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Fordham Competition Law Institute Fordham Competition Law Institute ANTITRUST ECONOMICS WORKSHOP 5 September 2018 | 9:15 a.m.–4:45 p.m. CLE Course Materials & Speaker Biographies Fordham Law School Skadden Conference Center | 150 West 62nd Street New York City Table of Contents 1. Speaker Biographies (view in document) 2. CLE Materials Panel 1: Merger Remedies Panel 3: The AMEX Decision: What’s Next? Salop, Steven C. Invigorating Vertical Merger Ohio et al. v. American Express Co. et al case Enforcement. (view in document) (view in document) Colangelo, G. and Maggiolino, M. Applying Two-Sided Weiskopf, D. and Pelnar, G. Bibliography Organized by Markets Theory: The Mastercard and American Express Topic and Region: Merger Remedies Decisions. (view in document) (view in document) Panel 2: What can we learn from Merger Panel 4: Structural Modeling and Antitrust: Current Retrospectives? and Future Applications Overall Findings of the Merger Retrospective Literature. Neco, A. and Whinston, M. Taking the Dogma out of (view in document) Econometrics: Structural Modeling and Credible Inference. (view in document) Kobayashi, Bruce H. Merger Retrospectives: History, Methodology, and Inference. (view in document) Speakers Michael Cragg Principal and Chairman, The Brattle Group Arthur Burke (moderator) Partner, Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP Arthur J. Burke is a partner at Davis Polk& Wardwell. Dr. Michael I. Cragg is Principal & Chairman of The In his capacity as a partner in the Litigation Brattle Group. Dr. Cragg has extensive consulting, Department in New York and Northern California, Mr. Burke has represented clients in a variety of antitrust, research, and expert witness experience in corporate securities, corporate governance and general litigation finance, financial services, and valuation. matters. In his antitrust practice, he also advises clients on the competition law aspects of mergers and Dr. Cragg has testified in state and federal courts as acquisitions. Mr. Burke received his BA/BS from the well as in regulatory proceedings nationwide. His University of Pennsylvania and his JD from the expertise includes consulting on risk and financial University of Michigan Law School. management matters with a focus on leading teams in complex litigation. Mary Coleman Executive Vice President, Compass Lexecon He has assisted corporations, the U.S. Department of (moderator) Justice, and the Internal Revenue Service in developing economic and financial testimony in a variety of Dr. Mary Coleman is an Executive Vice President at finance and tax litigation. Dr. Cragg recently played a Compass Lexecon. Dr. Coleman received her Ph.D. in key role in the closely watched case regarding the Economics from Stanford University. Dr. Coleman’s government's treatment of AIG, as well as in the consulting practice specializes in the competitive highly-publicized Long Term Capital Management analysis of mergers and acquisitions and joint ventures, litigation and Eaton’s and Glaxo’s recent transfer and antitrust litigation, including class action pricing disputes. certification issues. She has experience with a wide range of industries, including consumer products, Prior to joining the firm, Dr. Cragg was a founding retailing, distribution, food packaging, petroleum and partner of Cambridge Finance Partners, LLC where he natural gas, chemicals, coatings, industrial gases, served as a consultant and expert witness on litigation concrete and cement, defense industries, cases in the financial services, pharmaceutical, electric telecommunication, publishing, newspapers, and gas, and high-tech industries. He was also formerly agricultural products, paper products, payment a partner at Bates White and a vice president at systems, pharmaceuticals, hospitals, physicians, Analysis Group, where he focused on antitrust, medical devices, health care, computer hardware and intellectual property, and competition analysis. software. She has made presentations before US and foreign antitrust authorities and submitted expert Dr. Cragg began his career as a professor of economics testimony in federal court. at Columbia University and UCLA’s Andersen School of Management. He was also a consultant at RAND, From November 2001 until March 2004, Dr. Coleman and a senior economist in the Capital Markets Section was the Deputy Director for Antitrust in the Bureau of of the Milken Institute. His research has been Economics of the Federal Trade Commission. In this sponsored by a range of institutions and foundations role, Mary headed the antitrust group in the Bureau of including the NSF and NIH. Dr. Cragg currently serves Economics and was involved in all antitrust as a co-editor of The Economists’ Voice. He received his investigations at the FTC as well as several non- BSE from Princeton University, his MA from the enforcement projects. She managed the economic University of British Columbia, and his Ph.D. in Finance input into all antitrust cases and provided advice to the and Economics from Stanford University. Bureau of Competition staff lawyers and management as well as to the Commission. David Evans From May 2004 to August 2009, Mary was a Founder, Market Platform Dynamics Managing Director at LECG, LLC. Mary also worked at My academic work has focused on industrial LECG from 1993 to 2001 and was a Principal from 1999 organization, including antitrust economics, with a to 2001. From 1990 to 1993, Dr. Coleman served as a particular expertise in multisided platforms, digital staff economist at the Federal Trade Commission. economy, information technology, and payment systems. I have authored eight books, including two award winners, and more than one hundred articles in testified in many other trials and hearings on these areas. I have developed and taught courses monopolization, damages, and class related to antitrust economics, primarily for graduate certification. Additionally, Israel has served as the lead students, judges and officials, and practitioners, and expert in front of government agencies in many high have authored handbook chapters on various antitrust profile recent mergers including, among others, subjects. Comcast-NBCU, American Airlines-US Airways, and AT&T-Time Warner. My expert work has focused on competition policy and regulation. I have served as a testifying or consulting James Keyte expert on many significant antitrust matters in the Director of Global Development, The Brattle Group United States, European Union, and China. I have also (moderator) made submissions to, and appearances before, James Keyte is the Director of Global Development at competition and regulatory authorities with respect to mergers and investigations in those and other The Brattle Group. In this capacity, Mr. Keyte plays a jurisdictions. I have worked on litigation matters for lead role in growing Brattle’s antitrust practice and defendants and plaintiffs, on mergers for merging parties and intervenors, and for and in opposition to defining a new level of quality for economic consulting. competition authorities. He is a graduate of the His extensive practical experience, along with his deep University of Chicago, from which he earned a BA, and antitrust expertise, gives Brattle a competitive MA, and a PhD, all in economics. advantage in producing top quality expert work Mark Israel product across all competition subject areas. Mr. Keyte Senior Managing Director, Compass Lexecon is directly engaged in marketing, training, and quality review across all of Brattle’s competition and antitrust Mark Israel is a Senior Managing Director at Compass engagements both in the U.S. and Lexecon. Prior to joining Compass Lexecon, he served as globally. an Associate Professor at Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management. He received his Ph.D. in Mr. Keyte previously spent more than twenty years as Economics from Stanford University in 2001. a partner at Skadden, where he handled a wide variety of antitrust litigation, transactions, and advisory Israel has substantial experience applying economic matters across numerous industries. He led high- analysis and econometric tools to antitrust cases profile antitrust cases involving alleged price-fixing, including mergers, joint ventures, regulatory monopolization, mergers, intellectual property proceedings and litigation matters, in the U.S. and licensing, and sports-related matters, including class internationally. He has served as an expert for both actions. He was also involved in a number of high- government agencies and private parties, in cases profile mergers, several of which involved litigation involving industries such as telecommunications, cable challenges by the DOJ and FTC. television, broadband internet service, airlines, health insurance, food distribution, railroads, shipping, Mr. Keyte is the Director of the Fordham Competition financial markets, nuclear waste disposal, consumer Law Institute (FCLI), which he will continue to lead, retail, and many others. Israel has written numerous and has published more than 50 articles related to academic articles on topics including competition antitrust across a wide range of topics, including on the economics, econometrics, merger policy, subject of expert testimony. He is an adjunct professor telecommunications, airlines, insurance markets, and at Fordham Law School, a former editor of Antitrust applied econometrics. His research has been published Law Journal, and currently serves as editor of Antitrust in leading scholarly and applied journals including, Magazine. He holds a J.D. from Loyola Law School among
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