Korea's Economy
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6/3/2009 12:45:34 6/3/2009 12:45:34 PM6/3/2009 12:45:34 PM Korea’s Economy Korea’s 2009 ea’sea’sea’s Econo Econ Econ Korea’s Korea Economic Institute PRESORTED STANDARD 1800 K Street, N.W. Suite 1010 U.S. POSTAGE K K K K K K K K K K K K K K K Washington D.C., 20006 PAID PERMIT #3777 WASHINGTON, DC co Eecoco 18002_COVER-N1-R2.indd 118002_COVER-N1-R2.indd 1 CONTENTS Part I: Overview and Macroeconomic Part V: north Korea’s Economic Issues Development and External Relations Korea’s Near-Term Economic Prospects and Engagement on the Margins: Capacity Building Challenges in North Korea Subir Lall and Leif Lybecker Eskesen . 1 Bernhard Seliger . 67 Global Financial Crisis and the Korean Economy: North Korea and International Financial Issues and Perspectives Organizations: Political and Economic Barriers Pyo Hak-kil . 8 to Cooperation Lee Sang-hyun . 76 Part II: Financial Institutions and Markets The Impact of U.S. Financial and Economic Distress on South Korea Thomas Cargill . 15 The Wall Street Panic and the Korean Economy Kim Dong-hwan . 25 Part III: Structural Reform Economic Policy Reforms in the Lee Myung-bak Administration Tony Michell . 33 Tax Reform in Korea Randall Jones . 45 Part IV: External Issues U.S.-Korea Economic Relations: View from Seoul Han Dongman . 55 A Washington Perspective Jordan Heiber and Jennifer Schuch-Page . 64 000ix-x_TOC.indd 1 5/26/2009 10:30:09 AM STRUCTURAL REFORM ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS IN THE LEE MYUNG-BAK ADMINISTRATION By Tony Michell Policy and Global Crisis February 2008 as America’s subprime problem and the export-led economy of Korea. The crisis exposed Between winning the election in December 2007 in a matter of months every weakness in every and taking office in February 2008, Lee Myung- company and every sector and every economy that bak and his administration sketched out a massive might have been worked out over a matter of years. reform program that would potentially affect every The questions are whether the policies adopted by aspect of Korea’s economic and social life, from the the Lee Myung-bak administration during its first organization of ministries, through macroeconomic year in office were appropriate and whether it is policies, privatization, taxation, education reform, fully using the experience of the past. and the restructuring of policies affecting land de- velopment from zoning to massive infrastructure The first thing to state is that the global crisis has projects intended to jump start the Korean economy. almost no resemblance to the so-called Korean IMF Part of this policy was aimed at rolling back 10 years crisis of 1997–98. In 1997–98, the Korean domestic of so-called progressive government, and part was to economy collapsed as the chaebol failed to pay back try to change the way the Korean economy worked their bank loans, dragging down the banks as well. by opening much more of it to private enterprise In the last days of 1997, foreign exchange reserves and market forces. were exhausted. The exchange rate of the won to the dollar fell from 900 to almost 2,000, and imme- This article, rather than providing a comprehensive diately exports grew while the domestic economy overview of the structural issues, addresses a select continued to contract. number of issues that may be viewed as characteriz- ing the Lee Myung-bak administration’s main policy In 2008–09 the issue was the collapse of exports themes. The approach is largely chronological be- driven by the collapse of the world economy, and cause much of the battle plan did not survive contact Korea’s domestic economy declined later. Today, with the enemy, but the measure of the administra- the domestic economy is expected to experience a tion is how it has adapted to new circumstances and fairly shallow recession, with the export economy to opposition to its core economic policies. already experiencing a massive contraction. Un- like 1997–98, many Korean companies now are Korea is exposed to the global crisis that is now cash rich with relatively low debt-equity ratios. engulfing the world, just as any other economy. The recovery scenario is based on exports leading, President Lee warned Koreans early into his term and domestic demand recovery following, with in office that Korea faced a severe test coming infrastructure investment coming close behind at from overseas, but there was no immediate action. the back end of 2009. Lagging sectors are likely Koreans, like the citizens of many countries, did not to be semiconductors and construction (especially see the connection between what was still seen in domestic and commercial building).1 1. For an official statistical comparison with a financial slant, see “The Korean Economy: 1997 vs. 2008,” Economic Bulletin (Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Republic of Korea) 30, no. 12 (December 2008): 2–6, http://english.mosf.go.kr/public/ direction_list.php?sect=pubs_economic. STRUCTURAL REFORM 33 033-044_Michell.indd 33 5/26/2009 11:33:58 AM The strengths that Korea’s previous experience idea of a canal from Seoul to Busan. This would brings to the present situation are: make the construction industry surge with energy, make Hyundai Construction and other construction • Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAM- companies in bankruptcy suddenly valuable, and CO) is an excellent vehicle for handling toxic bring rising land prices and economic activity to assets in the financial sector; a corridor that had not seen much growth for one to two decades. Initial claims that it would reduce • Seminationalization of weaker banks is still partly transport costs were largely abandoned in the face of in place; transport experts’ insistence that it would not. • Companies have kept their leverage low after a At the same time, Minister Kang’s thinking was disastrous experience in 1997–98; and that the won, which had been steadily strengthening for several years, should be forced to drop from its • Exposure to outside toxic financial instruments range of 920–950 to the U.S. dollar to about 1,000, and frauds has been limited. where the won/yen exchange rate would be about 1 yen to 10 won, which was felt to be the optimum for Campaign Vision: 747 Thinking Korea to compete against Japan. Although revers- ing the strengthening of the won would lower the The president was elected on a reform program per capita GDP short term, it would raise the GDP that was aimed at bringing Korea a new era of growth rate. growth. Koreans worried that their economic po- tential growth rate was slowing rapidly and that a But how could Korea become the seventh-largest 3–4 percent growth rate of gross domestic product economy in the world? It seems that the advisers (GDP) would allow Korea to neither maintain its were not aware when they coined the slogan that position in the league of world economic powers Korea had slipped from 10th place to 13th place nor continue the growth of the standard of living as Russia, India, and Brazil raced past. Even so, up to the level of advanced countries. President Lee however you run the numbers on the back of the had been elected as the “business president” on the envelope, the only way Korea could get to seventh “747 platform,” which proposed that the country was to add the 24 million North Koreans to the 49 could grow at 7 percent annually, per capita income million South Koreans and also speed up the North could reach $40,000, and Korea could become the Korean economy. This was not going to happen, in seventh-largest economy in the world. Although this their view, unless North Korea collapsed and was was admittedly a long-term vision, the president absorbed by South Korea; and the group’s North initially said that this would be achievable within Korea policy was clearly tinged by this concept. In his five-year term as president, but apologists stated this thinking, although it was never explicitly stated, later that this was a plan to be achieved by 2017. unification was to be not an abstract goal but some- thing whose time could come within the five-year The 747 concept reveals some of the flaws in the presidential term. Any North-South cooperation that thinking of the group that surrounded President Lee delayed the collapse of the North was not really in Myung-bak. The group that emerged as the strongest line with this hope, and this included the Kaesong contenders for control of the president’s thinking in- industrial estate. President Lee was to speak on the cluded Kang Man-soo, who was appointed minister subject of unification with more assurance than his of strategy and finance. To achieve 7 percent growth, two predecessors, who had expected it to happen the economy was going to need both domestic and on a mutually negotiated basis and would not be external drivers. Exports would need to race faster, the “acquisition” that President Lee’s group nursed and the domestic economy would need to positively in their souls. hum. When the group of advisers reflected on what engine was big enough to accelerate a maturing The president and his advisers also wished to create economy, which all historic experience should have a smaller government by merging and rearrang- told them could not be done, they came up with the ing ministries, privatizing state-owned assets, and 34 THE KOREA ECONOMIC INSTITUTE 033-044_Michell-R1.indd 34 6/1/2009 10:00:30 AM selling the indebted companies—such as Woori, For some regulatory reforms, more than one Daewoo Shipbuilding and Engineering, Hyundai relevant law needs to be revised.