tailoring efforts to provincial p . 31 . 31. U.S. Government Accountability Office 2008. Short-term measures to support medium-term objectives 27 example of defining the objectives jointly but playing field among the candidates and credible following Afghan leadership on the implemen- international support for holding and monitor- tation arrangements . The lesson here is that ing the election . Now that President Karzai’s if implementation arrangements are carefully term ends on May 22, 2009, creative thinking examined from the perspective of existing as- is required to ensure that the executive branch sets and capabilities on the ground, politically focuses on core functions and does not become feasible win-win solutions can be devised . The embroiled in the electoral campaign in favor of clear overall lesson: it is not the context of Af- one candidate or another . Drawing on experi- ghanistan that is problematic; it is the design ence from Guatemala to Indonesia to Mexico and implementation of state-building efforts to the Philippines to South Africa, there is an that are central to success, along with the abil- accumulation of knowledge and wisdom on su- ity to forge coalitions for change . The interna- pervising and monitoring elections . The inter- tional community now recognizes the central- national community can partner with the Af- ity of governance in this way, which provides ghan electoral commission, civil society, and the opening to once again put a state-building politicians to arrive at a roadmap for holding agenda in place . The price of international in- credible elections . coherence is too high, and the effects too great, for engagement to continue using the same Were Afghans to engage in discussing a vision failed tools . for the future over the next six months and to compete legitimately to offer different options Short-term measures to for realizing this future, they could become en- thused about the political process . They need to support medium-term articulate a social contract and the mechanisms objectives to fulfill it, and the election provides an ave- nue for this to take place . A legitimate election It is thus clear that medium-term state-building process can draw in the Taliban rank and file objectives are justified. Given the history of and isolate Al Qaeda and the irreconcilable ele- state-building in Afghanistan and the interac- ments of the insurgency . It is thus necessary to tion of that state with the international commu- treat the elections as the significant event of the nity, the question is not whether, but how effec- year . The role of the UN can again be reviewed tiveness can come about. In the short term five by a panel of eminent international experts concrete steps can support the implementation so that recommendations for increasing their of medium-term objectives . relevance, impartiality, and effectiveness can be made and implemented . But it is clear that Get the elections right the international community must send strong signals and set down red lines to indicate that there are limits to what is acceptable to allow The event that will determine the direction and this process to take place . pace of change in Afghanistan is the forthcom- ing presidential election of August 20, 2009 . For the first time in Afghan history, Afghans Adopt a coherent international will have the opportunity to either change or strategy for the medium term retain a head of state through a democratic process . Given the current disenchantment With the weight and presence of the interna- with the government, the population needs to tional community increasing in Afghanistan, be assured that views and votes are going to a medium-term framework is critical to find- really matter . Such assurance requires a level ing an effective exit strategy based on intended 28 A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan

results . Two innovations would make a differ- in urban areas, focusing on property rights, ence to the success of the election and to sig- housing, and services, would generate Afghan naling to the Afghan public and political class stakeholders in the system rather than outside change. The first is to adopt a counter-insur- the system . gency framework as the dominant model for the use of international forces in Afghanistan . The second innovation is in what external ac- Counter-terror can be a significant component tors do more broadly . If the international civil- of COIN, but COIN cannot be part of a strategy ian community agrees to become the catalyst driven by counter-terrorism alone . As in Iraq, a and referee for building Afghan institutions, COIN strategy adapted to local conditions can the impact of their actions could be enhanced . yield significant results. Uncoordinated actions have so far been a self- inflicted wound through the failure of design. The COIN manual describes three classifica- Insistence on existing roles and regulations, tions for the territorial dimension of the coun- without agreement on limited rules, means ter-insurgency: campaign areas under control, that the lack of coordination has become in- contested areas, and areas held by insurgents 32. tractable . And the assumption of a command There is also a territorial dimension to gover- and control approach has prevented the devel- nance as the state has a claim over territory, opment of networks among different organiza- which has been undermined to a large extent in tions . Moving forward, donors need to arrive many parts of Afghanistan, where local power at a rule set for actions specifically designed structures carry more weight than the central for Afghanistan—a Marshall Plan approach to government . Afghan provinces, based around reduce complexity and ensure that funds are provincial capitals, need functioning capital channeled and used most effectively in sup- cities—virtuous centers—across the country . port of institution-building . This is extremely But the greatest governance issues are in Ka- difficult on the ground, given the competing bul, and these percolate outward to generate interests and mandates . And the best that can further issues of state functionality at the other be achieved might be a limited number of dif- levels of governance . Until now international ferent rule sets, understanding that some rules actors have focused on areas in which the in- cannot be changed . surgents are strongest, with benign neglect of other areas . This has opened a vacuum, now The point is that donors must now agree on a filled by the insurgency and criminality. coordinated approach that prevents duplicat- ed effort and action and supports joint goals There are now many signs that top ranking U S. . rather than disparate outcomes . This approach military leaders, from Admiral Mullen to Gen- does not mean ceasing all direct activities im- eral Petraeus, have become convinced of the mediately . It means having a clear strategy for need for a new approach . This new understand- shifting from direct implementation and man- ing by U .S . and NATO leadership is mirrored agement to becoming a catalyst for building by an awareness in the Afghan population that Afghan institutions and supporting Afghan there seems to be no endpoint to the current actions behind the four orders of priorities deterioration and that a radically new approach agreed on through intensive discussion . The is required . A doctrine of taking back cities— quality of international staff and their ability urban consolidation—is a low-hanging fruit, to design institutional arrangements that create and the development of an NSP-type program Afghan stakeholders in transparent rules and regulations and enable them to own the process of development is central to this . Only a 32 . U .S . Army 2006 . Short-term measures to support medium-term objectives 29

handful of technical experts designed the na- decisionmaking and implementation . They tional telecoms program and reviewed the pro- could also focus on economic interventions posals from telecoms companies for licensing . in agriculture, labor migration, and miner- The World Bank team that helped to design als, including competent international advice the National Solidarity Program was a small on contracting for mining, oil, and gas . They core group . Sustainability in these cases was could include urban neighborhood stabiliza- based on targeted rather than blanket technical tion and investment in Afghan skills, includ- assistance . ing vocational training based on Afghanistan’s skill requirements and investment in second- With the ever-globalizing communications net- ary and tertiary education . And they could fo- work, much wider support networks could be cus on infrastructure development, including mobilized without the expense of putting thou- a distributed generation system using renew- sands of international experts on the ground . able energy sources, such as microhydro and Communication can project governance, but the microsolar power . government and the international community cannot communicate that they are able to pro- Use the National Solidarity Program vide security or freedom of movement . While as a platform the problems the international community faces are significant, much progress has also been The National Solidarity Program (NSP) has made, and a concerted effort to communicate created social capital and delivery mechanisms these successes to an increasingly skeptical at the local level across rural inhabitants in Af- Afghan population, in conjunction with other ghanistan. The aim of the first National Soli- positive changes in engagement, would prove darity Program was to create this capital, now a extremely valuable . platform for moving forward . The goal must be to transform Community Development Coun- Prepare new national programs cils into rural enterprises for sustainable liveli- hoods, and to use the program as the basis for National programs have proven their compara- further wealth redistribution and private devel- tive advantage over traditional donor-driven opment programming . To reach this goal, the models of development . As the preparation of National Solidarity Program can provide rural these programs from design to implementation electrification through micro- and meso-hydro can take from three months to a year, using the projects and small and medium-size dams . Re- period between now and the inauguration of liable power will transform the lives of women the new Afghan administration would ensure and children by substantially reducing the time that the new government can launch a series of spent on daily labor and providing boiled water these programs during its first 100 days in of- for children, reducing exposure to disease and fice. For regaining the trust of the people, such increasing life chances . Power is also the foun- an approach could yield significant dividends. dation for agricultural processing and business Given the order of institutional priorities de- development . The NSP platform could also lineated above, members of the international transform agriculture from a traditional activ- community could arrive at a sensible division ity to a knowledge-based system, whose farm- of labor and cooperate on the choice and scope ers have detailed information on soil, crops, of programs . These could focus on restoring and water management and a keen understand- law and order, including a unified approach ing of the market and the value chains that af- to rule-making, to create predictable flows of fect their ability to sell produce and increase information and to enable joint Afghan-U .S . incomes . 30 A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan

Once villages have reliable power, the National get things right in Afghanistan—the situation Solidarity Program can also become a vehicle is difficult, but by no means impossible, and if for distance learning by providing children the focus is on sustainable institution-building, access to global networks of knowledge and the Taliban’s gains can be reversed, governance learning . And to build the bottom-up process can be improved, and economic opportunity of governance, NSP resources can provide an can be created . The Afghan people want insti- incentive for villages to collaborate in expand- tutions of good governance and to be part of ing networks within and across districts to cre- the modern global system . They want to escape ate infrastructure and collaborate on economic their isolation and Sub-Saharan levels of pov- activity . Such progress, if scaled, would bring erty . For this to happen the government must substantial peace and development dividends, articulate, own, and implement an agenda for and a level of ownership that would ensure state-building, and the international communi- community protection against the insurgency . ty must be a catalyst for state and market functionality . Only this approach will lead to sus- Create eight model provinces tainable stability and prosperity for the Afghan people . An analysis of the threats, weaknesses, To regain the initiative in Afghanistan, areas and assets in Afghanistan and within the in- solidly under government control must be capi- ternational community indicates that such a talized on . It may seem counter-intuitive to fo- state-building approach cannot be implemented cus on areas where the government is strong, while the articulated objectives are long term, when there are so many areas where it is weak . but the commitments are short term, and there But the demonstration and multiplier effect of is no coherent set of ordered priorities matched progress in these provinces would deny the in- with effective implementation instruments . surgency further room for expansion . The Na- tional Solidarity Program began with three dis- Medium-term objectives in support of state tricts in every province and has since expanded functionality are both historically and strate- to be truly national in scope; there is no reason gically justified. Better state-building will al- why a similar approach could not be adopted low the military to integrate an approach to for development more broadly . Building model counter-insurgency with a narrative of national provinces in the North, North West, South, and vision and leadership that can produce partner- South West is feasible . Authority could be given ships between Afghans and their international to developmental and military actors in these supporters through a variety of specific actions areas to operate under special rules that give in the short term—getting the elections right, greater flexibility for support to good gover- developing a coherent international strategy, nance, with more of a venture capital approach . preparing new national programs, using the In the South and East an approach that segments National Solidarity Program as a basis for de- the territory into individual provinces and dis- livery, and creating eight model provinces to tricts and in turn allow for sequencing these spread stability . Each newly designed or re- provinces into phases would allow for coherent evaluated program and mechanism could be engagement that balances force and persuasion . aligned across center, province, and municipality by combining bottom-up and top-down approaches . Agreeing on the sequence and Conclusions priorities of issues and actions is essential for successful implementation . And the results The new Obama strategy for Afghanistan and must be communicated to the Afghan people Pakistan provides a significant opportunity to before, during, and after any reforms, to ensure Conclusions 31

continuing support . The government and inter- coproduction will allow Afghan reformers to national community would be well advised to articulate the country’s aspirations and needs underpromise and overdeliver, rather than vice and will involve close cooperation and col- versa, as is currently the case . laboration with the international community on the value systems that should drive good Two common threads fundamental to state- governance . Progress in Afghanistan is desir- building unite the approach here . First, the able for a variety of reasons . A plan for intel- notion of a double compact—involving agree- ligent state-building based on partnerships of ment between the Afghan government and its this sort will make this progress in Afghani- citizens and between the Afghan government stan both feasible and credible . For the sake of and donors—can shape responsive policy- Afghan, regional, and global stability, this is making for the people . Second, a process of now imperative . 32 A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan

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Th e At l a n t i c Co u n c i l ’s Bo a r d o f Di r e c t o r s

A Ten-Year Framework for Afghanistan Executing the Obama Plan . . . And Beyond

A Report by the Atlantic Council

Ashraf Ghani

April 2009