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CVII: 2 (February 2000), Pp TAMAR SZABÓ GENDLER July 2014 Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences · Yale University · P.O. Box 208365 · New Haven, CT 06520-8365 E-mail: [email protected] · Office telephone: 203.432.4444 ACADEMIC EMPLOYMENT 2006- Yale University Academic Vincent J. Scully Professor of Philosophy (F2012-present) Professor of Philosophy (F2006-F2012); Professor of Psychology (F2009-present); Professor of Humanities (S2007-present); Professor of Cognitive Science (F2006-present) Administrative Dean, Faculty of Arts and Sciences (Sum2014-present) Deputy Provost, Humanities and Initiatives (F2013-Sum2014) Chair, Department of Philosophy (Sum2010-Sum2013) Chair, Cognitive Science Program (F2006-Sum2010) 2003-2006 Cornell University Academic Associate Professor of Philosophy (with tenure) (F2003-S2006) Administrative Director of Graduate Studies, Department of Philosophy (F2004-S2006) Co-Director, Program in Cognitive Studies (F2004-S2006) 1997-2003 Syracuse University Academic Associate Professor of Philosophy (with tenure) (F2002-S2003) Assistant Professor of Philosophy (tenure-track) (F1999-S2002) Allen and Anita Sutton Distinguished Faculty Fellow (F1997-S1999) Administrative Director of Undergraduate Studies, Department of Philosophy (F2001-S2003) 1996-1997 Yale University Academic Lecturer (F1996-S1997) EDUCATION 1990-1996 Harvard University. PhD (Philosophy), August 1996. Dissertation title: ‘Imaginary Exceptions: On the Powers and Limits of Thought Experiment’ Advisors: Robert Nozick, Derek Parfit, Hilary Putnam 1989-1990 University of California at Berkeley, PhD candidate (Philosophy) [transferred to Harvard] 1983-1987 Yale University. BA (Humanities and Mathematics-&-Philosophy), summa cum laude, 1987 2009-2010 Full-time year-long coursework in Neuroscience, Statistics, and Psychology, Yale University August 2009 Participant, 2-week Intensive Summer Institute in Neuroscience, University of Pennsylvania Sum.1998 Participant, 6-week NEH Summer Institute, “Self and Psychopathology,” Cornell University AREAS OF RESEARCH SPECIALIZATION AND TEACHING COMPETENCE Areas of Research Specialization: Philosophical Psychology; Epistemology Additional Areas of Teaching Competence: Cognitive Science; Metaphysics; Political Philosophy; Ethics; Aesthetics; General History of Philosophy FELLOWSHIPS, HONORS AND AWARDS 2013 Yale College Sidonie Miskimin Clauss Prize for Excellence in Teaching in the Humanities 2009-2010 Mellon New Directions Fellow 2003-2004 Ryskamp Fellow, American Council for Learned Societies 2003-2004 Senior Fellow, Collegium Budapest (Institute for Advanced Study), Hungary 1994-1995 Mellon Dissertation Fellowship in the Humanities. 1991-1994 National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship 1989-1991 Mellon Graduate Fellowship in the Humanities 1987 Distinction in Humanities; Distinction in Mathematics-&-Philosophy, Yale University Sum. 1986 National Endowment for the Humanities, Younger Scholars Summer Fellowship PUBLICATIONS IN PHILOSOPHY and COGNITIVE SCIENCE/PSYCHOLOGY Collected Papers Intuition, Imagination and Philosophical Methodology: Selected Papers. NY/Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford Univ. Press, 2010. (Selection of my previously-published papers with substantive new introduction and cross-references.) Reviewed in: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (15 June 2011); London Review of Books (22 September 2011); Metapsychology (6 December 2011); Australasian Journal of Philosophy (10 September 2012); Analysis Reviews (three-reviewer symposium (October 2012)); Minds and Machines (August 2013) Monograph Thought Experiment: On the Powers and Limits of Imaginary Cases. NY: Garland Press (now Routledge), 2000. Dissertations in Philosophy Series. (70,000 words) Edited volumes The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology. Co-edited by Herman Cappelen, Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne. NY/ Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming. (Collection of 50+ specially-commissioned essays.) Perceptual Experience. Co-edited with an introduction by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne. NY/Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford University Press, 2006. (Anthology of new papers.) Conceivability and Possibility. Co-edited with an introduction by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne. NY/Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford University Press, 2002. (Anthology of new papers.) Edited journals Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Co-edited with John Hawthorne. (Biannual journal) Volume 1, 2005; Volume 2, 2007; Volume 3, 2010; Volume 4, 2013; [Volume 5, expected 2014] Philosophy Compass, Epistemology Section. On-going on-line journal. Editor, 2005-2008; Advisory board, 2005-present. The Monist (Personal Identity). Co-edited with Dean Zimmerman. 87:4, October 2004. Edited textbook The Elements of Philosophy: Readings from Past and Present. Co-edited with Susanna Siegel and Steven M. Cahn, NY: Oxford, 2008. (Textbook; anthology of pre-existing and specially-prepared papers) Tamar Szabó Gendler – July 2014 — page 2 of 18 Original articles and substantive responses “Self-Control in School-Age Children” (with Angela Duckworth and James Gross.) Educational Psychologist. (forthcoming) DOI:10.1080/00461520.2014.926225 (17,000 words) “The Third Horse: On Unendorsed Association and Human Behavior” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Volume 88, Issue 1: 185–218 (June 2014) (15,000 words) “Using Knowledge: On the Philosophical Implications of Stereotype Threat” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research [forthcoming] (13,000 words) “Between Reason and Reflex: Response to Commentators” and “Précis of Intuition, Imagination and Philosophical Methodology” Analysis Reviews (October 2012), (6000 and 2000 words) “On the Epistemic Costs of Implicit Bias” Philosophical Studies 156:1 (September 2011), 33-63 (18,500 words) “Alief in Action (and Reaction)” Mind & Language 23:5 (November 2008), 552-585. (16,500 words) “Alief and Belief” Journal of Philosophy (October 2008), 634-663. (14,500 words) Selected by The Philosopher’s Annual as one of the 10 best articles published in philosophy in 2008. “Self-Deception as Pretense” Philosophical Perspectives: Philosophy of Mind (2007). (13,000 words) “Philosophical Thought Experiments, Intuitions and Cognitive Equilibrium” Midwest Studies in Philosophy: Philosophy and the Empirical, XXXI (2007), pp. 68-89. (10,000 words) “Imaginative Contagion” Metaphilosophy 37:2 (April 2006), pp. 1-21. (8000 words) “Imaginative Resistance Revisited” In Shaun Nichols, ed. The Architecture of the Imagination. Oxford University Press, 2006. (13,000 words) “Genuine Rational Fictional Emotions” (with Karson Kovakovich) Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics (Matthew Kieran, ed.) NY: Blackwell, 2005, pp. 241-253. (7000 words) “The Real Guide to Fake Barns: A Catalogue of Gifts for Your Epistemic Enemies” (with John Hawthorne) Philosophical Studies, 124 (2005), pp. 331-352. (8000 words) “Thought Experiments Rethought – and Reperceived.” Philosophy of Science, 71: 5 (Dec. 2004), pp. 1152-1164. (5000 words) “On the Relation between Pretense and Belief.” Imagination, Philosophy and the Arts. (Domenic McIver Lopes & Matthew Kieran, eds.) NY: Routledge, 2003, pp. 125-141 (10,000 words) “Personal Identity and Thought-Experiments.” Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 52, No. 206 (Jan. 2002), pp. 34-54. (10,000 words) “Origin Essentialism: The Arguments Reconsidered” (with John Hawthorne). Mind, Vol. 109, Issue 434 (April 2000), pp. 285-298. (6000 words) “The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance.” The Journal of Philosophy, XCVII: 2 (February 2000), pp. 55-81. (13,000 words) Tamar Szabó Gendler – July 2014 — page 3 of 18 “Exceptional Persons: On the Limits of Imaginary Cases.” The Journal of Consciousness Studies, Vol. 5, Nos. 5-6 (October 1998), pp. 592-610. (12,000 words) Reprinted in Models of the Self (Shaun Gallagher and Jonathan Shear, eds.) Exeter, UK: Imprint, pp. 447-465. “Galileo and the Indispensability of Scientific Thought Experiment.” The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 49, No. 3 (Sept. 1998), pp. 397-424. (12,000 words) “On the Possibility of Feminist Epistemology” Metaphilosophy. Vol. 27, Nos. 1&2 (January 1996), pp. 104-117. (8000 words) Overview articles “The Problem of Imaginative Resistance” (with Shen-yi Liao) Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Literature, (Forthcoming) (6000 words) “Imagination” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy; March 2011 (14,000 words) “Pretense and Imagination” (with Shen-yi Liao) Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews (WIREs):Cognitive Science, Volume 1, May/June 2010 (10,000 words) “Personal Identity and Metaphysics” Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind (Brian McLaughlin and Ansgar Beckerman, eds. NY/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009 (7000 words) “Perceptual Experience” (with John Hawthorne) Perceptual Experience (Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, eds.) NY/Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 1-30. (10,000 words) “Conceivability and Possibility” (with John Hawthorne) Conceivability and Possibility (Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne, eds.) NY/Oxford: Clarendon/Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 1-70. (30,000 words) Shorter Encyclopedia entries “Imaginative Resistance” (substantive entry) Blackwell Companion to Aesthetics, 2008. (2500 words) “Imagination” (substantive addendum) Encyclopedia of Philosophy. MacMillan, 2005. (2000 words) “Thought Experiments in Science” (substantive entry) Encyclopedia of Philosophy. MacMillan, 2005. (3000 words) “Robert Nozick” and “Peter Unger.” (biographical entries) Dictionary of American Philosophers: 1850-1960. Thoemmes Press, 2004. (2500 and 600 words respectively)
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