The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

Analysis of the organization's efforts

to transform the conflict in the Great Lakes Region

Michael Fubu Ngubu

Malmö University Department of Global Political Studies Peace and Conflict Studies Bachelor Thesis 12 Credits PACS III Spring Semester 2021 Supervisor: Professor Kristian Steiner Word count: 12,918

Abstract

Since the 1990s the Great Lakes Region has continued to be mired in intractable conflict, with the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) being at the centre of it.

The aim of this study is therefore an attempt to understand how the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region has fared in the transformation of conflict in the region, through its attempts in the DRC.

For the purpose of the study, conflict transformation as presented by John Paul Lederach was used as a theory of analysing the selected peace efforts by the ICGLR. Furthermore all the data used in the study was secondary data which consists of archival records and documentation.

The study revealed two key issues in the ICGLR’s approach to peace attempts in DRC; it showed that there are gaps in the conflict transformation approach of the earlier attempts by the ICGL, which favored more political solutions. Secondly a rethink of the approach revealed a much more robust approach, which seeks to address not only the political conflicts but also seeks to address the historical and structural conflicts in the region. However with the positive change in the approach there are still high levels of conflict in the DRC.

Key words: Conflict Transformation, John Paul Lederach, Case Study, Democratic Republic of Congo, Great Lakes Region

List of Abbreviations

AU: African Union CAR: Central African Republic CNDP: National Congress for the Defense of the People COMESA: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa CSOs: Civil Society Organisations DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo EAC: East African Community ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States FARDC: Forces armées de la république démocratique du Congo FDLR: Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda FNL: Forces Nationales de Libération GLR: Great Lakes Region ICGLR: International Conference on the Great Lakes Region IGAD: Intergovernmental Authority on Development LRA: Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army MONUSCO: United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo NDC-R: Nduma défense du Congo-Rénové NGO: Non-Governmental Organisation NMOG: Neutral Military Observer Group OAU: Organisation for African Unity RCD: Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie RPF: Rwandese Patriotic Front SADC: Southern Africa Development Community UN: United Nations

Table of Contents

1 Introduction ...... 1 1.1 Statement of the problem ...... 2 1.2 Aim and Research question ...... 4 1.3 Peace and Conflict Studies relevance of the research ...... 4

2 Background ...... 6 2.1 Historicity of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo ...... 6 2.2 History of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region ...... 8 2.3 Historical causes of conflict in the Great Lakes Region ...... 9

3 Previous Research ...... 12 3.1 Previous research on military interventions ...... 12 3.2 Previous research on peace agreements ...... 13 3.3 Previous research on the Arusha Peace Accord ...... 14 3.4 Previous research on the Arusha Peace & Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi .. 15 3.5 Previous research on the Lusaka Peace Accord ...... 15 3.6 Research gap ...... 16

4 Analytical Framework ...... 17 4.1 Definitions of conflict transformation ...... 17 4.2 Conflict transformation vs conflict resolution ...... 18 4.3 Approach to conflict transformation ...... 20 4.3.1 Inquiry 1: The presentation of the ...... 21 4.3.2 Inquiry 2: The horizon of the future ...... 22 4.3.3 Inquiry 3: Development of change processes ...... 23 4.4 Identifying actors in conflict transformation ...... 23 4.4.1 Track I- Top leadership ...... 23 4.4.2 Track II- Middle level leadership ...... 24 4.4.3 Track III- Grass roots ...... 24

5 Method ...... 25 5.1 Research design ...... 25 5.2 Validity and reliability ...... 26 5.3 Data collection ...... 27 5.4 Case selection ...... 28 5.5 Ethical considerations ...... 28 5.6 Scope and delimitation of the study ...... 28

6 Analysis ...... 30 6.1 The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region ...... 30 6.1.1 Priority policy options and guiding principles ...... 31 6.1.2 Relevant protocols articles to the study ...... 31 6.2 Peace initiatives ...... 32 6.2.1 Disarmament and repatriation of all armed groups in Eastern Congo ...... 32 6.2.1.1 Presenting the situation in the DRC Conflict ...... 33 6.2.1.2 Presenting the Horizon of the future for the DRC ...... 34

6.2.1.3 Developing the change process for the DRC ...... 35 6.2.2 Important actors for conflict transformation ...... 36 6.2.3 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region ...... 37 6.2.3.1 A new presentation of the situation in the DRC Conflict ...... 37 6.2.3.2 Re-identifying important actors to conflict transformation ...... 38

7 Conclusion ...... 40 7.1 Concluding discussion ...... 40 7.2 Reflection on the results ...... 41 7.3 Suggestions for future research ...... 41

8 Bibliography ...... 42

1 Introduction

The name ‘Great Lakes Region’ (GLR) was originally derived from the freshwater lakes and river basins within the central and eastern parts of Africa (Khadiagala, 2006). The region has been an arena of strife since the 1960s after many countries in the region gained independence, and this civil strife has usually been protracted in nature. The region comprises Burundi, Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Kenya, Republic of Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. However, for the purpose of this research, the term Great Lakes Region (GLR) will be used to define the countries Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, and the DRC, these being countries that have seen and are still faced with constantly evolving conflict, which has threatened to destabilize the region for decades.

The categorization of these conflicts as interstate or intrastate is somehow irrelevant, as the conflicts tend to expand geographically with shifting conflict epic centers being common. Furthermore, conflicts in the Great Lakes Region are dynamic and complex, as they involve multiple and interlocking regional and international actors (Ansorg, 2011). These conflicts however have common features relating to issues of governance, ethnic division, structural failures, resource exploitation, and unequal access to natural resources and opportunities, which are predominantly present.

The inability by governments to manage multi-ethnic societies by ensuring equitable access to natural resources, rule of law, and political inclusion creates a recipe for conflict, as social and political elites play on ethnic divisions and prevailing stereotypes (Van Leeuwen, 2008).

It is with this background that the International Conference on the Great Lakes was established in 2003 under the guidance of the United Nations to promote peace and security in the region. Different peace attempts have been employed in the past to address these conflicts with a high degree of unsuccessfulness. As said, this region has had its fair share of civil war, with various initiatives to end them being unsuccessful. It is therefore against this background that this study attempts to understand efforts by the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) to address conflicts in the region.

1.1 Statement of the problem

Conflicts in the GLR have a strenuous effect on the security of the region. For example, the 1973 conflict in Burundi not only claimed an estimated 300,000 lives but as many as 800,000 have sought refuge in neighbouring countries, while its current political crisis over the 2015 disputed elections has created a further 175,000 refugees (Brachet and Wolpe, 2005:1; IRIN, 2016; The New Humanitarian, 2016). While in neighbouring Congo the country’s rich mineral resource and its instability have led neighbouring countries, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda in particular to exploit the crisis for their own accumulative strategies (Daley, 2006:307).

An estimated 5.4 million people have died in the DRC from conflict-related deaths in the past two decades, and just as many have fled to other countries (Wielenga and Akin-Aina, 2016:1; Daley, 2006:303; IRC, 2021). And the electoral and political crisis experienced in 2016 only added to the already rampant civil unrest and embolden armed groups in some areas (IRC, 2021). These conflicts force millions of people to seek refuge in neighbouring countries which has both a direct and an indirect effect on neighbouring countries as high migration of refugees forces them to adjust their economies, which are already strained to accommodate them (International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 2015). The situation in the region holds a serious challenge in the region’s geopolitics, in part due to the shared ethnic similarities of the region which risks a conflict spillover to other countries in the region.

Amongst other conflicts in the region is, the 1979 invasion of Uganda by Tanzania and other anti- Amin forces, the Banyamulenge Rebellion in 1996 to seize Zaire’s eastern Kivu provinces and the 1994 Tutsi genocide in Rwanda (Shahzad, 2016) and the involvement of seven African nations in the DRC war of 1998 – 2000, labelled Africa’s First World War (Daley, 2006:303).

There has been a continuation and shifting of conflicts in the region, which according to some scholars have been largely exacerbated by illegal armed groups from within and outside the region, deteriorating democratic tenets, mismanagement of natural resources, the inability of the governments to manage multi-ethnic societies, rule of law and political inclusion as social and political elites play on ethnic divisions and prevailing stereotypes (Githaiga, 2011; Ramadhani et al. 2011:1). In fact, Ramadhani et al (2011:1), further writes that “from 1960 to

2010, 86 conflict-episodes were recorded in the GLR: 35 in Uganda; 19 in Burundi; 19 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 11 in Rwanda and 2 in Kenya.”

The conflict dynamic has continued to be a threat to peace and security in the region which has on many occasions spilt over to other regions such as the East African Community (EAC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ACCAS) and the Southern Africa Development Community, (SADC) leading to these organizations to respond by intervening militarily.

Apart from the obvious regional threats to security and peace, the conflicts have further risked investment and hurt the business climate of the region, as the region is an important part of the trade routes to many regional economic groupings such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and the EAC (SADC, 2014).

Above that, the European Union (EU) suspended a $390-million project to connect the power grids of Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of Congo due to increasing insecurity in the region (Relief web, 2017).

These conflicts rhyme with a cynical pattern and regional dimension which are apparent in the GLR where countries are locked in destructive war-peace-war cycles, which are mostly blamed on weak political institutions including those responsible for conflict resolution (Michailof et al. 2002:7).

Based on the recognition that political instability and conflicts in these countries have a considerable regional dimension and thus require a concerted effort to promote sustainable peace, stability and growth in the region (ICGLR, 2012). The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region was established. The members to the conference signed a Pact on Security, Stability and Development in the Great Lakes Region in December 2006, which through its protocols serve as a legal framework and an agenda of the ICGLR with the aim of creating conditions for security, stability and development between the member states (ICGLR, 2012). At its best expectation, the organization is mandated to neutralize all negative forces and any form of political conflict to ensure sustainable development (Kok and Zounmenou, 2013). The organization has achieved some success in certain areas in Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda, neutralizing the M23 rebels in

the Eastern DRC, reduction of illegal mineral trading through the “Mineral Tracking and Certification Scheme”, utilizing its International Protocol for documentation and investigation and prosecute crimes as well sexual violence in conflict, however, the organization has struggled to fully transform the conflict in the DRC (ICGLR, 2015; ICGLR, 2017). Based on the above complexities and threats, there is a need for more analysis of the ICGLR’s attempt to attain peace, security and stability in the region through its various peace initiatives together with other cooperating partners.

1.2 Aim and research question

The research will seek to understand how the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region has fared in the transformation of conflicts in the region through a study of conflicts and interventions in the DRC from the period 2005 to 2020. In attempting to achieve the stated aim, the research will attempt to answer the question:

How has the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region performed in its attempts to achieve peace, security and stability in the Great Lakes Region through its interventions in the Democratic Republic of Congo?

While building my analysis on Lederach’s conflict transformation approach, the operational questions for the research will be,

1. Have the peace initiatives in the region accommodated historical, social, and structural components in their peace attempts? (see 4.3) 2. Which levels of actors have been accommodated in the peace processes? (see 4.4) These questions will be discussed further in section 4 of the research.

1.3 Peace and conflict studies relevance of the research

This research is about a conflict that is right at the centre of Peace and conflict studies in every sense. It bears all the dynamics of old wars and new wars as described by Kaldor and other scholars, it also falls under security which many scholars define as “an alleviation of threats to cherished values” (Williams, 2011:1), however, the choice of

cherished values is mainly a preserve of the political elite. As this conflict involves both national, international as well as local insurgencies, the research attempts to address the impact of the conflict, from national security, international security as well as human security, with regards to all forms of violence, direct and indirect associated with the conflict.

2 Background

This chapter begins by discussing the historical development of the conflicts in the DRC, while the second part of the chapter will discuss the brief history of the International Conference on the Great Lakes region, and the final part of the chapter will look at the historical causes of the conflicts in the GLR.

2.1 The historicity of the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The Great Lakes Region (GLR) of Africa is a region consisting of central and eastern African states situated along the lakes: Tanganyika, Kivu, Albert, Victoria, Turkana and Nyasa (Tshiband, 2009:1). In general, the region consists of countries including Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Zambia, Malawi, Uganda, Ethiopia and Mozambique. However, in terms of conflict in the Great Lakes Region, the term refers to Burundi, DRC, Rwanda and Uganda due to the many recurrent conflicts that have been suffered by these countries since the nineties (Ibid).

For a lot of people, the GLR is associated with ‘chaos’ after the term was linked to numerous violent conflicts due to a number of crises that gripped the region and made it into a fertile ground for armed conflicts.

For at least over two decades the GLR has been regarded as one of the most unstable regions in the world. From the early crisis of the Genocide in Rwanda which claimed approximately 800 000 to 1million lives (Prunier, 1995:261-265), to the continuing war in the DRC which has claimed approximately 5.4 million lives (IRC, 2021), to the civil war in Burundi with a death toll estimated at around 50 000- 100 000 lives (Klinghoffer, 1998: 34).

Of the three mentioned above, the DRC has often been referred to as a “geological scandal” due to the contrast between the massive natural resources of the country and the extremely high levels of poverty of its people. The DRC includes at least 409 ethnic groups, among which are the Tutsis and Hutus in the east near the Rwanda and Burundi borders (Tshiband, 2009:5).

During and post-Rwandan Genocide and civil war in Burundi, neighbouring DRC experienced a high flow of refugees fleeing from atrocities led by a Tutsi led rebellion (Tshiband 2009:5), this massive flow of refugees came with it about 50 000 Hutu militias who were armed. The flow of refugees from Rwanda and Burundi created an ethnic imbalance in the eastern DRC and would later create instability in the group relations (Ibid).

After the genocide, the new Tutsi leadership in Rwanda perceived the presence of the Hutu militias in the Congo as a threat to its national security (Longman, 2002:127-144), coupled with a reluctance by the DRC government to expel Hutu rebels, led to an orchestrated rebellion, the Alliance of Democratic Forces (ADFL) for the Liberation of Congo in 1996, which backed rebel leader Laurent-Désiré Kabila to overthrow the DRC president Mobutu Seseseko and his regime after a campaign of less than one year (Dunn, 2002:53-74). During that period there were alleged massive massacres of Hutu refugees in refugee camps and the use of child soldiers, but allegations were never investigated, likely due to the support the new DRC president Kabila enjoyed both from regional governments and the USA (Ibid).

The new Congolese president was seen as a glimmer of hope for the region, but that hope quickly vanished. He was regarded by many regional leaders as a puppet of Rwanda and Uganda, which helped install him to power (Ibid). However, due to his lack of political skill and experience, he failed to satisfy his mentors’ expectations in terms of border security as both Ugandan rebels and ex-Rwandan army soldiers continued to launch attacks in Uganda and Rwanda respectively from Congolese territory (ibid). The situation led to Rwanda and Uganda orchestrating a failed attempt to remove Kabila from power and at the same time similar efforts were being made by local rebel groups in the Kivu provinces who ended up having control of two-thirds of the province (Tshiband, 2009:6). This led Kabila to shift his alliances to other regional forces, he acquired support from Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia (ibid). This war led to the DRC being divided into three regions controlled by the government and rebel movements allied to either Rwanda or Uganda from the period 1998-2003 (ibid). Kabila eventually managed to fend off efforts by Uganda and Rwanda to overthrow him through the help of his allies who in return enjoyed mining concessions, the war was later characterized as the war over natural resources resulting in massive illicit exploitation of resources by all parties involved (UNSC, 2003).

Up to this date, rebel movements in Congo and surrounding countries continue to threaten peace and security in the region, through their continued sporadic attacks on both civilians and military targets which have left about 5.7 million displaced and a further 19.6 million requiring humanitarian aid (IRC, 2021).

2.2 History of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

The establishment of the ICGLR and its agenda reflect the search for agreements among countries regionally as well as internationally to address the consequences of violent conflicts, political crises, and interference in internal affairs which characterized the Region in the 1990s. (Hauck, 2017:6). First was the consequences of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda with significantly high death toll and displacements (Ibid, 5) this coupled with the presence of Rwandese refugees in Congo and militia became a threat to regional security. Secondly, there was an urgent need to end the political crisis and war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) where at least 7 African countries and rebel groups were involved in what some observers called “the first African World War” in 1998 (Ibid, 5), This war according to Hauck (2017),

Divided the DRC into three zones, one (West) under Kinshasa government control supported by Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia; the second (East) by a rebel movement (Congolese Rally for Democracy- RCD), supported by Rwanda (and somehow by Burundi); and third (North) by another rebel movement, the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC) supported by Uganda.

This conflict, coupled with grave human rights violations, growing illegal exploitation of minerals, and bad governance set in motion a series of diplomatic exchanges and peace attempts that led to the formation of the ICGLR. In the year 2000 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), as stated in its UNSC resolutions 1291 and 1304 proposed to have an international conference on peace, security, democracy, and development in the great lakes region. This led to the establishment of the Secretariat of the ICGLR in Nairobi Kenya, under the umbrella of the United Nations (UN) and the African Union (AU) (ICGLR 2004)

The interconnectedness of the member countries means that conflict and instability in any of the member countries may highly have a regional dimension and consequently affect other countries in the region. Therefore, based on the recognition of this regional aspect and the conviction that group effort was key to the promotion of peace and stability, the ICGLR was formed. During its existence, the ICGLR has had several attempts at creating peace in the region, with some degree of both success and failure.

2.3 Historical causes of conflict in the Great Lakes Region

Understanding the origins of the conflicts is important as it is useful for facilitating processes of conflict transformation since the process requires a deep understanding of the society in which peace is being constructed. The following factors have been consistently highlighted as the major root causes of conflicts in the region, i.e. (a). Legacy of colonialism, (b). Bad governance and democratization, (c). Ethnic relations, and (d). Internationalization of conflicts. a. Legacy of colonialism as a source of conflict

The colonial political avenue as a source of conflict to the Great Lakes region refers to the politics of "divide and conquer" and the authoritarian and tyrannical indirect rule that was inflicted upon the colonized people by their colonizers. An example of Rwanda and Burundi before colonialism, Hutus and Tutsi were not considered different ethnicities, but it was rather after the colonial policy adopted by both Germans and Belgians played the racial card, classifying Rwandans and Burundians according to their ethnicity, and promoting Tutsis to the detriment of the Hutu majority (Tshiband, 2009:3; Wielenga and Akin-Aina, 216:3; Lemarchand, 1970). This policy promoted Tutsis saying they were ‘born to be chiefs’, while Hutus were denied access to positions of leadership and sometimes education (Prunier, 1995:33). This division and exclusion later became one of the major causes of the 1994 genocide.

b. Bad governance and democratization as a source of conflict

The post-colonial states have been characterized by bad leadership and bad governance.

Corruption, nepotism, exclusion, marginalization, injustice, and unequal distribution of national resources have become the primary indicators of the sort of governance found in these countries

(Shyaka, 2008).

There has been a continuation and shifting of conflicts in the region, which according to some scholars have been largely exacerbated by, deteriorating democratic tenets, mismanagement of natural resources, the inability of the governments to manage multi-ethnic societies, rule of law, and political inclusion as social and political elites play on ethnic divisions and prevailing stereotypes (Githaiga, 2011; Ramadhani et al. 2011:1). In fact, Ramadhani et al further writes that “from 1960 to 2010, 86 conflict-episodes were recorded in the GLR: 35 in Uganda; 19 in Burundi; 19 in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and 11 in Rwanda and 2 in Kenya” (Ramadhani et al. 2011:1). The Great Lakes Region has experienced a paradox of democracy and elections triggering violence, instead of entrenching good governance and contributing to stability. (Kanyangara, 2016). Even though proponents of the democratic theory suggest that “democracies are less likely than other regimes to experience violent conflict (Bunce, 2005; Ramadhani et al. 2011). African history, however, suggests that the process of democratization may be a difficult and dangerous one, liable to produce violent conflict.

c. Ethnic relations as a source of conflict

The presence of diverse ethnic groups in any specific region does not in itself serve as the major trigger to spark conflict. However “conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda, DRC, and Uganda have been motivated not by ideology, but typically by ethnicity or by political leaders’ ability to arouse ethnic hostility for their own ends' ' (Kanyangara 2016).

Argued as a product of colonialism, ethnicity has been pushed by the Hamitic hypothesis, which states that “everything of value ever found in Africa was brought there by the Hamites, allegedly a branch of the Caucasian race” (Sanders, 1969:521). Its application particularly in Rwanda and Burundi constitutes to a large extent the cause of the Hutu-Tutsi conflict which resulted in the

1972 Burundian genocide and the 1994 Rwandan genocide (Prunier, 1994; Shyaka, 2008). This by many accounts has remained a hindrance to inclusive identity and citizenship. d. Internationalization of conflicts

Compared to other regions, Africa has seen the highest degree of internationalization of conflicts. For the total conflicts which affected the World between 1945 and 1990, this degree is about 70% for Africa while the average for the World was about 40% (Shyaka, 2003). An example is the protection of Kabila by the U.S.A from investigations into the massacres of the Hutu refugees, this US support of Kabila has been argued to have been motivated by an interest in natural resources, containing Islamic fundamentalism in east Africa and challenging the waning Francophone power in the region (Dunn, 2002, 53- 74). Another example is France having launched 12 military operations in the Great Lakes Region from 1990-1994 (Shyaka, 2003). This internationalization of conflicts has been argued to undermine the effectiveness of international and local peacebuilding mechanisms (Shyaka 2003; Kaldor, 2012).

3 Previous Research

There have been various peace attempts over time to resolve, transform and manage conflict in the GLR and this paper is not the first to research those various peace attempts in the region. This section will therefore look at the previous research of other researchers on peace attempts ranging from military initiatives to peace agreements that have been employed in the GLR by different governmental, international, and local bodies.

3.1 Previous research on military interventions

Since independence, international and regional organizations have positioned themselves as agents for peace in the region with varying degrees of success. This relative ineffectiveness of peace-making in Africa is partly attributed to three things. Organization of African Unity’s (now African Union) principles of non-interference in internal affairs of states, non-commitment of resources to support regional missions, and the implication of western governments in African conflicts (Daley, 2006:309; De Witte, 2001).

However, by 2006 African Union had been involved in three regional initiatives for peace: Rwanda (1993), Burundi (2000), and Democratic Republic of Congo (2000). The organization has also spearheaded peacekeeping missions in the form of the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG) in Rwanda, Burundi, and Congo (Daley, 2006:309). And currently, the United Nations has three missions in the region namely in DRC, Central African Republic, and South Sudan (United Nations, 2021). Peacekeeping missions have however had very little success in transforming conflicts for a variety of reasons such as, peacekeepers usually not having the capacity to take care of root causes of conflicts, the multiplicity of conflict players, making it difficult to come to an agreement, non-commitment of resources by both regional and international governments, and fatigue from the international community which has been supporting peacekeeping mission for over two decades in the region (Genugten, 2008:42; Howard, 2002:528).

Other scholars have stated that peacekeeping operations usually fail to understand the complexity of the region’s political and conflict dynamics, with the case of Congo where the International community perceived it to be a post-conflict case when the country has inherent violence even in “peace times” (Salaun, 2019). While others write that the international community usually focuses on quick results, which is usually the mandate of many peacekeeping missions and has a tendency of constituting linkages to the government of the country without involving them in the formulation and negotiation of the mandates (Wiharta, 2019). This usually ends up in failure as it does not create long- term strategies that ensure the primacy of politics to create a space for sustainable development.

3.2 Previous research on Peace Agreements

Peace in itself should be viewed as a process and not an abrupt end to the conflict, this is even truer if we look at the continued violence in Rwanda, the DRC, and Burundi, which have had many peace agreements between them.

A perusal of the various peace agreements shows that they are largely brokered by international mediators and contain largely principles and objectives that appear essential to ensure the ending of the wars and the return to the rule of law usually through transitional governments. This according to Jones (2001:159) usually lacks the strategic conflict transformation systems in terms of adequate coordination and there is a failure by the international mediators to understand the complexity of the local dynamics of civil war. He further states that peace through transitional governments usually means the inclusion of extremists into government (Ibid).

3.3 Previous research on the Arusha Peace Accord

The Arusha Accords of 1993 were a UN-sponsored agreement signed in Tanzania between the Tutsi-led Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), and the Government of Rwanda. Its main objective was to bring a cease-fire between the RPF and the Hutu regime and allow for the repatriation of Tutsi refugees and their participation in government (Daley. 2006:310). Since the Hutu had the strongest power position, they were reluctant to adhere to the Accord, which would have significantly reduced their claims to power.

Lemarchand (1994:591), writes of the Accord as a recipe for disaster and that:

The negotiations were conducted under tremendous external pressures from OAU, France, Belgium, the USA, and Tanzania, thus not having any genuine consensus from all parties to the conflict.

Eventually eight months later, due to failure by the accord to push both sides of the conflict to implement the accord, the genocide happened. While other scholars cite the failure of the accord due to the model relying on power- sharing between the belligerents, political parties, and rebels, while not having any strategic policy to deal with extremists and losers (Daley, 2006:310; Jones, 2001). Lastly, there was controversy surrounding Mobutu Seseseko’s appointment as Organisation on Africa Unity (OAU) mediator, considering that Zaire had sent troops to Rwanda to support the Government prior to his appointment (Jones, 2001:54).

In conclusion, the Accord did not succeed because it did not seek to address the root causes of the conflict, but was rather designed to curtail the immediate prevailing political conflict in Rwanda.

3.4 Previous research on the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi

Initial peace efforts in Burundi arose from regional initiatives led by concerned neighboring states about the nature of the war and its potential for destabilizing the region. This eventually led to the signing of the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, which was signed in the presence of USA President Bill Clinton. Several commentators have however labeled the agreement as having lacked political pact on behalf of the signatories for peace, with the process being sped up to suit Bill Clinton's timetable, which led to some of the signatories not seeing the document before it was signed and some warring factions not being present for the signing (Daley, 2006:311).

There was further re-negotiation to the agreement, which later came to be known simply as the “Compromise of Pretoria” or “The Pretoria Protocol on Outstanding Political, Defense and Security Power Sharing Issues in ' Burundi” gave the Tutsi group 50% share of institutions of government, 40% share of the senate and 50% of the army (United Nations Peacemakers,2003) However this agreement brought about disagreements in the constitution, ethnic balance in the army and ultimately failed to reach a cease-fire with one remaining rebel group (Daley, 2006:311-12).

3.5 Previous research on the Lusaka Peace Accord

Following years of tensions and heavy fighting, it became apparent that conflict in the DRC could not be solved by military means. With pressure from local, regional and international bodies, there were efforts to reach a new consensus for the Congo and the region in the post-Mobutu era after a five-year civil war that involved at least seven countries and at least ten irregular armies (Campbell, 2002:28).

This led to the Lusaka Peace Accord, signed in 1999, it was tasked with ending the war in the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo, but it, however, did not stem the violence. (Daley, 2006:311-12; Campbell, 2002:28). The agreement dragged on for two

years until finally a transitional power-sharing peace agreement was reached. Critiques of this Accord state that, at the formal state level the agreements led to the withdrawal of foreign troops from Congolese territory, but they have not stopped foreign complicity in the illegal extraction of valuable strategic minerals, nor did it end fighting, as local militias and foreign rebel groups continue to operate in eastern Congo (Campbell, 2002:28; United Nations, 2002).

3.6 Research gap

Given the challenges a lot of previous peace attempts have encountered, as well as the complex dynamics of the conflicts in the region, it is imperative that the various dynamics that inform the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region are constantly interrogated and examined so as to be able to understand more and contribute to more sufficiently equipped sustainable interventions.

Therefore, this research seeks to contribute to the understanding of ICGLR regional efforts towards attaining peace, security, and stability and advance better practice to regional conflict transformation.

4 Analytical Framework

The analytical framework discusses the theory of Conflict Transformation as presented by John Paul Lederach. I will begin with the various definitions of the theory of conflict transformation as defined by Lederach and other scholars, followed by a brief comparison of conflict transformation to other competing theories such as conflict resolution. I will then present the approach to conflict transformation as opined by Lederach, from conflict mapping to the identification of conflict actors.

4.1 Definitions of conflict transformation

Theories of conflict transformation build on an assumption that conflict is a normal social occurrence and, therefore, focuses on the transformation of violent conduct into a peaceful one (Paffenholz, 2014:13). This is one of the peacebuilding theories but its main difference from theories such as conflict resolution and conflict management is that,

Conflict transformation’s field of view is intended to be far deeper in addressing the root causes of social conflicts as much as possible while recognizing that some conflicts are not resolvable until and unless fundamental arrangements are changed. (Coy, 2009:5)

It is therefore worth mentioning that conflict transformation is not a wholly new approach, but rather a reconceptualization of the field to adapt to the complexities of contemporary conflicts. It has many different definitions from different scholars with the definitions having some overlapping characteristics.

As a theory, conflict transformation can be defined as a combination of conflict management and conflict resolution. It is regarded more as a continuous approach than a determined act. Miall (2004:4), instead defines conflict transformation as “a process of engaging with and transforming the relationships, interests, discourses and, if necessary, the very constitution of society that supports the continuation of violent conflict.” Therefore, conflict transformation occurs when “essential social and political changes are made to eliminate inequalities and deliver fundamental human needs to everyone in the

society. On the other hand, Diamond (1994:3), defines conflict transformation as “endeavors that seek to change the conditions that give rise to the underlying root causes of the conflict”. Meaning in this definition conflict transformation strategies are seen to address more of nation-building and national reconciliation, healing, change, and social transformation. While Lederach's definition states that;

Conflict transformation is to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as life- giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, and respond to real-life problems in human relationships (Lederach, 2014).

The above definition is not the easiest to understand, but in my attempt to make it simpler, I will rewrite it as the ultimate goal of conflict transformation is to help groups, societies as well as countries to move from violent and destructive conflicts to constructive and peaceful conflicts. Meaning that conflicts are not only inevitable in human societies, but often desirable when they are well conducted. Thus, justice, freedom, and more equitable and integrated relations may be advanced by well-waged conflicts (Kriesberg, 2011:50).

4.2 Conflict transformation vs conflict resolution

According to Lederach, (2014), “conflict transformation provides a perspective on the conflict that is different from that of conflict resolution”. Wallensteen (2002:8) defines conflict resolution as “where the conflicting parties enter into an agreement that solves their central incompatibilities, accept each other’s continued existence as parties, and cease all violent action against each other.” Meaning that conflict resolution comes about after a conflict has already occurred. A number of authors explain conflict transformation as an extension or part of conflict resolution, as both resolution and transformation claim to be process-oriented (Lederach, 2014; Mitchell, 2002). While others make clear distinctions between the theories in terms of actors to the process, contending that, while resolution tends to deal with conflicts by operating close to officials and elites, or decision-makers, transformation advocates and practices the notion that

processes have to take place at all levels including the grassroots. (Miall, 2004:4; Mitchell, 2002:19; Botes, 2003:16).

Others state the difference in the timeline of change stating that a conflict transformation is a comprehensive approach that addresses a range of dimensions, from short to long term timelines, while conflict resolution aims to achieve an agreement for short term for the relief of immediate pain (Lederach, 2014; Wani et al. 2013).

Lederach (2014), further goes on to distinguish conflict transformation as being centered around relationships while conflict resolution is centered on the immediate context of the conflict.

Conflict transformation aims to create capacity and offer support to structural change rather than just facilitating outcomes through peace agreements, it engages conflict both at the pre- violence and posts violence stages while recognizing the causes and consequences of violent conflict being beyond the place of fighting, while conflict resolution, on the other hand, engages conflict at the post violence stage (Lederach, 2014; Wani et al. 2013). Meaning, unlike conflict resolution which seeks to end the prevailing conflict, conflict transformation on the other hand tries to seek not only how to end the immediate conflict but also look beyond and question how to create a future that is free from destructive conflict.

However, the clearest summary of the differences in the two theories have been opined by Lederach, (2014), in his “Little Book of Conflict Transformation” as presented in the table below.

Conflict Resolution Conflict Perspective Transformation Perspective

The key question How do we end How do we end something not something destructive desired? and build something desired?

The focus It is content-centered. It is relationship centered.

The purpose To achieve an To promote constructive agreement and solution to change processes, the presenting problem inclusive of, but not creating the crisis. limited to, immediate

solutions.

The development of the It is embedded and It envisions the process built around the presenting problem as immediacy of the an opportunity for relationship where the response to symptoms symptoms of and engagement of systems within which relationships are embedded.

Time frame The horizon is short term The horizon for relief to pain, change is mid-to-long- anxiety, and range and is intentionally difficulties. crisis responsive rather than crisis-driven.

View of conflict It envisions the need It envisions conflict as to de-escalate conflict an ecology that is processes. relationally dynamic with ebb (conflict de- escalation to pursue constructive change) and flow (conflict escalation to pursue constructive change).

4.3 Approach to conflict transformation

Scholars and students of peace and conflict studies recognize that to create the conditions for sustainable peace, conflict must be seen as a potentially positive mechanism for social and political change (Coy, 2009:1). To fully utilize that potential, Lederach proposes the use of conflict transformation.

Lederach (2014), further suggests conflict transformation is more than a set of techniques but rather a way of “looking and seeing” which requires different lenses through which we view social conflict. Rather than narrowly focusing on a single wave of events, “a transformational approach seeks to understand the particular episode of conflict not in isolation, but as embedded in the greater pattern” (Ibid).

Unlike conflict resolution which largely tends to focus on the methods for de-escalating, conflict transformation involves de-escalation and engaging conflict even in escalating times, in pursuit of constructive change, through a variety of roles, functions, and processes, some of which may push conflict out into the open (Ibid). Conflict transformation, therefore, focuses not only on the resolution of a particular “episode” of conflict, but it seeks the “epicenter” of conflict. Lederach (2014) writes that;

An “episode” of conflict is the visible expression of conflict rising within the relationship or system, usually within a distinct time frame, while the “epicenter” of conflict is the web of relational patterns, often providing a history of lived episodes, from which new episodes and issues emerge.

Therefore, if the episode releases the conflict in the relationship, then the epicenter is where the conflict is produced, thus the justification to focus on it. In attempting to answer the operational question in section 1.2, which states that; have the peace initiatives in the region accommodated historical, social, and structural components in their peace attempts?

The research will utilize the approach by Lederach (2014), which opines the importance of mapping the conflict, using what he calls “the big picture of conflict transformation” which he divides into three points of inquiry, namely, Inquiry 1 (the presentation of the situation), Inquiry 2 (The horizon of the future) and Inquiry 3 (Development of change processes).

4.3.1 Inquiry 1: The presentation of the situation

The emphasis here is on the presentation of the situation as a space for exploration of meaning and action, which has immediate issues embedded in patterns and history (Lederach, 2014). This should make the researcher aware that whatever the state of the conflict, it is interlinked. Every conflict is interlocked with many others. “Smaller conflicts are nested in larger conflicts, each party in a conflict has its own set of other antagonists, each conflict is one in a series of earlier struggles, and each side has its own internal fights” (Kriesberg, 2011:52). Meaning every conflict is rooted in history and has social and structural components.

In order to understand what is going on, you have to look at the prevailing conflict, but that is not just looking at the surface level issues but it involves deeper levels of history, how the particular conflict has developed over time, the dynamics that have been taking place over time, what are the patterns of interactions and relationship that has been going on over time. Therefore he suggests looking not only into issues and history but also patterns. It entails asking what the bigger picture of relationships and patterns within which the conflict rises are.

For Lederach (2014), understanding the patterns of “how things have been” provides the context from which immediate disputes rise to the surface. Therefore, “The potential for constructive change lies in our ability to recognize, understand, and redress what has happened” (ibid).

4.3.2 Inquiry 2: The horizon of the future

You can't really figure out how you want to change until you figure out what you want your change system to look like and what your goals are. You need to think about what the potential and needed change processes are that can respond to immediate issues, as well as the broader setting that creates the crisis (Lederach, 2014).

This brings us to his second inquiry, it brings about questions like, what do we hope to build? What would we ideally like to see in place? How can we address all levels—immediate solutions as well as underlying patterns of relationships and structures? (Ibid, 2014). That is looking at the current conflict, recognizing its interconnectedness to the past, social and structural forces, then imagining what constructive conflict we want to create and how.

This has three elements, there is the obvious solution, but there are also relations and systems. Meaning you need to understand how people are going to relate to each other, how the dynamics of the system are going to be different from what has been going on in the “presenting situation” that will enable the new system to be more constructive than the current system.

According to Paffenholz (2006:4), this involves having to think of how to deal with the dilemma of “short-term conflict management and long-term relationship building, as well as the resolution of the underlying causes of conflict”. It harnesses the ideas of possibilities of what could be constructed in a conflict (Lederach, 2014). However, it implores on the importance of visualizing the overall picture as an interconnected circle.

4.3.3 Inquiry 3: Development of change processes

This inquiry focuses largely on the design and support of the change process. The inquiry requires that “we think about a response to the conflict as the development of processes of change that attend to the web of interconnected needs, relationships, and patterns on all four levels: personal, relational, cultural, and structural” (Lederach, 2014). We have to think of the longer-term vision we hope to build from the seeds and potential in the crisis.

This entails holding together multiple processes at the same, which are interdependent, different but not incompatible (ibid). Here we must conceptualize processes that address solutions for the immediate problem, but at the same time create a platform for long term change of relational and structural patterns of the conflict brought about over varying time periods, affecting different levels of the system (Lederach, 2014; Paffenholz, 2014:15; Miall, 2004:6).

In the development of change processes, Lederach focuses on 4 key dimensions of change, personal change, relational change, structural change, and cultural change (Lederach, 2014; Paffenholz, 2014:15).

4.4 Identifying actors in conflict transformation

Conflict transformation framework builds on the view that “an infrastructure for establishing peace is needed, as it both legitimizes the process and also integrates multiple levels of the population (actors) affected by the conflict, both in terms of input in the peace process as well as its implementation” (Botes, 2003:10). In attempting to answer the second operational question, which levels of actors have been accommodated in the peace processes? It is important to identify which actors or which levels in the conflict will be most effective in the process of conflict transformation. Lederach (1997:38), identifies and divides these levels or actors into three “levels” or “tracks of actors” that need to be impacted within this holistic conflict transformation approach within the population. 4.4.1 Track I- Top leadership This is ideally where negotiations to end conflict normally take place. Usually accessed by mediation at the level of states (Paffenholz, 2006:5). Comprising mostly of key political, military, and religious leaders in the conflict. Due to their high profile, they are in positions of

power. The critique of dealing with only top leaders is that they must usually maintain an image of strength, which makes it difficult for them to accept anything less than their publicly stated goals, which makes them difficult to compromise (Lederach, 1997:40). 4.4.2 Track II- Middle-level leadership This consists of those who function in leadership but are not formally tied with the government or major actors to the conflict (ibid: 41). Lederach (1997:40), argues that “it is the middle-level leaders that hold the greatest potential for establishing an infrastructure that can sustain the peacebuilding process over the long term”. This is because not only are they far more numerous than top-level leaders, but are also likely to have a relationship with both top-level leaders and significant connections to the grass root levels, which the top leaders claim to represent, and their status and influence derive from their relationships with others (Paffenhoz, 2014:15). They include leaders of mid-level Non- Governmental Organizations (NGOs), government institutions, religious leaders, academic intellectuals, etc. (Lederach, 1997:39). 4.4.3 Track III- Grassroots The leadership here includes “those involved in local communities, members of indigenous NGOs carrying out relief projects, health officials, and refugee camp leaders” (Ibid: 42). This represents the majority of the population and they themselves have the greatest responsibility, and the greatest opportunity, for transforming their own conflicts. They represent the population who experience the day-to-day effects of the conflict. Lederach writes of the importance to understand the relationships in a conflict setting stating that, while a higher status in the conflict pyramid entails much more access to information and more capacity and opportunity to make decisions, the individual is less likely to be affected by the daily effects of the decisions in the conflict, while on the other hand having a low status means being closer to the daily effects of the conflict but far less privileged to access information and capacity to make decisions (Ibid:43). These complex power relations represent some of the difficulties in creating and later on implementing sustainable peace processes.

5 Method

This chapter discusses the method of the research, by first presenting the research design, then discussing the data selection process, and finally a discussion of the case selection. 5.1 Research design For the purpose of the research, I will use a case study to address the aim of the research. This is because the research question and subsequent operational questions of the research deal with tracing operational processes over time rather than mere frequencies or incidences (Yin, 2018). I decided on employing a case study for the research, firstly as it intends to understand an empirical situation, secondly case studies have a unique strength in their ability to deal with a variety of evidence (Ibid, 2018).

A case study can be defined as an “empirical method that investigates a contemporary phenomenon (the “case”) in depth and within its real-world context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context may not be clearly evident” (Ibid, 2018). Meaning they allow for a thorough analysis of the complex and particularistic nature of distinct phenomena. A case study is a relevant choice of design when the aim of the research is to understand real-life events, with a presumption that the understanding of those events will involve significant contextual conditions relevant for the case (Yin, 2009:3-5).

Case studies can be broken into three types. Explanatory case study, which is being used for this study, seeks to answer questions that deal with the tracing of operational processes over time, rather than mere frequencies or incidence. Descriptive case studies whose main goal is to assess a sample in detail and in-depth, based on an articulation of a descriptive theory, and finally exploratory case studies whose goal is to develop pertinent hypotheses and propositions for further inquiry (Yin, 2018; Mills et al. 2012).

Case studies can be intensive or focused thus helpful for directing the researcher's desired level of intellectual penetration of the phenomenon. (Mills et al. 2012:2). It can also offer a means of investigating complex and relatively unstructured social units comprising various variables of

importance in explaining and understanding the phenomenon (Bennett and Elman, 2007:171; Reis, 2009). Since case studies are anchored on empirical real-life situations it provides a more holistic account of the phenomenon under study (Reis, 2009). And just like many other research methods, case studies play an important role in advancing knowledge and improving practice, since it provides readers with meaningful insights and experiences that can be used as hypotheses for future research (Ibid, 2009).

Despite the many benefits of case study methods, they have their fair share of criticism. Firstly, is that they lack scientific rigor, however, this criticism can be overcome by researchers avoiding being sloppy and following systematic procedures (Yin, 2018). Second is the confusion of research case studies with non-research case studies, this too can be overcome by highlighting researchers’ procedure, being transparent and explicit about limiting or eliminating any bias (Yin, 2018). Third is that case studies provide little basis for providing generalized results. However, the simple answer to this is that “case studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations or universes” (Yin, 2018). Meaning the role of a case study research is to expand and generalize theories rather than extrapolate probabilities. Fourth is the extensive level of effort it requires to conduct a case study, however, compared to other forms of methods such as ethnography and survey can potentially be more time- consuming and expensive than a case study (Reis, 2009:15). 5.2 Validity and reliability Validity in research can be defined as “the degree to which a test or measuring instrument actually measures what it purports to measure or how well a test or a meaning instrument fulfills its function” (Anastasi & Urbina, 1997). Basically, it determines whether the research truly measures that which it was intended to measure or how truthful the research results are. This validity has been divided into three categories, construct validity, internal validity, and external validity (Yin, 2018:87). However, for the purpose of this study, only internal validity was relevant in establishing causal relationships. There was no physical observation involved in this study, meaning all research data was secondary data. Consequently, to avoid making inaccurate inferences from the data, I employed explanation building as the analytical technique to achieve internal validity. Meaning

the case study was analyzed using data to develop explanations about the developments of the case. Finally, external validity deals with knowing the study findings are generalizable beyond the immediate study (Ibid, 2018). However, the aim of this research is not to come up with findings that can be generalized to a population but rather, hypothetical and theoretical generalizations.

Although ‘Reliability’ is a concept used for evaluating quantitative research, the idea is however used in all kinds of research. However, in qualitative research reliability is a purpose of generating understanding, and there have been arguments as to whether reliability is necessary for establishing the quality of qualitative research. Stenbacka (2001), argues that reliability concerns measurements then it has no relevance in qualitative research. Since there can be no validity without reliability, a sufficient demonstration of validity should be enough to establish reliability, since reliability is a consequence of validity (Patton, 2001; Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Likewise, to create a stronger analysis I used enough data from previous research, archival records, journals, organizational websites, government websites, and news agencies, to entertain plausible rival explanations, thereby ensuring internal validity and consequently reliability. 5.3 Data collection

Case studies can be conducted using both primary and secondary data, which can be acquired through six types of sources, namely, documentation, archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observation, and physical artifacts (Yin, 2018:178). This study used a mixture of different types of secondary data through the use of archival records, and documentation.

It should, however, be noted that no single source of data has the complete advantage over others but, however, various sources highly complement each other and a good case study will therefore want to rely on as many sources as possible (Yin, 2018).

In order to answer my operational questions in chapter 1.2 (questions 1 and 2), the research used archival records consisting of organizational records from the ICGLR, UN, MONUSCO, and AU.

While the documentation for the research was made of administrative documents from the ICGLR, UN, AU, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), and from governments of, Uganda, Rwanda, Congo, and Burundi, which comprised of peace proposals and peace agreements, progress reports and treaties as well formal studies, evaluations, news and news articles relating to the case.

Since all data was collected from sources, who might have their own allegiances to certain governments or institutions, there was no way of ensuring the objectivity of the data, however, to minimize this bias extensive triangulation of sources was used in data collection. 5.4 Case selection

The research will look at the case of the conflict and peace attempts in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The justification for this selection is, firstly looking at the ICGLR from different angles, the core of ICGLR’s purpose has been and still is the conflict in the Eastern parts of DRC and beyond. Secondly, the case hinges on the fact it combines all complex features summarizing all aspects of conflicts that have taken place in the region.

5.5 Ethical considerations A good case study researcher will strive for the highest ethical standards while doing research. These standards include “having a responsibility to scholarship, such as neither plagiarizing nor falsifying information, as well as being honest, avoiding deception, and accepting responsibility for your own work” (Yin, 2018:87).

For this research, it was imperative that no data was fine-tuned to suit any desired outcome. To ensure the validity and reliability of this study, extensive triangulation was performed.

5.6 Scope and delimitation of the research

The study focuses on the peace attempts which were carried out specifically in the DRC after the formation of the ICGLR, this period is from 2005-2020. The period was selected to reflect the earlier peace attempts as well as take into account the more recent peace attempts.

Furthermore, even though interviews and observation would have been ideal to conduct this research, putting into consideration the available time, limited financial resources and

complexity of travel guidelines due to the covid pandemic, I decided to use only secondary data for the study.

6 Analysis

The chapter will start with a brief overview of the organizational mandate and policy of the ICGLR, pointing out some of its important articles (protocols) relating to peace and security. Secondly, the chapter will look at the Disarmament and Repatriation of all Armed Groups in Eastern Congo and the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region and analyze them in line chapter four (Analytical Framework) of this study with regards, in answering my operational questions.

6.1 The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region

The formation of the ICGLR and its agenda reflects the search for peace and security in the GLR and beyond, by addressing the effects of violent conflicts, political crises, and interference in internal affairs which have been a characteristic of the region since the early 1990s. Most notable among the mid-nineties conflict, was the Rwandan genocide, Burundi civil war, and most certainly the civil war in the eastern part of DRC. These conflicts combined had a death toll estimated at 5 million and created over 10 million in refugees. The urgency for an intervention created the ICGLR under the guidance of the UN and the OAU now AU. Although the proposal for the formation of the ICGLR was raised in 2000 by the UNSC and subsequently opening of the secretariat in Kenya, it was not until November 2004 under the auspices of the UN and AU that it came into force with the signing of the Dar es Salaam Declaration on Peace, Security, Democracy and Development in the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR, 2004:2). In this declaration member states declared their collective determination to transform the GLR into a space for sustainable peace and security in strict compliance with the UN Charter, the Constitutive Act of the African Union, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, as well as all relevant international and regional legal instruments (Ibid). However, it took another two years for the ICGLR to develop and agree on the organizational Protocols and Programs of action signed in Nairobi Kenya in December 2006 when the organization adopted the Pact on Security, Stability, and Development in the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR, 2012). These protocols and programs of action serve as an operational framework for the ICGLR.

6.1.1 Priority policy options and guiding principles

The immediate priority options of the ICGLR was to transform the region into a space for, Sustainable peace and security, through offering full support to national peace processes in the region, strengthening bilateral and regional cooperation, establishing an effective regional security framework for prevention, management, and peaceful settlements of conflicts, promote common policies to end the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and protect the protection of vulnerable groups (Ibid, 4-5).

Political and social stability, through the promotion of regional policies and strategies based on norms of democracy and good governance, combating discriminatory ideologies, policies, and practices as well as any violence, put in place national and regional policies based on democracy and good governance aimed at consolidating the rule of law, building capacity in leadership, and promote effective participation of different social-economic actors such as private sector, civil society women and youth in the consolidation of democracy and governance (Ibid, 5).

6.1.2 Relevant protocols articles to the study

There are articles from the Pact on Security, Stability, and Development in the Great Lakes Region that have been deemed relevant to this research due to their uniqueness and their intended purpose in the pursuit of peace and security.

Chapter II’s Art. 5. “Protocol on Non-aggression and Mutual Defense in the Great Lakes Region,” aims at preventing and resolving internal and interstate armed conflicts within and between member states, and resolving any kind of disputes by peaceful means (ICGLR, 2012; UN, 2021). It places the obligation on all member states to prevent and resolve any conflict in a peaceful manner. This obligation however is not only limited to relations among states and actions by states but any threats or aggression through propaganda (Roscini, 2009:934), which has been a common characteristic of the conflicts in the GLR region especially those that have ethnic elements to them. The act further prohibits this aggression either from states individually or collectively and from non-state actors (Ibid, 935). This aspect is important as it recognizes that conflicts in the region have been driven by non-state actors from Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR), Burundi’s Palipehutu – Forces Nationales de Libération (FNL), Uganda’s Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and more than twenty militia groups have taken part in the DRC conflict after 1994 controlling about 51% of the country (UN, 2001).

Secondly Article 8 “Protocol for the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination.” sets to guide member states to refrain from, prevent and punish for the crimes of genocide, war crimes against humanity and all forms of discrimination (ICGLR, 2012:5), this article also implores member states to prescribe propaganda of institutions or groups whose ideas are based on superiority of any particular group or ethnic origin. (Ibid). The article recognizes that at the heart of many of the conflicts in the region is a result of exclusion from political and economic participation based on the superiority and inferiority of ethnicities. This brought about the genocides of both Burundi and Rwanda and is still a big part of the ongoing conflict in the DRC.

Lastly, art. 9, “Protocol Against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources'' aims to combat the illegal exploitation of natural resources which constitutes a violation of the States’ right of permanent sovereignty over their natural resources (ICGLR, 2012:6). This protocol recognizes that illegal exploitation of natural resources is not only a major cause of conflicts in the region but also a means of continued funding of these conflicts. A study by the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) in 2009 on the role of natural resources in conflict and peacebuilding processes, found that 40% of all interstate conflicts since the 1960s have a link to natural resources (Njuguna, no date). This protocol also supports the idea that peace initiatives should recognize the need for resource management as an important component in the peace process. Even though many processes in the GLR have been about political power- sharing, it should be worth noting that conflicts and social issues do not arise from a vacuum, especially when we focus on resources as a driver of these conflicts (Ibid).

6.2 Peace initiatives

In line with its objective and principles, the ICGLR has had several peace initiatives aimed at bringing peace and security to Congo and the region. This part will analyze the selected initiatives through the guidelines set in the analytical framework of the research.

6.2.1 Disarmament and repatriation of all armed groups in Eastern Congo

After an assessment, a conclusion was made that eastern Congo, north-western Burundi, and south-western Uganda in the GLR are the most volatile regions characterized by State-centric

conflicts, State against rebel group conflicts, and rebels against local communities (ICGLR, 2006:1). Estimates in Burundi and DRC put it equivalent to one AK47 per family, a situation which makes the opportunity for lawlessness and random aggression extremely high. (Edmonds et al. 2009:32). However, the political instability in the DRC especially in the eastern part of the country made the DRC the epicenter of the conflict thus the focus of the disarmament and repatriation exercise.

Following these security concerns, the AU was the first to propose “through its Peace and Security Council meeting in Libreville in March 2005, the forceful disarmament of the negative forces in the eastern DRC (Ibid). Subsequently, during the Regional Interministerial Committee Meeting in 2006 in Lusaka to embark on a project supporting and strengthening existing initiatives to disarm armed groups in the region, ICGLR members decided to initiate disarmament response to help facilitate stability of the region in line with the initial objectives of the Lusaka Accord (Ibid). This was to be achieved by working with other cooperating partners such as AU, MONUC, and FARDC who led the process for voluntary and forced disarmament of negative forces (Ibid). This was to be done from the period 2007-2011.

According to the ICGLR, the strategy of the process was “to send a political signal to negative forces that times have changed and that states had come up with two-pronged strategies made up of diplomatic efforts and actual military intent” (ICGLR, 2006:5).

The conflict transformation proposal presents 3 strategies to disarmament, namely (a) diplomatic and political efforts through the ICGLR, (b) Support to military efforts, and (c) Humanitarian support actions.

6.2.1.1. Presenting the situation in the DRC conflict

Firstly, using Lederach’s (2014), approach of conflict transformation emphasizes the need for mapping the conflict and attempting to understand the historical aspects and relations of the conflict. However, the Diplomatic and political efforts through the ICGLR of the proposal suggested launching offensive diplomacy and considering amnesty to armed groups with the exception of genocidal forces and leaders of armed groups (ICGLR, 2006:6).

While this strategy might appear workable on paper, the complexity of the conflict in the DRC suggests it is highly unattainable. The proposal’s suggestion of arresting leaders of armed

groups and granting amnesty to their followers, ignores to some extent the history and relations between the leaders and their followers, even though some followers might have joined involuntarily, the likelihood that a good number of them joined based on the cause or believed in the agenda of the leader, means they might not voluntarily disarm, firstly because their agenda will likely have to be achieved for them to disarm and secondly knowing their leaders will be persecuted will in many instances not drive their followers to disarm voluntarily, a situation which may translate to mistrust. The strategy might eventually lead not only to non- compliance but potential future violence.

Secondly, both the Support to military efforts and Diplomatic and political efforts through the ICGLR to force disarmament do not provide a solution to the root causes of the conflict but rather only attempts to eliminate the violent aspect of the conflict which on many occasions reappears. Even though the abundance of weapons in the region helps in exacerbating the violence in the region, documented evidence suggests this is not the cause of the violence and the creation of armed groups.

In fact, many instances of violence have been reported either in areas endowed with natural resources or for the purpose of acquiring resources. The presence of unregulated mining in the DRC is one of the biggest impediments to peace in the country (Ahere, 2012:4). This in itself indicates that one of the reasons for the formation of these armed groups has been resources, which the Diplomatic and political efforts and military efforts are both not addressing, and for as long as the mining companies continue to operate in a conflict-laden atmosphere which allows them to trade minerals for arms, peace in the DRC will remain a far-fetched reality. With this analysis, the process can therefore be critiqued to have focused on a single wave of events.

6.2.1.2 Presenting the horizon of the future for the DRC

Presenting the horizon of the future entails understanding how people are going to relate to each other. This should involve having to think of dealing with the short dilemma of conflict management and long-term relationship building (Paffenholz, 2006:4; Lederach, 2014). However, the “military effort” approach was counterproductive in the sense that, for the “diplomatic and political efforts” to work, the authorities needed to establish a certain level of trust with the armed rebels, however, report in 2014 after the defeat of the M23 rebels found that a large number of the rebels fled to neighboring Rwanda seeking asylum rather than

returning to DRC stating that they did not trust the amnesty offered by the DRC government (BBC, 2014).

Furthermore, both Rwandan and Burundi Hutu- and Tutsi-aligned forces were involved in the DRC wars. Rwanda demanded that DRC expel the Rwandan Hutu Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) from its Kivu provinces, however, the Congolese government had not been successful due to lack of capacity. The situation has led to allegations that,

Rwanda in retaliation rendered support to the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) Tutsi rebel army and, later, the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP), both under Laurent Nkunda” (Edmonds et al. 2009:37).

The amount of influence to the conflict which neighboring countries to the DRC have means that only disarmament inside Congo is inadequate as those unwilling to disarm can easily seek refuge in neighboring countries and return to fight at a later stage.

This is evidenced in the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) 2020 Report of the Secretary-General, which states that, the security situation in parts of eastern Congo has worsened after the expiry of the disarmament initiative, with 2020 recording 281 deaths, including 50 FARDC officials. The situation is estimated to have further internally displaced over 10 000 people (UNSC, 2020).

The report further state that even though during the fighting between government and forces and armed groups a total of 90 weapons were handed in by the Nduma défense du Congo- Rénové (NDC-R) who willingly surrendered, “rival armed groups moved to occupy positions vacated by the NDC-R” (Ibid, 3).

6.2.1.3 Developing the change process for the DRC

This encompasses the design and support of the change that we want to see. While the third strategy of the proposal is the “Humanitarian support actions” there seems to be no explicit mention of what will exacerbate the humanitarian situation. Without a proper understanding of what is creating the problem will most likely lead to an inadequate solution to the problem. The process of developing a change process implores thinking about all change that we want from cultural, structural, and relational change. However, with vast literature suggesting gun ownership in the Congo might be borne from anywhere from protection, status symbol, or

simply as a tool to violence. This means the use of military efforts to disarm gun owners who might own guns for reasons other than conflict, might create unnecessary casualties or create a risk of alienating more citizens who might eventually find embrace in the rebel groups. For instance, a MONUSCO 2020, Report to the Secretary-General, states that from the year 2019 to 2020 the Congolese military was responsible for 44% of reported human rights violations in eastern Congo. Considering that neighboring countries have citizens who fled to the DRC due to conflicts in their respective countries, a report of human rights violations by the DRC army does not only raise serious concern to the neighboring countries and cooperating partners but might also lead to non-cooperation towards the whole initiative.

6.2.2 Important actors for conflict transformation

In building an infrastructure for establishing peace, it is important that a certain level of engagement is included from all states of the conflict if the process is to increase its probability of success.

However, the planning and details of the “Disarmament and Repatriation of all Armed Groups in Eastern Congo” were largely placed in the hands of the elite or top political and military heads, which according to Lederach (2014), is not the best approach to conflict transformation since political leaders usually attempt to fulfill political motives which mainly deals with a reshaping of the balance of power and influence in the military and political realm of the conflict-ridden society.

Attempting to bring some peace and security to the eastern DRC after a ceasefire agreement eventually, the DRC formed a coalition government which comprised four vice presidents, two of which came from rebel groups (SIDA, 2004:171). This approach had the potential to open up vertical separations in the government as each group of ministers had its own vice president, secondly, it has the risk of creating political competition than coalition, as each group will endeavor to have majority members in the election and each group will work more in ensuring its opposition group does not grow stronger than them. This scenario in turn puts the aspirations of the top leaders on top of the ordinary people thus risking another conflict.

Secondly, the top leadership has little or no sense of the reality of facts at the grassroots level as they are not affected by the everyday consequences of the conflict, on top of that political elites have a publicly known stance which makes it hard for them to compromise on their stance,

as with the case with when the M23 rebels were defeated, the DRC denied granting the group’s leaders the amnesty accorded to the rest of the rebels, while on the other hand the former rebel leaders were given asylum in Rwanda which was reluctant to hand them over to the DRC.

6.2.3 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region

The complexity faced in the previous peace attempts and the organization’s recognition of their earlier strategy being inadequate prompted the ICGLR to restructure its approach to attaining peace and security in DRC and the region. In February 2013, 11 countries signed the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region. This agreement provides an improvement from the earlier conflict transformation approaches specifically in the presentation of the situation and identifying important actors to conflict transformation. This created an opportunity for the ICGLR to address the root causes of the conflict and foster trust and cooperation between neighbors and other cooperating partners (ICGLR, 2013).

The agreement further made a commitment to consolidate state authority in eastern DRC, make progress in Decentralization, further reconciliation, and structural reform of public institutions (Ibid).

6.2.3.1 A new presentation of the situation in the DRC Conflict

An adjustment to the earlier attempt to transform the conflict in the DRC and the region can be seen in the emphasis of the agreement to reformulate the disarmament initiative by formulating the Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) done in collaboration with MONUSCO. This was a rethink of the first disarmament attempt, which faced many challenges. This attempt called for a comprehensive voluntary DDR of Congolese armed groups and the DDRRR of foreign armed groups (MONUSCO, 2021). The approach of including repatriation, resettlement, and a restructured reintegration, recognizes that conflicts in the eastern DRC are interconnected and affected by events and relations in neighboring states. For instance, the biggest rebel group currently operating in eastern DRC Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), responsible for multiple international law violations such as the use of child soldiers, killing, maiming, and sexual violence is originally from Uganda (UN, 2016). There has also been massive advocacy for more robust enforcement of the Regional

initiative against the illegal Exploitation and for Certification of Natural Resources. This not only acknowledges the impact of illegal exploitation of minerals on the ongoing conflict in the region, but also seeks commitment from member states and cooperating partners to concrete action such as training locals to police mining areas, and the commitment to the mineral certification mechanism (ICGLR, 2006).

This approach is in line with Lederach’s big picture of conflict transformation, which looks not only at the current conflicts but goes beyond history to uncover the relationships in the conflict and also provides an opportunity for a long term process of conflict transformation which is ultimately about changing individual attitudes and addressing the need for structural reforms (Ahere, 2012:1).

Secondly the new attempt is meant not only to end conflict and disarm rebels but goes further to provide an alternative means of survival for former armed rebels whose main source of survival has been through violent conflict. This initiative recognizes that conflicts have been driven by various factors, from economic, social, and political reasons.

6.2.3.2 Re-identifying important actors to conflict transformation

It has been suggested that “the causes of the DRC conflict were distinctively local, therefore, could only be properly addressed by combining action at the grassroots level with intervention at higher political levels” (Autesserre, 2010). Likewise, it is argued that the resurgence of conflict in the GLR points to the failure of ICGLR policies to make an impact on people at the grassroots level, and the failure to mobilize ordinary citizens to demand peace and stability from representatives (Kanyangara, 2016:5). This gap between the grassroots level and the top political representatives is filled with many various Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). Engaging the CSOs has been viewed as critical to the ICGLR achieving results that have been eluding them.

Even though CSOs have been recognized as being central to transforming the GLR instability into a space of stability and prosperity, their involvement has been very limited, however, this agreement commits to a more robust engagement of CSO, who are the middle-level players in conflict transformation. This according to Lederach (2014), is the most effective level of engagement in conflict transformation, since it consists of leadership not formally tied to major

conflict actors, has far more numerous players than top leadership, and consist of leaders who have a relationship with both the top-level leaders and the grassroots (ibid).

The agreement further emphasizes with regards to CSOs, the importance of putting in place a regular mechanism to review and assess their collaboration and complementarity towards peace and security (Kanyangara, 2016:5). This mechanism will help build the confidence and trust between top-level players (governments) and middle-level players (CSOs), which is likely to impact positively on conflict resolution, as governments can get a good sense of the reality on the ground through interaction with CSO and the grassroots, can trust the CSOs to represents their aspirations.

7 Conclusion

7.1 Concluding discussion

The name Great Lakes Region has been synonymous with chaos and violence for over two decades, which eventually necessitated the formation of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region. This study’s aim, as stated in the beginning, was to develop an understanding of how the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region has fared in the transformation of conflict in the region, with a special focus on the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In conclusion, as can be seen from the above analysis, the Disarmament and Repatriation of all Armed Groups in Eastern Congo lacked fundamental components to ensure a successful conflict transformation, everything from the mapping of the conflict, to assist in understanding not only the historical aspect of the conflict but as well as the relationship and structural aspects of the conflict. This oversight in approach left the process with many gaps.

The Disarmament and Repatriation of all Armed Groups in Eastern Congo at almost all stages was characterized by the involvement of external actors and foreign governments whose interests was can be argued to be mainly based on the need to ensure the DRC did not continue to be a breeding ground for rebel groups which operated against countries like Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda. Therefore, these countries' interests were more on securing their borders and reaching political solutions to the problem, than addressing the structural and historical issues of the people of the DRC.

Over the years with vast research on the conflict in the region, conflict transformation, there is a better understanding of the conflict in the region as well as conflict transformation and its processes, which has been visible in the later improved in the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region which backed many other robust peace attempts, among them the reformulated Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR), and the Regional initiative against the illegal Exploitation and for Certification of Natural Resources, which realizes the impact of illegal mining on the exacerbation of the conflict.

Lastly, the recognition and involvement of more CSOs in the process of strengthening the connection of the grassroots and the top leadership can be instrumental to making great strides in transforming the conflict in the DRC and the region. CSOs must be fully involved in working with other actors and stakeholders in consolidating peace in the DRC by focusing on transformative strategies that are aimed at ensuring the development of infrastructure to accommodate various grievances which lead to violent conflict.

7.2 Reflection on the results

I should note that the selection of my data has influenced the results of this study, since not all peace attempts have been deemed failures at achieving their intended purpose, and had the study relied on those peace attempts, the study would have given a picture of the DRC being a stable country. However, my justification for the data selection is that it reflects the current state of affairs in the DRC despite a few pockets of success, the country still has over 20 armed groups in eastern DRC actively engaging in armed assaults on civilians and government machinery. My conclusion, therefore, does not contradict the majority of previous research conducted on the peace attempts in the DRC and the GLR.

7.3 Suggestion for future research

Sadly, with all the above-mentioned positive changes, vicious cycles of brutal conflict remain worryingly high in the DRC, a situation which in the future should necessitate an intensive examination into why despite many peace attempts peace continues to elude the DRC.

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