1. Slade’s Case (1602) Slade's Case (or Slade v. Morley) was a case in English that ran from 1596 to 1602. Under the medieval , claims seeking the repayment of a debt or other matters could only be pursued through a of debt in the of Common , a problematic and archaic process. By 1558 the had succeeded in creating another method, enforced by the Court of King's , through the action of assumpsit, which was technically for deceit. The used was that by failing to pay after promising to do so, a had committed deceit, and was liable to the . The conservative Common Pleas, through the appellate court the Court of Exchequer Chamber, began to overrule decisions made by the King's Bench on assumpsit, causing friction between the . In Slade's Case, a case under assumpsit, which was brought between of the Common Pleas and King's Bench, was transferred to the Court of Exchequer Chamber where the King's Bench judges were allowed to vote. The case dragged on for five years, with the finally being delivered in 1602 by the Chief of the King's Bench, . Popham ruled that assumpsit claims were valid, a decision called a "watershed" moment in , with archaic and outdated principles being overwritten by the modern and effective assumpsit, which soon became the main in contract cases. This is also seen as an example of judicial , with the courts making a revolutionary decision Parliament had failed to make.

2. [1603] 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (King’s Bench): (most widely known as The Case of Monopolies): establishing that it was improper for any individual to be allowed to have a monopoly over a trade of cards. Edward Darcy v Thomas Allin of London Haberdasher (1602) 74 ER 1131 (also spelled as "Allain" or "Allen" and "Allein" but most widely known as the Case of Monopolies), was an early landmark case in English law, establishing that the grant of exclusive rights to produce any article was improper (monopoly). The reasoning behind the outcome of the case, which was decided at a time before courts regularly issued written opinions, was reported by Sir When the case went before Edward Coke, the Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, he overturned the decision of the King, and held that cases may be tried only by those with legal training and subject to the . Coke stated that common law cases were "not to be decided by natural reason but by artificial reason and judgment of law, which law is an art which requires long study and experience":[1]:21 A controversy of land between parties was heard by the King, and given, which was repealed for this, that it did not belong to the common law: then the King said, that he thought the law was founded upon reason, and that he and others had reason, as well as the Judges: to which it was answered by me, that true it was, that God had endowed His Majesty with excellent science, and great endowments of nature; but His Majesty was not learned in the of his realm of , and causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his subjects, are not to be decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason and judgment of law, which law is an act which requires long study and experience, before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it: that the law was the golden met-wand and measure to try the causes of the subjects; and which protected His Majesty in safety and peace: with which the King was greatly offended, and said, that then he should be under the law, which was treason to affirm, as he said; to which I said, that Bracton saith, quod Rex non debed esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege [That the King ought not to be under any man but under God and the law.]. In another report, Coke is quoted as saying all causes were "to be measured by the golden and straight met-wand of the law, and not to the incertain and crooked cord of discretion"

3. The Case of Prohibitions (1607) (Court of Common Pleas) Case of Prohibitions [1607] EWHC J23 (KB) is a UK case decided by Sir Edward Coke. Before the Glorious Revolution of 1688, when the sovereignty of Parliament was confirmed, this case wrested supremacy from the King in favour of the courts.

4. Dr Bonham’s Case (1610) Thomas Bonham v College of Physicians, commonly known as Dr. Bonham's Case or simply Bonham's Case, was a case decided in 1610 by the Court of Common Pleas in England, under Sir Edward Coke, the court's Chief Justice, who explained why he thought that "in many cases, the common law will control Acts of Parliament". Coke's meaning has been disputed over the years. According to one interpretation, Coke intended the kind of that would later develop in the United States, but other scholars believe that Coke meant only to construe a , not to challenge parliamentary sovereignty. If Coke intended the former, he may have later changed his view. The statement by Coke is sometimes considered to be an obiter dictum (a statement made 'by the way'), rather than part of the ratio decidendi (rationale for the decision) of the case. Whatever Coke's meaning, after an initial period during which his decision enjoyed some support but no were declared void, Bonham's Case was thrown aside, in favour of the growing doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. In one of the most prominent early treatises supporting the doctrine, wrote that Parliament is the sovereign lawmaker, preventing the common law courts from throwing aside or reviewing statutes in the fashion that Coke had suggested. Parliamentary sovereignty is now the accepted judicial doctrine in the legal system of England and Wales. Bonham's Case was met with mixed reactions at the time, with King James I and his , Lord Ellesmere, both deeply unhappy with it. One of the reasons for Coke's dismissal from the Common Pleas in 1613 was suggested to be the case. Academics in the 19th and the 20th centuries have been scarcely more favourable and called it "a foolish doctrine alleged to have been laid down extra-judicially" and simply an "abortion". In the United States, Coke's decision met with a better reaction. During the legal and public campaigns against the of assistance and the 1765 Stamp Act, Bonham's Case was used as a justification for nullifying the legislation, but by 1772, Blackstone's views had gained acceptance. The 1803 case Marbury v. Madison, which in 1803 formed the basis for the exercise of judicial review in the United States, under Article III of the US , used the words "void" and "repugnant", but the usage of Marbury was somewhat different from that of Coke.

5. Entick v Carrington [1765] 19 Howell's State 1030: establishing the civil liberties of individuals and limiting the scope of power. Entick v Carrington [1765] EWHC KB J98 is a leading case in English law and UK constitutional law establishing the civil liberties of individuals and limiting the scope of executive power.[1] The case has also been influential in other common law and was an important motivation for the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. It is famous for the dictum of Lord Camden: "If it is law, it will be found in our books. If it not to be found there, it is not law." On 11 November 1762, the King's Chief Messenger, Nathan Carrington, and three other King's messengers, James Watson, Thomas Ardran, and Robert Blackmore, broke into the home of the Grub Street writer, John Entick (1703?– 1773) in the parish of St Dunstan, Stepney "with force and arms". Over the course of four hours, they broke open locks and doors and searched all of the rooms before taking away 100 charts and 100 pamphlets, causing £2,000 of damage. The King's messengers were acting on the orders of Lord Halifax, newly appointed Secretary of State for the Northern Department, "to make strict and diligent search for ... the author, or one concerned in the writing of several weekly very seditious papers intitled, The Monitor, or British Freeholder".

Entick sued the messengers for trespassing on his land. Lord Camden The took place in Westminster Hall presided over by Lord Camden, the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. Carrington and his colleagues claimed that they acted on Halifax's warrant, which gave them legal authority to search Entick's home; they therefore could not be liable for the . However, Camden held that Halifax had no right under statute or under to issue such a warrant and therefore found in Entick's favour. In the most famous passage Camden stated: The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their . That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances, where it has not been taken away or abridged by some for the good of the whole. The cases where this right of property is set aside by , are various. Distresses, executions, forfeitures, taxes etc are all of this description; wherein every man by common gives up that right, for the sake of justice and the general good. By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No man can set his foot upon my ground without my licence, but he is liable to an action, though the damage be nothing; which is proved by every declaration in trespass, where the defendant is called upon to for bruising the grass and even treading upon the soil. If he admits the fact, he is bound to show by way of justification, that some positive law has empowered or excused him. The justification is submitted to the judges, who are to look into the books; and if such a justification can be maintained by the text of the statute law, or by the principles of common law. If no can be found or produced, the silence of the books is an authority against the defendant, and the plaintiff must have judgment. Hence Lord Camden ruled, as later became viewed as a general principle, that the state may do nothing but that which is expressly authorised by law, while the individual may do anything but that which is forbidden by law. Significance The judgment established the limits of executive power in English law: the state may act lawfully only in a manner prescribed by statute or common law. It was also part of the background to the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and was described by the Supreme Court of the United States as "a 'great judgment', 'one of the landmarks of English liberty', 'one of the permanent monuments of the British Constitution', and a guide to an understanding of what the Framers meant in writing the Fourth Amendment".

6. Tulk v Moxhay (1848) 41 ER 1143: establishing that in certain cases a restrictive covenant can "run with the land" (i.e. bind a "future owner") in furnishing (act of knoledge). Tulk v Moxhay is a landmark case that decided that in certain cases a restrictive covenant can "run with the land" (i.e. a future owner will be subject to the restriction) in equity. It is the reason Leicester Square exists today. On the face of it disavowing that covenants can "run with the land" so as to avoid the strict common law former definition of "running with the land", the case has been explained by the Supreme Court of Canada, in 1950 as "Covenants enforceable under the rule of Tulk v Moxhay, are properly conceived as running with the land in equity" which summarises how the case has been interpreted and applied in decisions across common law jurisdictions.

7. Hadley v Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch. 341 (Court of Exchequer): establishing the extent to which a party in breach of contract is "liable" for the damages. Hadley v Baxendale [1854] EWHC J70 is a leading case. It sets the leading rule to determine consequential damages from a breach of contract: a breaching party is liable for all losses that the contracting parties should have foreseen, but is not liable for any losses that the breaching party could not have foreseen on the information available to him. The claimants, Mr Hadley and another, were millers and mealmen and worked together in a partnership as proprietors of the City Steam-Mills in Gloucester. They cleaned grain, ground it into meal and processed it into flour, sharps, and bran. A crankshaft of a steam engine at the mill had broken and Hadley arranged to have a new one made by W. Joyce & Co. in Greenwich. Before the new crankshaft could be made, W. Joyce & Co. required that the broken crankshaft be sent to them in order to ensure that the new crankshaft would fit together properly with the other parts of the steam engine.

Hadley contracted with Baxendale and Ors, who were operating together as common carriers under the name Pickford & Co., to deliver the crankshaft to engineers for repair by a certain date at a cost of £2 sterling and 4 shillings (current value of about £240.00; this inflation is computed by consumer prices, not by production prices or capital values, and is thus likely an underestimate.)[1].

Baxendale failed to deliver on the date in question, causing Hadley to lose business. Hadley sued for the profits he lost due to Baxendale's late delivery, and the awarded Hadley damages of £25 (present value approximately £2,500). Baxendale appealed, contending that he did not know that Hadley would suffer any particular damage by reason of the late delivery.

The question raised by the appeal in this case was whether a defendant in a breach of contract case could be held liable for damages that the defendant was not aware would be incurred from a breach of the contract.

Baron Alderson The Court of Exchequer, led by Baron Sir Edward Hall Alderson, declined to allow Hadley to recover lost profits, in this case, holding that Baxendale could only be held liable for losses that were generally foreseeable, or if Hadley had mentioned his special circumstances in advance. The mere fact that a party is sending something to be repaired does not indicate that the party would lose profits if it is not delivered on time. The court suggested various other circumstances under which Hadley could have entered into this contract that would not have presented such dire circumstances, and noted that where special circumstances exist, provisions can be made in the contract voluntarily entered into by the parties to impose extra damages for a breach. Alderson B said the following. Now we think the proper rule in such a case as the present is this: Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it. Now, if the special circumstances under which the contract was actually made were communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants, and thus known to both parties, the damages resulting from the breach of such a contract, which they would reasonably contemplate, would be the amount of injury which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these special circumstances so known and communicated. But, on the other hand, if these special circumstances were wholly unknown to the party breaking the contract, he, at the most, could only be supposed to have had in his contemplation the amount of injury which would arise generally, and in the great multitude of cases not affected by any special circumstances, from such a breach of contract. For, had the special circumstances been known, the parties might have specially provided for the breach of contract by special terms as to the damages in that case, and of this advantage it would be very unjust to deprive them. Now the above principles are those by which we think the jury ought to be guided in estimating the damages arising out of any breach of contract... But it is obvious that, in the great multitude of cases of millers sending off broken shafts to third persons by a carrier under ordinary circumstances, such consequences would not, in all probability, have occurred, and these special circumstances were here never communicated by the plaintiffs to the defendants. It follows, therefore, that the loss of profits here cannot reasonably be considered such a consequence of the breach of contract as could have been fairly and reasonably contemplated by both the parties when they made this contract.

Lon L. Fuller and WR Perdue evaluated the idea of reducing contractual remoteness to a foreseeability triumph in this way:

In its second aspect Hadley v Baxendale may be regarded as giving a grossly simplified answer to the question which its first aspect presents. To the question, how far shall we go in charging to the defaulting promisor the consequences of his breach, it answers with what purports to be a single test, that of foreseeability. The simplicity and comprehensiveness of this test are largely a matter of illusion. In the first place, it is openly branded as inappropriate in certain situations where the line is drawn much more closely in favor of the defaulting promisor than the test of foreseeability as normally understood would draw it. There are, therefore, exceptions to the test, to say nothing of authorities which reject it altogether as too burdensome to the defaulter. In the second place, it is clear that the test of foreseeability is less a definite test itself than a cover for a developing set of tests. As in the case of all "reasonable man" standards there is an element of circularity about the test of foreseeability. "For what items of damage should the court hold the defaulting promisor? Those which he should as a reasonable man have foreseen. But what should he have foreseen as a reasonable man? Those items of damage for which the court feels he ought to pay." The test of foreseeability is therefore subject to manipulation by the simple device of defining the characteristics of the hypothetical man who is doing the foreseeing. By a gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion this "man" acquires a complex personality; we begin to know just what "he" can "foresee" in this and that situation, and we end, not with one test but with a whole set of tests. This has obviously happened in the law of , and it is happening, although less obviously, to the reasonable man postulated by Hadley v. Baxendale.[2]

As early as 1894, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized the influence of Hadley upon American law: In Hadley v. Baxendale (1854) 9 Exch. 345, ever since considered a leading case on both sides of the Atlantic, and approved and followed by this court in Telegraph Co. v. Hall, above cited, and in Howard v. Manufacturing Co., 139 U.S. 199, 206, 207 S., 11 Sup. Ct. 500; Baron Alderson laid down ... the principles by which the jury ought to be guided in estimating the damages arising out of any breach of contract[.] The Hadley holding was later incorporated into Section 351 of the Restatement (Second) of . A 1994 law review article noted that as of that year, Hadley had been cited with approval by the state supreme courts of 43 U.S. states; three state supreme courts had adopted the Hadley holding without citing Hadley itself; and intermediate appellate courts in the four other states had also favorably cited Hadley. In Satef-Huttenes Albertus SpA v Paloma Tercera Shipping Co SA (The Pegase) [1981] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 175, Robert Goff J stated Although the principle stated in Hadley v Baxendale remains the fons et origo of the modern law, the principle itself has been analysed and developed, and its application broadened, in the 20th century ... The general result of the two cases is that the principle in Hadley v Baxendale is now no longer stated in terms of two rules, but rather in terms of a single principle—though it is recognised that the application of the principle may depend on the degree of relevant knowledge held by the defendant at the time of the contract in the particular case. This approach accords very much to what actually happens in practice; the courts have not been over-ready to pigeon-hole the cases under one or other of the so-called rules in Hadley v Baxendale, but rather to decide each case on the basis of the relevant knowledge of the defendant. However, it has been suggested that the rule in Hadley v Baxendale is not as novel as its celebrated importance suggests. Justice Edelman, in a speech on the topic, asserts that "the rule set out in Hadley v Baxendale was not novel". For example, Justice Edelman notes that, in 1564, the French jurist Charles Dumoulin had argued that liability for breach of contract should be limited to foreseeable damage, thereby pre-dating this same sentiment in Hadley v Baxendale. The core of the judgment (below) is often cited as an example of a combination of the reasonable man's objective test AND a subjective test: Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it.

8. Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330: establishing a doctrine of strict liability for some inherently dangerous activities.(good faith). Rylands v Fletcher [1868] UKHL 1 was a decision by the which established a new area of English tort law. Rylands employed contractors to build a reservoir, playing no active role in its construction. When the contractors discovered a series of old coal shafts improperly filled with debris, they chose to continue work rather than properly blocking them up. The result was that on 11 December 1860, shortly after being filled for the first time, Rylands' reservoir burst and flooded a neighbouring mine, run by Fletcher, causing £937 worth of damage (equivalent to £86,500 in 2018). Fletcher brought a claim under negligence against Rylands, through which the case eventually went to the Exchequer of Pleas. The majority ruled in favour of Rylands. Bramwell B, however, dissenting, argued that the claimant had the right to enjoy his land free of interference from water, and that as a result the defendant was guilty of trespass and the commissioning of a nuisance. Bramwell's argument was affirmed, both by the Court of Exchequer Chamber and the House of Lords, leading to the development of the "Rule in Rylands v Fletcher"; that "the person who for his own purposes brings on his lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, is answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape". No right "to enjoy property" exists in UK black letter law, and it is this decision upon which stare decisis is built in the area.

This doctrine was further developed by English courts, and made an immediate impact on the law. Prior to Rylands, English courts had not based their decisions in similar cases on strict liability, and had focused on the intention behind the actions rather than the nature of the actions themselves. In contrast, Rylands imposed strict liability on those found detrimental in such a fashion without having to prove a duty of care or negligence, which brought the law into line with that relating to public reservoirs and marked a significant doctrinal shift. Academics have criticised it, however, both for the economic damage such a doctrine could cause and for its limited applicability.

The tort of Rylands v Fletcher has been disclaimed in various jurisdictions, including Scotland, where it was described as "a heresy that ought to be extirpated", and Australia, where the High Court chose to destroy the doctrine in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd. Within England and Wales, however, Rylands remains valid law, although the decisions in Cambridge Water Co Ltd v Eastern Counties Leather plc and Transco plc v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council make it clear that it is no longer an independent tort, but instead a sub-tort of nuisance

9. Smith v Hughes (1871) LR 6 QB 597 The claimant had purchased a quantity of what he thought was old oats having been shown a sample. In fact the oats were new oats. The claimant wanted the oats for horse feed and new oats were of no use to him. The seller was aware of the mistake of the claimant but said nothing. The claimant brought an action against the seller based on mistake and misrepresentation. Held: both actions failed. The action based on misrepresentation failed as you cannot have silence as a misrepresentation. The defendant had not mislead the claimant to believe they were old oats. The action based on mistake failed as the mistake was not as to the fundamental terms of the contract but only a mistake as to quality.

10. Foakes v Beer [1884] 9 A.C. 605: establishing the rule that prevents parties from discharging a contractual obligation by part performance. Foakes v Beer [1884] UKHL 1 is an English contract law case, which applied the controversial pre-existing duty rule in the context of part payments of debts.[1] It is a leading case from the House of Lords on the legal concept of . It established the rule that prevents parties from discharging an obligation by part performance, affirming Pinnel's Case (1602) 5 Co Rep 117a. In that case it was said that "payment of a lesser sum on the day [i.e., on or after the due date of a money debt] cannot be any satisfaction of the whole." The appellant, Dr John Weston Foakes, owed the respondent, Julia Beer, a sum of £2,090 19s after a court judgment. Beer agreed that she would not take any action against Foakes for the amount owed if he would sign an agreement promising to pay an initial sum of £500 (£52,615.38 in 2012 adjusted for inflation) and pay £150 twice yearly until the whole amount was paid back. Foakes was in financial difficulty and, with the help of his , drew up an agreement for Beer to waive any interest on the amount owed. She signed. Foakes paid back the principal but not the interest. Then Beer sued Foakes for the interest. The question was whether she was entitled to it, despite their agreement that he would not need to pay it.

At trial, the court found in favour of Foakes. Watkin Williams J upheld this decision, given the agreement between the two. Mathew J said, “It is material to notice that by the agreement the debtor shall not bind himself to pay the creditor's nominee. That stipulation renders the document available as a security. Upon the authority of the decisions, I think there was abundant consideration for the agreement.” On appeal, in a short judgment Brett MR instead held for Beer because there was no consideration for the agreement. Lindley LJ and Fry LJ concurred without giving considered opinions. The House of Lords (Earl of Selborne LC, Lord Watson and Lord FitzGerald) upheld the ruling of the Court of Appeal in favour of Beer. They reasoned that though the agreement did not contemplate the interest owed, it could still be implied given an enforceable agreement. However, the promise to pay a debt was deemed not to be sufficient consideration as there was no additional benefit moving from Foakes to Beer that was not already owed to her.

Lord Blackburn, however, while not overtly dissenting, seemed to express reservations. “What principally weighs with me in thinking that Lord Coke [in Pinnel's case] made a mistake of fact is my that all men of business, whether merchants or tradesmen, do every day recognise and act on the ground that prompt payment of a part of their demand may be more beneficial to them than it would be to insist on their rights and enforce payment of the whole. Even where the debtor is perfectly solvent, and sure to pay at last, this often is so. Where the credit of the debtor is doubtful it must be more so. I had persuaded myself that there was no such long-continued action on this dictum as to render it improper in this House to reconsider the question. I had written my reasons for so thinking; but as they were not satisfactory to the other noble and learned Lords who heard the case, I do not now repeat them nor persist in them. I assent to the judgment proposed, though it is not that which I had originally thought proper.” Significance Barely more than a restatement of the ancient rule in Pinnel's case, Foakes v Beer was effectively treated as per incuriam by Lord Denning in Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd, on the basis that in 1884 the court in Foakes had failed to pay cognisance to the 1877 case of Hughes v Metropolitan Railway Co, which had introduced the concept of promissory .

11. The Moorcock 14 P.D. 64 (1889): establishing the concept of implied terms in contract law. The Moorcock (1889) 14 PD 64 is a leading English contract law case which incepted an important test for identifying the main terms the law will imply into commercial (non-consumer) agreements, that is those "necessary and obvious...to give business efficacy". Terms shall not be implied merely because they appear "desirable and reasonable". The case has been widely cited in later cases and narrowly distinguished. The owners of the ship called The Moorcock contracted for space at a wharf owner's jetty in order to unload The Moorcock's cargo. While docked, the tide went down to a point where the hull of the ship hit a ridge, causing damage to the ship. The plaintiff argued that the wharfingers were responsible to ensure that his vessel would remain safe while docked. The wharf owners, in their defence, claimed that there were no provisions in the contract to ensure the vessel's safety nor could they have foreseen the damage caused to the vessel. The issue before the Court was whether there can be any implied warranty in the circumstances. The trial court found that there was an implied warranty. The Court held for the ship owner, ruling that there was an implied term that the wharfingers had taken reasonable steps to ascertain the state of the riverbed adjacent to the jetty (not, as often stated, an implied term that the jetty would be a safe place to dock). If the wharfingers had taken such reasonable steps then they would have discovered the ridge of rock and would have been under a duty to warn the shipowners of the potential hazard. Failure to warn would have been actionable in tort. Therefore, this very restricted term was sufficient to provide such protection to the shipowners as would be necessary to give the contract business efficacy. Bowen LJ stated that any implied warranties must be based on the presumed intentions of the parties. An implied warranty may be read into a contract for reasons of "business efficacy" and in order to maintain the presumed intention of the parties. In business transactions such as this, what the law desires to effect by the implication is to give such business efficacy to the transaction as must have been intended at all events by both parties who are business men; not to impose on one side all perils of the transaction, or to emancipate one side from all the chances of failure, but to make each party promise in law as much, at all events as it must have been in the contemplation of both parties that he should be responsible for in respect to those perils or chances. Bowen LJ looked at the presumed risks of the agreement and who was expected to bear them. The wharfingers were in such a position that they could have discovered that there was a risk of damage to the ship and would be in the best position to the safety of the vessel.

12. Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1893] 1 QB 256: establishing the test for formation of a contract. Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Company [1892] EWCA Civ 1 is an English contract law decision by the Court of Appeal, which held an advertisement containing certain terms to get a reward constituted a binding unilateral offer that could be accepted by anyone who performed its terms. It is notable for its curious subject matter and how the influential judges (particularly Lindley LJ and Bowen LJ) developed the law in inventive ways. Carlill is frequently discussed as an introductory contract case, and may often be the first a law student studies in the law of contract. The case concerned a flu remedy called the "carbolic smoke ball". The manufacturer advertised that buyers who found it did not work would be awarded £100, a considerable amount of money at the time. The company was found to have been bound by its advertisement, which was construed as an offer which the buyer, by using the smoke ball, accepted, creating a contract. The Court of Appeal held the essential elements of a contract were all present, including offer and acceptance, consideration and an intention to create legal relations. The Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. made a product called the "smoke ball" and claimed it to be a cure for influenza and a number of other diseases. (The 1889–1890 flu pandemic was estimated to have killed 1 million people.) The smoke ball was a rubber ball with a tube attached. It was filled with carbolic acid (or phenol). The tube would be inserted into a user's nose and squeezed at the bottom to release the vapours. The nose would run, ostensibly flushing out viral infections.

The Company published advertisements in the Pall Mall Gazette and other newspapers on November 13, 1891, claiming that it would pay £100 (equivalent to £11,000 in 2018) to anyone who got sick with influenza after using its product according to the instructions provided with it.“ £100[1] reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza colds, or any disease caused by taking cold, after having used the ball three times daily for two weeks, according to the printed directions supplied with each ball. £1000 is deposited with the Alliance Bank, Regent Street, showing our sincerity in the matter. During the last epidemic of influenza many thousand carbolic smoke balls were sold as preventives against this disease, and in no ascertained case was the disease contracted by those using the carbolic smoke ball. One carbolic smoke ball will last a family several months, making it the cheapest remedy in the world at the price, 10s. post free. The ball can be refilled at a cost of 5s. Address: “Carbolic Smoke Ball Company”, 27, Princes Street, Hanover Square, London.” Mrs. Louisa Elizabeth Carlill saw the advertisement, bought one of the balls and used it three times daily for nearly two months until she contracted the flu on 17 January 1892. She claimed £100 from the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company. They ignored two letters from her husband, a solicitor. On a third request for her reward, they replied with an anonymous letter that if it is used properly the company had complete confidence in the smoke ball's efficacy, but "to protect themselves against all fraudulent claims", they would need her to come to their office to use the ball each day and be checked by the secretary. Mrs. Carlill brought a claim to court. The representing her argued that the advertisement and her reliance on it was a contract between the company and her, so the company ought to pay. The company argued it was not a serious contract.

The Carbolic Smoke Ball Company, represented by H. H. Asquith, lost its argument at the Queen's Bench. It appealed straight away. The Court of Appeal unanimously rejected the company's arguments and held that there was a fully binding contract for £100 with Mrs. Carlill. Among the reasons given by the three judges were (1) that the advertisement was not a unilateral offer to all the world but an offer restricted to those who acted upon the terms contained in the advertisement (2) that satisfying conditions for using the smoke ball constituted acceptance of the offer (3) that purchasing or merely using the smoke ball constituted good consideration, because it was a distinct detriment incurred at the behest of the company and, furthermore, more people buying smoke balls by relying on the advertisement was a clear benefit to Carbolic (4) that the company's claim that £1000 was deposited at the Alliance Bank showed the serious intention to be legally bound. The judgments of the court were as follows.

13. Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre v Selfridge and Co. Ltd. [1915] A.C. 847: confirming privity of contract: only a party to a contract can be sued on it. (This principle was later reformed by statute.) Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] UKHL 1 (26 April 1915), [1915] AC 847 is an English contract law case, with relevance for UK decided in the House of Lords. It established that an agreement for resale price maintenance was unenforceable as a matter of privity of contract. It should not be confused with Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co Ltd v New Garage & Motor Co Ltd,[2] a separate decision of the House of Lords in the preceding year relating to substantially the same resale price maintenance agreement but ruling on the concept of liquidated damages. Under the modern law of the Competition Act 1998 or EU competition law an agreement like this would be regulated as an anticompetitive agreement.

14. Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] S.C.(H.L.) 31: Lord Atkin established the "neighbour principle" as the foundation of the modern Scots delict (English tort) of negligence. This case used a wide ratio decidendi, which was held later as obiter, but still established the law of tort. Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] "UKHL 1," regarding the rule against company "directors" and officers from taking corporate opportunities in violation of their "duty of loyalty" to the company. Regal (Hastings) Ltd v Gulliver [1942] UKHL 1, is a leading case in UK company law regarding the rule against directors and officers from taking personal advantage of a corporate opportunity in violation of their duty of loyalty to the company. The Court held that a director is in breach of his duties if he takes advantage of an opportunity that the corporation would otherwise be interested in but was unable to take advantage. However the breach could have been resolved by ratification by the shareholders, which those involved neglected to do.

15. Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] K.B. 130: establishing the doctrine of promissory estoppel. Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1947] KB 130 (or the High Trees case) is an English contract law decision in the High Court. It reaffirmed and extended the doctrine of promissory estoppel in contract law in England and Wales. However, the most significant part of the judgment is obiter dicta as it relates to hypothetical facts; that is, the landlord did not seek repayment of the full wartime rent. Denning J held estoppel to be applicable if ... a promise was made which was intended to create legal relations and which, to the knowledge of the person making the promise, was going to be acted on by the person to whom it was made and which was in fact so acted on. n 1937, High Trees House Ltd leased a block of flats in Clapham, London, for a rate £2500/year from Central London Property Trust Ltd. Due to the conditions during the beginning of World War II occupancy rates were drastically lower than normal.

In January 1940, to ameliorate the situation, the parties made an agreement in writing to reduce rent by half. However, neither party stipulated the period for which this reduced rental was to apply. Over the next five years, High Trees paid the reduced rate while the flats began to fill, and by 1945, the flats were back at full occupancy. Central London sued for payment of the full rental costs from June 1945 onwards (i.e. for last two quarters of 1945).

16. Hedley Byrne v Heller [1963] 2 All E.R. 575: establishing liability for pure economic loss, absent any contract, arising from a negligent statement. Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd [1964] AC 465 is an English tort law case on economic loss in English tort law resulting from a negligent misstatement. Prior to the decision, the notion that a party may owe another a duty of care for statements made in reliance had been rejected, with the only remedy for such losses being in contract law. The House of Lords overruled the previous position, in recognising liability for pure economic loss not arising from a contractual relationship, introducing the idea of "assumption of responsibility".

17. Fagan v Metropolitan Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439: a leading case illustrating the requirement for concurrence of actus reus (Latin for "guilty act") and dicerned truth. (Latin for "guilty mind") in order to establish a criminal offence. Fagan v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1969] 1 QB 439, [1968] 3 All ER 442, [1968] 3 WLR 1120, 52 Cr App R 700, DC is a leading case that illustrates the requirement of concurrence (or coincidence) of actus reus (Latin for "guilty act") and mens rea (Latin for "guilty mind") in order to establish an offence under the of England and Wales.

18. R v Caldwell [1981] 1 All ER 961 The respondent had done some work for the owner of a hotel as the result of which he had a quarrel with the owner, got drunk and set fire to the hotel in revenge. The fire was discovered and put out before any serious damage was caused and none of the ten guests in the hotel at the time was injured. The respondent was indicted on two counts of arson under s 1(1) and (2)a of the Criminal Damage Act 1971.

At his trial he pleaded guilty to the lesser charge of intentionally or recklessly destroying or damaging the property of another, contrary to s1(1), but pleaded not guilty to the more serious charge under s 1(2) of damaging property with intent to endanger life or being reckless whether life would be endangered. He claimed that he was so drunk at the time that the thought that he might be endangering the lives of the people in the hotel had never crossed his mind. The trial judge directed the jury that drunkenness was not a defence to a charge under s 1(2) and he was convicted. On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the ground that the mental element of intention or recklessness in regard to endangering life referred to in s 1(2)(b) was a matter of specific intent going beyond the actus reus and therefore had to be established as a separate ingredient of the offence, and drunkenness could accordingly be a good defence.

19. Factortame case (1990): the European Court of Justice ruled that the House of Lords was required to suspend an "Act" of Parliament that infringed- EC law. R (Factortame Ltd) v Secretary of State for Transport was a judicial review case taken against the United Kingdom government by a company of Spanish fishermen who claimed that the United Kingdom had breached European Union law by requiring ships to have a majority of British owners if they were to be registered in the UK. The case produced a number of significant judgments on British constitutional law, and was the first time that courts held that they had power to restrain the application of an pending trial and ultimately to disapply that Act when it was found to be contrary to EU law.

20. R v R [1991]: the House of Lords invalidated the defence of marital rape to reflect a changing "view" in society. arbitrally alienated.

21. R. v Kiranjit Ahluwalia (1992) Kiranjit Ahluwalia (born 1955) is an Indian woman who came to international attention after burning her husband to death in 1989 in the UK. She claimed it was in response to ten years of physical, psychological, and sexual abuse.[1] After initially being convicted of and sentenced to life in prison, Ahluwalia's conviction was later overturned on grounds of inadequate and replaced with voluntary manslaughter. Although her submission of provocation failed (under R v Duffy the loss of control needed to be sudden,[2] which this was not), she successfully pleaded the partial defence of diminished responsibility under s.2 Homicide Act 1957 on the grounds that fresh medical (which was not available at her original trial) may indicate diminished mental responsibility.[3]

22. R v. Miller (1992) R v Miller [1982] UKHL 6 is an English criminal law case demonstrating how actus reus can be interpreted to be not only an act, but a failure to act.

23. Walford v. Miles (1992) The buyers and sellers of a company agreed orally for the sellers to deal with the buyers exclusively and to terminate any negotiations between them and any other competing buyer. The sellers later decided not to proceed with their negotiations with the buyers and went on to sell the company to another party. The buyers sued for breach of the oral agreement. The sellers’ defence was that the parties were still in negotiations and the oral agreement was an agreement to negotiate in good faith. Held: The oral agreement was unenforceable. An agreement to negotiate in good faith was unworkable in practice because while negotiations were in existence, either party was entitled to withdraw from those negotiations at any time and for any reason. Such an agreement was uncertain and had no legal content. Lord Ackner said: ‘The reason why an agreement to negotiate, like an agreement to agree, is unenforceable is simply because it lacks the necessary certainty. The same does not apply to an agreement to use best endeavours. This uncertainty is demonstrated in the instant case by the provision which it is said has to be implied in the agreement for the determination of the negotiations. How can a court be expected to decide whether, subjectively, a proper reason existed for the termination of negotiations? The answer suggested depends upon whether the negotiations have been determined ‘in good faith’. However, the concept of a duty to carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant to the adversarial position of the parties when involved in negotiations. Each party to the negotiations is entitled to pursue his (or her) own interest, so long as he avoids making misrepresentations. To advance that interest he must be entitled, if he thinks it appropriate, to threaten to withdraw from further negotiations or to withdraw in fact in the hope that the opposite party may seek to reopen the negotiations by offering him improved terms. Mr Naughton, of course, accepts that the agreement upon which he relies does not contain a duty to complete the negotiations. But that still leaves the vital question: how is a vendor ever to know that he is entitled to withdraw from further negotiations? How is the court to police such an ‘agreement’? A duty to negotiate in good faith is as unworkable in practice as it is inherently inconsistent with the position of a negotiating party. It is here that the uncertainty lies. In my judgment, while negotiations are in existence either party is entitled to withdraw from these negotiations, at any time and for any reason. There can be thus no obligation to continue to negotiate until there is a ‘proper reason’ to withdraw. Accordingly, a bare agreement to negotiate has no legal content.’ As to a lock out agreement, Lord Ackner said: ‘There is clearly no reason in English contract law why A, for good consideration, should not achieve an enforceable agreement whereby B, agrees for a specified period of time, not to negotiate with anyone except A in relation to the sale of his property.’ and ‘B, by agreeing not to negotiate for this fixed period with a third party, locks himself out of such negotiations. He has in no legal sense locked himself into negotiations with A. What A has achieved is an exclusive opportunity, for a fixed period, to try and come to terms with B, an opportunity for which he has, unless he makes his agreement under seal, to give good consideration.’

24. Bolitho v Hackney - describes the standards you have to breach. Bolitho v. City and Hackney Health Authority [1996] 4 All ER 771 It is an important English tort law case, on the standard of care required by medical specialists. It follows the Bolam test for professional negligence, and addresses the interaction with the concept of causation

25. McDonald's Corporation v Steel & Morris (1997) McDonald's Corporation v Steel & Morris [1997] EWHC QB 366, known as "the McLibel case", was an English for libel filed by McDonald's Corporation against environmental activists Helen Steel and David Morris (often referred to as "The McLibel Two") over a factsheet critical of the company. Each of two hearings in English courts found some of the leaflet's contested claims to be libellous and others to be true. The partial nature of the victory, the David-and-Goliath nature of the case, and the drawn-out litigation embarrassed McDonald's.[citation needed]

The original case lasted nearly ten years which, according to the BBC, made it the longest-running libel case in English history. McDonald's announced it did not plan to collect the £40,000 it was awarded by the courts. Following the decision, the European Court of (ECHR) ruled in Steel & Morris v United Kingdom the pair had been denied a fair trial, in breach of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (right to a fair trial) and their conduct should have been protected by Article 10 of the Convention, which protects the right to freedom of expression. The court awarded a judgement of £57,000 against the UK government. McDonald's itself was not involved in, or a party to, this action, as applications to the ECHR are independent cases filed against the relevant state. In 2013 it was revealed that one of the authors of the "McLibel leaflet", Bob Lambert, had been an undercover police officer who had infiltrated London Greenpeace. In 2016 it was revealed that a second undercover police officer, John Dines, had a sexual, romantic relationship with Helen Steel.

26. Re A (conjoined twins) (2001) Re A (conjoined twins) [2001] 2 WLR 480 is a Court of Appeal decision on the separation of conjoined twins. The case raised several legal, ethical and religious dilemmas including whether it would be permissible to kill one of the children to save the other,and whether it was permissible to act against the wishes of the twins' parents.

27. A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (2004) A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56 (also known as the Belmarsh 9 case) is a UK human rights case heard before the House of Lords. It held that the indefinite detention of foreign prisoners in Belmarsh without trial under section 23 of the Anti-terrorism, and Security Act 2001 was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. The case should not be confused with the case A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) [2005] UKHL 71, which relates to the use of evidence obtained by torture in British courts.

28. The Pinochet case (2006) In 1998, Pinochet, who still had much influence in Chile, travelled to the United Kingdom for medical treatment— allegations have been made that he was also there to negotiate arms contracts. While there, he was arrested on 17 October 1998 under an international warrant issued by judge Baltasar Garzón of Spain, and was placed under house arrest: initially in the clinic where he had just undergone back surgery, and later in a rented house. The charges included 94 counts of torture of Spanish citizens, the 1975 assassination of Spanish diplomat Carmelo Soria, and one count of to commit torture—allegations of abuses had been made numerous times before his arrest, including since the beginning of his rule, but never acted upon. Still struggling with the conditions set by the difficult transition to democracy, the Chilean government of the Concertación, then headed by President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, opposed his arrest, extradition to Spain, and trial.

There was a hard-fought 16-month legal battle in the House of Lords, then the highest court of the United Kingdom. Pinochet claimed immunity from prosecution as a former head of state under the State Immunity Act 1978. This was rejected, as the Lords decreed that some international , such as torture, could not be protected by former head-of-state immunity. This judgement was set aside in a second, unprecedented case, on the basis that one of the judges involved was potentially biased due to his ties to Amnesty International, a human rights activist organization that had campaigned against Pinochet for decades and intervened in the case. A third case in March 1999 confirmed the original , but the Lords held in this case that Pinochet could only be prosecuted for crimes committed after 1988, the year during which the United Kingdom implemented legislation for the United Nations Convention Against Torture in the Act 1988. This invalidated most, but not all, of the charges against him; but the outcome was that extradition could proceed. In April 1999, former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and former US President George H. W. Bush called upon the British government to release Pinochet. They urged that Pinochet be allowed to return to his homeland rather than be forced to go to Spain. On the other hand, United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights, Mary Robinson, hailed the Lords' ruling, declaring that it was a clear endorsement that torture is an international crime subject to universal . Furthermore, Amnesty International and the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims of Torture demanded his extradition to Spain. Finally, in protest against Spain's action, Chile withdrew for a time its ambassador from Madrid.

29. R v Horncastle and others (2009) R v Horncastle and others1 was an English legal case concerning the rules on evidence. The appellants claimed that English law on hearsay evidence violated Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) according to decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). The UK’s Supreme Court dismissed the appeal. Subsequent UK cases have followed the Supreme Court’s approach rather than the ECtHR. Therefore, this tension remains unresolved.

30. Al Rawi and others v The Security Service and others (2011) On appeal from: [2010] EWCA Civ 482 Considers whether the court has the power to order a “closed material procedure” for the whole or part of the trial of a civil claim for damages. The respondents claimed compensation for their alleged detention, rendition and mistreatment by foreign authorities in various locations, including Guantanamo Bay. They claimed that the appellants had been complicit in what had allegedly happened. The Supreme Court, by a majority, dismissed the appeal. The lead judgment was given by Lord Dyson, with whom Lords Hope, Brown and Kerr agreed. Lord Phillips would also dismiss the appeal but for different reasons. Lord Mance, with whom Lady Hale agreed, and Lord Clarke give dissenting judgments. The court unanimously decided that there was no power at common law to replace public interest immunity, whereby a judge decides whether in the public interest certain material should be excluded from a hearing, with a closed material procedure. The court has an inherent power to regulate its own procedure. In so doing it may introduce innovations in the interests of justice. However, the court cannot exercise its power to regulate its own procedures in such a way that will deny parties their common law right to a fair trial. Such a change could only be for Parliament to make.

31. Lucasfilm Limited v Ainsworth (2011) Lucasfilm Limited v Ainsworth was a 2011 court ruling by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom.The case concerned an dispute over the production of Lucasfilm's Stormtrooper costumes by model maker Andrew Ainsworth. Mr Ainsworth argued that the helmets, which he continues to manufacture and sell, were functional props covered only by design right legislation, as opposed to Lucasfilm's assertion that they were sculptures or art which fall under copyright law. Design right protection is retained for 15 or 10 years, copyright protection can last considerably longer

32. CTB v News Group Newspapers (2011) CTB v News Group Newspapers is an English legal case between Manchester United player Ryan Giggs, given the pseudonym CTB, and defendants News Group Newspapers Limited and model Imogen Thomas. On 14 April 2011, Mr Justice Eady granted first a temporary injunction at the High Court in London, preventing the naming of the footballer in the media, then extending it on 21 April 2011. The injunction was initially intended to prevent details of the case – an alleged extra-marital relationship between Giggs and Thomas – from being published in The Sun. The ruling of the court was based on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which guarantees the "Right to respect for private and family life." Following the publication of details of the gagging order on Twitter, naming Giggs as the footballer involved, there was widespread discussion in the UK and international media on the issue of how court injunctions can be enforced in the age of social media websites. On 23 May 2011, Justice Eady rejected News Group Newspapers' application to lift the injunction, despite pressure from the public and government. Later the same day, Liberal Democrat MP John Hemming used to name Ryan Giggs as CTB. On 22 May 2011, the Sunday Herald, a Scottish newspaper, published a thinly-disguised photograph of Ryan Giggs on its front page, with the word "CENSORED" covering his eyes.[26][27] The paper added in its editorial column, "Today we identify the footballer whose name has been linked to a court superinjunction by thousands of postings on Twitter. Why? Because we believe it is unsustainable that the law can be used to prevent newspapers from publishing information that readers can access on the internet at the click of a mouse." The Sunday Herald also stated: "We should point out immediately that we are not accusing the footballer concerned of any misdeed. Whether the allegations against him are true or not has no relevance to this debate. The issue is one of freedom of information and of a growing argument in favour of more restrictive privacy laws."

Giggs' lawyers had not applied for an interdict (injunction) at the Court of Session in Edinburgh. This meant that the London High Court ruling had no force in Scotland, unless copies of the Sunday Herald were sold in England or Wales.[30] Sunday Herald editor Richard Walker indicated to the BBC that the Herald was not sold in England or Wales, and added that the footballer's name and photo were exclusive to the print edition and had not been posted on the newspaper's website. Dominic Grieve, the Attorney General for England and Wales, said that no legal action was planned against the Sunday Herald.

33. Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd (2013) Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] UKSC 34, [2013] 2 AC 415 is a leading UK company law decision of the UK Supreme Court concerning the nature of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, resulting trusts and equitable proprietary remedies in the context of English

34. R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice (2014) R (Nicklinson) v Ministry of Justice was a 2014 judgment by the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom that considered the question of the right to die in English law.

35. R (Miller) v Secretary of the State for Exiting the European Union (2017) R (Miller) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5 is a UK constitutional law case decided by the United Kingdom Supreme Court on 24 January 2017, which ruled that the UK Government (the executive) may not initiate withdrawal from the European Union by formal notification to the Council of the European Union as prescribed by Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union without an Act of the UK Parliament permitting the government to do so. Two days later, the government responded by bringing to Parliament the European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill 2017 for first reading in the House of Commons on 26 January 2017. The case is informally referred to as "the Miller case" or Miller's case.

White Mississippi Judge Not Happy With Non-Republican Colleagues

KEVIN DRUMMARCH 25, 2019 3:58 PM

In a recent redistricting case in Mississippi, a federal judge ruled that black voting strength had been illegally diluted in a particular district and ordered that several majority-black precincts be added to it. The case was appealed, and a three-judge appellate panel upheld the ruling, 2-1. The dissenting judge, Edith Brown Clement, unsurprisingly disagreed with the majority on a number of points of law. But that’s not all. She also explicitly accused the majority of ruling in favor of the black defendants because they were Democrats: This case presents several extraordinary issues. Unfortunately, this court’s usual procedures do not appear to permit en banc review of this denial of a stay even if a majority of the active judges would otherwise grant it. I am afraid defendants have simply had the poor luck of drawing a majority-minority panel. I trust that in light of this, the State will pursue a stay in the Supreme Court because of the injustice that results from the joint efforts of the district judge and the motions panel majority. The Supreme Court has five Republican and four Democrats. I guess that’s more to Judge Clement’s liking. UPDATE: Wait. Both of the judges in the majority appear to be white men. So what was Clement referring to? The consensus seems to be that she was referring to party affiliation, not race. I’ve revised the headline and the text to reflect that.