1. Slade's Case (1602) Slade's Case (Or Slade V. Morley) Was a Case In
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Introduction
Introduction What is Competition Policy? Competition Policy is government policy affecting the level and nature of competition in a market. This policy is contained in the Competition and Consumer Act (2010) and the ACCC. The Harper Review Issues Paper said: ‘Competition is the process by which rival businesses strive to maximise their profits by developing and offering desirable goods and services to consumers on the most favourable terms’. In addition, they said: ‘Competition policy is a set of policies and laws that protects, enhances and extends competition’. The Joy of Competition Studying competition law is useful as it is inter-disciplinary. It exposes you not only to competition law, but also economics. Furthermore, competition law is an international issue. There has been lots of interesting developments overseas, for example Apple, Amazon, Intel, Google, online travel booking, global beer mega-mergers (BUD and SAB US$105 billion). There is also lots of international cooperation (& conflict), and plenty of opportunity for study/practise abroad. Furthermore, competition law is exciting and topical. It has been in the media of late as there was the Competition Policy Review reported in 2015, which was the first major competition policy review in 20 years. Why is Competition Law Important? Competition law is important to the following parties: • For consumers – Competition provides them with more choice, lower prices, and better quality. • For business – Competition protects against anti-competitive practices, and rewards innovation. • For society – Competition law is important for promoting efficiency – resources allocated to where they are most desired. The Harper Review Issues paper found that competitive markets can lead to: • ‘Lower resource costs and overall prices • Better services and more choice for consumers and businesses • Stronger discipline on businesses to keep costs down • Faster innovation and deployment of new technology; and • Better information, allowing more informed choices by consumers’. -
"This Court Doth Keep All England in Quiet": Star Chamber and Public Expression in Prerevolutionary England, 1625–1641 Nathaniel A
Clemson University TigerPrints All Theses Theses 8-2018 "This Court Doth Keep All England in Quiet": Star Chamber and Public Expression in Prerevolutionary England, 1625–1641 Nathaniel A. Earle Clemson University, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses Recommended Citation Earle, Nathaniel A., ""This Court Doth Keep All England in Quiet": Star Chamber and Public Expression in Prerevolutionary England, 1625–1641" (2018). All Theses. 2950. https://tigerprints.clemson.edu/all_theses/2950 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses at TigerPrints. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Theses by an authorized administrator of TigerPrints. For more information, please contact [email protected]. "THIS COURT DOTH KEEP ALL ENGLAND IN QUIET" STAR CHAMBER AND PUBLIC EXPRESSION IN PREREVOLUTIONARY ENGLAND 1625–1641 A Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of Clemson University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts History by Nathaniel A. Earle August 2018 Accepted by: Dr. Caroline Dunn, Committee Chair Dr. Alan Grubb Dr. Lee Morrissey ABSTRACT The abrupt legislative destruction of the Court of Star Chamber in the summer of 1641 is generally understood as a reaction against the perceived abuses of prerogative government during the decade of Charles I’s personal rule. The conception of the court as an ‘extra-legal’ tribunal (or as a legitimate court that had exceeded its jurisdictional mandate) emerges from the constitutional debate about the limits of executive authority that played out over in Parliament, in the press, in the pulpit, in the courts, and on the battlefields of seventeenth-century England. -
Speakers of the House of Commons
Parliamentary Information List BRIEFING PAPER 04637a 21 August 2015 Speakers of the House of Commons Speaker Date Constituency Notes Peter de Montfort 1258 − William Trussell 1327 − Appeared as joint spokesman of Lords and Commons. Styled 'Procurator' Henry Beaumont 1332 (Mar) − Appeared as joint spokesman of Lords and Commons. Sir Geoffrey Le Scrope 1332 (Sep) − Appeared as joint spokesman of Lords and Commons. Probably Chief Justice. William Trussell 1340 − William Trussell 1343 − Appeared for the Commons alone. William de Thorpe 1347-1348 − Probably Chief Justice. Baron of the Exchequer, 1352. William de Shareshull 1351-1352 − Probably Chief Justice. Sir Henry Green 1361-1363¹ − Doubtful if he acted as Speaker. All of the above were Presiding Officers rather than Speakers Sir Peter de la Mare 1376 − Sir Thomas Hungerford 1377 (Jan-Mar) Wiltshire The first to be designated Speaker. Sir Peter de la Mare 1377 (Oct-Nov) Herefordshire Sir James Pickering 1378 (Oct-Nov) Westmorland Sir John Guildesborough 1380 Essex Sir Richard Waldegrave 1381-1382 Suffolk Sir James Pickering 1383-1390 Yorkshire During these years the records are defective and this Speaker's service might not have been unbroken. Sir John Bussy 1394-1398 Lincolnshire Beheaded 1399 Sir John Cheyne 1399 (Oct) Gloucestershire Resigned after only two days in office. John Dorewood 1399 (Oct-Nov) Essex Possibly the first lawyer to become Speaker. Sir Arnold Savage 1401(Jan-Mar) Kent Sir Henry Redford 1402 (Oct-Nov) Lincolnshire Sir Arnold Savage 1404 (Jan-Apr) Kent Sir William Sturmy 1404 (Oct-Nov) Devonshire Or Esturmy Sir John Tiptoft 1406 Huntingdonshire Created Baron Tiptoft, 1426. -
Charter Constitutionalism: the Myth of Edward Coke and the Virginia Charter*
Boston College Law School Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School Boston College Law School Faculty Papers 7-2016 Charter Constitutionalism: The yM th of Edward Coke and the Virginia Charter Mary Sarah Bilder Boston College Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Legal History Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons Recommended Citation Mary Sarah Bilder. "Charter Constitutionalism: The yM th of Edward Coke and the Virginia Charter." North Carolina Law Review 94, no.5 (2016): 1545-1598. This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 94 N.C. L. REV. 1545 (2016) CHARTER CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MYTH OF EDWARD COKE AND THE VIRGINIA CHARTER* MARY SARAH BILDER** [A]ll and every the persons being our subjects . and every of their children, which shall happen to be born within . the said several colonies . shall have and enjoy all liberties, franchises and immunities . as if they had been abiding and born, within this our realm of England . .—Virginia Charter (1606)1 Magna Carta’s connection to the American constitutional tradition has been traced to Edward Coke’s insertion of English liberties in the 1606 Virginia Charter. This account curiously turns out to be unsupported by direct evidence. This Article recounts an alternative history of the origins of English liberties in American constitutionalism. -
Of Information in the Insider Trading Offence
WESTERN AUSTRALIAN STUDENT LAW REVIEW Volume 1(1), July 2017 Founding Editor-in-Chief Claudia Carr Editors Jessica Border Kenneth Chen Junior Editor Xavier Hazard Media, Marketing and Design Sophia Nugawela Editorial Advisory Board Professor Camilla Baasch Andersen, University of Western Australia Professor Dale Pinto, Curtin University Dr Eileen Webb, Curtin University Dr Michelle Evans, Curtin University Professor Natalie Skead, University of Western Australia Dr Philip Evans, University of Notre Dame Dr Robert Cunningham, Curtin University Professor Robyn Carroll, University of Western Australia Ken Yin, Edith Cowan University EDITORIAL Western Australian law students are unique. We reside in a relatively small capital city in a state isolated from our eastern peers. The size and isolation of our population makes for a tight-knit community – one that I hope this journal will foster and encourage. My hope is that the Western Australian Student Law Review will facilitate interaction and collaboration between Western Australia’s law students and universities by encouraging all students to engage in topical legal discussion with one another. I believe this is particularly important now that Western Australia is home to five law schools. The Western Australian Student Law Review seeks to transcend university and is not tied to any one law school. The project has come together as a result of contributions from all five of Western Australia’s law schools. Most importantly, the Western Australian Student Law Review is a medium for Western Australian law students to contribute to legal scholarship. Over the next few years, the legal industry can expect disruption from bright young legal minds – minds that rely on technology more than ever before and favour creative thinking. -
Since 1961, the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (WUTC) Has Regulated Solid Waste Collection
IN CLERKS OFFICE SUPREME COURT STATE OF WASHINGTON FEB 2 1 2008 DATE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON JOSEF VENTENBERGS, KENDALL TRUCKING, INC., a Washington Corporation, RONALD HAIDER, and HAIDER CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Washington Corporation, Petitioners, NO. 76954-1 v. THE CITY OF SEATTLE, a Municipal Corporation, SEATTLE PUBLIC EN BANC UTILITIES, and CHUCK CLARKE, in his official capacity as Director of Seattle Public Utilities, WASTE MANAGEMENT OF WASHINGTON, FILED FEB 2' 12008 INC., d/b/a Waste Management of Seattle, a Delaware Corporation, and RABANCO, LTD., a Washington Corporation, Respondents. BRIDGE, J.P.T. *—Since 1961, the Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission (WUTC) has regulated solid waste collection. However, pursuant to * Justice Bobbe J. Bridge is serving as a justice pro tempore of the Supreme Court pursuant to Washington Constitution article IV, section 2(a). Ventenbergs, et al. v. City of Seattle, et al., 76954-1 statute, the WUTC's jurisdiction over a solid waste collection company ends when that company contracts directly with a city. In the early 1990s the City of Seattle (City) decided to contract with solid waste handlers directly, thus ending WUTC's jurisdiction over the companies with which the City contracted. When the City decided to enter into direct contracts, only Rabanco and Waste Management were legally operating (i.e., they were in compliance with existing WUTC regulations) within the City. However, smaller companies, including Kendall Trucking (owned by petitioner Josef Ventenbergs and utilized by petitioner Ronald Haider), were providing collection services for construction, demolition, and land clearing waste (CDL), a specific type of solid waste. -
A MEDIEVAL BOOK and EARLY-MODERN LAW: BRACTON's AUTHORITY and APPLICATION in the COMMON LAW C.1550-1640 Ian Williams*,
Williams, A Medieval Book A MEDIEVAL BOOK AND EARLY-MODERN LAW: BRACTON'S AUTHORITY AND APPLICATION IN THE COMMON LAW c.1550-1640 Ian Williams*, The thirteenth-century book known as Bracton was first printed in 1569, fifteen years after Glanvill and three decades after Britton1. Despite its relatively late arrival into the list of printed common law books, of all the older common-law books it is Bracton which has tended to occupy the interest of historians. In no small part, this is due to Edward Coke’s later use of Bracton in disputes with James I2. However, much less interest is shown in Bracton’s use in early-modern England more generally, certainly compared to Bracton’s use as a source for thirteenth century law3. This article seeks to correct that imbalance by showing that Bracton was an important source for some early-modern common lawyers, particularly in certain fields. There were a number of impediments to the use of Bracton in the early-modern common law which may have inhibited its reception. The most recent work has suggested that Bracton’s popularity in early-modern England stemmed from Coke’s popularisation of the book by his references to it in his Reports4. In fact, some of the impediments to Bracton’s use were overcome, or overlooked, in the sixteenth and early-seventeenth centuries. Bracton came to have an assured place in the common-law canon even before Coke’s use of the text, although it never became a standard reference work. * Lecturer, University College London; Faculty of Laws, Bentham House, Endsleigh Gardens, London WC1H 0EG, UK; [email protected]. -
Modernizing Interpleader
MODERNIZING INTERPLEADER ZECHAZAH CHAFM, JR. Professor of Law, Harvard Law School Interpleader possesses on first acquaintance an attractiveness which is not exceeded by any other remedy known to the law. "The mere "statement of the principle," declared Sir James Willes,' "shows its "jujstice." As a quick and simple way out of a complex situation, it has an intellectual fascination like the vx method for solving simul- taneous quadratic equations. Upon further study of 'the cases, how- ever, the lawyer's mental reaction changes to intense exasperation. Nowhere else, perhaps, can he encounter technicalities equal to those which hem in this admirable remedy. It is the purpose of this article to examine the most important of the restrictions on the general prin- ciple of interpleader, and consider how far they can properly be removed and how much some legislative efforts to accomplish this result have already succeeded. Here, as so often in the discussion of legal reforms, we have to discriminate between the accidental and the permanent, between limitations on judicial powers which are purely historical or arbitrary and those which are inherently desirable and cannot be discarded without causing grave injustice.2 The general principle of interpleader is simple and clear. Where two persons are engaged in a dispute, and that which is to be the fruit of the dispute is in the hands of a third party who occupies the posi- tion of a stakeholder and is willing to give up the stakes according to the result of the dispute, then if that stakeholder is sued or threatened with suit, he is not obliged to be'at the expense and risk bf defending two actions; but, on giving up the thing in dispute, he is to be relieved, and the court directs that the persons between whom the dispute really exists shall fight it out at their own expense.3 The principle may be illustrated by some situations where it is well settled that interpleader will be granted. -
MONOPOLY in LAW and ECONOMICS by EDWARD S
MONOPOLY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS By EDWARD S. MASON t I. THE TERM monopoly as used in the law is not a tool of analysis but a standard of evaluation. Not all trusts are held monopolistic but only "bad" trusts; not all restraints of trade are to be condemned but only "unreasonable" restraints. The law of monopoly has therefore been directed toward a development of public policy with respect to certain business practices. This policy has required, first, a distinction between the situations and practices which are to be approved as in the public interest and those which are to be disapproved, second, a classification of these situations as either competitive and consequently in the public interest or monopolistic and, if unregulated, contrary to the public in- terest, and, third, the devising and application of tests capable of demar- cating the approved from the disapproved practices. But the devising of tests to distinguish monopoly from competition cannot be completely separated from the formulation of the concepts. It may be shown, on the contrary, that the difficulties of formulating tests of monopoly have defi- nitely shaped the legal conception of monopoly. Economics, on the other hand, has not quite decided whether its task is one of description and analysis or of evaluation and prescription, or both. With respect to the monopoly problem it is not altogether clear whether the work of economists should be oriented toward the formu- lation of public policy or toward the analysis of market situations. The trend, however, is definitely towards the latter. The further economics goes in this direction, the greater becomes the difference between legal and economic conceptions of the monopoly problem. -
Classes of Misdemeanors: Anatomy of a Criminal Case
The Misdemeanor Process "It shall be the primary duty of all prosecuting attorneys...not to convict, but to see that justice is done." Art. 2.01 Texas Code of Criminal Procedure The County Attorney handles over XXXXXXX new misdemeanor cases each year. These crimes contribute to the steady erosion of our community's civility, order, and safety. These crimes, if undeterred, can and will erode the quality of life for all of the citizens of Ector County. As Ector County grows, its citizens must remain vigilant to lower the number of these quality of life crimes. The County Attorney thanks all those citizens who contribute to public safety through jury service, volunteer organizations, and reports of crime to law enforcement. Classes of Misdemeanors: This Office is responsible for the prosecution of all misdemeanor cases that are filed in Ector County. “Misdemeanor” is defined in the law as any crime where the maximum possible jail time is one year or less. There are three categories of misdemeanors: Class A; Class B; and Class C. Class A misdemeanors are punishable by a fine of up to $4,000 and/or confinement in jail of up to one year. Some examples of Class A misdemeanor offenses include assault causing bodily injury, driving while intoxicated second offense, theft of property valued at $500 to $1500, and resisting arrest. Class B misdemeanors are punishable by a fine of up to $2,000 and/or confinement in jail of up to six months. Some examples of Class B misdemeanor offenses include driving while intoxicated first offense, possession of marijuana less than two ounces, and telephone harassment. -
Business Law, Fifth Edition
BUSINESS LAW Fifth Edition This book is supported by a Companion Website, created to keep Business Law up to date and to provide enhanced resources for both students and lecturers. Key features include: ◆ termly updates ◆ links to useful websites ◆ links to ‘ebooks’ for introductory and further reading ◆ ‘ask the author’ – your questions answered www.cavendishpublishing.com/businesslaw BUSINESS LAW Fifth Edition David Kelly, PhD Principal Lecturer in Law Staffordshire University Ann Holmes, M Phil, PGD Dean of the Law School Staffordshire University Ruth Hayward, LLB, LLM Senior Lecturer in Law Staffordshire University Fifth edition first published in Great Britain 2005 by Cavendish Publishing Limited, The Glass House, Wharton Street, London WC1X 9PX, United Kingdom Telephone: + 44 (0)20 7278 8000 Facsimile: + 44 (0)20 7278 8080 Email: [email protected] Website: www.cavendishpublishing.com Published in the United States by Cavendish Publishing c/o International Specialized Book Services, 5804 NE Hassalo Street, Portland, Oregon 97213-3644, USA Published in Australia by Cavendish Publishing (Australia) Pty Ltd 3/303 Barrenjoey Road, Newport, NSW 2106, Australia Email: [email protected] Website: www.cavendishpublishing.com.au © Kelly, D, Holmes, A and Hayward, R 2005 First edition 1995 Second edition 1997 Third edition 2000 Fourth edition 2002 Fifth edition 2005 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise, without the prior permission in writing of Cavendish Publishing Limited, or as expressly permitted by law, or under the terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organisation. -
Courtroom Terminology.Pdf
Courtroom Terminology A Accused: formally charged but not yet tried for committing a crime; the person who has been charged may also be called the defendant. Acquittal: a judgment of court, based on the decision of either a jury or a judge, that a person accused is not guilty of the crime for which he has been tried. ADA: Assistant district attorney. An assistant district attorney works for the elected District Attorney. An ADA will review and prosecute cases as assigned. ADA's meet with law enforcement, witnesses, and victims. They generally have authority to dispose of those cases assigned to them. Adjournment: putting off or postponing business or a session of court until another time or place. Adjudication: the judicial decision that ends a criminal proceeding by a judgment of acquittal, conviction, or dismissal of the case. Affidavit: a written statement that the writer swears is true. Aggravating factors: factors that make a crime worse than most similar crimes. Aggravating factors are often defined by law and include such things as: victim very old, gang related, done for hire, especially cruel, defendant does not support his family, or took advantage of a position of trust. Aggravated range: When a person is sentenced, this indicates a sentence that is more severe than the “presumed” sentence for a given crime. A defendant may receive more time if the judge finds aggravating factors. If no aggravating factors are found, the sentence will come from either the “presumptive” or “mitigated” range. Alleged: said to be true, but not yet proven to be true; until the trial is over, the crime may be called the “alleged crime.” Appeal: a request by either the defense or the prosecution that a higher court review the results of a decision on certain motions or in a completed trial.