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Description of document: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) article The OXCART Story, 1971 Requested date: 24-July-2013 Released date: 20-September-2013 Posted date: 20-January-2014 Source of document: Information and Privacy Coordinator Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20505 Fax: 703-613-3007 File a FOIA Records Request Online Note: Source publication: Studies in Intelligence 15, Winter 1971, pages 1-34. The governmentattic.org web site (“the site”) is noncommercial and free to the public. The site and materials made available on the site, such as this file, are for reference only. The governmentattic.org web site and its principals have made every effort to make this information as complete and as accurate as possible, however, there may be mistakes and omissions, both typographical and in content. 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Central Intelligence Agency Washington,• O.C. 20505 20 September 2013 Reference: EOM-2013-02068 This is a final response to your letter of 24 July 2013 wherein you requested an Executive Order 13526 mandatory declassification review of the following document: "The OXCART Story, Studies in Intelligence 15, Winter 1971, pages 1-34." We completed a thorough search of our records and located a document responsive to your request. We have determined that it may be released in sanitized form. We have deleted material that must remain classified on the basis of Section 3.3(b))(l) of Executive Order 13526. Enclosed is a copy of the document showing our deletions and citing our exemption. As the CIA Information and Privacy Coordinator, I am the CIA official responsible for this determination. You have the right to appeal this response to the Agency Release Panel, in my care, within 45 days from the date of this letter. Please include the basis of your appeal. Michele Meeks Information and Privacy Coordinator Enclosure ENCLOSURE C06107525 C00604096 Approved for Release: 2013/09/17.:o 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs This publication is prepared primarily for the use of US government officials. The format, coverage and content are designed to meet their requirements. To that end, some issues of Studies in Intelligence each year remain classified and are not circulated to the public, resulting in numbering gaps in scholarly collections and accounting for discontinuities in page numbering. These printed unclassified extracts t"om a classified issue have been provided as a courtesy to subscribers. Some of the material in this publication is copyrighted, and noted as such. Those items should not be reproduced or disseminated without permission. All statements or fact, oplnl on, or analysts expressed In Studies In Intelligence are those of the authors. Tbey do not necessarily renect omclal positions or views of the Central Intelligence Agency or any other US government enUty, past or present Nothing In the contents should be construed as asserting or Implying us government endorsement or an article's factual statements, Interpretations, or recommendations. Approved for Release: 2013/09/17 ' C06107525 <iUUbU4U96 Approved for Release: 2013/09/17 SiCRl!:T Record of a pioneering achievement THE OXCART STORY Thomas P. Mclninch One spring day in 1962 a test pilot named Louis Schalk, employed by the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, took off from the Nevada desert in an aircraft the like of which had never been seen before. A casual observer would have been startled by the appearance of this vehicle; he would perhaps have noticed especially its extremely long, slim, shape, its two enormous jet engines, its long, sharp, projecting nose, and its swept-back wings which appeared far too short to support the fuselage in mght. He might well have realized that this was a revolutionary airplane; he could not have known that it would be able to fly at three times the speed of sound for more than 3,000 miles without refueling, or that toward the end of its flight, when fuel began to run low, it could cruise at over 90,000 feet. Still less would he have known of the equipment it was to carry, or of the formidable problems attending its design and construction. There was, of course, no casual observer present. The aircraft had been designed and built for reconnaissance; it was projected as a successor to the u.2. Its development had been carried out in profound secrecy. Despite the numerous designers, engineers, skilled and unskilled workers, administrators, and others who had been involved in the affair, no authentic accounts, and indeed scarcely any accounts at all, had leak~d. Many aspects have not been revealed to this day, and many are likely to remain classified for some time to come. The official designation of the aircraft was A-12. By a sort of inspired perversity, however, it came to be called OXCART, a code word also applied to the program under which it was developed. The secrecy in which it was so long shrouded has lifted a bit, and the purpose of this article is to give some account of the inception, development, operation, and untimely demise of this remarkable airplane. The OXCART no longer flies, but it left a legacy of technological achievement which points the way to new projects. And it became the progenitor of a similar but somewhat Jess sophisticated recon· naissance vehicle called the SR-71, whose existence is well known to press and public. SECl'tl!T 1 Approved for Release: 2013/09/17 (06107525 (!;UUbU4U96 Approved for Release: 2l)13/09/17 SECFU!'.T OXCART Sequel to the U-2 The U-2 dated from 1954, when its development began under the direction of a group headed by Richard M. Bissell o_fCIA. In June 1956, the aircraft became operational, but officials predicted that its useful lifetime over the USSR could hardly be much more than 18 months or two years. Its first flights over Soviet territory revealed that the air defense warning system not only detected but tracked it quite accurately. Yet it remained a unique and invaluable source of intelligence information for almost four years, until on I May 1960, Francis Gary Powers was shot down near Sverdlovsk. Meanwhile, even as the U-2 commenced its active career, efforts were under way to make it less vulnerable. The hope was to reduce the vehicle's radar cross-section, so that it would become less susceptible to detection. New developments in radar-absorbing materials were tried out and achieved considerable success, though not enough to solve the problem. Various far-0ut designs were explored, most of them seeking to create an aircraft capable of flying at extremely high altitudes, though still at relatively slow speed. None of them proved practicable. Eventually, in the fall of 1957, Bissell arranged with a contractor for a job of operations analysis to determine how far the probability of shooting down an airplane varied respectively with the plane's speed, altitude, and radar cross-section. This analysis demonstrate"d that supersonic speed greatly reduced the chances of detection by radar. The probability of being shot down was not of course reduced to zero, but it was evident that the supersonic line of approach was worth serious consideration. Therefore, from this time on, attention focussed increasingly on the possibility of building a vehicle which could fly at extremely high speeds as well as at great altitudes, and which would also incorporate the best that could be attained in radar­ absorbing capabilities. Lockheed Aircraft Corporation and Convair Division of General Dynamics were informed of the general requirement, and their designers set to work on the problem without as yet receiving any contract or funds from the government. From the fall of 1957 to late 1958 these designers constantly refined and adapted their respective schemes. Bissell realized that development and production of such an aircraft would be exceedingly expensive, and that in the early stages at least it would be doubtful whether the project could succeed. To secure the necessary fonds for such a program, high officials would have to receive the best and most authoritative presentation of whatever prospects might unfold. Accordingly, he got together a panel consisting of two distinguished authorities on aero­ dynamics and one physicist, with E. M. Land of the Polaroid Corporation as ;;hairrnan. Between 1957 and 1959 this panel met about six times, usually in 2 SEERE'f Approved for Release: 2013/09/17 C06107525 Approved for Release: 2b13/09/17 ~uubuqu96 OXCART ii~RiT Land's office in Cambridge. Lockheed and Convair designers attended during parts of the sessions. So also did the Assistant Secretaries of the Air Force and Navy concerned with research and development, together with one or two of their technical advisors. One useful consequence of the participation of service representatives was that bureaucratic and jurisdictional feuds were reduced virtually to nil. Throughout the program both Air Force and Navy gave valuable assistance and cooperation. As the months went by, the general outlines of what might be done took shape in the minds of those concerned. Late in November 1958, the members of the panel held a crucial meeting.

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