JFQJOINT FORCE QUARTERLY The Persian Gulf War — Ten Years After Principles of Jointness Naval Innovation 00 Winter Japanese Self- 01 Defense Forces Missile Defense Attack Operations A PROFESSIONAL MILITARY JOURNAL If the Joint Chiefs of Staff could guarantee that any “one” of the Armed Services could by itself protect the nation, we would subscribe enthusiastically to the proposition of putting every- thing we had behind one Service....But we cannot. No one weapon, or one Service, or one form of mili- tary action is considered sufficient to meet all our security needs. —Arthur W. Radford JFQ AWord fromthe AH–64As with Hellfire missiles, Desert Storm. Chairman DOD n January 17, 1991, at 0238 hours local offensive by coalition ground forces. These open- time, AH–64 Apache helicopters fired ing attacks of the Persian Gulf War are exemplars volleys of Hellfire missiles and rockets, of the synergy of weapons systems. They high- Osimultaneously destroying two early light the value of having many different arrows warning radar sites and paving the way for coali- in one’s quiver and the effectiveness of jointness. tion aircraft to penetrate undetected deep inside Desert Storm reflected the technological superior- Iraq. Minutes later, F–117 stealth fighters, ship- ity of the Armed Forces. More importantly, it was launched Tomahawk missiles, and cruise missiles a showcase of the spirit, dedication, and profes- launched from B–52s initiated paralyzing strikes sionalism of American troops. around Baghdad. These separate coordinated at- The 10th anniversary of the Persian Gulf War tacks crippled Iraqi integrated air defenses as well provides an appropriate moment to examine the as command and control capabilities. Thus began nature of an historic victory and profit from its Operation Desert Storm, a 43-day war that culmi- lessons. In tandem with Just Cause in Panama, nated in the liberation of Kuwait after a 100-hour (continued on page 4) Winter 2000–01 / JFQ 1 I CONTENTS 1 A Word from the Chairman 24 A Network-Centric Solution: by Henry H. Shelton Naval Operations in the Persian Gulf 7 From the Field and Fleet: by Norman Friedman Letters to the Editor JFQ 30 Storm Over the Desert— I FORUM A New Assessment 8 The Persian Gulf War— by Benjamin S. Lambeth Ten Years After 35 Airpower and a Decade 12 Lessons of Desert Storm of Containment by Paul K. White by Barry R. McCaffrey 40 Postwar Strategy: An Alternative View by Ted Galen Carpenter I OUT OF JOINT 45 Principles of Jointness by Robert C. Rubel I 50 Naval Innovation: From Coal to Oil by Erik J. Dahl 57 Jointness in the Japanese Self-Defense Forces 18 The Joint Force—A Decade, by Fumio Ota No Progress by Douglas A. Macgregor 61 A Systems Approach to Readiness Reporting by John C.F. Tillson PHOTO CREDITS The cover shows M1A1 main battle tank under 66 Rethinking Joint Training camouflage, Desert Storm (DOD). The front inside cover features A–10s, Seymour Johnson Air Force Base (U.S. Air by Anthony Haugrud, Gary C. Lehmann, Force/Raheem Moore), soldiers covering operations in and Curtis Phillips Kosovo (982d Signal Company/Drew Lockwood), marines being extracted during exercise (Fleet Imaging Center Pacific, Guam/Crystal Marie Brooks), and launching S–3B 71 Missile Defense Attack from USS Enterprise (U.S. Navy/Marlow P. Dix). The table of contents depicts Iraqis collecting debris allegedly Operations fallen from sky (AP/Wide World Photos/Jassim by Nathan K. Watanabe and Mohammed) and HMS Inflexible (National Archives). The back inside captures marine disembarking from assault Shannon M. Huffman vehicle (U.S. Navy). The back cover shows Korean war memorial, Washington (Combat Visual Information Center/Robert J. Thayer); marines heading for Blue Beach at Inchon, September 15, 1950 (U.S. Army 77 Space and the Theater Signal Corps/Herbert Nutter), F–86 Sabre jets, December 1950 (U.S. Air Force History Office), soldiers atop M–26 tank awaiting North Koreans on Naktong Commander’s War River, September 1950 (U.S. Army Signal Corps/Thomas Marotta). by Thomas A. Doyne 2 JFQ / Winter 2000–01 0327 Prelims.Pgs 9/7/01 8:54 AM Page 3 WINTER 2000–01 / NUMBER 27 83 Joint Shipboard Helicopter I THE JOINT WORLD Operations 101 Organization, Doctrine, by Geoffrey C. Lambert and and Education Mark M. Huber I OFF THE SHELF 89 Fighting with Fires by Guy R. Hooper and 103 Negotiating in the Post-Cold Michael L. McDaniel War World: A Review Essay by Casimir A. Yost I COMMENTARY 105 Doughboys in Battle: 95 New Instruments for War A Book Review and Peace by Brian M. Linn by Joseph J. Eash III 106 Preparing for the Next War: A Book Review by John F. Antal 107 In the Shadow of Hanoi: A Book Review by Rod Paschall 108 Blueprint for Strategic Thought: A Book Review by Harold R. Winton 109 Intervention in Haiti: A Book Review I OF CHIEFS AND CHAIRMEN by Ronald H. Cole 100 Forrest Percival Sherman Joint Force Quarterly Stephen J. Flanagan Robert A. Silano LTC James Jay Carafano, USA Director Director of Publications Executive Editor Institute for National Strategic Studies Institute for National Strategic Studies Editor-in-Chief Editor Martin J. Peters, Jr. Calvin B. Kelley William A. Rawley Production Coordinator Copy Editor U.S. Government Printing Office Art Director JFQ is published for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff portions of this journal may not be reproduced or extracted topics of common interest to the Armed Forces (see page 112 by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National De- without permission of copyright proprietors. An acknowledg- for details). Please direct all editorial communications to: fense University, to promote understanding of the integrated ment to Joint Force Quarterly should be made whenever mate- Editor, Joint Force Quarterly employment of land, sea, air, space, and special operations rial is quoted from or based on its contents. ATTN: NDU–NSS–JFQ forces. The journal focuses on joint doctrine, coalition warfare, This publication has been approved by the Secretary of De- 300 Fifth Avenue (Bldg. 62) contingency planning, combat operations conducted by the fense. All previous issues have been published electronically Fort Lesley J. McNair unified commands, and joint force development. and are available over the Internet at the address indicated Washington, D.C. 20319–5066 The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations ex- below. Paid subscriptions to JFQ are offered through the U.S. pressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do Government Printing Office. Telephone: (202) 685–4220 / DSN 325–4220 not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense The editors invite articles and other contributions on joint Fax: (202) 685–4219 / DSN 325–4219 or any other agency of the Federal Government. Copyrighted warfighting, interservice issues that support jointness, and e-mail: [email protected] Internet: http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine ISSN 1070–0692 April 2001 Winter 2000–01 / JFQ 3 I Joint Force Quarterly A WORD FROM THE CHAIRMAN GEN Henry H. Shelton, USA (continued from page 1) Publisher military performance during Desert Shield/Desert Storm was the culmination of a decade of reform ADVISORY COMMITTEE in doctrine, training, and leadership develop- VADM Paul G. Gaffney II, USN I National Defense University ment. The conflict validated changes in com- Chairman mand and control introduced by the Goldwater- BG David A. Armstrong, USA (Ret.) I Office of the Chairman Nichols Act. It also marked a departure from the gradualist approach that characterized American Col Darrell A. Browning, USMC I Marine Corps Command and Staff College participation in Vietnam. Rather than strike, then Brig Gen Richard B. Bundy, USAF I The Joint Staff pause, as was tried unsuccessfully two decades VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN I Naval War College earlier, the Gulf War was prosecuted vigorously from start to finish, with dramatic results. New I MG Reginal G. Clemmons, USA National War College weapons and equipment—precision strike muni- A. Denis Clift I Joint Military Intelligence College tions, stealth fighters, and information technolo- gies—likewise demonstrated their potential and VADM Scott A. Fry, USN I The Joint Staff enhanced the effectiveness of applying over- BG David H. Huntoon, USA I U.S. Army Command and General Staff College whelming force. MG Robert R. Ivany, USA I U.S. Army War College The Gulf War also underscored the impor- tance of diplomacy and interagency cooperation Brig Gen Edward L. LaFountaine, USAF I Joint Forces Staff College in dealing with regional and international security Maj Gen David F. MacGehee, Jr., USAF I Air War College challenges. The establishment and maintenance MajGen Harold Mashburn, Jr., USMC I Industrial College of the Armed Forces of a coalition of 35 diverse countries under a U.N. mandate required deft diplomatic footwork. And I Col John T. Sheridan, USAF Air Command and Staff College diplomacy also played a major role during the Col John H. Turner, USMC I Marine Corps War College conflict, exposing the intransigence of Saddam Hussein and dissuading Israel from responding to 40 SCUD missiles which struck the country. EDITORIAL BOARD Stephen J. Flanagan I National Defense University Chairman Desert Storm demonstrated the Richard K. Betts I Columbia University significance of public backing for I Col John M. Calvert, USAF Joint Forces Staff College military operations Col Stephen D. Chiabotti, USAF I Air Command and Staff College Eliot A. Cohen I The Johns Hopkins University Desert Storm also demonstrated the signifi- COL David M. Cole, USA I U.S. Army War College cance of public backing for military operations. COL Robert A. Doughty, USA I U.S. Military Academy As a veteran of the Vietnam War, I was moved to Aaron L.