Perspective National security and scientific communication Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky* Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94309 Contributed by Wolfgang K. H. Panofsky, February 29, 2000 s science facing a new environment trig- Even after the end of the Cold War there report includes in that term indigenous Igered by the alleged successful espio- is evident need for protecting truly sensi- efforts of China in designing their own nage by foreign parties, in particular tive information, in particular in the in- nuclear weapons, information gathered China, aimed at the nation’s nuclear weap- terest of retarding, or hopefully prevent- from basic science or open scientific ons secrets? Several much publicized re- ing, the proliferation of nuclear weapons. sources, and information obtained by es- ports, in particular that of the Cox Com- But many reviews of U.S. security prac- pionage. In contrast to the conclusion of mission of the Congress†, the Rudman tices, in particular those carried out by the Cox Commission, the intelligence report by the President’s Foreign Intelli- committees of the National Academy of community concludes that it cannot de- gence Advisory Board, and the review of Sciences, have emphasized that security by termine the extent of weapons informa- the findings of the intelligence commu- restriction should apply only to those sub- tion gathered from each of these sources. nity, have alleged security deficiencies jects whose release would demonstrably Although the Cox Commission does not within the U.S. defense establishment and do major damage to national security. address the range of information obtained in particular U.S. nuclear weapons labo- In other words, such restrictions should by China between that publicly available ratories. None of these reports have build high fences around few truly sen- and that still classified, it also does not claimed that the presence of foreigners at sitive areas and not extend restrictive assess the extent to which weapons that U.S. academic research institutes or uni- practices to wider areas of scientific could be developed as a result of the versities has in any way been involved in communication. ‘‘stolen’’ information could impact U.S. the alleged security breeches. Yet, reme- There are strong reasons for these con- national security. dial measures instituted by the U.S. gov- clusions, both born from the idealistic The Cox Commission agrees that no ernment are far ranging and affect not conviction that scientific results belong to complete nuclear weapons drawings or only weapons-related activities but the the whole world and from the pragmatic design details have been acquired by U.S. scientific establishment in general. conclusion that broad restrictions on sci- China. National security has many aspects, in- entific exchanges are not enforceable in Can the information alleged to be sto- cluding economic strength, the morale practice, certainly not over a protracted len by the Cox Commission lead to new and well-being of the people, as well as period. Thus we strongly criticize much of Chinese weapons designs that can be military prowess. In respect to the latter, the thoughtless extension of security re- fielded without nuclear tests? In this latter some emphasize restrictions aimed at pre- strictions over ‘‘sensitive’’ information connection, we note that China is a sig- venting information developed in the past that has no demonstrable direct security natory of the Comprehensive Nuclear from reaching unfriendly nations or par- implications. Weapons Test Ban Treaty and has given ties. But then there are those, this author The Cox Commission implicitly consid- assurance that it will not conduct further included, who conclude that national se- ers China’s thefts of U.S. secret informa- nuclear weapons tests even in the absence curity in the past has been predominantly tion as a hostile act, yet essentially all of ratification of that treaty. advanced by achievements in a free envi- nations in the world collect information What are the facts? China tested its first ronment and that such achievements are from other countries whether they are nuclear weapon 36 years ago and since endangered if undue security measures by friends or adversaries. The U.S. arrested then has accumulated between 400 and restrictions are allowed to dominate. Both an Israeli spy many years ago and more 500 nuclear weapons in its inventory com- are needed, but to use the phrase coined recently arrested an Australian agent pared with an enduring stockpile of more by journalist Alan Barth, the ‘‘utility of without accusing Israel or Australia of than 10,000 such weapons in the posses- freedom’’ is essential in advancing na- hostile acts. Collecting information from sion of the U.S. and about 15,000 nuclear tional security. other countries, which those nations do weapons held by Russia. During the ‘‘hot’’ and ‘‘cold’’ wars the not wish to have disclosed, is part of the The composition of U.S. stockpiles are spectacular achievements of United international mores of today. Generally, different from those of Russia. The U.S. States science and technology were ac- collection of such information is carried complished in unusually unrestricted en- out clandestinely, and neither success of vironments. Mistakes and false starts were collection efforts nor penetration of se- *To whom reprint requests should be addressed at: 2575 Sand Hill Road, Menlo Park, CA 94025. E-mail: made but, just because the open nature of crecy barriers erected by nations are pub- [email protected]. such errors drew criticism, corrections licly acknowledged. †Final Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National were readily taken. U.S. openness com- Let me examine the accusations of Security and Military͞Commercial Concerns with the Peo- pared favorably with that of the United widespread Chinese ‘‘thefts’’ of vital nu ple’s Republic of China. Released in classified form in Jan- States’ opponent nations, in particular the clear weapons secrets that are contained uary 1999 and in unclassified form in May 1999. All refer- practices of the former Soviet Union. This in the Cox Commission report. That re- ences in this paper are to the unclassified (‘‘redacted’’) version of the report. openness did not permit other countries to port states that ‘‘The People’s Republic of Article published online before print: Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. catch up; on the contrary, the technology China has stolen design information of the USA, 10.1073͞pnas.100114597. Article and publica- gap between the U.S. and the Soviet U.S. most advanced thermonuclear weap- tion date are at www.pnas.org͞cgi͞doi͞10.1073͞ Union widened throughout the Cold War. ons.’’ Yet, in using the word ‘‘stolen’’ the pnas.100114597 5034–5036 ͉ PNAS ͉ May 9, 2000 ͉ vol. 97 ͉ no. 10 Downloaded by guest on September 24, 2021 has about 6,000 strategic weapons com- ever, believed to be larger and more mas- launched by the Chinese; three of those pared with Russia’s 3,000 whereas Russia sive than their U.S. counterpart. China has launches failed. These failures resulted in has a very much larger number of tactical, not deployed any multiple warhead mis- financial losses to U.S. contractors and short-range nuclear weapons compared siles. The alleged theft of the W-88 design their insurance companies, and thus the with those still retained by the U.S. But, of thus raises the question whether this American firms concerned (Loral and Chinese nuclear weapons, perhaps only would enable China to adapt this design to Hughes) agreed to cooperate with the 100 are strategic and only some 20 nuclear deploy MIRVs in the future. Obviously People’s Republic of China in analyzing weapons could reach the U.S. from China this question cannot be conclusively an- these failures. The Cox Commission al- or from its one operational strategic sub- swered nor can one conclude that China leges that in connection with these joint marine. Moreover, China’s nuclear weap- could not develop such multiple warhead failure analyses the American firms failed ons are almost all based at fixed land- missiles without access to U.S. informa- to secure the required export licenses. based locations that could be rendered tion. Without nuclear tests this question is This charge is currently under litigation. unusable by preemptive attack of the likely to remain moot. Whatever the outcome of this legal pro- much larger forces of Russia and the U.S. If China developed multiple warhead cess, it is clear that American participation The unclassified version of the Cox missiles in the future, this would primarily in the failure analyses did not reveal en- Commission report is specific only in re- enable China to deploy land-based multi- cryption information and would not result spect to two categories of weapons about ple warhead missiles, which also could be in improvements in accuracy or range of which the People’s Republic of China made mobile, thus making them more Chinese rockets. The cooperation may allegedly has acquired ‘‘stolen’’ informa- survivable against pre-emptive attack. have resulted in improvements in reliabil- tion. The first category concerns the so- This would be in line with China’s de- ity of the Chinese systems and, of course, called neutron bomb belonging to the clared ‘‘no first use’’ policy, which restricts the contractual arrangements providing family of enhanced radiation weapons. the use of China’s nuclear forces to a mode for the U.S. satellites to be carried by The second pinpoints the W-88 technol- responding only to nuclear attack by oth- Chinese rockets provided money for the ogy where W-88 is the designation of a ers. Under that doctrine increasing the relevant Chinese entities. In discussing warhead whose development started close survivability of China’s forces, which at this complex situation, there are many to 30 years ago and is now carried by a present is marginal, would be improved.