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Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure

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Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure Massachusetts Trial Court Law Libraries including amendments effective September 1, 2021. Rules of Court Disclaimer The Trial Court Law Libraries make every effort to provide a current, accurate copy of the rules of court on this site. However, this is not an official source for the rules, and the libraries cannot be held responsible for any errors or omissions contained on these pages. If you are concerned about the timeliness or accuracy of a rule, please consult one of the print sources for Massachusetts Rules of Court, or contact your nearest Trial Court Law Library for assistance. https://www.mass.gov/lawlib Print sources for rules: • Annotated Laws of Massachusetts: Court Rules, LexisNexis, annual. • Massachusetts General Laws Annotated, v.43A-43C, West Group, updated annually with pocket parts. • Massachusetts Rules of Court, West Group, annual. • The Rules, Lawyers Weekly Publications, loose-leaf. Table of Contents Rules of Court Disclaimer Rule 1: Scope of Rules Rule 2: One Form of Action Rule 3: Commencement of Action Rule 4: Process Rule 4.1: Attachment Rule 4.2: Trustee Process Rule 4.3: Arrest: Supplementary Process: Ne Exeat Rule 5: Service and Filing of Pleadings and Other Papers Rule 6: Time Rule 7: Pleadings Allowed: Form of Motions Rule 8: General Rules of Pleading Rule 8.1: Special Requirements for Certain Consumer Debts Rule 9: Pleading Special Matters Rule 10: Form of Pleadings Rule 11: Appearances and Pleadings Rule 12: Defenses and Objections - When and How Presented - By Pleading or Motion - Motion for Judgment on Pleadings Rule 13: Counterclaim and Cross-Claim Rule 14: Third-Party Practice Rule 15: Amended and Supplemental Pleadings Rule 16: Pre-Trial Procedure: Formulating Issues Rule 17: Parties Plaintiff and Defendant: Capacity Rule 18: Joinder of Claims and Remedies Rule 19: Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication Rule 20: Permissive Joinder of Parties Rule 21: Misjoinder and Non-Joinder of Parties Rule 22: Interpleader Rule 23: Class Actions Rule 23.1: Derivative Actions by Shareholders Rule 23.2: Actions Relating to Unincorporated Associations Rule 24: Intervention Rule 25: Substitution of Parties Rule 26: General Provisions Governing Discovery Rule 27: Depositions Before Action or Pending Appeal Rule 28: Persons Before Whom Depositions May Be Taken Rule 29: Stipulations Regarding Discovery Procedure Rule 30: Depositions Upon Oral Examination Rule 30A: Audiovisual Depositions & Audiovisual Evidence Rule 31: Depositions of Witnesses Upon Written Questions Rule 32: Use of Depositions in Court Proceedings Rule 33: Interrogatories to Parties Rule 34: Producing Documents, Electronically Stored Information, and Tangible Things, or Entering Onto Land, for Inspection and Other Purposes Rule 35: Physical and Mental Examination of Persons Rule 36: Requests for Admission Rule 37: Failure to Make Discovery: Sanctions Rule 38: Jury Trial of Right Rule 39: Trial by Jury or by the Court Rule 40: Assignment of Cases for Trial: Continuances Rule 41: Dismissal of Actions Rule 42: Consolidation: Separate Trials Rule 43: Evidence Rule 44: Proof of Official Records Rule 44.1: Determination of Foreign Law Rule 45: Subpoena Rule 46: Exceptions Unnecessary Rule 47: Jurors Rule 48: Number of Jurors -- Majority Verdict Rule 49: Special Verdicts and Interrogatories Rule 50: Motion for a Directed Verdict and for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict Rule 51: Argument: Instructions to Jury Rule 52: Findings by the Court Rule 53: Masters Rule 54: Judgments: Costs Rule 55: Default Rule 55.1: Special Requirements for Defaults and Default Judgments for Certain Consumer Debts Rule 56: Summary Judgment Rule 57: Declaratory Judgment Rule 58: Entry of Judgment Rule 59: New Trials: Amendment of Judgments Rule 60: Relief from Judgment or Order Rule 61: Harmless Error Rule 62: Stay of Proceedings to Enforce a Judgment Rule 63: Disability of a Judge Rule 64: Report of Case Rule 65: Injunctions Rule 65.1: Security: Proceedings Against Sureties Rule 65.2: Redelivery of Goods or Chattels Rule 65.3: Proceedings for Civil Contempt Rule 66: Receivers Rule 67: Deposit in Court Rule 68: Offer of Judgment Rule 69: Execution Rule 70: Judgment for Specific Acts: Vesting Title Rule 71: Process in Behalf of and Against Persons Not Parties Rule 77: Courts and Clerks Rule 78: Motion Day Rule 79: Books and Records Kept by the Clerk and Entries Therein Rule 80: Stenographic Report or Transcript Rule 81: Applicability of Rules Rule 82: Jurisdiction and Venue Unaffected Rule 83: Supplemental Rules Rule 84: Forms Rule 85: Title Rule 1: Scope of Rules These rules govern the procedure before a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court or of the Appeals Court, and in the following departments of the Trial Court: the Superior Court, the Housing Court the Probate and Family Court in proceedings seeking equitable relief, the Juvenile Court in proceedings seeking equitable relief, in the Land Court, in the District Court and in the Boston Municipal Court, in all suits of a civil nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81. They should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding. As used in these rules the following terms shall be deemed to have the following meanings: "Superior Court" shall mean the Superior Court Department of the Trial Court, or a session thereof for holding court. "Housing Court" shall mean a division of the Housing Court Department of the Trial Court, or a session thereof for holding court. "Probate Court" shall mean a division of the Probate and Family Court Department of the Trial Court, or a session thereof for holding court. "Land Court" shall mean the Land Court Department of the Trial Court, or a session thereof for holding court. "District Court" or "Municipal Court" shall mean a division of the District Court Department of the Trial Court, or a session thereof for holding court; except when the context means something to the contrary, said words shall include the Boston Municipal Court Department. "Municipal Court of the City of Boston" or "Boston Municipal Court" shall mean a division of the Boston Municipal Court Department of the Trial Court, or a session thereof for holding court. "Juvenile Court" shall mean the Juvenile Court Department of the Trial Court, or a session thereof for holding court. Amended June 27, 1974, effective July 1, 1974; November 9, 1979, effective January 1, 1980; December 13, 1981, effective January 1, 1982; amended effective June 8, 1989; July 1, 1996; amended April 5, 2007, effective June 1, 2007; amended November 28, 2007, effective March 1, 2008; amended June 29, 2016, effective August 1, 2016. Reporter's Notes Reporter’s Notes (2016) The amendment to Rule 1, adopted from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, changed the second sentence of the first paragraph so that it reads: "They [the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure] should be construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." The purpose of the change was to acknowledge that both the court and the parties have the obligation to employ the rules for the purposes set forth. Reporter’s Notes (2008): The definition of "Municipal Court of the City of Boston" has been amended in light of legislation in 2003 transferring various Divisions of the District Court Department located in Suffolk County to the Boston Municipal Court. See G.L. c. 218, s. 1 and G.L. c. 218, s. 50. Whenever the term "District Court" is used in the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, the reference is to be construed as including the Boston Municipal Court, unless "the context means something to the contrary." Mass. R. Civ. P. 1, sixth definition. Reporter’s Notes (2007): The 2007 amendments to Rule 1 make the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure applicable to proceedings in the Juvenile Court where equitable relief is sought. For example, a civil action brought in the Juvenile Court seeking specific performance of a post-adoption contract (G. L. c. 210, s. 6D) will be governed by the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. Reporter’s Notes (1996): With the merger of the District/Municipal Courts Rules of Civil Procedure into the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure in 1996, minor changes have been made to Rule 1 with the addition of references to the District Court and to the Boston Municipal Court. Reporter’s Notes (1973): This rule is substantially the same as Federal Rule 1, substituting Massachusetts references for those of the United States. The rules apply to cases at law or in equity. (See Rule 2 for merger of law and equity.) The reference in Rule 1 to cases at law or in equity in no way attempts to enlarge the jurisdiction of any court. In cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the litigation is controlled by the rules applicable in the court where the action rests. Thus an action for divorce which is triable in either the Probate Court or the Superior Court, is, when commenced in the Superior Court, controlled by these rules, even though if, had it been commenced in the Probate Court, it would be controlled by the extant Probate Court rules. Cases involving switches between the Superior Court and a district court or the Boston Municipal Court are governed by Rule 81(f) and 81(g). See also Rule 13(j). Rule 2: One Form of Action There shall be one form of action to be known as "civil action". Effective July 1, 1974. Reporter’s Notes (1973): “Merger” of Law and Equity, refers only to the procedure involved, i.e., the manner of framing and trying the issues, and the type of relief.
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