Defending Perceptual Objectivism: A Naturalistic Realist Analysis of Aesthetic Properties A dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Cincinnati in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of Philosophy of the College of Arts and Sciences by Iris P. Spoor B.A. Thomas More College November, 2017 Committee Chair: Jenefer Robinson, Ph.D. Abstract This dissertation has several key components. First, I argue that the dispositional model of aesthetic properties is the most viable form of aesthetic realism. I explain that it is able to effectively balance the subjective and objective characteristics of aesthetic properties. I go on to argue that the most naturalistically viable form of dispositionalism is perceptual objectivism. Next, I synthesize the work of Frank Sibley and Jerrold Levinson and develop a fuller account of perceptual objectivism. In chapter 2, I argue that perceptual objectivism has two crucial features: (1) a dispositional realist model of aesthetic properties (which I call the perceptual model) and (2) the descriptive analysis of aesthetic properties. The descriptive analysis of aesthetic properties is the most controversial—and the most important—part of perceptual objectivism. Because of this, the bulk of the dissertation is devoted to defending the descriptive account from a philosophical and an empirical perspective. It is fairly unusual to treat aesthetic properties as fundamentally descriptive; indeed, it is why perceptual objectivism might be considered a revisionist theory of aesthetic properties. A key component of this view is something I call the separability thesis. The thesis contends that evaluative reactions to aesthetic properties can be separated from the objective, perceptual content of an aesthetic experience thereby leaving us with the non-evaluative core of the aesthetic property. As I outline in chapter 5, garishness is a good case study. The descriptive content creates the boundary of the concept. Many would agree that garishness is an unpleasant feature of an object. A garish carpet, for example, might cause one to experience genuine aesthetic displeasure. This displeasure, however, does not constitute the property. A ‘garish’ object is characterized by bright, clashing colors. The fact that we can consistently apply and understand ‘garish’ suggests that there is some kind of common perceptual content associated with an experience of the property. This common perceptual content also explains how an artist can intentionally manipulate a medium to create certain aesthetic effects. Two aspects of the view loom large in criticism: 1) the separability thesis (described above) and 2) the empirical viability of higher-order aesthetic perception. In chapter 3, I respond to several potent challenges to the separability thesis. In chapter 4, I address 2) by taking an extensive look at empirical aesthetics. I analyze one case in particular, amusia, which offers possible empirical support for the perceptual objectivist analysis of aesthetic experience. Finally, in chapter 5 I draw on the philosophy of perception to defend the perceptual model of aesthetic experience. A fully developed account of perceptual objectivism offers philosophers a naturalistically viable form of aesthetic realism and opens up new possibilities for research in meta-aesthetics. ii iii Acknowledgements This dissertation would not have been possible without the consistent support and guidance of my committee chair, Jenefer Robinson. Over the years this has been in development, she has offered support and constructive criticism that shaped my project into what it is today. I am also indebted to my other committee members, Lawrence Jost and Vanessa Carbonell, who have offered extensive comments and suggestions that have greatly improved the quality of my work. They have put in a great deal of effort to make it possible for me to complete this year. I greatly appreciate their efforts. I’d also like to thank my undergraduate advisor, Jerome Langguth. His teaching, and guidance, inspired me to pursue philosophy at the graduate level. I must also thank the UC Philosophy Department. My years there were happy ones that greatly improved my abilities as a writer and as a philosopher. I’d like to thank all of the faculty and graduate students for their support over the years, but I’d particularly like to recognize Doug Keaton, Vanessa Bentley, Daniel Hartner, and Tom Polger for their helpful comments on this dissertation. Steven Cahn also deserves my thanks for generously providing insights on the subject of amusia. Last, but not least, I want to thank Director of Graduate Studies, Angela Potochnik, for her important assistance. My colleagues at Mount St. Joseph University also deserve my thanks. They have offered support and given me every opportunity to succeed as a professor and finish this dissertation at the same time. Without their understanding, this simply would not have been possible. Mike Sontag, Ron White, and Buffy Barkley have been especially helpful in making this dissertation possible. I am most grateful, though, to my family. They have been unfailingly supportive of my graduate work and my personal development. Were it not for the intellectual environment fostered at home—and the endless debates--I would likely never have pursued philosophy. iv Table of Contents Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... ii Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... iv Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................... v Chapter 1: An Introduction to Aesthetic Realism ..................................................................... 1 1.1 Aesthetic Realism and Aesthetic Properties.......................................................................... 2 1.1a Reasons to be a Realist .................................................................................................... 6 1.2 Powerful Challenges for Aesthetic Realism........................................................................ 12 1.2a The Argument from Relativity ...................................................................................... 12 1.2b The Naturalistic Objection ............................................................................................. 15 1.3 Dispositional Realism in Ethics and Aesthetics .................................................................. 19 1.4 Dispositional realism and Perceptual Objectivism ............................................................. 27 Chapter 2: Defining Perceptual Objectivism ........................................................................... 33 2.1 Aesthetic Properties: Sibley ................................................................................................ 33 2.2 Aesthetic Properties: Levinson............................................................................................ 39 2.3 The descriptive account of aesthetic properties .................................................................. 50 2.4 Supervenience ..................................................................................................................... 54 2.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 67 Chapter 3: Defending the Non-Evaluative Analysis of Aesthetic Properties ........................ 69 3.1 Bender and Irresolvable Perceptual Disputes...................................................................... 70 3.1a Bender’s Empirical Critique .......................................................................................... 82 3.2 Rafael De Clercq’s Variable Polarity Argument................................................................. 85 3.3 Shaping and the Evaluative Standpoint ............................................................................... 89 3.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... 98 Chapter 4: Empirical Aesthetics and the Descriptive Account .............................................. 99 4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 100 4.1a Empirical Adequacy and The Principle of Minimal Psychological Realism .............. 101 4.1b Why Neuroaesthetics? ................................................................................................. 102 4.2 Aesthetic Processing: A Neuroaesthetic Perspective ........................................................ 103 v 4.2a Is There An Aesthetic Center of the Brain? ................................................................ 104 4.3 Zeki and the Foundations of the OFC Theory .................................................................. 107 4.3a Descriptive vs. Aesthetic Judgments: An Empirical Perspective ................................ 114 4.4 Empirical Failings of the OFC View................................................................................. 117 4.4a Abnormal Cases: OFC Damage with Spared Aesthetic Experience ........................... 119 4.5 Towards New Insights: Anjan Chatterjee’s framework ...................................................