Void Marriages: Answers to Common Questions
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The Natural Law, the Marriage Bond, and Divorce
Fordham Law Review Volume 24 Issue 1 Article 5 1955 The Natural Law, the Marriage bond, and Divorce Brendan F. Brown Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Brendan F. Brown, The Natural Law, the Marriage bond, and Divorce, 24 Fordham L. Rev. 83 (1955). Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol24/iss1/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Natural Law, the Marriage bond, and Divorce Cover Page Footnote Robert E. McCormick; Francis J. Connell; Charles E. Sheedy; Louis J. Hiegel This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol24/iss1/5 SYMPOSIUM THE NATURAL LAW AND THE FAMILYf THE NATURAL LAW, THE MARRIAGE BOND, AND DIVORCE BRENDAN F. BROWN* I. THE NATURAL LAW DICTATES MONOGAMXY N ATURAL law is that objective, eternal and immutable hierarchy of moral values, which are sources of obligation with regard to man be- cause they have been so ordained by the Creator of nature. This law con- forms to the essence of human nature which He has created. It is that aspect of the eternal law which directs the actions of men.' Although this law is divine in the sense that it does not depend on human will, neverthe- less, it is distinguishable from divine positive law, which has been com- municated directly from God to men through revelation, for natural law is discoverable by reason alone." Natural law has been promulgated in the intellect. -
Civil Consequences of Marriage Within Statutory Prohibition: Effect of a Removal of the Impediment Donald J
Notre Dame Law Review Volume 29 | Issue 1 Article 6 10-1-1953 Civil Consequences of Marriage within Statutory Prohibition: Effect of a Removal of the Impediment Donald J. Prebenda Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Donald J. Prebenda, Civil Consequences of Marriage within Statutory Prohibition: Effect of a Removal of the Impediment, 29 Notre Dame L. Rev. 80 (1953). Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol29/iss1/6 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NOTRE DAME LAWYER The writer favors the opposite position, namely, that no abrogation should be grarited, in cases where the basis for the petition is pecuniary interests, such as title to property, heirship, and the like. Either on the grounds of estoppel, or simply in principles of equity, adoptive parents should not be permitted to alter the status of the child as it best suits their financial interests for the moment. Joseph T. Helling. Domestic Relations CIVIL CONSEQUENCES OF MARRIAGE WITHIN STATUTORY PROHIBITION: EFFECT OF A REMOVAL OF THE IMPEDIMENT In the United States statutory provisions concerning marriage are multiple and diversified. The legislatures of each state, empowered by constitutional authority to protect and safeguard public morals, have enacted what may be termed protective standards in regard to classes of people who may legally enter into a marital relationship. -
Title 30. Husband and Wife Chapter 1 Marriage
Utah Code Title 30. Husband and Wife Chapter 1 Marriage 30-1-1 Incestuous marriages void. (1) The following marriages are incestuous and void from the beginning, whether the relationship is legitimate or illegitimate: (a) marriages between parents and children; (b) marriages between ancestors and descendants of every degree; (c) marriages between siblings of the half as well as the whole blood; (d) marriages between: (i) uncles and nieces or nephews; or (ii) aunts and nieces or nephews; (e) marriages between first cousins, except as provided in Subsection (2); or (f) marriages between any individuals related to each other within and not including the fifth degree of consanguinity computed according to the rules of the civil law, except as provided in Subsection (2). (2) First cousins may marry under the following circumstances: (a) both parties are 65 years of age or older; or (b) if both parties are 55 years of age or older, upon a finding by the district court, located in the district in which either party resides, that either party is unable to reproduce. Amended by Chapter 317, 2019 General Session 30-1-2 Marriages prohibited and void. (1) The following marriages are prohibited and declared void: (a) when there is a spouse living, from whom the individual marrying has not been divorced; (b) except as provided in Subsection (2), when an applicant is under 18 years old; and (c) between a divorced individual and any individual other than the one from whom the divorce was secured until the divorce decree becomes absolute, and, if an appeal is taken, until after the affirmance of the decree. -
The Historical Evolution of the Concepts of Void and Voidable Marriages
Santa Clara Law Santa Clara Law Digital Commons Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship 1-1-1967 The iH storical Evolution of the Concepts of Void and Voidable Marriages Paul J. Goda S.J. Santa Clara University School of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/facpubs Recommended Citation 7 J. Fam. L. 297 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The Historical Evolution Of The Concepts Of Void And Voidable Marriages PAUL J. GODA, S.J.* The distinction between void and voidable marriages arose in cases where property was the main issue and as a result of conflicts of jurisdiction between ecclesiastical and temporal courts. If the marriage could be civilly attacked after the death of one of the spouses, then it had been a void marriage; if it could not be attacked, even though canonically invalid, the marriage was voidable but not avoided. Property cases were usually handled by temporal courts, where' as cases involving the validity of the marriage were heard in ecclesiastical courts. However, after the Reformation property and relational aspects of marriage were no longer heard separately. This was necessitated by Henry VIII's predica- ment: in order to obtain his annulment(s) he had to forbid appeals to Rome; thus he had to put marriage under the same procedure as property claims. -
The Putative Spouse and Marriage by Estoppel Doctrines: an "End Run Around Marriage" Or Just a Marriage?
Child and Family Law Journal Volume 8 Issue 1 Article 3 3-27-2020 The Putative Spouse and Marriage by Estoppel Doctrines: An "End Run Around Marriage" or Just a Marriage? Dana E. Prescott, Esq., Ph.D Follow this and additional works at: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/cflj Part of the Elder Law Commons, Family Law Commons, Juvenile Law Commons, and the Other Law Commons Recommended Citation Prescott, Esq., Ph.D, Dana E. (2020) "The Putative Spouse and Marriage by Estoppel Doctrines: An "End Run Around Marriage" or Just a Marriage?," Child and Family Law Journal: Vol. 8 : Iss. 1 , Article 3. Available at: https://lawpublications.barry.edu/cflj/vol8/iss1/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Barry Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Child and Family Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Barry Law. The Putative Spouse and Marriage by Estoppel Doctrines: An “End Run Around Marriage” or Just a Marriage? Dana E. Prescott, Esq., Ph.D* I. INTRODUCTION For generations in the United States, each state determined the definition of a legally recognized marriage.1 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court long ago held that marriage “has always been subject to the control of the [state] legislature.”2 For the most part, these early notions of “federalism”3 permitted states to constrain the definition of a lawful marriage. States did so without much public controversy; at least when consistent with socially and legally *Dana E. Prescott is licensed to practice in Maine and Massachusetts and a partner with Prescott, Jamieson, & Murphy Law Group LLC, Saco, Maine. -
Is a Marriage in Wyoming Between Minors Without Parental Consent, Valid, Void Or Voidable
Wyoming Law Journal Volume 17 Number 3 Article 9 December 2019 Is a Marriage in Wyoming between Minors without Parental Consent, Valid, Void or Voidable J. Patrick Hand Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj Recommended Citation J. P. Hand, Is a Marriage in Wyoming between Minors without Parental Consent, Valid, Void or Voidable, 17 WYO. L.J. 252 (1963) Available at: https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlj/vol17/iss3/9 This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Wyoming Law Journal by an authorized editor of Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship. IS A MARRIAGE IN WYOMING BETWEEN MINORS WITHOUT PARENTAL CONSENT, VALID, VOID OR VOIDABLE? It is the purpose of this article to explore the probable status of a marriage in Wyoming when either or both of the paticipants are minors and the parental consent required by statute has not been obtained.1 The importance of such exploration shows itself in several ways, for example: rights of a surviving spouse upon the death of the other spouse, alimony, support, the husband-wife privilege in the law of evidence, and the guilt of a defendant in a rape, morals or similar criminal charge. In all the above examples (and others) the decisive issue may very well be the marital status of the parties. As one authority puts it, "marriage involves the rights, privileges, powers, and immunities arising when a man and woman have so far satisfied the procedural requirements as to make it legally correct to say they are husband and wife." 2 Have the man and woman satisfied the Wyoming procedural requirements when a parental consent is required but has not been obtained? Let us take two hypothetical situations in which the Wyoming Supreme Court may be asked to determine this status: I, Suppose B (a male, age 19 years) and G (a female, age 17 years), both Wyoming residents, wish to marry. -
Disfavoring Annulments
REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 749 September Term, 2014 ______________________________________ MARGUERITE R. MORRIS, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF KATHERINE SARAH MORRIS v. ISAAC JEROME GOODWIN ______________________________________ Woodward, Kehoe, Arthur, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Woodward, J. ______________________________________ Filed: October 26, 2016 Appellant, Marguerite R. Morris, personal representative of the estate of her daughter, Katherine Sarah Morris, filed a pro se petition to annul Katherine’s marriage to appellee, Isaac Jerome Goodwin, in the Circuit Court for St. Mary’s County. Appellant alleged that the marriage was based on fraud. The circuit court dismissed her petition with prejudice on the grounds that appellant did not have standing to sue for the annulment of Katherine’s marriage to appellee. Appellant presents two questions for our review, which we have slightly rephrased: 1. Does a personal representative have standing to prosecute a petition for annulment of the decedent’s marriage on the basis of fraud? 2. Did the circuit court err in not granting appellant a hearing before dismissing her petition for annulment for failing to state a claim upon which relief can be granted? For the reasons set forth below, we shall affirm the judgment of the circuit court. BACKGROUND On August 3, 2011, Katherine married appellee in Arlington County, Virginia. At that time, appellee was a U.S. Army Staff Sergeant stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. Katherine was a fourth-year student at the University of Maryland, College Park. Following the wedding, appellee returned to Fort Bragg, and Katherine continued to reside on campus. Katherine committed suicide on or about May 6, 2012.1 On September 11, 2012, appellant was appointed personal representative of Katherine’s estate by the 1 On Saturday, May 5, 2012, Katherine walked out of her College Park apartment at approximately 5:45 p.m. -
California Putative Spouses: the Innocent, the Guilty, and the Law
[MACRO] CHANG_FINAL_4.11.2015 (DO NOT DELETE) 4/11/2015 10:00 PM CALIFORNIA PUTATIVE SPOUSES: THE INNOCENT, THE GUILTY, AND THE LAW Helen Chang* INTRODUCTION The putative spouse doctrine permits the court to include an otherwise void or voidable marriage under the protective umbrella of California’s community property system.1 The doctrine derives its literal meaning from the word “putative,” which is defined as “reputed,” “supposed,” or commonly esteemed”2 and applies to those “marriages” in which at least one of the parties believes that they are legally married.3 The term is applied to a matrimonial union which has been solemnized in due form and celebrated in good faith by at least one of the parties but which by reason of some legal infirmity is either void or voidable.4 * Professor of Law, Golden Gate University School of Law. My gratitude and respect to brilliant colleagues and friends: Michael Zamperini, Janice Kosel, and Marc Greenberg for their never-ending support. A special thank you to Roger Bernhardt whose inquiry regarding putative spouses in California provided the inspiration for this article. 1. A putative marriage exists if at least one of the spouses believes s/he is legally married but the marriage is void “because of some legal infirmity.” Recknor v. Recknor, 187 Cal. Rptr. 887, 890-91 (Ct. App. 1982); Vargas v. Vargas, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779, 780 (Ct. App. 1974). For example, Husband and Wife 1 are legally married and later believe they are legally divorced. Husband then enters into a second “marriage” with Wife 2 but since the divorce from Wife 1 is invalid, Husband cannot be legally married to Wife 2. -
Clarifying Marriage Requirements in North Carolina Jessica T
Campbell Law Review Volume 35 Article 4 Issue 2 North Carolina 2013 2013 Avoiding Wonderland: Clarifying Marriage Requirements in North Carolina Jessica T. Burgess Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr Recommended Citation Jessica T. Burgess, Avoiding Wonderland: Clarifying Marriage Requirements in North Carolina, 35 Campbell L. Rev. 227 (2013). This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Campbell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. Burgess: Avoiding Wonderland: Clarifying Marriage Requirements in North Ca Avoiding Wonderland: Clarifying Marriage Requirements in North Carolina "[A] journey is like marriage. The certain way to be wrong is to think you control it. " INTRODUCTION* After thirteen years of dating, Michael, a wealthy entrepreneur residing in Wake County, North Carolina, proposed to Natalie. Natalie gleefully accepted his proposal and the two were married in December 2007. In a Christmas-themed ceremony officiated by Natalie's father, she and Michael exchanged traditional Christian wedding vows and consented to take each other as husband and wife. The couple intended to be legally married and lived happily together-for three years. For reasons unknown to Michael, Natalie left the marital home during the summer of 2010 and subsequently filed for divorce, equitable distribution, and spousal support. To appropriately respond to Natalie's divorce complaint, Michael consulted a family law practitioner in Raleigh, North Carolina and surprisingly discovered problems with his marriage. First, neither he nor Natalie obtained or signed a marriage license. -
Report on Nullity of Marriage
The Law Commission (LAW COM. No. 33) FAMILY LAW REPORT ON NULLITY OF MARRIAGE Laid before Parliament by the Lord High Chancellor prrrsuarrt to section 3(2) of the Law Commissions Act 1965 Ordered by The House of Commons ro be printed 3rd December 1970 LONDON HER MAJESTY'S STATIONERY OFFICE 8s. Od. [4Op] net 164 The Law Commission was set up by section 1 of the Law Commissions Act 1965 for the purpose of promoting the reform of the Iaw. The Commis- sioners are- The Honourable Mr. Justice Scarman, O.B.E., Chairman. Mr. Claud Bicknell, O.B.E. Mr. L. C. B. Gower. Mr. Neil Lawson, Q.C. Mr. N. S. Marsh, Q.C. The Secretary of the Commission is Mr. J. M. Cartwright Sharp, and its offices are at Conquest House, 37-38 John Street, Theobald's Road, London, WClN 2BQ. CONTENTS Paragraphs Page INTRODUCTION 1-10 1 PART I SHOULD LACK OF CONSENT MAKE A MARRIAGE VOIDABLE INSTEAD OF VOID? . 11-15 4 PART I1 SHOULD AN UNDER-AGE MARRIAGE BE MERELY VOIDABLE OR RATIFIABLE? . 16-20 6 PART 111 SHOULD ALL OR SOME TYPES OF VOID- ABLE MARRIAGE BE REGARDED AS VALID AND BE TERMINATED ONLY BY DIVORCE? 21-28 10 PART IV SHOULD THERE BE ADDITIONAL GROUNDS OF NULLITY? . 29-35 15 Parties of the same sex. 30-32 15 Slerility . 33-34 16 PART V WHAT SHOULD BE THE GENERAL BARS TO NULLITY? . 36-45 17 Collusion 37-38 17 Approbation . 39-44 18 PART VI EXAMINATION OF GROUNDS OF NULLITY 46-86 21 Void Marriages (a) Invalid ceremony 47 21 (b) Non-age . -
'Were We Ever Married?' a Guide to Marriage-Spotting
“Were we ever married?” A guide to marriage-spotting Introduction 1. When is a marriage ceremony not a marriage ceremony but simply play-acting? 2. It is a question which has vexed many High Court and Appellate judges over the years. The issue generally surfaces when: a. An application is made for a matrimonial order, proof of marriage is required to accompany the court forms (PD 7A para 3.1) and the respondent defends the proceedings on the basis of there being no valid marriage. b. An application is made for financial relief after an overseas divorce and the respondent disputes a valid marriage ever took place. 3. But it can equally come into play under an application under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 or, simply, because a couple suspect their wedding did not comply with the regulations of the Marriage Acts. A quick trawl of the various authorities on the topic of marriage will uncover the following types of (non)marriage: a. Valid marriage b. Presumed marriage c. Void marriage1 d. Non-marriage 4. The outcome is critical to the applicant seeking financial relief. A finding of a valid or presumed marriage will entitle the applicant to pursue divorce and the attendant financial relief. A void marriage enables the applicant to seek a decree of nullity, which also opens the door to a claim for financial relief. However, if a court finds that there has been no marriage, the only avenues which may be available to the applicant are the Trust of Land and Appointment of Trustees Act 1996 and/or Schedule 1 of the Children Act 1989. -
Marriage, Domicile and the Constitution
MARRIAGE, DOMICILE, AND THE CONSTITUTION FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020 11:45 AM MARRIAGE, DOMICILE, AND THE CONSTITUTION MARK STRASSER∗ ABSTRACT In three of the major right to marry cases in which the plaintiffs challenged their domicile’s refusal to permit them to marry, the couples had married in a sister state in accord with local law. In none of these cases did the Court address the conditions under which states, as a constitutional matter, must recognize marriages validly celebrated in another state. This article argues that the position reflected in the First and Second Restatements of the Conflicts of Law captures the United States Constitution’s approach. A marriage valid in the states of celebration and domicile at the time of its celebration must be recognized throughout the country, contrary policy of the forum state notwithstanding. In addition, the article discusses both the conditions under which states must permit the enjoyment of the incidents of marriage, and some of the changes in state law that would be necessary were the Court to expressly adopt the position advocated here. Copyright © 2020 Mark Strasser. ∗ Trustees Professor of Law, Capital University Law School, Columbus, Ohio. MARRIAGE, DOMICILE, AND THE CONSTITUTION FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/17/2020 11:45 AM 104 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY [VOL. 15 TABLE OF CONTENTS INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................... 104 I. MARRIAGE RECOGNITION RIGHTS ................................................. 106 A. Right to Marry Caselaw .............................................................. 107 B. The Restatements .......................................................................... 113 C. Evasion Statutes ........................................................................... 116 D. Marital Status Recognition Caselaw ........................................... 118 E. Limiting Enjoyment of the Incidents of Marriage .................... 125 F.