North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand?
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NORTH KOREA: CAN THE IRON FIST ACCEPT THE INVISIBLE HAND? 25 April 2005 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE NORTH KOREAN ECONOMY ......................................................................... 2 A. ORIGINS................................................................................................................................2 B. RISE AND FALL OF THE COMMAND ECONOMY ......................................................................2 C. COLLAPSE AND CHANGE.......................................................................................................3 D. INCIPIENT ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND MARKETISATION ..........................................................5 E. TENTATIVE OPENING ............................................................................................................6 1. Trade..........................................................................................................................7 2. Direct investment.......................................................................................................8 3. Special Economic Zones..........................................................................................10 III. OBSTACLES TO REFORM....................................................................................... 12 A. THE RULING ELITE .............................................................................................................12 B. CAPITAL DECLINE...............................................................................................................14 C. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT .........................................................................................15 D. THE KNOWLEDGE DIVIDE ...................................................................................................15 E. CRONY CAPITALISM............................................................................................................16 IV. POLICY RESPONSES: COERCION OR COOPERATION?................................ 17 A. SANCTIONS? .......................................................................................................................17 B. FACILITATING REFORM.......................................................................................................19 1. Build a vanguard for change....................................................................................19 2. Support the market economy ...................................................................................21 3. Begin comprehensive needs assessments ................................................................21 V. PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE ............................................................................ 22 A. UNITED NATIONS................................................................................................................22 B. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS .........................................................................23 C. SOUTH KOREA ....................................................................................................................24 D. JAPAN .................................................................................................................................24 E. OTHERS ..............................................................................................................................24 F. CONSULTATIVE GROUP.......................................................................................................25 VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 25 APPENDICES A. MAP OF NORTH KOREA.......................................................................................................26 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ...........................................................................27 C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA ..................................................................28 D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD MEMBERS........................................................................................30 Asia Report N°96 25 April 2005 NORTH KOREA: CAN THE IRON FIST ACCEPT THE INVISIBLE HAND? EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Despite the deepening nuclear confrontation between have little impact on the North Korean economy, North Korea and the world, the North is undergoing the particularly if its two largest trade partners, China and most profound economic changes since the founding of South Korea, were not to participate. The economic the state 57 years ago. It is unclear if the regime is changes underway are also unlikely to lead to the capable of fully embracing the market; the final outcome toppling of the regime any time soon, but as they take cannot be predicted, and no major new economic hold, the pressure for political change will increase. The engagement should be attempted until the nuclear issue international community can start to improve North is resolved. Nevertheless, the international community Korea's chances of making a successful transition by: has an opportunity to increase the chances that North taking advantage of the new opportunities to train Korea will make a successful transition from a Stalinist North Koreans in financial, technical and market command economy to one that is more market-driven economic skills, both inside and outside the and integrated into the global economy. Facilitating its country; economic reforms remains the best strategy for pushing the North towards more acceptable international conduct. addressing infrastructural constraints, particularly There are some important preliminary steps not involving in the power and transportation sectors; and the transfer of meaningful resources that ought to be undertaking comprehensive needs assessments to undertaken immediately both in order to prepare for prepare for the next stage of reform. what should be done if a nuclear deal is struck and to show Pyongyang why it needs to make that deal in its North Korea will not and should not receive significant own interest. international development assistance until it gives up its nuclear weapons, but it would be worthwhile trying The most important changes since July 2002 are that already to develop a better understanding of the gradual marketisation and incipient entrepreneurship are country's economy and what it will require in the way of creating semi-private markets, shops and small businesses help. Whether the regime survives or not, North Korea across the country; and economic ties with China and will need officials who are better versed in economic South Korea are deepening in unprecedented ways, matters and have a greater exposure to the world. giving a growing number of North Koreans their first Increasing knowledge about the economy would also unfiltered taste of the outside world. likely improve the prospect that any deal reached on the nuclear issue would lead to transformation of the Deeper institutional reform is still constrained by the economy and improved living standards rather than regime's overriding obsession with its survival. Economic simply channel resources to the elite. growth is also hindered by the degeneration of the industrial, transportation and energy infrastructure and Seoul/Brussels, 25 April 2005 the bureaucracy's lack of understanding of basic market economic concepts. Corruption is rampant, and many state officials have already learned how to tilt the market for their own enrichment. Even if the regime can overcome these obstacles, the reform process will ultimately fail unless it can proceed in an international environment that is conducive to providing the necessary technical and financial assistance. Economic sanctions, though they may well become necessary if the nuclear issue remains unresolved, would Asia Report N°96 25 April 2005 NORTH KOREA: CAN THE IRON FIST ACCEPT THE INVISIBLE HAND? I. INTRODUCTION Anecdotal evidence from the hundreds of foreign aid workers, diplomats and government officials who have been granted access to the North allows for corroboration North Korea's provocative behaviour makes it difficult of many details provided by North Korean officials and for countries seeking engagement to facilitate reform. It is the state-run media. North Korea has also allowed difficult to argue other than that most direct international international agencies and experts to conduct detailed in- assistance should remain unavailable until the nuclear country studies ranging from the state of the environment crisis is resolved. Moreover, if that crisis grows worse, it to nutritional standards and management techniques. may well become necessary to move in the opposite Interviews with refugees and defectors have been direction -- to sanctions -- as the only measure short of documented. The Bank of (South) Korea and the Korea force available to persuade Pyongyang to reverse Trade Promotion Agency (KOTRA) both produce data 2 course.1 However, resolving that crisis is only the first on the economy, and trade statistics can be extracted step. For North Korea eventually to become a more from those of North Korea's trade partners. stable and normal country, it also needs to complete the transition from a command economy to a market economy. It is unclear if