Counter-Terror and the Logic of Violence in Somalia's Civil
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Load more
Recommended publications
-
Epidemiological Week 45 (Week Ending 12Th November, 2017)
Early Warning Disease Surveillance and Response Bulletin, Somalia 2017 Epidemiological week 45 (Week ending 12th November, 2017) Highlights Cumulative figures as of week 45 Reports were received from 226 out of 265 reporting 1,363,590 total facilities (85.2%) in week 45, a decrease in the reporting consultations completeness compared to 251 (94.7%) in week 44. 78,596 cumulative cases of Total number of consultations increased from 69091 in week 44 to 71206 in week 45 AWD/cholera in 2017 The highest number of consultations in week 44were for 1,159 cumulative deaths other acute diarrhoeas (2,229 cases), influenza like illness of AWD/Cholera in 2017 (21,00 cases) followed by severe acute respiratory illness 55 districts in 19 regions (834 cases) reported AWD/Cholera AWD cases increased from 77 in week 44 to 170 in week 45 cases No AWD/cholera deaths reported in all districts in the past 7 20794 weeks cumulative cases of The number of measles cases increased from in 323 in week suspected measles cases 44 to 358 in week 45 Disease Week 44 Week 45 Cumulative cases (Wk 1 – 45) Total consultations 69367 71206 1363590 Influenza Like Illness 2287 1801 50517 Other Acute Diarrhoeas 2240 2234 60798 Severe Acute Respiratory Illness 890 911 16581 suspected measles [1] 323 358 20436 Confirmed Malaria 269 289 11581 Acute Watery Diarrhoea [2] 77 170 78596 Bloody diarrhea 73 32 1983 Whooping Cough 56 60 687 Diphtheria 8 11 221 Suspected Meningitis 2 2 225 Acute Jaundice 0 4 166 Neonatal Tetanus 0 2 173 Viral Haemorrhagic Fever 0 0 130 [1] Source of data is CSR, [2] Source of data is Somalia Weekly Epi/POL Updates The number of EWARN sites reporting decrease from 251 in week 44 to 226 in week 45. -
Calula Calula Calula Calula BOSSASO BOSSASO !
Progression of Nutrition Situation (Gu 2011 - Deyr 2015/16) SOMALIA - ESTIMATED NUTRITION SITUATION (IPC PHASES) SOMALIA - ESTIMATED NUTRITION SITUATION (IPC PHASES) SOMALIA - ESTIMATED NUTRITION SITUATION (IPC PHASES) August , 2012 (Based on June/July, 2012 surveys) -IPC Ver 2 December , 2012 (Based on October-December, 2012 surveys) -IPC Ver 2 August 16th , 2011 (Based on June/July surveys) - IPC Ver 2 SOMALIA - ESTIMATED NUTRITION SITUATION (IPC PHASES) SOMALIA - ESTIMATED NUTRITION SITUATION (IPC PHASES) Gu 2011 January , 20Deyr12 (Based on N o2011/12vember/December, 2011 surveys) -IPC Ver 2 Gu 2012 Deyr 2012/13 August , 2013 (BGuased on A2013pril-June, 2013 surveys) -IPC Ver 2 Calula Calula Calula Calula BOSSASO BOSSASO !. !. BOSSASO Calula BOSSASO !. Qandala !. Qandala Qandala Las Qoray/ Qandala Las Qoray/ BOSSASO Zeylac Bossaaso Zeylac Bossaaso Las Qoray/ !. Badhan Las Qoray/ Badhan Zeylac Bossaaso Qandala Lughaye ERIGABO Zeylac Lughaye ERIGABO Badhan !. Badhan Bossaaso !. Lughaye ERIGABO Las Qoray/ AWDAL Lughaye ERIGABO !. Zeylac Bossaaso Iskushuban AWDAL AWDAL Badhan Baki !. Baki Iskushuban Iskushuban Lughaye ERIGABO Berbera AWDAL Baki !. Borama SANAG Iskushuban Borama Berbera SANAG Berbera AWDAL Baki Borama SANAG Iskushuban BORAMA Ceel Afweyne BARI Berbera BORAMA Ceel Afweyne BARI Baki !. Sheikh Borama SANAG Sheikh BORAMA Ceel Afweyne BARI Berbera Ceerigaabo !. Ceerigaabo !. Sheikh Borama SANAG W. GALBEED BORAMA Ceel Afweyne BARI W. GALBEED W. GALBEED Ceerigaabo Gebiley Sheikh Gebiley BORAMA Ceel Afweyne BARI HARGEYSA BURAO -
The Scarcity of Land in Somalia
The Scarcity of Land in Somalia Natural Resources and their Role in the Somali Confl ict Occasional Paper April 2009 Occasional Paper III The Scarcity of Land in Somalia Natural Resources and their Role in the Somali Conflict Dustin Dehérez Director of Northeast-African Studies Düsseldorf Institute for Foreign and Security Policy (DIAS) April 2009 The responsibility for contents and views expressed in this Occasional Paper lies entirely with the author INTERNATIONALES KONVERSIONSZENTRUM BONN - An der Elisabethkirche 25 BONN INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR CONVERSION (BICC) GMBH D - 53113 Bonn Tel.: 0228-911 96-0 Geschäftsführer: Peter J. Croll Fax: 0228-24 12 15 Aufsichtsratsvorsitzender: Staatssekretär Dr. Michael Stückradt E-Mail: [email protected] Handelsregister: Bonn HRB 6717 Internet: www.bicc.de Contents Introduction 6 Traditional conflict resolution in the clan-based society of Somalia 7 Land as a natural resource and its role in the Somali civil war 9 Conclusion 11 References 14 About BICC 16 5 The Scarcity of Land in Somalia Natural Resources and their Role in the Somali Conflict Introduction proposed by this Occasional Paper, might illuminate one of the underlying roots of n the past years, Somalia has become the conflict and state failure and might also help I most prominent example of state-failure in address central problems to conflict Sub-Saharan Africa. It is important to note, resolution in Somalia. It is the thesis of this however, that not the entire country is Paper that in the fertile riverine areas of plagued by the breakdown of civil and state southern Somalia, natural resources and order. -
The Kismayo Bubble - Justice and Security in Jubbaland
CONFLICT RESEARCH PROGRAMME Research at LSE Conflict Research Programme Research Memo 26 March 2021 The Kismayo Bubble - Justice and Security in Jubbaland Nisar Majid and Khalif Abdirahman Overview The absence of a credible and functional government, in Somalia, since the late 1980s has been felt particularly strongly in the arena of the rule of law. Under President Siad Barre, the judicial system was resented for being corrupt, politically manipulated and for rejecting Islamic precepts, and many welcomed its demise. It was perhaps inevitable that in the absence of a system of state courts that Islamic law and courts would emerge. As Muslims, Somalis were able to call upon a well-formed body of jurisprudence and practice that enjoyed social legitimacy and historically validated practices, to establish courts. Islamic law has a particular advantage in this regard in that it encompasses a penal code, a civil code, and commercial and tax codes. All of these are essential for the conduct of everyday life. Recent analyses of the justice and security sector have highlighted its politicisation and, particularly in Mogadishu, a political economy centred around clan-based mobilization and conflict, ideological divisions between supporters of different versions of Islamic and secular law as well as rent seeking behaviour. At a practical level, although some significant developments are noticeable, government courts remain subject to high levels of corruption and manipulation, are slow, limited by poor security and a lack of enforcement capacity. The persistence of Al Shabaab as a credible actor in the provision of justice sits in stark contrast to that of the Government. -
Somalia's Jubbaland: Past, Present and Potential Futures
Rift Valley Institute Meeting Report Nairobi Forum, 22 February 2013 POLITICS NOW Somalia's Jubbaland: Past, present and potential futures an ‘ethno-state’ liKe Puntland, because it is not Key points populated by a single clan. Some view Jubbaland as a § Due to its natural resources and location, Darod clan state, but when the large number of non- Jubbaland has the potential to be one of Darod populations along the Jubba river and in east Somalia’s richest regions, but conflict has bank communities taKen into account, the Darod clan kept it chronically unstable for over two probably comprise 50-60 per cent of the total decades. population. He warned that, if Jubbaland is treated as a Darod state and power-sharing is institutionalized § The regions of Jubbaland are not linked by along those lines, then other residents of the region road and have no history of shared would feel disenfranchised and could turn to al- administration. As an administrative unit, Shabaab. Jubbaland is not likely to be functional. Is Jubbaland viable as a federal state? First, for § The Somali constitution provides no clear Jubbaland to succeed as such a state, it needs some guidance on how newly declared federal history of shared governance and cooperation—and states are to be created, or what their it does not have such a history. Distant Jubbaland relations with the central government communities are very unlikely to respect claims of should be. authority from Kismayo. § The environmental consequences of the charcoal trade are having a negative impact A second criterion for judging whether a region could on livelihoods and food security. -
The Security Bazaar Aisha Ahmad Business Interests and Islamist Power in Civil War Somalia
The Security Bazaar The Security Bazaar Aisha Ahmad Business Interests and Islamist Power in Civil War Somalia Many intractable civil wars take place in countries with large Muslim populations.1 In these pro- tracted conºicts, Islamists are often just one of many actors ªghting in a com- plex landscape of ethnic, tribal, and political violence. Yet, certain Islamist groups compete exceptionally well in these conºicts. Why do Islamists some- times gain power out of civil war stalemates? Although much of the existing research points to either ethnic or religious motivations, I argue that there are also hard economic reasons behind the rise of Islamist power.2 In this article, I offer a micro-political economy model of Islamist success in civil war that highlights the role of an important, but often-overlooked, class: the local busi- ness community. The convergence of business and Islamist interests is relevant across a wide range of cases of contemporary civil war. In present-day Syria and Iraq, jihadi groups have built strong ties to smuggling and criminal networks to fund their Aisha Ahmad is Assistant Professor at the University of Toronto and a former fellow of the International Se- curity Program at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. The author is especially grateful to outstanding colleagues in Kenya and Somalia, including Jabril Abdulle, Sahal Abdulle, Dr. Ibrahim Farah, Dr. Yahya Amir Ibrahim, and Dr. Deqo Mohamed. The author also thanks Theodore McLauchlan, Stephen Saideman, Stuart Soroka, and the anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier drafts, as well seminar and workshop participants at the Belfer Center and McGill University who provided helpful feedback. -
The Impact of War on Somali Men an Inception Study
The Impact of War on Somali Men An Inception Study LOGiCA Study Series The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank 1818 H Street, NW Washington, DC 20433 All rights reserved First published May 2015 www.logica-wb.net This Study Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage discussion and exchange of ideas on gender and conflict related issues in Sub-Saharan Africa. Papers in this series are not formal publications of the World Bank. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The series is edited by the Learning on Gender and Conflict in Africa (LOGiCA) Program of the World Bank within the Social, Urban Rural and Resilience Global Practice. This paper has not undergone the review accorded to official World Bank publications. The findings, interpreta- tions and conclusions herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and its affiliated organizations, its Executive Directors, or the governments they represent. To request further information on the series, please contact [email protected] LOGiCA. Papers are also avail- able on the LOGiCA website: www.logica-wb.net. Cover design and text layout: Duina Reyes-Bakovic Photo credits: Image 1: copyright Mark Bradbury, Togdheer elders sit to deliberate on matters affecting the community. Image 2: copyright CRD / Interpeace, Galgaduud 07-08. The Impact of War on Somali Men An Inception Study A Rift Valley Institute Research Project Funded by the LOGiCA trust fund of the World Bank THE RIFT VALLEY INSTITUTE (RVI) The Rift Valley Institute (www.riftvalley.net) works in Eastern and Central Africa to bring local knowledge to bear on social, political and economic development. -
Countering Terrorism in East Africa: the U.S
Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response Lauren Ploch Analyst in African Affairs November 3, 2010 Congressional Research Service 7-5700 www.crs.gov R41473 CRS Report for Congress Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress Countering Terrorism in East Africa: The U.S. Response Summary The United States government has implemented a range of programs to counter violent extremist threats in East Africa in response to Al Qaeda’s bombing of the U.S. embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 and subsequent transnational terrorist activity in the region. These programs include regional and bilateral efforts, both military and civilian. The programs seek to build regional intelligence, military, law enforcement, and judicial capacities; strengthen aviation, port, and border security; stem the flow of terrorist financing; and counter the spread of extremist ideologies. Current U.S.-led regional counterterrorism efforts include the State Department’s East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI) and the U.S. military’s Combined Joint Task Force – Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA), part of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM). The United States has also provided significant assistance in support of the African Union’s (AU) peace operations in Somalia, where the country’s nascent security forces and AU peacekeepers face a complex insurgency waged by, among others, Al Shabaab, a local group linked to Al Qaeda that often resorts to terrorist tactics. The State Department reports that both Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab pose serious terrorist threats to the United States and U.S. interests in the region. Evidence of linkages between Al Shabaab and Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, across the Gulf of Aden in Yemen, highlight another regional dimension of the threat posed by violent extremists in the area. -
THE FAUNA of JUBALAND by JOHN N
26 Oryx to see that the Serengeti Plains are still designated as a Game Reserve and not as a National Park, but this is said to be only until the final boundary of the Serengeti National Park has been fixed. Captain Keith Caldwell, whose knowledge of East African game is unrivalled and who has just returned from Tanganyika, was called into consultation during the framing of the draft bill under discussion. The Society is grateful to its very active member and welcomes the new Bill as a sincere attempt to put game preservation in Tanganyika at last upon a sound footing. THE FAUNA OF JUBALAND By JOHN N. WARD and DAVID S. SORRELL The object of these notes is to give a record of the wild life living in the Lower Juba area of Somalia, and to assist visitors to Jubaland in finding the haunts of the various animals described. The writers do not presume to lay down the methods of identifying these animals because more knowledgeable authors have already done this elsewhere. The Lower Juba is that area which was the Administrative District of Kismayu under the recent British occupation. It extends from Ghesgud to Dujuma on the left bank of the Juba River, and contains all the land between the right bank of the river and the Kenya border from Ras Ciamboni to Dif, lying south of a line Dif-Dujuma (see map). The area is approximately 20,000 square miles, and was held by the British from 1898 to 1925 when it was handed over to the Italians. -
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia Unsom
UNITED NATIONS NATIONS UNIES UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN SOMALIA UNSOM Briefing to the Security Council by Ambassador Nicholas Kay, Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for Somalia 11 March 2014 [AS DELIVERED] Madam President, Members of the Council, Thank you for giving me the opportunity to brief the Council from Mogadishu today and for your continued support to Somalia’s peace-building and state-building. I am on the ground in Mogadishu and not with you in New York due to the intensity of events at this moment. I hope you understand. Madam President The best hope for peace and stability in Somalia, the Horn of Africa and beyond remains a united, secure and federal Somalia. This is achievable. Somalia can reach its goal of an agreed constitution, a nation-wide electoral process and increased security by 2016. But times are tough, and in the short term may get tougher. Insecurity in Mogadishu poses challenges for Somalis, the UN and the international community. 2014 is a crucial year. It is marked, I would say, by security and political challenges, which will be overcome if the Federal Government of Somalia and international partners remain united and if both accelerate delivery of their mutual commitments. Madam President As I speak, an expanded AMISOM and the Somali National Army (SNA) are prosecuting a renewed offensive against Al Shabaab, made possible by UN Security Council Resolution 2124. It will be the most significant and geographically extensive military advance since AMISOM started, and there have already been notable successes. I pay tribute to the commitment and sacrifices made by AMISOM and its police and troop contributing states. -
Gedo Intercluster Initial Investigation – September
INTER -AGENCY DROUGHT ASSESSMENT IN LOWER JUBA REGION OF SOMALIA JANUARY 2017 INTER-AGENCY DROUGHT ASSESSMENT IN LOWER JUBA REGION – JANUARY 2017 Table of contents Executive summary -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Key findings --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2 Recommendations --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3 Acronyms, abbreviations and definitions of Somalia terminologies --------------------------- 6 Acknowledgement ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 7 Introduction /context of the inter-agency assessment -------------------------------------------- 8 Methodology ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 9 Assessment findings -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 Impact of drought ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 10 Findings by cluster ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 10 Food Security and Livelihoods --------------------------------------------------------------- 10 Education ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 12 Nutrition -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13 Water, Sanitation -
Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War
Policy Briefing Africa Briefing N°99 Nairobi/Brussels, 26 June 2014 Somalia: Al-Shabaab – It Will Be a Long War I. Overview Despite the recent military surge against Somalia’s armed Islamist extremist and self- declared al-Qaeda affiliate, Al-Shabaab, its conclusive “defeat” remains elusive. The most likely scenario – already in evidence – is that its armed units will retreat to small- er, remote and rural enclaves, exploiting entrenched and ever-changing clan-based competition; at the same time, other groups of radicalised and well-trained individ- uals will continue to carry out assassinations and terrorist attacks in urban areas, in- cluding increasingly in neighbouring countries, especially Kenya. The long connec- tion between Al-Shabaab’s current leadership and al-Qaeda is likely to strengthen. A critical breakthrough in the fight against the group cannot, therefore, be achieved by force of arms, even less so when it is foreign militaries, not the Somali National Army (SNA), that are in the lead. A more politically-focused approach is required. Even as its territory is squeezed in the medium term, Al-Shabaab will continue to control both money and minds. It has the advantage of at least three decades of Salafi-Wahhabi proselytisation (daawa) in Somalia; social conservatism is already strongly entrenched – including in Somaliland and among Somali minorities in neigh- bouring states – giving it deep reservoirs of fiscal and ideological support, even with- out the intimidation it routinely employs. An additional factor is the group’s proven ability to adapt, militarily and politically – flexibility that is assisted by its leadership’s freedom from direct accountability to any single constituency.