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Krótki Przewodnik Po Nowym Jedwabnym Szlaku

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Krótki Przewodnik Po Nowym Jedwabnym Szlaku KRÓTKI PRZEWODNIK PO NOWYM JEDWABNYM SZLAKU Adam Nobis KRÓTKI PRZEWODNIK PO NOWYM JEDWABNYM SZLAKU Wro cław 2017 Copyright © by Adam Nobis and Wydawnictwo CHRONICON 2017 Recenzenci prof. dr hab. Leszek Koczanowicz, Uniwersytet SWPS dr hab. Leszek Kopciuch, prof. nadzw., UMCS Redakcja Joanna Rosik Korekta Zespół Wydawnictwa CHRONICON Indeks Autor Opracowanie typograficzne Adam Kolenda Na okładce Rys. Anna Morawiecka Mapy Rys. Józef Mikołajek ISBN 978-83-946166-9-4 www.chronicon.pl tel. +48 606 412 330 Druk I-BIS Wrocław [email protected] tel. +71/342 25 17, 602 65 14 13 Spis treś ci Wprowadzenie . 7 CZĘŚĆ 1. TRASY I MIEJSCA . 9 1. Koleje . 11 2. Drogi, mosty, tunele . 22 3. Koleją i morzem . 25 4. Morzem . 26 5. Kanały . 28 6. Porty . 30 7. Lotniska . 33 8. Rurociągi . 35 9. Linie energetyczne i elektrownie . 38 10. Telekomunikacja . 39 11. Kopalnie . 41 12. Miejsca . 42 CZĘŚĆ 2. LUDZIE, INSTYTUCJE, PROJEKTY . 67 CZĘŚĆ 3. ZNACZENIA I WARTOŚCI . 103 CZĘŚĆ 4. NOWY JEDWABNY ŚWIAT . 153 Literatura . 167 Spis map . 205 Indeks miejscowości, portów, lotnisk . 206 Краткий путеводитель по Новому Шелковому Пути. Краткое изложение . 211 A Short Guide to the New Silk Road. Summary . 213 Krótki przewodnik po Nowym Jedwabnym Szlaku. Streszczenie . 215 Wprowadzenie Wielu z nas słyszało o Jedwabnym Szlaku. Od kilkunastu lat coraz częściej mówi się o Nowym Jedwabnym Szlaku. Ten krótki przewodnik przeznaczony jest dla tych, którzy chcieliby o tym Nowym Szlaku dowiedzieć się czegoś wię- cej. Jak każdy krótki przewodnik po jakimś znanym mie- ście, ten także pozwala nam zapoznać się tylko z wybrany- mi ludźmi, miejscami, wydarzeniami. W dodatku podając o nich skromne, ograniczone informacje. Monografia mia- sta wymaga całościowego opisu i podsumowań. A co, jeśli miasto pełne jest zabytków z różnych epok a w większej swojej części jest placem budowy? Przewodnik, nie oferując syntezy, pozwala nam poruszać się między tymi budowa- mi i poznawać, a także porównywać ze sobą różne miejsca. Mały, napisany prostym językiem przewodnik ma jeszcze tę zaletę, że mogą po niego sięgnąć różne osoby: studenci, biznesmeni, akademicy, turyści, a także ci, którzy są cieka- wi świata, w jakim żyją. W dodatku mały format sprawia, że książka zmieści się w kieszeni, plecaku czy służbowym neseserze, gdy wyruszymy w trasę. Formuła przewodnika zamiast monografii jest dodatkowo uzasadniona wielością i różnorodnością planów i inicjatyw, które w większości właśnie powstają, a dodatkowo są modyfikowane na etapie realizacji. Czytelnik sam oceni przydatność tego tekstu. 7 Nowy Jedwabny Szlak jest placem budowy. Niektóre jego elementy są już wykonane. Inne w budowie czy na etapie projektu. Kolejne jego składniki będą zapewne projektowane w przyszłości. Wierzę w jej nieprzewidywalność. Nie zamie- rzam więc jej przewidywać. Spróbujmy jednak zrozumieć, co dzieje się na tym placu budowy? Co dzieje się w świecie, w którym żyjemy? Rozumienie to dodatkowo utrudnia pewna okoliczność. Na placu tym obecne są różne ekipy budowlane, które kierują się własnymi celami i projektami. Projekty te cza- sem pokrywają się, a czasem się od siebie mniej lub bardziej różnią. W budowie Nowego Jedwabnego Szlaku uczestniczy wiele krajów, firm, organizacji, osób. To prowokuje do posta- wienia pytania o to, czy mamy do czynienia z jednym Nowym Szlakiem, czy raczej z wielością powiązanych ze sobą nitek? Tak jak było to w przypadku tego Jedwabnego Szlaku, który teraz musimy dla odróżnienia nazywać starym. Nie sądzę, by ten przewodnik odpowiedział nam na to pytanie. Mam jed- nak nadzieję, że czytelnik, który będzie szukał wyjaśnienia tej i innych kwestii, uzna ten przewodnik za pomocny. Teraz krótki przewodnik po tym przewodniku. Nowy Szlak – jak Stary – to sieć połączeń między różnymi, odle- głymi miejscami. W Części 1 dla przykładu wybrane połą- czenia i miejsca. Część 2 to ludzie, instytucje, projekty – też oczywiście nie wszystkie. Część 3 to znaczenia i wartości nadawane Nowemu Szlakowi przez różne osoby i w róż- nych miejscach. Część 4 to chyba jednak próba podsumowa- nia. Jest o tym, czym Nowy Szlak jest dla świata, w którym żyjemy, i jego przyszłości? Przewodnika tego – jak i innych – nie musimy czytać od początku do końca, strona po stronie. Zachęcam raczej do odnajdywania i lektury interesujących nas treści w takiej kolejności, która jest nam potrzebna. CZĘŚĆ 1 TRASY I MIEJSCA 1. Koleje 1.1. Yiwu (义乌) – Madryt (Madrid) 18 listopada 2014 r. z Yiwu we wschodnich Chinach do Madrytu wyruszył pierwszy bezpośredni pociąg towarowy o nazwie Yixinou. 82 wagony i lokomotywy, które zmieniały się co 800 km. Po 21 dniach i pokonaniu 13 052 km dotarł 9 grudnia na stację Madrid Abroñigal, witany przez minister transportu Hiszpanii Anę Pastor. Trasa połączenia prowadzi przez Chiny (Luoyang, Xian, Urumczi), Kazachstan (Dostyk, Astana), Rosję (Jekaterynburg, Moskwa), Białoruś (Brześć), Polskę (Warszawa), Niemcy (Berlin, Saarbrücken), Francję (Poitiers) i Hiszpanię (Irún). Po drodze trzy razy zmienia- no podwozie z powodu różnego rozstawu szyn, na granicy: chińsko-kazachskiej w Dostyk, białorusko-polskiej w Brze- ściu i w Irún na granicy francusko-hiszpańskiej. Pierwszy transport przywiózł 1400 ton produktów przeznaczonych do bożonarodzeniowej sprzedaży. Yixinou, który opuścił Madryt 29 stycznia, powrócił do Yiwu 22 lutego z ładun- kiem wina, oliwy, wody mineralnej i hiszpańskiej szynki. Alexander, Harriet; World’s Burgen, Stephen; The Silk Shepard, Wade; Why Tharoor, Ishaan; The world’s Xie, Jun; Yiwu 11 Legenda: 1-Madryt 2-Moskwa 3-Yiwu Mapa 1. Kolej Yiwu-Madryt 1.2. Chengdu (成都) – Łódź Od kwietnia 2013 r. do Łodzi przyjeżdżają pociągi towa- rowe z Chengdu w środkowych Chinach. Operatorem tego połączenia jest łódzka firma Hatrans. Oferuje ona cotygo- dniowy ekspresowy przewóz towarów składem 41 wago- nów w ciągu 14 dni przez Kazachstan, Rosję i Białoruś. Tra- sa prowadzi przez Urumczi w Chinach, kazachski Dostyk, rosyjski Jekaterynburg i Moskwę oraz białoruski Brześć i liczy 9826 km. Początkowo wagony wracały puste. Dopie- ro 18 sierpnia 2015 r. ze stacji kolejowej Łódź-Olechów do Chengdu odjechał pierwszy skład 41 wagonów o wadze 1000 ton, załadowany m.in. ciastkami z wiórkami koko- sowymi, wódką, wodą mineralną, piwem i cydrem. Dwa pierwsze lata to ok. 100 regularnych i 50 czarterowych połą- czeń, którymi z Chin przyjeżdżały produkty elektroniczne, samochodowe, AGD i tekstylia. W kierunku przeciwnym głównie polskie produkty spożywcze. Hatrans Logistics Magnuszewska, Agnieszka; Łódź Magnuszewska, Agnieszka; Pociągi Magnuszewska, Agnieszka; W kwietniu 1.3. Łódź – Xiamen (厦门) W sierpniu 2015 r. Hatrans uruchomiło połączenie towaro- we z Łodzi do portu Xiamen na chińskim wybrzeżu Cieśni- ny Tajwańskiej. 26 sierpnia ze stacji Łódź-Olechów odjechał pierwszy pociąg do Xiamen. W inauguracji uczestniczyli: pre- zydent Łodzi Helena Zdanowska, marszałek województwa łódzkiego Witold Stępień oraz wiceburmistrz Xiamen Yunfeng 13 Zheng*. 40 wagonami w 15-dniową podróż odjechały produk- ty regionu łódzkiego: słodycze, piwo i cydr. Trasa to blisko 11 tys. km przez Białoruś (Brześć), Rosję (Moskwa), Kazachstan (Dostyk) i Chiny (Urumczi, Czengdu). Bińczyk, Beata; Inauguracja Jędrzejczak, Agnieszka; Pierwszy 1.4. Zhengzhou (郑州) – Hamburg Firma DB Schenker uruchomiła kolejowe połączenie pomię- dzy niemieckim Hamburgiem i Zhengzhou w Chinach. Naj- pierw w sierpniu 2013 r. pociągi z Chin zaczęły docierać do Niemiec, a 1 września 2014 r. pierwszy pociąg wyjechał w kie- runku przeciwnym. Wśród uroczyście żegnających pociąg poza przedstawicielami władz firmy i miasta był Fuzhan Xie, gubernator prowincji Henan. Trasa składu 41 kontenerów to 10 214 km przez Niemcy (Duisburg), Polskę (Warszawa, Mała- szowice), Białoruś (Brześć, Mińsk), Rosję (Moskwa), Kazach- stan (Astana, Zharyk, Dostyk) i Chiny (Urumczi). W 2015 r. w kierunku Chin pociągi odjeżdżały dwa razy w miesiącu, a w kierunku Niemiec dwa razy w tygodniu. Czas podróży to 16–18 dni. Do Hamburga jadą chińskie wyroby motoryzacyjne i elektroniczne. Pierwszym pociągiem do Chin pojechały prze- mysłowe automaty produkcyjne dla firm technologicznych. DB Schenker; DB Schenker Geodis; Euroasia Good Hope Logistics; Freight King, Mike; DB Schenker * Przy wszystkich osobach różnych narodowości przyjąłem pol- ski zwyczaj podawania najpierw imienia, a następnie nazwiska. Gdy w zapisie bibliograficznym pojawia się najpierw nazwisko a po nim imię, to oddzielone są przecinkiem. 14 1.5. Yiwu (义乌) – Londyn (London) 18 stycznia 2017 r. po 16 dniach podróży do towaro- wej stacji Barking na wschodzie Londynu przybył pociąg z Yiwu ze wschodnich Chin. Pociąg nazwany „Wschod- nim wiatrem” składał się z 34 wagonów, które przywiozły 68 kontenerów towaru wartości 4 mln brytyjskich funtów: odzież, walizki, torebki, portfele. To pierwszy pociąg, który rozpoczął regularne, cotygodniowe, bezpośrednie połącze- nie Londynu z Yiwu, mające być formą oceny zapotrzebo- wania. Pokonał 11 999 km przez Kazachstan, Rosję, Białoruś, Polskę, Niemcy, Belgię, Francję, by tunelem pod Kanałem La Manche dojechać do Londynu. Patrick Sawer zauważa, że nazwa pociągu nawiązuje do słów Przewodniczącego Mao o tym, że „Wschodni wiatr zwycięży nad zachodnim wia- trem”. Dodaje też, że wydarzenie to „oznacza nowy rozdział w historii handlowego szlaku o wielowiekowej tradycji”. Sawer, Patrick; East (ﺗﻬﺮﺍﻥ) Yiwu (义乌) – Teheran .1.6 23 stycznia 2016 r. w irańskim Teheranie prezydent Ira- nu Hassan Rouhani i przewodniczący ChRL Jinping Xi podpisali porozumienie dotyczące wymiany handlowej, umożliwiające zwiększenie jej w trakcie najbliższej
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