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1. Slade's Case (1602) Slade's Case (Or Slade V. Morley) Was a Case In

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1. Slade's Case (1602) Slade's Case (Or Slade V. Morley) Was a Case In 1. Slade’s Case (1602) Slade's Case (or Slade v. Morley) was a case in English contract law that ran from 1596 to 1602. Under the medieval common law, claims seeking the repayment of a debt or other matters could only be pursued through a writ of debt in the Court of Common Pleas, a problematic and archaic process. By 1558 the lawyers had succeeded in creating another method, enforced by the Court of King's Bench, through the action of assumpsit, which was technically for deceit. The legal fiction used was that by failing to pay after promising to do so, a defendant had committed deceit, and was liable to the plaintiff. The conservative Common Pleas, through the appellate court the Court of Exchequer Chamber, began to overrule decisions made by the King's Bench on assumpsit, causing friction between the courts. In Slade's Case, a case under assumpsit, which was brought between judges of the Common Pleas and King's Bench, was transferred to the Court of Exchequer Chamber where the King's Bench judges were allowed to vote. The case dragged on for five years, with the judgment finally being delivered in 1602 by the Chief Justice of the King's Bench, John Popham. Popham ruled that assumpsit claims were valid, a decision called a "watershed" moment in English law, with archaic and outdated principles being overwritten by the modern and effective assumpsit, which soon became the main cause of action in contract cases. This is also seen as an example of judicial legislation, with the courts making a revolutionary decision Parliament had failed to make. 2. Darcy v Allein [1603] 77 Eng. Rep. 1260 (King’s Bench): (most widely known as The Case of Monopolies): establishing that it was improper for any individual to be allowed to have a monopoly over a trade of cards. Edward Darcy Esquire v Thomas Allin of London Haberdasher (1602) 74 ER 1131 (also spelled as "Allain" or "Allen" and "Allein" but most widely known as the Case of Monopolies), was an early landmark case in English law, establishing that the grant of exclusive rights to produce any article was improper (monopoly). The reasoning behind the outcome of the case, which was decided at a time before courts regularly issued written opinions, was reported by Sir Edward Coke When the case went before Edward Coke, the Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas, he overturned the decision of the King, and held that cases may be tried only by those with legal training and subject to the rule of law. Coke stated that common law cases were "not to be decided by natural reason but by artificial reason and judgment of law, which law is an art which requires long study and experience":[1]:21 A controversy of land between parties was heard by the King, and sentence given, which was repealed for this, that it did not belong to the common law: then the King said, that he thought the law was founded upon reason, and that he and others had reason, as well as the Judges: to which it was answered by me, that true it was, that God had endowed His Majesty with excellent science, and great endowments of nature; but His Majesty was not learned in the laws of his realm of England, and causes which concern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his subjects, are not to be decided by natural reason but by the artificial reason and judgment of law, which law is an act which requires long study and experience, before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it: that the law was the golden met-wand and measure to try the causes of the subjects; and which protected His Majesty in safety and peace: with which the King was greatly offended, and said, that then he should be under the law, which was treason to affirm, as he said; to which I said, that Bracton saith, quod Rex non debed esse sub homine, sed sub Deo et lege [That the King ought not to be under any man but under God and the law.]. In another report, Coke is quoted as saying all causes were "to be measured by the golden and straight met-wand of the law, and not to the incertain and crooked cord of discretion" 3. The Case of Prohibitions (1607) (Court of Common Pleas) Case of Prohibitions [1607] EWHC J23 (KB) is a UK constitutional law case decided by Sir Edward Coke. Before the Glorious Revolution of 1688, when the sovereignty of Parliament was confirmed, this case wrested supremacy from the King in favour of the courts. 4. Dr Bonham’s Case (1610) Thomas Bonham v College of Physicians, commonly known as Dr. Bonham's Case or simply Bonham's Case, was a case decided in 1610 by the Court of Common Pleas in England, under Sir Edward Coke, the court's Chief Justice, who explained why he thought that "in many cases, the common law will control Acts of Parliament". Coke's meaning has been disputed over the years. According to one interpretation, Coke intended the kind of judicial review that would later develop in the United States, but other scholars believe that Coke meant only to construe a statute, not to challenge parliamentary sovereignty. If Coke intended the former, he may have later changed his view. The statement by Coke is sometimes considered to be an obiter dictum (a statement made 'by the way'), rather than part of the ratio decidendi (rationale for the decision) of the case. Whatever Coke's meaning, after an initial period during which his decision enjoyed some support but no statutes were declared void, Bonham's Case was thrown aside, in favour of the growing doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. In one of the most prominent early treatises supporting the doctrine, William Blackstone wrote that Parliament is the sovereign lawmaker, preventing the common law courts from throwing aside or reviewing statutes in the fashion that Coke had suggested. Parliamentary sovereignty is now the accepted judicial doctrine in the legal system of England and Wales. Bonham's Case was met with mixed reactions at the time, with King James I and his Lord Chancellor, Lord Ellesmere, both deeply unhappy with it. One of the reasons for Coke's dismissal from the Common Pleas in 1613 was suggested to be the case. Academics in the 19th and the 20th centuries have been scarcely more favourable and called it "a foolish doctrine alleged to have been laid down extra-judicially" and simply an "abortion". In the United States, Coke's decision met with a better reaction. During the legal and public campaigns against the writs of assistance and the 1765 Stamp Act, Bonham's Case was used as a justification for nullifying the legislation, but by 1772, Blackstone's views had gained acceptance. The 1803 case Marbury v. Madison, which in 1803 formed the basis for the exercise of judicial review in the United States, under Article III of the US Constitution, used the words "void" and "repugnant", but the usage of Marbury was somewhat different from that of Coke. 5. Entick v Carrington [1765] 19 Howell's State Trials 1030: establishing the civil liberties of individuals and limiting the scope of executive power. Entick v Carrington [1765] EWHC KB J98 is a leading case in English law and UK constitutional law establishing the civil liberties of individuals and limiting the scope of executive power.[1] The case has also been influential in other common law jurisdictions and was an important motivation for the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. It is famous for the dictum of Lord Camden: "If it is law, it will be found in our books. If it not to be found there, it is not law." On 11 November 1762, the King's Chief Messenger, Nathan Carrington, and three other King's messengers, James Watson, Thomas Ardran, and Robert Blackmore, broke into the home of the Grub Street writer, John Entick (1703?– 1773) in the parish of St Dunstan, Stepney "with force and arms". Over the course of four hours, they broke open locks and doors and searched all of the rooms before taking away 100 charts and 100 pamphlets, causing £2,000 of damage. The King's messengers were acting on the orders of Lord Halifax, newly appointed Secretary of State for the Northern Department, "to make strict and diligent search for ... the author, or one concerned in the writing of several weekly very seditious papers intitled, The Monitor, or British Freeholder". Entick sued the messengers for trespassing on his land. Lord Camden The trial took place in Westminster Hall presided over by Lord Camden, the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas. Carrington and his colleagues claimed that they acted on Halifax's warrant, which gave them legal authority to search Entick's home; they therefore could not be liable for the tort. However, Camden held that Halifax had no right under statute or under precedent to issue such a warrant and therefore found in Entick's favour. In the most famous passage Camden stated: The great end, for which men entered into society, was to secure their property. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all instances, where it has not been taken away or abridged by some public law for the good of the whole. The cases where this right of property is set aside by private law, are various. Distresses, executions, forfeitures, taxes etc are all of this description; wherein every man by common consent gives up that right, for the sake of justice and the general good.
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