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Defending Perceptual :

A Naturalistic Realist Analysis of Aesthetic Properties

A dissertation submitted to the

Graduate School

of the University of Cincinnati

in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

Doctor of

in the Department of Philosophy

of the College of and Sciences

by

Iris P. Spoor

B.A. Thomas More College

November, 2017

Committee Chair: Jenefer Robinson, Ph.D.

Abstract

This dissertation has several key components. First, I argue that the dispositional model of aesthetic properties is the most viable form of aesthetic . I explain that it is able to effectively balance the subjective and objective characteristics of aesthetic properties. I go on to argue that the most naturalistically viable form of dispositionalism is perceptual objectivism. Next, I synthesize the work of Frank Sibley and Jerrold Levinson and develop a fuller account of perceptual objectivism.

In chapter 2, I argue that perceptual objectivism has two crucial features: (1) a dispositional realist model of aesthetic properties (which I call the perceptual model) and (2) the descriptive analysis of aesthetic properties. The descriptive analysis of aesthetic properties is the most controversial—and the most important—part of perceptual objectivism. Because of this, the bulk of the dissertation is devoted to defending the descriptive account from a philosophical and an empirical perspective.

It is fairly unusual to treat aesthetic properties as fundamentally descriptive; indeed, it is why perceptual objectivism might be considered a revisionist theory of aesthetic properties. A key component of this view is something I call the separability thesis. The thesis contends that evaluative reactions to aesthetic properties can be separated from the objective, perceptual content of an aesthetic thereby leaving us with the non-evaluative core of the aesthetic property. As I outline in chapter 5, garishness is a case study. The descriptive content creates the boundary of the . Many would agree that garishness is an unpleasant feature of an object. A garish carpet, for example, might cause one to experience genuine aesthetic displeasure. This displeasure, however, does not constitute the property. A ‘garish’ object is characterized by bright, clashing . The fact that we can consistently apply and understand ‘garish’ suggests that there is some kind of common perceptual content associated with an experience of the property. This common perceptual content also explains how an artist can intentionally manipulate a medium to create certain aesthetic effects.

Two aspects of the view loom large in criticism: 1) the separability thesis (described above) and 2) the empirical viability of higher-order aesthetic . In chapter 3, I respond to several potent challenges to the separability thesis. In chapter 4, I address 2) by taking an extensive look at empirical . I analyze one case in particular, amusia, which offers possible empirical support for the perceptual objectivist analysis of aesthetic experience. Finally, in chapter 5 I draw on the to defend the perceptual model of aesthetic experience. A fully developed account of perceptual objectivism offers philosophers a naturalistically viable form of aesthetic realism and opens up new possibilities for research in meta-aesthetics.

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Acknowledgements

This dissertation would not have been possible without the consistent support and guidance of my committee chair, Jenefer Robinson. Over the years this has been in development, she has offered support and constructive criticism that shaped my project into what it is today. I am also indebted to my other committee members, Lawrence Jost and Vanessa Carbonell, who have offered extensive comments and suggestions that have greatly improved the of my work. They have put in a great deal of effort to make it possible for me to complete this year. I greatly appreciate their efforts. I’d also like to thank my undergraduate advisor, Jerome Langguth. His teaching, and guidance, inspired me to pursue philosophy at the graduate level.

I must also thank the UC Philosophy Department. My years there were happy ones that greatly improved my abilities as a writer and as a philosopher. I’d like to thank all of the faculty and graduate students for their support over the years, but I’d particularly like to recognize Doug Keaton, Vanessa Bentley, Daniel Hartner, and Tom Polger for their helpful comments on this dissertation. Steven Cahn also deserves my thanks for generously providing insights on the subject of amusia. Last, but not least, I want to thank Director of Graduate Studies, Angela Potochnik, for her important assistance.

My colleagues at Mount St. Joseph University also deserve my thanks. They have offered support and given me every opportunity to succeed as a professor and finish this dissertation at the same time. Without their understanding, this simply would not have been possible. Mike Sontag, Ron , and Buffy Barkley have been especially helpful in making this dissertation possible.

I am most grateful, though, to my family. They have been unfailingly supportive of my graduate work and my personal development. Were it not for the intellectual environment fostered at home—and the endless debates--I would likely never have pursued philosophy.

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Table of Contents

Abstract ...... ii Acknowledgements ...... iv Table of Contents ...... v Chapter 1: An Introduction to Aesthetic Realism ...... 1 1.1 Aesthetic Realism and Aesthetic Properties...... 2 1.1a Reasons to be a Realist ...... 6 1.2 Powerful Challenges for Aesthetic Realism...... 12 1.2a The Argument from Relativity ...... 12 1.2b The Naturalistic Objection ...... 15 1.3 Dispositional Realism in and Aesthetics ...... 19 1.4 Dispositional realism and Perceptual Objectivism ...... 27 Chapter 2: Defining Perceptual Objectivism ...... 33 2.1 Aesthetic Properties: Sibley ...... 33 2.2 Aesthetic Properties: Levinson...... 39 2.3 The descriptive account of aesthetic properties ...... 50 2.4 Supervenience ...... 54 2.5 Conclusion ...... 67 Chapter 3: Defending the Non-Evaluative Analysis of Aesthetic Properties ...... 69 3.1 Bender and Irresolvable Perceptual Disputes...... 70 3.1a Bender’s Empirical Critique ...... 82 3.2 Rafael De Clercq’s Variable Polarity Argument...... 85 3.3 Shaping and the Evaluative Standpoint ...... 89 3.4 Conclusion ...... 98 Chapter 4: Empirical Aesthetics and the Descriptive Account ...... 99 4.1 Introduction ...... 100 4.1a Empirical Adequacy and The Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism ...... 101 4.1b Why Neuroaesthetics? ...... 102 4.2 Aesthetic Processing: A Neuroaesthetic Perspective ...... 103

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4.2a Is There An Aesthetic Center of the Brain? ...... 104 4.3 Zeki and the Foundations of the OFC Theory ...... 107 4.3a Descriptive vs. Aesthetic Judgments: An Empirical Perspective ...... 114 4.4 Empirical Failings of the OFC View...... 117 4.4a Abnormal Cases: OFC Damage with Spared Aesthetic Experience ...... 119 4.5 Towards New Insights: Anjan Chatterjee’s framework ...... 124 4.5a Amusia and Higher-Order Phenomenal Impressions ...... 127 4.5b Possible objection to the Amusia argument ...... 131 4.6 Conclusion ...... 137 Chapter 5: Defending the Perceptual Model of Aesthetic Experience ...... 138 5.1 Problems with Response Dependence...... 139 5.1a Realist conceptions of sensory properties ...... 144 5.1b A Note on Normativity and Intuitions ...... 148 5.1c Conclusions about Colors ...... 150 5.2 Aesthetic Experience, Pleasure and Perception ...... 151 5.2a Response to Zangwill...... 155 5.3 Perception and Rich Perceptual Content ...... 160 5.4 Implications for the perceptual model in aesthetics ...... 162 5.4a Objections to contrast arguments ...... 165 5.5 Conclusion ...... 170 Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion...... 172 6.1 Research and Methods ...... 173 6.2 Chapter Summary and Contributions ...... 175 6.3 Future Research ...... 185 References ...... 189

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Chapter 1: An Introduction to Aesthetic Realism

Aesthetic realism is the view that aesthetic properties exist in the world, are accessible to human perceivers and form the basis of aesthetic judgments.1 The strength of one’s realism can vary, but realism implies that aesthetic properties, like , are real qualities of objects. As

John Bender puts it, realists “must acknowledge properties such as elegance, complexity, vividity, and irony as real features of one’s ” (2003, p. 83). Anti-realists, by contrast, treat aesthetic properties as entirely mind-dependent. The apparent properties are viewed as ways objects appear to perceivers with differing aesthetic sensibilities (Goldman 1993, p, 31).

Debates about the metaphysical status of aesthetic properties have gone on for centuries.

In the past, these debates typically concerned the nature of one aesthetic property, in particular, . Philosophers like , St. Augustine and St. treated beauty as an independently existing quality.2 Others, such as and Edmund Burke see beauty as existing in the mind of the perceiver. Presently, the dynamics of the debate have not greatly changed, but the sorts of properties in question have expanded considerably. Beauty is no longer the only aesthetic property under consideration.

Typically, realist philosophers tend to argue for the mind-independence of aesthetic properties while anti-realists suggest they are mind-dependent properties. However, there is a middle way, call it moderate realism, which acknowledges the subjective aspect of aesthetic experience without sacrificing realist . Moderate aesthetic realism typically takes

1 Inquiries into aesthetic realism generally fall in the subfield of “meta-aesthetics”. 2 See Symposium, Confession, and Summa Theologica respectively.

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the form of a dispositionalist, or response-dependent account.3 A dispositionalist account treats aesthetic properties as powers to produce certain reactions in a class of observers. The focus on the responses of perceivers can account for the subjective aspect of aesthetic experience, but it also grounds aesthetic experience in an external object. Both anti-realists and realists can employ the dispositionalist framework.

Another motivation for dispositional realism is that such accounts are more amenable to naturalistic metaphysics. In this chapter, I argue that moderate dispositional realism is in a good position to address the most difficult challenges facing aesthetic realism. I go on to argue that the most promising version of dispositional realism, however, treats aesthetic properties as fundamentally non-evaluative in character. Additionally, while I believe metaethical frameworks are invaluable in clarifying the aesthetic case, I think there has been too great a reliance on versions of in developing aesthetic realism. There are pathways open for aesthetic realism that do not exist for moral realism.

1.1 Aesthetic Realism and Aesthetic Properties

To make sense of aesthetic realism, it is necessary to establish what an aesthetic property is. There is some broad agreement among philosophers that aesthetic properties are higher-order properties that depend upon lower order non-aesthetic ones. Jerrold Levinson explains that we have a “fairly intuitive” grasp on the class of aesthetic properties, which includes garishness, unity and flamboyance to name a few (Levinson 2003, p. 113). This is a Wittgensteinian, family

3 As Rafael De Clercq puts it: “Appealing to the notion of response-dependence has become a standard way of accounting for mind-dependence, and so developing a moderate kind of realism” (2008, p. 904).

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resemblance approach to classifying aesthetic properties.4 What defines this family resemblance changes depending on the philosopher you ask. In Levinson’s case, all of these aesthetic properties involve higher-order, phenomenal impressions which are “-relevant” (2011, p.

134) whereas Sibley, for example, says that all aesthetic properties require to discern.

Rafael De Clercq notes that most philosophers are content with this family resemblance strategy though some, like Monroe Beardsley, Peter Kivy and De Clercq himself, offer more explicit criteria (2008, p. 894). Throughout this dissertation, I employ the standard, Levinsonian way of characterizing aesthetic properties.

Central to any account of aesthetic properties is an explanation of what makes one property “aesthetic” and another “non-aesthetic”. Frank Sibley approached this subject in his seminal essay “Aesthetics ” (1959).5 His treatment of the topic has had far-reaching influence. Sibley approaches the distinction between aesthetic properties and non-aesthetic properties by discussing aesthetic terms (p.1). Sibley defines an aesthetic term as one which requires “taste or perceptiveness” (p. 1) in order to apply it. Correspondingly, an aesthetic concept is a taste concept (p. 1). Even though Sibley does not commit to the view that each sort of term corresponds to an existing property, his view has nevertheless become the basis, or foil, for most contemporary views of aesthetic properties in meta-aesthetics.6 It is important to keep in mind that Sibley that when we use aesthetic terms we are attributing some kind of quality (i.e. property) to the object.

4 Wittgenstein’s approach is based on the observation that some things which may appear to share some essential feature might in fact just share overlapping similarities. His classic example is the concept of a game. Wittgenstein says that games have no essential characteristics. Instead, they share the same relationship to each other that family members do: “…the various resemblances between members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament, etc. etc. overlap and crisscross in the same way.” (Philosophical Investigations, §67). 5 All page numbers refer to this anthology of Sibley’s work: Approach to Aesthetics: Collected Papers on Philosophical Aesthetics. (2001). 6 Rafael De Clercq refers to the Sibleyan classification as “the received view” (2008, p. 897).

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Sibley further explains that aesthetic properties can be divided into three broad types: solely evaluative, descriptive merit-terms and -added terms.7 This tripartite approach has played a role in most major meta-aesthetics papers written after Sibley’s essay. Solely evaluative terms are ones that have very limited descriptive content, such as “ugly”. They confer praise or blame, but we cannot learn much about the “ugly” object from the term alone.

Descriptive-merit terms attribute a property to an object, such as “balance”, that also confers a merit on the object depending on the sphere of assessment. Evaluation-added terms have both descriptive and evaluative content (positive or negative), e.g., “insipid”. This approach to classifying aesthetic properties is of particular importance in this dissertation because it paves the way for the view that aesthetic properties are fundamentally descriptive in character. I will consider Sibley’s tripartite theory of aesthetic properties in much more detail in chapter 2.

Accounts of aesthetic properties also require a discussion of how aesthetic properties and non-aesthetic properties interact. Aesthetic realists typically explain the relationship between non-aesthetic properties and aesthetic properties via a supervenience relation. Roughly, to say that A supervenes on B is to say that there can be no in the A properties without a change in the B properties. For example, one might argue that ‘gracefulness’ supervenes on

‘curving lines’.8 Supervenience comes in many forms (weak/strong; local/global).9 Different versions of supervenience account for many of the differences between realist theories of aesthetic properties.

Whichever account of aesthetic properties and aesthetic supervenience one adheres to, it is widely thought that the aesthetic realist is in a more difficult position than the anti-realist

(2008, Schellekens, p. 171). The realist is championing an objectivist view of aesthetic

7 I will be discussing Sibley’s view in much more detail in chapter 2. 8 This obviously does not exhaust all the possible subvening properties for ‘gracefulness’. 9 I discuss aesthetic supervenience and its varying degrees in chapter 2.

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properties and judgments. The realist believes that there is a fact of the matter about whether or not Mozart’s “Rondo Alla Turca” is “vivacious” or “insipid”. This flies in the face of the common that “beauty is in the eye of the beholder”. Despite ostensibly more objective than aesthetics, ethics faces a similar dynamic. As Peter Railton says, “So common has it become in secular intellectual culture to treat as subjective or conventional that most of us now have difficulty imagining what it might be like for there to be facts to which moral judgments answer” (2003, p. 3). Echoing this, Elizabeth Schellekens points out, “Few philosophers would disagree with the claim that with regards to aesthetic and moral value, the burden of philosophical explanation has tended to rest more on the Realist than on the Anti-

Realist” (2008, p. 171). Despite the obstacles facing realism, there are compelling reasons for pursuing a realist account of aesthetic properties.

Before proceeding to discuss the appeal of realism, it is important to consider another important debate within metaethics and meta-aesthetics, namely objectivism vs. .

The debate is sometimes conflated with the realism/anti-realism, but there are good reasons to keep them conceptually separate. The objectivism/subjectivism debate, as Schellekens explains,

“concerns whether or not qualities are to be ascribed to the object or the subject of experience, and so whether it is the object or the subject that makes something appear as it does” (2008. p.

170). An aesthetic objectivist, then, believes that aesthetic qualities can be ascribed to an object

(like a ) whereas the subjectivist believes that they should be ascribed to the subject (our personal experience of the painting). Even though it may be tempting, Schellekens argues that we ought not to treat realism/anti-realism and objectivism/subjectivism as synonymous. She contends that the tenets of objectivism and realism can come apart. For example, she argues that anti-realists share some objectivist views, such as the perceptual model of aesthetic properties,

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while they obviously cannot share a realist’s view of aesthetic properties. Alternatively, aesthetic realists, like Nick Zangwill, actually maintain subjectivist views of aesthetic experience. Thus, I agree that the categories ought to be kept distinct even if it is often the case that an anti-realist view is subjectivist and a realist view is objectivist. To be clear, in this dissertation I argue for a realist and objectivist interpretation of aesthetic properties.

1.1a Reasons to be a Realist

One major appeal of aesthetic realism is its ability to account for the apparent of aesthetic judgments. An objective judgment is true or false independently of how anyone thinks or feels about a matter. At first glance, one might be inclined to reject the notion that aesthetic judgments have an objective character. This is in strong contrast to moral realism, which achieves its chief appeal via our apparent tendency to view moral judgments as objective.

As once famously said in response to ethical non-cognitivism10, "I cannot see how to refute the arguments for the subjectivity of ethical values but I find myself incapable of believing that all that is wrong with wanton cruelty is that I don't like it" (Pigden, p. 165).

Granted, this picture of anti-realism and non-cognitivism implied by Russell’s quote is somewhat simplistic, but it captures the fundamental appeal of moral realism—it can ground and explain our strong intuition that some things are right and some things are wrong—independent of how anyone feels about it.

Initially, one might think that a parallel appeal does not exist in the aesthetic case.

Indeed, people typically consider aesthetic judgments to be entirely subjective--beauty is in the eye of the beholder. This position might be called aesthetic subjectivism and, as Eddy Zemach

10 Ethical non-cognitivism argues that ethical sentences do not express propositions and therefore do not have value.

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correctly points out, it is one of the most commonly held views (p. 42). I think this attitude does exist, but it co-exists with a completely opposite attitude, namely, that aesthetic judgments do have some objective weight, and that these judgments make reference to actual properties of an object. It is important to note that one might maintain an anti-realist view of aesthetic properties while nevertheless arguing that an aesthetic judgment can be normative. Thus, I do not raise this tension to show that one must be a realist to believe that aesthetic judgments can be normative.

Rather, I raise it to show that we do in fact have intuitions that could lend support to an objectivist and realist conception of aesthetic properties.

This tension was highlighted and explored in 18th century philosophy, particularly among the British empiricists, like Hutcheson and Hume. Schellekens (2009) who calls this problem the

“paradox of taste” summarizes as follows: “how are we to reconcile the subjective pleasure that is undeniably part of aesthetic experience with the objective aspirations of the very judgments resulting from that pleasure?” (p. 738). Hume sets up the problem succinctly in his classic essay

“Of the Standard of Taste”.

In the essay, Hume begins by noting the common sense observation that there is great

“inconsistence and contrariety” (ST, p. 134) in taste among men. He adds that “the sentiments of men often differ with regard to beauty and deformity of all kinds, even while their general discourse is the same” (ST, p. 134). Nevertheless, he claims, it is “natural for us to seek a

Standard of Taste” (ST, p. 136) to settle disputes in sentiment. Most sentimentalists, he adds, would reject any such standard as unattainable because sentiment is always right given that it

“has reference to nothing beyond itself” (ST, p. 136). This “” (ST, p. 137), however, is opposed by another “species of common sense” (ST, p. 137), namely, the belief that some objects are of greater aesthetic value than others. There does, in fact, seem to be some degree of

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uniformity in taste, Hume suggests. For instance, to use a contemporary example, there is some agreement that Twilight, a kitschy young adult novel, is not as aesthetically valuable as Crime and Punishment. In such cases, Hume argues, “The principle of the natural equality of tastes is then totally forgot” (ST, p. 137). Thus, there must be some standard involved. If this is the case, then “certain principles of approbation or blame” (ST, p. 140) can be discovered. This discussion illuminates the paradox of taste, but I do not mean to suggest that Hume was a realist about aesthetic properties. He was not (Schellekens 2009, p. 739; Zangwill, 2001, p. 19). 11

While Hume may not have been a realist about moral or aesthetic properties, his succinct statement of the “paradox of taste” supports the idea that aesthetic judgments have objective aspirations and are therefore not unlike our ordinary conception of moral judgments.

Considering examples of ordinary aesthetic discourse makes this apparent. When two people argue about the aesthetic value of a movie, for example, they take themselves to be engaging in a legitimate discussion that goes beyond a simple “yay” or “nay” response. Suppose Smith and

Jones are arguing about whether the Adam Sandler film they just viewed was good. Smith thinks it was a good movie and Jones does not. If you have been part of a conversation like this, you know that the argument can carry on for some time. Such a discussion typically involves an appeal to the actual content of the film. Smith might point to a scene where Sandler cross- dresses and contends that it was comical; Jones might reply that it was grating and unfunny.

Such disagreements seem to require the disputants to postulate an independent set of aesthetic properties (or facts) that can be appealed to in order to support their respective arguments. At the

11 Hume says, for example, that “Beauty is no quality in things themselves, it exists merely in the mind which contemplates them” (ST, p. 134). Later in the article, he reiterates this point noting that beauty belongs “entirely to the sentiment internal or external” (ST, p. 141). Thus, Hume does not base the standard of taste on objective aesthetic properties. Instead, he argues that the standard of taste is the consensus of critics who are defined by the five central qualities he outlines in the essay.

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least, such arguments have to be based upon more than a simple “I don’t like it” vs. “I like it”.12

Jones could not, rationally, expect Smith to assent to his view that the film was unfunny merely because he felt it was unfunny (as we shall see later, the tendency for there to be aesthetic disputes also forms the basis of an anti-realist rebuttal).

People consistently engage in aesthetic discussion, debate and appreciation and this engagement is more complex and involved than a categorization of likes and dislikes. In short, to borrow from Russell, I find it hard to believe that the only thing aesthetically wrong with

Eddie Murphy’s historic bomb, Pluto Nash is that I don’t like it. Levinson captures this thinking well when he says, “Both the authority of aesthetic judgment, that is, its pretension to prescribe preferences validly, and its explanatoriness, that is, its promise to account informatively, if qualifiedly, for preferences actually had, require us to conceive of aesthetic judgments as more than just registerings of personal likes and dislikes.” (1998, p. 5). In short, aesthetic judgments intuitively seem to have a certain amount of objectivity. Realism is in a good position to support and explain the objective character of aesthetic judgments. The aesthetic realist can appeal to aesthetic facts about a particular object of attention to support their aesthetic judgments. The aesthetic realist can explain why Pluto Nash is a terrible film by appealing to the aesthetic properties that it has.

I think realism also explains aesthetic phenomenology quite effectively, but it is in this area where dispositional realism seems to capture our intuitions best. Aesthetic phenomenology is tricky in that it has obvious subjective components. For instance, we might consistently experience some kind of aesthetic pleasure upon hearing a Beethoven sonata and take that to be

12 A group of students in my philosophy of class once had a spirited debate about why Indiana Jones and the Kingdom of the Crystal was such a bad film. They agreed that it was aesthetically poor, but each had slightly different reasons. One group suggested that the over-use of CGI ruined the film while others blamed the Deus ex Machina plot devices. In short, everyday arguments about aesthetic objects, like Indiana Jones 4, involve appeals to objective features of the aesthetic object.

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the essence of the aesthetic experience. I believe, however, that aesthetic phenomenology has a significant objective component as well. Using an approach from metaethics will help bear this out. Alexander Miller, when discussing moral phenomenology, comes up with helpful examples to delineate between properties that appear to be a quality of subjective experience and ones that appear to be actual qualities of an object. To modify Miller’s example slightly, compare your experience of a tomato with your experience of a piece of rotting meat (p. 126). If you have normal vision and you are in normal conditions, the tomato will look red. That is, the tomato appears to actually have the property of being red. Your color experience attributes the property of redness to the tomato. As Miller says, your attention appears to be “drawn outwards” (p. 126). In the case of your response to rotting meat, Miller says that “your attention is largely directed inwards” (p. 126). You experience nausea at the sight of the rotting meat, but your experience attributes the nausea to yourself, not the meat. He summarizes this contrast saying that redness is “out there on the object” and nausea is “in here in my guts” (p. 126).13

It might be argued that the rotting meat has the property of ‘nauseatingness’ which occasions the nausea response. This suggests that nausea is in some sense outwardly directed.

This observation would seem to undermine the intuitive force of the example. While I believe that nausea can inform us about our environment, for instance telling us if there is something disgusting out there, it is still inwardly focused.14 Miller actually drew the example from Mark

Johnston’s work, The Manifest. I think Mark Johnston’s account of the example makes it even more obvious what the distinction is. In the following passage, Johnston is drawing a contrast between color experience and a hedonic experience to refute the view that color experience is, in

13 This should not be taken as an endorsement of crude color realism. Rather, it is A helpful way to indicate some intuitive differences about subjective and objective qualities. 14 Nausea, indeed, can simply arise of its own accord. It might also be in response to stress, etc. Our experience of redness, however, typically needs to be occasioned by some external red object.

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essence, the enjoying of . The color experience is outwardly focused, while the hedonic experience, regardless of what external property occasioned it, is still inwardly focused:

[W]e do not experience color in anything like the way in which we experience, say, nausea, i.e. as a kind of inner we undergo as a result of the influence of something external, say rotting and noisome meat. The noisome meat has the disposition to produce an "inner experience" of nausea in us, nausea being, along with , the best candidate to be understood as the enjoying of qualia. But we do not mistake our experience of nausea for a surface property of the meat. Conceiving of visual as the enjoying of qualia thus implies that we are systematically mistaking intrinsic features of mental events for properties of surfaces.

I maintain that aesthetic phenomenology is similarly outwardly focused. When we talk about a statue being graceful or a flower being beautiful, we attach that property to the object— much like we attribute a color property to an object. Further, like color properties, we don’t experience them as contingent upon our perception of them. If there is a red tomato sitting on my countertop, I do not suddenly think it is pitch when I turn out the . The property seems bound up with the object itself. The same can be said of aesthetic properties. If you judge a particular mural to be garish, you attribute that property to the object itself. I might refer to it as “that garish mural” as easily as I might refer to a tomato as “that red tomato”. Zangwill echoes this thought contending that “we ordinarily conceive of aesthetic properties as causally and spatiotemporally endowed” (2001, p. 180). We do experience pleasure and displeasure as in response to aesthetic properties, but I contend that that is not the essence of an aesthetic experience. Our ‘garish’ experience has more in common with our ‘red’ experience than it does nausea. I consider this point in detail in chapter 5.

I believe aesthetic realism provides a compelling explanation for the objective character of aesthetic experience: there are objective aesthetic properties in the world that we can perceive

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and consistently identify. Our tendency to argue about all things aesthetic is more evidence of our implicit belief that aesthetic properties are objective and can be recognized by others.

The discussion in this section is not intended to be an exhaustive defense of realism.

Rather, it is a prima facie case for exploring a realist account of aesthetic properties.

Additionally, it provides a benchmark for an aesthetic realist theory. If a realist theory fails to ground the objectivity of aesthetic judgments and the outwardly focused character of aesthetic phenomenology, it is not likely to be a viable theory.

1.2 Powerful Challenges for Aesthetic Realism

There are, of course, reasons to reject realism. I will consider two recurrent criticisms that I think are particularly difficult for realism to rebut. The first might be called, as it is in metaethics, the argument from relativity and the second could be called the naturalistic objection. Broadly speaking, these criticisms could be seen as responses to the realist account of aesthetic objectivity and the realist account of aesthetic phenomenology.

1.2a The Argument from Relativity

The relativity objection emphasizes the subjective qualities of aesthetic phenomenology and judgments. Relativism15 about aesthetic judgments combined with an anti-realist metaphysics is a popular position among philosophers and non-philosophers alike when it comes to aesthetics (Zemach, p. 41). Relativists contend that there is a great deal of variation in

15 I do not mean to suggest that there is only one form of . Relativism, like realism, comes in many forms. Some varieties of relativism, such as Goldman’s (see Aesthetic Value) have an objectivist character. Nevertheless, such views take aesthetic judgments to be relative to , or a defined class of perceivers. They are not based on reactions to real, objectively existing aesthetic properties.

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aesthetic judgments. They argue that the best explanation of this variation is that aesthetic properties do not actually exist and are in fact simply ways an object appears to a given perceiver. For the relativist, then, a sentence like “Moulin Rouge is gaudy” actually means

“Moulin Rouge seems gaudy to me.”

Alan Goldman ably pursues this argument in his book Aesthetic Value (1995). Goldman, an anti-realist himself, argues that the of irresolvable disputes in aesthetics makes the realist position ultimately untenable. It’s not the mere existence of disagreement, he explains, that leads him to this view, but “the seemingly best explanations for such” (1993, p. 31). He uses a musical example. He notes that almost every music lover finds that the “opening phrases of

Mozart’s 29th and of Beethoven’s 6th symphony are beautiful” (p. 31). The realist explains this by arguing that this agreement occurs just because there is something beautiful in the phrases while the anti-realist argues that this agreement stems from common musical training, cultural background and so on (p. 31). Goldman adds that a real property of beauty “would be perceived with far more regularity than we find in ascriptions of beauty” (p. 31).

The anti-realist also emphasizes cases of apparently irresolvable disputes. Goldman offers the hypothetical example of one critic who finds Tchaikovsky’s 6th Symphony

“powerfully poignant” while another finds it “self-indulgently maudlin” (p. 31). The realist, he argues, has difficulty here because she “must hold that one of these critics is wrong because of some defect in her ability to perceive the property in question” (p. 31). This is less plausible, he believes, than the anti-realist explanation which is that “the divergence in judgment reflects irreconcilably different musical tastes or reactions to the ultra-Romantic idiom” (p. 31). This sort of dispute need not be imaginary. Take, for example, these two quotes from critics commenting on Baz Luhrmann’s highly polarizing of The Great Gatsby (2013).

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Christopher Orr of The Atlantic pans the film calling it “rowdy and cluttered” (p. 1) while Rick

Groen of the Globe and Mail praises the film saying it is a “lyrical tone poem” (p. 2). How can two experienced critics differ so widely after seeing exactly the same film? This is tricky for the realist, but not so much for the anti-realist. Goldman explains that, in most cases, critics’ differences reflect “irreconcilable” differences in taste (1993, p. 31). The film has no real properties that should be reliably producing aesthetic experiences of a certain kind.

Goldman further argues that most aesthetic attributions are evaluative in character: “To call an artwork beautiful, powerful, vivid, or graceful is to praise it” (p. 32). He contends that if such judgments ascribe real properties to objects, then “evaluative components” are essential to aesthetic properties (p. 32). The next step in his argument is to claim that “values exist only relative to the desires, needs, preferences, or responses of valuing agents” (p. 32). He concludes that aesthetic properties, then, must “consist in complex relations between those objective (usually formal) properties on which the realist takes them to supervene and evaluative responses of the relevant class of ideal perceivers or critics” (p. 32). He believes that this relational picture threatens the entire realist project because the distinction between “the ways objects and their aesthetic properties appear to evaluating subjects and the ways they are might seem to vanish” (p. 32).

To recap: the argument from relativity contends that aesthetic realism fails because our aesthetic responses are simply too variable and inconsistent to create the basis for any objectivist account of aesthetic properties. This criticism is particularly damaging for response-dependent forms of realism given their emphasis on consistent, reliable perception of aesthetic properties.

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This criticism challenges both the realist analysis of aesthetic phenomenology and the normative character of aesthetic judgments. But, as we shall soon see, it rests on an entirely evaluative analysis of aesthetic properties which the realist need not accept.

1.2b The Naturalistic Objection

For the purposes of this inquiry, I consider the naturalistic objection to be a synthesis of related concerns. It is a combination of a parsimony objection (i.e. an argument resting on the explanatory superfluity of aesthetic properties) and the intuition behind Mackie’s “queerness” argument. Both present troubling concerns for the realist.16

Contemporary is in a state of “opt-out” . That is unless you explicitly state that your account is non-naturalistic, it is presumed, or expected that your claims are against the backdrop of a thorough-going naturalism. This has some serious implications for realist theories in ethics and aesthetics. Proposing the existence of peculiar properties like aesthetic and moral properties is even more challenging when one has to situate these properties in a naturalistic ontology. I think it is important for aesthetic realism to address this concern and I believe it is fully capable of doing so especially in the form of dispositional realism.17

The parsimony objection is a familiar one in metaphysics and need not be naturalistically motivated. It usually takes the form of some kind of explanatory challenge: do the allegedly real, objective properties in question play a significant role in any explanation? That is, are they

16 This objection impacts any form of aesthetic realism. Response-dependent realism, as it turns out, fares better with this criticism. 17 There are some intriguing non-naturalistic accounts on offer in ethics, Shafer-Landau (2003), Parfit (2011). There are fewer options in meta-aesthetics, but recently Nick Zangwill has said that he is moving in a non-naturalistic direction (2011).

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doing any causal work? If not, the argument goes, those properties are likely causally inert and therefore superfluous. In the spirit of parsimony, we should eliminate any superfluous, epiphenomenal properties from our ontology, or reduce them to their base (i.e. subvening) properties. Jaegwon Kim has developed a version of this view aimed at non-reductive naturalists

(or more accurately non-reductive physicalists) in the .

According to the non-reductionists in the philosophy of mind, higher-order mental properties supervene on lower order brain properties. They argue that higher-order mental properties have causal powers distinct from their subvening brain properties. The higher-order mental properties nevertheless remain physical, naturalistic properties. Jaegwon Kim believes this picture is implausible primarily because of what he calls the problem of causal exclusion

(1998, p. 37). In his view, the non- reductionist ultimately must decide between adopting dualism or . Of course, Kim believes the only real solution is to adopt reductionism.18 Briefly stated, if a non-reductionist physicalist accepts the causal closure of the physical, (i.e. the view that all events must have physical causes),19 then one runs into the problem of causal over-determination. Suppose mental event m occurring at time t causes physical event p. So far this looks like m straightforwardly causes p. Not so fast, says Kim. The non-reductionist physicalist argues that all mental events supervene on some lower-order physical events. Suppose m supervenes on physical base property p*. Why not, then, simply attribute the causation of p to p*? As Kim explains it, “the physical cause threatens to exclude the mental cause” (1998, p. 37). To use a more concrete example, suppose that Smith is wincing in pain. We can explain Smith’s wincing in terms of some mental event like pain or anxiety or it

18 This is the general theme of Mind in a Physical World. His position is expressed with nuance in that book, but it suffices for the present discussion to know that he believes non-reductive is impossible. 19 Kim specifically says: “any physical event that has a cause at time t has a physical cause at t” (1993, p. 280).

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can be explained at a lower, physical level like “c-fiber firing”.20 It seems, then, that we have no reason to be realists about the higher-order mental properties.

Derek Matravers has developed a similar line about aesthetic properties that echoes

Kim’s misgivings. He argues that the introduction of objective higher-order aesthetic properties confuses more than it clarifies or explains. He contends that anti-realism has the benefit of being

“ontologically parsimonious” (2005, p. 208). Matravers believes that aesthetic properties should

“do their work” when it comes to explaining the objectivity of aesthetic attributions (p. 208), but also in explaining aesthetic experience more broadly (p. 206).21 Let’s look at an example of aesthetic experience to see his point.

Suppose Smith listens to Chopin’s “Raindrop Prelude”22 and finds it to be graceful. A realist about aesthetic properties might explain Smith’s experience by saying that Chopin’s

“Raindrop Prelude” contains the higher-order property of “gracefulness”. Matravers argues, however, that this sort of explanation is no better than a non-aesthetic explanation of Smith’s experience. An anti-realist, for instance, could say that Smith experienced “gracefulness” because the “Raindrop Prelude” exhibits non-aesthetic properties such as repeated quavers and chromatic often associated with the aesthetic term “gracefulness”. What explanatory work, Matravers would ask, is the aesthetic property of ‘gracefulness’ actually doing in this example that non-aesthetic properties like “light repeated quavers” do not already achieve? It appears to be a case of causal over-determination. Matravers concludes that it is more parsimonious and equally as valid to explain Smith’s experience referring only to the non- aesthetic qualities of the piece (p. 208).

20 I realize that this well-worn example is scientifically misleading, but it illustrates Kim’s basic point. 21 There is, of course, a vast debate about what exactly “aesthetic experience” is. Matravers has no commitment to a particular account of aesthetic experience in this paper. He simply believes that if aesthetic properties should be able to explain something, aesthetic experience would be one of those things. 22 Op. 28, No. 15.

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For Matravers and others, then, there is no need to postulate the existence of higher-order aesthetic properties. Everything can be explained and is best explained by appealing to lower- level, non-aesthetic properties. This, of course, does not mean that we should eliminate talk of higher-order aesthetic experience. That is, we should not replace all talk of “gracefulness” with talk of, for example, curving lines. It would mean treating higher-order aesthetic experience as entirely subjective.

These objections put pressure on the aesthetic realist to produce evidence of causal efficacy. Of course, it is also open to the realist to attempt to forge a non-naturalistic path. I do not, however, think that is necessary. I believe aesthetic realism can accept the explanatory challenge and remain naturalistic.

Both of these objections highlight the subjectivity of aesthetic experience. The argument from relativity highlights widespread aesthetic disagreement even among expert critics. The naturalistic objection treats the aesthetic property as something projected onto the environment— not something objectively there. There is a middle ground of sorts, a moderate realism, in the form of dispositional realism that has the potential to bridge the subjective/objective divide without sacrificing what is appealing in both treatments of aesthetic experience. In the past, dispositional realists in aesthetics have followed models developed by dispositional realists in ethics. In the following section, I outline what dispositional realism looks like in the ethical case and discuss why philosophers should be cautious about applying that model directly to aesthetic properties.

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1.3 Dispositional Realism in Ethics and Aesthetics

Dispositional realism, in general, is by its nature a compromise between the subjective and the objective. Because of this, dispositional realism has become quite popular in different philosophical circles. In the case of aesthetics, De Clercq explains that appealing to the dispositional model of aesthetic properties “has become a standard way of accounting for mind- dependence, and so developing a moderate kind of realism” (2008, p. 904). By grounding the existence of aesthetic properties in the responses of relevant perceivers, dispositional realism is able to successfully capture aesthetic phenomenology while still providing a framework for normative aesthetic judgments. Like all moderate positions, dispositional realism is a target of criticisms from both sides of the debate.

Dispositional realism is able to assuage some of the concerns leveled by the naturalistic objection. By grounding aesthetic properties in the responses of human perceivers, it avoids the spookiness of a Moorean intuitionism.23 As Railton explains, the dispositional account does not require “anything outside the domain of the natural” (1998, p. 88). This does not, of course, immediately answer the naturalistic objection. It does, however, put realism in a position to make a respectable attempt. Dispositional realism is at greater risk from the argument from relativity, but, as we shall see, one form of dispositional realism is capable of responding effectively.

The basic structure of a dispositional account has the following form: “The property F just is the disposition to produce response R in subject S under conditions C” (Byrne and Hilbert, p. 143). To use a color example, the basic dispositional or response-dependent account would

23 Moore held that good is an unanalyzable, non-natural, sui generis property. The Moorean intuition is some kind of internal moral sense that allows us to grasp these properties.

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explain that canary , for instance, is the “disposition to appear canary yellow, i.e. as the higher-order property of having some (lower-order) intrinsic properties” (Ibid., p. 148).

Dispositionalism in philosophy has a long intellectual pedigree, but dispositionalism about color properties in particular was popularized by who argued that some features of the world, namely secondary qualities, appear to be “nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various sensations in us” (II. 2.8). Dispositionalism is arguably the dominant view in color ontology (Cohen, p. 4). Though Locke’s formulation is not realist, many color realists have found his basic structure appealing. This simple perceiver- response paradigm, however, needs considerable fleshing out. Dispositionalism also requires an account about what perceivers, circumstances, and effects are considered typical (Cohen, p. 4).

Explanations of these important elements account for many of the differences between dispositionalist views.

More recently, the dispositionalist structure has become popular in metaethics and aesthetics. While the basic structure is nearly identical, writers in ethics are using dispositionalism to account for value properties and that is a significant difference. Value dispositionalism in ethics argues that moral properties are dispositions to produce responses from suitable subjects in “appropriate environments” (Shafer Landau & Cuneo, p. 133).24 The straightforward dispositional form “The property F=the disposition to produce R in S under C” will not do in ethics, however, because the properties in question are not descriptive features like color properties. D’Arms and Jacobson note that values “seem to be irreducibly normative: they can only be understood in terms of how we should respond as opposed to how people actually do

24 It is important to note that some response-dependent theories in metaethics treat moral concepts as response dependent while they treat moral properties as response independent. Shafer-Landau & Cuneo explain that sensibility theories in metaethics tend to defend the view that moral properties are themselves response dependent (p. 133).

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respond” (p. 197). Because of this, dispositional accounts in ethics have a “warrant” clause.

That is, it’s not enough that a particular property reliably produces response R in a subject S; the response must be warranted, or fitting.25 In light of this, Jacobson helpfully re-describes these theories as “fitting-attitude” (FA) theories (2011, p. 1). FA theories acquire their appeal by balancing the intuition of robust realism that, for example, we ought to esteem courage because it is estimable, with the intuition of dispositionalism that something cannot be estimable without a human response.

FA theories of value are also appealing to naturalists and non-naturalists eager to dispel criticisms such as Mackie’s, centering on the peculiarity of value properties.26 For the naturalist, dispositionalism grounds value properties in a human response and therefore in the natural world. For the non-naturalist, like John McDowell, dispositionalism allows one to say that

“Values are not brutely there—not there independently of our sensibility—any more than colours are: though, as with colours, this does not prevent us from supposing that they are there independently of any particular apparent experience of them” (p. 146). In this way, non- naturalistic value dispositionalism at least attempts to avoid the postulation of a mysterious, non- natural Moorean intuitive sense.

25 The terms “merit”, “warrant” and “fitting” appear throughout the FA literature. I treat them as equivalent in this dissertation. 26 Mackie’s argument has a metaphysical and an epistemological component (Shafer-Landau & Cuneo, p. 19). The metaphysical problem is as follows: if values were objectively real, they would be properties of “a very strange sort, utterly different from anything else in the universe” (p. 19). Mackie gives an example of this strangeness. He notes that some kind of supervenience relation must be required to explain the relationship between some natural fact and a moral fact. He uses the example of deliberate cruelty and says that for the realist, “the wrongness must somehow be ‘consequential’ or ‘supervenient,’ it is wrong because it is a piece of deliberate cruelty. But just what in the world is signified by this ‘because’?” (p. 20). Mackie offers Plato’s Forms as a “dramatic picture of what objective values would have to be” (p. 20). The epistemological problem: if such properties did exist, the only way we could be aware of them, Mackie argues, is via some “special faculty of moral perception or intuition, utterly different from our ordinary ways of knowing everything else” (p. 19).

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To complicate things further, there are a variety of FA theories to consider. A generic FA theory has two central tenets. First, FA theories reduce values such as the good to the deontic

(Jacobson, p. 3). That is, FA theories argue that the good should be understood “in terms of what one ought, or have most reason, to feel” (p. 3). The second central tenet is the response- dependent account of value which contends that values are at least partly determined by human responses (p. 4). There are two broad types of FA theories that evolve from this generic base: sensibility theories (Wiggins, McDowell) and sentimentalist theories (Hume, Railton).

D’Arms and Jacobson explain that sensibility theories seek to “vindicate the phenomenology of valuing as a matter of sensitivity to features of the world, while acknowledging that values are founded on human sentimental responses” (2006, p. 196).

Wiggins and McDowell are the most prominent advocates of this viewpoint. McDowell says for example:

The idea of value experience involves taking admiration, say, to represent its object as having a property that (although there in the object) is essentially subjective in much the same way as the property that an object is represented as having by an experience of redness—that is, understood adequately only in terms of the appropriate modification of human (or similar) sensibility (p. 143).

Sensibility theories also recognize that there is a crucial disanalogy with color experience, namely that value experience is not just elicited in appropriate conditions in appropriate perceivers; it also must be merited (McDowell, p. 143). Sensibility theories, broadly speaking, reject the view that values can be reduced to natural properties (Jacobson, p. 7).

Sensibility theories emphasize the role of moral affect as a part of our response to moral properties (Darwall et al., p. 20), but they also highlight the role of reason. An evaluative response to a particular object or event is fitting “when there is sufficient reason to feel it towards that object” (Jacobson, p. 7). This basic structure is designed to capture all value,

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including aesthetic value. While he doesn’t heavily focus on the aesthetic, McDowell believes that aesthetic experience “presents itself, at least in part, as a confrontation with value” (1983, p.

1) and therefore can be analyzed just as one analyzes moral value. Wiggins also believes that aesthetic value should be analyzed just like moral value (Darwall et al., p. 228-9).

D’Arms and Jacobson further contend that sensibility theory has two distinct advantages over intuitionism. First, it attempts to give an account that “explains how values could be essentially related to human concerns” which “avoids the mystery” of non-natural properties (p.

198). Second, it develops an account explaining how “we can obtain evaluative by means of ordinary human sentiments and attitudes” (p. 198).

Sentimentalism, not surprisingly, is based on the work of David Hume. In both ethics and aesthetics, Hume’s essay “Of the Standard of Taste” provides a blueprint for a dispositional theory of value. In broad outline, sentimentalism appears very similar to sensibility theory. It differs, though, in that it privileges certain universal sentiments or as Jacobson calls them “pan- cultural emotions” (p. 9). Jacobson does note that some sentimentalist theories, like Adam

Smith’s, can be read as a pure dispositional account. That is, they reject normative reduction (p.

9).

One significant and oft repeated charge against FA theory worth considering is the

“wrong kind of reason” problem. Jacobson explains that there can be reasons for having a particular attitude that do not “bear directly on the evaluative questions that the analyses seek to analyze” (p. 11-12). For example, an Adam Sandler fan might threaten to harm Smith if he doesn’t write a glowing review of Jack and Jill. Avoiding pain and perhaps death is a good reason to desire to critically praise Jack and Jill, but it is certainly not a response merited by the object in question. Thus, it is the wrong kind of reason to aesthetically endorse Jack and Jill. FA

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theory advocates have some replies for this kind of objection. They contend that the subject would not confuse the coerced “desire” to rate the film positively with a genuine evaluation of the movie itself. That is, there would be no real confusion between the fitting attitude of approval or disapproval based on good reasons with the coerced attitude of approval.

The basic structure of FA theory does seem to suit the aesthetic case. It gives us a perceptual model that captures our intuitions about aesthetic experience and also gives us a way to ground objective judgments about aesthetic properties. These are undoubted of the approach, but it is also a difficult theory to apply; especially in the aesthetic case. Jacobson borrows an example from Berys Gaut concerning cruel humor to demonstrate a wrong kind of reason problem. It demonstrates, I believe, just how difficult it can be to apply FA theory the aesthetic case.

In the original example, Gaut asks us to imagine a filled with funny jokes, but the jokes are so incredibly cruel that the audience is not amused at all because “they correctly thought that it would be wrong to feel amusement” (Gaut in Jacobson, p. 12). Jacobson contends, however, that one could argue that the jokes are still hilarious and therefore could warrant an aesthetic judgment that the jokes are funny, but it might mean that expressing amusement or enjoying the comedy is morally problematic (p. 12). This is an instance of the wrong kind of reason problem because Gaut’s reasons for criticizing the comedy are actually not reasons to find the jokes unfunny. Rather, they are moral reasons not to express amusement at the jokes, or even reasons to resist the urge to laugh. The joke itself might be funny on its own sans any moral consideration. Thus, Gaut’s moral reasons for not expressing or feeling amusement at the cruel comedy are the wrong kind of reason to find it unfunny simpliciter. In other words, the moral reasons do not bear directly on the joke’s funniness. This highlights that

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aesthetic objects, like , do have formal, perceivable properties that can be disconnected from an overall evaluative judgment. One does not need to accept aesthetic moralism in order to see this.27

There is another significant difficulty with FA theory from the realist (and naturalistic) perspective: evaluative perception. As noted above, FA theory is seen as less empirically suspect than Moorean intuitionism because it does not postulate the existence of some special internal sense, or in Hutcheson’s case, an additional external sensory modality. That said, FA theory does suggest that human are capable of evaluative perception. It implies that human beings are able to perceive ethical properties in objects and events. For instance, some even claim that human beings can perceive reasons.28 Not surprisingly, evaluative perception is controversial. As Dustin Stokes points out, traditional models of perception take it to be purely sensory (i.e., sight, touch, hearing, etc.) and descriptive (forthcoming, p. 3). Evaluative perception, while it does not require the invention of new sensory modalities, or internal moral senses per se, still asks us to believe something very speculative from an empirical point of view.

This is not a reason to reject the account out of hand, but it is a reason to exercise caution.

There are many defenders of evaluative perception and an increasing number of individuals defending it from an empirical point of view.29 Dispositional realist theories in ethics seem to require some sort of evaluative perception given that moral properties are value properties. However, it is not obvious that aesthetic dispositional realism needs to take this path. Aesthetic experience is fundamentally perceptual in ways that moral experience simply is

27 Aesthetic moralism is the view that ethically objectionable content that is integral to a work might count as a bad making feature. 28 Church, Jennifer. “Seeing Reasons”. (2010) Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. Vol. LXXX (3) 29See Evaluative Perception (forthcoming) ed. Anna Bergqvist.

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not. It would be incorrect to say that aesthetic experience is devoid of evaluative content, but these components do not necessarily define aesthetic experience.

Given the intensely perceptual nature of aesthetic properties, the aesthetic realist can plausibly develop a dispositional realist account that treats aesthetic properties as fundamentally non-evaluative (i.e. descriptive). Over the years, there have been a handful of realist accounts in aesthetics that take this approach. One of the most influential was Frank Sibley’s. Sibley suggests that aesthetic properties can be approached as perceptual properties, like color properties, at least in certain respects.30 He argues on this basis that aesthetic judgments could achieve a kind of objectivity (Stokes, forthcoming, p. 3).31

I believe Frank Sibley’s approach is a very promising compromise for aesthetic realism.

It offers an objective account of aesthetic properties that is naturalistically grounded, but it does not entail a commitment to evaluative perception. Evaluative perception is not necessarily implausible, but it does add a layer of confusion and difficulty that is simply not necessary in the aesthetic case. It also does not fully capture aesthetic phenomenology (more on this in chapter

5). The Sibleyan approach does require, however, a strong commitment to the descriptive analysis of aesthetic properties that many philosophers find objectionable. This type of view has been helpfully labeled by Elizabeth Schellekens as “perceptual objectivism” (2006, p. 166).

In “Towards a Reasonable Objectivism for Aesthetic Judgments” (2006), Schellekens contends that Sibley’s perceptual objectivism has “many significant advantages” (2006, p. 166) over alternative realist accounts, but nevertheless concludes that it is fundamentally flawed. In the following section, I will consider Schellekens’ argument in detail and argue that while she

30 It is important to note here that Sibley believes that aesthetic properties and color properties diverge in some important ways. For example, he suggests that we cannot expect there to be “maximum agreement” on the attribution of an aesthetic property whereas we might be able to expect that with a color property (p. 76). 31 Sibley advocated a moderate objectivism. I will discuss this in more detail in chapter 2.

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has done us a tremendous favor in sketching the basic framework of perceptual objectivism, her account nevertheless misreads Sibley in key ways which affects her conclusions about the viability of perceptual objectivism.

1.4 Dispositional realism and Perceptual Objectivism

Elizabeth Schellekens agrees that dispositional accounts of aesthetic (and moral) properties have considerable appeal for realists because such accounts capture both the objective and subjective character of aesthetic experience. Although she acknowledges its appeal,

Schellekens is ultimately critical of the dispositional approach. She focuses on Wiggins’ sensibility theory, more specifically his “sensible subjectivism” and Frank Sibley’s dispositional account of aesthetic properties which she calls “perceptual objectivism”. She notes that both accounts share the view that aesthetic judgments can be correct or incorrect and both accounts treat aesthetic properties as dispositional or response dependent (2006, p. 165). While

Schellekens believes that Sibley, McDowell, and Wiggins are all adopting sensibility theories, she does distinguish them, noting that Wiggins is arguing for subjectivism while Sibley is seeking an objectivist account (2006, p. 166).

Ultimately, Schellekens argues that these views all fail because they rely on an infelicitous analogy between value properties and secondary qualities. She believes that the analogy is “initially fruitful” but is in fact “what prevents either [account] from attaining its purpose” (p. 166). In other words, she believes that dispositional or secondary quality accounts of aesthetic properties fail to establish the objectivity of aesthetic judgments, which is one of the desiderata for an aesthetic realist theory. Alternatively, I contend that the difference between

Sibley’s dispositionalism (i.e. basic perceptual objectivism) and the FA theories proposed by

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Wiggins, McDowell and even Railton is significant. The fundamental difference, in my view, is that Sibley’s account does not rely on a conception of aesthetic properties as purely value properties while a FA account of aesthetic properties would entail an evaluative conception of aesthetic properties. After taking a closer look at Schellekens’ arguments, I will discuss why we should not think of Sibley’s view as a FA theory and, further, why this should make his account particularly interesting to the naturalistically inclined aesthetic realist.

Schellekens briefly addresses Wiggins’ theory, primarily to provide contrast to Sibley’s view. Schellekens notes that both sensible subjectivism and perceptual objectivism rely on a

“somewhat eighteenth-century” idea that human beings have a “discriminatory sensibility”, for instance, the faculty of “taste”, which is “exercised in perception and appreciation of aesthetic properties” (2006, p. 167). Schellekens contends that the reliance on aesthetic sensibility “as an epistemological tool” is motivated by the perceptual character of aesthetic properties “but also the non-inferential character of aesthetic judgment-making about them” (2006, p. 167). So, for instance, one could not judge that a particular painting is graceful solely based on a description of its non-aesthetic qualities. Similarly, according to this view, one could not judge that a particular object was red if informed that the object in question has a surface spectral reflectance of 650 nm. Aesthetic sensibility theories emphasize the need for careful attention to an object

“discerning what is salient, and making appropriate discriminations” (Schellekens, 2006, p. 167).

Finally, she says that aesthetic sensibility theories contend that our “appropriate” responses to aesthetic properties are “what it is for that property to be present” (2006, p.169).

Schellekens goes on to explain that both sensible subjectivists and perceptual objectivists view aesthetic properties as response dependent which she characterizes in the following way:

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For an aesthetic property F, ‘x is F iff x is disposed to produce x-directed response R in all actual and possible subjects S under conditions C’ (2006, p. 168).32

The dispositional account of aesthetic properties is central to both viewpoints, but the sort of response that is produced in perceptual objectivism is quite a bit different from sensible subjectivism. It is not entirely clear that Schellekens recognizes this distinction. She goes on to say, for example, that on a dispositional model, aesthetic properties are “understood as instantiating a certain property in of its disposition to yield and ‘make appropriate’ a given response” (2006, p. 168). She seems to be claiming that aesthetic dispositionalism, simpliciter is some kind of FA theory, but that is not what perceptual objectivism, as seen in the work of

Sibley, is offering.

Though admitting their overall appeal, Schellekens believes that sensibility theories, in ethics and aesthetics, fail to ground a meaningful objectivity for moral or aesthetic judgments.

She believes the analogy with secondary perceptual qualities like color breaks down. In the case of color, one’s perceptual experience is the “only source of both explanation and justification”

(p. 170). Schellekens believes that when we judge that ‘x is graceful’, for example, it is not enough to say that “x is graceful because my response to x was thus” (p. 170). Schellekens argues that sensibility theories, like Wiggins’ sensible subjectivism, despite their appeal to merited, or warranted responses, are really not offering a “significant advance” over a traditional secondary quality model, as seen in (p. 171). But, she believes, aesthetic properties are not like color properties; an appeal to perceptual experience is not enough to justify an

32 Schellekens draws this formulation from Mark Johnston’s work. It could be seen as controversial in a number of ways, but it provides a helpful reference point for considering response dependence more broadly. For a less technical definition, Stecker explains that a property is “response-dependent if its instantiation in an object, by definition, consists in that object having a steady disposition to bring about a certain reaction in human beings” (2010, p. 72).

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aesthetic judgment. Further, Schellekens believes that Wiggins’ sensible subjectivism, and similar FA theories, have no non-arbitrary way of confirming that one response is appropriate while another is not. This criticism is in keeping with the criticism that FA theories have no way of ensuring that a response is grounded in good reasons—it could be the case that the response is based on “bad or irrelevant grounds” (fn. p. 173). In other words, Schellekens thinks that sensible subjectivism fails, in large part, because it is subject to ‘wrong kind of reason’ problems.

Schellekens applies her critique more directly to Sibley’s perceptual objectivism. She explains that Sibley’s account rests on two primary claims. The first claim is that aesthetic justification is relevantly similar to color judgment justification (p. 172). The second claim is that this justification “refers to agreement between the experiences of subjects, rather than only to features of the object of appreciation” (p. 172). Schellekens contends that Sibley’s account is also susceptible to the wrong kind of reason problem. She contends that a perceiver can have

“good reasons” for responding to a painting, for instance, with but not, therefore, have a good reason to judge that the painting as aesthetically bad (p. 173). In other words, a perceiver may have compelling reasons for having a particular emotional response, but not the right kind of reasons for making an overall negative or positive evaluation (p. 173).

Schellekens takes this critique further, contending that merely thinking that a looks graceful is not “a sufficient reason” for judging the sculpture to be graceful (p. 173). It is not a sufficient reason because aesthetic judgments are only in part perceptual judgments-- aesthetic judgments are not just instances of aesthetic perception (p. 173). Schellekens prefers a weaker conception of the relationship between aesthetic perception and aesthetic properties:

“having the perception should be not so much ‘part of the telling itself’ as ‘that by which we tell’ that a given object is likely—rather than certain—to have a particular aesthetic property” (p.

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174). She adds that it is very difficult and sometimes impossible to determine whether or not one’s own perceptual experience “is based on good reasons or not” (p. 174).33

The problem with Schellekens’ critique of Sibley is that he never claims that an aesthetic judgment, conceived of here as a judgment that ‘x has aesthetic property a, b or c’ needs to be grounded in reasons. Schellekens eventually concedes this point noting that Sibley rejects the idea that aesthetic judgments need to be supported “rationally” (p. 174). For Schellekens, this means that Sibley’s account is “highly counter-intuitive” (p. 175). Sibley appears to be saying that there are “features responsible for a thing’s aesthetic character” while at the same time he claims that “these cannot serve as justifying reasons for the aesthetic judgment that something has a particular character” (p. 175). She thus concludes that Sibley’s account offers very little to recommend it over a traditional subjectivist account (p. 175). In her view, all Sibley’s objectivism can provide is something like the following claim: “x is such as to give rise to a certain perceptual experience” (p. 175).

Sibley repeatedly notes that he is seeking a limited notion of objectivity (2001, p. 71).

He even adds that he is deliberately ignoring questions about objective (p. 71). His goal, unlike Wiggins and McDowell, then, is not to establish a standard of aesthetic evaluation.

Instead, his goal is to show that most aesthetic properties are non-evaluative. On this view, making a judgment like “that gazelle is graceful” is more like making the judgment that a stop sign is red than it is like a value-laden, moral judgment. This is in stark contrast to FA theories which argue that aesthetic properties are value properties and our responses to those properties must be merited. Sibley explicitly rejects the idea that our response to aesthetic properties must

33 It would be preferable to use the phrase “right kind of reason” rather than “good reason”.

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be grounded in reasons. Thus, I contend, Sibley rejects normative reduction which is one of the central tenets of FA theory.

Schellekens contends that Sibley’s account contradicts itself because it simultaneously holds that a certain feature can warrant certain responses yet he denies that one can give reasons for a particular aesthetic judgment, beyond a perceptual proof. This apparent contradiction disappears, however when one realizes that Sibley never accepts normative reduction. Despite mischaracterizing aspects of the Sibleyan framework, I think the term “perceptual objectivism” is an effective title for a Sibleyan inspired account of aesthetic properties. I will continue to use it throughout this dissertation as I believe it helps clarify a very confused theoretical landscape in aesthetics.

To recap, dispositional realism has particular appeal to aesthetic realists because it balances the objectivity and subjectivity characteristic of aesthetic judgments and experience. I argue that perceptual objectivism is a particularly promising form of dispositional realism; especially from a naturalistic perspective. Perceptual objectivism, rooted in the work of Frank

Sibley and Jerrold Levinson, treats aesthetic properties as fundamentally descriptive in character.

I believe there is great potential in this approach once it is bolstered from a philosophical and an empirical perspective. In the following chapter, I will develop the basic structure of perceptual objectivism in more detail primarily by drawing on the work of Frank Sibley and Jerrold

Levinson.

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Chapter 2: Defining Perceptual Objectivism

I have argued that perceptual objectivism is a promising starting point for naturalistic aesthetic realism. In this chapter, I will flesh out the bare bones concept Schellekens has given us and develop a theoretical framework for perceptual objectivism. I synthesize the work of several different philosophers, most notably Jerrold Levinson and Frank Sibley, to achieve this goal.34 Levinson’s view, in particular, is a good foundation for robust perceptual objectivism, but it is in need of modification.

In order to be a bona fide meta-aesthetical theory, perceptual objectivism must address several key issues in meta-aesthetics. In this chapter, I will focus on aesthetic properties, response-dependence and supervenience. This obviously does not exhaust the list of important meta-aesthetical categories, but it is necessary to analyze these dimensions in order to separate perceptual objectivism from other views. I will begin with an analysis of aesthetic properties in

Sibley’s work and trace its progress in Levinson’s scholarship.

2.1 Aesthetic Properties: Sibley

Sibley offers a dispositional account of aesthetic properties.35 He does not explicitly call himself a realist about aesthetic properties, but he is clearly an objectivist. That is, even if Sibley does not believe aesthetic qualities exist out there in the world, he believes that aesthetic qualities are ascribed to the objects of experience. When one says that a statue is graceful, for example,

34 Schellekens’ own description is drawn almost entirely from the work of Frank Sibley, but she does acknowledge that Jerrold Levinson is an inheritor and interpreter of Sibley’s work (2006, p. 168). 35 Stecker’s definition of response-dependence is helpful to keep in mind: “a property is response-dependent if its instantiation in an object, by definition, consists in that object having a steady disposition to bring about a certain reaction in human beings” (2010, p. 72).

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Sibley would say that one is ascribing the property of ‘gracefulness’ to the object itself, not to one’s own subjective experience.

The first important step in Sibley’s analysis is the claim that aesthetic qualities depend upon the non-aesthetic qualities of an object (p. 3).36 Gracefulness, for example, might depend upon the non-aesthetic quality of curving lines (p. 3). The key difference, of course, is that the non-aesthetic features do not require “taste” to discern (p. 3). The concept of a taste faculty is problematic to say the least. Although Sibley does not commit himself to anything like

Hutcheson’s “seventh sense”, his account is firmly grounded in human perceptual faculties

(2013, Lyas, p. 193). This suggests that aesthetic properties are indeed perceptual. Further,

Sibley contends that aesthetic properties are higher-order properties that depend upon lower- order aesthetic properties in much the same way that color properties depend upon lower-order physical properties like surface spectral reflectances. Taste, then, could be considered the ability to perceive these higher-order properties. What makes Sibley’s approach unique is that he does not suggest that this is a special value-sensing capacity. He seems to think that we can hone and educate this ability, but remains committed to the idea that it is fundamentally perceptual.37

Despite this dependence relation between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic, the non- aesthetic qualities of an object cannot serve as sufficient conditions for applying an aesthetic term or attributing an aesthetic quality (p. 4). Even if a painting is filled with curving lines, for example, that alone cannot justify a claim that the painting has the aesthetic quality of gracefulness. Aesthetic concepts, he tells us, are actually negative-condition governed (p. 5).38

36 “Aesthetic qualities are dependent upon non-aesthetic ones for their existence. They could no more occur in isolation than there could be facial resemblances without features, or grins without faces; the converse is not true” (Sibley, p. 35). 37 This is one of the primary reasons for Schellekens’ labeling of his view as perceptual objectivism. 38 Sibley states it quite strongly saying that aesthetic concepts “are not, except negatively, governed by conditions at all” (p. 8).

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This means that certain non-aesthetic qualities can rule out aesthetic qualities. For instance, it would be incorrect to say that Mary Cassatt’s Sleepy Baby (1910) is garish given that it features a soft, color palette. However, one would not be entitled to call it “delicate” or “insipid” simply because it has that soft pastel palette. In this example, the of the painting serves as the non-aesthetic quality that guides our application of the aesthetic terms. Based on this, it is not surprising that Sibley also claims that aesthetic properties are “emergent” (p. 35).39

That is, he does not believe that aesthetic properties can be reduced to some specific set of non- aesthetic properties.

Sibley also developed a tripartite distinction among aesthetic terms. This distinction has had a significant impact on debates about aesthetic properties and aesthetic realism. It becomes central to Levinson’s modified Sibleyan account. According to Sibley, there are what he describes as intrinsically, or solely-evaluative aesthetic terms (p. 91), descriptive merit terms (p.

91) and evaluation-added terms (p. 92). Solely-evaluative terms include such terms as

“valuable” or “mediocre” and “worthless” (p. 91). Sibley explains that these terms are

“evaluative (pro or con) whatever the subject-matter they are applied to, and may be applied to any subject” (p. 91). Sibley adds that the application of an evaluative aesthetic term to a particular object or context does not necessarily attribute a particular property, or if it does mean to attribute a property the term “gives little or no indication of what these properties might be”

(p. 90).

In contrast, we have descriptive-merit terms which are basically descriptive: they are used to attribute a property to an object. Sibley calls them “straightforward property terms” (p.

92). He provides examples like “unified”, “balanced” and “witty” (p. 93). Unlike more typical descriptive terms such as “round”, however, descriptive-merit terms also constitute a merit in

39 I will discuss what this means in more detail in section 2.

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some objects (p. 91). That is, the properties to which these terms refer can sometimes be cited in support of some critical verdict (p. 92). Sibley uses the example of “sharpness” as a descriptive merit term. For Sibley, sharpness is a descriptive-merit term because it picks out a property, namely sharpness, which can be a positive or a negative quality depending on the sphere assessment. For example, if the property is attributed to a razor, it is a meritorious quality, whereas if it is attributed to something else, such as a soup spoon, it probably is not. Thus, a descriptive-merit term refers to a property that is a good-making, or bad-making, feature according to some “sphere of assessment” (p. 92).

Finally, Sibley describes evaluation-added terms which are terms that have both descriptive and evaluative components. That is, an evaluation-added term attributes a particular property to an object and indicates the speaker’s attitude towards that property (p. 92). Sibley puts it the following way: “These are terms which are supposed to have both a descriptive and an evaluative component: that is, when they are applied to something, not only is a property being attributed to it but an indication is being given that the speaker has a favourable or unfavourable attitude to that property”(p. 92). His examples include “tasty” and “insipid” (p. 92). ‘Tasty’ implies a positive judgment while ‘insipid’ appears to imply a negative judgment. Both of these terms, however, also indicate certain properties. Sibley contends that ‘tasty’ descriptively means

“’having a good deal of flavour’” while insipid means “’having little flavour’” (p. 92). Sibley adds that a number of philosophers consider merit terms in ethics, like “courageous” and

“honest” to be evaluation-added types (p. 92). He contends, however, that most apparent evaluation-added terms, including the ones found in ethics, could be pared down to descriptive– merit terms (p. 93). He explains that one does not need to know that qualities like courage, for example, are held in esteem in order to apply them correctly (p. 92). The merit, or defect, he

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believes, is largely determined “vis-á-vis certain spheres of assessment” (p. 92). Given this possibility, it’s not surprising that Sibley thinks most aesthetic terms are of the descriptive-merit variety (p. 93). He says that many apparent evaluation-added terms could be applied correctly by someone “who did not value such qualities” (p. 93).

Sibley’s tripartite distinction, in particular, the classification of evaluation-added terms and solely-evaluative terms, likely sounds familiar to anyone who has worked in ethics. The distinction he draws between evaluation-added terms and solely-evaluative terms very closely parallels similar distinctions made between “thick” moral concepts and “thin” moral concepts.40

The two types of concepts are distinguished based on how much descriptive content they contain. Thin concepts include concepts like “good”, “bad”, “right” and “wrong”. These concepts are descriptively thin. Their conditions for application are not limited by descriptive content. Thick concepts, like “courageous” and “treacherous” by contrast, do have more specific descriptive content. A concept like courage does have some obvious conditions for application

(the person/action we are applying it to must display courage-relevant qualities such as a rationally-grounded tolerance of fear). Applying this to Sibley’s distinction, we can see that evaluation-added concepts could be easily re-described as thick aesthetic concepts while solely- evaluative concepts could be called thin aesthetic concepts.41

With respect to descriptive-merit terms, for the sake of this discussion, I believe we can eliminate them. As noted above, Sibley thinks that evaluation-added terms can usually be pared down to descriptive-merit terms. This suggests that the two are in some sense equivalent. I believe he includes the two different categories because certain terms like ‘elegant’ carry with

40 The term “thick” concept has its origins in the work of Bernard Williams, in particular Ethics and Limits of Philosophy. He includes examples like “treachery” and “courage”. These concepts he says “seem to express a union of fact and value” (p. 129). 41 I believe the metaethical terminology is more parsimonious than Sibley’s distinction and I will use it throughout this inquiry.

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them a specific evaluation whereas descriptive-merit terms are neutral. So, for example, the word ‘sharp’ is a descriptive-merit term because it implies a positive, or a negative, evaluation depending on the sphere of assessment. Whereas a word like ‘elegant’ seems to always imply a positive evaluation. Sibley is making a linguistic point. He notes that we learn to use the word

‘elegant’ in that way, but in actuality, it has a fundamentally descriptive character (p. 93).42

Sibley concludes that we can use aesthetic terms in a way that is, “not only partially, but is wholly descriptive, and where, as with ‘sharp’ or ‘honest’, a quality is named which happened to be one widely recognized as being of value in a certain sphere” (p. 94). Thus, I believe he sees no metaphysical distinction between the two categories aside from their linguistic connotations.

Because the evaluation-added label better parallels the notion of a thick concept in ethics, I will continue to focus on evaluation-added terms in this chapter.

Sibley’s classification of aesthetic terms was tremendously influential in shaping philosophers’ views of aesthetic properties. Sibley carefully avoids saying anything specific about the metaphysical status of aesthetic properties--even though it is fairly obvious he thinks that some aesthetic properties are descriptive in character. He contends that a descriptive-merit term, for example, attributes a property to an object. It is also clear that he thinks that aesthetic properties are dispositional, but he doesn’t specify what sort of response an aesthetic property is supposed to evoke. For a more complete account of how to characterize aesthetic properties in a perceptual objectivist way, we must turn to the work of Jerrold Levinson.

42 He says: “I see no reason to suppose that, once we have come to reocgnise the property, P, which people generally value or admire, we cannot continue to use most of the terms in question, ‘graceful’, ‘handsome’, etc., in a neutral and purely descriptive way.” (p. 93-4).

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2.2 Aesthetic Properties: Levinson

Jerrold Levinson is a major contributor to the meta-aesthetics literature and his views are more explicit and detailed than Sibley’s with respect to the exact nature of an aesthetic property.

I believe his work gives us a very strong starting point for perceptual objectivism (even though he himself does not use that label for his work). In what follows, I draw on Levinson’s account of an aesthetic property as a higher-order perceptual impression, but I situate it within a traditional dispositional framework. Levinson himself adopts a ‘ways-of-appearing’ account of aesthetic experience which I reject.

Levinson takes the basic structure of the Sibleyan account and fleshes it out by adding an aesthetic supervenience account and a more detailed discussion of the descriptive character of most aesthetic properties.43 According to Levinson, aesthetic properties are higher-order phenomenal impressions that have “value relevance” (2011, p. 139). Value relevant properties, he explains, are properties that are “prima facie intelligible to cite in support of aesthetic evaluations” (2005, p. 218). He avoids giving explicit criteria for aesthetic properties, however, and instead relies on the “usual enumerative induction to characterize the class” (2011, p. 134) as described in chapter 1. In other words, he adopts Sibley’s approach and relies on an accepted set of exemplary aesthetic terms to carve out the class of aesthetic properties.

Levinson contends, like Sibley, that aesthetic attributions are “largely descriptive in character” (1994, p. 351). These attributions, he argues, report certain “looks, feels and appearances” which emerge out of lower order perceptual properties (p. 351). In the case of art,

Levinson makes it clear that the appearances must be relativized to a perceiver who “views the work in appropriate conditions, such as the work’s context of origin and artistic conventions” (p.

43 In discussing Levinson’s views, I will be drawing on his most recent work on the subject; primarily from Music, Art and Metaphysics (2011) and Contemplating Art (2006). Music, Art and Metaphysics was first published in 1990, but the 2011 edition includes updated and refined arguments on the subject of aesthetic supervenience.

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351). This makes Levinson’s account sound like a straightforward dispositionalist realism, but in other work Levinson explicitly denies that he sees all aesthetic properties as response dependent (2006, p. 343). Thus, he holds what Stecker calls a “mixed view”—some properties are response-dependent and others are not (2010, p.73). Levinson contends that some properties are in fact higher order “ways of appearing”, or “manifest properties” (p. 343).44 I argue in chapter 1, that the dispositional model is the best framework for aesthetic realism and further argue that perceptual objectivism is the most viable form of dispositional realism. Thus, it is important to consider Levinson’s reasons for abandoning the dispositional model. If he is correct, then we might be forced to greatly modify perceptual objectivism, or abandon it altogether. As it turns out, I think Levinson’s rejection of the dispositional model of aesthetic properties is far too hasty. In order to understand this, however, it is important to consider why

Levinson moved to a mixed view.

Levinson has several reasons for retreating from a traditional dispositionalist view, but the central problem can be traced to a debate in the . Concerns about the phenomenological accuracy of dispositionalism in the case of color have been increasing. The problem centers on the content of color experience. It seems that our color experiences represent colors as phenomenal impressions—not as dispositions to afford such impressions. Colin

McGinn phrases the problem clearly: “when an object looks red, does it look as if it has the sort of disposition that [dispositionalism] says that redness consists in?” (1996, p. 539). Boghossian and Velleman share the same concern and spell it out in evocative terms:

When one enters a dark room and switches on a light, the colours of surrounding objects look as if they have been revealed, not as if they have been activated. That is, the

44 This terminology is drawn from a paper by Mark Johnston which Levinson appears to have found very convincing: “Are Manifest Qualities Response-dependent?”, The Monist, vol. 81 (1998). Levinson adopts Johnston’s “ways-of-appearing” language in Contemplating Art (2006) and even more explicitly in “Aesthetic Realism II” (2008).

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dispelling of darkness looks like the drawing of a curtain from the colours of the objects no less than from the objects themselves. If colours looked like dispositions, however, then they would seem to come on when illuminated, just as a lamp comes on when its switch is flipped. Turning on the light would seem, simultaneously, like turning on the colours; or perhaps it would seem like waking up the colours, just as it is seen to startle the cat. Conversely, when the light was extinguished, the colours would not look as if they were being concealed or shrouded in the surrounding darkness; rather, they would look as if they were dormant, like the cat returning to sleep. But colours do not look like that; or not, at least, to us (Boghossian and Velleman 1989, p. 85).

Levinson believes this is a concern in the case of aesthetic experience as well. He argues that we directly perceive aesthetic properties—they do not “switch on” as it were. We do not experience garishness, for example, as a power to produce garishness, we experience it as garishness. This seems to be correct. When I look at an image of Hello Kitty, for instance, I see it as cute or kitschy, not as having the power to produce the phenomenal experience of in me.45

Derek Matravers spells this intuition out in more technical terms. He argues that aesthetic experience does not represent aesthetic properties as dispositional; rather it represents them as phenomenal qualities (2005, p. 205). He uses the example of a graceful ballet dancer to draw this out. He explains that “our experience of the ballet dancer has a certain content (phenomenal grace). We take that content to represent the way the world is” (2005, p. 205). In contrast, a dispositional realist would argue that our experience represents the dancer as actually having the property of grace and go on to use this as support for a realist interpretation of aesthetic phenomenology (p. 205). That is, according to the dispositional realist, an aesthetic property is a property of an object and not just a subjective, phenomenal experience. Matravers argues, however, that this claim does not make sense—what we actually experience is “phenomenal grace” (p. 205). In other words, Matravers is suggesting that we don’t experience the actual property of grace, just some manifestation of said quality. This is highly problematic for

45 One might ask at this point, what would a disposition look like? Byrne suggests that one really can’t see a disposition in a meaningful sense (p. 13), but he offers a possible example: a wine glass hitting the floor and breaking. When the glass breaks, the object appears to be manifesting fragility (p. 13).

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perceptual objectivism. If aesthetic properties are dispositions, and our aesthetic experience does not represent aesthetic properties as dispositions, it suggests that our aesthetic experience

“systematically misrepresents the way the world is” (Matravers, p. 205).46 This looks like trouble for dispositionalist realism in color theory and aesthetics alike, but, as it turns out, there is reason to doubt this conclusion. I will return to this point after a consideration of Levinson’s alternative account.

Levinson’s “ways-of-appearing” model of aesthetic properties (2006, p. 343) is designed to side-step this worry about aesthetic experience. He also believes the ways-of-appearing model helps dispel some concerns about the explanatory power of aesthetic properties (2006, p. 345).

In developing this view, I believe Levinson strays in some significant ways from his early accounts of aesthetic realism. His original account was a moderate, response dependent realism.47 With the ways-of-appearing account, he explicitly rejects response dependence for formal aesthetic properties (like balance) and suggests that some aesthetic properties, which he considers response-dependent, like facial loveliness, may be analyzed in terms of a distinctive sort of pleasurable feeling (2006, p. 348). This non-dispositionalist account of aesthetic properties does not easily fit into the perceptual objectivist framework. I believe it threatens to undermine the objectivity of the account and, more importantly, its naturalistic viability. It is tempting to ignore this debate entirely and hang on to a traditional dispositional model despite the concerns raised by Boghossian, Velleman, and McGinn. This strategy, however, would involve evading very serious arguments against dispositionalism. Thus, I think it is necessary to consider this critique. Luckily, I do not think it is necessary to abandon dispositionalism based

46 Matravers ultimately argues that property talk in aesthetics simply serves to confuse and we should sidestep this debate entirely and focus on non-aesthetic properties. 47 This is noted by many authors most relevant for this dissertation--including Schellekens (2006) and Zangwill (2001).

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on the phenomenological arguments found in McGinn, Boghossian and Velleman. First, I will begin with a discussion of why Levinson’s ways-of-appearing approach is not preferable to traditional dispositionalism in order to show why dispositionalism is worth preserving in the first place. Second, I evaluate the problems raised by McGinn et al. and offer a reply.

In her dissertation48, Elizabeth Zeron Compton directly challenges Levinson’s ways-of- appearing account. Compton’s thesis seeks to establish a dispositional account of aesthetic properties, so it will come as no surprise that she would object to Levinson’s wholesale rejection of the view. Compton shares some of my metaphysical concerns about Levinson’s view. By identifying aesthetic properties with ways-of-appearing as opposed to a disposition, she argues that Levinson has unmoored aesthetic properties from the external world and made them unacceptably subjective (p. 160).49 She finds his view especially troubling because he says that manifest aesthetic properties do not require standard observers or observation conditions (2006, p. 345). She concludes that a straightforward dispositional account is better equipped to address two major problem areas for aesthetic realism: the objectivity of aesthetic judgments and the objective characteristics of aesthetic experience.

I agree with her on both counts (see chapter 1), but I have some different concerns and potential solutions. With respect to objectivity, Levinson’s ways-of-appearing model is problematic. It opens his account up to more objections from anti-realists. In particular, it is susceptible to the parsimony objection. Returning to Matravers’ ballet dancer example, if we concede that the aesthetic property of grace just is the manifest appearance of grace to a particular observer (i.e. phenomenal grace) then we seem to have less reason to appeal to

48 “A dispositional account of aesthetic properties “ by Elizabeth Ashley Zeron Compton, Ph.D., State University of New York at Buffalo, 2012, 203; 3516527. Her mature view might be considered a perceptual objectivist account (though she herself does not use the label). 49 She puts it this way: “they will not be stable properties of objects but rather events that necessarily involve observers’ minds. This would make aesthetic properties mind-dependent and subjective.” (p. 160).

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objective aesthetic properties. If our aesthetic perceptual experience is not directly tied to the object in question (on the ways-of-appearing model an aesthetic property seems to be some form of sui generis property) then it would be impossible to ground an objective aesthetic judgment in aesthetic perception. Matravers states it this way: “It seems as if the whole story can be told using only the way the spectator experiences the non-aesthetic properties of the ballet dancer”

(2005, p. 206).

On the subject of aesthetic experience, more needs to be said. The objections of

McGinn, Velleman and Boghossian gain their force from intuitions about our phenomenological experience. If dispositional accounts get the phenomenology wrong in the color case, then they get it wrong in the aesthetic case (as Levinson observed). I believe this worry, however, can be defused.50 I would add to Compton’s list of concerns that, as I suggest in chapter 1, the straightforward dispositionalist model is more amenable to naturalism than competing accounts.

This is especially important for perceptual objectivism given that it relies on higher-order perception. This perceptual ability must be rooted in actual human capabilities otherwise it would collapse into a mysterious, Hutchesonian seventh sense.51

One could follow Robert Stecker (2010, p. 74) and sidestep the question of ways-of- appearing and default to a standard dispositional account, but I think the heart of McGinn et al.’s critique does need to be addressed.52 There are multiple responses to their challenge, but I will focus on a succinct argument from Alex Byrne. Byrne’s critique of Velleman and Boghossian begins with an observation from Mark Johnston.

50 Compton ultimately believes the phenomenological worry can be dismissed, but goes down a different path. 51 I realize that some philosophers might be perfectly fine with this outcome, but it is unlikely to appeal to a naturalistically minded one. 52 Stecker questions whether or not a ways-of-appearing model is genuinely different from a dispositional account. He concludes that Levinson does not gain much by the distinction (p. 74). I agree with this, but his analysis as offered in Stecker (2010) is too thin to support the conclusion.

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To recap, anti-dispositionalists in color theory, like Velleman and Boghossian, argue that dispositionalism is flawed because it is inconsistent with our experience of color. They observe that colors simply do not look like dispositions. This claim, that colors do not look like dispositions, at first glance, seems correct. However, the mere fact that yellow, for instance, does not look like a disposition, is not enough to disprove dispositionalism. As Byrne notes, samples of alcohol do not look like samples of CH3CH2OH (p. 14). The limits of our perceptual systems are not the boundaries of our knowledge. The color case, however, does not quite match the chemistry example he provides.

In order to understand why Boghossian and Velleman’s observations are a problem for dispositionalism, Byrne explains, one needs to understand some assumptions about color experience made by many philosophers. Johnston outlines these assumptions and describes them as “core beliefs” in folk color theory (beliefs that each of us develop over time from various sources). The most important one for this debate is Revelation. According to Revelation, visual experience provides us with “total information about the nature of colors” (Byrne, p. 15).53

Johnston gives the example of canary yellow. If Revelation is true, “The intrinsic nature of canary yellow is fully revealed by a standard visual experience as of a canary yellow thing”

(1997, Johnston, p. 137). This raises a serious problem for color dispositionalism given that colors do not look like dispositions. As Byrne puts it, if Revelation is true, then dispositionalism is “straightforwardly false, because it is not the case that colors look like dispositions” (Byrne, p.

15). This would be equally problematic in the aesthetic case if Revelation also applies to aesthetic perceptual experience.

53 Keith Allen states it in the following way: “normal perceiving subjects who enjoy standard visual experiences already know, or are at least in a position to know, everything there is to know about the essential nature of colour.” (2011, p. 155).

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Mark Johnston took this worry to heart and developed a more nuanced dispositional account including the concept of manifest properties (which is where Levinson derives his ways- of-appearing account). Byrne, however, is not convinced that Revelation debunks or falsifies dispositionalism. In other words, he does not believe that color properties (in our case aesthetic properties) need to look dispositional in order to be dispositional. Byrne’s response ultimately relies on a careful dissection of Revelation. He begins by arguing that Revelation implies two different beliefs: infallibility and self-intimation.

Infallibility can be spelled out in the following way: “if it seems to be in the essential nature of the colours that p, then it is in the essential nature of the colours that p” (Allen, 2016, p.

2). This means that the essential nature of colors is transparent to an ordinary perceiver.

Infallibility, then, implies that misrepresentation does not happen (Allen, 2011, p. 156).54 While this is still a controversial claim, it does not falsify dispositionalism. Self-intimation is more problematic. Self-intimation can be defined the following way: “if it is in the essential nature of the colours that p, then it will seem to be in the essential nature of the colours that p” [my emphasis] (Allen, p. 2).55 Self-intimation implies that no aspect of the essential nature of colors will escape visual experience (Allen, 2016, p. 132).56 This is more obvious with an example. In the above definition, imagine ‘reflectance types’ in place of p. If it is in the essential nature of colors that they are reflectance types, this fact should be obvious from a visual experience of color. This fact is not obvious from visual experience, so by self-intimation, we must conclude that colors are not reflectance types. This same argument can be used against dispositionalism.

If self-intimation is true, then dispositionalism is false—we do not seem to visually experience

54 Allen puts it this way: “colours cannot fail to be the way they are experienced to be” (2011, p. 156). 55 In the broader philosophy of mind, self-intimation is a “supposed property of mental states and events, whereby to enter into the state, implies knowing one is in the state” (Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy). For example, being in pain entails knowing that one is in pain. 56 “colours cannot be any more than they are experienced to be either” (Allen, 2011, p. 156).

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colors (or aesthetic properties) as dispositions. According to self-intimation, visual experience reveals the essence of a color. That is, colors cannot be more than they appear to be. If visual experience does not represent colors as dispositions, then it is impossible for colors to be dispositional in their essence. Byrne notes a serious problem with self-intimation, however.

Self-intimation would make it impossible to make any interesting scientific claims about color:

The property cannot be a physical property, or even a property informatively characterized in the vocabulary of some yet-to-be-formulated non-physical science, because these claims do not appear to be true (Byrne, p. 15).

In other words, self-intimation implies that blue is nothing more than an appearance—its essence is fully contained in our phenomenal experience of it. This would mean blueness cannot be a physical property, for example, because its essence just is the phenomenological experience.

Byrne sees this as absurd and rejects self-intimation. Byrne concludes that Velleman and

Boghossian need both infallibility and self-intimation to undermine dispositionalism. The observation that colors do not look like dispositions only has force if one adopts self-intimation and it is clear that this is, at best, a dubious assumption.

Because Revelation, he believes, implies both infallibility and self-intimation we must reject Revelation. If Revelation is false, then Velleman and Boghossian’s observations about phenomenology and dispositionalism lose their effectiveness. While this account can be challenged, it shows that we do not have to reject dispositionalism out of hand.

While Levinson does not discuss Revelation in his comments on the issue, Compton contends that Levinson’s ways-of-appearing account of aesthetic properties implies a commitment to Revelation in the aesthetic case. This is a fair conclusion given that Levinson bases his ways-of-appearing account on a Boghossian-Velleman type of argument. Further,

Levinson’s chief interlocutor on the subject, Derek Matravers, argues that any account of an

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aesthetic property entails certain core beliefs (à la Johnston) and one of those beliefs is

Revelation (2005, p. 202). Compton follows a different path in defusing Revelation57, but she comes to similar conclusions as Byrne only in the aesthetic case. She suggests that the perceptual manifestation of an aesthetic property is not the entire story. She argues that “there is more to the intrinsic nature of an aesthetic property than that which is manifest or revealed in direct perceptual experience of it” (p. 168). This parallels Byrne’s suggestion that color properties have more to their intrinsic nature than is revealed in direct perceptual experience. I think this is a sensible and safe claim for perceptual objectivism to adopt. Indeed, as Byrne pointed out in the case of color, if something like this claim is not made, then it makes empirical investigation into the physics of color nearly impossible (and pointless).

Given these considerations, I believe Levinson is far too hasty in abandoning his more traditional dispositional realist account of aesthetic properties. Matravers argues that a dispositional account of aesthetic experience necessarily fails because he is committed to

Revelation (2005, p. 202). As we have seen, however, one need not accept Revelation and if we accept Byrne’s formulation of it we have good reasons to deny it. Thus, Levinson need not be concerned that aesthetic experience does not reveal the dispositions. It could still plausibly be the case that an aesthetic property just is a disposition to afford a higher order perceptual experience (as Levinson used to have it). Further, it might be possible to retain some of his manifest property talk within a different dispositionalist framework.58

57 She relies, for the most part, on the work of Joseph Tolliver. 58 Levinson relies on the work of Mark Johnston to develop his non-dispositional way-of-appearing account of aesthetic properties. Johnston, however, also formulates a more nuanced version of dispositionalism meant to accommodate the phenomenological objection I have been considering. He develops an account of a “constituted disposition” which is a “higher order property of having some intrinsic properties which, oddities aside, would cause the manifestation of the disposition in the circumstances of manifestation” (Johnston 1992, p. 234). As Matravers points out, this account does not entail Revelation, although as we have seen that is not necessarily a problem. I think Levinson should consider revisiting Johnston’s constituted disposition approach.

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The upshot of this discussion is ultimately simple: perceptual objectivism requires a dispositional realist model of aesthetic properties. Even though quite a number of philosophers have abandoned dispositional realism about perceptual properties, like color, we have seen there is no pressing need to do this. The exact structure of the dispositional account--whether it is

Johnston’s, Byrne’s, Locke’s or even Compton’s--is not so significant. I believe perceptual objectivism can remain open to different dispositional formulations as long as it treats aesthetic properties as objectively real, higher-order perceptual properties.

I have argued that Levinson’s basic framework is helpful in creating the foundation of perceptual objectivism, and yet I rejected his latest formulation of aesthetic properties as ways- of-appearing. I believe that perceptual objectivism should rather adhere to one of Levinson’s earlier treatments of aesthetic properties as straightforwardly dispositional. An aesthetic property could be defined in the following way, as a disposition to afford higher order impressions of an aesthetic sort (Levinson, 2006, p. 320). For example, vividness is a higher order perceptual property because it depends on other, lower-order perceptual properties like brightness (2010, Stecker, p. 73). Levinson also suggests that these higher order properties can produce a “distinct, holistic impression” (2011, p. 153).

That said, I believe Levinson’s most significant contribution to perceptual objectivism actually concerns his descriptive account of aesthetic properties and what I call the separability thesis. I will now turn to Levinson’s argument for this view.

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2.3 The descriptive account of aesthetic properties

In general, Levinson agrees with Sibley that there are some solely evaluative aesthetic attributions like “splendid” and “excellent” that the speaker uses to identify a degree of perceived artistic excellence, or the speaker’s preference (1994, p. 351). These aesthetic judgments do not attribute a property to an object. Instead, they “denote a degree of aesthetic value or disvalue”

(2006, p. 316). For example, calling a painting “striking”, “excellent” or “dire” does not attribute any specific characteristic to it.

Nevertheless, Levinson believes that most aesthetic attributions are descriptive.

Descriptive or non-evaluative aesthetic terms include “balanced”, “cheerful” or “garish” (1994, p. 351-2). Levinson at first rejects the idea that aesthetic terms are “mixed” (1994, p. 352), but in other work, he appears less certain (2006, p. 317). He takes an agnostic position on the subject of “thick” aesthetic properties.59 Ultimately, Levinson argues that most aesthetic properties or concepts that appear to be thick, are in fact descriptive. He suggests that terms like

“graceful” are “basically descriptive terms, naming properties which, as it happens, constitute merits or defects in certain spheres of assessment” (2006, p. 317).

At this point, one is tempted to reply that terms like garish and gaudy are very clearly meant to condemn and wouldn’t even make sense separated from a negative evaluation.

Levinson admits that some aesthetic terms appear to entail certain attitudes or evaluations like

“gaudy” (1994, p. 352). But he insists that such terms cannot “be held strictly” (p. 352) to entail a particular evaluative meaning. This strategy is borrowed from Grice’s suggestion that some evaluative meanings can be merely conversationally implicated (Zangwill, 2001, p. 16). Grice argued that implicature, “is not part of the conventional meaning of the sentence uttered, but depends on features of the conversational context” (Wayne, 2014). Given this, he believes that

59 See Bonzon (2009) for a defense of thick aesthetic concepts. I will consider his view in chapter 3.

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implicatures are “cancellable” (2001, Zangwill, p. 16). In order to show that terms like “gaudy” only implicate a demerit in an object, Levinson must show that properties like gaudy have a substantive, identifiable character that is not associated with the implied demerit.60 Levinson believes that the evaluative content of an aesthetic ascription can be cancelled which leaves us with a purely descriptive attribution. In this way, the evaluative component of an aesthetic property can be separated from its non-evaluative essence. In the rest of the dissertation, I will refer to this argument as the separability thesis.61 To summarize, the separability thesis contends that the evaluative aspect of an aesthetic property is separable from its descriptive essence. This thesis contends that thick properties like ‘garishness’ have a non-evaluative essence while any apparent evaluative component is only conversationally implied. In other words, the separability thesis argues that terms like ‘garish’ only attribute a descriptive property—it does not attribute an evaluative property. The evaluative component of the term is only conversationally implied. The conversationally implied evaluation is completely separable from the core, descriptive essence of an aesthetic property.

In keeping with this thesis, Levinson argues that when we attribute properties like gaudiness and garishness to an object, we are attributing to the object a purely descriptive, distinctively aesthetic content (2006, p. 318). This content is a higher-order perceptual impression (p. 318). Levinson offers several reasons for accepting the non-evaluative analysis of aesthetic properties. First, he argues that we can usually find alternative descriptions “of the distinctive experiential contents involved” in which the evaluative component has been cancelled

(2006, p. 318). In other words, the evaluative suggestions which are derived “perhaps, from past

60 Zangwill explains that if we want to show that “judgments of daintiness and dumpiness only conversationally imply a judgment of merit, we need to show that we can cancel the conversationally implied judgment of merit without retracting the substantive aesthetic description” (2001, p. 16). 61 It is worth noting that in the following discussion Levinson does not rely on his more updated ways-of-appearing account of aesthetic properties. Indeed, it is not required to support the separability thesis.

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histories of use in connection with particular canons of criticism—can be explicitly cancelled, or disavowed, without semantic anomaly” (1994, p. 352). Levinson further insists that even if aesthetic terms did have an evaluative component, there would still be “a purely descriptive, but distinctively aesthetic, content in such attributions” (p. 352). ‘Gaudy’, he explains can be described as follows “bright, non-harmonious, eye-catching color combinations” (1994, p. 352;

2006, p. 318). Second, he contends that it’s possible to get disputing critics to agree on “the common perceptual ground in their aesthetic responses” (2006, p. 218).62 Finally, he says that without the descriptive content of aesthetic terms, it is difficult to explain “what competent critics with an evaluative difference of opinion could really be talking about” (p. 352).

Additionally, he says that unless we postulate “distinctive aesthetic impressions as the descriptive content of common aesthetic attributions” then we are unable to understand “what appreciators’ aesthetic experience—the basis of such attributions—could possibly consist in” (p.

352). Further, it would be very difficult to explain how some individuals approve of a work just because of its allegedly negative properties, like gaudiness (1994, p. 352). The existence of independent, perceptual aesthetic properties offers explanations for these things.

One might contend that many aesthetic properties appear to differ only in their respective evaluative implications which would suggest they are actually evaluative in their essence. For example, ‘bold’ and ‘gaudy’ could refer to the same set of properties, such as intense color, but each term implies a different attitude towards intense color. ‘Delicate’ and ‘anemic’ might refer to the same pastel color palette in a painting, but each implies a different attitude towards that pastel color palette. (2006, p. 319). This suggests that aesthetic terms reflect an attitude more than they identify objective properties. Levinson replies that even these cases indicate that the ascribers are reacting to an aesthetic property. He argues that the fact that we oftentimes lack an

62 John Bender strongly disagrees with this claim. I will discuss this in much more detail in chapter 3.

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ideal neutral word to describe our common aesthetic experience does not prove that there is no aesthetic property to which these terms refer (2006, p. 320).

This account fares quite well against the irresolvable dispute argument. Because aesthetic properties are “higher-order perceptual properties…which qualified parties grasp in common” (1994, p. 354) we have an objective set of properties to consider when assessing competing claims. As mentioned in chapter 1, other response-dependent accounts, like

Wiggins’ sensible subjectivism, are not as well equipped to answer the irresolvable dispute argument. The argument contends that even ideal critics, the most expert class of perceivers, can disagree about aesthetic attributions. Fitting attitude theories struggle to respond to scenarios in which even perfectly attuned agents can disagree (whether it is an ideal moral agent or an ideal aesthetic one). In Levinson’s account, he connects the response to a perceptual impression rather than a sentiment. Aesthetic properties, then, are not relativized to evaluative attitudes. Rather, they are dependent upon a sort of perception (Bender, 1996, 374-5). Perceptual objectivism combined with the non-evaluative analysis of aesthetic properties is uniquely equipped to handle the irresolvable dispute argument.

Because aesthetic properties are treated as non-evaluative in character, this approach is also uniquely situated to contend with naturalistic concerns. Clearly, work needs to be done to reconcile any realist view with the parsimony/explanatory challenge63, but the non-evaluative approach to aesthetic properties allows aesthetic properties to be more easily analyzed in an empirical manner. With a strong empirical grounding for descriptive aesthetic properties, I believe it is much more difficult to eliminate them from our ontology. Unfortunately, little has been done, so far, to bridge the gap between meta-aesthetics and empirical aesthetics. With

63 If an aesthetic property plays no causal role, then it ought to be eliminated from our ontology. The naturalistic objection is tied to this concern—if aesthetic properties are not natural properties then they cannot be considered causally efficacious.

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perceptual objectivism, I believe there are numerous possibilities to not only incorporate some findings from empirical aesthetics but also resolve some entrenched questions in meta-aesthetics.

One problem I have not yet considered is how these higher-order aesthetic properties relate to lower-order, non-aesthetic ones. To analyze this relation in more detail, I turn to the subject of aesthetic supervenience.

2.4 Supervenience

Aesthetic realists typically explain the relationship between non-aesthetic properties and aesthetic properties via a supervenience relation. Roughly, to say that A supervenes on B is to say that there can be no difference in the A-properties without a change in the B-properties.

Following Jaegwon Kim (1993), Gregory Currie explains that an aesthetic supervenience account can take two general forms: weak or strong. He tells us that an aesthetic property, A weakly supervenes on a non-aesthetic base property B “just in case necessarily, if two things have the same B-properties, they have the same A-properties” (p. 243). This is considered weak because, as Kim explains, it only “requires that within any possible world there not be two things agreeing in B but diverging in A” (p. 60). This means, of course, that an object judged to be graceful in this world could be judged garish in another without any change in the B-properties.

The critic Richard Roeper might judge The Godfather to be gritty and powerful in the actual world, while in some other possible world Richard Roeper* might judge it to be insipid. In contrast, strong supervenience holds that “however you imagine the circumstances to vary, if you suppose that the B-properties of a thing are unchanged; you must conclude that its A- properties are unchanged” (Currie, p. 244). Kim draws the contrast sharply with a moral example.

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Kim asks us to imagine that in the actual world, the property of ‘being a good man’ (G) supervenes on a set of properties: ‘being courageous’ (C), ‘being benevolent’ (B) and ‘being honest’ (H) (1993, p. 58). If (G) weakly supervenes on [C, B, & H], then two people in the actual world who have the properties of [C, B, & H] must both share the higher-order property of

(G) (p. 58). However, weak supervenience allows for the possibility of another world where

Smith, for example, has [C, B, & H] but is not considered a good man and therefore does not have the higher-order property of (G) despite having the proper supervenience base. This seems intuitively wrong in the ethical case and leads many to adopt strong moral supervenience.

According to strong moral supervenience, if (G) strongly supervenes on [C, B, & H], then in any possible world, someone who has the properties of [C, B, & H] also has the property of (G).

Kim explains that a supervenient property can have “alternative supervenience bases”, base properties that are “each sufficient for the supervening property” (p. 65). For example, St.

Francis might have the supervenient property of ‘being a good man’ because he has benevolence and honesty, while Socrates has the supervenient property of ‘being a good man’ because he has courage and honesty (p. 65). This is also true in the aesthetic case insofar as there are many ways in which a painting can be garish, e.g.

Kim argues that weak supervenience, in general, is problematic because he thinks it does not offer much in the way of explanation. Additionally, it runs afoul of our intuitions, especially in the moral case. The connection between moral traits and being a good person, Kim suggests,

“must be more than a de facto coincidence that varies from world to world” (1993, p. 60). The same concerns apply in the aesthetic case, though not to the same degree. Our intuitions about aesthetic properties tend to be more relativistic than our intuitions about moral properties.

However, as I argue in chapter 1, that is not always the case.

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There is another important component of supervenience to consider before deciding which version is necessary for perceptual objectivism to be plausible. Importantly, every supervenience thesis allows for an emergentist or a reductionist interpretation (Hick, p. 304).

Emergentists claim that the supervenient properties (like mental properties) are distinct from the subvenient base set. In other words, they cannot be reduced to the subvening base properties.

This thesis can be appealing to non-reductionists about higher order properties, like mental properties. It leads to problems, however, when it comes to scientific analysis. Reductionist accounts contend that supervenient properties, such as mental properties, can be reduced to their subvening base. Both reductionist and emergentist interpretations exist in the case of aesthetic supervenience.

Emergentist interpretations of supervenience have their own challenges. To briefly summarize the concept, holds that higher-order properties (e.g., mental properties) emerge in some manner from “complex arrangements of matter” (Crane, p. 208) and that these higher-order properties have distinct causal powers from their subvenient physical properties.

Importantly, emergentists hold that mental properties emerge “in a way that is inexplicable from the perspective of the sciences of matter” (Crane, p. 208). They say that this inexplicable relationship must be accepted with, in Samuel Alexander’s phrase borrowed from Wordsworth,

“natural piety” (Wilson, p. 40). This inexplicability is what makes emergentist accounts unacceptable to so many modern physicalist philosophers. That said, the approach has many prominent defenders and is by no means universally considered implausible. It’s also important to note that there are non-reductionist, physicalist interpretations of supervenience that are not

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explicitly emergentist.64 Ultimately, for perceptual objectivism, the most important point to emphasize is that any supervenience account it adopts must be non-reductionist.

Little has been done thus far to develop a supervenience account that fits with perceptual objectivism. Once again, we must turn to Frank Sibley and Jerrold Levinson for the beginnings of such an account. Frank Sibley never explicitly discussed aesthetic supervenience in his work, though he does suggest a supervenience account when he says that aesthetic properties depend on their non-aesthetic base properties. He also implies an emergentist interpretation when he argues for his negative-condition governing thesis. To recap, Sibley’s negative-condition governing thesis argues that certain non-aesthetic qualities can rule out aesthetic qualities but no combination of non-aesthetic qualities can guarantee the presence of certain aesthetic qualities.

Thus it is impossible to reduce an aesthetic quality like elegance to a conjunction of non- aesthetic, base properties, which rules out a reductionist interpretation for Sibley.

Jerrold Levinson, by contrast, is much more explicit about his supervenience claims and continues to refine his view in more recent work. I believe that his account correctly aims to ground aesthetic realism in a naturalistic way, but it needs some important modifications to fit within the perceptual objectivist framework and avoid certain supervenience pitfalls.

In Music, Art and Metaphysics (2011)65, Levinson develops a supervenience account which he categorizes as weak in Currie’s sense (Currie, p. 156). Levinson also defends an emergentist66 interpretation of the supervenience relation (2011, p. 140). That is, he argues that

“aesthetic attributes are ontologically distinct from whatever structural bases support them, and

64 Terry Horgan has developed such a view that he calls “Superdupervenience”. See: Horgan, Terrence. (1993). “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World”. Mind. 102 (408). Oct. 1993. P. 555-586. 65 Levinson draws on his (1983) essay “Aesthetic Supervenience” in the (2011) volume, but he does add some fairly substantive footnotes (p. 156-159). 66 Throughout this discussion, I will be using “emerge” in a thin sense to mean “not reducible to” (I thank Douglas Keaton for this helpful clarification).

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that they arise from them without in any sense including or comprising them in what they are”

(p. 140). Levinson initially characterized his view in the following way:

Two objects (e.g., artworks) that differ aesthetically, but neither contextually nor (purely) substructurally, necessarily differ structurally (i.e., in some perceivable but nonaesthetic feature; that is, there could not be two contextually and substructurally identical objects that were aesthetically different, yet structurally identical: fixing the structural properties of an object given its substructural and contextual ones already fixed, fixes its aesthetic properties) (p. 136).

Levinson states in a later footnote that he took his supervenience account to apply within a given world and not beyond (2011, p. 156). That is, Levinson’s supervenience account as stated above only applies to aesthetic objects within one world which makes it a weak supervenience account.

As we shall see, there are some drawbacks to adopting a weak version of aesthetic supervenience.

Levinson uses Mondrian’s Composition with Blue as a case study for emergent properties

(p. 149):

[T]he light gray—blue background carries with it a certain airiness, the deep blue square a decided coolness. Further, the structural relationship of the two colors yields a sense of . Finally, the configuration of four lines and [the] square, in its particular proportions and positionings, makes for a notable degree of stability and balance. All these aesthetic effects—the local airiness and coolness, the regional harmony, stability, and balance—somehow interact and coalesce, together perhaps with structural features I have not explicitly singled out, to give the overarching impression of tranquility and strength noted initially” (2011, p. 149-150).

Levinson believes that a reductionist account of aesthetic supervenience is simply incapable of capturing the idea of a holistic aesthetic impression like “tranquility” (p. 152). He suggests that a reductionist would say that the ‘coolness’ of the painting consists in a combination of its non-aesthetic features such as deep-blueness (2011, p. 152). Levinson believes the inadequacy of this is apparent. He contends that the existence of higher-order perceptual impressions makes more sense of our reactions. In other words, he believes that

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‘coolness’ does not just consist in ‘deep-blueness’ and rectilinearity of the primary lines (p. 152).

He concludes that there is a “distinct, holistic impression” that corresponds to our attribution of

‘coolness’ to the painting (p. 153). These impressions, he adds, “can be distinguished in the mind and none of them is the linear sum of any of the others” (p. 153).

Levinson’s discussion offers compelling evidence of why it is important for perceptual objectivism to adopt a non-reductionist account of supervenience. If aesthetic properties were collapsed into their non-aesthetic base properties, then one would be straightforwardly rejecting the real existence of higher-order, holistic aesthetic properties like elegance. That being said, modifications need to be made to Levinson’s original formulation (as he himself acknowledges).

I contend that his supervenience account must be strengthened for it to be of explanatory interest.

As Kim points out, “determination or dependence is naturally thought of as carrying a certain modal force” (p. 60). Weak supervenience lacks that modal force because it only applies within a given world. In what follows, I will consider some objections to Levinson’s weak supervenience view and suggest how the account might be strengthened.

Both Currie (1990) and Darren Hudson Hick (2012) argue that Levinson’s supervenience account is true, but uninteresting. The principal problems with the account are twofold: 1)

Levinson’s supervenience account is weak and 2) the base properties include contextual properties like art-historical properties. In order to fully grasp the difficulties with Levinson’s supervenience account, it is helpful to consider Hick’s re-description of it as a reference point:

If two artworks, x and y, are perceptually indistinguishable, physically indistinguishable, and are such that they belong to identical categories, were created by individuals with the same relevant properties, and so on, they will have the same aesthetic properties (p. 309).

Currie contends that this supervenience account “collapses into triviality” (p. 248) because Levinson includes contextual properties with the base properties. If you have two works

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x and y that have the same properties (including contextual properties), within the same world, then you necessarily must be referring to the same object. Currie puts it in clear terms: “…if the

B-properties are to include the kinds of historical properties that we have considered, it seems that two works with the same B-properties will be the same work” (p. 248). Hick shares Currie’s objections and puts it the following way, “There simply could not be two numerically distinct works in the same world that were structurally, substructurally, and contextually indistinguishable” (p. 309). Levinson’s account, therefore, is at least obviously true, if not entirely trivial as Currie suggests.67 Indeed, Levinson admits his first thesis was one without “all that much teeth” (p. 157). For naturalistic aesthetic realism to have any force, the supervenience account will need more strength.

Nick Zangwill emphasizes this issue in his critique of weak supervenience. He suggests that naturalistic aesthetic realism actually requires a strong supervenience thesis in order to

“make good the causal role of aesthetic properties” (2001, p. 181). In other words, if one claims that aesthetic properties are higher-order naturalistic properties then one must ground those properties in the natural world. Strong supervenience is one way to link these higher-order properties to their lower-order, base properties (2001, p. 181).68 Zangwill also contends that we have intuitions that support strong supervenience in the aesthetic case. He employs a compelling thought experiment from Wittgenstein to make this point: “Imagine this butterfly exactly as it is but not beautiful” (2001, p. 182). Zangwill (and Wittgenstein) suspects that most people will

67 Robert Fudge argues in “A Vindication of Strong Aesthetic Supervenience” that Levinson’s account is only trivial in the case of artworks (p. 164). He uses the example of a (p. 164). Fudge contends that there is no issue with imagining “two numerically distinct, but qualitatively identical appearing in different parts of the world” (p. 164). The trouble with this argument, however, is that Levinson intended his account to apply universally to aesthetic properties in nature and in art—it clearly does not do this. 68 Terence Horgan argues that strong supervenience is not adequate either and instead proposes “superdupervenience” (1993).

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find it difficult to imagine the butterfly’s twin having all of its non-aesthetic properties on another possible world and yet lack its aesthetic properties (in this case, beauty).69

Zangwill’s suggestion is prima facie appealing, but there are reasons why Levinson opted to go with a weaker supervenience account that need to be addressed. Levinson explains that it might be possible for the perceptual powers of beings to vary across worlds. This is clearly a problem for perceptual objectivism. Suppose Wittgenstein’s butterfly was shown to a group of aliens on another possible world who happen to have vastly different cognitive structure. They do have sensation, but let’s suppose it is entirely different from human perception (perhaps they are tetrachromats, or synethesetes). If strong supervenience is true, then the butterfly should be just as beautiful on that possible world as it is here on earth. Perceptual objectivism holds that making proper attributions of aesthetic properties depends upon the perceptual powers of beings and because those can vary across worlds (sometimes drastically) it looks like strong supervenience is not an option for perceptual objectivism. We appear to have a dilemma— accept strong supervenience and reject perceptual objectivism, or maintain perceptual objectivism and retreat to a weaker supervenience account. Levinson chose the latter, but I think he was too hasty.

One possible solution is to increase the strength of Levinson’s initial account without modifying what counts as base properties. Hick, for instance, believes that Levinson can easily shape his existing supervenience account into a stronger form by modifying what is included in the base set (aka the non-aesthetic properties). Hick’s formulation is designed to apply to artworks, but it could be reformulated in more general terms (as Levinson has done with his account). Hick suggests the following modification:

69 I do not wish to make any direct claims about beauty with this example. It simply raises a case of aesthetic supervenience where a strong version seems to make sense. The example might be modified using balance: Imagine the Parthenon exactly as it is, but not balanced.

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For any possible worlds, w and w*, and for any artworks x and y, if x in w has all of the same structural, substructural, and contextual properties as y in w*, and beings in w possess the same perceptual powers as beings in w*, then x in w is aesthetically indistinguishable from y in w* (p. 310).

This reformulation is appealing because it includes the perceptual powers qualifier that Levinson sought without abandoning a strong supervenience account. It is also able to explain how two artworks which are perceptually indistinguishable might nevertheless have different aesthetic properties. However, it does not fully escape the perceptual variation problem. Bender, for example, argues that strong supervenience does not work with response dependent properties because we cannot fix perceptual capacities across worlds (1987, p. 37). He uses a Cezanne painting as an example: “If human , for example, were very much more sensitive to than to , the interplay of colors in a Cezanne still life would no longer be subtle”

(1987, p. 37). By appealing to a standard perceiver, we’d be able to fix aesthetic properties within this world (weak supervenience), but it would be impossible to do so across worlds.

Thus, weak supervenience is acceptable, but strong is not.

This type of objection is no doubt what led Levinson to formulate a weak supervenience account in the first place. Robert Fudge, however, argues that strong supervenience does work with response dependent properties. He uses Bender’s Cezanne example to draw this out:

Now suppose there is a world, w, at which (1) there exists a painting physically identical to the Cezanne (call it w-Cezanne), and (2) all the sentient beings at w (w-beings) have different sensory apparatus from ours. Presumably, the w-beings will not perceive w- Cezanne as subtle. But, we can still ask whether w-Cezanne is subtle. If the Cezanne’s subtlety is defined in terms of its disposition to cause beings like us to have certain sensory/cognitive reactions, and w-Cezanne is qualitatively identical to the Cezanne in this world, then w-Cezanne must also be subtle, though no w-creature perceives it as such (p. 167).

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Given this, we might say that in all worlds physically similar to our own, “any painting B- indiscernible from the Cezanne must be subtle” (Fudge, p, 167).70 Strong supervenience, then, does work with a response-dependent account of aesthetic properties, logically speaking.

However, it is still not clear that it does much to explain the link between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic properties. Fudge suggests that this account suggests a “weaker entailment relation, like physical necessity” (p. 167). Physical (or nomological) necessitation tells us that the higher-order properties are necessitated by the lower-order properties given the laws of nature. This type of necessitation is weaker than metaphysical necessitation.71 Levinson, in fact, thought it might be too weak (2011, p. 156). Nevertheless, we can conclude that a strong form of

Levinson’s supervenience account, as outlined by Hick, is plausible even if it seems to be fairly modest.

More recently, Levinson has suggested a stronger link between perceptual properties and aesthetic properties than he initially did. In a series of footnotes discussing his original supervenience account, Levinson explains that aesthetic supervenience is a relation between

“two classes of fundamentally or primarily descriptive properties” (p. 157). He emphasizes that it may be “metaphysically necessary” that aesthetic properties are tied to “lower-level perceptual properties, even if those vary from world to world” (p. 157). He seems to acknowledge Currie’s suggestion that aesthetic properties do not strongly supervene on contextual properties and that therefore the contextual properties may not be a necessary part of the supervenience base (p.

156). All of this suggests that Levinson would be more amenable to an approach like Currie’s than he initially was. Given this, it is worth briefly considering Currie’s view.

70 When Fudge says ‘B-indiscernible’ he means any painting that has identical base properties as the Cezanne. 71 Philosophical zombies (individuals who are indiscernible from normal human beings and yet lack ) are metaphysically possible but they are not nomologically/physically possible. Thus, metaphysical necessitation is stronger than nomological.

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In Currie’s view the contextual properties, like art historical properties, must be eliminated from the base (p. 251). He argues instead that “a work’s aesthetic properties strongly supervene on its powers to affect us” (p. 251). Currie goes further and contends that art- historical properties are not essential properties and therefore do not need to be included in the subvening base (p. 254, 257). Currie clarifies that he thinks the aesthetic properties of a work supervene on the powers a work has to affect us and not on how they actually affect us. This explains how two different people may view the same work and have very different aesthetic experiences. He says: “Powers are dispositions, and dispositions are not always activated” (p.

252). A might have the power to move its audience, and yet not everyone in that audience will be moved (p. 252). This does not change the fact that the work has such a power to affect us. This suggests that an aesthetic object has certain “intrinsic properties” (p. 253)—the power to affect us resides in the object. This makes Currie’s account sound like the constituted- disposition account of aesthetic properties discussed above.

By eliminating the contextual properties from the base (i.e. the B-properties), Currie’s account makes it easier to deal with concerns about perceptual variation. As Hick notes, Currie’s insistence that A-properties do not supervene on the way an object actually affects a viewer, prevents a problem with mixed worlds—that is a world where two objects can share identical B- properties and have different A-properties (p. 310-311). This is an undoubtedly appealing aspect of the view, but it, of course, has its own problems.

Currie’s view successfully bans mixed worlds but it appears to offer no clear way to individuate aesthetic properties. If Smith finds a painting to be ‘elegant’ and Jones finds it

‘inelegant’, Currie’s account contends that the A-property in question does not change, but the perceiver’s reactions do. Hick suggests that this actually makes the account too relativistic. He

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argues that Currie’s model of aesthetic supervenience implies that an object’s A-properties

“consist in a series of infinite or nearly infinite conjuncts factoring over all of its powers to affect individuals of every possible type under each possible condition of perception” (p. 311).

Characterized in this way, Currie’s account indeed appears to be too relativistic for the aesthetic realist. Hick echoes this and contends that Currie’s account only tells us what it is like for an object to appear elegant (p. 311). This suggests that no object actually has the property of elegance, rather only the “power of appearing elegant to some individuals under some circumstances” (p. 311). Viewed this way, Currie’s account is really just another version of the ways-of-appearing view of aesthetic properties that I rejected above. Given this, I cannot accept his account as is, but I do believe his strategy of eliminating the contextual properties from the base, is still worth exploring.

Currently, I think perceptual objectivism would be wise to adopt the strong version of

Levinson’s supervenience account. As noted above, I think it does not do much to explain the relationship between aesthetic properties and non-aesthetic properties. Despite this, it does give us a non-reductive, naturalistic supervenience account that treats aesthetic properties in a dispositional way without ignoring the significance of contextual properties. Thus, I do not think perceptual objectivism can go wrong in adopting this account, but I do believe seeking a more satisfying supervenience account is an important area of future research for perceptual objectivism.

Levinson has some further helpful comments concerning aesthetic supervenience that tie in nicely with one of the overarching themes of this dissertation—namely that philosophers in aesthetics rely too heavily on metaethics to develop their accounts of aesthetic properties. He contends that aesthetic supervenience should be more carefully distinguished from moral

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supervenience than it usually is (2011, p. 157). He believes that aesthetic supervenience actually has more in common with psychophysical supervenience, that is, supervenience of mental properties on physical properties, than it does with moral supervenience which involves the supervenience of value properties on physical properties. In this discussion, he suggests that moral supervenience may turn out to be more of a linguistic construction, a “rational consistency requirement” (p. 157).72 He contrasts this with the “nomological-level dependencies within perceptual experience that are the crux of supervenience in the aesthetic case” (p. 157). In other words, Levinson takes his supervenience account to be a metaphysical one, not just a linguistic one. Importantly, Levinson distinguishes between aesthetic value supervenience and aesthetic supervenience simpliciter (p. 158). He explains that his account of supervenience is not meant to be an account of value supervenience and suggests that the two types of supervenience are

“manifestly not the same” (p. 158). Unfortunately, Levinson does not actually explain what the difference between aesthetic supervenience and aesthetic value supervenience actually is. He may have something in mind like Nick Zangwill’s “verdictive” aesthetic properties as opposed to

“substantive” aesthetic properties. In Zangwill’s account, verdictive aesthetic properties, like beauty, supervene on substantive aesthetic properties like balance, which in turn supervene on non-aesthetic properties, like colors.73

Despite the lack of specificity in his analysis, I think Levinson’s distinction between aesthetic value supervenience and aesthetic supervenience simpliciter is helpful to a point. I do not wish to argue, and perceptual objectivism need not argue that there are two different types of aesthetic properties that supervene on objects (as Zangwill does). One does not have to

72 Levinson is here referring to views such as prescriptivism and projectivism in metaethics. I do not wish to suggest that either view is true. The contrast Levinson draws does not depend on the truth of prescriptivism or projectivism in metaethics. 73 Zangwill calls this a “three-layered cake” (2001, p. 19).

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hypothesize, for example, the existence of aesthetic value properties and aesthetic descriptive properties. I think this introduces confusion. I believe it is possible for the perceptual objectivist--this is one way in which I believe the view needs to diverge from Levinson--to bite the bullet and contend that aesthetic properties just are descriptive properties. Ultimately, I believe this is the most controversial element of the perceptual objectivist view. In chapter 3, I will analyze the most persistent, and potent, critiques of this view.

2.5 Conclusion

In the following chapters, I defend the perceptual objectivist framework as I have outlined it here. While this framework is rooted in the work of Sibley and Levinson, it is not limited to either philosopher’s view. As I see it, perceptual objectivism has two crucial features:

(1) a dispositional realist model of aesthetic properties (i.e. the perceptual model) and (2) the descriptive analysis of aesthetic properties. As I have noted above, the response dependent model of aesthetic properties is not at all uncommon in aesthetics among both realists and anti- realists. It is (2) that generates the most controversy. I contend, however, that the descriptive analysis of aesthetic properties not only dispatches some criticisms of realism like the irresolvable dispute argument, it also bolsters the perceptual model in general. The remainder of this dissertation is devoted to building up the two pillars of perceptual objectivism. Because so much rests on the success of the non-evaluative analysis, I will spend the bulk of my time refining and defending the view that aesthetic properties are fundamentally descriptive in character.

In chapter 3, I defend the non-evaluative analysis from some persistent objections. I ultimately conclude that Bender’s naturalistic critique is a serious concern. In chapter 4, I

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consider some possible ways that empirical aesthetics (in particular neuroaesthetics) can help investigate the empirical plausibility of the non-evaluative analysis. In chapter 5, I will employ the strengthened non-evaluative analysis to defend the perceptual model itself.

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Chapter 3: Defending the Non-Evaluative Analysis of Aesthetic Properties

To briefly recap, the descriptive, or non-evaluative analysis74 treats aesthetic properties as higher-order phenomenal impressions of an aesthetic sort. This means that perceiving aesthetic properties would not require any special evaluative perception. Further, it means that aesthetic judgments are not necessarily evaluative ones. I explained, however, that perceptual objectivism must offer a renewed defense of the descriptive analysis and take seriously more recent attempts to undermine the view.

In this chapter, I consider three broad attacks on the descriptive analysis represented by

John Bender, Roman Bonzon and Rafael De Clercq. All three of these critiques challenge what I call the separability thesis which contends that evaluative reactions to aesthetic properties can be separated from the objective, perceptual content of an aesthetic experience thereby leaving us with the non-evaluative core of the property. In Bender’s case, he argues that even if some form of the separability thesis were granted, perceptual objectivism fails to counteract the irresolvable dispute argument levelled against aesthetic realism. Rafael De Clercq contends that aesthetic properties in fact have variable polarity rather than no polarity. Bonzon, drawing on the work of

McDowell and Wiggins, contends that we simply would have no epistemic access to aesthetic properties without taking an evaluative standpoint and therefore the descriptive approach is untenable.

I argue that all three approaches fail to defeat perceptual objectivism. However, I allow that Bender’s criticism of perceptual objectivism on empirical grounds is of special concern for my view. I have argued that perceptual objectivism provides a uniquely attractive framework

74 Specifically, as it is seen in perceptual objectivism.

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for the methodological (and substantive) naturalist. Thus, a challenge to the empirical plausibility of the account is significant.

3.1 Bender and Irresolvable Perceptual Disputes

John Bender is sympathetic to aesthetic realism, but ultimately rejects the view (2003).

In a 2001 article, Bender acknowledges that traditional arguments against realism, such as the irresolvable dispute argument, do not affect the perceptual objectivist model (p. 75).75 Indeed, the descriptive account of aesthetic properties is unaffected by evidence that even expert critics can disagree about how to evaluate an aesthetic object. Bender, however, thinks that perceptual objectivism is still subject to a variation of the irresolvable dispute argument. To make this clear, he draws a distinction between aesthetic “sensibility” which refers to one’s evaluative preferences (e.g. you think sweetness is always a good making feature of a dessert) and

“sensitivity” which is one’s capacity to detect value-neutral aesthetic properties like balance (p.

76). According to Bender, the original irresolvable dispute argument pertains to aesthetic sensibility. To counter perceptual objectivism, he offers cases of variation in aesthetic sensitivity rather than just cases of differing aesthetic sensibility.

Bender draws on empirical evidence to help make the case that widespread variation in aesthetic sensitivity exists. He tells us that, among normal humans, olfactory ability can vary up to 4,000 fold in cases such as detecting “substances such as lemon and ” (p. 76). He also notes that sensitivity to odors and sweetness varies throughout the day and almost 1/3 of

Americans are “insensitive to the bitter taste of phenylthiourea” (p. 76). The ability to taste

75 The argument from relativity, as outlined in chapter 1, contends that our aesthetic responses are simply too variable and inconsistent to create the basis for any objectivist account of aesthetic properties. The irresolvable dispute argument is a variation of the argument from relativity. It argues that even expert critics can disagree about what aesthetic properties should be attributed to an object. If even expert critics lack consistent aesthetic responses to the same object, there is little reason to believe there are objective aesthetic properties.

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phenylthiourea is an inherited trait.76 The sensitivity difference in this case, then, is caused by a genotypic difference. He cites a study indicating that 25% of Americans are “supertasters” who can process 25% percent more on their taste receptors than normal people (p. 76). He also produces an interesting wine-tasting example. Bender explains that 5% of bottled wines are

“tainted, or “corked” owing to a substance in improperly processed corks” (p. 76). Not everyone is equally sensitive to the “corked” taste and because of this, at least according to taste researcher, Christian Butzke of UC Davis, you see many different descriptions by different tasters of the same wine (p. 76). A “corked” taste is not a desirable quality in a wine. It is caused by a chemical called ‘TCA’ (2,4,6-trichloroanisole). James Laube with Wine Spectator notes the following, “At lower levels, TCA taint merely strips a wine of its flavor, making normally rich, fruity wines taste dull or muted, without imparting a noticeable defect” (Laube,

2007). However, not all tasters are equally sensitive to TCA. Thus, you could have two wine tasters who come up with completely different descriptions of a particular wine based on their sensitivity to TCA.

Bender believes cases like this undermine perceptual objectivism because it involves a perceptual difference rather than an attitudinal difference. He suggests that insisting that aesthetic properties produce consistent phenomenal impressions is “as unpersuasive as arguing that if the same degree of heat warms one person while causing burning pain in another, there is nevertheless a shared phenomenal impression of heat in the two cases, because both are registrations of heat” (p. 78). Bender develops an aesthetic version of this argument:

When A finds this Chablis searingly acidic while B finds it refreshingly brisk, A and B are having different experiences of the acidity of the wine, not different attitudinal reactions to one and the same phenomenal impression…A’s greater sensitivity to a

76 Phenylthiourea (aka Phenylthiocarbamide) is a compound used in genetics research. To some people it tastes very bitter, while others cannot taste it at all. The ability to taste it is governed by a gene. inherited as a dominant trait. It is intensely bitter to about 70 per cent of the population and nearly tasteless to the rest.” (King et al.).

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physical-structural feature of the wine (its total acidity) causes A to have a gustatory experience of the wine, which A finds warrants describing the wine as “searing” and if this aesthetic feature ruins the wine for A, it will ultimately be cited as (one of) A’s reasons for evaluating the wine as inferior. B experiences the acidity in a different, less intense way, which B finds warrants describing the wine as “brisk” and evaluating it more highly than did A (p. 78).

According to Bender, this case is an example of a “paradigm aesthetic disagreement” in which there is “no underlying shared experience or impression in terms of which we can shelter our realist predilections” (p. 79). If Bender’s analysis is right, this is a clear problem for the objectivist approach. This case suggests that people, even trained critics, do not in fact share common aesthetic impressions and could possibly arrive at an irresolvable dispute at that level.

In other words, critics not only reach stalemates when it comes to assigning value to an aesthetic object, they can also face intractable disputes about the phenomenal impressions produced by a certain aesthetic object. This suggests that objectivity is just as elusive at the descriptive level.

Bender’s sustained critique presents some issues requiring careful analysis. As I see it,

Bender’s argument has essentially the following structure:

P1. Aesthetic sensitivity, which concerns of neutral aesthetic properties, is distinct from aesthetic sensibility which involves one’s evaluative standpoint.

P2. If there are stable phenomenal impressions of an aesthetic sort, we should expect very little variation in aesthetic sensitivity.

P3. But empirical evidence suggests that there is significant variation in aesthetic sensitivity (e.g., supertasters.).

P4. Different sensitivities lead to different experiences of the same property (as in the acidic wine dispute).

P5. Different experiences plausibly constitute different phenomenal impressions of that property.

P6. It is unlikely that there are widespread, shared phenomenal impressions of an aesthetic sort.

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C. Therefore, perceptual objectivism fails to establish the objectivity of perceptual aesthetic judgments.

An obvious approach would be to deny Bender’s empirical premise. One could suggest that the empirical evidence does not establish, beyond doubt, that there is variation among human beings when it comes to aesthetic sensitivity. Levinson attempts something along these lines when he suggests that people differ more significantly in their sensitivities where taste and smell are concerned (Bender, 2001, p. 80). Levinson does not provide much in the way of empirical support, however, and Bender’s basic point is sound: perceptual variation exists. It is not enough to simply assert that gustation and olfaction are different from other modalities, or to imply that they are not truly relevant to aesthetics.77

Luckily, this approach is not necessary for the defense of perceptual objectivism. The mere existence of perceptual variation is not enough to show that disputes based on this variation are irresolvable. Non-evaluative response-dependent accounts (like color realism) have been contending with such issues for centuries. Bender’s approach ultimately reveals that he has not taken seriously the suggestion that aesthetic properties might be more like color properties than they are like moral properties. I think this is especially obvious in the warmth example.

In the following warmth analogy, Bender suggests that two people (call them Bob and

Sue) can feel the same degree of heat (suppose they are sitting at a fire in the living room) and have two different experiences. Bob says the room feels warm while Sue says the room temperature is searingly hot (p. 78). According to Bender, Bob and Sue each have a different phenomenal impression of the room’s temperature. He contends that any suggestion that Bob and Sue are having the same phenomenal impression would be “unpersuasive” (2001, p. 78). I

77 Levinson was not necessarily implying this, but it is a potential danger of rejecting Bender’s basic point.

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disagree. An obvious reply to this case would be to say that Bob and Sue are in fact having the same phenomenal impression of the room’s warmth, but they just have different preferences when it comes to heat. Bob simply likes a room to be that warm while Sue is made very uncomfortable by that level of heat. Consider the example again, but this time with a cold temperature. Bob likes to keep the AC set around 80 degrees so that the house never drops below that temperature. Sue finds this absurdly hot so she lowers it to 68 degrees. Bob and Sue might very well agree that the house is 80 degrees but they will disagree about whether or not it’s comfortable. This does not actually mean that they are having different phenomenal impressions of the temperature of the room. Rather, they have different preferences about temperature. A difference in preference would be a sensibility differences and not a sensitivity difference.

Bender would likely reply to this that Bob and Sue are not having a disagreement about their temperature preferences. They are disagreeing more fundamentally about what temperature the room actually is. This would make their dispute a sensitivity based one rather than a sensibility based one. Bender seems to think this leads to some kind of stalemate for the perceptual objectivist, but this is not the case. Suppose we ask Bob and Sue to tell us how hot (in degrees) they think the sitting room has become. Bob says it is 80° and Sue says 110°.

According to Bender, we have to accept that Bob and Sue are having different phenomenal impressions and that’s that. It is open to the realist, however, to argue that one of them is simply wrong. In this case, it is possible to independently measure the temperature of the room (chances are Bob is correct). If it turns out that Sue is wildly inaccurate in her temperature assessment then perhaps she falls outside of the class of standard perceivers. Establishing what constitutes that class is a problem unto itself, but Bender does not even engage with this possibility. I believe similar problems plague his aesthetic version of this dispute.

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In the example, Bender provides, A and B disagree about what aesthetic term to apply to a very acidic wine. Bender insists that A and B are not having sensibility based differences with respect to phenomenal impressions. Instead, he says they are having “different experiences” of the wine’s acidity (p. 78). Bender designed the case to mirror the heat example. I think the case is similar, but perhaps even more flawed. It is not at all clear that this disagreement between A and B is related only to sensitivity differences. In the heat example, Bob and Sue were ostensibly disagreeing about how hot the room actually was—not just whether or not they liked or disliked the heat level. In the wine example, it is not easy to discern if A and B are disagreeing about the phenomenal impression generated by the wine, or about whether or not they liked it.

Bender says that A has a greater sensitivity to the wine’s total acidity which leads him to label the wine as “searing”. This description of A’s judgment, however, sounds quite close to a sensibility based decision. A does not like very acidic tastes so he labeled the wine as “searing”.

B is not quite so averse to total acidity so he labeled the wine as “brisk”. Bender tells us these ascriptions “searing” and “brisk” are non-evaluative, but the way he has constructed the case makes it sound like a standard sensibility based difference. Person A doesn’t like highly acidic wine and B does. I suggest that we view this dispute as a subtle sensibility based disagreement.

I believe it is perfectly reasonable to suggest that A and B had the same phenomenal impression of the wine’s acidity. It’s just that one happened to like it and the other did not.

Not so fast, Bender might say. The terms “searing” and “brisk” are non-evaluative terms referring to value-neutral aesthetic properties. It just so happens that A and B have different opinions about which value-neutral aesthetic properties are present in the wine because they have had different experiences. Bender suggests we think of the dispute as really being one about the

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balance of the wine. Person A thinks the wine is unbalanced (too acidic) while B thinks it is balanced. For Bender, this is a “paradigm aesthetic disagreement” (p. 79). Once again, if you take seriously the perceptual objectivist claim that aesthetic properties are in fact value-neutral properties of an object that one can correctly or incorrectly identify, this objection has less force.

If the dispute is not, in fact, a sensibility based one (as I believe it is in the wine example), we could appeal to standard conditions and standard perceivers to assess the disputants’ claims. In the acidic wine case, it’s possible that A is far too biased against acidic wine. Perhaps he’s had a recent brain injury that makes him disproportionately taste acid. Alternatively, B might be biased in some way. In other words, A and B might not be standard perceivers.

Bender recognizes that the gustatory example might be immediately disqualified by a realist (p. 80).78 I have not chosen to do so, but I think his second example shows just as clearly that his objections based on aesthetic sensitivity miss the mark. Bender explains that Piet

Mondrian is well known for his attention to spatial balance in his works (p. 81). He notes that

Mondrian had a “scrupulous awareness” of all the “identifiable interrelationships between the elements of the works” that result in the impression of spatial balance (p. 81). In other words,

Mondrian has heightened sensitivity to spatial balance. Now suppose another painter believes he has achieved a similar balanced effect in one of his own . When the expert Mondrian sees this work, however, he believes it was unsuccessful in achieving spatial balance (p. 81).

When Mondrian points to specific elements of the work that make it fail to achieve balance, the other painter rejects the analysis. In this case, Mondrian has one view and the other painter has

78 Bender points out two possible objections. He first notes the “wine is not art” objection which contends that wine tasters simply aren’t engaging with aesthetic properties and aesthetic evaluations. Bender is skeptical of this reply (p. 80). I agree with Bender that this objection is weak, especially from the point of view of perceptual objectivism. The second objection he considers is from Levinson who suggests (rather than truly argues) that people likely differ more when it comes to smell and taste than they do with respect to other senses (p. 80).

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his own. According to Bender, they have reached an irresolvable dispute that is based in aesthetic sensitivity (p. 81).

I think Bender is not seriously engaging with perceptual objectivism in this instance. An aesthetic dispute of this sort is not a stalemate. If the two disputants disagree, as Mondrian and the imaginary painter do, the next step is to consider their claims against the backdrop of standard perceivers and standard conditions. As I mentioned earlier, I think it makes sense to appeal to an ideal critic in the case of an artwork because establishing the proper context (i.e. the appropriate conditions for making aesthetic perceptual judgments) requires some knowledge of art. It would not make sense, for example, to appeal to a consensus of random viewers, although in the spatial balance example such a consensus might be relevant).79

Interestingly, Bender seems to reject the idea that any objective standards could be introduced in the case of aesthetic sensitivity. For instance, he holds that aesthetic sensitivity disputes might be even more intractable than sensibility based disputes because “we would never think it appropriate to suggest that people with divergent sensitivities ought to be coming to the same aesthetic descriptions and evaluations of the same works” (2001, p. 79). This is question- begging, however, because the perceptual objectivist is claiming that we ought to, and can, come up with standard conditions, standard perceivers, or ideal perceivers. This, of course, means that some opinions will be invalidated. In the Mondrian example, analysis might (and probably will show) that Mondrian’s judgment is more accurate. Bender rejects out of hand the notion that

79 For example, McManus et al. designed a binary choice experiment in which 52 subjects were shown a pseudo- Mondrian next to a real Mondrian and asked to give a preference rating. The subjects preferred the real Mondrian 54% of the time which led McManus et al. to conclude that there was something about the Mondrian, perhaps its balance, which made it preferable (McManus, p. 181). This experiment is obviously not decisive support of my view (indeed it is even about preference ratings) but it suggests that there might be some consensus about which paintings achieve a high degree of spatial balance.

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perceivers’ sensitivities could be “calibrated”80 to ensure that their experiences can be compared.

Bender is much too hasty in this regard. I think such calibration is possible and it would be helpful to look to the philosophy of color for some guidance.

There is a longstanding debate in the color literature concerning the implications of variation in color experience. A famous example of this comes from an experiment conducted by Hurvich et al. (1968). The experiment was performed on a group of “color normal” subjects.

A “color normal” for the human species is a trichromat (Hardin, p. 78). For most experiments, the subjects are compared against the “average observer” which is an average of a large sample of actual color normals (Hardin, p. 89). This is the 1931 C.I.E.81 average observer (Hardin, p.

89). The C.I.E. developed mathematically defined color spaces and an objectively defined human observer based on data taken from a large group of humans with normal color vision.

The standard observer is actually a numerical representation of the typical human observer. In the experiment, Hurvich et al. asked 50 color normals to locate unique (or true) on a nanometer scale. The majority placed true green around the 490-520nm mark. That alone is a fairly significant amount of variation, but a number of subjects placed true green well outside those parameters (Hardin, p. 79; Cohen p. 24). Similarly, according to Bender, the mere existence of this type of disagreement in the aesthetic case is enough to render perceptual objectivism untenable. There is, not surprisingly, a traditional response from dispositional realists about color that is relevant to the aesthetic case.

A standard dispositional color realist account would argue that color disagreements can be resolved by appealing to a standard observer in standard conditions (Cohen, p. 30). This would not only include giving an account of something like a mathematical model of a normal

80 This is Levinson’s term (2001) 81 (The International Commission on Illumination)

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color perceiver (such as the C.I.E. observer) but also giving an account of what the standard conditions might be. It might be the case that many “normal” color perceivers have responses that are not 100% consistent with the objectively defined standard observer.82 I do not think we should expect a 100% match between the responses of actual perceivers and the standard observer. Indeed, the reason for developing a standard observer is to eliminate some of the

“noise” introduced by perceptual variation. Thus, we can expect some of the responses of actual observers to be different from the standard observer. That said, in the case of color, there is often a great deal of consistency. Most people with normal color vision, for example, place true yellow at 577nm (Hardin, fn. 19, p. 199).

In the aesthetic case, developing an account of a standard observer would clearly be tricky, although some authors have begun to tackle this issue.83 Much more empirical work needs to be done, however, in order to begin developing standards for human aesthetic perception. It may ultimately be simpler just to appeal to standard perceptual conditions for the different modalities. Some cases might be straightforward examples of non-normal perceivers and/or non-normal conditions. A color-blind person, for instance, would be an obvious example of a non-normal color perceiver. If a color-blind person disagreed with a standard color perceiver about the properties of a Matisse painting we could point to the difference in perceptual capacities to help resolve the dispute.

A particularly interesting example of a non-standard perceiver comes from Aldous

Huxley. In his book The Doors of Perception, Huxley describes his perceptual experiences

82 This is one of the points that Hurvich et al. wanted to make in their analysis of the experiment involving true green (Hardin, p. 89). 83 Elizabeth Ashley Zeron has broached this topic in her dissertation, “A dispositional account of aesthetic properties”, State University of New York at Buffalo.

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following a dose of mescaline. At one point, he is overwhelmed looking at a chair in his garden.

He says the chair looks like the “Last Judgment”, but also describes it as beautiful:

That chair--shall I ever forget it? Where the shadows fell on the canvas upholstery, stripes of a deep but glowing alternated with stripes of an incandescence so intensely bright that it was hard to believe that they could be made of anything but blue fire. For what seemed an immensely long time I gazed without knowing, even without wishing to know, what it was that confronted me. At any other time I would have seen a chair barred with alternate light and shade. The event was this succession of azure furnace doors separated by gulfs of unfathomable gentian. It was inexpressibly wonderful, wonderful to the point, almost, of being terrifying (p. 11).

If a normal person were to view the chair at the same time as Huxley, she would no doubt disagree with him about what aesthetic terms to apply to the chair. Because Huxley is high on mescaline, it would be plausible to conclude that he falls outside the class of standard perceivers.

I have not offered a positive account of how to define a standard aesthetic perceiver, but this example highlights a case in which appealing to a standard aesthetic perceiver makes sense. If two individuals disagree about which neutral aesthetic terms apply to a particular object it does not lead to a stalemate as Bender seems to think. The Huxley case is obviously an instance of non-standard perception. One perceiver is high on mescaline, and the other is not. In this case, perceptual objectivism contends that one perceiver is incorrect, namely Huxley because he is a non-standard perceiver. Defining the standard aesthetic perceiver would involve giving an account of standard human . That is not necessarily a simple matter, but it would clearly rule out the judgments of perceivers under the influence of mescaline. This provides a clear example of how perceptual objectivism can appeal to standard perception conditions for various sensory modalities when adjudicating aesthetic disputes. This approach is obviously further complicated when we move out of the realm of general aesthetic perception and consider deeper artistic analysis. The standard perceiving conditions in artistic cases would involve some account of historical background, genre, the current viewing context of the piece

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(e.g. is it in a museum?) and perhaps even the artist’s intentions depending on your point of view. Nevertheless, outlining standard perceiving conditions for aesthetic properties in general cases would be relevant to artistic analysis as well.

Bender is, of course, aware of standard dispositionalist replies to perceptual variation arguments and he could no doubt offer a critique of that reply. The fact that he does not engage with that debate suggests to me that he has not taken seriously his own distinction between aesthetic sensitivity and aesthetic sensibility. He claims that even anti-realists can make use of the distinction (p. 77), but his argument seems designed to show that there is considerable overlap between aesthetic sensitivity and aesthetic sensibility. He says, for example, that

“differences of sensitivity can affect both one’s disposition to see the work in a certain phenomenal way and one’s dispositions to judge it positively or negatively”: (p. 79). In the wine example, it is fairly clear that Bender is transitioning to a difference of sensibility. This is consistent with Bender’s view that aesthetic properties exist on a neutral-evaluative continuum and are not obviously separable into an evaluative and a non-evaluative component. For Bender, the only features of an aesthetic object that people (or critics) can objectively agree upon are the non-aesthetic features (like total acidity). I believe that Bender’s criticism never truly engages perceptual objectivism and fails to give a convincing rebuttal to the dispositionalist solution to perceptual variation arguments.

Bender, however, also critiques the empirical implications of perceptual objectivism.

Even though it is connected to his overall argument strategy, I believe the empirical critique requires separate consideration.

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3.1a Bender’s Empirical Critique

Leaning on his argument from widespread variation in both perceptual abilities and aesthetic sensitivity, Bender argues that the very idea of an aesthetic phenomenal impression is highly suspect and empirically inadequate. This charge is significant for any perceptual objectivist, but it is especially serious for my account because I have argued that perceptual objectivism is plausible from a naturalistic point of view.

Bender argues that perceptual objectivism cannot simply assert that some phenomenal impression is shared by people or expert critics who disagree about what aesthetic properties a particular object has (p. 375). Bender correctly notes that advocates of perceptual objectivism do not offer much in the way of an account of these phenomenal impressions (p. 375). In Bender’s view, the only perception we can be certain people are sharing is non-aesthetic in character

(1996, p. 375). He notes that Levinson’s own account of “gaudy”, designed to showcase a unique aesthetic impression, comes dangerously close to a non-aesthetic description: “bright and nonharmonious colors” (Levinson, 1994, p. 352). Bender contends that to insist that the wine tasters are sharing an experience over and above the non-aesthetic would be to “embrace rather boldly phenomenological entities of a shadowy and questionable nature” (p. 375). In this naturalistic vein, Bender adds that the Levinsonian approach to aesthetic properties implies a peculiar (aesthetic) psychology that is considerably more cumbersome than alternatives.

Bender believes the cognitive story implied by perceptual objectivism is overly complex and not plausible. He uses an example of a person labeling Tchaikovsky’s 4th symphony as

“bombastic” to highlight this complexity. First, perceptual objectivism claims that the perceiver registers an exuberant quality of the symphony. Second, the perceiver ascribes the evaluation added term “bombastic” which requires awareness of value-neutral aesthetic properties and then

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an awareness of their own evaluative reaction (p. 375). This process he says, “requires both an awareness of the neutral aesthetic feature of the symphony and a reaction to it” (p. 375). This is in contrast to the ascription of an allegedly descriptive property like “exuberance” which apparently only requires “one’s directly experiencing this phenomenal content” (p. 375). Bender believes that to perceive an evaluation-added property like gaudiness is no more complex than it is to see a non-evaluative property of balance or cheerfulness (p. 375). In other words, Bender believes perceptual objectivism offers a picture in which perceiving evaluative properties, like

‘bombastic’, is more cognitively complex than perceiving a value-neutral aesthetic property like

“exuberance”. Bender believes we do not experience aesthetic properties in this way (p. 375).84

However, because Bender does not give an empirical account of what is actually occurring when one experiences Tchaikovsky’s 4th symphony, his objection ends up being one about the phenomenology of aesthetic experience.

Nevertheless, this objection is valid in principle. If perceptual objectivism grossly misrepresents aesthetic perception (according to the best science available) then it fails as a methodologically (and substantively) naturalistic theory of aesthetic properties. Thus, I do believe that Bender’s empirical criticism is significant for my view.

There seem to be two major claims in Bender’s empirical critique: (1) perceptual objectivism does not offer concrete evidence that people can and do have higher-order phenomenal aesthetic impressions of a non-evaluative sort and (2) perceptual objectivism implies an overly complicated view of aesthetic perception (p. 375). Criticism (1) will be the focus of chapter 4, but something must be said about (2) first.

84 Bender believes that the “processes by which we apply evaluatively loaded concepts” are not different from the cognitive processes by which we apply evaluatively neutral concepts (p. 375).

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Perceptual objectivism need not claim, as Bender seems to think it does, that a person is running two cognitive programs as it were: non-evaluative aesthetic perception and evaluative aesthetic perception. The view does not necessarily imply this characterization and I would like to openly reject it. The perceptual objectivist should instead claim that a person can perceive a higher-order phenomenal impression like “gaudiness” in a non-evaluative way. When it comes to evaluation, the is not having a second sort of perception. Bender seems to think that evaluation added terms like “gaudy” are considered to have both an evaluative and a descriptive component. Some authors, like Roman Bonzon and Rafael De Clercq (more on them later) treat evaluation-added properties (that is “thick” aesthetic properties) as containing both an evaluative and a non-evaluative component, but perceptual objectivism does not. Indeed, one of the defining features of perceptual objectivism is the separability thesis. The separability thesis contends that evaluative reactions to aesthetic properties can be separated from the objective, perceptual content of an aesthetic experience thereby leaving us with the non-evaluative core of the property. Thus, I do not claim, and need not claim, that it takes some special form of perception, over and above non-evaluative aesthetic perception to see the gaudiness of a painting. It is quite the opposite. The gaudiness is a higher-order phenomenal aesthetic impression that is perceivable by a standard aesthetic observer.

Despite my criticisms of his reconstruction of the perceptual objectivist position, I think that Bender does offer one of the more potent criticisms of the naturalistic, non-evaluative approach. In chapter 4 I will investigate empirical support for the claim that people can and do perceive phenomenal impressions of an aesthetic character.

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3.2 Rafael De Clercq’s Variable Polarity Argument

The next two authors I discuss focus on attacking the separability thesis. The separability thesis, to recap, is the view that evaluative reactions to aesthetic properties can be separated from the objective, perceptual content of an aesthetic experience thereby leaving us with the non- evaluative essence of the property. This separability is a crucial element of perceptual objectivism.

Rafael De Clercq points out a little noted subtlety in the discussion surrounding the separability thesis. The descriptive view holds that one can use an aesthetic term like “garish” while “denying that the attributed property constitutes a merit or demerit” (De Clercq, 2008, p.

903). De Clercq astutely notes, however, that this argument overlooks the distinction between a term having “variable evaluative implications” and a term having no evaluative implications at all (p. 903). He goes on to say that the reason we can make sense of the claim that the gaudiness of Baz Luhrmann's Great Gatsby, for example, might be among its aesthetic merits is because properties like gaudiness “can take on different evaluative charges: positive, negative, and perhaps also neutral” (p. 903).

A property with variable evaluative polarity is in contrast to a descriptive property, like

“being rectangular” because such a property can be attributed without “any belief concerning its evaluative status” (De Clercq, p. 903). This argument has some plausibility. When Levinson shows that garishness can be both a positive and a negative for a work, it does not show, beyond a doubt, that garishness is therefore a neutral, non-evaluative property. Perceptual objectivism can immediately reply that one may attribute a property like delicacy without being certain of its evaluative status (p. 903). De Clercq replies that even if one is unsure of the evaluative status of an aesthetic property “the concept of value will be involved” (p. 903). In De Clercq’s view,

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then, Levinson’s arguments for the descriptive account only show that the properties in question have no definitive evaluative significance (positive, or negative) (2002, p. 171). I think this admission, though, is all that the proponent of the descriptive analysis really needs. If it is true that paradigm examples of evaluation-added terms like “garish” can be applied in both a negative and a positive way, one is left with the following question: what allows us to apply such terms as consistently as we do? The descriptive approach has a neat, clean answer to this: their core phenomenal character allows us to identify garishness consistently. If it was the evaluative character of garishness that defined it, we would be hopelessly confused, I think. In any case, the admission that apparently evaluative aesthetic terms can have more than one valence supports the view that the evaluative component of aesthetic properties does not necessarily define them.

De Clercq does offer an analogy in an attempt to bolster his case. He compares a value property to the property of magnetism to elucidate this point:

It is hard to see how a material object could be called ‘magnetized’ without certain expectations regarding its behavior, in particular, about its capacity to attract or repel certain other objects. However, one need not expect anything definite. For example, one need not believe that one object rather than another will be attracted or that the attraction will be toward the right-hand side rather than the left –hand side (judged simply in terms of where one is standing). Still some notion of a force exerted on objects in the vicinity will be implicated (p. 904).

Following this analogy, we might consider aesthetic properties as “valuized”. I believe that a further development of this analogy actually supports the descriptive analysis equally well.

Very simply speaking, a magnet is a material that produces a magnetic field. A magnet has a north and a south pole. The opposites attract and the likes repel. Interestingly, every object has some magnetic properties. There are ferromagnets, like nickel and cobalt, which strongly attract.

Ferromagnets are permanent magnets. Diamagnetism can actually occur in every object, but it

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most frequently is seen in metals like copper. Diamagnetism can be seen in water, wood, or even frogs.85 Diamagnets tend to repel, which is how diamagnetic objects can be made to levitate.

Paramagnetism can also be seen in many different objects. Paramagnetic objects are attracted to magnetic fields, though quite weakly. I believe De Clercq wants us to think of aesthetic properties as being magnetized like a ferromagnet, or permanent magnet. If a strong magnetic field is present, the ferromagnet will be strongly attracted or strongly repelled. But what does this really mean when translated to the value case? Perhaps he means that value is like a magnetic field generated by humans who have an evaluative standpoint and value properties are like nickel and cobalt—they must display their magnetic characteristics in the presence of a strong magnetic field.

This same magnetic analogy, though, might be used to support the descriptive analysis.

Instead of thinking of aesthetic properties as ferromagnets, why not consider them to be like diamagnets and paramagnets? They are not permanent magnets. That is, they are not always

“valuized”. In certain contexts, one might see some attraction or repulsion but this behavior does not define the property itself. This analogy easily feeds into Levinson’s suggestion that aesthetic properties could be seen as value relevant rather than evaluative. Yes, they often figure into evaluative judgments, and the pleasure they occasion certainly contributes to an overall conception of value. I believe, however, that we need not assert that this connection to value makes aesthetic properties evaluative in character.

In any event, by acknowledging that paradigm examples of negative aesthetic properties, like garishness, can actually be positive on occasion while typically positive properties, like elegance, can be negative, shows that defining these properties in terms of their evaluative character is not helpful. What makes them turn out as positive in one case and negative in

85 This explains the bizarre phenomenon of raining frogs (Simon & Geim, p. 6201).

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another is not due to some evaluative essence. Rather, they have a unique phenomenal character that we tend to value or disvalue depending on the context. This valuing and disvaluing may have a striking degree of consistency due to a variety of factors ranging from education and culture to evolutionary psychology. For example, one could argue that human beings take pleasure in paintings of water, or water features in landscape designs because easy access to water is tremendously important for survival. An oft cited example is Melamid & Komar’s

“Most Wanted Paintings” project. The two artists used a professional marketing firm to conduct a worldwide survey about aesthetic preferences. In the United States, for example, there was a preference shown for “traditional styles over more modern designs; they also express a strong preference for paintings that depict landscapes or similar outdoor scenes” (Melamid & Komar,

Diaart.org). 86

One could object that aesthetic properties are always valenced in a particular way--be it positive, negative, or neutral. The fact that negative aesthetic properties can sometimes be viewed positively does not mean that they have no valence at all; rather it means that in the right context their negative polarity is actually an overall aesthetic merit. So, for example, the gaudiness of Luhrmann’s Gatsby can be an overall aesthetic merit because the gaudiness comports with the general theme of the novel or the time period.

This objection seems to have some initial plausibility, but it does not hold up under closer inspection. According to this view, properties like garishness are always negative on their own and can only be considered in a positive light if they are combined with other aesthetic properties to generate an overall positive aesthetic evaluation. This would explain how people might find the gaudiness of Baz Luhrmann’s Gatsby a positive thing without appealing to a

86 For more of their results, see their website: https://www.diaart.org/program/exhibitions-projects/komar- melamid-the-most-wanted-paintings-web-project

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descriptive analysis of aesthetic properties. The trouble is that this alternative does not explain how one might approve of a work just because of its gaudiness, not its gaudiness in relation to other elements. I believe that such a scenario is possible. A person might intelligibly say that

Gatsby was only interesting because it was extremely gaudy. The objector might insist that gaudiness simply does not make sense if you strip away the negative aspect of it. In my view, this response is answered by the conversational implicature argument drawn on in chapter 2.

The idea that gaudiness has taken on cultural baggage that is not constitutive of the property

“gaudiness” is entirely plausible. Again, this does not mean gaudiness won’t tend to be negatively evaluated because it may consistently produce unpleasant sensations in its observers.

It does mean, however, that gaudiness is not defined by a negative evaluative component.

3.3 Shaping and the Evaluative Standpoint

Roman Bonzon argues that the evaluative component in an aesthetic property or concept cannot be stripped away from the non-evaluative component. This view flows directly from debates in metaethics that are largely centered on the plausibility of thick concepts in morality.

A thin moral concept would be one that has no descriptive content like “good” or “right”. A thick moral concept is one with descriptive limits like “courage”: Courage has clear descriptive content (there must be some act in which the agent overcomes their fear, for example), but it also appears to have an evaluative component. Acts labeled courageous are thereby deemed praiseworthy. R.M. Hare argues that it is possible to separate the descriptive content of a so- called thick moral concept from its evaluative content. In Moral Thinking, for example, he argues that it is possible for one to accept “that an act is “rude” without being committed to value it adversely” (p. 74-75). Bernard Williams disagrees with Hare and suggests instead that one

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must take an evaluative stance in order to be sensitive to moral qualities at all. Williams follows

Foot, Murdoch and McDowell in this attitude (Bonzon, p. 192).

McDowell87 provides one of the most extensive, and clearest, rehearsals of this argument.

McDowell contends that it is not possible to “disentangle” the descriptive and evaluative content in a moral concept (1996, p. 201). He explains that, in the moral case, it seems impossible to

“isolate a genuine feature of the world” (p. 201) that is, a feature which is present independent of how anyone values it. In other words, it seems unlikely that there is some feature of the world

“to which competent users of the [ethical] concept are to be regarded as responding when they use it: that which is left in the world when one peels off the reflection of the appropriate attitude”

(p. 201). He asks us to imagine a “specific conception of some moral virtue” in a “reasonably cohesive” moral community (p. 201). McDowell argues that if the separability thesis is plausible

(in his terms the “disentangling maneuver”) then a community outsider should be able to master a society’s moral concepts without adopting their evaluative standpoint (p. 201). In McDowell’s view, this is highly implausible because it would require that the outsider be able to

“comprehend their special perspective” (p. 202) without being a member of the community itself.

A metaphor might help elucidate McDowell’s point. In the John Carpenter cult classic

They Live, the main character acquires a pair of special glasses that allow him to see the world as it really is. He is justly skeptical at first, but when he puts on the glasses he discovers that everyday objects, like billboards, are actually mind control devices filled with subliminal messages. More disturbing still, he finds that many people are in fact aliens who conquered the world without our knowledge and are controlling the planet from behind the scenes. In

McDowell’s view, the evaluative perspective is somewhat like the glasses only in this case the

87 McDowell is a sensibility theorist and therefore takes the moral response to include affect and sentiment.

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glasses don’t reveal a secret alien cabal; rather they reveal moral properties. Based on his examples, it sounds like McDowell believes that each cultural group has their own pair of limited edition moral glasses.

Bernard Williams agrees with McDowell and takes up his example of the community outsider: “[the outsider] cannot stand quite outside the evaluative interests of the community he is observing, and pick up on the concept simply as a device for dividing up in a rather strange way certain neutral features of the world” (p. 142). Williams does allow that the “sympathetic observer” may be able to report on a particular practice he is observing, and even accurately predict the target culture’s use of the concept. Nevertheless, he still argues that when it comes to some of their concepts, like their religious concepts, the sympathetic observer “may not be ultimately identified with the use of the concept: it may not really be his” (p. 142). Thus, even if a community outsider is able to become an expert on the community, that person can never truly be said to have the ethical concept in question. He can understand that the community insiders are seeing something with their moral glasses, but he just can’t take a look for himself.

Bonzon transposes this debate into meta-aesthetics in “Thick Aesthetic Concepts” (2009).

His overall goal is to establish a plausible account of thick aesthetic concepts (p. 191) by challenging the separability thesis. In Bonzon’s view, terms for thick moral concepts are just like Sibley’s evaluation-added terms (i.e. terms that pick out aesthetic properties with both a descriptive and an evaluative component). He points to Sibley, Levinson, Budd and Zangwill as the chief proponents of the view that thick aesthetic concepts do not actually exist (p. 192). As noted in chapter 1, all four of these authors adopt the separability thesis (though Zangwill is less committed). Bonzon’s overall strategy is to show that this separation or disentanglement is not possible and thereby lay the groundwork for the existence of thick aesthetic concepts.

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Bonzon contends that even if it were possible to cancel the evaluative implication of an evaluation-added term (that is a “thick” term) it would not prove that thick concepts do not exist

(p. 196). Bonzon contends that the real question concerns how we initially learned to use aesthetic concepts (p. 196). He outlines two scenarios that could result in the cancellation of the evaluative component of particular aesthetic concepts: (a) because one does not feel the approbation or disapprobation that is the normal “condition of its use” (p. 196) or (b) because one “no longer shares the value linked with that approbation” (p. 196).

In scenario (a), Bonzon explains that one is able to recognize that the descriptive aesthetic judgment is appropriate or correct, but for “various psychological reasons” is unable to

“experience the associated feelings and therefore unable to affirm aesthetic value” (p. 196). He summarizes this condition: “One can see what all the fuss is about, but one is too depressed or distracted to feel and therefore endorse it” (p. 196). For example, one might visit the Governor’s

Palace in Williamsburg, VA and judge it to be an elegant structure, but not find it aesthetically valuable because a dreadful rainstorm has soured one’s mood.

In scenario (b), Bonzon tells us that it is possible for a person to so radically revise their

“aesthetic framework” that certain aesthetic concepts, like elegance, no longer play a significant role in their appreciation of aesthetic objects (p. 196). In this case, one can still recognize that a thick aesthetic concept does apply, but “can no longer see what the fuss is all about” (p. 196).

Returning to the Governor’s Palace example, suppose the same soaked visitor returns a decade later, and once again judges the building to be elegant. This time, however, her framework has altered so radically that elegance is no longer something she fusses about. Her tepid response, then, is not the result of a particular psychological state. It is the result of a full, aesthetic framework alteration.

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On the face of it, these two cases appear to support the separability thesis. Each scenario describes a situation where the evaluative and descriptive components of an aesthetic concept come apart. Bonzon insists, however, that these cases prove that “unless one first had a full grasp of the thick aesthetic concepts that we are now able to recognize as what these terms refer to, one has no purchase on the terms at all” (p. 197). At this point, Bonzon draws on the

McDowell/Williams evaluative standpoint argument outlined above. Bonzon contends that the descriptive features of actions “form no natural kind such as would give them shape in the absence of a communal evaluative perspective” (p. 197).

Bonzon takes this a step further arguing that evaluation-added terms must denote thick aesthetic concepts, because there “is no way of teaching someone what the terms mean unless he or she could be brought to share the affective attitudes, see the same saliencies, and make the same discriminations, as mature users of the terms” (p. 197). He directly denies the separability thesis, saying that one cannot pry apart the descriptive content from the “attitude or feeling aspect, since what holds the descriptive content together in the concept just is the attitude or feeling it calls forth” (p. 197). He also makes a still stronger claim, arguing that “Subjects without our emotional economy or lacking our aesthetic tastes or our cognitive capacities could not possibly grasp or deploy [aesthetic concepts]” (p. 197). He suggests that Sibley’s “taste” could be plausibly re-described as an evaluative standpoint (p. 198). In other words, Bonzon thinks Sibley conceives of taste as an aesthetic version of the moral glasses.

Bonzon makes some compelling points in his paper about the potential for thick concepts, but I think he ultimately fails to undermine the separability thesis and the descriptive analysis.

His view has two central failings: (a) over-reliance on a metaethical theory and (b) an account of

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aesthetic experience that is less intuitively plausible than the one offered by perceptual objectivism.

Bonzon depends on a framework developed by McDowell for moral properties. I have argued in chapters 1 and 2 that aesthetic properties do not correspond directly to moral properties. Given this, I do not believe that one can directly import an un-modified metaethical framework to explain aesthetic properties. The McDowell thought experiment Bonzon relies on is designed to elicit intuitions about a moral scenario. Bonzon then builds on those intuitions to develop his version of the evaluative standpoint argument. One cannot simply shift this approach to the aesthetic case. A new aesthetic-based thought experiment would need to be designed. Thus, even if by some philosophical miracle, everyone accepted McDowell’s shaping argument in metaethics, Bonzon would still need to defend his view in the aesthetic case.

Second, and perhaps more importantly, Bonzon’s analysis of thick aesthetic concepts rests on an affective or sentimentalist conception of aesthetic properties. He says that the content of a thick aesthetic concept is fused together by “sensibilities, interests, emotions, feelings” (p.

197). There are good reasons to believe, however, that many thick aesthetic concepts and their associated properties do not necessarily involve an emotional response. Seeing the campiness of

Batman (1966) does not require, I believe, a special affective or evaluative viewpoint. I do not mean to say that aesthetic experience does not involve emotion (that would be absurd) but I do not think one needs to be in a particular emotional state in order to perceive a particular aesthetic property. Elizabeth Schellekens makes a similar point. She explains that there are some works of art that she still finds very valuable, yet with respect to which she no longer experiences any noticeable affective impact: “I have seen a particularly beautiful sculpture many times before and am [now] mainly concerned to point out how moving its beauty is to a friend, even though I may

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not be experiencing the emotional response it gave rise to the first few times I saw it” (p. 126-

127). I think Schellekens is correct to take examples like the one she provides as evidence against sentimentalist aesthetics. It seems obviously wrong to say that a person who does not feel anything specific related to an aesthetic object they regard as valuable or beautiful is somehow not having an aesthetic experience, or has a psychological problem, or has experienced a framework change. Indeed, in Schellekens’ example, the person is so committed to her aesthetic framework that she takes others to view the aesthetic objects she values. Nevertheless, she does not feel anything specific.

At this point, I think Bonzon would reply that the person who still finds the statue beautiful without feeling anything towards it must have experienced the appropriate emotion at one point in time. Without this affective experience, she would not be able to correctly identify the properties in question. Schellekens seems vaguely attracted to this point of view as well (p.

128). I, however, do not think this concession needs to be made. Let us return to Bonzon in order to see this. The ethical thought experiments in this vein do have some potency. Imagine travelling to ancient Rome where honor killing happened with some frequency. Many (if not most) cultures in the modern world would find it impossible to call this “right”. They would also probably be unable to adopt the viewpoint which labels the act as morally permissible. They might, however, appreciate the jewelry, or other artistic endeavors of the ancient Romans with much the same mindset that they do today. Indeed, the continual recurrence of aesthetic styles from other cultures and time periods backs up this claim. This is not to say that the current denizens of Rome, for example, would enjoy or aesthetically value everything that the ancient

Romans produced. Indeed, they might dislike it very much. The point of this passage, however,

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is simply to highlight that a special aesthetic perspective is not required in order to perceive the aesthetic properties of an art object from a different time or place.

Consider another example of the community outsider case with aesthetic concepts. One example that leaps to mind is the Japanese concept of which roughly translates to

“the pathos of things”.88 Mono no aware is expressed in multiple art forms even outside of

Japan. For instance, Hugo award nominee, Ken Liu, wrote a short story called “Mono no aware” which he explains as “an aesthetic primarily oriented towards creating in the reader an empathy towards the inevitable passing of all things” (Liu, 2013). Interestingly, Liu himself is not from

Japan and explains that he acquired knowledge of the concept from outside through research and engaging with . He believes, however, that “no matter how much research is done, an outsider’s perspective will never have the same quality as an insider’s” (Liu, 2013).

This seems to support Bonzon’s point, but I believe the case of mono no aware actually may undermine the shaping argument. It is trivially true that my experience, or Liu’s experience, of mono no aware will be different from someone who was born and raised in Japan. Does this mean, however, that we cannot truly acquire the concept and apply it correctly? I think not. My own first explicit experience of mono no aware came in a Japanese history class. The instructor described the concept and then used the Japanese cherry blossom festival(s) as an example.

Every spring across Japan, people view the cherry blossoms as they begin to drop from their branches. The pale shower has a unique aesthetic character which is identified in part by mono no aware. The experience is heightened by the awareness that the beauty will soon be gone—the trees will be flowerless for another year. Of course, one can become a more adept user of the concept by repeated exposure to examples of mono no aware, but I think it is obvious

88 There is, not surprisingly, more than one way to translate the phrase. I chose one of the least controversial translations (Parkes, “”).

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that people can acquire the concept and apply it correctly (as Liu does in his short story) and possibly gain aesthetic pleasure from it.

At this point Bonzon might say that I already had the appropriate associated feeling when the concept was described to me; being a member of the source culture is not necessary. At first, this seems like a plausible reply, but further consideration of Bonzon’s position undermines it.

Bonzon explains that one may not experience an associated feeling with a particular concept, like elegance, after time, because that individual’s aesthetic framework has shifted. This implies that the associated feelings he speaks of arise from a particular aesthetic framework. He does not explicitly say this framework is cultural but it seems unlikely that he believes each person has their own framework. This suggests that one must be a member of a particular aesthetic framework to experience the associated feelings of a concept generated by the framework. This, in turn, suggests that one must be a member of a particular aesthetic community to truly learn its concepts, otherwise how would one ever experience the associated feelings? It is hard for me to imagine what kind of framework, other than cultural, Bonzon could have in mind. However, I think history has shown that aesthetic concepts do travel across borders. Elements of Japanese art have been consumed in different societies for quite some time and vice versa. It seems to me that aesthetic concepts are exchanged far more frequently and easily than moral concepts. This casts doubt on the plausibility of using McDowell’s thought experiment in the aesthetic case.

When I say that moral concepts are not as easily exchanged between cultures I mean that people frequently do not adopt moral practices from other societies or cultures the way they assimilate aesthetic practices. I do not mean to imply that aesthetic judgments are frivolous and therefore more easily made than moral choices. Rather, I believe that we cannot assume that McDowell’s cultural thought experiment would yield the same results in the aesthetic case.

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Bonzon’s evaluative standpoint argument fails because it relies on a meta-ethical theory developed through an extended thought experiment which ultimately does not apply to the aesthetic case. When something like the community outsider scenario is applied in the aesthetic case, the results are different. Bonzon does not offer compelling evidence that human beings require a particular value-laden point of view in order to identify aesthetic properties and fully experience them.

3.4 Conclusion

I have outlined three different criticisms of the descriptive analysis and found them all wanting. Bender’s argument from perceptual variation presents a traditional problem for any dispositional realist account, but does not invalidate perceptual objectivism. De Clercq’s variable polarity argument is clever and does offer an alternative to the descriptive analysis, but it ultimately fails to account for the stability of aesthetic property ascriptions. Finally, Bonzon’s aesthetic version of the evaluative standpoint argument fails to present compelling evidence that a special value-laden viewpoint is necessary in order to perceive aesthetic properties or understand aesthetic property ascriptions. Nevertheless, Bender’s overarching criticism that perceptual objectivism is suspect from an empirical perspective is a serious charge that requires closer consideration.

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Chapter 4: Empirical Aesthetics and the Descriptive Account

In chapter 3, I defended the descriptive analysis of aesthetic properties from a series of philosophical challenges. I concluded that the greatest threat to perceptual objectivism concerns its empirical adequacy. If the view implies claims that are inconsistent with our best evidence about human cognition it would certainly fail as a naturalistically based aesthetic realism. As I discussed, John Bender believes the descriptive analysis of aesthetic properties leads to an empirically implausible account of human cognition. A closer look at current research in empirical aesthetics (in particular, neuroaesthetics) in fact reveals that perceptual objectivism does not contradict current scientific research on aesthetic processing. On the contrary, there is some interesting new research being done in neuroscience that offers some tentative support for the perceptual objectivist account of aesthetic perception.

In this chapter, I have two primary aims. First, I consider a possible empirical counterexample to my view and show that it fails (both as a research program and as an objection to my view). Second, I consider an empirical aesthetic framework, developed by

Anjan Chatterjee, which has the potential to produce positive support of perceptual objectivism.

I consider the perceptual defect known as amusia as a test case for this framework.

In section 4.1, I argue that the Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism, developed by

Owen Flanagan, is a good guideline for evaluating how perceptual objectivism fares from a naturalistic perspective. I also outline ways in which empirical evidence can be and is relevant to meta-aesthetic inquiry. In section 4.2, I explain why neuroscience is the best place to look for evidence relevant to this inquiry. In section 4.3, I further argue that current neuroaesthetics seems united in its claim that the orbitofrontal cortex is the center of aesthetic processing. This finding seems to present a problem for perceptual objectivism. In section 4.4, I analyze these

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potential problems and determine that they are not a real obstacle to my view. I further argue that much of the work in empirical aesthetics is both philosophically and scientifically flawed.

In section 4.5, I consider an empirical aesthetic framework that has potential to shed light on the descriptive vs. evaluative debate.

4.1 Introduction

To briefly recap, perceptual objectivism argues that aesthetic properties are response- dependent and non-evaluative in character. The response in question is a higher-order phenomenal impression of an aesthetic sort. Bender’s empirical critique focuses on this higher- order phenomenal impression and has two primary features: he claims (1) perceptual objectivism does not offer concrete evidence that people can and do have higher-order phenomenal aesthetic impressions of a non-evaluative sort and (2) that perceptual objectivism implies an overly complicated view of aesthetic perception (p. 375). In chapter 3, I rejected Bender’s multi-tiered account of aesthetic processing and explained that perceptual objectivism does not require it (p.

15-16). His first objection presents a more complex challenge and will be the focus of this chapter.

Before launching directly into the empirical literature, I must establish some criteria for success. The claim that aesthetic properties are primarily non-evaluative is under scrutiny. In order to reply fully to Bender’s critique, I need to show that we can conceive of aesthetic properties as primarily non-evaluative in character without thereby committing us to some bizarre, implausible account of human cognition.

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4.1a Empirical Adequacy and The Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism

I believe that Owen Flanagan’s Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism (PMPR) for metaethics is a useful tool for measuring the success or failure of perceptual objectivism when it comes to empirical adequacy.

PMPR: Make sure when constructing a moral theory or projecting a moral ideal that the character, decision processing, and behavior prescribed are possible, or perceived to be possible for creatures like us (p. 32).

Flanagan’s principle, he tells us, is meant to be both descriptive and prescriptive:

It picks out an aspiration of almost all moral theories, and it sets out a criterion for evaluating theories in terms of this aspiration…For example a theory that requires the morally excellent person to possess every virtue violates the PMPR (p. 33).

In some ways, the PMPR is a more careful formulation of the “ought implies can” principle in ethics. Obviously, I am not offering a normative ethical theory. Indeed, perceptual objectivism argues that aesthetic properties are fundamentally non-evaluative in nature. I still think the

PMPR provides a useful empirical adequacy test for analyzing the intersection of the empirical and the metaethical, or in this case, the meta-aesthetic. A naturalistic, realistic meta-aesthetic theory that mischaracterizes human cognition, or implies implausible things about human cognition, is obviously a failure89. However, given that perceptual objectivism claims aesthetic properties are fundamentally descriptive in character, I need to modify the PMPR:

PMPRA: Make sure when constructing a theory of aesthetic experience that it only posits perceptual and cognitive abilities that are possible, or perceived to be possible, for creatures like us.

To satisfy the PMPRA, I need to show that perceptual objectivism is consistent with current research regarding aesthetic cognition. More specifically, I need to show that conceiving of

89 There is a similar, but less well known principle developed by Manuel Vargas called the “standard of naturalistic plausibility”: “On this standard, we demand a theory that is both compatible with a scientific worldview and that the balance of known truth-relevant considerations would be sufficient to lead a group of informed, well- reasoning, and disinterested persons to think the theory is plausible.” (p. 3).

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aesthetic properties as non-evaluative in character does not require us to also believe anything implausible about human cognition.

To show that perceptual objectivism can pass the PMPRA test, I am taking a two- pronged approach. First, I discuss an increasingly popular view in empirical aesthetics that aesthetic processing is fundamentally a type of value processing. This clearly presents a problem for perceptual objectivism. I argue, however, that the consensus view is ill-founded and the conclusion that aesthetic processing just is a species of value processing is not warranted by currently available data and is very probably false. Second, I discuss an empirical aesthetic framework developed by Anjan Chatterjee which presents promising new avenues of research that have the potential to offer positive support for perceptual objectivism.

4.1b Why Neuroaesthetics?

There are a vast number of empirical investigations into the aesthetic. In fact, “empirical aesthetics” is one of the oldest branches of experimental psychology--Gustav Fechner published a work on psychological aesthetics as early as 1876 (Jacobsen, 2010, p. 184). In order to find out if perceptual objectivism can pass the PMPRA test, I’ve decided to focus on the field of neuroaesthetics and cognitive psychological investigations into the aesthetic. I’ve chosen these particular fields of inquiry in part because they are currently very active, but primarily because their experiments seek information that is most relevant to my particular question. This is not to say that other approaches in empirical aesthetics are completely irrelevant to my view. Rather, I believe that the approach of neuroaesthetics is most likely to yield information regarding human abilities to perceive and process specific aesthetic properties. A little background will help make this clear.

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Neuroaesthetics is an example of what is known as “neurophilosophy” as opposed to the

“philosophy of neuroscience” (Bickle et al., 2012). That is, neuroaesthetics at present does not occupy itself with foundational questions about neuroscience, rather it seeks to apply the findings and methods of neuroscience to aesthetic issues.

Like all branches of neuroscience, neuroaesthetics relies heavily on fMRI imaging studies to glean information about particular brain areas and neural networks. As for typical experimental designs, the neuroscientist Anjan Chatterjee explains that neuroaesthetics can be divided into two varieties: classification and evaluation (2013, p. 35). Classification experiments seek to classify an aesthetic object and then proceed to analyze its properties. Then the researchers study the brain’s response to the properties in question. For example, ,

Martinez, and Parsons used PET scans to analyze what happens to the brain of a dancer as they perform a tango (Chatterjee, p. 34). In this case, the researchers focused on something that is agreed to be an aesthetic object, a dance, and studied brain’s response. In an evaluative study, researchers analyze a person’s hedonic reaction to an aesthetic object (p. 35). I will be considering both sorts of experiments, but classification experiments are of particular interest to me. Identifying areas of the brain associated with the perception of particular aesthetic properties will help isolate our reactions to higher-order phenomenal properties.

4.2 Aesthetic Processing: A Neuroaesthetic Perspective

Unfortunately, there are no studies that directly address whether or not aesthetic properties are evaluative or non-evaluative in character, or, for that matter, if humans can perceive higher-order aesthetic properties. There are, however, numerous studies which seek to isolate aesthetic judgments and aesthetic experience by having subjects perform prototypical aesthetic judgments, such as judging the beauty of an artwork or prototypical descriptive

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judgments like judging the shape of an object (e.g. identifying non-aesthetic properties like roundness or triangularity) (Jacobsen, 2006; Tsukiura and Cabeza, 2011). By examining brain activity during such tasks, researchers hope to discover which parts of the brain and which neural processes undergird aesthetic experience and aesthetic judgment. This approach is used pervasively in the neuroaesthetics literature (e.g., Zeki and Kawabata, 2004).

Much, then, turns on how researchers define the aesthetic. Without a firm conception of what counts as an aesthetic object, or judgment, it is not possible to accurately identify relevant brain activity (i.e. “aesthetic processing”). Most researchers currently working in empirical aesthetics rely on judgments about the beauty of an object or experience to delineate the aesthetic. While this approach isn’t entirely off base, it is obvious that reducing all aesthetic judgments and experiences to an investigation of the beautiful is flawed and in many ways a reversal of progress made in analytic aesthetics. It ignores a vast range of aesthetic properties like garishness and elegance, which is particularly problematic from the perceptual objectivist standpoint. In the following sections, I discuss ways in which this focus deeply skews findings in neuroaesthetics.

4.2a Is There An Aesthetic Center of the Brain?

Because empirical aesthetics is still in many ways a developing field, it is difficult to establish a received view of “aesthetic processing”.90 That being said, some consensus seems to be emerging suggesting that the orbitofrontal cortex (the OFC) is a center of aesthetic

90 This term is typically used as a blanket term to refer to aesthetic experience and aesthetic judgments. In other words, aesthetic processing refers to an individual’s brain activity whilst they are aesthetically engaged. Philosophers, with good reason, tend to balk at catch-all terms like “aesthetic processing”. Throughout the following sections, however, I will continue to use the phrase “aesthetic processing” to facilitate discussion of the empirical literature.

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processing91. Brown et al. (2011) go so far as to say the OFC might be the “aesthetic center” of the brain (p. 251). To see why this has serious implications for my view, we need to better understand the OFC.

The OFC is a very important, and very busy, brain area. It is a region of the prefrontal cortex located in the frontal lobes of the brain. To make it more concrete, the OFC is immediately above the orbits of your eyes. The OFC has been implicated in quite a few different brain functions, from olfactory processing to decision making and reward assessment:

The orbitofrontal cortex contains the secondary taste cortex, in which the reward value of taste is represented. It also contains the secondary and tertiary olfactory cortical areas, in which information about the identity and also about the reward value of odours is represented. (Rolls, 2004, p. 1).

The OFC appears to be strongly associated with the processing of reward. This leads some to suggest that the OFC is a value processing center (Rolls, 2011). Moll et al. (2002), for example, discovered that when subjects viewed morally salient stimuli, the OFC was active (p. 273).

Greene et al. (2001) report that moral judgments and judgments of empathy involve the OFC.

Researchers link this to the OFC’s role in the processing of reward (Moll et al., 2002, p. 273-4).

Rolls goes further, and labels the OFC the value center of the brain: “Value will be placed according to whether stimuli activate our reward or punishment systems, themselves tuned during evolution to produce that will increase the fitness of our genes” (p. 125).

While I do not want to make assumptions about what this means with respect to moral judgments, it does present a prima facie problem for my view. If aesthetic processing takes place in a brain area associated with value processing, it suggests that aesthetic judgments and experience have an evaluative character. One might further bolster this view by pointing out that research in neuroethics has shown that the OFC is active during moral judgments. This would

91 See for example, Chatterjee (2013), Zeki (2004), Tsukiura & Cabeza (2011) for just a few prominent examples.

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lend credence to the prevalent idea in metaethics and meta-aesthetics that moral and aesthetic judgments need to be treated in the same way, namely as value judgments. Thus, any strong connection between the OFC and aesthetic processing might appear damning for my view. I will refer to this view throughout as the “OFC view”.

To be clear, no philosopher specifically holds what I am calling the “OFC view” of aesthetic processing. There are many neuroscientists and cognitive psychologists who hold the view, but they do not articulate it in a philosophically specific way. Given this, I think it would be helpful, to spell out this view as a philosopher might.92

P1. The OFC is a reward/value processing center in the brain that is active during evaluative judgments.

P2. A growing consensus in empirical aesthetics believes that the OFC is the aesthetic center of the brain.

P3. If aesthetic processing is centered in the OFC, it is probably evaluative in character.

P4. If aesthetic processing includes aesthetic judgments and judgments about aesthetic properties, then they too are probably evaluative in character.

C. Therefore, perceptual objectivism is inconsistent with a growing consensus in empirical aesthetics.

Luckily, I do not consider the connection between the OFC and aesthetic processing to be a danger for my view. Let us consider this argument in more detail. P1 is plausible. The OFC is associated with assessment of reward and it has been implicated in studies of moral cognition.93

P2 is also factually accurate—there is a growing consensus especially within neuroaesthetics. P3 and P4, however, are suspect. My own rebuttal to the outlined argument will focus on

92 Philosophers who are critical of perceptual objectivism on empirical grounds, such as John Bender, might be attracted to the OFC view. 93 I recognize that critics can and do attack the notion that moral cognition is somehow deeply connected with the OFC. The point is simply that it is true that scientists and philosophers have been trying to connect moral processing with the OFC.

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undermining P3 and P4. I believe the activation in the OFC that has been seen in experiments focusing on aesthetic processing actually tells us more about the experimental design than aesthetic properties or aesthetic judgments. As we shall see, many of these experiments do not distinguish carefully between aesthetic judgments, descriptive judgments and evaluative judgments. This undermines any developing consensus.

In order to show why this developing consensus is misguided, I need to examine the origins of the OFC theory and trace its considerable influence.

4.3 Zeki and the Foundations of the OFC Theory

Semir Zeki is one of the earliest advocates of the OFC view. Zeki is a vision scientist who has increasingly turned his attention to aesthetic concerns. Zeki’s account of aesthetics is closely bound up with his own account of vision. William P. Seeley explains that Zeki holds a constructivist theory of vision which rests on two claims: first that the “sensory input to the visual system underdetermines the content of visual perception” (2006, p. 2). Second, because of this vision is an “interpretative or inferential process influenced by a perceiver’s prior knowledge of the distal environment” (p. 2). Zeki goes on to explain that the “receptive field properties of the visual cortex represent an evolved mechanism for selecting salient information concerning color, form, and motion from retinal images” (Ibid., p. 11). Artists manipulate this system by

“selecting salient visual cues” to act as raw material for the content of their works (p. 11).

In his experimental work, Zeki is primarily interested in studying how artists create aesthetic experiences in audiences. Zeki does not limit himself to a discussion of artists and artistic production, however. He also investigates normal perceiver reactions to aesthetic stimuli primarily using fMRI. Zeki’s fMRI studies have been often cited throughout the literature which

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might explain how the OFC view has gained such a foothold. Unfortunately, despite the obvious contributions of his research, I think some of his work is misleading. Specifically, I’m referring to Zeki’s suggestion that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) might be the “faculty of beauty” (2011, p. 1) in the brain. Taking a closer look at Zeki’s findings and similar research reveals that these kinds of claims are ill-founded and quite possibly empirically false.

Zeki began this line of research into beauty with a 2004 paper “The Neural Correlates of

Beauty”. In this study, Zeki and Kawabata investigated a group of subjects’ reactions to a series of paintings. A group of 10 neurologically healthy subjects (non-experts) were presented with

16 paintings (abstracts, still-lifes, landscapes, and portraits) while in an fMRI scanner (Kawabata and Zeki, p. 1699). Subjects were then asked to rate the painting as “beautiful” or “ugly” (p.

1699). Their results indicate that when judging a painting to be beautiful, subjects showed heightened activation in the OFC (p. 1702). In another study, Zeki and Tomohiro (2011) once again investigated the neural correlates of beauty, this time making bolder claims. In this study,

21 subjects were used, only one having any significant artistic expertise (p. 2). Subjects were exposed to paintings and musical pieces (classical and modern). After exposure to the stimuli, the subjects were asked to rate the objects as “beautiful, neutral, or ugly” (p. 2). Neuroimages were taken of the subjects during the task (p. 2). Zeki and Tomohiro explain that the only common area of activation during the judgments of beauty was in the OFC (p. 3). The authors note that these results have been repeated elsewhere such as in Tsukiura and Cabeza (2011), and

Jacobsen (2006) to name a few (p. 7).

Because of the apparently strong correlation between the OFC and aesthetic processing,

Zeki offers a new version of Burke’s definition of beauty: “Beauty is, for the greater part, some quality in bodies that correlates with activity in the OFC by the intervention of the senses” (p.

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7).94 Zeki takes this a step further, arguing that beauty is a value and the OFC must be a value center of the brain (p. 7). He contends that activation in the OFC occasioned by aesthetic processing parallels activation of the OFC observed in studies of moral judgment (p. 7). He suggests that the OFC might even be a general, supramodal value assigner (p. 7). Based on these correlations, Zeki develops what he calls the “brain based theory of beauty” which boils down to the claim that “all works that appear beautiful to a subject have a single, brain-based characteristic…they have as a correlate of experiencing them a change in the strength of activity within the OFC” (p. 8).

These findings have been cited in multiple articles and replicated, to an extent, by other studies. Brown et al. (2011) performed a meta-analysis of neuroimaging studies “across multiple sensory modalities and across both art and non-art objects” (p. 251).95 93 papers were examined.

The inclusion criteria required that whole brain analysis was performed by fMRI or PET, healthy subjects were used, and that the tasks involve some kind of aesthetic evaluation such as ratings of pleasantness (p. 251. The authors report that all analyses showed some kind of activation in the OFC (p. 251).

Brown et al.’s investigation goes even farther. Their overall goal in the study is to establish a naturalized notion of the aesthetic which for them primarily means expanding our notion of the aesthetic from the confines of art (p. 250). Brown et al.’s general hypothesis is that the processing underlying the appraisals of “objects of evolutionary significance” overlap with the processes underlying “aesthetic responses to art” (p. 250). This naturally led the authors to explore the link between aesthetic processing and the OFC, the supposed reward center of the

94 In his famous essay, “A Philosophical Inquiry Into The Origin Of Our Ideas Of The And Beautiful”, Burke defines beauty as “ that quality or those qualities in bodies, by which they cause love, or some passion similar to it” (I.x). 95 A non-art object, for example, would be an apple (Brown & Gao, p. 1)

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brain (p. 251). Citing Zeki, they suggest that the OFC might be a supramodal aesthetic center of the brain. They explain that the OFC has 3 major features that suggest it could be such a center.

First, it plays an important role in sensory processing, even being a secondary cortex for olfaction and gustation. Second, the OFC plays a role in polysensory convergence (the convergence of multiple sensory inputs). Third, it is involved with emotional processing (p.

251). Clearly, OFC related findings are not limited to Zeki and his partners.

Tsukiura and Cabeza (2011) provide an example of how these OFC findings have influenced developing research. Tsukiura and Cabeza investigated the Beauty-is-Good using fMRI analysis. The Beauty-is-Good stereotype refers to the implicit belief that beautiful96 people have better personalities and better moral character than less attractive people

(p. 138). Tsukiura and Cabeza hypothesized that similar brain regions may be involved with moral and aesthetic processing which results in a conflation of the two sorts of judgment in the

Beauty-is-Good stereotype (p. 138). To investigate this possibility, Tsukiura and Cabeza conducted an fMRI study on 21 subjects. They set up 3 tasks: 1) to rate the facial attractiveness of an image of a face, 2) to rate the moral goodness of a hypothetical action and 3) to rate the brightness of images (p. 139). The third task was meant as a control to test stimulus perception and motor response (p. 139).

The results of this investigation appear to confirm Tsukiura and Cabeza’s hypothesis— the facial attractiveness task and the moral evaluation task both induced activation in the OFC.

Tsukiura and Cabeza argue that this data shows that positive aesthetic judgments and moral judgments are significantly correlated (p. 144). They further suggest that this link results from the rewarding nature of aesthetic experience (p. 145). Negative aesthetic judgment (that is

96 In the context of their experiment, “attractive” people.

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judgments rating a face as unattractive) resulted in insular cortex activity (p. 143)97, a brain area associated with emotional cognition (Gu et al., p. 3372).

These experiments present an attractively simple view of aesthetic processing. The approach, however, is deeply flawed. Throughout the discussion of this research, it may have become obvious that the experiments were not designed carefully from the point of view of philosophical aesthetics. For instance, Zeki boldly claims that he is seeking a “theory of beauty”

(2011, p. 1). Zeki seems to presume that by locating the brain processes underlying judgments of beauty, he will discover the center of all aesthetic processing. It has long since been shown however, that beauty is not--or more accurately cannot be--the only aim of art or the only object of aesthetic experience. Some contemporary artists, for instance, intentionally create works that are not beautiful. In a number of cases, they openly attempt to create art objects that are disgusting or disturbing.98 These works nevertheless contain aesthetic properties. Zeki actually shows an awareness of this in his discussion of Marcel Duchamp’s work (2011, p. 8), but it only leads him to endorse a inspired view that any work may be “subjectively experienced as beautiful by an individual” (p. 8). Zeki’s discussion of Duchamp’s Fountain actually reveals his lack of precision with aesthetic concepts. Fountain is a “readymade”. Duchamp did not sculpt the urinal that he displayed in art shows. He acquired it from a manufacturer, Mott

Ironworks.99 The purpose of the piece is not to get one to appreciate the beauty of the urinal (or any of its aesthetic properties for that matter). To see Fountain as a potentially beautiful work of

97 The insular cortex is a portion of the cerebral cortex located under the lateral (aka, Sylvian) fissure (Shura et al., p. 277). 98 Consider Damien Hirst’s A Thousand Years (1990). NYT’s Sarah Lyall describes it evocatively: “an installation in which maggots hatching at one end of a glass case are faced with a life-or-death situation -- a rotting cow's head or a zapping device that kills insects” (p. 1). 99 He did, however, make some alterations to his ready-mades. In the case of Fountain, Duchamp wrote “R. Mutt” on the bottom right side of the urinal.

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art, for the right kind of beholder, is to completely misunderstand the piece. Not every piece of art is designed to create beauty and not all neuroaesthetics researchers seem to recognize this.

The problems do not end there. Zeki’s conception of beauty itself is deeply flawed. His hypothesis that the OFC might be the beauty center of the brain grew from studies showing that judgments of facial attractiveness activate the OFC (2011, p. 7). This clearly indicates that Zeki is not making a distinction, or even attempting to discover a distinction, between attractiveness and beauty. Attractiveness might seem equivalent to beauty for some, but it is obviously a much broader concept. Attractiveness, for instance, might just mean “pleasant to look at”.

Pleasantness, of course, could be a simple hedonic reaction to a stimulus. Judging something to be beautiful goes beyond a mere preference judgment. Mere preference ratings cannot legitimately be considered a placeholder for genuine judgments of beauty. This is a conceptual distinction that helpfully made centuries ago. Kant explains that the

“agreeable”, the “good”, and the “beautiful” come apart. The agreeable is “that which pleases the senses in sensation” (CJ, §3) while the good “pleases by means of reason alone, through the mere concept” (CJ, §4). These types of judgments are contrasted with judgments of the beautiful which are disinterested (CJ, §6) and “subjectively universal” (§8). This means that when we make a judgment of the beautiful, we expect, or at least believe in principle, that all other rational agents should agree with us.100 To summarize, agreeable things are pleasing because they satisfy some interest (i.e. gratification); good things are pleasing because they fulfill a certain standard, while beautiful things please in themselves (i.e., they provoke ‘disinterested pleasure’). By conflating these different concepts, Zeki’s research cannot be viewed as an accurate analysis of

100 Subjective universality is still a hotly debated topic among Kantian scholars. I do not wish to make any strong claims about the role it is meant to play in his philosophy.

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beauty. Zeki mistakenly reduces aesthetics and the philosophy of art to a study of beauty, but even his concept of beauty is unacceptably flawed.101

Even if Zeki were able to correct his approach to beauty, he would still be reducing aesthetics and the philosophy of art to a study of beauty. This ignores important aesthetic concepts and properties that are crucial to understanding the complexities of human aesthetic experience. As I have noted throughout this dissertation there are a wide range of ‘thick’ aesthetic properties that we can experience. When one views the Parthenon, for example, one may judge it to be beautiful, but one also has a very rich perceptual experience of its balance.

One might also perceive elegance in the simplicity and effectiveness of its design. To reduce all of this rich perceptual experience to an experience of the beautiful is to fundamentally misunderstand aesthetic experience. One might suggest that beauty consists in those properties.

Even if one believed this, however, one would still need to acknowledge that properties like balance are descriptively thick and Zeki makes no attempt to track our experience of those properties. Zeki’s approach, therefore, ignores all aesthetic properties apart from beauty and misidentifies beauty as a sort of preference judgment. Moreover, Zeki never shows any awareness that some aesthetic judgments seem to have a fairly specific descriptive component.

This undermines the foundations of the OFC view and other research built on Zeki’s approach.

In order to better assess the empirical plausibility of perceptual objectivism, it is necessary to find data that does not assume that aesthetic judgments are purely evaluative preference ratings.

101 This flawed thinking about beauty is seen in other researchers building on Zeki’s work. For example, Tsukiura & Cabeza only use facial attractiveness as a beauty judgment (p. 139).

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4.3a Descriptive vs. Aesthetic Judgments: An Empirical Perspective

The studies considered thus far do not carefully distinguish aesthetic judgments from evaluative judgments. In order to properly assess the empirical viability of perceptual objectivism, it is necessary to find evidence that aesthetic processing includes the processing of descriptive properties that some have claimed to be ‘aesthetic’.

Thomas Jacobsen, and his colleagues, who are amenable to the OFC view, do attempt to identify aesthetic judgments more carefully than Zeki. In a 2007 study, Hofel and Jacobsen explicitly set out to study aesthetic judgments (p. 9). Their strategy for isolating so-called aesthetic judgments was to contrast them with descriptive judgments. In the study, Hofel and

Jacobsen asked subjects to make an evaluative aesthetic judgment and a descriptive symmetry judgment about patterns made from generic figures like triangles, half of which were symmetrical (p. 11). While the subjects viewed the patterns, electrophysiological activity was recorded (p. 10).

Participants correctly judged symmetry 89% of the time (p. 14). Additionally, 47% of the patterns were judged as not beautiful (p. 14). Hofel and Jacobsen further report that evaluative aesthetic judgments (in this study, judgments of beauty) elicited activation in the frontocentral area. Both evaluative and descriptive judgments resulted in greater activity in the right hemisphere. Based on this, Hofel and Jacobsen conclude that “evaluative aesthetic judgment involves a two-step process of an early impression formation and a later evaluative categorization process” (p. 19).

Jacobsen conducted another task in which subjects were asked to evaluate the beauty of male and female faces. They were also asked if a face was round or oval (2010, p. 187).

Jacobsen explicitly refers to the judgments about shape as non-aesthetic judgments (p. 187). The

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aesthetic judgments were contrasted with the non-aesthetic judgments of shape an hour later.

Judgments were contrasted using fMRI. He explains that evaluative aesthetic judgments (i.e. judgments about beauty) led to activation in the frontomedial cortex (p. 189). In contrast, symmetry judgments appeared to elicit activation in parietal and premotor areas related to spatial processing (p. 189). Jacobsen concludes that “aesthetic judgments of beauty rely on a network that partially overlaps with the network underlying evaluative judgments on social and moral cues” (p. 189). He further appeals to another fMRI study by Kornysheva et al. (2009) showing similar activation patterns to support this finding (p. 189).

Roye et al. (2008) similarly attempted to study aesthetic processing by contrasting aesthetic judgments with descriptive judgments. Roye et al. explain that the distinction between descriptive and evaluative judgments rests on the idea that “evaluation is based on the individual subjective assessment of an entity” (p. 42). In contrast, a descriptive judgment can be

“objectified using an external reference” (p. 42). Roye et al. asked a group of subjects to rate the facial attractiveness of a set of images. The images were first rated for attractiveness by 24 female and 15 male students (p. 46)102. This allowed the researchers to group the stimulus photos into “attractive” and “unattractive” categories before showing them to subjects. Based on other aesthetic processing experiments, Roye et al. hypothesized that evaluative judgments would be quicker than descriptive judgments (p. 45). They also expected to find activation in brain areas involved with emotion based on the affective value of beautiful faces (p. 45).

The participants during the actual experiment were connected to an EEG. They were presented with photographs of 160 faces, half were men, and half were women (p. 45). The subjects were first asked if the faces were beautiful or not beautiful and then asked if the faces

102 They used a Likert scale ranging from 1-5 (p. 46).

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were oval or round. Introspective data was collected in a short interview following the experiment (p. 47).

In the evaluative judgment task, 39% judged the faces pre-categorized as attractive to be beautiful, and 61% judged them as not beautiful (p. 47). 48% of the attractive faces were judged to be oval by some subjects, while 52% of the faces were judged to be round (p. 47-8). Of the faces categorized as not attractive, 83% were judged to be not beautiful. 56% of those faces were judged to be round (p. 48). Perhaps not surprisingly, subjects reported that it was more difficult to make the descriptive judgment about face shape than the beauty judgment (p. 48).

The Roye et al. data shows less of a distinction between the descriptive and evaluative tasks than some other studies. The authors note that their measurements indicated that participants’ had

“significantly longer” reaction times for the judgment of head shape (i.e. descriptive judgment) than for the judgment of beauty (p. 53). But they did not notice the hemispheric asymmetry they had predicted (p. 55).103 Ultimately, they concluded that aesthetic judgments (once again a type of preference rating in this case) are much quicker than descriptive judgments, like judging the shape of a face.

While these experiments are more carefully designed than the first beauty focused experiments I discussed, they too are quite flawed. Like Zeki’s initial OFC studies, these studies start with the assumption that aesthetic judgments can be identified with judgments of preference. An experiment that begins with that assumption is going to fail to accurately distinguish an aesthetic judgment from a non-aesthetic judgment. Roye et al, for instance, compare aesthetic judgments with non-aesthetic judgments by comparing judgments of facial

103 Roye et al. predicted that there would be a hemispheric asymmetry of the evaluative process compared to the descriptive process in part because descriptive judgments simply take more time and also because they believe judgments of beauty have affective value that descriptive judgments do not (p. 45). That is, the authors expected to see activity in different hemispheres during the two judgment tasks given the seeming functional difference between the two types of judgments.

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attractiveness with a judgment about head shape (p. 44). This will not yield meaningful information about the distinction between aesthetic judgments and non-aesthetic judgments.

Much like Zeki, by asking subjects to make preference judgments (disguised as beauty judgments) the researchers are inadvertently biasing the results in favor of the OFC view. Of course, a preference judgment might result in activations in the OFC. This actually tells us very little about the nature of aesthetic processing.

The research promoting the OFC as an aesthetic center of the brain is clearly flawed from the perspective of philosophical aesthetics, but it is also flawed from an empirical perspective.

Deeper investigation into some of the popular articles I cited above makes it obvious that claiming aesthetic processing is some form of value or reward processing is not only too hasty, but likely false. I do not wish to argue that neuroscience or experimental psychology has by any means fully defined what value processing is.104 It would be more accurate to say that the experiments I have been considering do support the claim that reward/pleasure related processing does occur in the OFC region of the brain. The significant mistake that Zeki and others make is to equate aesthetic experience with hedonic experience. By doing this, they ignore other parts of the brain that could be (and are) involved with aesthetic experience.

4.4 Empirical Failings of the OFC View

As noted above, Brown et al. performed a meta-analysis showing that all major empirical aesthetic research indicates that the OFC is active during aesthetic processing. They also explain, however, that there are other common areas of activation. The anterior cingulate, right anterior insula and rostral region of the basal ganglia have all been involved in aesthetic

104 This includes neuroscientific articles claiming to have discovered the neural correlates of moral processing.

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processing. The authors also note that the OFC actually showed “more sensory specific than supramodal patterns of activation” (p. 252). Because of this finding, Brown et al. believe that the

OFC is not a supramodal aesthetic processing center of the brain (p. 252). This, of course, undermines the bold claims of Zeki et al.

Brown et al. suggest that the right anterior insula might be the most likely candidate for a supramodal aesthetic processing center (p. 254). They were surprised by this finding because the literature associates that brain area with emotions of disgust and sadness (p. 254). They add that the right anterior insula is strongly associated with sensory processing of taste, touch, vestibular functions and visceral perception (p. 254). Citing Araujo and Simon (2009), Brown et al. choose to highlight the right anterior insula connections to gustation saying that aesthetic processing might “literally map onto the taste center of the human brain” (p. 255). They interestingly add that the right anterior insula has shown “strong evolutionary expansion” in humans in comparison to other primates (p. 255).105 They also note that the right anterior insula has been associated with self-awareness or interoception (p. 255).

Brown et al. are firmly in the treating aesthetic judgment as pertaining to valenced objects and argue that aesthetic processing is rooted in a “comparison between subjective interoceptive states and exteroceptive perception whose goal is to determine whether perceived objects will satisfy or oppose homeostatic needs” (p. 256). Even though this study is seeking more support for the OFC view, it actually casts a great deal of doubt on that project. Their analysis shows that there are many other possible brain areas involved in an aesthetic judgment aside from the OFC. This greatly undermines the OFC view, especially the claim that aesthetic processing is centered in the OFC.

105 It also contains Von Economo neurons also known as “spindle” neurons.

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A different review of neuroaesthetics data by Nadal et al. (2009) seems to confirm my concerns about the OFC research. They note, for instance, that Kawabata and Zeki (2004) found activity in the OFC with positive preference ratings while Vartanian and Goel (2004) found activity in the left anterior cingulate gyrus and bilateral occipital gyri (p. 383). They further point out that neither of these studies showed activations in the amygdala during judgments of ugliness while other studies have (p. 383).

In the following section, I will consider some examples of patients with OFC damage who are nevertheless aesthetically engaged to show that other brain regions must be involved in aesthetic processing.

4.4a Abnormal Cases: OFC Damage with Spared Aesthetic Experience

Research being done on the aesthetic processing of abnormal subjects also undermines the OFC narrative. I will focus on a couple of examples from Miller & Miller (2011) and

William W. Seeley et al. (2008).

Miller & Miller investigate the effect certain forms of neurodegenerative disease have on aesthetic experience and production (2011). To understand their research, it’s important to be clear about the pathology involved. There are multiple forms of neurodegenerative disease.

Most forms of neurodegenerative disease start off focally and spread diffusely which results in global deterioration of cognitive ability (p. 361). The most common form of this type of disease is Alzheimer’s disease (p. 361). Some of these diseases, however, remain focal. These have been labeled frontotemporal lobar degeneration. Within this umbrella class, there are several syndromes that affect the temporal lobes. These syndromes are called frontotemporal dementias

(FTD). FTD patients provide rich information because the cognitive deficits do not spread like

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Alzheimer’s therefore allowing researchers to explore the potential functions of damaged areas.

Miller & Miller focus on the artistic behavior of FTD patients (p. 362).

The authors begin by clarifying that there are 3 types of FTD: behavioral, non-fluent and semantic (p. 362). Behavioral FTD involves loss of empathy, loss of typical disgust reactions, poor personal hygiene and disinhibition. The damage is focused on the ventral and medial portions of the frontal lobes (p. 362). Semantic dementia involves progressive loss of language skills, but also rigid behaviors and compulsions appear (p. 362). Semantic dementia generally affects the left side more than the right. It also tends to involve temporal lobes more than frontal.

The non-fluent aphasia version results in halting speech that leads to pure mutism (p. 362). Non- fluent patients are more like Alzheimer’s patients in that they don’t usually display obvious behavioral symptoms such as disinhibition (p. 363).

One interesting way in which FTD differs from Alzheimer’s is that some FTD patients maintain artistic ability and or develop new ones (p. 363). Miller & Miller cite Miller et al

(2000), a study involving 12 FTD patients who had developed new artistic abilities or maintained previous ones using music/visual tasks (2011, p. 363). The subjects displayed “striking similarities in their work” (p. 363). Their work tended to focus on photorealistic landscapes and portraits (p. 363). Most of the subjects went about their work with a “surprisingly high degree of focus” (p. 363). They would “obsessively” re-work them leading some clinicians to describe their behaviors as obsessive-compulsive disorder (p. 363).

Miller et al. hypothesized that the subjects were able to retain and even gain artistic talent because the brain areas responsible for visuospatial abilities, such as the posterior parietal cortex, were intact (p. 365). Further, some dorsolateral and medial frontal cortices were intact which they believe explains the source of the subjects’ artistic motivation (p. 365). This does not mean

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there was no damage to these frontal areas, however. To the contrary, the “artistic cohort” did display “orbitofrontal atrophy” with sparing of the dorsolateral and anterior cingulate cortices (p.

365). In other words, the artistic cohort had damage to the OFC while the anterior cingulate was mostly intact. Following Zeki’s suggestion that the OFC is the aesthetic center of the brain,

Miller & Miller speculate that the OFC atrophy might explain why patients seemed to display less aesthetic (p. 366). Miller & Miller acknowledge however that some FTD patients display more creativity or, at least, develop new styles (p. 366). The non-fluent aphasia groups, for example, began to deviate from realism. Some of the patients who had been artistic prior to their FTD became even more expressive (p. 366).

To support this particular point, Miller & Miller cite a study from William W. Seeley

(MD) et al. (2008) chronicling the stylistic changes of a non-fluent aphasia patient, Anne Adams.

Adams, a scientist, began developing an “intense desire” to produce visual art several years before the onset of “primary progressive aphasia” (PPA) which is a type of non-fluent aphasia

(Seeley, p. 39). One of the most famous PPA patients (currently known) was the composer

Maurice Ravel. Ravel’s best known work is a piece called “Bolero” (p. 40). When Adams began painting, she had not yet displayed any symptoms of PPA. At first, she painted standard landscapes. Six years into her creative period (at age 52), Adams began painting images representing musical pieces. Interestingly, she painted a work entitled “Unraveling Bolero” meant to be a visual instantiation of Ravel’s piece. The result was an intricate, abstract work quite different from her early work (p. 41). At 58, her work became even more abstract. She painted pi, for example, as a visual matrix (p. 42). At 60, Adams’ first language degradation symptoms became apparent (p. 41). During this early stage of PPA, Adams work took a

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strikingly photorealistic turn (p. 41). She painted detailed and accurate pictures of leaves and organisms like earthworms (p. 42). She showed a clear preference for visual symmetry (p. 42).

By 64, Adams was nearly mute (p. 42). It is worth noting that Adams never displayed significant personality changes (p. 41). At 67, Adams passed away from “progressive neurological decline” (p. 42). Throughout her creative period, Adams underwent imaging analysis because of an acoustic neuroma (p. 42).106 Due to this, researchers were given the rare opportunity to track changes in Adams’ brain structure. Seeley et al. explain that these early images reveal “emergent atrophy within the left inferior and opercular frontal regions, anterior insula and striatum” (p. 43). The frontal regions and the anterior insula have been singled out as aesthetic centers by the empirical aesthetics literature. Seeley et al. compared these scans with healthy control subjects and discovered that while Adams had lost brain mass in the areas just mentioned, she actually showed increased gray matter in 4 other areas: right intraparietal sulcus, right superior temporal sulcus, right parietal operculum and the right lateral occipital cortex (p.

45). The post-mortem analysis of Adams’ brain confirmed these findings (p. 45). Seeley et al. explain that the areas with increased gray matter help to “integrate multimodal perceptual data”

(p. 46).107

The authors further note that Adams painted until she simply couldn’t hold a brush anymore (p. 47). This strongly suggests that Adams, despite major atrophy of the frontotemporal regions, was still artistically motivated which highly suggests she was still aesthetically engaged.

Miller & Miller take these results to show that left-sided frontotemporal atrophy affects networks that can engender both creativity and photorealistic compulsion (p. 369).

106 An acoustic neuroma is a non-cancerous tumor on the main nerve of the inner ear (aka the auditory vestibular nerve). It typically grows slowly, but it can eventually become large enough to put pressure on the brain, which causes hearing loss, ringing in the ear, and imbalance (Mayo Clinic, Sept. 11th, 2017). 107 Seeley et al. suggest that the damage to Adams’ frontotemporal language areas might explain her changes in (p. 47).

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In my view, it is difficult to say whether a particular patient is more or less creative than a non-FTD patient and ultimately not that relevant. The main point is that individuals suffering from OFC, and anterior insula atrophy, not only enjoy aesthetic endeavors; they sometimes obsessively pursue them. Damage to the OFC, the alleged aesthetic center of the brain, apparently does not result in a lack of aesthetic interest or even skill at creating aesthetic objects.

The immediate response to my observations might be that not all areas of the frontotemporal region were destroyed and, perhaps, this means that FTD patients had enough of the OFC intact, or at least the relevant portions intact. This explanation, however, would not adequately explain the increase in aesthetic interest that takes place in FTD patients like Ann

Adams.

These examples suggest that even when the OFC is impaired, sometimes in significant ways, individuals still have aesthetic experiences. If the OFC were the center of aesthetic processing, one would expect individuals with significant damage to that region of the brain to lose some—or most—of their aesthetic experience. This is clearly not the case. The evidence available strongly indicates that claiming that the OFC is the aesthetic center of the brain is not only premature, but likely incorrect. At the least, assuming at the outset of an investigation that the OFC is the aesthetic processing center of the brain is more likely to mislead than to enlighten.

Thus, not only is the currently popular OFC theory flawed from a philosophical perspective, it is deeply flawed from an empirical perspective as well. One might think that the empirical data seems to support the view that aesthetic processing is purely evaluative, but I think it is now clear that such an is not warranted based on the current research.

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4.5 Towards New Insights: Anjan Chatterjee’s framework

My discussion in this chapter has focused largely on what is wrong philosophically and empirically with the prevalent OFC view. This strategy supports my claim that the existing empirical data does not invalidate perceptual objectivism. It does not, however, build a positive foundation for a perceptual objectivist picture of aesthetic processing. Thus, it is important for me to consider approaches in empirical aesthetics that could help build this positive foundation for the perceptual objectivist approach. In my view, a framework being developed by Anjan

Chatterjee shows the most promise in this regard.

Chatterjee’s book, The Aesthetic Brain (2013), features discussion of contemporary empirical aesthetics and his own neuroaesthetics framework. His focus is on the science, but unlike many others working in neuroaesthetics, he is beginning to incorporate philosophical aesthetics to develop a sharper analysis of art and aesthetics.

Chatterjee’s viewpoint, I think, is particularly intriguing because of its sensitivity to the inadequacies of neuroaesthetics. He highlights, for example, the risks of overt reductionism pointing out that relying on preference ratings as a correlate of aesthetic judgment is suspect

(2010, p. 59). He explains that this approach invites the “proverbial problem of looking for the dropped coin under the lamp because that is where things are visible, even if the coin was dropped elsewhere” (p. 59). This is precisely the problem with the OFC view as it is currently constructed. Focusing almost solely on the OFC is like searching for the coin under the lamp.

Chatterjee suggests new possible research avenues. Drawing on Fechner, he suggests revisiting “outer psychophysics: by using properties of objects to probe properties of the brain”

(p. 59).108 He says that in such experiments “finely characterized stimuli are related to the spatial

108 Fechner’s “outer psychophysics” involved the relation between the mind and a stimulus.

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and temporal response properties of neurons” (p. 59). This sort of approach would be much more fruitful from the perceptual objectivist perspective.

Chatterjee’s framework is adapted from the cognitive neuroscience of vision (Chatterjee,

2003, p. 55). He supposes that visual aesthetics is like vision itself. Visual aesthetics, he says, is

“derived from responses to different components of a visual object” (p. 55). Chatterjee explains that the nervous system processes visual information both hierarchically and in parallel (p. 55).

The levels of processing are labeled early, intermediate and late vision (p. 55). Early vision extracts simple elements of the visual scene like color and shape (p. 55). Intermediate vision organizes the visual information “to form coherent regions” preventing a sensory overload (p.

55). Like early vision, intermediate vision proceeds automatically (p. 55). Finally, late vision

“selects which coherent regions to scrutinize” (p. 55). Chatterjee adds that late vision evokes memories “from which objects are recognized and meanings attached” (p. 55).

Chatterjee goes on to relate this to visual aesthetics. He explains that the visual properties of artworks109 are at first processed like any other visual object. Next, the combinations of early and intermediate visual properties, like color, shape, and composition, engage “fronto-parietal attentional circuits” (p. 55). Attentional networks go on to moderate processing in the ventral visual stream (p. 55). He hypothesizes that this modulation leads to a

“more vivid experience of the stimuli, both its attributes, such as colors or form as well as content, such as faces and landscapes” (p. 55).

In summary, a “feed forward” system is established in which the properties of an aesthetic object engage attention, and attention then amplifies the processing of the object (p.

55). Chatterjee argues that responses to the early and intermediate visual features of an aesthetic

109 Chatterjee focuses on artwork in the piece, but this could involve any kind of aesthetic object.

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object are likely to be universal (p. 56). He believes this based on evidence that early and intermediate vision are hardwired cross-culturally (p. 56).

Chatterjee’s investigation of aesthetic processing focuses on the neuropsychology of abnormal cases. In particular, he focuses on brain damaged and cognitively impaired artists to see what that they can tell us about particular aspects of aesthetic processing in the brain. For instance, he considers artists with visual agnosia, a disorder in which patients cannot recognize an object visually (p. 57). Visual agnosia has two forms: apperceptive and associative.

Apperceptive agnosia involves deficiencies in visual perception while associative agnosia involves deficiencies in conceptual knowledge of objects. For example, Chatterjee discusses an artist called “JR” who acquired apperceptive agnosia following a stroke. JR was still interested in painting and maintained many of his skills, but he would often find himself “lost” in the middle of a drawing (p. 57). He would also do things like add 5 legs to a drawing of a rhinoceros (p. 57). Chatterjee also considers a pair of artists who suffered from associative agnosia. These artists were able to draw very well from a visual model, but if they were asked to draw an object based on a word only, they were unable to do so (p. 57).

Chatterjee incorporates these cases to show how abnormal subjects can illuminate aesthetic processing in visual aesthetics, but I think this approach could be expanded beyond just visual aesthetics. The hierarchical structure of Chatterjee’s framework is friendly to perceptual objectivism. I believe that non-evaluative higher-order phenomenal aesthetic impressions can find a space in that structure. I will briefly consider an abnormal case, specifically a condition known as amusia, to show how we might begin building a case for perceptual objectivism using

Chatterjee’s approach.

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4.5a Amusia and Higher-Order Phenomenal Impressions

Amusia is a disorder affecting the perception of music. This goes beyond mere “tone- deafness” and extends to musical memory, recognition, singing, the ability to tap in time to music and more (Alossa & Castelli, p. 269). Amusia can be acquired or congenital and it can come in multiple forms (Peretz and Hyde, p. 363). Amusia only affects 1.5% of the population and appears equally among men and women (Peretz, 2016, p. 858).110 Oliver Sacks describes amusia as a higher-order perceptual defect, like visual agnosia (p. 105).

Amusia cases, like the visual cases just considered, suggest that there are higher-order perceptual impressions associated with aesthetic experience. This is certainly a tentative claim— more research will need to be conducted with this specific question in mind to truly establish the sort of support my view needs, but it promises to help my case. In order to see how the amusia cases affect debate about higher-order aesthetic impressions, it is important to examine some amusia research in more detail.

Ayotte et al (2002) put 11 subjects with amusia through a battery of tests. The subjects were all healthy and had a university-level education. They discovered that amusical individuals showed a clear deficiency in musical pitch discrimination (p. 240). Most did not appreciate music and two reported hating music (p. 241). Amusia does not always result in a dislike of music, however. Oliver Sacks reports that an amusical subject, “I.R.” still claimed to enjoy music despite the perceptual deficit (p. 316). Nevertheless, amusical subjects tend to show a lessened interest in or enjoyment of music. In one test, Ayotte et al. exposed the amusical subjects and controls to samples of music that were consonant and dissonant (p. 242). They used the first bars of Albinoni’s Adagio for the consonant sample and created the dissonant sample by

110 Amusia is diagnosed using the Montreal Battery of Evaluation of Amusia (MBEA). The test is designed to evaluate a subject’s tonal knowledge (Peretz, 2016, p. 858).

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“by shifting the pitch of all tones of the leading voice by one semitone either upward or downward” (p. 242). Ayotte et al. predicted the controls would rate the consonant music as more pleasant than the dissonant music. Results showed that the controls rated the consonant music as more pleasant while the amusical subjects rated both categories as vaguely pleasant (p. 243).

Ayotte et al. also tested the amusical subjects’ ability to recognize pitch in spoken language use. They performed much better on these tasks (p. 245). Amusical subjects were also able to identify songs based on lyrics but not by their sounds alone (p. 246). Ayotte et al. argue that these results confirm the self-report of amusical subjects that they have a “selective problem in recognizing the melodic part of songs” (p. 246). Ayotte et al. conclude from these findings that “The musical disorder appears as an accidental disturbance in an otherwise fully normal cognitive affective system” (p. 249).

What exactly does this tell us about perceptual capacities and music? Isabelle Peretz and her colleagues have been analyzing this question specifically and have come up with some interesting conclusions. Peretz and Hyde, for example, argue that musical perception is distinct from other auditory functions like language perception (p. 363). They support this notion primarily with amusia cases, but begin with a discussion of infants. They claim that infants appear to be “born musical” (p. 362). Infants as young as 6-9 months are able to process consonant intervals more easily than dissonant intervals and appear to prefer musical scales with

“unequal steps” (p. 362). Peretz and Hyde argue that infants must be “perceptually equipped for assimilating the pitch structure of any culture” (p. 362). The upshot is that infant musical perceptual skills “appear precociously” with no “obvious function in language” which suggests the existence of “music-specific predispositions” (p. 362).

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Peretz and Hyde also use amusia cases to bolster the claim that human beings have a distinctive neural network for music perception. As discussed above, amusical subjects can suffer from recognition failures that are specific to music. This indicates that amusical subjects do not have a problem in recognizing pitch in general, but they do have a problem with fine- grained pitch discrimination (Pearce, p. 147; Peretz and Hyde, p. 363). Amusical subjects are also unable to recognize the distance of a semitone (Peretz and Hyde, p. 365).111 Peretz and

Hyde suggest that amusical subjects can still detect pitch intonation in language because the pitch variations are crude in comparison to music (p. 365). Specifically, Peretz argues that amusical subjects are “impaired at detecting pitch deviations that are smaller than two semitones” (2016, p. 859). This impairment, however, occurs in isolation from other speech disorders. Amusical subjects do not have impairments when it comes to perceiving speech prosody112, for example (2016, p. 859).113 Peretz’s work in particular has led many researchers to believe that an inability to make fine-grained pitch discriminations is at the heart of amusia.

The cause of this pitch discrimination problem, however, is not clear.

Interestingly, the pitch processing brain areas of amusical subjects appear to be functioning normally. This means that their brains process pitch information the way normal perceivers do. However, they are unable to consciously access this information (2016, p. 859).

Amusical subjects appear to have perception without awareness (2016, p. 859). Nevertheless,

Peretz et al. have found some abnormal activation patterns in amusical subjects’ brains. Their brains exhibit “neuronal anomalies” in the right frontotemporal network and the auditory cortex

(2016, p. 862). Peretz hypothesizes that while auditory input reaches the auditory cortex

111 For example, they would be unable to perceive the difference between C and C#. 112 Prosody refers to intonational aspects of language (this involves, tone, pitch, rhythm etc.). One would expect an amusical person to struggle with this aspect of language, but, as a general rule, they do not. 113 Peretz takes this as evidence that the processing of tone in speech and in music are quite different (2016, p. 859).

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normally, there is an abnormal top-down feedback from the inferior frontal gyrus to the superior temporal gyrus (2016, p. 862-3). The bottom-up process is fine, while the higher-order, top- down feedback is malfunctioning.114

McDermott et al. reproduced Peretz’s findings that amusical subjects appear to have normally functioning pitch-responsive regions in their brains (p. 2993) but they consider other possible explanations for how an amusical brain can process pitch normally while the amusical subject is still unable to consciously perceive music. One possibility Peretz does not consider is that amusical subjects might have impairments in regions outside of the pitch-responsive cortex

(p. 2993). McDermott et al. cite studies reporting that there are “music-selective responses” found in other regions of the auditory cortex (p. 2993). These regions are not in the pitch- responsive regions studied by Peretz et al. This intriguingly suggests that the pitch-responsive region does not tell the whole story about amusia. McDermott et al. suggest more research needs to be done to determine what role other music-selective circuitry plays in amusia (p. 2993).

Despite growing consensus around Peretz’s view, the specific cause of amusia is still an open question. Peretz is quick to note, however, that the fine-grained pitch processing problem is the “visible manifestation” of amusia but not the underlying cause (2016, p. 859). McDermott et al.’s suggestion that other music-selective regions might be involved with the disorder is intriguing and worth studying. I believe further study of those regions could also yield interesting results for my view.

Regardless of what specifically causes amusia, I think amusia studies produce strong evidence that music perception is distinct from other types of auditory perception. The existence of music-specific processing provides a plausible basis for claiming that human beings are

114 “In other words, the right STG of amusics would compute the statistical properties of the auditory input (bottom-up) without top-down influences from higher-order cortical regions.” (2016, p. 864).

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capable of higher-order aesthetic perception. This is obviously highly speculative, but it suggests a new potential avenue of research for neuroaesthetics—to seek evidence of aesthetic perceptual networks within different sensory modalities.

4.5b Possible objection to the Amusia argument

One might ask what the amusia cases just considered really tell us about aesthetic property perception. Consider the case of blindness in comparison. A blind person obviously cannot see or recognize visual aesthetic properties. This case, however, does not tell us much about the aesthetic properties themselves. Vision is a necessary condition for viewing anything, so it tells us very little about the nature of the aesthetic properties in question. The blind person, then, has an inability to even perceive the non-aesthetic properties on which the higher-order aesthetic properties must supervene.

On the face of it, amusia seems to be a similar case. Whatever perceptual capacity that is lacking in individuals with amusia might be necessary for music appreciation, but not sufficient for it. The fact that amusical subjects are unable to appreciate115 or even hear music as music, does not tell us that we should conceive of aesthetic properties as being non-evaluative in character, for example. In other words, amusical patients are simply unable to perceive the non- aesthetic base properties, such as semitones, of musical aesthetic properties like mellifluousness.

115 It is worth noting that Isabelle Gosselin and colleagues in a recent study found that some amusical subjects are able to emotionally respond to music even though they are unable to perceive it normally (2015). In one study, amusical subjects and controls listened to a set of 56 musical clips. They reflected four emotions: happy, sad, peaceful and scary. The happy excerpts, for example, had a fast tempo while the sad excerpts were in a minor mode and had a slow tempo (p. 174). The amusical subjects and controls ratings overlapped on the happy and sad clips (p. 175). Gosselin et al. performed other experiments also indicating that amusical subjects have “near normal” performance on emotion tasks. This led them to hypothesize that there is a dissociation between music perception and emotion recognition (p. 176). Gosselin et al. suggest that amusical subjects may have been relying on timbre related cues (p. 179). One very speculative suggestion is that “musical emotions might recruit the same circuits that have evolved for vocal emotions” (p. 180).

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I would agree that the case of blindness does not tell us much about visual aesthetic properties and does little to show that aesthetic properties might be higher-order phenomenal impressions of some sort. The amusia case, however, is importantly different.

There are multiple forms of blindness116, but all of them involve some fundamental failure of the visual system. A defining feature of amusia is the fact that amusical subjects have properly functioning auditory systems. Indeed, they even make basic pitch and tone discriminations. It is not until they are asked to perform more fine-grained discrimination tasks that they reach a perceptual blind-spot. Like Chatterjee’s visual agnosia example, it is a very specific form of perceptual defect that sheds light on the target question. Perhaps even more interestingly in the amusia case, there is strong evidence (Peretz, McDermott, etc.) suggesting that human beings have a music-specific perception capacity. The possible existence of music- specific perception networks is aesthetically significant. It suggests that there is unique, higher- order perception of music and its aesthetic properties.

Still, the skeptic might insist that fine-grained pitch discriminations are at the level of the non-aesthetic. In response to this, I would direct the skeptic to some recent amusia research suggesting that amusia is more than just a problem with fine-grained pitch discrimination.117

Reed and colleagues (2011) investigate the possibility that congenital amusia impairs the perception of musical properties “that do not rely on fine-grained pitch discrimination” (p. 305).

After extensively testing “G.G.”, a 64-year-old man with congenital amusia118, the authors argue

116 For instance, one might have damage to the eyes themselves, or just damage to the visual cortex. Both result in a loss of vision, but can have different specific features. 117 The researchers in this study are not denying that fine-grained pitch discrimination is a problem for amusical subjects. Rather, they argue it does not explain all of the deficits experienced by an amusical subject. 118 G.G. is a very intelligent individual who was well educated in music history. He was born in Hungary and worked in electrical engineering with a major for 36 years. He was actually discovered by Steven Cahn, a co-author of the study in question, at a music lecture that G.G. had attended out of interest. While G.G. had some severe musical perception impairments, he was very interested in understanding music history (in particular the composers).

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that amusia is not just a fine-grained pitch discrimination problem (p. 307). They argue that the musical perception deficits symptomatic of amusia owe to a combined problem with fine-grained pitch discrimination and a problem with tonal fusion (p. 307). Tonal fusion, Reed et al. explain, is defined as the “tendency of tones to ‘fuse’ or perceptually combine so that the perception of sound becomes a single tone or something different from the mere concurrence of its two tonal components” (p. 306).119 The higher tone, they explain, tends to fuse into the overtone of the lower. The perfect fifth and the octave are most likely to be heard as one tone (that is they are the most likely to tonally fuse) (p. 306-307). They argue that the ability to perceive these intervals separately is crucial for musical perception because these intervals are “the source for our notion of consonance and dissonance” (p. 307).120 It is important to note that normal perceivers can also experience tonal fusion.121 However, amusical subjects experience it to such a degree that it undermines their ability to perceive melody and accurately judge musical affect

(Reed et al., p. 317). The researchers suggest that because of his tonal fusion problem, G.G. might even lack the ability to develop a sense of musical space or experience harmonic enrichment.

In the study, they chose G.G. because he had been amusical from birth (p. 305). G.G. himself described his experience of music as “organized noise” (p. 308). It is important to note that G.G. had no difficulty recognizing emotion/inflection in speech (i.e. speech prosody) or

119 The concept of tonal fusion was originally developed by the German psychologist Stumpf in the early twentieth century as an explanation of consonance. Stumpf observed that consonant intervals tend to “cohere into a single sound image” (Ebeling, p. 2320). He described this phenomenon as tonal fusion. Stumpf did not have enough time to truly develop his view of consonance and eventually abandoned it (Ebeling, p. 2320). 120 It is worth noting that the nature of consonance and dissonance is still a widely debated issue in psychology and musicology. Many currently accept the view that dissonance is generated when two closely spaced tones “interact on the basilar membrane to produce a “beating” pattern and this in turn leads to roughness” (Plack, p. 476). This suggests that dissonance is related to “the degree of beating between harmonics” (Plack, p. 476). The tonal fusion theory offers an alternative to this view. 121 David Huron suggests, for example, that the opening of Copland’s Billy the Kid ballet suite is designed to induce tonal fusion, but that in other cases tonal fusion “may be contrary to the musical goal.” (p. 10.

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producing it himself (p. 309). When it came to music, however, G.G. was unable to successfully discriminate the emotional quality of the music (p. 316) and he could not discriminate semitone or whole-tone intervals (p. 310). These results are consistent with other studies of amusical subjects.

Reed et al. went in a new direction by testing G.G.’s tendency for “tonal fusion with consonant musical intervals” (p. 313). They went on to assess harmonic impairments that might result from a tendency for tonal fusion. According to the authors, a tendency for tonal fusion is most likely to impair the ability to recognize timbre (the character or quality of a musical sound), assessing consonance and dissonance and recognizing musical affect from harmony (p. 313).

Reed et al. borrowed a tonal fusion experiment from DeWitt and Crowder to test G.G. against normal subjects. In the original experiment, DeWitt and Crowder presented all harmonic intervals between 1 and 12 semitones to 7 healthy subjects (p. 314). In each trial, subjects were presented with a tone or a tone pair. They were then asked to report whether it was a single tone or two simultaneous tones. The highest error rate occurred at the most consonant harmonic intervals (6% for the perfect fifth and 25% for the octaves) (p. 314). That is, participants were most likely to report hearing one note instead of two with the most consonant harmonic intervals

(p. 314). Reed et al. performed the same experiment on G.G.—he found it quite difficult (p.

314). G.G. heard single tones 100% of the time when being presented with octaves and perfect fifths (p. 314). Clearly, then, G.G. was experiencing more tonal fusion problems than normal subjects.

Reed et al. performed a variety of other tests to confirm G.G.’s inability to perceive intervals distinctly (p. 315). For example, participants were presented with 11 different intervals and then asked to report if the intervals sounded pleasant or unpleasant (i.e., consonant, or

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dissonant) (p. 315). Classic examples of consonance and dissonance were used. Normal subjects consistently reported that the consonant intervals were pleasant while G.G. could not discriminate between consonant and dissonant chords and reported that he found them neither pleasant nor unpleasant (p. 315).

The authors conclude that in addition to having a fine-grained pitch discrimination problem, G.G. is unable to perceive consonant harmonic intervals because of his problem with tonal fusion (p. 317). They contend G.G.’s tonal fusion problem leads to serious impairment of musical perception such as an inability to perceive harmony, timbre, consonance or dissonance

(p. 317). Reed et al. suggest that the tonal fusion problem might actually precede the fine- grained pitch discrimination problem given the centrality of harmony and consonance in musical perception (p. 320). This strongly suggests that amusia is more than just an issue with recognizing lower-order, non-aesthetic qualities of music. Amusical subjects appear to be genuinely unable to perceive higher-order features of music like harmony, consonance, and timbre.

In Musicophilia (2007), Oliver Sacks offers some more anecdotal evidence suggesting that more than just fine-grained pitch discrimination is at the heart of amusia. He tells us of a female amusia patient labeled “Mrs. L.”. She describes her experience of music as the sounds of

“pots and pans crashing together” and she reported that she could only recognize the Star

Spangled Banner at events because people would stand up (p. 112). Mrs. L. showed no signs of other auditory impairments (p. 115-116) but also reported that she cannot understand what people enjoy in music (p. 116). From cases like Mrs. L., Sacks draws the conclusion that amusia is not just a deficit in pitch recognition, but it is a higher order perception defect (like visual agnosia) (p. 105). This observation is consistent with the findings of Reed et al.

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Even if it was granted that fine-grained pitch perception is just a case of non-aesthetic perception (which I don’t think should be immediately granted), there is a great deal of evidence suggesting that amusia involves higher-order perceptual deficits deeply connected to aesthetic perception.

It is important to be clear about exactly what I’m trying to show with the amusia case.

The goal of this chapter is to show that perceptual objectivism, specifically the claim that human beings can plausibly be said to perceive higher-order phenomenal impressions of an aesthetic sort, can pass the PMPRA. I think the amusia example satisfies this goal. The existence of a neural network subserving music perception strongly suggests that human beings have aesthetic perception capacities of a non-evaluative sort. I say “non-evaluative” because the perception I’m speaking of is not a reward assessment. Claiming that human beings can perceive higher-order aesthetic impressions is perfectly plausible from an empirical perspective.

I’ll allow that this does not fully answer the concern that the amusia examples might be overly focused on pseudo aesthetic properties (i.e. properties that could turn out to be non- aesthetic). Fine-grained pitch discrimination, for example, might be considered a non-aesthetic perceptual ability. I think cases like G.G. do help to answer this concern. As noted above, there is not yet consensus on what exactly is perceptually going wrong with amusical subjects. I believe focusing on the still developing tonal fusion research will provide even stronger support for perceptual objectivism.

The upshot of this analysis of amusia is that there is no reason to outright dismiss, on empirical grounds, the idea that human beings may have higher-order aesthetic perception.

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4.6 Conclusion

I argued in chapter 3 that establishing the empirical adequacy of perceptual objectivism was one of the biggest challenges the view faced. I believe that the empirical evidence considered in this chapter neutralizes that threat. While the developing consensus in empirical aesthetics (suggesting that the OFC is the aesthetic processing center of the brain) initially appears to undermine my view, I have shown that it is actually not a true threat. Instead, it reveals flaws in experimental design and a lack of philosophical acuity with respect to aesthetic concepts. From a constructive point of view, I think the abnormal case of amusia supports the plausibility of higher-order non-evaluative aesthetic perception and suggests exciting new research avenues for empirical meta-aesthetics. I believe perceptual objectivism, then, satisfies the PMPRA. Nevertheless, I think much more needs to be done to fully support perceptual objectivism from an empirical perspective, but I believe this inquiry has shown not only that it is possible, but also how it might be accomplished going forward.

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Chapter 5: Defending the Perceptual Model of Aesthetic Experience

I have argued that perceptual objectivism is a viable form of naturalistic aesthetic realism thanks to the dispositional model of aesthetic properties and the descriptive account. This view implies a perceptual model of aesthetic experience. I have argued that moving away from the pitfalls of treating aesthetic experience as a form of evaluative perception creates new opportunities for an empirically plausible dispositional aesthetic realism. I contend that aesthetic realism is uniquely capable of taking a non-evaluative path and puts it in a strong metaphysical position. There are critics; however, who believe that the perceptual model of aesthetic properties is a mistake and puts aesthetic realism in a less viable position than traditional moral realism. My chief interlocutor in this discussion is Nick Zangwill. He argues that perceptual objectivism122 could be in a worse metaphysical position than non-perceptually based realism.

Zangwill levels two significant charges against the perceptual objectivist position. He argues that (1) sensory dependence is a problem for realism and (2) aesthetic experience is not a case of perception. With respect to (1) he suggests that the sensory dependence thesis leads to the failure of response-dependent realism and with respect to (2) he attacks the perceptual model of aesthetic experience. Both of these critiques undermine the very structure of perceptual objectivism. I will address both of his concerns in this chapter. In the first section, I respond to his concerns about sensory-based response dependence and realism. In the second section, I critique his view of aesthetic perception and discuss some alternative accounts supporting the

122 In Zangwill’s book, The Metaphysics of Beauty, he outlines a view that sounds very close to perceptual objectivism, but labels it the “secondary quality view” (p. 190). He never explicitly criticizes perceptual objectivism. It would be accurate to say that Zangwill is criticizing any moderate, dispositionalist aesthetic realism.

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perceptual model. I then go on to consider ways in which the philosophy of perception can illuminate this debate.

5.1 Problems with Response Dependence

Before discussing Zangwill’s objections to perceptual objectivism, it is important to get a basic sense of his view, which is highly idiosyncratic. Zangwill is an aesthetic realist. He believes that aesthetics properties are objective and mind-independent (2015, p. 110), but he also believes that they are not perceptually accessible, or describable using literal terms (2011, p. 2).

Aesthetic judgments for Zangwill are made on subjective grounds.123 By contrast, he says empirical judgments are made on “the basis of perceptual experience” (2015, p. 110). He concludes from this that aesthetic properties themselves do independently exist, but they can only be known through nonperceptual means.124 He suggests that his own view might be called

“nonperceptual Moorean aesthetic realism” (2011, p. 14).125

Zangwill’s view is not one shared by many in meta-aesthetics, but his critique of aesthetic perception cuts to the heart of the perceptual objectivist account and is therefore worth considering in some detail. I will analyze his two primary objections in what follows.

Ultimately, I believe his critique fails to present a real problem for the perceptual account of aesthetic properties and experience.

123 Zangwill draws this terminology, and his thinking about aesthetic judgments, from the work of Immanuel Kant (2011; 2015). 124 He uses our experience of music as an example. When we listen to music, he says, “We are attending to aesthetic properties of sounds, and while they are not properties of our minds in the way that properties of sensations are, they are made on the basis of or on the ground of subjective experiences, which are typically private” (p. 109). 125 In Zangwill’s view, the Moorean component is that we do not perceive aesthetic properties the way we perceive physical and sensory properties (2015, p. 110). I will discuss these aspects of his view in more detail in section 5.2.

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Zangwill’s first concern involves what he takes to be a tenet of the received view of aesthetic properties in meta-aesthetics, namely “weak sensory dependence” (2001, p. 184). This thesis states: “Aesthetic properties depend in part on sensory properties, such as colors and sounds” (2001, p. 184). Zangwill himself is committed to this view (2001, p. 127). This view implies that sensory properties126 are necessary for aesthetic properties, but they may not be sufficient for them (2001, p. 185). Perceptual objectivism clearly accepts this thesis. While

Zangwill himself has realist leanings, he believes that the sensory dependence thesis creates a problem for aesthetic realism. 127 This ultimately leads him to a somewhat agnostic conclusion about aesthetic realism at the close of The Metaphysics of Beauty (2001). In later work, he leans towards a non-naturalistic view of aesthetic realism.128 Zangwill’s concern about sensory dependence can be boiled down to the following phrase: “aesthetic qualities of things cannot be more real than that to which they attach” (2001, p. 186). To understand how he arrives at this conclusion, it is necessary to consider his view of response-dependence and the ontology of color.129

Zangwill takes pains to distinguish between what he calls rigid and non-rigid response- dependent accounts of sensory properties. A rigid view contends that sensory properties are dispositions to elicit “experiences in organisms of the sort that we actually are now” (2001, p.

188). This implies that an object has a sensory property of a certain kind if and only if it has some “intrinsic physical property which, given the laws, determines that it has a disposition to

126 Zangwill is referring to secondary qualities, but he uses the term sensory qualities or properties to narrowly focus on a certain class of secondary qualities. 127 Zangwill specifically targets physicalist aesthetic realism in The Metaphysics of Beauty, but sees this as a problem for realism in general. 128 In a Q&A posted to PhilPapers, Zangwill explains that he leans towards non-naturalism (“My Philosophical views”, n.d.). 129 Zangwill implies that his views on secondary qualities hold for them all, but he focuses on color properties.

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provoke certain experiences in normal people under normal circumstances” (2001, p. 189).130

An intrinsic disposition, for example, would be the disposition of an iron key to melt at 500℃, which is determined by its intrinsic molecular structure. By contrast, an extrinsic disposition is one that exhibits certain manifestations in certain circumstances (McKitrick, p. 159). For example, the same iron key may have the disposition to open some locks. The melting disposition is intrinsic and the unlocking disposition is extrinsic. According to a non-rigid view of response-dependence, sensory properties are constituted in part by “our actual reactions”

(2001, p. 189). This means that a non-rigid view would be committed to the claim that our reactions in some sense determine the sensory properties—making it a relativistic, or subjectivist account. Zangwill notes that if you hold a non-rigid view of response-dependence then you will be committed to the following counterfactual claim: “if we had different reactions then things would have different sensory properties” (2001, p. 189). If you maintain a rigid view of response-dependence, then you will not be committed to that counterfactual. Zangwill defines the “secondary quality view” as a non-rigid response-dependent account of aesthetic properties

(p. 190). This is an important element of his argument given that he believes the non-rigid account is fundamentally subjectivist.

Zangwill goes on to demonstrate why he believes sensory properties, like color, are intuitively subjective. He does this by employing a familiar scenario from the philosophy of color. He calls it an argument from “possible divergence” (2001, p. 190), but it is also (perhaps more frequently) known as the argument from “perceptual variation” (Cohen, p. 24). First,

Zangwill contends that it is possible for there to be a species, Martians in this case, with very different perceptual mechanisms “such that when they perceive what we perceive, they have qualitatively different but equally fine-grained color experiences” (2001, p. 190). Cohen calls

130 Zangwill is not alone in using the intrinsic vs. extrinsic terminology, but it is somewhat idiosyncratic.

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this an “inter-species difference” (p. 26). This, of course, means that they would make different color judgments from normal human perceivers: they might, for example, believe that stop signs are royal blue. The upshot of his discussion is that perceptual divergence is possible (2001, p.

191). This component of his argument is not controversial.

The second component of Zangwill’s argument concerns our reaction to this obvious variation between Martians and ourselves. He contends that normal human perceivers would not think that the Martians are in error about their color attributions, saying that we “would be tolerant in our judgments about sensory qualities in a way that we are not in our judgments about physical properties” (2001, p. 191). Zangwill strengthens the claim arguing that we “should” be tolerant in cases of perceptual variation because “our situation with respect to them [Martians] is exactly parallel to their situation with respect to us” (2001, p. 192). The important point, though, is that we appear to be intuitively tolerant of divergence (2001, p. 193). In other words, he contends that humans have perceptual-divergence-tolerance built into their concepts of colors.

If we took redness to be real, then we would have to say that the Martian is mistaken when he labels the red stop sign as royal blue. We would not do this, Zangwill says, because we are tolerant of perceptual divergence. Because we are tolerant of such divergence, we intuitively prefer a non-rigid approach to color property response dependence (2001, p. 194). This becomes problematic if one is a realist about color properties. Intolerance of divergence favors a rigid response-dependent account.

Zangwill concludes from this that colors are likely entirely relational (2001, p. 194-5).

He suggests that color dispositions are extrinsic, like the comfortableness of chairs. The comfortableness of chairs, he claims, is entirely relative to the sort of being sitting in the chair

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(2001, p. 195).131 Thus, comfortableness is non-rigidly response dependent. Similarly, he contends that we ought to accept a non-rigid response dependence account of dispositional color properties because they are entirely dependent on the sensory experience of a perceiver and the reactions of perceivers can vary.

Zangwill boldly claims that the only way to “salvage realism” in this case would be to argue that our intuitive commitment to tolerance in the face of perceptual variation is misguided, and he thinks this is impossible (2001, p. 194). Zangwill believes that any version of aesthetic realism that accepts the dependence of aesthetic properties upon lower-order sensory properties will be in serious metaphysical danger. He states: “So long as we hold that aesthetic properties depend on sensory properties, we must hold that aesthetic properties inherit the metaphysical status of sensory properties, whatever it may be.” (2001, p. 200).

Before responding to Zangwill’s critique, I think it would be helpful to reorganize his argument in reference to perceptual objectivism:

(P1) Perceptual objectivism argues that aesthetic properties depend on sensory properties like color.

(P2) Given this dependence, if sensory properties turn out to be illusory or “nonreal” (2001, p. 196) then aesthetic properties would also be nonreal.

(P3) Perceptual variation and our acceptance of divergent perceptual judgments (i.e. tolerance) decisively shows that sensory properties are not objectively real.132

(C) Therefore aesthetic properties are not objectively real, i.e. perceptual objectivism fails as a realist theory of aesthetic properties.

Each premise in this argument is controversial, but I would like to focus my attention on P3, which is doing the most work in this particular argument. Zangwill’s argument for a subjective

131 A chair is designed for the comfort of a human being. Another animal--a giraffe for example--would find it less ideal. 132 He says “the moral and aesthetic qualities of things cannot be more real than that to which they attach” (p. 1)

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account of color properties is too thin to claim something so substantive. He also draws insupportable concerning our intuitions about color that undermine his argument. In the following section, I argue that Zangwill has not successfully established that sensory properties are nonreal and therefore fails to show that sensory-based dispositional aesthetic realism is in a worse position than alternative forms of realism. In short, I believe his concerns about sensory dependence are over-stated.

5.1a Realist conceptions of sensory properties

Perceptual variation is undoubtedly a problem that a secondary quality realist must face.

Zangwill focuses on an inter-species example, but inter- and intra-species variations are equally problematic (Cohen, p. 21-24). This problem has been considered for centuries, however, and there are more than a few responses that a realist might make. In this section, I will review several responses to the perceptual variation argument to make it clear that Zangwill is not justified in concluding that sensory properties are nonreal. Because Zangwill focuses on color perception in his examples, I will focus on color realism in this section.

One obvious reply a color realist might suggest is that we should become externalists about the content of sensory experience. In color ontology debates, “externalism” refers to realist theories that take color properties to be properties of external objects. This view suggests that the content of the Martian’s color experience and the content of the human perceivers’ color experience are both determined by external, objective properties that cause our sensory experience (Zangwill, 2001, p. 192). Even if the Martian had a different perceptual experience of the colors, his experience would still be caused, or fixed, by external properties. The trouble with this reply, as Zangwill correctly notes, is that it is not a dispositionalist view. It is more

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consistent with a physicalist account of color. Physicalist theories treat color properties as mind- independent physical properties of objects (usually characterized as a surface spectral reflectance). Physicalists suggest that the true nature of colors is hidden from us in our color experience.

Byrne and Hilbert defend a version of physicalist realism by suggesting that cases of variation in color perception are analogous to cases of perceptual variation with respect to temperature (2009, Cohen, p. 3). One person might think it is 69°F while another thinks it is

70°F and so on. We would not say in this case, though, that the variation indicated that each perception was veridical (Ibid. p. 3). Rather, the people perceiving the temperature simply

“have no ‘independent method’ of determining whether the temperature right now is exactly

70°F” (Byrne and Hilbert in Cohen, p. 3). Similarly, in cases of perceptual variation with respect to color, Byrne and Hilbert could argue that there is, for instance, a unique green, just as there is a particular temperature outside, but perceivers have no independent method, in the case of green, to check whose perception is veridical.133

Zangwill rejects this theory of color, in large part because he believes that it runs afoul of our intuitions about perceptual variation (2001, p. 192). But he is far too dismissive of the externalist, physicalist view of color. It provides a clear and robust example of how sensory properties can be firmly rooted in . That said, perceptual objectivism is, of course, not a strictly externalist account; it defends a dispositional account of sensory qualities. Luckily, color dispositionalists also have responses to cases of perceptual variation.

Dispositional realist theories of color tend to address cases of perceptual variation by appeal to standard conditions and standard perceivers. This approach works fairly well for many cases of intra-species perceptual variation. For example, if Smith were to see a red tomato as

133 Of course, Byrne and Hilbert’s suggestion has been challenged (Cohen, 2007, 2009).

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green because of his , we could explain this variation by appeal to a standard perceiver. The color ascription “the tomato is red” is still veridical—it would appear red under standard conditions to a standard perceiver.134

This model is complicated, however, when non-human perceivers are introduced. Thus,

Zangwill would likely say that a dispositionalist response to his Martian case is not adequate.

There is a long tradition of this debate in the ontology of color. Averill, for instance, argues that dispositional accounts of color tend to be anthropocentric—they define standard conditions and standard perceivers in human terms (p. 281). There could be, however, many different types of perceivers—such as Zangwill’s Martians. J.J.C. Smart, a prominent dispositional realist, argues that this isn’t necessarily a problem for dispositional accounts. Smart favors an idealized perceiver over a normal perceiver (p. 49). A normal or standard perceiver is a statistical aggregate representing normal human perception. An idealized perceiver, by contrast, is a combination of expert perceivers. For example, Jones might be excellent at discriminating blue and McTavish is very good at recognizing red hues. Combining these perceivers into one expert perceiver approaches the concept of an idealized perceiver (Smart, p. 48). Smart compares an idealized aesthetic perceiver to the “mean sun” concept in astronomical chronology (p. 49).135

The motion of the apparent (actual) sun is not uniform due to several factors, including the

Earth’s elliptical orbit. By contrast, the mean (idealized) sun moves in a circular, uniform orbit.

The concept is used as part of the equation of time designed to correct for the eccentricity of

Earth’s orbit. Smart is implying that an actual perceiver’s reactions could be compared with an

134 As discussed in chapter 3, standard perceivers are often defined by a statistical aggregate like the CIE standard observer. 135 According to the OED, the mean sun is an “imaginary sun conceived as moving through the sky throughout the year at a constant speed equal to the mean rate of the real sun, used in calculating mean solar time.” Solar time, as defined by the Astronomical Almanac, is a “measure of time based on the diurnal motion of a fiducial point, called the fictional mean sun”.

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idealized perceiver’s reactions to establish an objective standard. Smart admits that there is some anthropocentricity in his account of colors, but it is “as harmless as the key-centeredness of the shape of a lock” (p. 49).

Another possible approach would be to appeal to Mark Johnston’s concept of

“constituted dispositions”.136 According to Johnston:

A constituted disposition is a higher-order property of having some intrinsic properties which, oddities aside, would cause the manifestation of the disposition in the circumstances of manifestation. (Johnston 1992/1997, p. 147)137

Johnston’s approach includes the notion of an intrinsic property which further helps the dispositionalist to ground responses in real, existing properties. An example will help make

Johnston’s view more transparent. ‘Fragility’ is often used as an example of a dispositional property. A champagne flute, for instance, has the disposition to fracture if the conditions are right (e.g. it is dropped onto a hard surface). In Johnston’s account, the molecular structures of the glass are “the constituting bases of fragility” (Chirimuuta, p. 66). The constituting base taken together has the higher-order property of ‘being fragile’. Thus, fragility is a ‘constituted disposition’ rather than a bare disposition. Zangwill might argue that Johnston is building too much into his definition of a disposition, but it provides a clear example of how a dispositional account might respond to cases of perceptual variation. Even if perceivers had a great deal of variation in their responses, there would still be some intrinsic property that is responsible for these experiences.

As this brief survey shows, there are at least three sensible responses to the problem of perceptual variation. Zangwill is not justified in claiming that the existence of perceptual variation alone means that the sensory properties, like colors, are nonreal. Thus, Zangwill’s

136 I briefly covered this concept in chapter 2. 137 Quoted in “Color” (SEP)

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contention that so called “secondary quality” (2001, p. 190) views in aesthetics are a “halfway house” (2001, p. 196) between realism and non-realism, is based on a faulty argument. As this section shows, recognizing the response dependent character of aesthetic properties does not require one to abandon any notion of objectivity.

This section is not designed to prove that one of these responses to the problem of perceptual variation is correct. Rather, it is meant to show that there exist many convincing and creative replies to the problem of perceptual variation. Zangwill is far too dismissive of color realism in both physicalist and dispositionalist forms. He asserts, rather than demonstrates, that sensory properties like color are in a shakier ontological position than moral properties or aesthetic properties. In short, the mere existence of perceptual variation is not enough to disprove realist theories of color properties (or any other sensory properties). In fact, an analysis of color realism reveals just how well grounded such theories are in contemporary perceptual science.

5.1b A Note on Normativity and Intuitions

Zangwill also contends that our normative standards with respect to aesthetic judgments

“are higher” than with respect to sensory judgments (2001, p. 198). He says “Those who fail to appreciate the Alhambra are not just different but defective” (2001, p. 198).138 This has the situation backwards. I think one is likely to find that people are more willing to ascribe truth or falsity to color judgments than they are to aesthetic judgments. Indeed, this is one of the chief attractions of perceptual objectivism. It brings aesthetic judgments closer to the objectivity accorded to judgments about sensory qualities like color.

138 Zangwill is referring to a defect in aesthetic taste--not a perceptual or moral defect.

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An appeal to a study done by Nichols and Cohen would help bolster my claim here.

Nichols and Cohen presented “31 participants (7 male) with a counterbalanced series of cases of representational variation involving shape properties (rectangular, round), color properties (red, green), and gustatory (sweet, bitter, sour) properties, as well as cases of representational variation involving the application/non-application of the property delicious” (p. 221). They further explain that the cases of variation each involved “one human being and a non-human alien visiting earth” (p. 221). For example, in the color case, subjects were told that Harry, a human, and Andrew, an alien, both viewed a ripe tomato in good light. Harry says the tomato is red while Andrew says that the tomato is green (p. 222). They were then asked to choose which conversant was correct and explain, briefly, why (p. 222). Similar cases were created for the other categories of properties. The results were interesting: “participants preferred the relationalist [subjectivist] answer (3) 30.9% of the time in cases involving shape, 47% of the time in cases involving color, 72.5% of the time in cases involving gustatory properties (sweet, bitter) and 98.5% of the time in cases involving disagreement about delicious” (p. 223). They further explain that, for color, there were “11 consistent anti-relationalists” (p. 223).

I have a number of concerns about this particular experiment, especially the structure of the aesthetic questions, but it provides a nice example of how Zangwill is getting it wrong with respect to intuitions about color judgments and aesthetic judgments. One of the goals of perceptual objectivism is, in fact, to bring aesthetic judgments closer to the level of objectivity intuitively accorded to color judgments.

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5.1c Conclusions about Colors

Zangwill’s argument against color realism is far too hasty. He contends that sensory properties, like color, are nonreal almost entirely on the basis of perceptual variation and our intuitive response to that variation. My brief discussion of physicalist and dispositionalist responses to instances of perceptual variation is enough to undermine Zangwill’s main premise

(P3). Perceptual variation alone is not enough to prove that sensory properties are nonreal.

If we reject (P3) of his argument, his case against dispositional aesthetic realism and the sensory dependence thesis begins to collapse. Secondary qualities, like colors, are clearly not in as precarious an ontological position as Zangwill leads us to believe. Of course, there are anti- realists about color, but there are even more anti-realists about moral or aesthetic properties.

Zangwill’s argument is a clever sleight of hand trying to convince us that sensory properties are straightforwardly nonreal. The fact is, however, that they are far more dependable from a naturalistic realist perspective than moral or aesthetic properties.

The upshot of this section is straightforward. Zangwill has not successfully shown that sensory dependence is a metaphysical liability for the aesthetic realist. This is significant given that perceptual objectivism sees sensory dependence as a virtue of the account. Closer review reveals that his argument is based on a suspect premise, namely, that secondary qualities are straightforwardly not real. He tries to establish this on the basis of perceptual variation alone, which is not enough. Further, he argues that a perceptually based dispositional account must be non-rigidly response-dependent, but that too has not been established.

Zangwill’s critique of the response dependent framework, however, is only one component of his critique of perceptually based realism. Zangwill also argues that aesthetic

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experience is not perceptual (2011, p. 11). In the following section, I analyze his claim that aesthetic properties are not perceivable at all.

5.2 Aesthetic Experience, Pleasure and Perception

Zangwill argues that subjectivity is an essential part of aesthetic experience (2011, p. 10).

He contends that this subjectivity is tacitly or explicitly rejected by accounts that take aesthetic properties to be “perceived or perceivable” (2011, p. 10). He labels such a view the “perceptual model” (2011, p. 11). He notes that Sibley famously advocated the perceptual model and that virtually all contemporary aestheticians also accept that aesthetic properties are perceivable

(2011, p. 16). The perceptual model, obviously, is at the heart of perceptual objectivism. The fact that there is broad-based acceptance of the perceptual model suggests that perceptual objectivism need not be overly concerned about assuming that aesthetic properties are perceivable. But Zangwill claims that the perceptual model is actually incorrect and must be abandoned.

In the following section, I will outline Zangwill’s reasons for rejecting the perceptual model and offer a response. Ultimately, I believe that Zangwill’s view is an outlier and in a much more precarious position than the perceptual model. In contemporary analytic aesthetics, most philosophers take it as a given that aesthetic experience is perceptual in some way. This makes intuitive sense given the intensely perceptual character of most aesthetic qualities.

Indeed, the word “aesthetics” comes from the Greek word for perception (Nanay, p. 101).

As noted in section 5.1, Zangwill himself is a realist about aesthetic properties, but of a very peculiar sort. He prefaces his argument against the perceptual model by saying that he believes the subjective conception of aesthetic experience does not mean that aesthetic properties

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are not real (2011, p. 11). He notes that sensations are subjective, but can still be considered real

(2011, p. 11). His claim, then, is not that aesthetic properties are not real. Rather, he believes they are not perceivable.

Zangwill explains that for the perceptual model “to be interesting” it must claim that aesthetic properties, like beauty, “figure in the contents of ordinary perceptual experience of seeing and hearing” (2011, p. 11). In other words, he believes that the perceptual model must hold that aesthetic properties are represented in the content of perceptual experience (2011, p.

11). It is uncontroversial to suggest that low-level properties like ‘being round’ figure into the content of a perceptual experience. One can visually perceive that a globe is round, for example.

Higher-order properties, however, are more controversial. Consider the globe again. One might find that the globe has the aesthetic property of ‘balance’. The perceptual model in aesthetics,

Zangwill claims, holds that ‘balance’ is represented in the content of a visual experience just as much as ‘being round’ is.139

In order to show that aesthetic properties are not perceivable, Zangwill appeals to the phenomenology of aesthetic experience to undermine the perceptual model. He contends that aesthetic responses are fundamentally hedonic in character. Judging something to be beautiful, for instance, is generally accompanied by an experience of pleasure, while ugliness is accompanied by a feeling of displeasure (2011, p. 11). Pleasure and displeasure, Zangwill argues, are not part of the content of perceptual experience (2011, p. 11-12). The pleasure you take in beauty, he says, is not “an added ingredient in the content” (2011, p. 12). Aesthetic pleasure is a separate, non-perceptual experience.

139 Not all aestheticians who adhere to the perceptual model are likely to agree with Zangwill’s characterization of their view. Some, for example, might argue that they do not believe aesthetic properties are literally represented in a perceptual experience. Perceptual objectivism, however, does claim that aesthetic properties are represented in a perceptual experience, so Zangwill’s critique is particularly relevant to my view.

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Zangwill explains this difference in terms of belief ‘rationalization’.140 He argues that perceptual experiences rationalize belief, while pleasure and displeasure are “rationalized by belief” (2011, p. 12). For example, if one sees a monarch butterfly, that visual experience could justify a number of beliefs such as ‘this butterfly is orange’. The beliefs acquired from this perceptual experience then go on to rationalize certain aesthetic judgments such as ‘this butterfly is beautiful’. This judgment generates aesthetic pleasure. Aesthetic responses, therefore, are not based directly on perceptions—they are based on beliefs generated by perception. Zangwill summarizes this line of thinking: “Pleasures cannot be perceptual experiences and perceptual experiences cannot be pleasures.” (2011, p. 12). Because aesthetic experience is a hedonic experience, it cannot be a perceptual experience.

Zangwill, however, is a realist about aesthetic properties. If aesthetic experience is subjective and hedonic in character, it leaves one wondering exactly how aesthetic properties might be said to objectively exist. Zangwill tries to answer this question. He explains that aesthetic judgments are like judgments about private sensations (2011, p. 12). We ascribe aesthetic properties to things, like sounds, on the basis of a private, felt reaction.141 It is not entirely clear what Zangwill means by “felt” in this context. It is possible he is referring to the phenomenology of cognition—I will consider this concept in another section. The only way others know that one is having a particular aesthetic reaction is if one reports it (2011, p. 12).142

Because of the nature of aesthetic experience and aesthetic judgment, there can be no “public

140 Throughout this discussion, I use Zangwill’s term ‘rationalization’ instead of ‘justification’. I believe Zangwill means something like justification here, but since he is not clear on the point, I will retain his terminology. Whatever his exact meaning, it is obvious Zangwill does not intend the word to be used in its Freudian sense, namely the self-serving manipulation of facts. 141 Zangwill does not use this phrase, but it might help to think of the aesthetic response in this context like a non- perceptual sensation. 142 Zangwill later goes on to admit that some aesthetic reactions are made obvious by our behavior (2011, p. 12).

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check on aesthetic properties” (2011 p. 12). Aesthetic experience is private and aesthetic judgments are subjective.

He concludes from this that aesthetic properties cannot be perceivable. We cannot see the gracefulness, for example, in a performance of Swan Lake.143 If aesthetic properties were perceivable, he argues, then there would be “a common object of attention.” (2011, p. 12).

Zangwill contends that there is no common object of attention and there cannot be one because aesthetic responses are private (2011, p. 12). As evidence for this, he cites the frequent use of metaphor and non-literal devices in aesthetic description. There is no common percept to which we can refer. Instead, we have to approximate aesthetic properties with non-literal devices.

Zangwill does admit we occasionally use aesthetic terms in a literal sense. This is possible, he believes, when there is enough convergence in response (2011, p. 12).

To summarize, Zangwill believes that aesthetic experience is subjective, but he is nevertheless committed to the mind-independent existence of aesthetic properties (2011, p. 13).

He suggests that his view most closely aligns with the well-known moral philosopher, G.E.

Moore’s ethical non-naturalism. Moore claims that moral properties exist, but they are indefinable. Zangwill describes this ethical non-naturalism as “moral realism” combined with the “rejection of a perceptual ” (2011, p. 13). He asks, “why cannot one be a

Moorean in aesthetics?” (p. 13).

Zangwill admits this is a difficult view to develop in aesthetics and suggests that a special sort of aesthetic pleasure might be a starting point (2011, p. 13-14). He tentatively suggests that aesthetic pleasure is a mental state which represents aesthetic properties, but is not a perceptual experience. He labels this view, “nonperceptual Moorean aesthetic realism” (p. 14). Zangwill

143 “Strictly speaking, we do not see or hear the beauty of things, and we do not see or hear their grace or delicacy.” (2011, p. 12).

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suggests that what makes his view a Moorean one is the realist metaphysics combined with a rejection of a perceptual epistemology (2011, p. 13). Thus, I think the most important difference between Zangwill’s views in The Metaphysics of Beauty (2001) and his more recent work is the explicit rejection of the perceptual model.

5.2a Response to Zangwill

There are a number of flaws with Zangwill’s criticism of the perceptual model and his own tentative view. To facilitate this discussion, I think it would be beneficial to outline his argument in premise form. It is best understood as two separate mini arguments.

(P1) If aesthetic properties were perceivable, like color properties, then there would be a common object of perceptual attention in aesthetic experience (2011, p. 12).

(P2) There is no common object of perceptual attention in aesthetic experience (p. 12).

(C1) Therefore, aesthetic properties are not perceivable.

(P3) Aesthetic experience is instead a special sort of pleasure which represents aesthetic properties (p. 13)

(P4) Pleasures and perceptions are fundamentally different sorts of mental states (p. 12).

(C2) Aesthetic experience cannot be a perceptual experience.

One could grant Zangwill (P1). If a property is objectively perceivable, there must be some common object of attention. (P2), however, is unsubstantiated. Zangwill provides very little support for the claim that there is no common object of attention in an aesthetic experience.

There are philosophers who do offer arguments for this position, but there are

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counterarguments.144 Perceptual objectivism claims that there are common objects of attention in aesthetic experience. It contends that when two normal perceivers look at the Parthenon, for example, they are sharing the same perceptual experience. This in turn means that they are experiencing the same aesthetic properties. This experience can be modified by a number of factors, including expertise and past experiences, but they both perceive the same thing. Rather than directly address such a claim, Zangwill argues that aesthetic experience is in fact hedonic in nature and therefore cannot be a form of perception. Thus, it is this claim that is ultimately the crux of his argument against the perceptual model. In this section, then, I will focus on his argument that the aesthetic response is a special sort of non-perceptual experience.

The bulk of this dissertation has been devoted to showing that aesthetic properties are fundamentally descriptive. I have argued that our evaluative reactions to aesthetic properties can be separated from the objective, perceptual content. I have provided a number of examples of this. Garishness is a good case study. This descriptive content creates the boundary of the concept. Many would agree that garishness is an unpleasant feature of an object. A garish carpet, for example, might cause one to experience genuine aesthetic displeasure. This displeasure, however, does not constitute the property. A ‘garish’ object is characterized by bright, clashing colors. When a critic says that a painting is garish, for example, that ascription attributes certain qualities to the object, such as clashing colors. The fact that we can consistently apply and understand ‘garish’ suggests that there is some kind of common perceptual content associated with an experience of the property. This common perceptual content also explains how an artist can intentionally manipulate a medium to create certain aesthetic effects. One could commission an artist, for example, to create a garish painting and

144 In this dissertation, I have commented on this subject more than once. Derek Matravers, for example, thinks that there is no common object of attention when we experience aesthetic properties like elegance or gracefulness. Perceptual objectivism disagrees.

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the artist would have no trouble doing so. If aesthetic experience were purely a private, internal experience like pain, it would be difficult to explain many features of aesthetic experience.

Zangwill would likely insist that aesthetic pleasure and displeasure are not part of the perceived content. Properties like ‘garishness’ have a purely perceptual content while the aesthetic response is wholly separate. In other words, an aesthetic response is not a response to a perceived aesthetic property. It is a subjective, internal state. He puts it this way, “It may be that we take pleasure in beauty but that is not the perception of beauty” (2011, p. 12). Zangwill seems to be arguing the inverse of perceptual objectivism. Namely, that all descriptive aesthetic properties can be reduced to the non-aesthetic while aesthetic responses are in fact entirely subjective feelings of a special sort. This seems to undermine his claim that aesthetic properties are real and mind-independent. It is unclear how aesthetic experience could be entirely subjective/hedonic in character and yet somehow aesthetic properties remain real and mind- independent.

Zangwill has yet to fully develop his view of nonperceptual aesthetic realism, so it would be inadvisable at this point to fill in the gaps in his argument. I think it is more beneficial to look at an example that he thinks provides support for his conception of aesthetic experience.

Interestingly, it is a case I discuss at great length in this dissertation: amusia.

Zangwill describes amusia as a condition in which a person cannot perceive “music as such” but still retains the ability to “hear the sounds that constitute music” (2011, p. 15, fn. 11).

He argues that this supports a nonperceptual analysis of aesthetic properties, but is “difficult to square with a perceptual view” (2011, p. 15, fn. 11). Unfortunately, Zangwill does not elaborate his analysis of amusia beyond this footnote. He uses the example to support the claim that we take pleasure in beauty but we do not perceive it. I think the amusia example actually strongly

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supports the opposite view, namely that we do perceive aesthetic properties. A closer look at this example puts pressure on (P3) and undermines his overall argument.

In chapter 4, I discussed at length how the phenomenon of amusia can be used to support the view that human beings can and do experience higher-order phenomenal impressions of an aesthetic sort. Zangwill seems to think it proves the opposite—that we do not have perceptual experience of aesthetic properties. Zangwill’s conclusion is based on a misunderstanding of amusia.

There are several problems with Zangwill’s characterization of amusia. It would be incorrect to suggest that amusical subjects have perfectly functioning auditory systems. Indeed, the fact that their auditory systems are not fully functioning is exactly why they are diagnosed as amusical. It is true that most of their auditory perception is perfectly functional. The fact that they cannot hear music as normal perceivers is due to a number of factors. First and foremost, they seem to lack the ability to make fine-grained pitch discriminations, but they also have problems with tonal fusion that undermine their ability to hear a range of higher-order musical properties such as timbre, harmony and even the emotional quality of a piece of music. This lends credence to the perceptual view of aesthetic properties and in particular the perceptual objectivist view. If aesthetic experience requires fully functioning higher-order perception, it is difficult to deny that aesthetic experience is perceptual in character.

If we were to accept Zangwill’s premise, that amusical subjects have perfectly functioning auditory systems, we would be forced to draw even stranger conclusions about his account. If an amusical subject like G.G. is unable to hear music because of some sort of aesthetic pleasure deficit, we would expect to see a more global aesthetic problem for G.G.145

This is not at all the case for amusical subjects. Indeed, G.G. himself was a very aesthetically

145 G.G. was the subject of a study on amusia conducted by Reed et al. (2011).

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engaged individual. The aesthetic experience blind spot for amusical subjects does not extend beyond music. Amusical subjects get aesthetic pleasure from the perception of aesthetic qualities in the visual and cinematic arts. Amusia, therefore, fails to successfully support

Zangwill’s nonperceptual thesis, namely the view that aesthetic experience is not perceptual and is instead a special sort of pleasure which represents aesthetic properties.

Without directly referencing it, Zangwill’s argument seems to be addressing an increasingly debated subject in the philosophy of perception concerning the contents of perceptual experience. Bence Nanay has recently argued that many debates in aesthetics146 can be illuminated, or even settled, by exploring the philosophy of perception. He goes so far as to say that many traditional problems in aesthetics are “in fact about the philosophy of perception and can, as a result, be fruitfully addressed with the help of the conceptual apparatus of the philosophy of perception” (p. 101). I do not wish to commit to Nanay’s view in this dissertation, but I think he is correct to note that many problems in aesthetics would benefit from a foray into the philosophy of perception. I think Zangwill’s claim that aesthetic properties cannot be perceived is an obvious case.

Zangwill argues that aesthetic phenomenal content is not represented in a perceptual experience. This closely mirrors a claim in the philosophy of perception that higher-order properties are likely not directly represented in perceptual experience. I will briefly consider the debate in the philosophy of perception and re-apply it to the aesthetic case. Intriguingly, the amusia case will once again play a significant role in adjudicating this debate.

146 Nanay takes pains to distinguish aesthetics and the philosophy of art in his essay. He suggests that the philosophy of perception has less to add to debates about art and artistic properties (p. 103).

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5.3 Perception and Rich Perceptual Content

In the philosophy of perception, the traditional view147 holds that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience is limited to the representation of properties such as color, shape and spatial location (Bayne, p. 285). This is also known as the “sparse view” of perceptual content (Stokes, 2016, p. 4). The idea that higher-order properties can be represented in perceptual content, that is they can be perceptually experienced, is called the “rich perceptual content” view (Stokes, 2016). Traditional views in the philosophy of perception accept sparse content but reject rich content. In other words, the traditional view holds that experience of higher-order properties is post-perceptual.

The traditional view distinguishes between cognition (belief states, etc.) and perception.

Lower-order properties belong in the category of perception and higher-order properties belong in the category of cognition. One motivation for this is that perception and belief differ in their phenomenology (or lack thereof). Perception has a distinctive, outwardly focused phenomenology while cognition does not. A belief, for example, does not necessarily have a distinctive phenomenology.148 Stokes uses the following example to support the distinction:

There is nothing that it is like to believe that ‘St. John’s is the oldest city in Canada.’ By contrast, seeing the city of St. John’s will be rich in qualitative detail; it is characterized by a phenomenology that the correlative beliefs lack. (2013, p. 647).

Siegel describes the view in more technical terms: “if a subject S’s visual experience has the content that a thing x is F, then S’s visual experience represents the property of being F.” (2006, p. 481). For example, one can perceive the property of ‘being round’ in a spherical object. One

147 Tim Bayne also calls it the “conservative view” (p. 385). 148 There are an increasing number of philosophers who do suggest that belief states, for example, have their own phenomenology, but it is still a controversial view.

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can visually perceive that the surface is round. Thus, the property ‘being round’ can be represented in visual experience (Siegel, 2006, p. 481-2).

To recap, it is not controversial to claim that qualities like color are represented in perceptual (in this case, visual) experience (2006, p. 481-2). It is controversial to suggest that higher-order properties are represented in perceptual experience. Properties like ‘being a pine tree’ or ‘being a house’ are not typically thought to be part of the contents of visual experience

(Siegel, 2006, p. 482-3).

This suggests that cognitive states are not part of the content of a perceptual experience.

One’s belief that blue tends to be a melancholy color, for example, ought not to affect one’s ability to accurately perceive blueness. One might immediately object that cognition often does influence what one perceives. For example, Jones might have extreme exam anxiety and he believes that he has an important exam to take. That belief causes a migraine. The migraine brings along with it changes to Jones’ visual perception (e.g., flashing lights and blurred vision)

(Stokes, 2013, p. 650).

Stokes explains that traditionalists do not have a problem with this sort of cognition- perception interaction. In fact, quite a few traditionalists about perception are happy to suggest that cognition even affects the organization of low-level perceptions (Bayne, p. 392-392). A lover of honey-roasted peanuts and a hater of honey-roasted peanuts, according to this view, do not have different perceptual experiences of the candied nuts. The lover and the hater of honey- roasted peanuts have the same perceptual experience. They do, however, have different cognitive experiences. One’s belief that honey-roasted peanuts are the best snack might influence the way one’s low-level perceptual content is organized. Zangwill appears to be committed to the traditional view when he argues that perceptions ‘rationalize’ pleasures, but

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pleasures cannot ‘rationalize’ perceptions (2011, p. 12). That is, he believes that aesthetic pleasures are post-perceptual.

There are a number of reasons to doubt this traditional divide, but if higher-order properties cannot be represented in perceptual experience, as the traditional thesis has it, then that certainly presents a problem for the perceptual model in aesthetics. Ultimately, I think this is Zangwill’s primary point. If aesthetic properties are post-perceptual, then they are not perceivable. If they are not perceivable, the perceptual model in aesthetics is very likely incorrect.

5.4 Implications for the perceptual model in aesthetics

There are a number of ways the traditional view can be used to undermine the perceptual model in aesthetics. Dustin Stokes helpfully summarizes three such objections: (1) Perceptual experience only represents lower-order properties, (2) There are no mind-independent properties,

(3) Aesthetic responses are purely subjective (2016, p. 2-3). Stokes rightly notes that a lot of work has been done on (2) and (3). Zangwill’s objection to the perceptual model seems to be a combination of (1) and (3). Zangwill explicitly rejects (2); he contends that aesthetic properties do exist independent of the mind. In this section, I will focus on (1) and argue that it is entirely plausible to suggest that perceptual experience does represent higher-order properties, that is, rich perceptual content is possible. I will build on strategies developed by Susanna Siegel, Tim

Bayne and Dustin Stokes to help support this claim. First, I will discuss reasons for accepting the existence of rich perceptual content. I will then turn to objections.

A small caveat is in order. I do not wish to commit to any particular philosophy of perception. There are aspects of Siegel’s, Bayne’s and Stokes’ approaches about which I am

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skeptical. In order to establish the viability of rich perceptual content, however, it is not necessary to fully commit to their views.

Tim Bayne explains that defenders of higher-level149 perceptual content, i.e. rich perceptual content, rely on “contrast arguments” (p. 390). Contrast arguments present the reader with two scenarios that differ with respect to their phenomenal character, but not with respect to their low-level perceptual content (p. 390). Contrast arguments tend to be used to show that so- called ‘kind properties’ like ‘being a banana’ feature into the content of perceptual experience.150

A popular contrast argument comes from Susanna Siegel. She attempts to show that the kind property ‘being a pine tree’ can be represented in visual experience:

Suppose you have never seen a pine tree before, and are hired to cut down all the pine trees in a grove containing trees of many different sorts. Someone points out to you which trees are pine trees. Some weeks pass, and your disposition to distinguish the pine trees from other trees improves. Eventually, you can spot the pine trees immediately. Gaining this recognitional disposition is reflected in a phenomenological difference between the visual experiences you had before and after the recognitional disposition was fully developed (p. 491).

Siegel argues that one’s phenomenological experience of the pine tree before knowing how to identify it is different from one’s experience after learning how to identify it (p. 491). If there is a phenomenological difference between the two sensory experiences, then they differ in their content (p. 491). If they differ in their content, then they differ in which properties are represented in experience. The property in question is the higher-order property of ‘being a pine tree’. Prior to acquiring the knowledge of how to identify a pine tree, one did not visually experience that high-level content. Importantly, there is no change in the low-level perceptual content. The tree is the same color and shape that it was on the first viewing. The difference,

149 In discussing Bayne’s view, I will adhere to the convention of referring to “low level” and “high level” content. Low-level content refers to the perceptual representation of lower-order properties while high-level content refers to the representation of higher-order properties. 150 Even though these arguments are often used to support the idea that kind properties are perceivable, the same arguments can be used to support the existence of other higher-order properties.

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then, must be in the high-level phenomenal content. Siegel takes this case as evidence that high- level phenomenal content is part of perceptual experience. This case also suggests that the contents of perceptual experiences “can be influenced by other cognitive processing” (Siegel, p.

501). In short, the pine tree example suggests that rich perceptual content exists.

Tim Bayne uses a case of associative agnosia to develop an interesting contrast argument.

As discussed in chapter 4, visual agnosia is a disorder in which patients cannot recognize an object visually. It has two forms: apperceptive and associative. Apperceptive agnosia involves deficiencies in visual perception while associative agnosia involves deficiencies in conceptual knowledge of objects. Bayne describes a case of associative visual agnosia where the patient was completely unable to visually recognize certain objects. When presented with a stethoscope, for example, he called it “a long cord with a thing at the end” and when he was shown a can opener he asked, “could it be a key?” (p. 391). Bayne suggests that this patient experienced a change in the high-level phenomenal content of his visual experience following the onset of associative agnosia, but the low-level content of perception did not change (as evidenced by his ability to describe features of the objects). Thus, associative agnosia provides a strong contrast case in support of the existence of high-level phenomenal content.

This case parallels my discussion of amusia in chapter 4.151 I argue that amusia can plausibly be explained as a defect of higher-order perception. This is supported by the fact that amusical subjects retain normal auditory functioning, even recognition of tone in speech, yet lack the ability to hear music. Researchers (such as Oliver Sacks) compare it to visual agnosia for that reason—it is a selective deficit. To re-describe it in Bayne’s terms, amusia could be seen as a case of high-level phenomenal content being lost, while the low-level content is nevertheless

151 Bayne actually does refer to amusia as a kind of auditory agnosia, but does not go on to discuss aesthetic properties.

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retained. When listening to music, amusical subjects hear sounds, or noise more accurately, but they do not hear melody or harmony.

In both cases, associative visual agnosia and amusia, a person appears to lose part of their perceptual experience, namely their rich perceptual experience. This suggests that higher-order kind properties like ‘being a pine tree’, or ‘being a stethoscope’ and aesthetic properties like

‘being graceful’ are represented in normal perceptual experience. It is worth noting that one does not need to accept the existence of perceptual kind properties in order to accept the existence of perceptual aesthetic properties. Indeed, Stokes takes just this position (2016, p. 19).

5.4a Objections to contrast arguments

There are a number of replies a traditional representationalist theorist might offer in response to the contrast cases outlined above. I will consider two substantive ones in this section. First, adherents of the traditional view argue that apparent contrast cases can be explained in terms of the low-level perceptual content only. Second, some critics of rich perceptual content argue that the high-level phenomenal content is not perceptual, it is actually cognitive. That is, they suggest that when one experiences high-level phenomenal content one is actually experiencing cognitive qualia. Finally, I consider an interesting use of Frank Jackson’s knowledge argument to undermine the intuitive appeal of rich perceptual content.

Michael Tye is among those who argue that contrast cases can be explained in terms of the low-level perceptual content only. He focuses on a contrast case involving language acquisition. When one learns French there are differences in one’s auditory phenomenology.

Words that were indistinguishable prior to learning French, become quite clear and easily perceivable after learning the language. It might even bring about differences in mental imagery

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and so on. This seems to be yet another contrast case, but Tye disagrees. He argues that the auditory perceptual content does not change after learning French. Instead, the low-level content is re-organized by cognitive processing. The perceptual experience itself does not include high- level phenomenal content (Bayne, p. 392).152 In other words, Tye believes that all apparent cases of high-level phenomenal content are actually instances of top-down modulation (Bayne, p. 392).

Perceptual content, then, is always low-level.

This is a compelling potential response because it acknowledges that we have experiences that seem like rich perceptual content, but it explains this without an appeal to higher-order perceptual properties. There are significant problems with this approach, however.

Bayne, for instance, contends that not all contrast cases can be explained in this manner. He argues that associative agnosia is one such case. He explains that it involves a clear change in high-level phenomenal content without any change/modulation of the low-level content. But if

Tye is right, agnosia, for example, would not be a perceptual deficit; it would in fact be a cognitive deficit. This appears to be Zangwill’s view of agnosia, as evidenced by his brief discussion of amusia. He suggests that amusical subjects retain their low-level perceptual content but lack the cognitive aesthetic experience. Bayne does not think this is a valid explanation of the condition.

I think Bayne is correct to reject this interpretation. Bayne’s response focuses on object recognition. He demonstrates this by noting that high-level phenomenal content cannot be restored to an agnosia patient by altering their beliefs. Bayne appeals to an associative agnosia patient to support this. In one case, when researchers presented a subject with a pipe, he was unable to recognize it. They informed him that the object was a pipe and he did acknowledge the information. Later, the examiner would say “suppose I told you the last object was not really a

152 My exposition of Tye’s view here is adapted from quotes of his featured in Bayne’s article.

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pipe what would you say?” and the subject replied “I would take your word for it. Perhaps it’s not really a pipe” (quoted in Bayne, p. 396). Bayne argues that the subject did not have a phenomenal experience of the pipe as a pipe and acquiring the appropriate belief was unable to change that (Bayne, p. 396). Presumably, if the patient had retained his phenomenal experience of the pipe, he would not be so easily swayed by the examiner’s testimony. In other words, agnosia subjects do lack a crucial aspect of phenomenal content in their perceptual experience. It is more than a purely cognitive deficit as evidenced by the fact that experiences of high-level phenomenal content cannot be restored merely through acquiring certain beliefs.

I think the case of the amusical subject, G.G., discussed at length in chapter 4, supports

Bayne’s analysis.153 It is not the case that G.G. lacks appropriate beliefs about music. He was actually very knowledgeable in the subject, for example, he knew quite a few details about the life and work of Johann Strauss. Yet when the “Blue Danube Waltz” was played, he could not recognize the piece. This suggests that there is a higher-order perceptual blind spot in amusical subjects that is not related to having a particular set of beliefs.

Stokes echoes this point with an appeal to the famous Müller-Lyer illusion. He argues that the illusion shows that one’s phenomenology is often unaffected by belief. Even after one learns that the lines are in fact the same length, they still look to be of different lengths. Stokes’ example is meant to show that a perceptual gestalt is not necessarily the result of top-down modulation.

Another possible explanation of contrast cases is that the high-level phenomenal content is actually the phenomenology of cognition.154 In other words, when one seems to phenomenally experience a property like ‘being a pine tree’ one is actually just phenomenally experiencing a

153 It also does not require a commitment to the existence of perceivable kind properties. 154 It is important to note that this is a rare view and not one that Tye explicitly adheres to. However, it is a natural evolution of his explanation of cases involving apparent high-level phenomenal content.

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belief or thought. Zangwill seems to endorse this view of aesthetic experience when he argues that one’s experience of aesthetic properties is actually an experience of a judgment. Indeed, his appeal to amusia seems designed to support this conclusion. He argues that we can take pleasure in beauty but that is not itself a perception of beauty (2011, p. 12). Zangwill might claim that an amusical subjects’ inability to experience musical beauty while nevertheless retaining their experience of low-level auditory phenomenon, suggests they are missing cognitive phenomenology of an aesthetic sort. This goes beyond missing a particular belief state—the subject is actually missing the phenomenology of thought.

As mentioned above, the idea of cognitive phenomenology is very controversial. Many philosophers explicitly reject the possibility of cognitive phenomenology. While I do not reject it out of hand, I do find it implausible. What is it like to experience a belief or a judgment?

Without a clear idea of what this experience is supposed to be, it is not possible to conclude that apparent experiences of higher order phenomenal content are actually cognitive. More importantly, I do not think this view accurately captures aesthetic phenomenology. If one views

Michelangelo’s “Pieta” and finds it beautiful, this is experienced in a straightforwardly perceptual way. If the cognitive phenomenology view were correct, we would experience all the low-level content in a perceptual way and the experience of the high-level aesthetic content would be cognitive in character. This does not accurately reflect a typical aesthetic experience.

Another interesting argument to help undermine the intuitive force of rich perceptual content involves Frank Jackson’s famous color scientist thought experiment. In the thought experiment, Mary, an expert neuroscientist, is forced to investigate the world from a black and white room. She knows everything there is to know about the color red from the science of vision and color, but she has not ever had a perceptual experience of red. One day, Mary is

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released from the room and sees the full range of colors for the first time. Jackson asks whether she has learned anything new. If Mary does learn something new, one version of the knowledge argument goes, then qualia must exist.155 Jackson, and many others, believe that Mary does learn something new through having the phenomenal experience of redness.

Tim Bayne wonders if the thought experiment also applies to high-level perceptual content. If it does not, then that is a prima facie reason for rejecting the existence of high-level qualia. Bayne uses a category property ‘being a tomato’ in his version of Jackson’s thought experiment. Mary is now an expert in object recognition. She has studied everything there is to know about tomatoes, but she has never actually seen one. One day, Mary finally gets to see a tomato. Does she learn something new? (p. 401). Bayne thinks our intuition would be to say that she does not appear to learn anything new. One can perfectly understand the category of tomato through theory alone. This version of the thought experiment certainly seems to have less intuitive force than the version featuring the lower-order property of redness. Thus, the thought experiment can be used to undermine rich perceptual content.

Bayne concludes that we should not put too much weight on the thought experiment or the knowledge argument (p. 401). I think he is right to be cautious about the use of that thought experiment, but I actually think in case of aesthetic perception, the thought experiment has as much force as it does in the color case. Consider an aesthetic variation on the thought experiment. Mary is an expert on Frederic Chopin. She knows everything there is to know about his life and his music, but she has been amusical from birth. She is completely unable to hear the musical content in a Chopin piece. Miraculously, one day, her amusia is reversed and she hears the Raindrop prelude for the first time. Has she learned something new about Chopin’s music? I think the obvious answer is yes. It seems that there is something fundamentally

155 Jackson goes on to argue that the example refutes physicalism, but he later softened his conclusion.

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perceptual about such an aesthetic experience that cannot be gathered purely cognitively. Stokes picks up on this unique aspect of aesthetic properties as compared to other higher-order properties. He argues that aesthetic properties might be pure appearance properties (2016, p. 18-

19).156 I argue against taking the pure appearance analysis of aesthetic properties in chapter 2, but I do believe that aesthetic properties are intuitively understood as being perceivable in a way that kind properties are not. This actually makes aesthetic properties more likely candidates for rich perceptual content than kind properties.

We should not take such thought experiments to be conclusive proof one way or the other about high-level perceptual content. However, in the aesthetic case, it does provide prima facie support for the existence of rich aesthetic content.

5.5 Conclusion

Zangwill argues that dispositional aesthetic realism built on the perceptual model is in a precarious metaphysical position. First, he argues that the response dependent model of aesthetic properties is on shaky ground because it ties the fate of aesthetic properties to the fate of secondary qualities, like color. In his view, secondary sensory qualities are quite possibly nonreal. If aesthetic properties depend upon them, it would make them nonreal also. Second, he argues that aesthetic properties are not perceivable. Both charges run directly counter to perceptual objectivism.

First, I argue that Zangwill’s argument against response dependence is inadequate. He takes the argument from perceptual variation in color to be decisive. It is not. There are numerous responses available to a dispositional realist. His version of moderate aesthetic

156 Levinson shares a very similar view, i.e. the “ways of appearing” account that I addressed in chapter 2.

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realism (which he calls a “halfway house” view between realism and subjectivism) does not take account of any of these potential responses and therefore is a particularly weak version of moderate realism. Thus, I think Zangwill’s concerns about the sensory dependence thesis are actually overstated.

With respect to the second point, Zangwill argues that aesthetic properties are not represented in the content of perceptual experience. Instead, he suggests that aesthetic experience is actually a special sort of pleasure which represents aesthetic properties. He contends that pleasures and perceptions are fundamentally distinct. Therefore, aesthetic properties are not perceivable.

In response, I argue that we need not accept Zangwill’s assertion that aesthetic properties are fundamentally hedonic in character. He too hastily dismisses the possibility that there are common objects of aesthetic attention in aesthetic experience. This undermines his analysis of aesthetic experience and shows how it fails to explain key aspects of aesthetic experience. I further contend that Zangwill’s view is best understood as a traditional, sparse view of perceptual content. In response, I argue that a rich view of perceptual content is plausible and provides a strong basis for believing that aesthetic properties are in fact perceivable.

This chapter does not conclusively show that rich perceptual content exists, but it shows that the rich view is philosophically plausible. Indeed, aesthetic properties are one of the most plausible candidates for genuine rich perceptual content.157

157 Kind properties, despite being the focus of much of the literature, are more dubious.

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Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion

Do aesthetic properties exist? This question has occupied the minds of thinkers since the beginning of philosophy. If your answer to this question was ‘yes’, then you are an aesthetic realist. An aesthetic realist believes that aesthetic properties, like garishness, exist in the world, are accessible to human perceivers and form the basis of aesthetic judgments. If your answer to the opening question was ‘no’, then you are an anti-realist. Anti-realists treat aesthetic properties as entirely mind-dependent. The apparent properties are viewed as ways objects appear to perceivers with differing aesthetic sensibilities (Goldman 1993, p, 31).

There is a middle way between these two extremes, call it moderate realism, which balances the subjective and objective aspects of aesthetic experience. Moderate aesthetic realism typically takes the form of a dispositionalist, or response-dependent account. A dispositionalist account treats aesthetic properties as powers to produce certain reactions in a class of observers.

The focus on perceiver responses accounts for the subjective aspect of aesthetic experience, but it also grounds aesthetic experience in an external object.

Take the property of ‘garishness’ as an example. Lisa Frank’s Rainbow Reef, for instance, is a garish image—almost comically so. A dispositional aesthetic realist claims that there is a property in the object itself that produces the experience of ‘garishness’ in us. But what is the essence of this property? Some dispositional realists contend that aesthetic properties are evaluative properties. An evaluative property is one that in and of itself confers value or disvalue on its bearer (e.g., “goodness” or “badness”). According to this view, to say that

Rainbow Reef is garish would attribute a negative evaluation of the piece. Alternatively, one could claim that aesthetic properties are fundamentally non-evaluative (i.e. descriptive)

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properties, namely a property that confers no intrinsic value or disvalue on its bearer (e.g., greenness, squareness).

In this dissertation, I argue for a dispositional realist account of aesthetic properties that treats them as fundamentally non-evaluative in character. This view is called ‘perceptual objectivism’. This dissertation is devoted to developing a robust account of perceptual objectivism and defending its core claims. A fully developed account of perceptual objectivism offers philosophers a naturalistically viable form of aesthetic realism that opens up new possibilities for research in meta-aesthetics and empirical aesthetics.

In section 6.1, I discuss my research and methodological approach. Section 6.2 is a chapter summary that highlights the key arguments and contributions of the dissertation. Finally, in section 6.3 I suggest future research possibilities.

6.1 Research and Methods

I began my research with the assumption that the most advantageous strategy for pursuing naturalistic aesthetic realism would be to follow in the footsteps of naturalistic moral realism and develop a parallel in the aesthetic case. After exploring this strategy in detail, I realized this approach, though fruitful in some respects, is limiting in the aesthetic case. One of the contributions of this dissertation is the development of a uniquely aesthetic approach to entrenched problems in meta-aesthetics.

In metaethics, there are a number of approaches to naturalistic moral realism that can be applied in the aesthetic case. I discuss a number of these approaches in chapter 1. Though each approach has different characteristics, they all treat moral properties (and aesthetic properties insofar as they address them) as value properties. This makes perfect sense in the ethical case,

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and at first glance, seems to make sense in the aesthetic case. Upon closer inspection, however, it becomes obvious that aesthetic properties are different in important ways. In chapter 1, and to a greater extent in chapter 5, I argue that aesthetic properties are fundamentally perceptual in a way that moral properties are not. This means that aesthetic properties require a different sort of analysis, namely a perceptual analysis.

Even though I believe that aesthetic properties need not be treated as fundamentally evaluative, like moral properties, metaethics still offers important conceptual clarifications that meta-aesthetics ought to adopt. For example, the metaethical notion of “thick” and “thin” concepts is very useful for analyzing aesthetic properties. Fitting attitude theories in ethics also provide helpful clarifications of dispositional accounts within aesthetics. However, because there is no 1:1 correspondence between moral properties and aesthetic properties, one cannot simply apply a metaethical framework in the aesthetic case without important modifications.

Thus, I do not think meta-aesthetics should entirely divorce itself from metaethics. Rather, I suggest that we should view meta-aesthetics as in a dialogue with metaethics. Both fields can inform one another without simply treating aesthetic properties as a sub-species of moral properties.

By treating aesthetic properties as fundamentally descriptive in character, this inquiry also opens up new possibilities for incorporating empirical research into meta-aesthetics. I explore this approach in detail in chapter 4. I argue that current empirical aesthetics research can be valuable to aesthetics, but it needs careful analysis. Many of the experiments being done in so called “neuroaesthetics” do not make careful conceptual distinctions that are necessary for understanding aesthetic properties. For instance, many of the studies I discuss emphasize

“beauty” without defining it in a clear and philosophical way. These studies also tend to eschew

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thick aesthetics properties like ‘garishness’ and ‘gaudiness’. I argue this is an area for improvement, but on the whole, I believe we can--and should--incorporate some of this research into our meta-aesthetic theorizing.

6.2 Chapter Summary and Contributions

In chapter 1, I argue that dispositional aesthetic realism (aka moderate aesthetic realism) is in a good position to address most of the primary challenges facing aesthetic realism. I conclude, however, that the best way to make the dispositional model work in the aesthetic case is to treat aesthetic properties as fundamentally non-evaluative (i.e. descriptive). Following the terminology of Elizabeth Schellekens, I call this view ‘perceptual objectivism’.

I argue that aesthetic realism is appealing because it is able to account for the outwardly focused phenomenology of aesthetic experience and the objective character of aesthetic judgments. I acknowledge, however, that realism faces some major challenges. I outline two criticisms that I think are particularly significant: the argument from relativity (1.2a) and the naturalistic objection (1.2b). The argument from relativity contends that aesthetic realism fails because our aesthetic responses are simply too variable and inconsistent to create the basis of any objectivist account of aesthetic properties. The naturalistic objection notes that value properties, like moral properties and (allegedly) aesthetic properties, are strange (critics sometimes appeal to

Mackie’s argument about the ‘queerness’ of moral properties). The objection further notes that higher-order properties like aesthetic properties appear to have no causal powers. Every apparent effect of an aesthetic property can be explained via lower-order non-aesthetic properties.

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I suggest that dispositional aesthetic realism is in a good position to address these challenges, but I contend that perceptual objectivism is the most viable form of dispositional realism. To understand why it’s important to review the basic structure of dispositionalism. A standard dispositionalist account takes the following form: The property F just is the disposition to produce response R in subject S under conditions C. For example, Canary yellow is the disposition to appear canary yellow, to normal perceivers in standard conditions. Dispositional realism is in a good position to answer both the argument from relativity and the naturalistic objection because it bridges the subjective/objective divide by grounding aesthetic responses in both the perceiver and the external world. Dispositional realism in aesthetics, however, typically treats aesthetic properties as evaluative. This means that it’s not enough that a particular property reliably produces response R in a subject S under conditions C; the response must be warranted, or fitting (1.3). Hence, such theories are called fitting attitude theories.

The problem with this approach in the aesthetic case is that it eschews the perceptual nature of aesthetic properties and treats them in an almost identical fashion to moral properties.

Because aesthetic properties are often considered to be strictly evaluative in nature, it is commonplace in philosophy to treat them as pseudo moral properties. I argue that aesthetic properties require a different analysis. Aesthetic properties, for instance, are fundamentally perceptual in a way that moral properties simply are not. Fitting attitude theories do claim that we experience moral properties in a perceptual way, but they characterize this as evaluative perception. This becomes problematic from an empirical perspective, but more importantly, it does not entirely fit the aesthetic case. I argue that a non-evaluative dispositional realism is a better fit for aesthetic properties and luckily is well equipped to deal with the naturalistic

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objection. Drawing on the terminology developed by Elizabeth Schellekens, I suggest we call this form of dispositional realism ‘perceptual objectivism’.

In chapter 2, I synthesize the work of Jerrold Levinson and Frank Sibley to create the basic framework of perceptual objectivism. I build out this framework by detailing how perceptual objectivism handles three major categories within meta-aesthetics: aesthetic properties, response-dependence, and aesthetic supervenience. I conclude that perceptual objectivism has two central pillars: the dispositional realist model of aesthetic properties and the non-evaluative account of aesthetic properties.

With respect to aesthetic properties (2.1), I emphasize the need to treat them as fundamentally descriptive in character. Most significantly, I incorporate what I call the

‘separability thesis’ which is derived from the work of Levinson. Levinson, drawing on the work of , argues this it is possible to separate the evaluative component of an aesthetic property from the non-evaluative essence of the property because the evaluative component is only conversationally implied. ‘Garishness’, for example, attributes the quality of bright, clashing colors to an object while the negative evaluation we associate with that word is not attributing an evaluative property to the object. Rather, it is expressing an evaluative attitude.

Because the approbation or disapprobation connected to a term like ‘garish’ is only conversationally implied, the evaluative component can be, in Levinson’s words, cancelled

“without semantic anomaly” (2006, p. 317). On the subject of response-dependence, I argue that perceptual objectivism does require a dispositional model of aesthetic properties. I reject

Levinson’s alternative ways-of-appearing account because it risks pushing aesthetic properties into an entirely subjective realm. The upshot of my argument, however, is that perceptual

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objectivism can remain open to different versions of the dispositional model as long as the model treats aesthetic properties as real, higher-order perceptual properties.

Finally, when it comes to supervenience, I argue that perceptual objectivism requires a non-reductive account given that it contends that aesthetic properties are higher-order properties.

If aesthetic properties were collapsed into their non-aesthetic base properties, then one would be straightforwardly rejecting the real existence of higher-order, holistic aesthetic properties like garishness. That is unacceptable for perceptual objectivism. I ultimately conclude that perceptual objectivism ought to adopt a strong form of supervenience to gain the most explanatory value out of the dependence relation.

Chapter two takes perceptual objectivism from a place-holder category and builds it into an actual meta-aesthetic theory. This will not only allow for swifter, more parsimonious classification of some meta-aesthetic views, it also gives others interested in the descriptive analysis of aesthetic properties a clear theoretical starting point. One virtue of the framework I develop here is that it allows some flexibility when it comes to supervenience and the specific character of the dispositional model in aesthetics.

In chapter 3, I defend the separability thesis, the most controversial aspect of perceptual objectivism, from three major critiques: Bender’s perceptual variation argument, De Clercq’s variable polarity argument, and Bonzon’s evaluative standpoint argument (drawn from the work of McDowell). Bender contends that even if some version of perceptual objectivism were granted, it would still fail to answer the irresolvable dispute argument (outlined in chapter 1). De

Clercq suggests that aesthetic properties have variable polarity rather than no polarity and

Bonzon claims that we would have no epistemic access to aesthetic properties without taking an evaluative standpoint and therefore the descriptive approach is untenable. I conclude that all

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three objections fail to defeat the descriptive analysis of aesthetic properties. However, I do allow that Bender’s criticism of perceptual objectivism on empirical grounds is of special concern for my view. I consider this critique in chapter 4.

Bender contends that there are no consistent phenomenal impressions of an aesthetic sort which implies that there are no real, existing, higher-order aesthetic properties. Instead, he suggests we view aesthetic properties in a relativistic way. He attempts to establish this on the basis of perceptual variation in aesthetic experience. He distinguishes between “sensitivity” differences, which are perceptual differences, and “sensibility” differences which are differences in evaluative attitudes. He believes that the existence of sensitivity differences in aesthetic experience establishes that there are no stable phenomenal impressions of an aesthetic sort. I argue in response that Bender has not seriously considered the possibility of a standard aesthetic perceiver. I suggest that most of the disputes in his examples could be addressed by an appeal to such a standard.

In section 3.2, I respond to criticism of the separability thesis more specifically. De

Clercq contends that it is possible that aesthetic properties have variable polarity rather than a defined evaluative implication. This approach could explain how gaudiness, for example, might be a good-making feature in some cases and not others but nevertheless remain fundamentally evaluative. This seems to be a clever compromise, but I argue that this account still fails to explain how we can consistently apply terms like ‘gaudy’ even though it can have multiple evaluative implications. I contend this supports the idea that aesthetic properties have a unique phenomenal character.

Finally, in 3.3 I address Bonzon’s argument that we cannot even experience aesthetic properties without an evaluative standpoint. Because of this, Bonzon does not believe that the

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evaluative component of an aesthetic property can be separated from its descriptive component.

If the evaluative component is removed, then the descriptive component has no specifically aesthetic character. Bonzon emphasizes that we would not be able to learn how to apply terms like ‘gaudy’ if we hadn’t learned to use it from an evaluative standpoint. I reply that Bonzon is relying too heavily on a particular evaluative standpoint argument found in the work John

McDowell. I argue that we cannot analyze aesthetic properties in exactly the same way as we analyze moral properties. This, of course, means we cannot just import a theory from metaethics and apply it to aesthetic properties without modification. Finally, I argue that the account of aesthetic experience he offers is actually less intuitively plausible than the one offered by perceptual objectivism.

Chapter 3 contributes a novel defense of the descriptive analysis of aesthetic properties and a new methodological approach to the relationship between meta-aesthetics and metaethics.

This chapter shows that the separability thesis is defensible and not at all implausible from a philosophical point of view. This chapter also outlines why it is problematic to directly import theories from metaethics and apply them without modification in the aesthetic case.

In chapter 4, I go on to respond to Bender’s criticism that perceptual objectivism implies an empirically implausible account of aesthetic experience. Specifically, he believes that perceptual objectivism does not offer concrete evidence that human beings can and do experience higher-order phenomenal impressions of an aesthetic sort. In order to address this claim, I delve into the empirical aesthetics literature and discuss some of their findings. I address the developing consensus within empirical aesthetics, particularly in “neuroaesthetics”, that aesthetic experience is based in the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC). This is of significance because the OFC is considered a reward processing center of the brain which appears to be active when

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subjects make evaluative judgments, like moral judgments. Because of the activation in the OFC seen in subjects engaging in aesthetic judgments tasks, quite a few researchers are concluding that aesthetic experience might be fundamentally evaluative in character. I label this the “OFC view”. The first half of chapter 4 is devoted to explicating this view and critiquing it. I conclude that most of the research being cited in support of the ‘OFC view’ is fundamentally flawed from an empirical and philosophical perspective. I believe this literature review is actually a small, but important, contribution to the ever-growing philosophy of empirical aesthetics. It could also contribute to improved experimental design in fields like neuroaesthetics.

In the second half of chapter 4, I argue that we should follow Anjan Chatterjee’s approach in empirical aesthetics. Drawing on the cognitive neuroscience of vision, Chatterjee suggests that we should analyze aesthetic experience like we analyze visual processing. He explains that vision has early, intermediate and late stages. He suggests that late vision probably plays the most important role in our aesthetic experience of visual properties. He uses abnormal cases to illuminate his account of aesthetic processing, e.g. visual agnosia. I suggest that this approach is a fruitful way to explore the plausibility of higher-order phenomenal impressions of an aesthetic sort. In the final section of chapter 4, I analyze an interesting perceptual defect called amusia.

Amusia is a disorder affecting the perception of music. It goes beyond tone deafness and extends to musical memory, recognition, singing, and more. Amusia is described by neurologists like Oliver Sacks as a higher-order perceptual deficit. This makes it a perfect abnormal case to explore the potential existence of higher-order aesthetic impressions. What makes this case particularly interesting is that amusical subjects have normal auditory perception in all cases but for musical perception. So, for example, an amusical person can hear speech

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normally, even intonation in speech, but they cannot hear melody, harmony, and so on in a piece of music. Some amusical subjects describe music as sounding like a racket. One possible explanation of the amusical defect, I argue, is that amusical subjects lack higher-order perceptual capacity with respect to the auditory sense. Given that amusical subjects experience lower-order auditory properties normally, it suggests that music perception is distinct from other types of auditory perception. The existence of music-specific processing provides a plausible basis for claiming that human beings are capable of higher-order aesthetic perception. Thus, my tentative claim in the final sections of chapter 4 is that amusia should be considered evidence that human beings can and do perceive higher-order phenomenal impressions of an aesthetic sort. My analysis of amusia is designed to show that there is no reason to dismiss, on empirical grounds, the idea that human beings may have higher-order aesthetic perception. This case is a particularly useful contribution to the meta-aesthetic debate because it outlines a research strategy for finding a naturalistic basis for higher-order property perception in human beings.

In chapter 5, I discuss Nick Zangwill’s critique of the perceptual model in aesthetics.

Zangwill believes that aesthetic experience is not a case of perception. If this is true, it would mean that perceptual objectivism is simply false. In fact, however, most philosophers in aesthetics do believe that aesthetic experience is in some way perceptual. Given this, one might think it is not important to respond to Zangwill’s critique. I believe, however, that it is of central importance to perceptual objectivism to defend the perceptual model in aesthetics. Additionally,

I think analyzing the problem of aesthetic perception through the lens of the descriptive analysis of aesthetic properties leads to interesting new ways of incorporating the philosophy of perception in aesthetics.

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Zangwill critiques the perceptual objectivist position in two ways. (1) He argues that a sensory-based response dependent view could jeopardize a realist view of aesthetic properties and (2) he argues that aesthetic experience is not a case of perception. I respond to both of his objections, but consider (2) to be the more significant problem and accordingly it receives most of my attention in the chapter.

With respect to (1), Zangwill’s critique emphasizes that aesthetic properties cannot be more real than what they depend on for their existence. The sensory dependence thesis says that aesthetic properties depend in some way on sensory properties, like colors, for their existence.

Perceptual objectivism is committed to this kind of dependence. Zangwill goes on to claim that sensory properties, like colors, are possibly nonreal. He bases this claim on the existence of widespread perceptual variation. Thus, Zangwill holds that any theory that claims aesthetic properties depend on sensory properties may be forced to accept that aesthetic properties are nonreal.

I briefly discuss a number of replies from realist theories in the philosophy of color to show that one can respond to the problem of perceptual variation. Zangwill does not seriously consider any of these replies to the perceptual variation problem. Given this deficiency, his argument is inadequate and does not conclusively show that sensory properties are nonreal.

Indeed, he cannot claim something of such significance purely on the basis of perceptual variation. I conclude that it is acceptable for a realist theory to adopt the sensory dependence thesis.

In (2), Zangwill claims that aesthetic experience, though it may seem like it, is not a case of perception. He argues that aesthetic experience is fundamentally subjective in character--even though he regards aesthetic properties to be real and mind-independent. He explains that

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aesthetic responses are actually hedonic in character. Judging something to be beautiful, for instance, is generally accompanied by an experience of pleasure, while ugliness is accompanied by a feeling of displeasure (2011, p. 11). Pleasure and displeasure, Zangwill argues, are not part of the content of perceptual experience (2011, p. 11-12). Aesthetic pleasure is a separate, non- perceptual experience. Thus, we cannot claim that human beings perceive higher-order aesthetic properties because aesthetic experience is not a case of perception.

I offer replies to both of Zangwill’s arguments. First, I argue that he doesn’t seriously consider the possibility that there is a common object of perceptual attention in aesthetic experience which makes his argument inadequate. Second, I challenge his account of aesthetic experience. He over-emphasizes the role of pleasure and displeasure in our experience of an aesthetic property. I add that aesthetic experience intuitively has a very overt perceptual character which he does not adequately explain in his account. I conclude that Zangwill is basing his account of aesthetic perception on a traditional or conservative model from the philosophy of perception which suggests that higher-order, holistic properties, like aesthetic properties or kind properties, are not represented in the content of a perceptual experience. The last sections of chapter 5 are devoted to exploring the philosophy of perception and the concept of rich perceptual content.

Rich perceptual content is the idea that higher-order properties can be represented in perceptual content, i.e. they can be perceptually experienced. The traditional or conservative view of perception denies that rich perceptual content is possible. I explain that while the traditional view is still prevalent in the philosophy of perception, many philosophers like

Susanna Siegel and Tim Bayne, argue that rich perceptual content is possible. I consider some so-called contrast cases (like Susanna Siegel’s famous pine tree example) designed to support the

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idea of rich perceptual content. I go on to apply this in the aesthetic case using amusia as a contrast case. I argue that contrast cases do support the idea of rich perceptual content— especially in aesthetic examples. I remain skeptical about whether or not kind properties like

‘being a pine tree’ are actually represented in the content of perceptual experience but I do not rule it out.

I conclude that the perceptual model accurately captures the character of aesthetic experience and does not undermine aesthetic realism. Further, I argue that because perceptual objectivism holds that aesthetic properties are fundamentally descriptive, it is uniquely positioned to claim that aesthetic properties are represented in the content of perceptual experience.

This chapter outlines a clear way in which philosophers in aesthetics can incorporate some arguments from the philosophy of perception to help illuminate aesthetic debates.

Alternatively, I think it shows ways in which aesthetics can inform and improve debates within the philosophy of perception.

6.3 Future Research

Perceptual objectivism opens up a number of opportunities for future research in philosophical aesthetics and empirical aesthetics. The two categories overlap in this case, but I will consider new research opportunities in philosophy first and then empirical aesthetics.

One important area for further research and development in meta-aesthetics is within the realm of supervenience. In this dissertation, I argue that perceptual objectivism requires a strong form of supervenience and settle on a strong form of Levinson’s supervenience account.

However, I think more possibilities are open to perceptual objectivism. For example, a non-

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contextualist supervenience, one that excludes art-historical properties and such from the supervenience base, might be a promising approach. It could turn out, for example, that Currie’s brand of strong supervenience, with modification, might work for perceptual objectivism.

It would also be worth exploring Terence Horgan’s concept of superdupervenience.

Superdupervenience is “supervenience that is robustly explainable in a materialistically acceptable way” (Horgan, p. 577). A robust explanation is one that explains supervenience in an ontological way, not simply as “a feature of ‘’ of the higher-order terms and concepts”

(Horgan, p. 577). Robust explanation, among other things, involves giving an empirical account of how the higher-order properties relate to the lower-order properties. I think perceptual objectivism, with its naturalistic focus, is in a position to explore this option.

By treating aesthetic properties as fundamentally non-evaluative, perceptual objectivism makes aesthetic properties a prime subject for the philosophy of perception. As discussed in chapter 5, perceptual objectivism contends that aesthetic properties are represented in the contents of perceptual experience. This is a hotly debated subject in the philosophy of perception (Nanay, 2014, p. 108). Aesthetic properties are sometimes raised in these debates, but the philosophy of perception tends to focus on kind properties like “tree” and “table”.

Perceptual objectivism makes the explicit claim that aesthetic properties are an instance of rich perceptual content and therefore it contributes directly to the conversation.

As Bence Nanay notes, multiple theories of aesthetic properties do imply that aesthetic properties are represented in aesthetic experience (2014, p. 108-110). However, most aesthetic theories of perception claim that aesthetic experience is some sort of evaluative perception. By contrast, perceptual objectivism is claiming that aesthetic perception is an instance of non- evaluative, higher-order perception. This makes a dialogue with the philosophy of perception

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natural for perceptual objectivism. In other words, the claims of perceptual objectivism are directly relevant to some active debates in the philosophy of perception.

This dovetails nicely with future research possibilities in empirical aesthetics. For example, the amusia case outlined in chapter 4 creates a promising model for an investigation into the possibility of higher-order aesthetic perception. That case pertains to higher-order auditory perception, but perceptual objectivism implies that similar cases could be found for other sensory modalities. It will be difficult to find many parallel cases to amusia, but the approach I outline in chapter 4 gives us a clear idea of what to look for and how to analyze the evidence.

Perceptual objectivism also develops interesting possibilities for empirical research into the aesthetic experience of animals. It is a common belief that aesthetic experience (and in particular artistic production) is limited to human beings. However, some cases suggest that animals may have a type of aesthetic experience and possibly even create art objects.158

Perceptual objectivism suggests that human beings are capable of higher-order perception and this includes the perception of aesthetic properties. The amusia case suggests that human beings might have specific neural mechanisms that undergird this higher-order perception. The nature of these mechanisms is not fully understood, but similar research might be carried out on animal brains. It might turn out, for example, that advanced species such as cetaceans and primates have similar neural mechanisms. The framework of perceptual objectivism would allow us to

158 The famous bower birds, for example, create elaborate structures that appear to serve no other purpose except to attract a female. Darwin argued that the “mating choices of female bower birds are made on aesthetic grounds” (Davies, 2012, p. 12). Many philosophers and scientists are skeptical of this strong claim, but the bowerbirds and similar examples suggest animals might be capable of some type of aesthetic experience.

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draw some tentative conclusions about the capacity of animals to experience aesthetic properties.159

This inquiry does not conclusively show that aesthetic realism is the correct analysis of aesthetic properties. Rather, by defining and defending perceptual objectivism I build a foundation for moderate aesthetic realism that is plausible from a philosophical and an empirical perspective. In conclusion, I believe that perceptual objectivism, and the new research that could develop from it, has the potential to expand the scope and influence of meta-aesthetics in both philosophy and empirical aesthetics.

159 Of course this is not to suggest a crude mind-brain identity theory. Some animal brains do not share any of the major features of human brain structure and yet display extraordinary intelligence. One strong example of this is the Corvidae family of birds which includes magpies, blue jays and crows. Caledonian crows, for example, have been demonstrated to create and use their own tools (Rutz et al., p. 1524). Nevertheless, perceptual objectivism would offer a new and interesting way to explore the possibility of animal aesthetic perception.

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