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Overviewoverview Working Together: R & D Partnerships in Homeland Security | April 2005 | Boston, Massachusetts OverviewOverview Importance of Economic Consequence Evaluation Evaluation Taxonomy Cleanup Standards Economic Consequences Conclusion 2 1 Working Together: R & D Partnerships in Homeland Security | April 2005 | Boston, Massachusetts WhyWhy EvaluateEvaluate EconomicEconomic Consequences?Consequences? Loss of life, property destruction, and loss of economic activity have significant consequences Loss of use of productive assets can extend for long periods and generate considerable economic loss Economic impacts need to be addressed in sequential order: Detonation, Atmospheric dispersion and deposition, Fallout from the weapon. Weapon characteristics provide the boundary conditions for the response: How large is the affected area? What actions need to be taken to protect the population? 3 EconomicEconomic EvaluationEvaluation TaxonomyTaxonomy The decision to invest in countermeasures can be viewed as a tradeoff between investment cost and the economic consequences of an event. High Value Target Expanded Consequence Evaluation Consequences Evaluation How many distinctive target types • 7 locations (including bridges, tunnels, should be considered? downtown) • Are there “classes” of targets? • 3 Nuc Yields • Really Big Cities • 1 RDD Yields • Medium Size Cities • D&D cleanup • Small Cities •D&D to 2 cleanup levels: • Border Cities •15 mrem/yr • What weapon yields for each class of target? • 2 rem/yr • How many cleanup levels should be • High correlation to cleanup level evaluated?evaluated 4 2 Working Together: R & D Partnerships in Homeland Security | April 2005 | Boston, Massachusetts EconomicEconomic ConsequenceConsequence CalculationCalculation MethodologyMethodology Literature review yields numerous methodologies for economic evaluation. Data used in this analysis: Federal Reserve Bank of New York Study1 Sandia National Lab RadTran V Economic Model Focus on five broad categories of cost ($2005): Loss of productivity from earnings forgone Indirect economic effects or multiplier Loss and damage to building structures Decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) cost (including disposal) Evacuation Cost Analysis does not cover the universe of all possible economic impacts Diversity of meteorological conditions not evaluated Same physical consequence plume evaluated for different locations Focus on sensitivity analysis of cleanup standards 1. Jason, Bram, James, Orr, and Carol Rapaport, “Measuring the Effects of the September 11 Attack on New York City”, FRBNY Economic Policy Review, November 2002. 5 EconomicEconomic ConsequenceConsequence CriteriaCriteria Selected five locations from isolated rural to high density urban areas: Lukeville, AZ Charleston, SC Detroit, MI San Ysidro, CA New York City, NY Evaluated consequences for 4 weapon types: 0.7kT nuclear weapon 13kT nuclear weapon 100kT nuclear weapon 10kCi Cs-137 RDD Evaluated five potential cleanup levels 6 3 Working Together: R & D Partnerships in Homeland Security | April 2005 | Boston, Massachusetts Potential Range of Cleanup Guidance for a Rad/Nuc Event – Which One Do We Use? 15 mrem/yr EPA, “Establishment of Cleanup Levels for CERCLA Sites With Radioactive Contamination” (e.g., Hanford Site) 25 mrem/yr NRC, Final Rule on Radiological Criteria for License Termination (10 CFR Part 20 Subpart E) 100 mrem/yr Health Physics Society Position Statement, “Guidance for Protective Actions Following a Radiological Terrorist Event” 500 mrem/yr EPA, “Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents," 400-R-92-001, … “doses in any single year after the first will not exceed 0.5 rem ” 2 rem/yr EPA, “Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents," 400-R-92-001, … “doses in first year will not exceed 2 rem ” 5 rem/yr NRC, “Standards for Protection Against Radiation,” recommendation and established dose limit for workers of 5 rem/yr (10 CFR 20 Subpart C) 7 RadioactivityRadioactivity DecaysDecays OverOver TimeTime 13-kT Surface Blast 1,000,000 0-1 yr dose 100,000 1-53 wk dose 1-13 mo dose 10,000 1-2 yr dose 1,000 100 10 Total Surface Area (km2) 0.01 0.1 1 10 100 Dose Rate (rem/yr) 8 4 Working Together: R & D Partnerships in Homeland Security | April 2005 | Boston, Massachusetts HypotheticalHypothetical 100100 kTkT PlumePlume ContoursContours forfor 55 CleanupCleanup LevelsLevels New York San Ysidro 9 ConsequenceConsequence SummarySummary ByBy CleanupCleanup LevelLevel forfor HypotheticalHypothetical WeaponWeapon EventsEvents $35,000 $30,000 Annual GDP 100 kT $25,000 $10 Trillion 13 kT $20,000 0.7 kT $15,000 $10,000 Cost/Billions $5,000 $0 Detroit Detroit Detroit Detroit Detroit Lukeville Lukeville Lukeville Lukeville Lukeville New York New York New York New York New York Charleston San Ysidro Charleston San Ysidro Charleston San Ysidro Charleston San Ysidro Charleston San Ysidro 15 mrem/yr 100 mrem/yr 500 mrem/yr 2.0 rem/yr 5.0 rem/yr Cleanup Standard 10 5 Working Together: R & D Partnerships in Homeland Security | April 2005 | Boston, Massachusetts ConsequenceConsequence SummarySummary - 0.7 kTkT $3,000 $2,500 VeryDetroit Low LowLukeville $2,000 MediumCharleston $1,500 HighNew York VerySanYsidro High Cost/Billions $1,000 $500 $0 15 mrem/yr 100 mrem/yr 500 mrem/yr 2.0 rem/yr 5.0 rem/yr Cleanup Standard 0.7 kT Cleanup Area (km2) Lukeville, AZ 1,430 179 45 10 4 Charleston, SC 557 97 29 6 3 Detroit, MI 90 42 25 10 4 San Ysidro, CA 1,430 179 45 10 4 New York, NY 600 179 45 10 4 11 ConsequenceConsequence SummarySummary - 13 kTkT $12,000 $10,000 VeryDetroit Low $8,000 LowLukeville MediumCharleston $6,000 HighNew York VerySan HIgh Ysidro Cost/Billions $4,000 $2,000 $0 15 mrem/yr 100 mrem/yr 500 mrem/yr 2.0 rem/yr 5.0 rem/yr Cleanup Standard 13 kT Cleanup Area (km2) Lukeville, AZ 28,587 4,249 950 238 95 Charleston, SC 2,679 630 275 117 52 Detroit, MI 502 134 57 40 28 San Ysidro, CA 28,555 4,239 950 238 95 New York, NY 9,753 2,594 474 237 95 12 6 Working Together: R & D Partnerships in Homeland Security | April 2005 | Boston, Massachusetts ConsequenceConsequence SummarySummary - 100 kTkT $25,000 Charleston Lukeville $20,000 Detroit San Ysidro $15,000 NeWNew YorkYork $10,000 Cost/Billions $5,000 $0 15 mrem/yr 100 mrem/yr 500 mrem/yr 2.0 rem/yr 5.0 rem/yr Cleanup Standard 100 kT Cleanup Area (km2) Lukeville, AZ 235,887 37,427 7,275 1,951 802 Charleston, SC 7,337 2,212 703 412 283 Detroit, MI 85,669 7,551 122 89 69 San Ysidro, CA 235,636 37,381 7,269 1,944 799 New York, NY 17,745 10,197 5,233 923 504 13 ConsequenceConsequence SummarySummary --10 10 kCi CsCs-137-137 $25,000 $20,000 VeryNew YorkHigh $15,000 $10,000 Cost/Billions $5,000 $0 15 mrem/yr 100 mrem/yr 500 mrem/yr 2.0 rem/yr 5.0 rem/yr Cleanup Standard 14 7 Working Together: R & D Partnerships in Homeland Security | April 2005 | Boston, Massachusetts ConclusionsConclusions Economic consequences of a Rad/Nuc event are highly dependent on cleanup standards Cleanup costs generally increase dramatically for standards more stringent than 500 mrem/yr Cleanup to the most conservative current standards (no matter what the class of target or weapon event) magnifies the consequences of the event Because such an event could potentially spread contamination very widely, even an event in a “remote” location could have huge economic consequences A risk-based approach to the development and application of cleanup standards is needed Policy implications of such a cleanup need to be fully evaluated Cleanup after a weapon event will be vastly different from cleanup of a contaminated industrial facility or former weapons production facility 15 BackBack-up-up SlidesSlides 16 8 Working Together: R & D Partnerships in Homeland Security | April 2005 | Boston, Massachusetts Nagasaki Data Yield ("Fat Man") 21 kT Detonation Height 500 m Population 240,000 people Leveled Area 6.7 km2 Prompt Fatalities 73,884 people Prompt Injuries 74,909 people Hiroshima Data Yield ("Little Boy") 12.5 kT Detonation Height 580 m Population 255,000 people Leveled Area 12.6 km2 Prompt Fatalities 140,000 people 17 EconomicEconomic ConsequenceConsequence CalculationCalculation MethodologyMethodology Focus on four broad categories of cost ($2005): Loss of productivity from earnings forgone Net present value (NPV) of lost life assumed to be $2.8M OMB discount rate of 7% Loss and damage to building structures and building damage: Utilized RadTran V for farm and urban areas ($29M to $220M per km2) Utilized projected WTC rebuild cost for high density urban areas ($6B to $19B per km2) Decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) cost: Sandia National Lab RadTran V Model for farm and urban areas ($90M to $270M per km2) Utilized WTC cleanup cost for high density urban areas ($3B to $24B per km2) Evacuation Cost ($3K to $5K per (people/km2) per km2) Indirect economic effects or multiplier effects (46% low impact; 82% high impact) 18 9 Working Together: R & D Partnerships in Homeland Security | April 2005 | Boston, Massachusetts RDDRDD Yield - 10 kCi CsCs-137-137 $5,000 $4,500 Cleanup/D&D $4,000 Lost Earnings (Loss of Life) $3,500 Rebuild/Content Replacement $3,000 Evacuation $2,500 Indirect Economic Losses $2,000 Cost/Billions $1,500 $1,000 $500 $0 15 mrem/yr 100 mrem/yr 500 mrem/yr 2.0 rem/yr 5.0 rem/yr Cleanup Standard 19 ConsequenceConsequence SummarySummary - 0.7 kTkT $3,000 $2,500 Cleanup/D&D Lost Earnings (Loss of Life) $2,000 Rebuild/Content Replacement $1,500 Evacuation Indirect
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