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2016 Antitrust Year in Review

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2016 Antitrust Year in Review 2016 ANTITRUST YEAR IN REVIEW AUSTIN BEIJING BOSTON BRUSSELS HONG KONG LOS ANGELES NEW YORK PALO ALTO SAN DIEGO SAN FRANCISCO SEATTLE SHANGHAI WASHINGTON, DC WILMINGTON, DE WSGR 2016 Antitrust Year in Review Table of Contents Introduction ......................................................................................................................................... 1 Mergers ............................................................................................................................................... 2 U.S. Trends ................................................................................................................................... 2 Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act Compliance ............................................................................... 2 Lessons from the Merger Year in Review ................................................................................. 3 Merger Enforcement Under the Trump Administration .............................................................. 4 International Insights ..................................................................................................................... 5 European Union (EU) ............................................................................................................... 5 China....................................................................................................................................... 7 Agency Investigations .......................................................................................................................... 7 Agency Litigation and Investigations .............................................................................................. 8 Expanded Agency Focus on Marketing and Bidding Restrictions ............................................. 8 1-800 Contacts ................................................................................................................. 8 DirecTV .............................................................................................................................. 8 Hospital Advertising Collusion ............................................................................................ 9 ASCAP/BMI Consent Decree Review ...................................................................................... 9 AmEx ...................................................................................................................................... 9 Statement on Competition in the Defense Industry ................................................................ 10 Statement on the Sharing Economy ...................................................................................... 10 Intellectual Property ..................................................................................................................... 11 Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Study on Patent Assertion Entities ..................................... 11 Proposed Update to the Joint Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property ................. 11 EU ............................................................................................................................................. 12 General Court in Lundbeck .................................................................................................... 12 Cross-Border Access to Pay-TV (Paramount Commitments) ................................................. 12 Google Investigations ............................................................................................................ 12 Search ............................................................................................................................. 12 AdSense .......................................................................................................................... 13 Android ............................................................................................................................ 13 Advocate General Wahl in Intel .............................................................................................. 13 WSGR 2016 Antitrust Year in Review Table of Contents (cont.) Morningstar ........................................................................................................................... 13 Essential Facilities and Remedies .......................................................................................... 14 International ................................................................................................................................ 14 China..................................................................................................................................... 14 Hong Kong ............................................................................................................................ 14 Korea .................................................................................................................................... 15 Brazil ..................................................................................................................................... 15 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 15 Criminal ............................................................................................................................................. 15 Notable Trends in the DOJ’s Criminal Antitrust Enforcement Program .......................................... 16 Notable Cases in DOJ Criminal Antitrust Enforcement ................................................................. 16 Corporate Prosecutions ......................................................................................................... 16 Individual Prosecutions .......................................................................................................... 17 The DOJ’s Focus on Compliance ................................................................................................ 19 DOJ Policy Initiatives in 2016 ...................................................................................................... 20 Guidance for HR Professionals: Criminal Enforcement in Labor Markets ................................ 20 International Criminal Enforcement Efforts .............................................................................. 20 Cartel Enforcement by Competition Agencies Outside the U.S. ................................................... 21 Outlook for 2017 ......................................................................................................................... 23 Civil Litigation .................................................................................................................................... 23 Antitrust Law Background ........................................................................................................... 23 Unilateral Conduct ...................................................................................................................... 24 U.S. ....................................................................................................................................... 24 International ........................................................................................................................... 26 Coordinated Conduct ................................................................................................................. 26 U.S. ....................................................................................................................................... 27 International ........................................................................................................................... 28 Outlook for 2017 ......................................................................................................................... 29 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................ 29 About WSGR’s Antitrust Practice ....................................................................................................... 30 WSGR 2016 Antitrust Year in Review Introduction Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati is interest in patent assertion entities and the increased costs of pursuing litigation pleased to present its 2016 Antitrust Year proposed updates to antitrust guidelines and the related discovery processes in Review. In this report, we summarize for IP licensing. In addition, we look have spawned “me-too” actions in which the most significant antitrust matters beyond the U.S., primarily to Europe, parties hope to leverage investigatory work and developments of the past year. We where we saw the EC’s pursuit of abuse already done by government agencies. begin with a look at the mergers and of dominance cases and its prosecution We examine the high-profile class action acquisitions arena, where we discuss of allegedly anticompetitive behavior in the cases that made headlines throughout the trends that characterized the FTC’s and pharmaceuticals and television licensing year, as well as analyze the types of cases DOJ’s aggressive approach to U.S. sectors. Further, we examine notable that were focal points in different court antitrust enforcement in 2016. We also recent activities of antitrust authorities in jurisdictions, including the Second Circuit’s contrast enforcement during the final
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