Perspective

National security and scientific communication

Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky*

Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94309

Contributed by Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, February 29, 2000 s science facing a new environment trig- Even after the end of the Cold War there report includes in that term indigenous Igered by the alleged successful espio- is evident need for protecting truly sensi- efforts of China in designing their own nage by foreign parties, in particular tive information, in particular in the in- nuclear weapons, information gathered China, aimed at the nation’s nuclear weap- terest of retarding, or hopefully prevent- from basic science or open scientific ons secrets? Several much publicized re- ing, the proliferation of nuclear weapons. sources, and information obtained by es- ports, in particular that of the Cox Com- But many reviews of U.S. security prac- pionage. In contrast to the conclusion of mission of the Congress†, the Rudman tices, in particular those carried out by the Cox Commission, the intelligence report by the President’s Foreign Intelli- committees of the National Academy of community concludes that it cannot de- gence Advisory Board, and the review of Sciences, have emphasized that security by termine the extent of weapons informa- the findings of the intelligence commu- restriction should apply only to those sub- tion gathered from each of these sources. nity, have alleged security deficiencies jects whose release would demonstrably Although the Cox Commission does not within the U.S. defense establishment and do major damage to national security. address the range of information obtained in particular U.S. nuclear weapons labo- In other words, such restrictions should by China between that publicly available ratories. None of these reports have build high fences around few truly sen- and that still classified, it also does not claimed that the presence of foreigners at sitive areas and not extend restrictive assess the extent to which weapons that U.S. academic research institutes or uni- practices to wider areas of scientific could be developed as a result of the versities has in any way been involved in communication. ‘‘stolen’’ information could impact U.S. the alleged security breeches. Yet, reme- There are strong reasons for these con- national security. dial measures instituted by the U.S. gov- clusions, both born from the idealistic The Cox Commission agrees that no ernment are far ranging and affect not conviction that scientific results belong to complete nuclear weapons drawings or only weapons-related activities but the the whole world and from the pragmatic design details have been acquired by U.S. scientific establishment in general. conclusion that broad restrictions on sci- China. National security has many aspects, in- entific exchanges are not enforceable in Can the information alleged to be sto- cluding economic strength, the morale practice, certainly not over a protracted len by the Cox Commission lead to new and well-being of the people, as well as period. Thus we strongly criticize much of Chinese weapons designs that can be military prowess. In respect to the latter, the thoughtless extension of security re- fielded without nuclear tests? In this latter some emphasize restrictions aimed at pre- strictions over ‘‘sensitive’’ information connection, we note that China is a sig- venting information developed in the past that has no demonstrable direct security natory of the Comprehensive Nuclear from reaching unfriendly nations or par- implications. Weapons Test Ban Treaty and has given ties. But then there are those, this author The Cox Commission implicitly consid- assurance that it will not conduct further included, who conclude that national se- ers China’s thefts of U.S. secret informa- nuclear weapons tests even in the absence curity in the past has been predominantly tion as a hostile act, yet essentially all of ratification of that treaty. advanced by achievements in a free envi- nations in the world collect information What are the facts? China tested its first ronment and that such achievements are from other countries whether they are nuclear weapon 36 years ago and since endangered if undue security measures by friends or adversaries. The U.S. arrested then has accumulated between 400 and restrictions are allowed to dominate. Both an Israeli spy many years ago and more 500 nuclear weapons in its inventory com- are needed, but to use the phrase coined recently arrested an Australian agent pared with an enduring stockpile of more by journalist Alan Barth, the ‘‘utility of without accusing Israel or Australia of than 10,000 such weapons in the posses- freedom’’ is essential in advancing na- hostile acts. Collecting information from sion of the U.S. and about 15,000 nuclear tional security. other countries, which those nations do weapons held by Russia. During the ‘‘hot’’ and ‘‘cold’’ wars the not wish to have disclosed, is part of the The composition of U.S. stockpiles are spectacular achievements of United international mores of today. Generally, different from those of Russia. The U.S. States science and technology were ac- collection of such information is carried complished in unusually unrestricted en- out clandestinely, and neither success of vironments. Mistakes and false starts were collection efforts nor penetration of se- *To whom reprint requests should be addressed at: 2575 Sand Hill Road, Menlo Park, CA 94025. E-mail: made but, just because the open nature of crecy barriers erected by nations are pub- [email protected]. such errors drew criticism, corrections licly acknowledged. †Final Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National were readily taken. U.S. openness com- Let me examine the accusations of Security and Military͞Commercial Concerns with the Peo- pared favorably with that of the United widespread Chinese ‘‘thefts’’ of vital nu ple’s Republic of China. Released in classified form in Jan- States’ opponent nations, in particular the clear weapons secrets that are contained uary 1999 and in unclassified form in May 1999. All refer- practices of the former Soviet Union. This in the Cox Commission report. That re- ences in this paper are to the unclassified (‘‘redacted’’) version of the report. openness did not permit other countries to port states that ‘‘The People’s Republic of Article published online before print: Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. catch up; on the contrary, the technology China has stolen design information of the USA, 10.1073͞pnas.100114597. Article and publica- gap between the U.S. and the Soviet U.S. most advanced thermonuclear weap- tion date are at www.pnas.org͞cgi͞doi͞10.1073͞ Union widened throughout the Cold War. ons.’’ Yet, in using the word ‘‘stolen’’ the pnas.100114597

5034–5036 ͉ PNAS ͉ May 9, 2000 ͉ vol. 97 ͉ no. 10 Downloaded by guest on September 24, 2021 has about 6,000 strategic weapons com- ever, believed to be larger and more mas- launched by the Chinese; three of those pared with Russia’s 3,000 whereas Russia sive than their U.S. counterpart. China has launches failed. These failures resulted in has a very much larger number of tactical, not deployed any multiple warhead mis- financial losses to U.S. contractors and short-range nuclear weapons compared siles. The alleged theft of the W-88 design their insurance companies, and thus the with those still retained by the U.S. But, of thus raises the question whether this American firms concerned (Loral and Chinese nuclear weapons, perhaps only would enable China to adapt this design to Hughes) agreed to cooperate with the 100 are strategic and only some 20 nuclear deploy MIRVs in the future. Obviously People’s Republic of China in analyzing weapons could reach the U.S. from China this question cannot be conclusively an- these failures. The Cox Commission al- or from its one operational strategic sub- swered nor can one conclude that China leges that in connection with these joint marine. Moreover, China’s nuclear weap- could not develop such multiple warhead failure analyses the American firms failed ons are almost all based at fixed land- missiles without access to U.S. informa- to secure the required export licenses. based locations that could be rendered tion. Without nuclear tests this question is This charge is currently under litigation. unusable by preemptive attack of the likely to remain moot. Whatever the outcome of this legal pro- much larger forces of Russia and the U.S. If China developed multiple warhead cess, it is clear that American participation The unclassified version of the Cox missiles in the future, this would primarily in the failure analyses did not reveal en- Commission report is specific only in re- enable China to deploy land-based multi- cryption information and would not result spect to two categories of weapons about ple warhead missiles, which also could be in improvements in accuracy or range of which the People’s Republic of China made mobile, thus making them more Chinese rockets. The cooperation may allegedly has acquired ‘‘stolen’’ informa- survivable against pre-emptive attack. have resulted in improvements in reliabil- tion. The first category concerns the so- This would be in line with China’s de- ity of the Chinese systems and, of course, called neutron bomb belonging to the clared ‘‘no first use’’ policy, which restricts the contractual arrangements providing family of enhanced radiation weapons. the use of China’s nuclear forces to a mode for the U.S. satellites to be carried by The second pinpoints the W-88 technol- responding only to nuclear attack by oth- Chinese rockets provided money for the ogy where W-88 is the designation of a ers. Under that doctrine increasing the relevant Chinese entities. In discussing warhead whose development started close survivability of China’s forces, which at this complex situation, there are many to 30 years ago and is now carried by a present is marginal, would be improved. factual errors in the Cox report regarding fraction of the U.S. Trident submarine However, the introduction of MIRVs into ranges and payloads of Chinese systems. fleet. such forces would not significantly change The Cox report also dedicates some A neutron bomb is a nuclear weapon the strategic threat against the U.S. which, space to discussing the political context of whose high-energy neutron radiation is considering the very small numbers in- the alleged episodes of spying for Chinese enhanced relative to the other lethal ef- volved, could be only retaliatory under military benefit. It is here where the highly fects of nuclear weapons, that is blast, any circumstances. politicized bias of the report is evident. thermal radiation, and delayed radioac- The primary evidence cited in the un- The report cites that the Chinese consti- tive effects through fallout. The alleged classified Cox Commission report for Chi- tution specifies that the Communist party utility of neutron weapons is the effect of na’s acquisition of the W-88 technology should assert supremacy over all govern- neutrons on humans without damage to stems from documents delivered voluntar- mental, military, and civilian entities and structures or materials. A neutron weapon ily by a Chinese ‘‘walk-in agent’’ to U.S. that the People’s Liberation Army is to be was alleged for some time to result in a Central Intelligence Agency representa- the primary beneficiary of economic pro- rather sharply defined kill radius. That tives. That document contains informa- ductivity. In fact, none of the cited refer- advantage turned out to be largely illusory tion about the W-88 that is classified un- ences to the Chinese constitution support because the variability of terrain and in- der U.S. rules. It remains obscure what or even mention these assertions. The terposed structures would blur the sharp- motivated the Chinese agent to deliver People’s Liberation Army complains pub-

ness of that radius and also because there this document. It is also not known from licly of insufficient funding as do military PERSPECTIVE is a wide gap between a radiation dose that which U.S. organization the alleged leak establishments of other nations. Also, un- would disable personnel and that would occurred because information about the der the current efforts to reduce the num- produce only latent, that is delayed, lethal W-88 is spread from the original designing ber of public enterprises in China in favor effects. A residual utility for neutron Department of Energy (DOE) laborato- of privatization, the People’s Liberation weapons is against massed armor where ries to the branches of the Defense De- Army is losing a large fraction of its the protective steel cover could be pene- partment, including the Navy, responsible directly managed economic infrastruc- trated by neutrons. The U.S. deployed for the deployment and maintenance of ture. Thus the political role of the military neutron weapons at home for a limited the submarine fleet. forces of China is significantly misrepre- period. China tested such weapons in 1985 To summarize, the importance of the sented in the report. but never deployed them. Considering this information alleged to be stolen by the In summary, the Cox Commission re- history and the fact that military utility of Cox Commission remains at best marginal port is a highly dubious basis for judging such weapons is clearly marginal, the im- to the military strategic relationship be- the alleged hostile actions of China against portance of the alleged loss of design tween the U.S. and China. U.S. interests. However, the conclusion information on neutron weapons is minor. By far the largest part of the Cox Com- that there are deficiencies in the govern- The W-88 two-stage thermonuclear de- mission report is dedicated to discussing mental security systems, and in particular sign leads to a weapon that is small in the alleged losses of U.S. missile technol- those of the DOE, are confirmed by other dimension and weight relative to its ex- ogy to China. These losses are largely reports, notably those by the Rudman plosive power. It thus has made it possible associated with the agreed use of Chinese committee of the President’s Foreign In- for the U.S. to design the very slender rockets as propulsion vehicles for Ameri- telligence Advisory Board. Accordingly, re-entry vehicles that are incorporated can communication satellites. In 1988 the the unreliability of the Cox Commission into the multiple warhead independently Reagan administration decided to launch report notwithstanding, the DOE has targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) car- U.S. satellites on Chinese rockets because launched major, highly publicized initia- ried by elements of the U.S. submarine Chinese launch services were available tives to strengthen this security apparatus, fleet. China has tested somewhat similar and were less expensive than the use of and Congress is supporting a major reor- thermonuclear designs, which are, how- U.S. vehicles. Eighteen satellites were ganization effort to give greater autonomy

Panofsky PNAS ͉ May 9, 2000 ͉ vol. 97 ͉ no. 10 ͉ 5035 Downloaded by guest on September 24, 2021 to the defense-related operations of the the DOE has deferred implementing that American laboratories and industry de- DOE within the department. This reorga- law pending a more precise description. pend heavily on the participation of for- nization formally took effect in the begin- A common factor of both the deemed eigners because an insufficient number of ning of March of this year, but its details export provisions and the introduction of Americans are trained in the scientific and remain controversial and the nomination sensitive unclassified technical informa- technical disciplines for which American of the new head for the separate military tion has resulted in uncertainty as to the industry and scientific institutes have an unit of DOE has not as yet been sent to the boundary between what is allowed or for- increasing appetite. Congress by the President. bidden conduct, specifically in respect to In addition, national weapons labora- At the end of last year the DOE estab- speech by scientific staff of DOE or its tories are carrying out cooperative activ- lished a security czar directly reporting to contractors in the presence of noncitizens. ities with foreign entities designed to its secretary. This direct access interferes Additionally, the DOE is wrestling with lead to much needed increased protec- with the appropriate balance within the the vexing problem of the security of its tion and control over fissionable mate- department between consideration of for- computers. The DOE has computation rials abroad, particularly in Russia. Such mal security, meaning security by restric- systems dedicated to classified informa- laboratory-to-laboratory collaboration tion, and the function of those divisions tion, but it also owns, and its contractors in materials protection, control, and ac- within the department responsible for ei- operate, large numbers of computers han- counting have been seriously slowed ther defense, science, or energy programs. dling unclassified information for a large down by the burdensome requirements This has led to many actions in the name variety of purposes. Wen Ho Lee, the embodied in the name of national secu- of security, some of which not only are of scientific staff member of Los Alamos rity. The result is less security, not more. dubious value to security but also have whose case has received wide publicity, Moreover an aura of suspicion created by interfered with the productivity of na- has been accused of downloading classi- the highly public emphasis on security, tional weapons laboratories in carrying fied information from the classified to the including the bad handling of the Wen out their activities in support of national unclassified system and having lost some Ho Lee case, has made recruiting and security. Moreover the reach of these se- of the tapes concerned. In response ini- retention of qualified personnel by na- curity regulations have gone well beyond tially the DOE issued regulations that tional weapons laboratories substantially the weapons laboratories into the unclas- forbade foreign access to all computers more difficult, with resulting negative sified national laboratories of the DOE, owned by the department. This action impact on those laboratories’ security- and even university contractors of the resulted in widespread protests because related programs, in particular the sci- department. the highly productive, and in fact neces- ence-based stewardship program de- Among these so-called remedial actions sary, international collaboration between signed to maintain the reliability and are the following: DOE laboratories and foreign participants safety of nuclear weapons. • Foreign visitors, in particular those widely includes the use of computers. Al- It is difficult to evaluate how this situ- from so-called sensitive countries, are though some of these questions remain ation will evolve. On one hand the ‘‘re- subject to indices checks, which greatly unresolved, currently computer use by medial’’ security programs may in time delay their participation in collaborative such collaborations can continue under restrict their scope to protecting truly activities. ‘‘exceptions,’’ which may be granted by important and critical elements of infor- • The DOE has ordered security stand- various authorities. mation, such as detailed design of nuclear downs, which interrupted work at all All of these actions in the name of weapons, military operations, and the like. laboratories, including that at the weap- remedies for the alleged deficiencies in Alternatively, the hysteria induced by the ons laboratories and the basic science security are totally peripheral to the prin- ‘‘spy’’ reports, such as that of the Cox establishments. cipal issue, which is that of protecting Commission, may lead to a widening • The DOE has issued instructions to its highly classified information. It actually scope of restrictive practices, severely laboratories to treat certain broad catego- goes in the opposite direction in seriously damaging both national security and sci- ries of scientific communications as diluting the efforts of those charged in entific productivity. Let us hope for the ‘‘deemed exports’’ requiring an export carrying out this primary task. Such ill- best! license. considered remedial actions in the name • Congress has incorporated a provision of security not only delay and interfere I have benefited from the analyses of Alastair Iain Johnston, Lewis R. Franklin, and Marco into the Year 2000 Defense Authorization with the conduct of laboratory scientific DiCapua jointly published in The Cox Commit- Act establishing fines for disclosure of work involving foreign entities, but they tee Report: An Assessment (Michael May, edi- ‘‘sensitive information’’ without defining also directly impact valuable activities de- tor) Stanford Center for International Security that term. In turn, the general counsel of signed to strengthen national security. and Cooperation, December 1999.

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