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EU Conflict prevention, management and resolution in

Rome, July, 2003 EU Conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa

Rome, July, 2003 2• EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

This report has been prepared by International Alert and in coordination with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Saferworld is an independent foreign affairs think-tank working to identify, develop and publicise more effective approaches to tackling and preventing armed conflicts. 46 Grosvenor Gardens, London SW1W 0EB, United Kingdom,Tel: +44 (0) 20 7881 9290, Fax: +44 (0) 20 7881 9291 Website: www.saferworld.org.uk E-mail: [email protected],

International Alert is an independent, non-governmental organisation which analyses the causes of conflict within countries, enables mediation and dialogue to take place and helps to develop the skills necessary to resolve conflict non-violently. International Alert works regionally in Africa, , Southern and and conducts policy and practice-orientated research and advocacy aimed at promoting sustainable peace. 346 Clapham Road, London SW9 9AP, United Kingdom, Tel. +44 (0) 20 7627 6800, Fax. +44 (0) 20 7627 6900, Website: www.international-alert.org E-mail: [email protected]

The Seminar discussion paper prepared by International Alert and Saferworld: Harnessing the EU-Africa partnership for peace and security as primary conditions for development – building on strengths and addressing challenges is available to download at http://www.international-alert.org/pdf/pubdev/EUAfrica%20SeminarItalianMOFAJuly2003.pdf EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 3

CONTENTS

ACRONYMS 5 SECTION II DISCUSSION PAPER: HARNESSING THE GLOSSARY OF TERMS 7 EU AFRICA PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE AND SECURITY AS PRIMARY CONDITIONS FOR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 9 DEVELOPMENT 28

SECTION I EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND ROME SEMINAR ON EU CONFLICT RECOMMENDATIONS 29 PREVENTION MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA (ROME, JULY 28 29 INTRODUCTION 34 2003) 12 CHAPTER 1: Chapter 1: CONFLICT, DEVELOPMENT 1.1. CONTEXT FOR THE SEMINAR 13 AND GOVERNANCE 38 Dr Kevin P Clements, International Alert 1.2. FRAMEWORK FOR THE SEMINAR AND REPORT 14 CHAPTER 2: CURRENT APPROACHES TO Chapter 2: CONFLICT IN AFRICA 41 WORKING GROUP DISCUSSIONS: KEY ISSUES AND CONCLUSION 15 2.1 AFRICAN RESPONSES TO CONFLICT IN AFRICA 41 WORKING GROUP 1: Hesta Groenewald - Saferworld, Prospects for strengthening peace and security in Dr Monica Juma – SaferAfrica, Africa: opportunities for EU-Africa institutional James Mackie – ECDPM partnership 15 2.2 UN RESPONSES TO CONFLICT WORKING GROUP 2: IN AFRICA 45 Prospects for strengthening peace and security in Alice Hutchinson, Saferworld Africa: the contribution of civil society 18 2.3 EU RESPONSES TO CONFLICT CHAPTER 3: IN AFRICA 49 OVERARCHING CONCLUSIONS OF Dr Terhi Lehtinen THE EU SEMINAR ON CONFLICT PREVENTION MANAGEMENT AND CHAPTER 3: RESOLUTION IN AFRICA 22 INNOVATIVE RESPONSES TO CONFLICT, UNDERDEVELOPMENT APPENDICES: 24 AND GOOD GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA-HARNESSING THE APPENDIX 1. Presentations 24 EU-AFRICA PARTERSHIP’S UNIQUE ROLE 56 APPENDIX 2. Agenda 26 3.1 ENHANCING THE ROLE OF THE EU APPENDIX 3. Participants 26 IN SUPPORTING THE AU AND SUB- REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS 56 Professor Josephine Odera, Africa Peace Forum 4• EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

3.2 MAKING NEPAD EFFECTIVE APPENDIX 2 CASE STUDY: 75 AND RESPONSIVE: Wilfred Hughes THE ROLE OF THE EU 59 A Southern perspective APPENDIX 3 CASE STUDY: Dr Monica Juma, SaferAfrica AFRICAN GREAT A Northern perspective 77 James Mackie, European Centre for Andrew Sherriff, Development Policy Management (ECDPM) International Alert

3.3 DEFINING & STRENGTHENING THE APPENDIX 4 CASE STUDY: EU’S DIPLOMATIC ROLE WITH 79 AFRICAN INSTITUTIONS, STATES Thomas Ansorg, Saferworld AND OTHER MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS 62 APPENDIX 5 CASE STUDY: Professor Josephine Odera, 81 Africa Peace Forum Nana K.A. Busia, Jr., & Lindsay Alexander, International Alert Lulsegged Abebe & Lindsay Alexander, 3.4 ENGAGING AND UTILISING CIVIL International Alert SOCIETY FOR DEVELOPMENT AND PEACE-BUILDING 63 Guus Meijer, Conciliation Resources

3.5 EXPLORING HOW THE EU-AFRICA PARTNERSHIP CAN ENHANCE SECURITY ON THE 66 Peter Cross, Saferworld

3.6 NEW PERSPECTIVES ON EU- AFRICA TRADE FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT 68 Kato Lambrects, Christian Aid

3.7 EU–AFRICA HARNESSING THE PRIVATE SECTOR FOR PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT 70 Jessica Banfield, International Alert

Conclusion 73

APPENDICES: 74 NATIONAL AND REGIONAL CASE STUDIES:ANALYSIS OF THE STRUCTURAL AND PROXIMATE CAUSES OF CONFLICT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

APPENDIX 1 CASE STUDY: ANGOLA 74 Guus Meijer, Conciliation Resources EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 5

Acronyms

ACP Africa, and Pacific ADB Africa Development Bank APRM African Peer Review Mechanism APSA African Peace and Security Agenda AU CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CMC Conflict Management Centre COMESA Common Market for Southern and East African States CPS Country Strategy Papers CPU Conflict Prevention Unit CSR Corporate Social Responsibility DDR Disarmament Demobilisation and Integration DG Development Development Directorate General DG Relex External Relations Directorate General DG Trade Trade Directorate General DFID Department for International Development DPKO UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations DRC Democratic Republic of Congo EAC EBA Everything But Arms EC European Community ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States ECHO European Conflict and Humanitarian Office ECOMOG Ecowas Monitoring Group ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States ECDPM European Centre for Development Policy Management ECPC European Civilian Peace Corps EDF European Development Fund EIB European Investment Bank EIDHR European Initiative for Human Rights and Democracy EPLO European Peace Liaison Office EU European Union ESDP European Security and Defence Policy EUPM European Union Police Mission FDI Foreign Direct Investment GAC General Affairs Council G8 Group of 8 (UK and Northern Ireland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, US, Russia) HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries HOM Head of Mission HSIC Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee IDP Internally Displaced Person IEMF Interim Emergency Multinational Force IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development MS Member State NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NEPAD New Partnership for Africa ’s Development NGO Non-governmental organisation NSA Non state actor 6• EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in PPEWU Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PSC Political and Security Committee PSO Peace Support Operation PSOF Peace Support Operation Facility RECs Regional Economic Communities RRF Rapid Reaction Force RRM Rapid Reaction Mechanism RSP Regional Strategy Papers SADC Southern African Development Community SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons SSR Security Sector Reform TNC Transnational Corporation UN United Nations UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia UN PoA United Nations Programme of Action EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 7

Glossary of terms

A lack of clarity and shared European Union (EU) understanding of the definition and use of terms related to conflict prevention creates obstacles to advancing a culture of conflict sensitivity across all EU institutions, processes and sectors. Understanding of the use of conflict prevention terminology in the paper does at times differ from the EU’s often varied application of the terms. Below are the definitions of terms used in the context of this paper:

Conflict prevention: long-term activities, which aim to reduce the structural tensions or prevent the outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violence (EPLO 2002).1 Conflict prevention denotes the full range of activities applicable to this aim including early warning, crisis management, peacekeeping, , conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation.

Early warning: the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purpose of: a) anticipating the escalation of violent conflict; b) the development of strategic responses to these crises; and c) the presentation of options to critical actors for the purpose of decision-making (FEWER, 1997 in PIOOM, Synthesis Foundation and FEWER,1998).2

Crisis management: the co-ordinated and timely application of specific political, diplomatic, economic and/or security related measures and activities taken in response to a situation threatening peace. The aim of which is to defuse tension, prevent escalation and contribute towards an environment in which a peaceful settlement of violent conflict or potential conflict is more likely to occur (EPLO, 2002). To be effective crisis management must be planned and implemented with its contribution and transition to longer-term conflict prevention as a key consideration.

Civilian aspects of crisis management There are four priority areas of civilian aspects of crisis management as defined by the Feira European Council in June 2000: police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection. Concrete targets have been met whereby member states have provided: 5000 police officers for international missions with the capacity to deploy 1000 personnel within 30 days; 200 experts in the field of rule of law; a pool of experts in civilian administration and two or three assessment teams that can be dispatched within three to seven hours and intervention teams of up to 2000 persons for deployment at short notice for civil protection. (http://ue.eu.int/pesc/default.asp?lang=en)

Military aspects of crisis management Under the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (agreed upon at the Helsinki European Council in December 1999), the EU can deploy within sixty days, and sustain for at least one year, up to 60,000 troops capable of carrying out the full range of Petersberg Tasks.This does not involve the establishment of a European army. The commitment and deployment of national troops is based on sovereign decisions taken by member states. (http://ue.eu.int/pesc/default.asp?lang=en)

Peacekeeping: common terms for various types of activity carried out: to resolve conflict; to prevent conflict escalation; or halt or prevent military actions; to uphold law and order in a conflict zone; to conduct humanitarian actions; to restore social and political institutions whose functioning has been disrupted by the conflict; and to restore basic conditions for daily living.

1 Building conflict prevention into the future of Europe: Conference report and EPLO position paper on the European convention and conflict prevention – 14 November 2002, Brussels, EPLO, 2002. 2 Alex P.Schid, Thesaurus and glossary of early warning and conflict prevention terms, PIOOM, Synthesis Foundation and FEWER, May 1998. 8• EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

The distinctive features of peacekeeping are that they are conducted under a mandate from the UN or regional organisations whose functions include peace support and international security (PIOOM, Synthesis Foundation and FEWER,1998). Peacekeeping operations can involve both civilian and military personnel and take place with the consent of the conflicting parties.

Conflict management: efforts to contain and reduce the amount of violence used by parties in violent conflict and engage them in a process to settle the dispute and terminate the violence (Creative Associates International, 1998 in Payson Conflict Study Group, 2001).3

Peacebuilding: the employment of measures to consolidate peaceful relations and create an environment that deters the emergence or escalation of tensions, which may lead to conflict (International Alert, 1995, ibid.). The overarching goal of peace-building is to strengthen the capacity of societies to manage conflict without violence, as a means to achieve sustainable human security (CPCC, undated, ibid.).

Conflict resolution (post-conflict peace-building): a process that transforms conflicts in an enduring manner rather than settling disputes or suppressing differences, by addressing basic human needs and building qualities of sustainable relationships between groups through creating structural mechanisms involving equality among identity groups, multi-culturalism, and federalism as appropriate to each situation (Fisher, 1997, ibid). This involves understanding and addressing the root causes of conflict.

Civil society: civil society exists outside the family, the market and the state. It represents citizens of society (individuals or organisations) outside the government, public administration or commercial sector who work to promote general or specific issues or interests on a not-for-profit basis. Civil society can include non-governmental / community-based organisations, women’s associations, youth organisations, indigenous people’s representatives, trade unions (workers’ collectives), religious organisations and the media.

Non-state actors (NSAs): citizens of society (individuals or organisations) outside the government or public administration that work to promote general or specific issues or interests. NSAs include civil society as well as actors in the commercial sector, i.e. profit-making business.

EU-Africa dialogue: a process of political dialogue between the EU and Africa launched by the first Africa-EU Summit in Cairo, April 2000.

ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement: a comprehensive trade and aid agreement between 77 Africa Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the European Union (EU) signed in Cotonou, Benin. It is the world’s largest financial and political framework for North South cooperation (Saferworld, 2002)4.

The Strategic Partnership for Africa (SPA): the SPA is dedicated to providing effective assistance to African countries although, more recently, the emphasis has shifted to supporting African efforts to reduce poverty. The World Bank Regional Vice President for Africa chairs the SPA and the partnership includes the Economic Commission for Africa, the Africa Development Bank and UNDP Africa Bureau.

3 Payson Conflict Study Group,Tulane University, A Glossary on Violent Conflict:Terms and Concepts used in Conflict Prevention, Mitigation and Resolution in the Context of Disaster Relief and Sustainable Development, prepared for USAID Office of Sustainable Development, Bureau for Africa Crisis, Mitigation and Recovery Division, May 2001. 4 Saferworld,Conflict Prevention Network,Africa Peace Forum and InterAfrica Group, Understanding the EU – A civil society guide to development and conflict prevention policies July 2002. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 9

Executive Summary

On 28-29 July 2003, the Italian Presidency of the European Union (EU) held an International Seminar on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa.The aim was to provide fresh insight into how the EU-Africa partnership can be re-invigorated in order to:

1. Strengthen conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa as a strategic and development priority for the EU; 2. Address and meet the challenges of sustainable peace, security and development in Africa; 3. Highlight potential opportunities for EU engagement with the 2001 New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) framework and with the recently formed African Union (AU); 4. Highlight opportunities for EU engagement with civil society in the African peace and security framework.

Senior officials from 24 EU Member and Accession States; the European Commission and the Council of the EU General Secretariat, met with representatives from African civil society to discuss key issues relating to peace and development in Africa.5 In addition, contributions were made by the UN Secretary General’s Special Advisor on Africa, Dr Ibrahim Gambari; Director of Political Affairs for the Africa Union, Dr Samuel Ibok; EU Special Representative for the Mano River Union, State Secretary Hans Dahlgren; EU Special Representative for the , Dr Aldo Ajello, and the Personal Representative for Africa to the G8 of the Italian Prime Minister, Hon. Alberto Michelini.

With the indefinite postponement of the EU-Africa Summit (following the cancellation of the Lisbon Summit in April 2003) the Seminar provided a useful opportunity to focus attention towards EU-Africa relations.The Seminar was also a timely follow-up to both the agreement made by the AU and NEPAD, in in February 2003, to ‘operationalise’ the African Peace and Security Agenda and the AU Maputo Summit in July 2003 where African Heads of State requested EU support for a Peace Support Operations Facility (PSOF).This was also the first time that African civil society were able to engage with the EU at this level and was an important step forward in strengthening engagement between the different actors in conflict prevention and resolution. Over the two days a range of different perspectives were heard in presentations, in plenary and through working group discussions that focused on two areas: Opportunities for EU-Africa institutional partnerships and the contribution of civil society.

To support the Rome seminar a background discussion paper was prepared for the delegates by a variety of European and African authors. The paper placed the seminar in the context of previous and ongoing EU Africa engagement and offered new ways forward.

This report consolidates the outcomes of the Rome seminar and the background paper. It is divided into two sections; Section I Report on Rome seminar on EU Conflict prevention management and resolution in Africa, Section II background paper: Harnessing the EU Africa Partnership for Peace and Security as Primary Conditions for Development.

Key themes, conclusions and recommendations include:

Maximising potential for the EU-UN-AU tri-lateral partnership for peace and development: There is widespread consensus that a tri-lateral partnership between the UN, the EU, and the African Union provides a strong framework for peace, security and development in Africa. For this tri-lateral partnership to be effective, it must be based on a process of continuous consultation

5 See pages 26-27 10 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

and co-ordination, so as to ensure that complementary roles and responsibilities are clearly articulated and acted upon.

In the past, when the EU Member States, the UN and African initiatives have acted in a coherent manner, together they have had a significant impact on peace, development and security, as evidenced in Mozambique and over the recent / Eritrea conflict. In this respect it may be necessary to encourage development of new arrangements, presently under consideration, for enhancing co-ordination and coherence between these institutions and ensuring that they are focussed towards an integrated approached to peace, security and development.

Re-invigorating the EU-Africa dialogue: Uncertainty persists concerning the resumption of the EU-Africa dialogue at summit level.The Commission Communication on the EU-Africa Dialogue (June 2003) aims to ‘pave the way for a resumption of high level political dialogue meetings’ and calls for ‘new modalities of EU-Africa dialogue and cooperation’.The proposals for new dialogue mechanisms outlined in the Communication provide useful ways forward and should be followed up by the European institutions. In particular, the need for a consultative mechanism between the EU and the AU on matters relating to Peace and Security is widely felt.The establishment of regular contacts in Addis Ababa between local EU Heads of Mission (HOM) and the EU Commissioner for Peace and Security should be a first step. Such a regular dialogue could be enlarged to other donors and to the Chair of the Peace and Security Council, once established.

Developing peace support operations: Recent examples of African peacekeeping forces intervening in the stabilisation of crises (, Liberia, and Democratic Republic of Congo) show the importance of tripartite co-operation between EU, UN and African actors. In the long-term, an African stand-by force would be an appropriate response: the G8 Ad Hoc Working Group on Security has identified, through coordination with the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and AU institutions, the target of setting up an African Brigade as a pan-African rapid intervention force by 2008.There are questions, however, of ownership, accountability and control of African peacekeeping capabilities that need to be addressed, although accountability should not come at the cost of flexibility and effectiveness of any African standby force.

Strengthening complementarity between regional and continent-wide processes: Some regional organisations are well placed to encourage a regional approach to conflict prevention, management and resolution, through mobilising peacekeeping activities, early warning and regional economic and political integration. In order for the continent-wide peace and security efforts to succeed, it is important to ensure that regional efforts are extended and co-ordinated with continent-wide ones to ensure complementarity and avoid duplication of efforts.The mandates and capacities of the 14 regional organisations, however, vary substantially. The EU could play an important role in supporting the AU and UN in strengthening regional organisation’s conflict prevention capacities and, in other cases, fulfilling this role in the absence of a regional institution. Civil society also plays an important consultative and monitoring role for regional organisations and their relations need to be strengthened.

Optimising an integrated and mutually reinforcing approach to development, trade and conflict prevention: Economic and social development and conflict prevention, management and resolution are genuinely complementary and mutually reinforcing. The prevention of longer-term conflict in Africa depends upon strengthening its overall economy and providing more opportunities for its people. The EU’s trade policies towards Africa should incorporate and be measured against both the Millennium Development Goals and EU commitments to conflict prevention. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 11

Addressing economies of war: Natural and mineral resources in failed states fund the activities of armed groups. Oil exploitation has, for example, been a major conflict trigger in Angola, Nigeria and recently Sao Tomé and few benefits have reached the populations. The EU should continue to apply political pressure on setting codes of conduct and standards, and mechanisms need to be created to ensure that natural and mineral wealth supports development and structural stability in Africa rather than undermines it.

Enabling civil society’s active role in building peace and security in Africa: The EU and UN have acknowledged, for some time, that the state alone cannot prevent or resolve conflict. Civil society organisations therefore play an important role in advancing peace and security at local, national, sub-regional and regional levels. Their various roles include: holding governments to account, exercising pressure on warring parties and fostering dialogue, mediating conflicts, raising awareness, advocating for peace, capacity-building, promoting democracy at all levels and policy development.

The signing of the ACP-Cotonou Partnership Agreement in 2000 noted that the active participation of civil society is vital since the state requires the support and active involvement of civil society if efforts to build peace and foster development are to be sustained. The AU has also acknowledged the important role civil society can play and, as such, has made a provision in its Constitutive Act, which stipulates that civil society consultation should be undertaken for all policy decisions. It is important to point out, however, that civil society should not be viewed as an alternative to the state, rather it should complement and strengthen the state system.

Mapping civil society expertise in peace and security issues: It is important to draw upon the insights of a range of African civil society organisations when addressing peace and security issues.The EU should support a civil society mapping project in Africa, allowing for increased consultations of EU and African institutions with civil society organisations.

Funding civil society organisations: Civil society organisations need and deserve support, both financially and sometimes technically, via skills transference.The EU is well placed to provide this support through its wide range of programmes and budget lines.Whilst funding for civil society organisations is available for development-orientated work, civil society organisations working in the field of conflict prevention have greater difficulties accessing funds. A reinforcement of EU development programmes directed to NGOs with relevant expertise in the field of CPMR must be encouraged. 12 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

Section 1 Report on the Rome Seminar on EU Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa

Rome, 28/29th July 2003 EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 13

Chapter 1

1.1. Context of the Seminar

Africa has suffered a total of one third of global armed conflicts over the past decade. The bottom 27 countries in the UNDP’s human development index are African and there are an estimated 6.1 million refugees and 20 million internally displaced persons across the continent. Conditions of underdevelopment, corruption, lack of democracy and freedom of expression provide fertile breeding grounds for terrorism, the proliferation of arms and drugs trafficking and the militarization of state and society.

In the new millennium, a number of positive initiatives have indicated the will for African responses to these problems, as well as international support for the new peace and security agenda in Africa. The establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2002 has set the stage for a new African framework and agenda for peace and security. The AU has endorsed NEPAD (The New Economic Partnership for African Development) as its operational programme and plans to set up a continental early warning system, an African stand-by-force and a special Fund for peacekeeping and conflict prevention (already created). The AU has also established innovative instruments for state-to-state review and monitoring of good governance and security through the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the Panel of the Wise. The African Union Summit held in Ethiopia in February 2003 was dedicated to the resolution of conflict in Africa, resulting in the agreement for African-led peace measures in seven African countries.6 In the AU Summit in Maputo in July 2003, the proposal for a Peace and Security Council was not ratified. However, with time, this has the potential for representing a major step forward in pan-African responses to African conflicts.

The EU is in a unique and important position to promote peace and sustainable development in Africa. In addition to strong historical ties between EU Member States and some African countries, there is also broad political will to engage with the continent.The EU remains the largest donor to the African region and can therefore play a leading role in conflict prevention through its development, trade and foreign policy instruments.The EU has taken part in various initiatives in support of the EU Africa Partnership including:

• The signing of the ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement (June 2000). • The EU-Africa Summit in Cairo (April 2000) and reflected in the resulting Cairo Declaration which made specific commitments on peacebuilding, conflict prevention, management. • The follow-up Summit in Ouagadougou (November 2002) outlined agreed areas of action and progress on the prevention and settlement of conflicts. • The Helsingborg Conference (August 2002) which brought together representatives from the Member and Acceding states, key EU institutions, the UN, OSCE, NATO, AU, ECOWAS and SADC - representing the first inter-institutional meeting of its kind on conflict prevention. • The G8 meeting in Evian (June 2003) met with the NEPAD Steering Committee and agreed to expand dialogue on NEPAD and the G8 Africa Action Plan.

The most recent and ongoing initiatives include: • The granting of 10 million Euros in April 2003, to support the AU’s agenda for peace and security and another 2 million for institutional support. EU Commissioner Poul Nielson has

6 The Summit agreed to peace measures in Burundi, Ivory Coast, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, , Comoros and Liberia. 14 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

also announced the potential “shaving-off” of European Development Funds (EDF) for the establishment of an African peacekeeping force. • The Commission Communication on the EU-Africa Dialogue (June 2003), which stressed the need for a re-invigorated EU-Africa dialogue through new avenues and in which the more long-term conflict prevention approach to conflict in Africa through trade, development and foreign policy instruments (via the Cotonou Agreement) were highlighted.

1.2. Framework for the seminar and report7

Over the two days of the Seminar a range of different perspectives were heard in presentations, in plenary and through working group discussions. Varied EU and African perspectives were presented from the EU Presidency, the UN, the AU, the EU Special Representatives, the G8, the European Commission and from African civil society. Two working groups then tackled two key issues - Prospects for strengthening peace and development in Africa:

1) Opportunities for EU-Africa institutional partnership and, 2) The contribution of civil society.

Key conclusions from the working groups were then presented in plenary, followed by a free discussion and closing comments from the Presidency.

Section 2 below provides a synopsis of the key issues and conclusions discussed in the working groups. It also highlights the key recommendations that came out of the two-day seminar to be fed into on- going policy processes and practice in Africa and the EU. Section 3 outlines the overarching conclusions of the Seminar. For a summary of the presentations given by the high level EU and African representatives, please see appendix 1. Appendix 2 and 3 provide the agenda for the Seminar and the list of participants.

7 See agenda attached on page 26 EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 15

Chapter 2 Working group discussions: key issues and conclusions

WORKING GROUP 1: PROSPECTS FOR STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA: OPPORTUNITIES FOR EU-AFRICA INSTITUTIONAL PARTNERSHIP

Working Group 1, chaired by the delegation of Ireland, focused on four items for discussion and the following key conclusions and recommendations emerged:

1. How can the EU better interact with and support the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC)? Context:At the AU Summit in Maputo in July this year, only seventeen of the twenty-seven ratifications needed for the entry into force of the protocol on the PSC were obtained. It is expected, nonetheless, that, by the end of the year, the remaining ratifications will be adopted for the passing of the PSC.A support programme for 10 million Euro by EU for AU activities in the field of Peace and Security has been signed on 2nd April in Addis Ababa by Commissioner Nielson.

• The EU-Africa dialogue needs to be re-invigorated. Uncertainty persists concerning the resumption of the EU-Africa dialogue at summit level (with the postponement of the second EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon in April this year). Even with the resumption of the practice of EU-Africa Summits, however, there is a need for a more agile and effective mechanism for a dialogue, as well as for a more focused agenda.

The ministerial troika meeting between the AU and the EU in the margins of the Maputo Summit on 11th July was a positive step forward. GAERC conclusions of 21st July 2003 underlined the joint strong commitment for the continuation and enhancement of the dialogue, with peace and security as a top priority, and confirmed the mutual wish to pursue the dialogue at Ministerial level with another troika meeting in the near future.

The Commission Communication on the EU-Africa Dialogue (June 2003) aims to,“pave the way for a resumption of high level political dialogue meetings” and calls for “new modalities of EU-Africa dialogue and co-operation”. The proposals for new dialogue mechanisms outlined in the Communication provide useful ways forward and should be followed up by the European institutions.

In particular, the need for a consultative mechanism between the EU and the AU on matters relating to Peace and Security is widely felt.The establishment of regular contacts in Addis Ababa between local EU Heads of Mission (HOM) and the EU Commissioner for Peace and Security should be a first step. Such a regular dialogue could be enlarged to other donors and to the Chair of the Peace and Security Council, once established. Similar procedures should likewise be established in the various capitals that host the Secretariats of the sub-regional and regional organisations.

• The fundamental barriers are political, not technical. Barriers to effective EU- Africa engagement include African institutions’ limited absorption, capacity and mechanisms, however, the key issue is political will from EU and African Member States. With political will, come resources. As one participant questioned,“Is Africa just our past, or is it our priority”.

• Need for African agenda setting and joint AU-EU planning. The EU should listen and hear African perspectives. The EU-AU relationship should be based on a common set of values – human rights, non-impunity, good governance etc – and not be built on another set of conditionalities. 16 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

• Support the African mechanisms in place. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the Panel of Eminent Person both have great potential for contributing to conflict prevention by promoting good governance and development. These mechanisms are still in their infancy and they must be given time to develop. Their legitimacy and capabilities will, however, be strengthened through support at the governmental, regional, continental and international levels.

2. How can the EU-Africa partnership better support the development of the Peace Support Operations Facility (PSOF)? Context:The Maputo Summit adopted a resolution requesting the establishment by the EU of a Peace Support Operations Facility, based on the principles of ownership and solidarity.The President of the Commission Romano Prodi announced to the Plenary of the Summit the potential “shaving-off” of EDF funds for the establishment of an African peacekeeping force.

A complementary, resourced and accountable peace support operations facility (PSOF):

• Recent examples of African peacekeeping forces intervening in the stabilisation of crises (Burundi, Liberia, Ivory Coast) show the importance of tripartite co-operation between EU, UN and African actors. A positive example was given by the rapid launch by the EU of operation Artemis in response to the request by the UN Secretary General for the constitution of an interim emergency multinational force in Bunia, DRC.This force is contributing to the stabilisation of the security and humanitarian situation in Bunia and is going to allow the UN Secretary-General to reinforce MONUC’s (UN mission in Congo) presence in Bunia.

• In the long-term, an African stand-by force would be an appropriate response: the G8 Ad Hoc Working Group on Security has identified, through coordination with the UN Department for Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and AU institutions, the target of setting up an African Brigade as a pan-african rapid intervention force by 2008.The latter would include a planning and command unit to be deployed in the field, and a civil component in order to make the peacekeeping effort a truly multi-dimensional one.

• Transparency of the African PSOF is essential for its sustainability. There are questions of ownership, accountability and control of African peacekeeping capabilities that need to be addressed. Accountability should not, however, be at the cost of flexibility and effectiveness of any African stand-by force. De-mining activities in Mozambique, for example, were delayed and too inflexible due the conditionalities set out for accountability purposes. The balance between accountability and efficiency of any PSO activities is crucial and deserves consideration by the EU at the outset of any mission.

3. What role can the EU play in supporting the development of regional organisations in Africa as part of the EU-Africa Dialogue process? Context:The conflicts in Africa have regional dynamics and therefore demand regional solutions. Strengthening regional security and development through regional economic and political integration are priorities for the EU in Africa.The African regional organisations input into the EU regional strategy papers and indicative programmes and are also linked into the pan-African peace and security framework under the AU.

• Strengthening complementarity between African regional organisations under the AU peace and security framework. Regional mechanisms can be effective focal points for a regional approach to conflict prevention through mobilising peacekeeping activities, early warning and regional economic and political integration.The mandates and capacities of EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 17

the 14 regional African organisations, however, vary substantially. Only ECOWAS and SADC, for example, have regional peacekeeping capabilities. West and benefit from strong leadership from Nigeria and South Africa to drive the regional organisations forward. lacks a lead state with the political and economic capability and credibility to take up such a role. In the Horn, could potentially play this role within the IGAD framework.

In the absence of an effective sub-regional organisation capable of making a contribution to conflict prevention (such as the African Great Lakes Region) the EU might support AU and UN initiatives to address conflict. With the functioning regional organisations, the AU can also play an important role in linking the regional bodies together under a unified continent-wide peace and security agenda. The EU could support the AU in doing this by strengthening the co-ordination of expenditure across regional organisations on PSOs and other cross-cutting issues (such as small arms, illicit exploitation of natural resources, terrorism).

• Strengthening linkages between regional institutions and civil society. Civil society relations provide a consultative and monitoring role for regional organisations and their relations need to be strengthened. Annual review meetings between regional organisations, civil society and the EU (the Commission and delegations) should be considered. Lessons should also be learned from a recent ECOWAS-civil society meeting in which mechanisms were agreed upon through which civil society can engage with conflict prevention issues in the region and influence ECOWAS’ policies on human security.8

4. How can cross-cutting issues of trade, natural resources, development and security be made more coherent for a multi-faceted conflict prevention approach? Context:We underline that further efforts are needed to prevent violent conflict at the earliest stages by addressing their root-causes in a targeted manner and with an adequate combination of all available instruments, EU Africa Cairo Declaration, April 2000.

• No development without peace. After 50 years of development in Africa, development has not proven to bring peace to the continent. Peace is, therefore, the prerequisite to long-term sustainable development. Africa-EU relations are based on a culture of development and humanitarianism, and lack a culture of peace and security. Development programmes, for example, too often overlook issues of good governance, policing, security sector reform, justice and non-impunity. An essential aspect of linking development to conflict prevention is the strengthening of coherence between CFSP, Cotonou and other trade agreements.

The UN Special Advisor on Africa’s mandate is to provide the link between the development aid and humanitarian arms (e.g. UNDP) and the political and security departments of the UN (UNSC, DPKO etc). The establishment of a similar role for the EU would assist with co- ordinating CFSP and DG Dev issues across the pillars.

• Addressing economies of war. Natural and mineral resources in failed states fund the activities of armed groups. Oil exploitation has, for example, been a major conflict trigger in Angola, Nigeria and recently Sao Tomé. Natural resource exploitation is not necessarily the cause of violent conflict but exacerbates it as war economies thrive and prolong conflict. The EU has played a crucial role in supporting the Kimberley Process to control the trade in conflict diamonds, and has also done preliminary work on a communication on the conflict timber trade.

8 During the Consultation on Strengthening the Human Security Capacities of ECOWAS and West African Civil Society in Abuja, Nigeria (May 30- June 1 2003), hosted by ECOWAS, Centre for Democracy and Development and International Alert, it was agreed that a civil society co- ordination committee should be established and a civil society liaison representative appointed within the ECOWAS Secretariat. 18 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

The EU should continue to apply political pressure to ensure that the Kimberley Process legislation stays on track, including provision for formal monitoring mechanisms, and preparing private sector actors to follow-through on their commitments under the Process. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), launched by the UK Government, whose objective is to increase transparency over payments and revenues in the extractive sector in countries heavily dependent on these resources, deserves the support of the EU.The UN Panel of Experts Reports on the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other forms of wealth in the DRC should also be followed-up.

Disincentives, such as smart sanctions, need to be put in place against those states that intervene in other territories for resources. In addition to preventing the illicit exploitation of natural resources for the benefit of a few elites, mechanisms also need to be created to ensure that natural and mineral wealth supports development and structural stability in Africa for the wider population rather than undermines it.

• Assessing the impact of trade. The prevention of longer-term conflict in Africa depends upon strengthening its overall economy and providing more opportunities for its people. The EUs trade policies towards Africa should incorporate and be measured against both the Millennium Development Goals and EU commitments to conflict prevention. Practical tools, such as indicators and benchmarks, for the monitoring of impact of EU trade and aid engagement in Africa should be developed and joint conflict impact assessments should take place in consultation with the AU,African regional organisations,African states and civil society.

WORKING GROUP 2: PROSPECTS FOR STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY IN AFRICA:THE CONTRIBUTION OF CIVIL SOCIETY9

“Co-operation with other actors and with stakeholders in a conflict situation is needed in order to achieve sustainable processes and a high degree of ownership”, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU PROGRAMME FOR THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS,JUNE 2002.

The EU and UN have acknowledged10 for some time that the state alone cannot prevent or resolve conflict. Civil society organisations therefore play an important role in advancing peace and security at local, national, regional and continental levels. The signing of the ACP Cotonou Partnership Agreement in 2000 noted that the active participation of civil society, particularly in the field of conflict prevention, is vital since the state requires the support and active involvement of civil society if efforts to build peace are to be sustained. Equally so, it is clear that civil society should not be viewed as an alternative to the state, rather it should compliment and strengthen the state system.

NGOs are key actors in conflict prevention. Often they are on the ground in situations where official state structures are absent.They can function as reliable and neutral observers in situations where there is no international presence and mediation activities by specialised NGOs have also proven decisive.

9 Civil society is a contested concept. For the purposes of the Rome Seminar, civil society refers to all those organised groups, financially independent of the state, who articulate collective interests, submit specific political demands to the state and hold state authorities accountable for their actions. These groups can include NGOs, grass roots organisations, women’s organisations, youth organisations, indigenous peoples representatives, trade unions, religious organisations, private local and multi-national business and the media. 10 The Cotonou Agreement (2000) calls for the participation of non-state actors, including civil society, private sector and local governments in EU-ACP co-operation. Articles, 8, 9, 11 and 96 relate specifically to how this partnership relates to the issue of conflict prevention. Other relevant documents include the Council/Commission policy statement on the ‘ECs Development Policy’ (2000) and the ‘Commission Communication on the Participation of Non-State Actors in EC Development Policy’ (2002). The UN Secretary-General’s report, ‘The Prevention of Armed conflict’ (2001) also noted that,‘NGOs can contribute to the maintenance of peace and security by offering non violent avenues for addressing the root causes of conflict at an early stage. Moreover, NGOs can be an important means of conducting track II diplomacy when governments and international organisations are unable to do so.’ EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 19

The AU has also acknowledged the important role civil society can play and, as such, has made a provision in its Constitutive Act, which stipulates that civil society consultation should be undertaken for all policy decisions. Civil society was also actively involved in identifying NEPAD’s priority areas for peace and security later endorsed by the G8 and AU.

The participation of the African civil society representatives in this forum at the Rome Seminar was a first, and should be commended. However, despite the recognition of the role of civil society in policy and by their very participation in the Seminar, the contributions made by nine African civil society representatives proved that there remains a gap to be filled in the understanding of the appropriate roles civil society organisations (CSOs) can play in advancing peace and security agendas and in how best the EU can support civil society’s efforts to do so.

Working group 2, chaired by the delegation of Belgium, focused on three key questions for discussion and the following key conclusions emerged:

1. What is the role of civil society in advancing the Africa Peace and Security Agenda?

Civil society organisations are often viewed as service delivery organisations, requiring project support, which act at the grassroots level, to supply populations with basic services that the state is failing to provide. This view of civil society is too narrow. The civil society workshop at the Rome Seminar identified the variety of roles played by civil society at the local, national, sub- regional and regional levels: These include:

• Holding governments to account by providing oversight and monitoring.

• Exercising pressure on warring parties and fostering dialogue between them and other actors in the conflict. Civil society often has more access to these groups and can avoid diplomatic hurdles faced by governments.

• Mediating conflicts. There are many positive examples of where civil society organisations play an important role in encouraging conflicting parties to negotiate. The Mano River Women’s Network were, for example, able to organise the first Heads of State meeting between the three countries involved in the sub-regional conflict.

• Raising awareness. The media can play a critical role in both exacerbating and mitigating war. Wider civil society organisations (including conflict-sensitive media) can counteract this by raising awareness of the true nature of a conflict, thereby consolidating peace (e.g. the success of Burundi’ s independent radio).

• Capacity-building. Civil society is weak or non-existent in many parts of Africa. Areas or which have more vibrant civil society organisations can assist others via effective networks, workshops, seminars and trainings. Civil society can also help build the capacity of government structures. Community-based policing in Kenya, for example, aims to foster a culture of co- operation and trust between the Kenyan police force, local authorities and communities. • Promoting democracy at all levels. Civil society’s advantage is that it can work towards long- term solutions. It can provide, for example, expertise and advice and broaden debates to prepare the ground for elections (locally and nationally) and it can support parliamentary assemblies. 20 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

• Policy development. Civil society can and has assisted with policy development, nationally, sub- regionally, regionally and internationally - the role played by the South African NGO SaferAfrica in developing the NEPAD peace and security priorities, for example.

2. How can civil society best perform these functions and advance the African peace and security agenda?

In order to implement the eight priorities of the Africa Peace and Security Agenda,11 and the Cotonou Partnership Agreement, the active participation of civil society is required. The civil society workshop at the Rome Seminar identified a variety of methods by which this engagement could be achieved. These include:

• Implementing the African peace and security agenda – civil society will need to be directly involved in order to guarantee success. For example: • Priority 3: Early warning – Civil society can encourage an early response to potential conflicts through excellent analysis of both the root causes of a conflict and the evolving situation. • Priority 5 - Stemming the flow of illicit weapons will require that civil society organisations raise awareness in communities, both of the dangers of the weapons and on how people can participate in collection and destruction programmes. • Priority 6 - Improving Security Sector Reform (SSR) will require the active oversight of civil society.

• Enhancing civil society dialogue with parliaments, for example, via the Joint EU-ACP Parliamentary Assembly (JPA) and the EU-ACP Civil Society Forum (although the latter has yet to be operationalised).

• Mainstreaming conflict prevention measures – Civil society organisations can ensure that the peacebuilding agenda is better integrated into longer-term development processes.

• Recognising and advancing the important role that women play in implementing the peace and security agenda. See the Maputo Declaration on gender mainstreaming and the effective participation of women in the African Union by the representatives of African women’s organisations and networks, 24 June 2003. 12

• Focusing on youth groups, providing them with alternative opportunities to conflict.

3. How can the EU best support civil society in Africa?

Recognising the role of civil society

The EU-Africa dialogue should recognise, via political dialogue, the important role that civil society can play towards enhancing the peace and security agenda.

11 In March 2002, NEPAD’s Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee developed six priority areas. These formed the basis of the G8 Africa Action Plan adopted in June 2002 and were then operationalised under the African Peace and Security Agenda at the AU-NEPAD meeting in Addis Ababa in February 2003. The six areas are: Developing mechanisms, institution building processes and instruments for achieving peace and security in Africa; Improving capacity for and co-ordination of early action for conflict prevention, management and resolution; improving early warning capacity in Africa through strategic analysis and support; prioritising strategic security issues such as DDR; ensuring action to eradicate the problem of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons; improving the security sector and the capacity for good governance as related to peace and security; generating minimum standards for the exploitation and management of Africa’s resources in areas affected by conflict; assisting in resource mobilisation for the AU peace fund and for regional initiatives aimed at preventing, managing and resolving conflicts on the continent. 12 The Maputo Declaration on gender mainstreaming and the effective participation of women in the African Union can be downloaded at http://www.au2003.gov.mz/2003_docs.htm EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 21

Ensuring civil society’s input into the policy-making process

Whilst the AU is engaging with African civil society through existing African civil society forums at the national level (e.g. Cotonou Steering Group), regionally (e.g. IGAD Civil Society Forum) and at a continent wide level (e.g. AU Civil Society Network), the EU and European NGOs are failing to systematically communicate with or utilise these channels.

Consideration should be given to supporting the establishment of civil society co-ordinators in EC delegations, whose sole responsibility would be to ensure regular dialogues between civil society, EU and African governments.The information obtained from dialogue with civil society organisations could help inform Country Strategy Papers, be fed into analysis prepared for Council orientation debates and also inform programming priorities.

EU HOMs in African capitals should engage representatives of civil society organisations in regular dialogue, including over issues of conflict prevention.

An EU-Africa Civil Society Forum, ahead of the next high level EU-Africa gathering, deserves support in order that civil society can submit relevant policy proposals.

A joint ACP-EU Parliamentary Assembly advocacy training workshop for EU and African civil society representatives might also be considered.

Mapping civil society expertise in peace and security issues

It is important to draw upon the insights of a range of African civil society organisations when addressing peace and security issues. Undertaking detailed country mappings of civil society organisations is one way of achieving this, and lessons could be learned from the recent Cotonou civil society consultation mapping process carried out in Sudan.

A civil society mapping project at regional level in Africa deserves EU support in order that a variety of civil society organisations with relevant expertise in advancing the eight priorities of the Africa Peace and Security Agenda are identified. Once identified, these civil society organisations could be consulted by the AU via established channels.

Funding civil society organisations

Civil society organisations need and deserve support, both financially and sometimes technically, via skills transference. The EU is well placed to provide this support through its wide range of programmes and budget lines. Whilst funding for civil society organisations is available for development-orientated work, civil society organisations working in the field of conflict prevention have greater difficulties accessing funds.

The EU should revisit the inter-linkages between conflict prevention policy and development with a view to removing constraints that exist on the use of development aid and guaranteeing more flexible and transparent funding mechanisms. 22 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

Chapter 3 Overarching conclusions of the EU Seminar on conflict prevention management and resolution in Africa.

Maximising the potential for the EU, UN,African Union tri-lateral partnership for peace and development

There is widespread consensus that a tri-lateral partnership between the UN, the EU, and the African Union provides a strong framework for peace, security and development in Africa.

For this tri-lateral partnership to be effective, it must be based on a process of continuous consultation and co-ordination, so as to ensure that complementary roles and responsibilities are clearly articulated and acted upon. In the past, when the EU Member States, the UN and African initiatives have acted in a coherent manner, they have had a significant impact on peace, development and security, as evidenced in Mozambique and over the recent Ethiopia / Eritrea conflict.

To maximise impact within this tri-lateral partnership, horizontal linkages between these institutions and processes, and vertical linkages between them and regional organisations and other implementation arms, need to be co-ordinated and coherent.

In this respect it may be necessary to encourage development of new arrangements, presently under consideration, for enhancing co-ordination and coherence between these institutions and ensuring that they are focused towards an integrated approached to peace, security and development.

Optimising an integrated and mutually reinforcing approach to development and conflict prevention

There is a convergence of views that the activities related to peace and security form a continuum, stretching from conflict prevention to peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Economic and social development, conflict prevention, management and resolution are genuinely complementary and mutually reinforcing. Development processes that do not take account of conflict prevention considerations risk being unsuccessful, and the converse is also true.

Development and conflict prevention can be brought closer together through the agreement of integrated priorities and operational plans and ensuring the appropriate EU / African and EU institutional relationships facilitate rather than hamper this process. This integration should be tasked with overcoming the impasse of “no development without peace, no peace without development”. However, much work remains to be done to bring the two constituencies together for better understanding and coordination.The recent UN Office for West Africa bringing together both the security and development instruments is a key and welcome development in this area.

Utilising the EU for the building of African capacity in conflict prevention, management and resolution

The EU itself has much to offer Africa in terms of building capacity in conflict prevention, management and resolution – including peacekeeping. While financial resources form a central pillar of this, there is also an important technical capacity building and skills transfer role that the EU can fulfil. While appropriate accountability needs to be agreed, innovative approaches to EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 23

providing EU financial resources towards this end should be actively pursued. In this regard, the recent Commission proposal to look at EDF resources merits further attention and support. Currently, the EU support continues to be assessed on a case-by-case basis; the establishment of an ad-hoc facility would represent a comprehensive and predictable response.

Enabling civil society’s role in building sustainable peace and development in Africa

It is important that the EU recognises the key role that civil society can play in the EU-Africa partnership, both in terms of advocacy in the policy-making process and in the micro- management of crises, as well as a partner in the delivery of assistance. Civil society is not a substitute for an effectively functioning state, rather it plays a complementary role and can enhance opportunities for peace and conflict prevention. It is important to ensure that all means of engagement between the EU and African civil society (e.g. through the Cotonou framework) are maximised.Therefore, the EU should support a civil society mapping project in Africa, allowing for increased consultations of EU and African institutions with civil society organisations. In addition, a reinforcement of development programmes directed to NGOs with relevant expertise in the field of CPMR would be commendable. 24 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

Appendicies The dynamic and reinforcing partnership between the AU and the EU in promoting peace, security and stability in Africa is welcomed APPENDIX 1: PRESENTATIONS by the AU, especially in its support for the establishment by the EU of a Peace Support Operations Facility (PSOF) for the African Union Note: The ‘summary of presentations’ contained below were drawn and the financial assistance of 10 million Euro for the AU’s peace from notes taken by International Alert and Saferworld during the and security agenda. However, the AU appeals to the European seminar and other supplementary material. Union to, “explore further what it can do to support the ongoing initiatives by ECOWAS and the United States in Liberia”. A message • Summary of address by UN Secretary General Special of hope from the African Union; hope in its ability to build a future Advisor on Africa, Dr Ibrahim Gambari. more peaceful, secure and definitely hopes for a stable Africa. This is achievable, but the AU is also not so naïve as to think that it can Professor Gambari opened his speech with the question, “How can be done all on its own. today’s EU-Africa partnership be more results-orientated in delivering assistance to the people of Africa?” There is a greater • Summary of address by the EU Special Representative need for EU co-ordination with regard to African affairs and for the Mano River Union, State Secretary Hans institutions, and the long-term prevention of conflict in Africa Dahlgren. depends on strengthening its overall economy with more opportunities for its people. Three specific actions were Hans Dahlgren opened his speech by stating that the EU-Africa recommended for this end. The EU should: Seminar is “very timely” as in Monrovia, disease, hunger and an influx of refugees is leading to a “humanitarian catastrophe”; this • formulate a comprehensive ‘Africa policy’, which incorporates on the background of “a spiral of mistrust and violence that has commitments made towards the Millennium Development Goals lasted over a decade”. Without political will, nothing will change, and the outcomes of recent international conferences, such as yet only Africans can solve Africa’s conflicts and increased political Doha, Monterrey and Johannesburg; will has been demonstrated by the development of the AU and • prioritise support towards assisting the AU and sub-regional NEPAD. organisations in their plans to implement peace, security and development work, and There is increased awareness in Africa of the need for a more • strengthen Africa’s efforts at economic and trade capacity- integrated approach to conflict prevention and resolution. The case building and development. in Sierra Leone, where Pakistanti peacekeepers lead the re- establishment of civilian services, undertook DDR, SSR, human • Summary of address by the Director, Peace and rights justice and reconciliation initiatives, institutional and Security in the African Union Commission, Ambassador democratic reform and redistribution of natural resources is a good Samuel Ibok. example of an integrated approach. As part of an integrated approach, the success of the Mano River Union Women’s Union in Ambassador Ibok stated that, “the African Union is predicated on bringing together the three heads of state from Liberia, and two major planks that also converge with the NEPAD priorities – Sierra Leone in sub-regional dialogue, is another example of the peace and security on the one hand and development on the other”. importance of involving women (as well as other civil society With the active support and collaboration of partners like the United groups) in peacebuilding activities. Nations and the European Union, as well as other bilateral initiatives, the African Union is today better equipped, as an West Africa is a regional conflict dynamic and therefore institution, to tackle the scourge of conflicts in Africa. However, the necessitates regional analysis and regional solutions. The EU’s challenge remains as to how to work together to implement this comparative advantage is that it does not have a specific agenda to capacity to make a difference to those affected by conflict on the promote in West Africa and this facilitates partnership between the ground in Africa. EU and the regional body, ECOWAS. The EU has shown it can be of support through, for example, the joint missions between ECOWAS There is hardly any conflict in Africa today that does not have one and the EU [with the Ghanaian Foreign Minister and the Special African organisation, be it regional or sub-regional, an African Representative (Dahlgren)] in the Liberian Peace talks. leader or a collection of leaders, devoting resources and time to bring about closure. However, “the reality remains that such efforts • Summary of address by the EU Special Representative continue to be undermined by constraints of resources to support for the Great Lakes Region, Dr. Aldo Ajello. their implementation”. Nowhere has this been more acutely felt than in the deployment of peacekeeping forces, where international Dr Ajello remarked that, “the UN simply cannot carry out all the support has been “grossly inadequate, a little too late and work that is necessary in solving conflicts in Africa”. Not only is sometimes not available, to say the least”. the cost insurmountable but the UN can create expectations which cannot be realised since they are only peacekeepers, not enforcers. Within the framework of the new Peace and Security Agenda, the For this reason, mobilising the efforts of regional and continent Assembly of the Union in Maputo adopted core programmes that wide organisations is important. seek to strengthen the Union’s capacity in conflict prevention, management and resolution.13 The Peace and Security Council was, Whilst regional organisations have played a successful role (e.g. however, not ratified. Nonetheless, any concerns that there is no ECOWAS), the case of the DRC proves that they can in fact political will to support this mechanism should be dispelled. The complicate matters. Not only do they lack training and resources problem of ratification is not a political problem, but a technical but regional organisations also face difficulties when negotiating one. Once the provisions are internalised by Africans through their with rival Heads of State, since close proximity to countries in elected representatives, this will ensure ownership of the Council by crisis, can create suspicion and heighten tension. the generality of African peoples. By December this year, the required number of ratifications will be attained. The EU, UN and international community should support continent wide organisations, namely the AU and ensure greater consistency in their response to crises. The UN and AU working together, backed by a firm international community, is the key and should be 13 This includes through mechanisms to address peace enforcement strengthened. When this happens, change is possible (e.g. the (peacekeeping), democracy, good governance, human rights, successful Mozambique UN mission). The recent EU Operation humanitarian crises, DDRR and mainstreaming civil society, women and Artemis has similarly proved successful and prevented the region youths. from returning to full blown conflict. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 25

• Deputy Head of Unit Co-ordinator ACP political Issues, ownership, accountability and control of an African peacekeeping European Commission, Mark Van Bellinghen. force that need to be addressed. The development community is also wary of the transferral of funds away from other important Mr van Bellinghen noted that, “peace is the absolute pre-requisite, development needs. However, if managed correctly, security and without which no development can even be envisaged”. Quoting development responses can be mutually beneficial as, without the words of the UN Secretary General he added, “there is no trade- addressing sustainable development, “the EU and Africa will be off between development and peace support measures”. doing crisis management for the next 30 years”. This means linking crisis management, conflict prevention and rehabilitation Support for Peace Support Operations, (operations which cover a through balancing the EU CFSP, trade and aid responses to Africa. wide range of actions from conflict prevention actions (mediation) up to post conflict reconstruction) is now wide-spread amongst the All the major conflicts in Africa have regional dimensions and international community and Africa. At the Maputo Summit, the therefore demand regional solutions. Regional organisations can African Heads of State requested EU support for a Peace Support play an important role in this but that each requires “different types Operations Facility (PSOF). In the AU’s view, this should be and levels of support from the EU and AU”. financed from resources allocated to each African State under existing co-operation agreements with the EU. This effectively The EU has a well-developed policy framework and tools through means that European Development Funds (EDF) will be re-oriented which these issues can be re-visited, however, in doing this, one to cover peace and security related expenditures. The EDF will cross-cutting issue needs to be addressed – implementation. The shortly start operating the recently signed 12 million Euro which is EU has grappled with understanding why conflict prevention is an largely aimed at covering operational costs of AU mediators, important issue and why the EU is an important actor in this field, facilitators and observer missions. now the question is how can this be put into practice? What indicators and benchmarks should, therefore, be developed to Questions remain, particularly over the political framework of the measure the impact of the EU’s engagement in peace and security PSOF. It is important that Africa retains ownership of the facility in Africa? whilst addressing, with the EU, issues of management and legality. EU Seminar on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution • Summary of address by the Director of the Africa (CPMR) in Africa (Rome, 28/29th July 2003) Department, Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lars Ronnas.

During working group 1, the Swedish delegate provided an introductory speech on, “Beyond to the Gothenburg Action Plan: taking forward EU commitments on conflict prevention in Africa”. As framed in the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts and other related texts, at the Goteburg European Council (June 2001) the EU committed itself to:

• set clear political priorities for preventive actions, • improve early warning, action and policy coherence, • enhance its instruments for long- and short-term prevention, and • build effective partnership for prevention.

With these commitments, the emergence of the new African peace and security framework and the tripartite role of the UN in Africa, the legal and political framework is in place for building peace and security in Africa. Therefore is there now a coherent approach for translating policy into action?

The important link between security and development has been made, however, the EU suffers from lack of institutional coherence (through the pillar structure). Solutions therefore need to provide linkages through, for example, the formulation of country approaches and the rapid reaction mechanism. Development mistakes from the past must, however, not be repeated, and here the DAC development principles can be drawn upon. Development and security, however, are not enough; “human rights violations also undermine society”. Human rights are embodied in EU and African law, yet dialogue on human rights is “infrequent and mistrust prevails”. Questions therefore need to asked as to whether the Cotonou Agreement provides a sufficient basis for driving forward EU-Africa engagement on peace, security and development.

• Summary of address by Manager of the Development & Peacebuilding Programme at International Alert, Andrew Sherriff

Andrew Sherriff framed the issues and key questions for discussion during working group 1. He started by stating that the EU’s role with the AU goes beyond recent financial support, therefore, “what is the role of the EU with the AU?”

The Peace Support Operations Framework is a key aspect of this relationship, however, there are delicate issues relating to 26 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

APPENDIX 2: AGENDA APPENDIX 3: LIST OF PARTICIPANTS 28th July 1800 OPENING SESSION Senator Alfredo MANTICA, DEPUTY MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF ITALY • Welcome address by Italian Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Alfredo Mantica Ambassador Bruno CABRAS, DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, • Address by UN Secretary General Special Advisor on ITALIAN MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (CHAIRMAN OF THE SEMINAR) Africa, Dr. Ibrahim Gambari • Address by Representative of African Union, Dr. Ambassador Ibrahim GAMBARI, SPECIAL ADVISER ON AFRICA OF THE UNITED Samuel Ibok, Director for Political Affairs – African NATION SECRETARY GENERAL vision on CPMR, new peace and security framework and prospects of co-operation with the EU Ambassador Samuel IBOK, DIRECTOR FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS OF THE AFRICAN UNION Buffet-dinner Ambassador Hans DAHLGREN, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE 29th July PRESIDENCY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE MANO RIVER UNION 900-1045 PLENARY SESSION • Communication by the EU Special Representative for Dr. Aldo AJELLO, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION FOR THE the Mano River Union, State Secretary Hans GREAT LAKES REGION Dahlgren • Communication by the EU Special Representative for Hon. Alberto MICHELINI, PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFRICA TO THE G8 the Great Lakes Region, Dr. Aldo Ajello OF THE ITALIAN PRIME MINISTER • Representative of the European Commission, Marc Van Bellinghen REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AFRICAN CIVIL SOCIETY • Representative of the African Civil Society, (IN ALPHABETICAL ORDER) Joel George (Pal) Martins 1. Mme Venantie Nabintu BISIMWA, SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL DU RESEAU DES 1045-1100 COFFEE BREAK FEMMES POUR LE DÉVELOPPEMENT ET LA PAIX (RÉPUBLIQUE DÉMOCRATIQUE DU CONGO – RDC)

1100-1330 WORKING GROUPS 2. Prof. Sam Gbaydee DOE, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE WEST AFRICA WG1: (Sala Nigra – 1st floor) Prospects for NETWORK FOR PEACEBUILDING (WANEP) (GHANA) strengthening peace and security in Africa: opportunities for EU-Africa institutional partnership 3. Prof. Hashim Mohammed EL HADI, DEPUTY CHAIRMAN OF THE SUDAN Chaired by the Delegation of Ireland NON-STATE ACTORS INTERIM COMMITTEE (SUDAN) Introduction by International Alert Presentation by the Swedish Delegation “Beyond the 4. Mme Khady FALL TALL, SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL DE L’ASSOCIATION DES Gothenburg Action Plan: taking forward EU FEMMES DE L’AFRIQUE DE L’OUEST (SENEGAL) commitments on CPMR in Africa”. WG2 (Sala delle Conferenze Internazionali): Prospects 5. Dr. Vasu GOUNDEN, DIRECTOR OF THE AFRICAN CENTRE FOR THE for strengthening peace and security in Africa: the CONSTRUCTIVE RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES (SOUTH AFRICA) contribution of civil society 6. Dr. Joel George (Pal) MARTINS, DIRECTOR OF SAFERAFRICA (SOUTH AFRICA) Chaired by the Delegation of Belgium Introduction by Saferworld 7. Mr. Abdul MOHAMMED, DIRECTOR OF THE INTER-AFRICA GROUP (ETHIOPIA) In relation to the designated issue, each working group will: 8. Dr. Eugéne NINDORERA, ANCIEN MINISTRE POUR LES DROITS DE L’HOMME 1. analyse and discuss the nature of each specific issue DU BURUNDI (BURUNDI) 2. identify relevant institutional stakeholders and their linkages within Africa and Europe 9. Mr. Angelo TIGER, CHAIRMAN OF THE SOUTH SUDANESE COTONOU INTERIM 3. identify strengths and weaknesses COUNCIL (SUDAN) 4. brainstorm solutions or processes likely to advance the EU-Africa partnership on peace and security 5. discuss key recommendations for further action DELEGATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION AND EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 1330-1500 LUNCH PRESIDENCY - ITALIA 1500-1800 PLENARY SESSION Sandro DE BERNARDIN, EUROPEAN CORRESPONDANT, MFA (1630-1645 COFFEE BREAK) Daniele VERGA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL, DG FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, MFA - Reports from the Chairs of each working group Antonino PROVENZANO, HEAD OF SECRETARIAT TO VICE MINISTER SEN. - Further discussion MANTICA, MFA Giuseppe BERLENDI, HEAD OF MULTILATERAL AFFAIRS DESK, DG FOR SUB- CONCLUSIONS SAHARAN AFRICA, MFA Benedetto LATTERI, HEAD OF SECRETARIAT, DG FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, MFA Pierfrancesco SACCO, HEAD OF PESC UNIT, DG FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION, MFA Giammichele DE MAIO, PERSONAL ASSISTANT TO VICE MINISTER SEN. MANTICA Paolo TOSCHI, FOCAL POINT FOR THE ITALIAN PRESIDENCY - AFRICA WORKING GROUP, DG FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, MFA

EUROPEAN COMMISSION Jean Christophe BOIDIN, HEAD OF UNIT, DG DEV C1 (REGIONAL MATTERS) Marc VAN BELLINGHEN, DEPUTY HEAD OF UNIT, DG RELEX A4

COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION GENERAL SECRETARIAT Peter CLAUSEN, DESK OFFICER FOR AFRICA , DG E V Marie Louise LINDORFER, DESK OFFICER FOR AFRICA, DG E V EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 27

EIRE / IRELAND BELGIQUE Nicholas O’BRIEN, (CHAIRMAN OF WG 1), COUNSELLOR, AFRICA SECTION, Jan MUTTON, DIRECTEUR AFRIQUE, SERVICE AFRIQUE (CHAIRMAN OF WG 2) POLITICAL DIVISION Sophie DA CAMARA, EXPERT À QUALIFICATION SPÉCIALE, DIRECTION GÉNÉRALE Emma LEONARD, THIRD SECRETARY, SECURITY POLICY SECTION, DE LA COOPÉRATION INTERNATIONALE, SERVICE AFRIQUE POLITICAL DIVISION. Isabelle MADUDA LUKEBAMOKO DESK AFRIQUE OCCIDENTALE, SERVICE AFRIQUE CESKA REPUBLICA Lenka POKORNA Segretario, CZECH EMBASSY, ROME ESPANA José Luis Martìn YAGUE, HEAD OF SUB-SAHARAN AREA UNIT, DG FOR NEDERLAND MEDITERRANEAN, AND AFRICA Arend HUITZING, ADVISOR, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA DEPARTMENT Joop NIJSEEN, 1ST SECRETARY, DUTCH EMBASSY ROME DANMARK Loch TEN HAGEN, 2ND SECRETARY, DUTCH EMBASSY ROME Lars BREDAL, DEPUTY HEAD OF DEPARTMENT EAST, WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA Rolf Michael HAY PEREIRA HOLMBOE HEAD OF DIVISION EESTI Katrin MOON, LIAISON OFFICER FOR THE ITALIAN PRESIDENCY, ELLAS ESTONIAN EMBASSY, ROME Alexandros PAPAIOANNOU SECRETARY, GREEK EMBASSY, ROME

LUXEMBOURG SUPPORTING INSTITUTIONS Nadia ERNZER, AFRICA DESK, MFA SAFERWORLD KYPROS Sue DE LA MESURIER Paul EAVIS UNITED KINGDOM Vanessa HAINES Bernard HARBORNE, DEPARTIMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT Alice HUTCHINSON Ian FORBER, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE Claire MILLINGTON, BRITISH EMBASSY, ROME INTERNATIONAL ALERT Lulsegged A. ABEBE LATVIA Lindsay ALEXANDER Ludmila BULIGINA, CONSIGLIERE LATVIAN EMBASSY, ROME Andrew SHERRIFF

OSTERREICH SCUOLA DI SANT’ANNA Monika GRUBER LANG, SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA DESK, MFA Valeria IZZI Elisabeth LEINER

LIETUVA Edita LAZDAUSKAITE, SECOND SECRETARY, LITHUANIAN EMBASSY , ROME

SUOMI – FINLAND Heli SIRVE, UNIT FOR WESTERN AND EASTERN AFRICA Heidi MARTTILA, PROGRAMME OFFICER, UNIT FOR SOUTHERN AFRICA

MAGYARORSZAG Peter GYORI, HEAD OF SECTION, DEPT. OF EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION; Zsolt MARIS, AFRICA DESK, 6TH TERRITORIAL DEPARTMENT Domokos VEKAS FIRST SECRETARY, HUNGARIAN EMBASSY, ROME

DEUTSCHLAND Johannes REGENBRECHT, REFERAT 302 (DIVISION SOUTHERN AFRICA AND GENERAL AFRICAN AFFAIRS) AUSWÄRTIGES AMT

MALTA Joseph IZZO CLARKE, COUNSELLOR, MALTA EMBASSY, ROME

PORTUGAL Vasco VALENTE AMBASSADOR OF PORTUGAL TO ITALY Carla SARAGOCA SECRETARY, PORTUGUESE EMBASSY, ROME

POLSKA Wojciech PONIKIEWSKI, MINISTER-COUNCELLOR, POLISH EMBASSY, ROME Krzysztof STRZALKA, FIRST SECRETARY, POLISH EMBASSY, ROME

FRANCE Jean Christophe BELLIARD, SOUS-DIRECTEUR POUR L’AFRIQUE CENTRALE ET ORIENTALE Marie Claire GERARDIN, COUNSELLOR, FRENCH EMBASSY, ROME

SLOVENIA Mateja VODEB, MFA, DEPT. FOR ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA

SVERIGE Lars RONNAS, DIRECTOR, AND DEPUTY HEAD OF THE AFRICA DEPARTMENT Ragnar ANGEBY, AMBASSADOR, DEPARTMENT OF GLOBAL SECURITY

SLOVENSKO Miriam RAFAJOVA, SECRETARY, SLOVAK EMBASSY, ROME 28 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

Section 2

DISCUSSION PAPER FOR THE ROME SEMINAR ON EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

Harnessing the EU-Africa partnership for peace and security as primary conditions for development

Rome, 28/29th July 2003 EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 29

Executive summary and recommendations

This discussion paper has been written in preparation for the EU-Africa Seminar, hosted by the Italian EU Presidency in Rome in July 2003. The efforts of the Italian Presidency are timely.Whilst the continent remains poverty stricken and ravaged by conflict, it appears there is a renewed commitment by both Africa, the EU and the international community to develop fresh approaches to address peace and security. The EU-Africa dialogue offers an opportunity for alternative means of guaranteeing security and development by moving away from the reactionary, hard security approach, exemplified by the “war on terror” and the European Security Strategy, towards a longer-term conflict prevention approach that utilises all the EU and African mechanisms available.

The aim of the paper is to place the Seminar in the context of previous and on-going EU-Africa engagement in conflict, security and development.The Seminar provides an opportunity to follow- up and build-on the work of previous presidencies in this field. This paper reviews progress so far and provides recommendations for further measures to strengthen EU and African capacity on conflict prevention and to improve the coherence and effectiveness of EU action in the field.

Chapter 1: Conflict, development and governance

Critical for understanding the obstacles to human security is the nexus between governance, development and conflict. Fragile states, characterised by a lack of rule of law, impunity, organised crime, weak law enforcement, corruption and an absent or underdeveloped civil society are more likely to suffer from conflict. The promotion of state and public sector reform is a pre-requisite for effective conflict prevention, sustainable development and poverty alleviation.This is particularly relevant in Africa, where some individual government policies advance particular sets of interest that can negatively impact on the welfare of society as a whole. This chapter highlights the importance of:

• Developing state systems with an emphasis on eliminating corrupt behaviour and supporting justice and security sector reform programmes. • Engaging with civil society as an important tool of governance. • Assessing the impacts of conditionality set by EU national regional and multilateral development agencies on African political and economic systems.

Chapter 2: Current approaches to conflict in Africa

African responses to conflict in Africa

Despite the frequent lack of resources, technology and capacity, African states themselves are taking collective action to prevent and resolve violent conflicts. This is due in part to the increasing reluctance of the international community to take the political, military and financial risks of intervening in African conflicts, and because of the realisation that modern internal conflicts have extremely costly regional impacts.

Continent wide, regional, national and local strategies to prevent violent conflict are required.The creation of NEPAD in 2001 and the establishment of the Africa Union (AU) in 2002 reflect a reinvigorated attempt at developing African strategies for the prevention and resolution of conflicts. The challenge is to ensure that these continent-wide approaches are effectively integrated into the sub-regional economic and conflict prevention initiatives carried out by SADC, ECOWAS and IGAD. In other fledging sub-regions, institutions need support to emerge into functioning organisations capable of making a contribution to conflict prevention. Underpinning all 30 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

of these initiatives, should be the involvement of local civil society groups.This section highlights a number of measures that would strengthen African responses including:

• Drawing upon and integrating into AU structures, the peacekeeping experiences of ECOWAS and the early warning structure of IGAD. • Taking forward the AU and NEPAD’s priorities (which converge with the aims of the EU development assistance) across all the EU’s development trade and foreign policy instruments. • Supporting and strengthening linkages and interaction between government and civil society.

UN responses to conflict in Africa

The UN’s commitment to conflict prevention in Africa is strong. In response to the disasters of Somalia and , it is attempting to improve both its peacekeeping operations and its longer- term strategies for conflict prevention.The UN is beginning to institutionalise methods and mechanisms to ensure that conflict prevention is mainstreamed across the UN system. In the current geopolitical climate, where the hard security approach is being pushed, the challenge is to ensure that emphasis on conflict prevention mainstreaming is maintained and not undermined by other agendas. Furthermore, the EU and AU, who are increasingly engaging with the UN in preventing conflict in Africa, should mirror this strategy. It is vital that all plans for crisis management in Africa are linked with longer-term prevention strategies, which include the input of civil society. Efforts to achieve a comprehensive approach should include:

• Encouraging Member States to support the UN politically, operationally and financially. Political will is required to ensure that the Security Council authorise peacekeeping operations with effective mandates and robust rules of engagement and that necessary resources are available. • Strengthening the UN’s Early Warning and Preventive Measures training within the UN and beyond. • Integrating conflict sensitivity/analysis throughout the UN’s programming - from planning to evaluation. • Developing co-operation across the UN, EU and other international institutions in order to co-ordinate with the emerging AU peace and security agenda.

EU responses to conflict in Africa

The EU has a unique capacity to have significant and positive impact on promoting structural stability in Africa. Political, social and cultural relations between Europe and Africa date back several centuries. The EU has a number of political mechanisms and financial instruments at its disposal to support peace and development in Africa including, trade cooperation, justice and home affairs instruments, and development budget lines.The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (2000) provides a framework for EU-Africa cooperation in political and economic spheres, which for the first time calls for the participation of non-state actors including civil society, private sector and local governments, in the development and implementation of policy and programmes. The EU-Africa Partnership is promoted through various international, African and non-state actor initiatives, such as Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers, NEPAD, small arms initiatives, civil society networks and parliamentary initiatives including the Joint ACP-EU Parliamentary Assembly. Despite these initiatives, many challenges remain to be overcome if the EU-Africa Partnership is to become truly effective in achieving peace and development on the ground. Difficulties include: the EU’s preference for engaging in conflicts nearer to home rather than in the poorest parts of the world, the EU’s institutional complexity and divergent foreign policy interests in Africa and the EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 31

traditional focus of EU assistance on short-term emergencies rather than longer term development efforts. This section makes recommendations, which include the following:

• Ensuring effective use of EU financial instruments and enhancing political dialogue with African regional organisations in order to build capacities and strengthen political and economic partnerships. • Enhancing cooperation between EU and African citizens, NGOs, governments, parliamentarians, universities and local governments, e.g. through institutional twinning. The African diaspora could play a significant role in promoting the EU Africa partnership for peace. • Making capacity building the key approach for partnership. Investing in institutional capacity and training in peace and development is the first step towards enhanced partnership.

Chapter 3: Innovative responses to conflict, underdevelopment and good governance in Africa – harnessing the EU-Africa Partnership’s unique role.

The human security and development record of African countries has not been as encouraging as hoped. The EU continues to play a critical role in the development of Africa and African organisations but this needs to be enhanced. The aim of this chapter is to encourage innovative approaches to conflict prevention and put forward some ideas to develop key partnerships.

Enhancing the role of the EU in supporting the effectiveness of the AU and sub- regional organisations

Weak states make weak institutions. For the AU and other sub-regional organisations in Africa to play a more effective role in peace and development, the EU must focus more attention on the development of capable and effective state systems in Africa. This should be undertaken through a number of capacity building and co-ordination measures including:

• Supporting governments committed to democratic processes as well as ensuring that civil society become and remain engaged in conflict prevention processes, e.g. IGAD’s Early Warning and Early Response (CEWARN) was developed with substantial involvement of civil society organisations. • Strengthening African institutions both by helping policy direction and providing technical support. • Sharing institutional skills with institutions, e.g. through EU/Africa institutional secondments. • Improving EU and other donor co-ordination within intergovernmental organisations.

Making NEPAD effective – the role of the EU

NEPAD is an important new African initiative, which acknowledges that peace and security are essential preconditions for accelerated growth and security. Actors both in the international development community and in Africa remain confused about its value. Two authors, one from the South, the other from the North offer their sometimes varying opinions on how the EU can enhance NEPADs role, including;

• Supporting joint AU-NEPAD activities such as joint consultations, coordination activities and information sharing. • Enhancing the capacity of the AU and NEPAD by providing direct training and institutional development. 32 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

• Ensuring the participation of non-state actors in processes. • Recognising that the AU rather than NEPAD is the proper institutional framework and has the political legitimacy for harnessing partnership relations and addressing African challenges of conflict, underdevelopment and governance. • Developing clear common policy on support to pan-African institutions. The EU Governments and EC have a poor level of exchange of information between them on what they are doing to support NEPAD and the AU.

Defining and strengthening the EU’s diplomatic role with African institutions, states and other multilateral organisations

The long history of EU-Africa relations offers both opportunities and constraints to the EUs diplomatic role. African relations with multilateral organisation, including the IMF and World Bank, have stressed economic conditionality, which is pronounced as solely economic but perceived by African states as politically dependent. The EU therefore has a balancing role to play, by influencing the governance situation and establishing when conditionalities should be eased.The diplomatic role of Special Representatives provides a key opportunity and should be strengthened, as should the EU-ACP Joint Parliamentary Assembly. Recommendations include:

• Strengthening the EU’s diplomatic role by engaging in dialogue with the EU, African countries and also representatives of multilateral agencies. • Supporting the important role played by Special Representatives by establishing a central funding mechanism and encouraging close co-operation with the UN in conflict regions. • Enhancing the role of the EU-ACP Joint Parliamentary Assembly through greater dialogue with non-state actors and to generate more effective monitoring of the implementation of EC co- operation through, for example, the development of a working group on peace and security.

Engaging and utilising civil society (individuals and organisations) for development and peacebuilding

A vibrant and representative civil society can play an important complementary role to the state. In designing its development policies and specific projects, the EU should be aware of the interdependence of state and civil society as well as their fundamentally different characters. The Cotonou Partnership Agreement recognises the important role of civil society and the EU needs to undertake a number of measures to strengthen civil society legitimacy, capacity and organisational development including:

• Encouraging civil society group networking (including regionally and sub-regionally) in order to develop democratic practices. • Building capacity of civil society groups and ensuring that EC Country Delegations monitor local developments and trends and tailor support to meet needs. • Balancing support for civil society with support for the state and security sectors. Peace and development cannot be brought about by civil society in a political and legal vacuum. The EU must work with state institutions and agencies in order to increase effectiveness, transparency and accountability.

Exploring how the EU-Africa partnership can enhance security on the continent

Whilst there are many causes for Africa’s security dilemma, the breakdown of the state and its inability to provide security for its people and the excessive proliferation of small arms are key causal factors. In attempting to address problems of insecurity in Africa’s conflicts, a concerted, multi-layered and co-ordinated effort is required. Local, regional, national and international EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 33

partnerships are essential to this process. The EU-Africa partnership therefore has a vital role to play. Key priorities to be addressed include the need for effective demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) programmes, reform of the security sector, and the need to tackle the spread of small arms. Actions to achieve these ends could include:

• Reviewing best practice internationally in DDR programmes, to ensure that such programmes are adequately resourced and that peacekeeping missions have effective mandates that include disarmament. • Developing security sector reform programmes focusing on all of the component parts of the security sector including the judiciary, military, customs and police, and encouraging community-based policing to be an integral part of this. • Taking a comprehensive approach to tackling the small arms and light weapons issue and support full implementation of regional and sub-regional agreements such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Firearms Protocol and the Declaration for the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes region, as well as the UN Programme of Action.

New perspectives on EU-Africa trade for peace and development

One of the symptoms of Africa’s underdevelopment is its inability to trade its way out of poverty. International trade and investment has the potential to create wealth which, if fairly distributed, addresses one of the root causes of conflict in Africa, namely access and control over resources. Irresponsible trade, however, can fuel and prolong violent conflict, as has happened with oil and diamond extraction in countries such as Sudan, Angola and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Although in theory African exports are eligible to enter the European market without facing any tariff barriers (through the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions and now the Cotonou Partnership agreement) African exports to the EU declined by more that half between 1975 and 1995. The paper makes a number of recommendations including:

• Committing funds and political resources to investigate how future Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms will affect the development of agro-processing industries in African countries. • Extending the moratorium on export subsidies to a permanent elimination of export subsidies on exports destined for African markets. • ACP negotiators and the Commission undertaking a through revision of the rules of origin that African products need to comply with in order to undertake preferential treatment. • Revising the series of demands that the Commission and the European trade ministers have included in their mandate that concern the opening up of African markets upon entry into force of Economic Partnership Agreements.

EU-Africa harnessing the private sector for peace and development

Although the EU has identified the nature and behaviour of the private sector as a significant factor in many conflicts, little effort has been made to engage the different types of private sector actors in conflict prevention. However, a conflict-sensitive private sector could play an important role in peace and development. A number of recommendations are made including:

• Applying political pressure to ensure that the Kimberley Process legislation stays on track and progressing preparations for a communication on conflict timber. • Developing clear guidelines for EU multinational corporations working in conflict zones. • Exerting pressure on exporting countries to accept independent experts to monitor the illegal trade in conflict commodities. • Exploring options for the European Commission to partner with the private sector in poverty reduction, development and conflict prevention policies. 34 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

Introduction

This discussion paper has been written in preparation for the EU-Africa Seminar, hosted by the Italian EU Presidency in Rome in July 2003. The efforts of the Italian Presidency are timely.Whilst the continent remains poverty stricken and ravaged by conflict, there is a renewed commitment by both Africa, the EU and the international community to develop fresh approaches to address peace and security.The EU-Africa dialogue offers an opportunity for alternative means of guaranteeing security and development by moving away from the reactionary, hard security approach, exemplified by the “war on terror” and the European Security Strategy, towards a longer-term conflict prevention approach that utilises all the EU and African mechanisms available.

The aim of the paper is to place the Seminar in the context of previous and on-going EU-Africa engagement in conflict, security and development.The Seminar provides an opportunity to follow-up and build-on the work of previous presidencies in this field.This paper reviews progress so far and provides recommendations for further measures to strengthen EU and African capacity on conflict prevention and to improve the coherence and effectiveness of EU action in the field.

Conflict in Africa

By 2015, an estimated 345 million people in Africa will live in extreme poverty, on US$1 a day or less - up from 100 million when the Millennium Development Goals were first set in 1990. Africa has suffered a total of one third of global armed conflicts over the past decade creating an estimated 6.1 million refugees and 20 million internally displaced persons across the continent.

There are, however, pockets of hope. Economically, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Mozambique and have all enjoyed growth rates of around seven per cent in the last decade. In terms of peace and security, the ceasefire signed in Angola in April 2002 appears to have been upheld, as has the 1999 and 2000 peace agreements in Sierra Leone, and Eritrea and Ethiopia. EU supported Somali and Sudanese peace-talks are also making progress, and in Kenya recently there was a peaceful transition of power following multiparty elections. A UN-ECOWAS brokered Liberian ceasefire has also been recently signed, although with rising hostilities it is not being upheld.

In an increasingly interdependent world, violent conflict and political instability in Africa has direct and indirect consequences for the EU and beyond. In situations of conflict, political democracies are unable to mature and conflict creates conditions where terrorism and organised crime thrive.The majority of conflict in Africa has its origins in intra-state violence, however, few conflicts are without inter-state and regional dynamics through refugee and arms flows, inter-state terrorism and financing. The trafficking of people, weapons and drugs by organised criminal groups are widespread problems for EU member states, which incur political, financial and security costs.Today’s global political climate reinforces the need for conflict prevention in Africa to be given greater political priority.

EU responses

The EU has a unique capacity to have a significant and positive impact on promoting structural stability in Africa. Member states have strong historical ties with Africa, there is broad diplomatic engagement on the ground through the delegations, and the EU represents the largest aid provider and world trader with Africa. The EU also has a wide range of instruments available to it (trade, development, private sector relations, diplomacy) to mainstream a comprehensive conflict prevention-development framework with Africa. A number of structural frameworks and mechanisms between the EU and Africa have been established to formalise and operationalise these relations.14

14 See figure (a) for key EU policy statements related to conflict prevention EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 35

The launching of the EU-Africa dialogue in the first Africa-Europe Summit in Cairo (2000) and the development of policy frameworks, such as the EU-ACP Cotonou Partnership Agreement (2000), have created new mechanisms for EU-Africa engagement in trade, development, diplomacy, conflict prevention and security. The commitments to peace-building, conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa agreed in the Cairo Programme of Action, outlined at the Cairo Follow-up summit in Ouagadougo (November 2002), signaled the willingness on the part of Heads of State of both regions to give priority to these issues. The Common Position concerning conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa, May 2001, (Article 1.3), also stipulates that the EU shall develop a “proactive, comprehensive and integrated approach, which shall serve as a common framework for actions of individual states”. The Common Position is due to be reviewed under the Italian Presidency and, following the concentration of political attention and resources on Iraq - to the detriment of Africa, will provide a welcome and timely impetus for renewed political engagement.

Figure a

Key EU policy statements related to conflict prevention

• Communication from the Commission on The Participation of Non-State Actors in EC Development Policy, November 2002 • Implementation of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, Seville European Council, June 2002 • Development Council Conclusions on Countries in Conflict, May 2002 • Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention, July 2001 • EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, Gothenburg European Council, June 2001 • Development Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention, May 2001 • Council Common Position Concerning Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution in Africa, May 2001 • Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, April 2001 • European Parliament Resolution on Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management, March 2001 • Report presented by the High Representative/ Commission on Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of EU Action in the Field of Conflict Prevention, December 2000 • The European Parliament Resolution on Gender Aspects of Conflict Resolution and Peace-building, November 2000 • Cotonou ACP-EU Aid and Trade Partnership Agreement, June 2000

African responses

The establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2002 has set the stage for a new African framework and agenda for peace and security. The AU has endorsed NEPAD (The New Economic Partnership for African Development) as its operational programme specifically in its decision to set up a Peace and Security Council. In 2002, the AU planned to set up a continental early warning system, an African stand-by-force and a special Fund.Through these mechanisms, the AU Indicative Work Programme on Peace and Security (2002-2003) (see Chapter 2) also aims to reinforce AU inter-action with regional African organisation (such as ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD etc) when implementing conflict prevention activities and peace support operations. The first AU Summit in Ethiopia in February 2003 gave its backing to prioritising the resolution of conflicts, which are blighting the continent’s economic revival. The Summit agreed to peace measures in Burundi, Ivory Coast, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Comoros and Liberia.These include using African monitors to review cease-fires, and assembling all-African peacekeeping forces. 36 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

These efforts are been strongly supported by the international community. The Swedish Government’s Foreign Minister’s conference in Helsingborg in August 2002 brought together representatives from the member and accession states, key EU institutions, the UN, OSCE, NATO, AU, ECOWAS and SADC - representing the first inter-institutional meeting of its kind on conflict prevention. In April 2003, the EU granted 10 million euros to support the AU’s agenda for peace and security and another 2 million for institutional support. EU Commissioner Poul Nielson has also announced the potential “shaving-off” of EDF funds for the establishment of an African peacekeeping force. The G8 meeting in Evian in June 2003 met with the NEPAD Steering Committee and agreed to expand dialogue on NEPAD and the G8 Africa Action Plan. The AU Summit in Maputo in July 2003, is also due to prioritise the peace and security agenda, with specific reference to the peacekeeping capacities across the continent. In continuity with these on-going activities, the forthcoming EU-Africa Seminar provides an opportunity to follow-up and build-on the work of previous presidencies in this field.

The development of a new pan-African level of governance has created a new framework for the EU-Africa dialogue. However, numerous challenges remain. Not all the African and EU approaches are mutually reinforcing and there is some concern that there is a push towards returning to a narrow definition of security, rather than one which guarantees long-term human security and addresses the root causes of conflict and underdevelopment. This paper therefore aims to provide analysis and recommendations on how to further the EU-Africa dialogue to ensure lasting peace and development in Africa.

The notion of partnership

An effective partnership between the EU and Africa is vital to address development and security issues. For this reason this paper loosely defines the EU-Africa partnership as one which should be based on the following:

- The existence of differing but mutual reinforcing responsibilities for peace and development for the EU and Africa; - The need for complementarity and coherence, i.e. between peace and development, as well as between and within the EU and Africa in working toward this end; - The existence of common values and principles guiding this partnership: equitable participation, shared ownership and goals, common understandings and approaches, cultural exchange, a global-local view, dialogue, implementation and evaluation; - The articulation of this partnership around (a) key policy issues, such as: development, trade and diplomacy, and (b) key cross-cutting issues such as: conflict prevention, civil society/NSA participation, gender equality, environment, small arms, etc.

Overview of paper

This paper has been written from a range of European perspectives and strengthened by insights from the African viewpoint. It begins with an important overview of the links between conflict, development and governance in Africa. Chapter two examines in more detail ‘Current approaches to conflict in Africa’, in terms of how Africa itself has responded to conflict across the continent, and also how the UN has engaged. To reflect the key concern and rationale of the paper, the majority of chapter two focuses on EU responses and how the EU-Africa partnership can be developed. Chapter three,‘Innovative responses’, is divided into seven sub-sections and offers some ‘original thinking’ on how to take the EU-Africa Partnership forward. It is varied in its nature, emphasising the need for a coherent and multi-dimensional approach, and includes broad contributions on trade, security and private investment as well as more detailed contributions on EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 37

how to enhance both the EU’s diplomatic role, and its support for African regional organisations. The section concludes with two contributors from the North and South offering different perspectives on the role of the EU in making NEPAD more effective.

The appendices provides a series of case studies of recent and on-going conflicts both at a regional level - West Africa, the Great Lakes and the Horn - and country specific level, Sudan and Angola. The case studies aim to contextualise the analysis in the main body of the paper by outlining the causes of the national and regional conflicts, the current EU and African responses to this and opportunities for ways forward through EU-African engagement.

A summation of recommendations brought out throughout the paper is provided in succinct points within the executive summary at the beginning of the document. 38 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

Chapter 1 Conflict, development and governance

Dr Kevin P Clements,15 International Alert

Critical for understanding the obstacles to human security is the nexus between governance, development and conflict. Failed and failing state systems are both an important source of internal conflict and an impediment to its resolution. Political systems in the major conflict zones are seriously deficient.This poses particular types of problems for conflict transformation actors seeking to devise processes for dealing with such violence. Far too often African leadership and political processes are characterised by policies, which advance very particular sets of interests, often with disastrous consequences for the security and welfare of society as a whole. Non- accountable, non-responsive, ineffective states (normally existing within weak economies) also fall victim to organised crime, rebel movements, insurgencies and violent conflict.

As the Carnegie Commission on the prevention of deadly conflict argues, the ultimate goal of conflict prevention is the creation of “capable states”. That is, states that are capable of regulating transnational as well as domestic actors and that are accountable to, promote and respond to thriving economies and active civil societies.There are profound limits to what the EU, the UN or any other multilateral organisation can do in the absence of effective and capable states.The promotion of state and public sector reform, therefore, is a pre-requisite or co-requisite for effective conflict prevention, sustainable development, and poverty alleviation. Simultaneous with this reform is a parallel need to focus attention on ways in which state systems can generate more professional, accountable police and security forces capable of delivering real security and safety to citizens.

The 2002 Human Development Report develops a series of subjective indicators of governance, relating to democracy, rule of law and government effectiveness. No African country is listed in the High Human Development category.There are 15 African countries listed at the lower end of the Medium Human Development category, and 29 African countries listed at the bottom end of the Low Human Development Category with rankings between 139 and 173 in the world.While these indicators are subjective, they indicate that on general governance issues, the rule of law and state effectiveness, African countries are performing poorly and this is a major contributor to conflict issues throughout the sub continent. It also makes it more difficult for African states to provide the right macro-economic environments for any sort of sustainable development to occur.

Indicators of weak governance

In an analysis of 17 recent complex humanitarian emergencies, Kalevi Holsti argues that the political factors likely to result in a complex humanitarian emergency or large scale organised violence include the following:

“The risk of an emergency is likely to increase with two or more distinct ethnic, language, or religious communities; among countries which acquired independence after 1945; where there is government exclusion and persecution of distinct social groups; where there is rule by kleptocrats or entrenched minorities; and where there is weak government legitimacy”16.

15 Dr. Kevin Clements has been the Secretary General of International Alert since 1999. 16 E Wayne Nafziger, Frances Stewart and Raimo Vayrynen (eds) 2000 War Hunger and Displacement:The Origins of Humanitarian Emergencies, Oxford, OUP Vol. 2 p.4 EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 39

These are all factors that are structurally conducive to violence and they are consistent with most of the political risk factors and indicators identified by those devising tools and methods for more conflict-sensitive development strategies. Holsti’s analysis concludes that it is not only ethnic hatred or group divisions which generated violent behaviour in the 17 cases studied, but also the deliberate and intentional acts of politicians and government officials who organised violence against different groups within the communities under their control.

“…organised politicides by government have resulted in far greater casualties than other types of civil war, including rebellions. The presence of early warning indicators has not helped the international community to prevent such emergencies”17.

When the coercive power of the state and the exchange power of the market have been subverted by corrupt politicians and bureaucrats it, therefore, makes the prospects for sustainable peace extremely unlikely. If conflict transformation actors do not acknowledge these fundamental realities when devising intervention strategies they may unwittingly generate peaceful illusions on unjust and untenable institutional bases.The pervasive elements of an undemocratic and weak state include:

Subversion of the rule of law - as has happened in most conflict zones around the world.The current situation in Zimbabwe where the government has systematically undermined the rule of law is an example of a situation where armed and brutal conflict has replaced normal politics.

Impunity - when the rule of law is subverted.This can lead to wide scale human rights abuse or even genocide, as happened in Rwanda. In situations where there is uneven impunity, it is those with economic and political power who can rise above the law and those with no such power who become subject to arbitrary, corrupt and oppressive law (e.g. the relatively powerless are victims of petty corruption such as arbitrary police fines, and of high-level elite corruption, such as leadership expropriation of national revenues).

Organised crime - organised crime syndicates are a threat to democracy and stability in many parts of the developing world.The interaction between crime and conflict - especially where ruling elites or subversive groups use organised crime to justify and finance their activities - needs to be given more prominence in the design of conflict resolution processes.

Weak law enforcement and the politicisation of security - security forces frequently generate mistrust and insecurity, arbitrariness rather than evenhandedness, and fail to deliver the conditions necessary for the promotion and maintenance of law and order and development processes. Attention must be paid to reform of the security sector and processes that enshrine support for international human rights standards.

Corruption - whether it is an occasional aberration or viewed as an essential way of bypassing extensive bureaucracy, corruption undermines the legitimacy and authority of the state. When corruption becomes institutionalised and cultures of theft become dominant and widespread those who benefit most from them may resort to coercion and organised violence in order to defend their economic interests.

Absence of or weakened civil society - trying to harness the integrative power of the community in situations of instability by working in and through other civil society institutions, (families, religious, educational, health and others) may be helpful in terms of emergency relief and

17 Ibid 40 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

humanitarian assistance. However, it will not yield medium to long-term, sustainable peace as these initiatives will always be subverted by the actions of corrupt governments and the increasing criminalisation of politics.Therefore, as good governance depends on a lively and robust civil society this central paradox needs to be addressed.

Response from international institutions

Over the last 20 years, Bretton Wood’s institutions used to argue for “minimalist” state systems. The results of many of these policies were a reduction in the public sector, often fatally weakening it or making it ineffective.The proposals advanced by the World Bank in 1997 to deal with these sorts of issues were to firstly match state activities to capabilities, both financial and human, and secondly seek improvements in state capability through reform of public institutions—primarily through public sector reform programmes, training of officials, providing adequate rewards for “public service” and developing bureaucratic flexibility and responsiveness. These initiatives/processes are supposed to be coupled to restraints on arbitrary and repressive behaviour and systematic programmes to eliminate corrupt behaviour in state systems.

These reform instruments have been linked to different types of conditionality set by national, regional and multilateral development agencies. It is important, therefore to focus some attention on First and Second-generation conditionality and their impacts on African political and economic systems. First generation conditionality focussed on market liberalisation, administrative reform and balancing budgets. Applying these processes to weak economies often generated direct violence as the price of staples rose, the public sector was weakened and the population bore the brunt of reconstruction. Second generation conditionality has focussed on democratic reform, promotion of human rights and administrative accountability.

The results of these initiatives have been mixed but it is important to ask what their consequences have been in relation to African conflict, public sector and state reform and enhanced respect for human rights and the rule of law? It is particularly important to focus attention on the security sector to see whether or not there has been a willingness to place the coercive agencies of the state under civilian control; to develop an adequate separation of police and military power and objectives which focus on human security as much as the security of political leadership and the state apparatus.

What is becoming increasingly clear is that there is very little prospect of African leaders being able to regulate “subversive” transnational economic, political, military and criminal exchanges, unless there are effective state systems, and effective sub-regional and regional organisations with which to do so. How to develop policies and programmes that really do move towards the millennium development targets, and serve public welfare rather than the sectional interests of political and urban elites is, therefore, one of the greatest challenges facing African political leaders today. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 41

Chapter 2 Current approaches to conflict in Africa 2.1 African responses to conflict in Africa

Hesta Groenewald18, Saferworld, Monica Juma19, SaferAfrica, James Mackie20, ECDPM

Despite the frequent lack of resources, technology and capacity, African states themselves are taking collective action to prevent and resolve violent conflicts. This is due in part to the increasing reluctance of the international community to take the political, military and financial risks of intervening in African conflicts, and because of the realisation that modern internal conflicts have extremely costly national and regional impacts.

Continent-wide, regional, national and local strategies to prevent violent conflict are required.The creation of New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), in 2001, and the establishment of the Africa Union (AU), in 2002, reflects a reinvigorated attempt at developing African strategies for the prevention and resolution of conflicts. The challenge is to ensure that these continent-wide approaches are effectively integrated into the sub-regional economic and conflict prevention initiatives carried out by SADC, ECOWAS and IGAD. In other fledgling sub-regions, institutions need support to emerge into functioning organisations capable of making a contribution to conflict prevention. Underpinning all of these initiatives, should be the involvement of local civil society groups.

Continent wide approaches - AU / NEPAD

The first AU summit was held in June 2002 in South Africa.The AU has been created as the successor of the OAU with the aim of moving from the OAU’s mostly state-centric focus to a continental organisation with greater civil participation (civil society, parliaments, labour organisations etc). In terms of issue areas, the AU is meant to focus on economic integration and social development, with peace and security issues as an integral part of achieving these objectives.

NEPAD was the amalgamation of three key initiatives on taking African development forward and was formally adopted by the OAU and established in 2001. NEPAD is therefore a programme of the AU, even though it has a separate management structure in the form of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee (HSIC) and a NEPAD Secretariat, based in South Africa.

In March 2002, the NEPAD’s HSIC developed concrete steps for policy and programme development in six areas identified as NEPAD priorities in the peace and security. These were crystallised into the NEPAD Initial Action Plan and formed the basis for the G8-Africa Action Plan adopted in June 2002 in Kananaskas. The six priority areas were then operationalised under the African Peace and Security Agenda (APSA), established during the AU-NEPAD Consultation in Addis Ababa, 17-18 February 2003.21 It is critical to note that all six of NEPAD’s priority areas were adopted as part of the eight priority areas of APSA calling for immediate action.These were:

• Developing mechanisms, institution building processes and support instruments for achieving peace and security in Africa.

18 Hesta Groenewald is currently project officer on the Conflict Prevention Programme of Saferworld. She has worked extensively on conflict prevention and peace-building in Africa. 19 Dr. Monica Kathina Juma is a programme officer working in the NEPAD programme at SaferAfrica. Prior to this she served as a Research Associate in the Africa Program of the International Peace Academy in New York, where she produced a state of the art review of the capacity of African institutions to respond to crises and conflicts in eighteen countries in Sub Saharan Africa 20 Mr. James Mackie is ECDPMs Programme Coordinator for the Political Dimensions of the Partnership theme. Prior to this he spent 10 years as the Secretary General of the European development NGO umbrella organisation, the EU-NGDO Liaison Committee 21 See Operationalising the NEPAD Peace and Security Action Plan. Priorities, Process Considerations and Focus Areas, July 2002. 42 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

• Improving capacity for, and coordination of, early action for conflict prevention, management and resolution. • Improving early warning capacity in Africa through strategic analysis and support. • Prioritising strategic security issues such as DDRR and coordinating and ensuring effective implementation of African efforts aimed at preventing and combating terrorism. • Ensuring efficient and consolidated action for the prevention, combating and eradicating the problem of the illicit proliferation, circulation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons. • Improving the security sector and the capacity for good governance as related to peace and security. • Generating minimum standards for application in the exploitation and management of Africa’s resources (including non-renewable resources) in areas affected by conflict. • Assisting in resource mobilisation for the AU Peace Fund and for regional initiatives aimed at preventing, managing and resolving conflicts on the continent.22

As a way forward, the AU-NEPAD Consultations adopted three broad areas for immediate follow-up:

1. Ensuring regular information exchange between the AU Commission and the NEPAD Secretariat on all issues related to the AU-NEPAD peace and security initiative. 2. Scheduling regular consultations on coordination and implementation of initiatives, elaborating strategies for the mobilization of resources and effective outreach initiatives to sensitise partners on the AU/NEPAD peace and security agenda. 3. Adoption by the AU Commission and the NEPAD Secretariat of more proactive approaches to addressing issues of peace and security on the continent, including undertaking research on the root causes of conflicts and their prevention in Africa; the acceleration of capacity-building initiatives to address challenges to peace and security and, the utilisation of African expertise in support of African initiatives.

The AU-NEPAD consultation also considered the need to adopt a common approach to international peace and security partnership and developed proposals on how to approach such partnerships. Among them was a recommendation for the AU Commission and the NEPAD Secretariat to initiate contacts, joint presence and approaches with Africa’s partners as part of a concerted effort to enlist support for the AU-NEPAD peace and security agenda. In terms of operation therefore, the envisaged framework is one where the AU and NEPAD are complementary and supportive of each other.

Figure 2.1

EU support for the AU/ NEPAD

The EU is currently engaged with pan-African institutions to varying degrees. First and foremost, it is involved in the EU-Africa Dialogue or Cairo process, which, however, is stalled indefinitely. As this represents the only formal political dialogue framework between the two this is a serious problem that is already causing considerable diplomatic difficulties. The longer this situation is allowed to continue, the more serious the repercussions. Over the past year, several EU member states have been individually supporting NEPAD with funds but these have been primarily for the Secretariat for developing ideas (notably on good governance and the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), networking and for raising awareness. However, so far, no programme funding has been made available. Member states and now the EC itself have, nonetheless, been providing the OAU / AU with funds for its peace and security work. The scale of this has grown considerably with the recent signing of a 10M EC grant. Finally, although the EU has not yet been providing funds to the OAU or AU for

22 For a comprehensive discussion refer to the Report of the AU-NEPAD Consultations on Peace and Security EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 43

programmes in other fields, there have been EC funds made available to the African RECs23 and some of this funding has been for peace and security as well as for development work.

EU and G8 support for AU peace and security initiatives

The EU and G824 have offered financial and practical support to the AU’s new continent wide framework for peace and security, which includes the creation of a Peace and Security Council and an African peacekeeping force. It is hoped that by 2010, Africa will be able to send its own troops to conflict zones and that the soldiers will be integrated into the armed forces of their own country, but be rapidly deployable as part of a UN or AU-led initiative. The AU intends to draw upon already operational sub-regional peacekeeping forces such as ECOWAS and early warning capacities, in order to maintain coherence. Various commitments have been made by EU member states and, in April 2003, European Commissioner Poul Nielson pledged 12 million euros to the AU for their work in this area. In addition, Nielson has suggested that ACP countries earmark one per cent of their European Development Fund (EDF), the financial instrument of ACP-EU co-operation, to place in a fund to develop peacekeeping, which will be managed by the AU. While these developments are welcome, there is a risk, however, of an over emphasis on supporting military crisis management over the longer-term “soft security” goals of conflict prevention. Both approaches should receive equal support and attention, if a lasting peace is to be seen in Africa.

The key success of NEPAD to date has been its ability to get both African and international attention focussed on the problems of Africa and the need for an ambitious and co-ordinated approach to resolve them. It has also succeeded in getting major donors to accept, in a short space of time, the principle that a new donor partnership with Africa is needed. In other words NEPAD’s great success has been its advocacy role. The deal that NEPAD proposes to donors is essentially very simple: the African leaders involved promise to work on good governance standards across Africa and tackle conflict prevention and resolution systematically themselves, providing the donors, for their part, increase substantially the aid made available to Africa and reduce conditionality.

Regional and sub-regional responses

The continent-wide initiatives are keen to ensure that sub-regional processes under the auspices of regional economic communities (RECs) are integrated into the AU and NEPAD processes. In fact, although most of the RECs were established with mostly economic aims in mind, the most prominent of these have already made much progress on becoming fully fledged sub-regional organisations with political, economic and security mandates.These organisations include the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD).Various other arrangements exist within Africa as well, in various phases of establishing economic integration, such as the East African Community (EAC), the Common Market for Southern and (COMESA), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Arab Union. ECCAS, the EAC and COMESA are also developing various mechanisms and protocols on peace and security, with COMESA focusing more on conflict prevention through preventive diplomacy and ECCAS envisaging a Central African Peace and Security Council, an early warning system and a multinational force.

On the one hand, the process of moving from economic to multi-purpose sub-regional organisations may provide some opportunity for comparison and sharing of experiences with the

23 RECs: Regional Economic Communities: SADC, ECOWAS, COMESA 24 At the G8 summit in Evian, in June leaders offered to train a brigade of 3,000-3,500 soldiers and assist with the establishment of early warning crisis observation centres, and the development of organisational structures and partnership arrangements. 44 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

EU. On the other hand, in order for the continent-wide peace and security efforts to succeed, it is important to ensure that sub-regional efforts are extended and co-ordinated with the continent- wide ones in order to ensure complementarity and avoid the duplication of efforts.

Although various African countries have contributed troops to UN (and a few OAU) peacekeeping operations, sub-regional organisations, notably SADC and ECOWAS, have also assumed a prominent position in this regard (See fig 3.1 and Chapter 2.2, UN responses to conflict in Africa).

Figure 2.2. Examples of regional responses

The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) The ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) intervened in the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s and thus established ECOWAS as the first African REC to undertake a military peace-keeping/peace enforcement intervention. Since then, ECOWAS’s peace and security framework has developed significantly, the key institution being the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution and Security.The Mechanism is charged with responding to sub-regional conflicts, ranging from fact-finding and diplomatic efforts to military intervention. ECOMOG has been institutionalised as the permanent military arm of ECOWAS and member states are expected to designate military units for service with ECOMOG. A key institution of the Mechanism is the Mediation and Security Council (MSC), which functions like the UN Security Council and consists of nine member states that rotate biannually.The MSC is responsible for authorising, co-ordinating and managing all interventions, including military and diplomatic missions. ECOWAS has also set up an early warning and information-gathering capacity in the form of four zonal observatories (based in the region) and the Observation and Monitoring Centre, situated in the office of the Deputy Executive Secretary. ECOWAS has been active in subsequent conflicts in the region, notably the Ivory Coast and the Mano River Union, through mediation efforts, fact-finding missions and some peacekeeping deployments.

The Southern African Development Community (SADC) SADC’s peace and security agenda is governed by the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security (OPDS).The OPDS is similar to the MSC of ECOWAS in that it has the authority to authorise interventions, whether diplomatic or military, in conflicts in the region. SADC has been involved in diplomatic and military interventions in the region. Despite some internal divisions about the mandate and procedure of the OPDS, Zimbabwe spearheaded a military intervention in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Africa did the same in Lesotho.The OPDS has since undergone some reforms in order to make it more difficult for member states to undertake action without the full support of the other SADC members. It has two key sub-components that address specific issues, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) and the Inter-State Politics and Diplomacy Committee (ISPDC, not yet operational).

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) IGAD was originally established with a focus on addressing sub-regional issues of drought and development, but in 199625 the focus expanded to include sub-regional economic integration and political and security issues. Interestingly, IGAD’s official peace and security mandate focuses more on dialogue and diplomatic (rather than military) intervention,26 managed by the Division for Political and Humanitarian Affairs within the IGAD Secretariat. IGAD’s official adoption of the Conflict Early Warning and Response Network (CEWARN) is a major step in the direction of developing African capacities for conflict prevention and timely intervention in potential conflict situations. IGAD has also played a leading role (with external support from the EU) in peace negotiations in the Sudan and Somalia.

25 Subsequent to an Assembly of Heads of State and Government decision, the Inter-Governmental Authority on Drought and Development (IGADD) was transformed into the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). 26 The objectives of IGAD are explained on the website, www.igad.org. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 45

Local responses - African civil society

Regional and sub-regional organisations in Africa can only partially respond to conflict in Africa. The implementation and long-term success of any attempts at conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace-building lie with governments and their civil society.Within Africa, civil society engagement has taken shape on different levels.

On the continental level, there have been efforts at institutionalising civil society involvement with the AU through the establishment of the Economic, Social and Cultural Committee (ECOSOCC) and the Pan-African Parliament. Furthermore, the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Culture for Africa (CSSDCA), an institution which initiated from African civil society, has also been taken up within the AU and will be used as a mechanism for monitoring the implementation of AU plans and projects.Within sub-regional organisations, civil society involvement has fluctuated, with very few of the REC’s working with civil society on a sustained and institutionalised basis.The implementation of CEWARN within IGAD is a positive development, as this is mainly implemented by civil society.

On a national level, civil society in most parts of Africa is very active on issues of conflict resolution and peace-building. Several networks of like-minded organisations have developed, such as the Coalition for Peace in Africa (COPA), Peace Tree Network, the Peace and Development Network and the Network of African Peace-builders, to name but a few.These networks are based on the acknowledgement that some issues are better addressed on a regional basis, that many similar issues are faced in different parts of the continent, and that the networks can provide a valuable forum for sharing experiences and undertaking joint advocacy or activities in response to conflict.The Cotonou Agreement has also created new momentum for civil society to form national Cotonou platforms or committees as well as the global ACP Civil Society Forum, that can ensure that ACP-EU co-operation adequately addresses concerns relating to conflict in Africa. In some African countries civil society is still weak and the political environment may not always be conducive to more ‘political’ activities such as peace-building.Yet much progress has been made and the importance of addressing conflict as a prerequisite for poverty-reduction and sustainable economic development is increasingly being recognised.

2.2 UN responses to conflict in Africa

Alice Hutchinson,27 Saferworld

The UN Secretary General has consistently declared that for the UN there is no higher goal, no deeper commitment and no greater ambition than preventing armed conflict.28 Indeed it is a fundamental pledge of the UN Charter.29 The UN’s commitment to Africa is equally strong and in the Secretary General’s 2001 report on ‘The causes of conflict in Africa’. he noted that African leaders, the international community and the UN had failed Africa by ‘not adequately addressing the causes of conflict, by not doing enough to ensure peace and by our repeated inability to create the conditions for sustainable development’. Yet the UN has frequently had to act in the midst of violent conflict, and in complex emergencies (e.g. Somalia and Rwanda) without effective mandates or resources. The Report of the panel on UN Peace Operations or ‘The Brahimi report’ (2000) noted that the UN has ‘repeatedly failed to meet the challenge’ of conflict

27 Alice Hutchinson is a Media and Parliamentary Officer at Saferworld, responsible for EU advocacy. 28 See Secretary-General Kofi Annan's keynote address to the Conference on Preventing Deadly Conflict, at the University of California at Los Angeles 1998 29 In the words of the UN charter the UN was founded to ‘save succeeding generations from the scourge of war’ (Brahimi Report 2000) 46 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

prevention. In response, the UN has begun to make significant steps, both in reforming its reactive peacekeeping operations and more importantly by institutionalising a more comprehensive, proactive approach to conflict prevention which better links the development and security tracks.

The UN must maintain and strengthen its commitment to mainstreaming long-term conflict prevention alongside improving peacekeeping operations. Furthermore, as the EU and AU increasingly engage with the UN in preventing violent conflict in Africa, they too must give equal support to both methods, and not focus on providing a solely military response.

UN approaches to conflict in Africa

The severity of violent conflict in Africa, particularly over the last decade has resulted in a consistent commitment in trying to tackle the situation by the UN. It has experienced varying levels of success, from downright failure in Somalia and Rwanda, to more healthy examples of Mozambique and, to a degree, Angola. High-level structural difficulties at the UN are largely to blame for its failure to react as effectively as it might. These include; the inability of the Security Council to agree rapid and robust mandates for troops, the lack of political will to provide enough troops (e.g. MONUC for the DRC has only about half the troops that the UN has mandated), the difficulties of reacting early for fear of intruding on a nations territorial sovereignty and a lack of resources.The majority of troop contributions to UN peacekeeping forces are from developing countries and therefore contributions from strong countries with good resources, are lacking. For these reasons, the variety of tools available to prevent violent conflict have tended to be used once a conflict has escalated and are therefore better described as short and medium crisis management measures, which include:

Short-term responses

• Peacekeeping Since 1989, thirteen of the UN’s thirty two peacekeeping operations have been deployed in Africa – more than in any other single region. An intense and constructive debate has taken place between member states and the Secretariat (Secretary General and Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations) to try and improve peacekeeping operations. Proposals include strengthening management, strategic planning and policy capacity development in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, capacities for rapid deployment, organizational structure and staffing and a system-wide capacity for information and analysis. Concrete results which appear to have evolved from this process include the increasing inter-operability with sub-regional initiatives in Africa, for example, with ECOWAS/ECOMOG in Liberia and the efforts to strengthen Africa’s capacity for peacekeeping via joint exercises and promotion of African participation in ‘stand by’ arrangements. Increasing engagement is likely to take place when the AU’s African peacekeeping force comes into operation. (See figure 2.0 Chapter 2.1)

Medium-term responses

• Envoys and Special Representatives of the Secretary General (SRGS) Those with a high standing can have great use in preventative diplomacy, as seen in East Timor. In 1997 the UN appointed a joint UN/ OAU Special Representative to the Great Lakes, which represented a significant innovation.

• Mediation Joint OAU/ UN negotiators have been used in Burundi and are of most use when they have EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 47

a high standing with the parties and internationally, when they have a clear knowledge of the conflict and when they include all actors including potential ‘spoilers’.

• Observer missions Deploying UNOMIL observers alongside ECOMOG in Liberia proved successful in implementing the electoral and humanitarian and human rights components of the mission.

• Sanctions These can be both diplomatic and economic, but can have counterproductive effects and must be carefully contemplated. For instance whilst sanctions on Burundi achieved some of their aims they also had damaging side effects particularly on Burundi’s relationship with .30

• Arms embargoes UN arms embargoes are a useful tool but have tended to occur too late. Wider plans to halt the spread of illicit transfers of weapons (e.g. the UN Programme of Action to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons) finances and natural resources represent more proactive approaches.

The Secretary General has correctly stated that, ‘in the right conditions UN peacekeeping operations can make the difference between peace and war in Africa’31, however, as the Brahimi report noted,‘force alone cannot create peace; it can only create the space in which peace may be built’. The Secretary Generals report on the prevention of armed conflict (2001) took this point a step further and reiterated the crucial role that conflict prevention can play, stating that,‘comprehensive and coherent conflict prevention strategies offer the greatest potential for promoting lasting peace and creating an enabling environment for sustainable development’. In response, efforts have been made to ensure that all actions and agencies of the UN are aware of the potential impact their policies might have on the emergence of a conflict. The UN recognises this and is trying to overcome the fact that ‘departments that are responsible for security policy tend to have little knowledge of development and government policies, while those responsible for the latter rarely think of themselves in security terms’.32 The following approaches reflect this emphasis on the need for longer- term conflict prevention measures.

Longer- term measures33

• The framework for co-ordination Originally established in 1994 to co-ordinate peacekeeping operations the framework now focuses on early warning and conflict prevention. It brings together various agencies to discuss shared analysis and response. It reviews recommendations for preventative action and forwards them to the Executive Committee on peace and security or to the committee on humanitarian affairs. However it has tended to focus its attentions on areas of ‘high tension’ rather than ‘unstable peace’.

• Interagency missions These missions are usually between the UN and other agencies such as sub-regional organizations.The first mission was established in 2000, for West Africa. It sought to integrate the efforts of the UN with ECOWAS. The mission has since visited 11 countries in West Africa to identify risks and challenges for conflict prevention at a regional level. It has

30 See Chandra Lekha Sriram,‘Insights from the cases: Opportunities and challenges for preventative actors’ in ‘From promise to Practice’ A project of the International Peace Academy 2003 31 Secretary Generals report on ‘The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa’ 1998 32 1999 Secretary Generals Report on the Organisational Structure of the UN 33 For more in depth description of these methods see Karin Wermester,‘From Promise to Practice? Conflict Prevention at the UN’ International Peace Academy publication 2003 48 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

recommended a UN office for West Africa and the office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for West Africa.

• Peacebuilding support offices (PSBOs) These were established under aegis of Department of Political Affairs between 1997-2000 in response to concerns of the fragile peace left after the withdrawal of ECOMOG and UNOMIL in Liberia and are now also present in Guinea Bissau and Central African Republic. PSBOs develop integrated peace-building and conflict prevention strategies along with all actors (national legislators, civil society, political parties) through confidence building, political stabilisation, electoral support, and co-ordinating donor efforts.

• Mainstreaming conflict prevention across development and security agencies The Governance and Rule of Law Unit of the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery of UNDP has undertaken a systematic approach to mainstream conflict prevention into UN development and governance assistance (e.g. incorporating better analysis of governance rule of law and security sector issues into development assistance planning and implementation).

• Early warning indicators In 2001, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) began to develop a set of early warning indicators designed to aid the recognition of the potential for a conflict, to ensure common understanding across UN departments and agencies and promote coherent policy responses.

• Building local capacity to prevent conflict. UN Staff college- country specific workshops The UN staff colleges’ Early Warning and Preventative Measures (EWPM) course has proved successful for UN staff and has now been developed for regional and country specific workshops (e.g. in Niger, 2001). They are held at the request of the government and developed in collaboration with government officials, UN coordinators and country teams and UNDP staff, they also include civil society, with the aim of developing local strategies or implementation plans for conflict prevention.

UN EU efforts at preventing conflict in Africa

Strengthening co-operation between the UN and the EU across a wide range of policy areas was underlined in the Gothenburg European Council of June 2001. The specific themes of co- operation outlined included conflict prevention and civilian and military aspects of crisis management (through, for example, information exchange, consultations between Special Representatives, field co-ordination and training) and the agreed areas of co-operation included the Great Lakes, the Horn and West Africa. Modalities for EU-UN co-operation were also outlined as mechanisms for facilitating guidance, continuity and coherence at all levels. Inter-agency co-operation was further discussed at the wider ranging Helsingborg conference in 2002, which reviewed the collective challenges faced by the EU, UN, NATO and OSCE as well as the AU, SADC and ECOWAS, in addressing conflict prevention. Most recently, through the UNDP liaison office in Brussels, efforts have been made to strengthen the EU-UN partnership further with the updated signing of the Financial and Administrative Framework (FAFA), which should ensure closer programming dialogue between the Commission and the UN.

As yet, practical EU engagement with the UN regarding conflict prevention has largely been in the form of crisis management, including the EU Bosnia Police Mission (EUPM), which took over from the UN in January 2003.Traditionally, the EU’s crisis management capabilities (military and civilian) EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 49

have not extended to Africa, however, the first joint military deployment of EU forces to Africa recently took place in June 2003 through the rapid reaction mechanism.34 It is too early to draw lessons from this Interim Emergency Multinational Force (IEMF) to the Congo, but there will no doubt be questions regarding the inter-operability between troops from different member states and agencies. Civilian crisis management mechanisms have yet to be applied to Africa, however, experience should be drawn from the EUPM’s engagement in Bosnia, including the double-hatting of the EU and UN Special Representative. The EU might also share with African governments the experience of training civilian personnel in the four areas of civilian competence – policing, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection. The potential for further collaboration with regards to conflict prevention in Africa is strong, particularly since both institutions engage in virtually the entire range of external relations mechanisms. The EU could, for example, complement the work undertaken by UN Special Representatives, UNDP anti-poverty programmes or UNDDA’s engagement in regional small arms initiatives. As part of this process, there should be a review of the progress made by the processes set up for facilitating continuity and coherence across the modalities for EU-UN co-operation at the Gotéburg Council Meeting, June 2001.

Challenges and opportunities

The UN is taking a number of steps to counteract the need for exclusively military responses in preventing violent conflict.These efforts should be developed further and given serious commitment. Changing attitudes from ones that emphasise hard security over conflict prevention will take time, especially in today’s geopolitical climate. Whilst the UN has placed the emphasis on conflict analysis and design response (in particular through the EWPM course) this has not necessarily led to an understanding that conflict sensitivity needs to be integrated throughout their programming cycle in order to minimise negative impact and maximise the positive impact of the UN’s actions on the situations in which they are situated.

Strengthening co-operation across the UN, EU and other international institutions is welcome and progress should be reviewed with a follow-up conference to the one held in Helsingborg on inter- agency operability co-operation. The conference should address how institutions can best co- ordinate with the emerging AU peace and security agenda.

The commitments made towards building the capacities of Africans to build a peacekeeping force are welcome steps forward.The development of some form of UN military staff training college might go someway towards developing coherent and operative UN, AU and EU troops. It is also vital that the EU, AU and the UN work together to link their plans for crisis management in Africa, with longer-term conflict prevention strategies, which include the input of civil society.

2.3. EU responses to conflict in Africa

Dr.Terhi Lehtinen35

Political, economic, social and cultural relations between Europe and Africa date back several centuries.This common heritage and deep historical ties provide a basis for strengthening the strategic EU-Africa partnership for peace and development.The historical EU-Africa summit in Cairo in 2000 aimed to revitalize this partnership for the new Millennium, while also extending this continent-wide dialogue beyond the traditional EU and African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)

34 In June 2003 the EU announced the first military mission outside Europe agreeing to send 1, 400 French, Belgian and British peacekeepers to war torn Congo to replace the 750 Uruguayan UN peace keepers. 35 Dr.Terhi Lehtinen is a Finnish researcher with extensive experience on EU policy instruments in Africa, and has worked for the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM). 50 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

cooperation framework to include Mediterranean countries36 under the joint EU-Africa framework.The second ministerial meeting in Ouagadougou in November 2002 reiterated the joint EU-Africa commitment to the strategic partnership.

Strengthening the EU-Africa partnership appears to be a real challenge in the era of globalisation, where negative media images, for example of African famines and civil wars often draw the attention away from the positive examples of successful political transitions or local peace-building efforts. However, positive initiatives are also emerging to reverse this picture.The ratification of the Cotonou Agreement - providing an innovative framework for political dialogue, trade and development cooperation among the EU and Sub-Saharan Africa, together with creation of the African Union (AU) and design of the NEPAD initiative - to which the EU is also fully committed – give hope for enhancing cooperation in peace and development. Similarly, recent international efforts in poverty reduction e.g. the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative and Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRSP); in sustainable development e.g. the Johannesburg summit and in development financing e.g. the Monterrey summit, have helped to build international consensus about the need to urgently tackle the problems in Africa. Also, the EU-ACP trade negotiations and the “Everything but Arms” (EBA)-initiative aim to strengthen and renew commercial ties between Europe and Africa. At the same time, the African civil society and private sector are organizing themselves to become partners in these international processes.

Furthermore, it is agreed that tackling problems of poverty and underdevelopment is not just a matter of international solidarity, it is a common responsibility in the context of global interdependence.The emerging global threats, whether linked to terrorism, to illegal migration, to organized crime or to worldwide health risks all suggest that promoting peace and development in Africa are in the joint interest of the EU and the African leaders.Therefore, it is time to think of new innovative ways to resolve common problems, by building on strong historical relations and on the lessons learnt from previous cooperation initiatives.This new EU-Africa partnership for peace and development should be based on the existence of differing but mutually reinforcing responsibilities; on complementarity between peace and development; on common values and on shared ownership and goals.The partnership could be shaped through enhanced cooperation in key policy issues, such as development, trade and political dialogue as well as in key cross-cutting issues such as conflict prevention, civil society participation, gender equality, environment and small arms.This chapter aims to reflect on challenges, opportunities and potential for this new partnership.

EU-Africa partnership initiatives

Since the mid 1990s, the EU has been actively considering the issue of conflict prevention in Africa and has developed a body of key policy statements to address the issue.This commitment reflects to a large extent the nature and history of the EU. It is itself a successful case of conflict prevention as it was designed to reduce the likelihood of renewed conflict in Europe after World War II.The EU now has a wide range of instruments at its disposal to tackle peace and development on the African continent.

EU mechanisms and financial instruments at its disposal to support peace and development in Africa:

• Political instruments. The instruments of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) include political dialogue, declarations, troika missions, demarches, joint actions, special envoys and common positions.

36 The North African countries also have long historical relations with the European Union through Euro-Mediterranean partnership, which has been strengthened through the Barcelona process, initiated in 1995.This chapter focuses on initiatives in Sub-Saharan Africa. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 51

• Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) and instruments in the area of civilian crisis management (police, rule of law) may also improve the EU’s response to nascent conflict situations. However, funding of CFSP (“pillar II”) actions and resources for civilian crisis management are limited.Therefore Cotonou continues to be the most appropriate long- term framework for dialogue and financial support to conflict prevention in Africa.

• Trade cooperation. EU trade policies include conflict management dimensions, as regional economic integration is often seen as a potential tool for preventing conflicts.The ongoing EU-ACP trade negotiations provide a common framework for EU-Africa partnership in the WTO context.The EBA initiative also aims to improve access of Least Developed Countries (LDC) to European markets. However, these measures should coincide with meaningful reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).

• Justice and Home Affairs instruments. New instruments in Justice and Home Affairs pillar (such as fight against terrorism, migration and asylum policy, etc) are gaining importance in the EU approach towards Africa.

• Development-oriented budget lines and humanitarian aid.The European Commission has several budget lines, such as European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights, (EIDHR)37, food security and NGO co-financing, to complement formal EU-ACP cooperation in Africa. Similarly, the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) provides humanitarian assistance in Africa.These funds are often channelled through NGOs and other civil society actors and do not require agreement with the government.These budget lines provide a relatively flexible instrument for targeted support to peace and development.

Most recently the Cotonou Agreement (2000) provides a comprehensive framework for political, development and trade cooperation between Europe and Africa. It calls for participation of non- state actors (NSA’s), including civil society, private sector and local governments, in the EU-ACP cooperation38.The EU-ACP institutions, including the Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA), provide useful institutional fora for dialogue and cooperation.The Cotonou Agreement39 has several relevant articles, which spell out principles for EU-Africa partnership and are relevant to the issue of conflict prevention:

• Article 8 on political dialogue, which may take place at different levels: African, regional level or national. Also, civil society actors can for the first time be associated with political dialogue processes, although the agreement does not clarify the practical modalities for their involvement. • Article 9 refers to “essential elements”40 of EU-ACP cooperation, namely human rights, democracy and rule of law. Furthermore, good governance is defined as a “fundamental element” of cooperation, with special focus on fight against corruption. • Article 11 on conflict prevention, management and resolution. • Article 96 providing for a consultation procedure in the case that one of the parties does not respect one of the essential elements of the agreement.

37 In 2001, the European Commission defined a new strategy for EIDHR, which selected 29 “focus countries” for enhanced human rights projects providing targeted support to democracy and governance. 38 In November 2002, the Commission issued a Communication about participation of NSA which outlines the involvement of NSA throughout the programming cycle of development cooperation 39 The European Development Fund (EDF), the financial instrument for EU-ACP cooperation, has a regional dimension. Both national and regional programming of the 9th EDF includes provisions for conflict prevention, civil society participation and governance in ACP countries. 40 EU’s external relations strategy and cooperation agreements with third countries include human rights, making human rights a key principle of the partnership. 52 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

The EU-Africa partnership is also actively promoted through various initiatives of the international community, African organisations, governments and various non-state actors (NSA):

• EU commitment to Poverty Reduction Strategies, macro-economic support and sectoral programmes in Africa. The EU is a major donor in Sub-Saharan Africa and under the 9th EDF around 30 per cent of its development funds are channelled through macro-economic support and financing the countries’ own poverty reduction strategies.This shift away towards strategic focus on social sectors and institutional capacity building may provide an important contribution to sustainable development. However, careful analysis of expenditure (including military expenditure), conflict assessment and local capacity are needed. Also, participation in global health initiatives, especially HIV/AIDS, is crucial for future African human resources.

• Support to African regional structures and member state support to NEPAD via the G8. The AU’s initiative in peace and development and the NEPAD initiative has created new opportunities for enhanced EU-Africa partnership. However, evolution of peace and security dimensions within regional organizations and new initiatives is dependent on the political will of governments, which may limit effectiveness of external intervention.

• EU support to regional infrastructure and cross-border projects. Cooperation on small arms, an area in which African governments have a joint security interest, seems to have provided promising results. Cross-border cooperation in areas, such as military inspections, customs, trade, infrastructure, tourism, energy and illicit traffics, which are not explicitly linked to conflict prevention, all have an impact on Africa’s economic growth and political cooperation. EU Member States also have experience in building local capacity for cross- border security cooperation.

• Promoting peace and development through networks of civil society, parliamentarians, private sector and local governments. Emerging civil society is a dynamic economic and political force in Africa, where informal economy, religious and ethnic networks and grassroots peace initiatives often challenge the rigidity of formal state systems. EU has in the past focused on “government-to-government” cooperation, but Cotonou provides new opportunities for support to informal networks of civil society organizations, parliamentarians, private sector and local governments, which may promote common values of democracy and citizens’ participation.

The EU has elaborated multi-dimensional approaches to developmental and political challenges in Africa.These principles, mechanisms and promising initiatives provide a basis for the EU-Africa Partnership for peace and development

Challenges for an enhanced EU-Africa Partnership

Some challenges remain to shaping the enhanced EU-Africa partnership for peace and development:

• Status of Africa in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).In recent years, the EU’s CFSP efforts have focused on neighbouring regions in the and on highly media-driven crises in Afghanistan and Iraq, while Africa seems to not have received the attention it deserves as an important strategic partner. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 53

• EU’s institutional complexity and divergent foreign policy interests in Africa.It often appears that institutional complexity of EU decision-making, the different cooperation frameworks (eg. Cotonou Agreement, MEDA Partnership) and divergent foreign policy interests of the 15 Member States41, have undermined the coherent use of available EU instruments in Africa NS make strategic planning for coherent initiatives challenging. However, the quality of the EU/ Africa partnership provides an opportunity for a common effort of strategic dialogue and partnership, which goes beyond traditional donor-recipient relations.

• Development cooperation “subordinated” to the fight against terrorism and illegal migration.The EU is increasingly linking development cooperation to “pillar III” considerations. Cooperation agreements with third parties will include a clause about terrorism and review process of the 9th EDF might increase linkages between monetary allocations and repatriation of illegal migrants. Careful consideration of the implications of III pillar measures is necessary.

• Negative image of Africa and focus on short-term emergencies. Media images of African crises lead donors to focus more on short-term emergency efforts (e.g. food and humanitarian aid) while it is hard to sustain an interest and adequate funding for long-term development and conflict prevention efforts. However, various EC financial instruments, including Cotonou, are geared towards long-term development efforts.

• Testing validity of new African initiatives. In recent years, African leaders have made suggestions about improved governance and democracy through joint principles and a peer review system. However, it is challenging to translate rhetoric into reality, when not all African governments respect jointly agreed principles.Transition to new forms of governance and political pluralism is a slow and difficult process, but not impossible, as the examples of Senegal or Kenya have shown.

• Limits of state-centric approach to EU-Africa partnership. Dynamic linkages exist among citizens of the two continents, through migration, tourism, education, culture and globalised media. Revitalization of the EU-Africa partnership requires building networks among universities, local governments, parliamentarians, civil society, private sector, cultural institutions and a EU-Africa civil society forum could be a step towards this.

• Challenge of EU’s internal reforms. Since 2000, the European Commission is undergoing wide institutional reforms, which aim to improve efficiency and quality of external assistance. This impacts on external cooperation programmes both through institutional changes (such as “deconcentration” of responsibilities to EC Delegations) and strategic policy changes (poverty reduction is defined as the key objective of EC cooperation).The success of the reform process is a precondition for the effective implementation of the EU-Africa partnership.

Opportunities for an enhanced EU-Africa Partnership

Revitalising the EU-Africa partnership for peace and development through innovative thinking and multiple initiatives:

41 The Enlargement to Eastern European countries is likely to further increase this diversity of foreign policy traditions and geopolitical interests. 54 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

• Promote constructive dialogue on governance as a pre-condition for peace and development. Despite difficulties of dialogue on some political issues, efforts are needed to continue this dialogue, understand divergent perspectives and finding solutions to common problems.

• Enhanced donor coordination and joint initiatives.The EU-Africa partnership has to take into account the evolution of other initiatives, such as G8 Africa Action Plan, PRSP, Strategic Partnership for Africa (SPA). Effective coordination and coherence and support for these initiatives will ensure a success of joint efforts for peace and development.

• Focus on implementation of high level commitments. Affecting long term stability on the ground requires commitments at the highest level, such as through the EU-Africa dialogue, to be translated into practical action through a multi dimensional partnership and accompanied by a monitoring a follow up process.

• Define a multi-dimensional partnership. Historical dynamics of EU-Africa relations go beyond government-to-government cooperation, therefore, it should build on existing networks and cultural linkages between the two continents.

• Effective use of EC financial instruments and enhanced political dialogue with African regional organizations (eg. AU) and governments in order to build capacities and strengthen the political and economic partnership. Strategic alliances for example in the WTO and UN contexts may be mutually beneficial.

• Recognise the importance of Member States’ historical links and foreign policy traditions, which complement the EU’s common efforts. Pooling of funds and the definition of comparative advantages between EC and Member States could have positive impacts on visibility and effectiveness of EU’s contribution to conflict prevention in Africa.The EC, with large EDF financial contributions may support regional economic integration through trade promotion and infrastructure, as well as through “general” institutional support for regional organisations (i.e. AU, IGAD). In contrast, Member States have a specific role in the area of civilian crisis management (rule of law, police training, customs cooperation, joint military inspections), support to key institutions in the area of governance and promoting peace.

• Promote cooperation and contacts among citizens, NGOs and private sector, governments, parliaments, universities, local governments. EU should focus on existing regional processes and actors that promote citizens’ cooperation and democratic debates in Africa. Institutional twinning and technical capacity building of regional platforms provide promising avenues for donor support to peace-building initiatives. For example, African diasporas could play a role in promoting EU-Africa partnership for peace and development.

• Special attention to the AU and its efforts in pilot countries.The shaping of the new African agenda through the AU deserves full support of the EU. Special attention should be paid to “pilot” actions of the AU, for example in Somalia and Burundi. Also, the EU cooperation with various regional organizations, such as SADC or ECOWAS, offers promising avenues for regional peace building in Africa.

• Focus on the African youth.While European countries are struggling with pension reforms, the main challenge for the African continent is to provide for its youth. Cooperation EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 55

should focus on children’s security, health and education, (including civic education), as they will provide the future generation of African leaders.

• Make capacity building the key approach for partnership. Improving training and capacity in peace and development is the first step towards enhanced partnership. Innovative cooperation requires new knowledge and capacities from both the European and African sides.

These initiatives require new ways of thinking and respect for efforts of peace building and conflict resolution by African citizens, not only by their governments. It also requires adopting a wider concept of “human security”, which is based on peace and sustainable development. 56 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

Chapter 3 Innovative responses to conflict, underdevelopment and good governance in Africa: harnessing the EU-Africa partnership’s unique role

The EU plays a critical role in the development of Africa and African organisations. It is evident, however, that the human security and development record of African countries has not been as encouraging as had been expected. Declining standards of living, conflicts and crises of governance remain daunting challenges. In a geopolitical climate that sees political interest and resources quickly shift between strategic crises (e.g. Afghanistan and Iraq), the commitments and structures established between Africa and the EU must therefore be consolidated and fully implemented for a longer-term approach to peace and development. The innovative responses in this section reflect the multi-sectoral and multi-level approach necessary for harnessing the unique role of the EU-Africa partnership. This includes strengthening the vertical relationships between civil society and the EU and pan-African institutions, as well as addressing the horizontal, cross- cutting issues that impact on conflict, such as trade, arms and the role of the private sector.

3.1. Enhancing the role of the EU in supporting the AU and sub- regional organisations

Professor Josephine Odera42

The EU has the capacity to support the AU and other sub-regional organisations in Africa to play a more effective role in the continent’s peace and development. It must, however, address both the conceptual and operational issues in that process.This section makes the basic assumption that weak states make weak institutions.There are therefore two aspects to enhancing the role of the EU in supporting the effectiveness of the AU and sub-regional organisations: the role of the state and the regional institutions.

The recent name change from the Organisation of African Unity to African Union is, in itself, a statement on the need for transformation of the regional organisation. Indeed, sub-regional organisations, such as Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), have over time been revising and expanding their mandates to, for example, take conflict responses into account. The East African Community (EAC) is in the process of defining its common policy frameworks in various areas including that of security and foreign policy.This on- going process reflects the conventional wisdom that development, peace and good governance are significantly correlated and not one can be achieved in isolation of the others.

Enhancing the capacity of members to act

The challenges faced by both the AU and other sub-regional organisations are all embedded in the capacity to act. Firstly, inter-governmental organisations, unless enjoying some form of supranationality, are constrained in their capacity to act by the nature of their membership. At the state level, enhancing the effectiveness of inter-governmental organisations involves the strengthening of democratic processes. It has become evident that the democratic culture will flourish where there is

42 Professor Josephine Odera is Deputy Director of the Africa Peace Forum based in Kenya. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 57

a strong vibrant civil society and civic education must continue. It is therefore critical that the EU maintain its support in affirming governments committed to democratic processes while at the same time ensuring that civil society organisations remain critically engaged in socio-economic and political processes. Development investment that raises basic indicators of literacy, primary health, food security and enables the building of indigenous expertise and its growth is also essential. Such efforts at state level eventually translate into stronger membership of sub-regional organisations.The point to be made here is that enhancing the effectiveness of sub-regional organisations is ultimately correlated to the strength of the membership.

Institutional strengthening

From an institutional perspective, the AU and other sub-regional organisations lament the lack of capacity to carry out their mandates.This is made worse by the financial crises that these organisations face due to lack of contributions from member states.The ten million euros allotted by the EU for institutional capacity building of the AU is a welcome development, however, it is important to also enable these organisations to engage the right personnel for the right tasks. In addition to supporting policy direction, the EU should provide capacity building support for programme areas, which includes components for building staff capacity through strengthened recruitment processes and training. Unless this is done, there is the risk of programme support without the personnel to carry it out, or vice versa. As African institutions remain highly patriarchal, this should include the promotion of women to influential positions and gender awareness training for all staff. The EU (and UN) could also share with African institutions the challenges and opportunities for mainstreaming UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and the European Parliament Resolution on the Gender Aspects of Conflict Resolution and Peace-building across their institutional structures and processes.43

It is also important that in offering support, the EU should avoid taking on the role of line management or micro management of these organisations.The effectiveness of African intergovernmental organisations is unlikely to increase if donors act as umpires and players at the same time.These suggestions bring out the tension or dilemmas with respect to roles and responsibilities. Knowing who and where to draw the line in the relationship has, to date, proven elusive. The Cotonou Agreement talks of partnerships and it is here where that principle meets one of its greatest challenges. Redefining or refining partnership principles is a necessity for enhancing the effectiveness of the AU and sub-regional organisations.

Civil society participation

The effectiveness of the AU and sub-regional organisations can be immensely improved by increased civil society participation in their programmes, which is stated principle. Partnerships with civil society offer potential to re-orient policies and make the work of intergovernmental organisations more responsive to the African people (not just leaders), while maintaining effective external linkages. In many instances, however, civil society organisations are simply tolerated rather than seen as important partners.The EU can support civil society organisations to work with intergovernmental organisations in the design or implementation of programmes. IGAD’s Early Warning and Early Response Mechanism (CEWARN) was developed with substantial involvement of civil society organisations. Current efforts of the East African Community towards developing common policy frameworks are also drawing in civil society organisations.These are trends that the EU can support and promote. See section 3.3. for more on civil society engagement.

43 For more information see "Impacting Policy" at http://www.womenbuildingpeace.org/ 58 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

Sharing skills and expertise

The long history of European engagement in Africa gives the EU a definite advantage in relating to African actors and institutions.The EU as an institution has much to offer emerging, or even older, organisations in terms of lessons and possibilities. Seconding experts on short-term basis while also offering opportunities for African technocrats to study the operations of the EU is an important form of skills transfer that could be made more systematic.The process must, however, retain its skills transfer principle as opposed to dependency on expatriates.The new form of technical assistance that is emerging where donors permanently station their staff in intergovernmental organisations may yield some short-term benefits of ensuring adherence to donor requirements but in the long run, the internalisation of standards is likely to suffer.

Building capacity for conflict prevention, management and resolution

In the current IGAD peace processes for both Somalia and Sudan, the EU has taken an active role in providing both financial and technical support to IGAD. No doubt the frustration of long drawn out processes has given the impression that donors need to take a more active role.The case of IGAD in its mediation efforts shows that its role can be strengthened by building the capacity of the organisation to take on its role of conflict prevention, management and resolution through establishing full fledged departments of well qualified staff. Currently the organisation suffers from understaffing.While donor funding is forthcoming, it must be accompanied by evident institutional growth in capacity and impact.

Africa does appreciate supportive engagement of the EU and other external actors as has been witnessed in the peace processes in Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia and Sudan, among others. To avoid another level of tension in terms of whether he who pays the piper should call the tune, the involvement of donors should not diminish the roles and responsibility of the regional actors and the organisation. Where peace agreements have been signed, support for implementation remains crucial.The EU should continue to work with the AU in putting in place effective mechanisms for the monitoring of peace agreements including support for peacekeeping. Financial and technical assistance especially in disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration are areas that have long been identified as pertinent to the implementation of peace agreements. An element that has understandably received inadequate support is that of de-mining in conflict situations; yet there are areas, which enjoy relative stability that can also benefit from de-mining programmes.The de-mining programme in Southern Sudan is one such example.The moral of the story in this respect is that responding to conflicts sometimes requires breaking new frontiers.This calls for peace programmes that are bold in character and effective in impact.

Promoting donor co-ordination towards intergovernmental organisations

There is a case for addressing donor competition in intergovernmental organisations.While some EU members maintain bilateral programmes with intergovernmental organisations, there is a case for harmonisation so that competition at a donor level does not result in proliferation of similar programmes stretching the capacities of the recipient organisations and ultimately reducing their effectiveness.The EU could play an important harmonising role.

Promoting cross-cutting issues

There are some specific issues that the EU could help intergovernmental organisations to address. Referred to as ‘cross-cutting issues’, they include cross-border issues of crime including terrorism, EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 59

drugs and arms trafficking.44 In the African context, one must add to these issues, livestock rustling, cross-border ethnic conflicts and even demarcating borders.The Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict of 1998- 2000 is just one of the recent cases of the wars triggered by border disagreements. Setting up well- trained units to analyse and offer policy advice to the organisations and their members is a venture worth investing in both at the national and organisational levels. Such units would take into account efforts aimed at strengthening the capacity of the security sector to address these problems.

3.2. Making the New African Partnership for Development (NEPAD) effective and responsive: the role of the EU

3.2. 1. A Southern perspective

Dr. Monica Juma,45 SaferAfrica

How can the EU-AU partnership be enhanced?

Implementing the AU NEPAD African Peace and Security Agenda (APSA) priorities offers an opportunity to enhance the EU-AU partnership. Given the limitations of both NEPAD and the AU structures (see Chapter 2), a gradual approach to implementation has been conceived with sustained action at the continental, regional and national operational levels. The continental level is expected to guide and inform the rest through the generation of regional umbrellas for concerted action, and improved mechanism for dialogue between government and civil society. Sub-regional mechanisms are envisaged to provide frameworks that can assist states to implement the APSA through concerted and harmonious actions. Finally, responsibility for the implementation of activities and action relating to APSA rests on national actors and stakeholders. EU support needs to target each of these levels to ensure the effective operationalisation of the APSA priorities through: a) generation of operational guidelines for regional and national entities to commence implementation of recommendations and agreed actions; and b) building the capacity of actors (both governmental and non-governmental) to enable them to participate, input and co-operate in implementation processes.

Specifically the EU can contribute in a number of ways:

1.The EU could enhance political buy-in at the strategic level. This could include support for joint AU-NEPAD activities such as joint consultations, co-ordination activities and information sharing on APSA. Support for political buying-in could also take the form of encouraging individual states or groups of states to stay the course through positive sanctions.

2.While the secondary level of implementation lies within the realm of sub-regional organisations, the capacities of these organisations remain wanting.The EU could enhance the capacity of these organisations through: • Support for direct training; e.g. for officials. • Institutional development; e.g. of the sub-regional secretariats. • Provision for exchange between sub-regional organisations and between these actors and the AU and NEPAD.

44 European Commission, One Year On:The Commission’s Conflict Prevention Policy, 15 March 2002, pp 8-10. 45 Dr. Monica Kathina Juma is a Programme Officer working in the NEPAD programme at SaferAfrica. Prior to this she was a Research Associate in the Africa Program of the International Peace Academy in New York, where she produced a review of the capacity of African institutions to respond to crises and conflicts in 18 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 60 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

3.The participation of non-state actors as effective interlocutors in the APSA to ensure human security is emphasised throughout the APSA deliberation. For these stakeholders to undertake effective action calls for a measure of capacity building. Training to hone their skills in conflict management, prevention and resolution would ensure their full participation, input and co-operation in processes that create peace, contribute to human security and developmental processes in and for Africa.

4.The EU should support mechanisms for assisting national implementation efforts through the building of capacity and the construction of communication and dialogue between governmental officials and civil society, particularly at the community level.

5. At the strategic level, the EU could support co-ordination and joint research activities, facilitation and work-shopping that the AU Commission, the NEPAD peace and security sub- committee, and the newly created NEPAD office of the UN in New York will have to undertake to implement the recommendations of the APSA.

These proposed activities would ensure co-ordination and joint efforts between different secretariats in support of a common APSA; the provision of capacity to sub-regional secretariats as required, and the effective construction of feasible operational guidelines and work plans that will transform the priority arenas into workable timeframes for action.

3.2.2 A Northern Perspective

James Mackie,46 European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM)

NEPAD is an important new element on the African development scene which, has succeeded in playing an effective advocacy role (see Chapter 2) but it is still a recent arrival and has its limitations. First, it is led by a limited number of African leaders and while these are among the most prominent and farsighted, many others are unsure of whether to get involved in an initiative over which they feel they will have limited influence. The perception that NEPAD fails to provide a people-centred, pro-poor and gender responsive economic framework for poverty eradication has been re-enforced by the lack of consultation with parliaments and civil society in Africa, resulting in the current problems of limited domestic support for the initiative. Secondly, NEPAD has attracted much criticism from African academics and civil society who essentially feel that the deal the NEPAD leaders struck with the G-8 was too much tailored to the development agenda of donors, too much oriented towards increasing aid flows and not that favourable to Africa. The gender blindness in recognising the devastating impact of structural adjustment programmes policies imposed by international financial institutions on women and the poor is an example of how NEPAD fails to address some of the core macro-issues that the African poor are burdened by. NEPAD therefore suffers from problems of ownership in Africa and, as a result, has only limited value as a rallying point for action on development in Africa, however supportive donors may be.

Another weakening factor has been the confusion surrounding the link between NEPAD and the African Union and the split of responsibilities between the two. Both President Mbeki and Obasanjo have said clearly that NEPAD is a programme of an institution, the AU. But as long as the NEPAD Secretariat in Pretoria is run as a separate entity to the AU Commission in Addis Ababa, doubts will remain. At worst, it may lead to a situation where donors focus all their attention on NEPAD, while neglecting to invest in the development of the AU as a new pan-

46 James Mackie is ECDPM’s Programme Co-ordinator for the Political Dimensions of the Partnership theme. Prior to this he spent 10 years as the Secretary General of the European development NGO umbrella organisation, the EU-NGDO Liaison Committee. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 61

African institution. Mbeki and Obasanjo’s position is clearly the right way to go because NEPAD could gain much from being directly associated with the stronger political ownership felt by many Africans for the AU, but there is a certain reluctance to make the move because of the AU’s image, inherited from the OAU, of being a bureaucratic structure which would damage the dynamism of NEPAD. The AU is moving to change this image and the European Community (EC) is, in fact, willing to support it in doing so. It is also hoped that the relationship between the AU and NEPAD will be clarified at the AU Summit in Maputo in July 2003.

What then should be the role of the EU in making NEPAD more effective? Clearly this is primarily the responsibility of the African leadership. Donors can, however, help by being clear and consistent in their support and the EU has a particularly important role to play, because the NEPAD is an AU programme and Europeans have a comparable framework with which to deal with the AU: the EU. There are perhaps four principles the EU needs to follow in dealing with pan-African institutions:

1. Ensure an AU-EU political dialogue framework is operational and usable. 2. Support NEPAD while investing in the consolidation of the AU as a legitimate and effective pan-African institution. 3. Be clear about what framework (AU, NEPAD, etc) to use for each type of support. 4. Ensure coherence in EU and bilateral EU-Member State (MS) support.

In practice this means that the first crucial priority is to get the EU-Africa dialogue back on track and operating smoothly. Maputo provides an opportunity for a new start and the ideal chance to establish an EU-AU dialogue rather an EU-Africa dialogue. The links should be between the two Unions and not between the EU and the Member States of the other. If the EU were to recognise this and deal with the AU as a whole, including its elected representatives and office bearers, the EU’s unwillingness to deal with certain African governments would no longer be an issue.47

Secondly, the EU should recognise the AU – rather than NEPAD – as the proper institutional framework with the political legitimacy for harnessing partnership relations and for addressing all- Africa challenges of conflict, underdevelopment and governance. Among other things this implies that the EU (EC+MS) should go on supporting the AU as the appropriate focus for peace and security issues by supporting the work of its Conflict Management Centre (CMC) and its new Peace & Security Council. Equally, if the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) is going to operate effectively at a political level then it must clearly be an AU mechanism and not just a NEPAD initiative. It also means providing support to the AU’s efforts to define and promote proper standards of governance across the continent.

The EU should also be clear that NEPAD is not an execution agency. Development projects in Africa will not and should not be carried out by NEPAD, but by four levels of organisations that already exist: the AU for all-Africa projects, the RECs for regional ones, governments for national level projects and fourthly, by civil society actors in appropriate places.

This then leaves NEPAD the role which it performs best and one for which it can provide real added value: advocacy. Advocacy vis-a-vis the donor community and, one would hope increasingly, once its integration into the AU is clearly established beyond any doubt, advocacy for development inside Africa. NEPAD can then provide the framework to co-ordinate initiatives across the continent; dynamise continental initiatives; ensure support is forthcoming where it is

47 Of course, the AU might conceivably elect Zimbabwe to its chairmanship but then the EU would not be dealing with Zimbabwe as Zimbabwe, but as the representative of the AU. 62 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

needed; encourage the appropriate actors, be they member states government or others, to get involved in regional and continental programmes; ensure that no AU member state gets left behind and that those that have difficulty are helped to keep up with others. It can ensure that initiatives, for instance to build capacity, in areas such as, amongst others, good governance are undertaken and that resources from outside the continent are directed where they are most needed. This advocacy role could also play an important part in facilitating increased participation and ownership of the initiative by civil society. This could, amongst other approaches, take place through raising awareness and supporting women’s forums to consult on how NEPAD addresses their economic, social and political role and needs.

Finally, it is high time that EU governments and the EC develop a clear common policy on support to pan-African institutions. There is currently a very poor level of exchange of information between them on what they are each doing to support NEPAD and the AU. Instead, there is a series of unco-ordinated support measures and initiatives pulling in different directions and strongly divergent views on the role of NEPAD and the importance of the EU-Africa dialogue. As a group of donors committed to working together they have a clear responsibility to develop a common policy towards the AU and NEPAD and to ensure they all adhere to it closely in their political relations with Africa and their bilateral aid programmes, as well as in the overall EC programme.

3.3 Defining and strengthening the EU’s diplomatic role with African institutions, states and other multilateral organisations

Professor Josephine Odera-APFO 48 & Lindsay Alexander-International Alert 49

Defining the EU’s role as intermediary and broadening political dialogue

The long history of EU-Africa relations offers both opportunities and constraints to the EU’s diplomatic role. Strengthening this role will require first and foremost clarification on the necessity for and nature of that diplomatic role.

The history of African relations with multilateral organisations such as the IMF and World Bank have depended either on development approaches or on conditionalities which are pronounced wholly economic, but are highly dependent on the political situation. As a result, relations become tense when multilateral organisations withhold funding or impose conditions that are deemed unjust, depending on which side of the political fence one is.The EU has a role to play in both having a positive influence on the political/ governance situation and also by assisting in establishing when conditionalities must be eased in order to motivate change. However, without having an understanding of the demands of both sides, the diplomatic role is unlikely to be effective. Issues that the EU should continue to encourage and promote are national policies that offer support to political parties so that relations with particular multilateral agencies cease to be a political tool to the detriment of a country at large.

An effective way of strengthening the EU’s diplomatic role would be the expanded use of the political dialogue instrument to focus not only on bilateral relations between the EU and African countries but rather to make this dialogue tripartite by including, whenever necessary, representatives of these multilateral agencies.

48 Professor Josephine Odera is Deputy Director of the Africa Peace Forum based in Kenya. 49 Lindsay Alexander is the EU Policy Officer for the Development and Peace-building Programme at International Alert. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 63

Special Representatives

The diplomatic role of special representatives is an important one in Africa. Hans Dalhgren in the Mano River Union,West Africa, and Aldo Ajello in the Great Lakes region work closely with state leaders, the UN, AU and regional bodies to co-ordinate EU engagement and peace-building processes in the regions. While some degree of flexibility in their mandate is important, there lacks clarity, however, in how their roles link in with other EC processes and structures of the ground (e.g. linkages with the Heads of Delegation and with the development of regional strategy papers).

Due to the funding structures for Special Representatives, represented by individual Member States (e.g. Dalhgren is funded by the Swedes and Ajello by the Italians), special representatives can also lack a shared mandate from all EC states. As a result, the wealthier Member States will continue to bear greater influence on their role in these regions (e.g. excluding the accession states). Without a central fund, the legitimacy and influence of special representatives will, therefore, be undermined and the financial resources for Special Representatives’ to engage long- term remain unavailable.

To optimise the effectiveness of Special Representatives in Africa, and elsewhere, attention should be given to understanding the added value that an EU representative can bring (e.g. linkages to the Members States, a common and foreign security policy) and how this can complement the role of the UN, for example. Lessons can also be learned from High Representative, Lord Ashdown double- hatting as EU Special Representative for the EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovinia. Stronger and more systematic processes also need to be established to operationalise linkages between special representatives and other EU processes and structures on the ground.This should be taken on a case-by-case basis to reflect the regional context. The funding structures for special representatives also need to be reviewed whereby a central fund from the CFSP budget is allocated.

The role of the EU-ACP Joint Parliamentary Assembly (JPA)

An often under-used mechanism for diplomacy is the EU-ACP Joint Parliamentary Assembly. It is an important means of democratising ACP-EU co-operation, however, the relations between the national parliaments and the Assembly could be enhanced. The ACP Parliament could be strengthened to enhance the democratic foundation of ACP-EU co-operation - through dialogue with non-state actors - and also to act as monitors for effective implementation of EC co- operation – through the development of a working group on peace and security, for example. A Belgian-led programme of awareness-raising seminars in Africa, to clarify the role of ACP national parliaments under the Cotonou Partnership, concluded that while there is some consensus on the roles to be played by national parliaments, there is still a real hunger for information.The EU could play an important role in strengthening the operations and institutions of the JPA as well as the capacities of the national parliaments to engage.

3.4. Engaging and utilising civil society (individuals and organisations) for development and peacebuilding

Guus Meijer, 50 Conciliation Resources

The role of civil society in development and peacebuilding can not be seen in isolation of that of the state, its agencies and institutions. Civil society is often seen as antagonistic or even hostile to the

50 Guus Meijer is a Dutch free-lance consultant and trainer in conflict transformation and peace-building and a Programme Associate of Conciliation Resources. 64 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

state or to the government in power, especially in Africa, but paradoxically the state and civil society are mutually dependent. Civil society needs a legal framework and a generally facilitating political and social environment in order to blossom, which only the state can provide.The state, on the other hand, needs a dynamic and vocal civil society in order to keep in touch with the various needs and interests in the country and not become isolated and self-indulgent. State and civil society should, therefore, be seen as complementary, which is not to say that their interests are always parallel.

In designing its general development policies and specific projects, the EU should be acutely aware of both this interdependence of state and civil society, as well as of their fundamentally different character.The Cotonou Partnership Agreement between the EU and the ACP countries in fact recognised the important role of non-state actors, including civil society actors and the private sector, in promoting peace and development.There are legal provisions for the involvement of civil society in political dialogue, national and regional programming, as well as in the formulation and implementation of co-operation policies. In addition to this, the Agreement also foresees improved access to funding and capacity building support for non-state actors.The question remains what type of support is needed for civil society actors to strengthen their legitimacy, capacity and organisational development? These are issues which should be actively pursued by the new EU Presidency, especially with regard to Africa, in the context of the European Commission Communication on Co-operation with Non-State Actors (November 2002).

Civil society as an engine for peace and development

African states are generally weak in the sense that they do not have effective control over the whole territory they are formally administering (e.g. for tax collection, security, administration of justice, and other areas of policy implementation), nor are they able to deliver the social and other services to the whole of their population. In many cases, this reality is exacerbated by on-going or recently ended armed conflict, between the government and rebel forces or between warlords. The move towards democratisation in the 1990s has only been partially successful. Although there are now more African countries which have formally adopted a pluralistic political system and new elites have come to power through elections, the record on democracy and good governance is very uneven. Non-state actors, such as churches and church-related organisations, women’s organisations, human rights and other NGOs, are playing a crucial role in holding the state to account and pressing for further democratic changes, as well as in substituting for absent or non-delivering state agencies in areas such as education, health, social welfare, economic development, justice, human rights, and public information (media).

It is important to distinguish the two roles of pressure group and service-delivery organisation, as well as the corresponding types of civil society organisations or NGOs – although there is often overlap in practice.The first one is much closer to the political process, and sometimes referred to as ‘non-party political movements’, while the second one is seen as more technical and ‘neutral’, and therefore easier to deal with for external governmental or intergovernmental donor agencies. Yet, given the current realities in Africa, where in many countries political, economic and media interests are closely intertwined in clientelist networks and a more open and democratic polity remains a distant dream, support for independent and critical voices continues to be crucially important for sustainable peace and development.The EU has demonstrated in the past to be willing and able to provide such support and it should continue to do so. Both NEPAD and the Cotonou Agreement could provide a framework in this respect in as far as they champion transparency, good governance and the role of civil society.There are platforms for civil society engagement in the EU-Africa dialogue under Cotonou that could be strengthened and institutionalised, such as national platforms/committees, the pan-African ACP Civil Society Forum and the Joint Paliamentary Assembly. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 65

African countries have experienced in rather extreme form the main social, political and economic trends that characterised the decade of the 1990s worldwide: liberalisation of the economy and democratisation of the political system.This has meant even greater demands on civil society organisations, especially on private service delivering agencies that take over some of the functions traditionally performed by the state. Indigenous non-state actors, both individuals and organisations, are also increasingly playing constructive roles in facilitating the process of peacemaking at the political level, as well as peace-building at the level of local communities in countries plagued by civil wars, such as Angola, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Sierra Leone, Uganda and others.Whenever appropriate and feasible, the EU should encourage such initiatives by providing capacity-building support and protection.

Democratising civil society

The relationship between development, on the one hand, and peace and conflict, on the other, is a complex one, nevertheless, many development interventions, coupled with the unavoidable effects of globalisation, lead to greater inequalities in and between countries, more competition, tension and conflict – creating a need for effective conflict management mechanisms at all levels. A ‘conflict perspective’ should be integrated across the full range of development projects (e.g. transport, housing, education, water and the environment). In this context, consultation, participation and inclusion of all stakeholders are valid principles that need to be integrated as far as possible into all project design and implementation. Civil society, in its multifarious manifestations, is where these values are mostly put into practice.This should not blind us, however, to the ‘democratic deficit’ that many civil society organisations exhibit.They often claim to speak and act in the name of ‘the people’, while in many cases their legitimacy is not being tested and they remain limited to a professional elite.‘Democratising civil society’ would therefore be a constructive goal for any peace and development-oriented intervention and the EU would be wise to build that into its approach. One way of achieving this would be to support institutional development and national or even regional networking among civil society organisations.

Building capacity of civil society

In all of the areas referred to above, local organisations need and deserve support, both financially (given the difficulty in mobilising resources domestically), and sometimes technically as well. Through its wide range of programmes and budget lines, the EU has been actively supporting development in all its forms, as well as democratisation, human rights and peace-building, both through multi-lateral and bilateral channels.The many EC country delegations are in a good position to monitor local developments and trends and to tailor support to real needs; their capacity to actively engage with local civil society actors needs to be enhanced. Foreign companies or Northern-based NGOs, which are often brought in to ‘deliver’ projects and programmes, run the risk of displacing and disempowering local forces and missing opportunities for building or enhancing local capacities for peace and development. A closer liaison with Northern-based NGOs can be part of the solution, provided they work in real partnership with local actors; it would be better even to directly support local organisations, wherever it is possible to closely accompany and monitor their activities.

Balancing support for civil society with support for the state

As indicated above, peace and development can, however, not be brought about by civil society alone, in a political, legal and economic vacuum. It would not be appropriate to directly involve civil society organisations in all and every type of programme, although it might be sensible, as suggested above, to engage them in consultations (taking into due consideration who they 66 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

represent). The African state needs support as well as civil society and the EU should work with state institutions and agencies in order to make them more transparent, more accountable and more competent – to the benefit of society at large.This applies, for example, to the justice and security sectors (police, judiciary, prison system, military), so crucial for sustainable peace yet often extremely weak. Civil society, in the form of unions, professional bodies, independent media and community groups, again remains a vital partner in applying the necessary pressure for state institutions to change.

3.5. Exploring how the EU-Africa partnership can enhance security on the continent

Peter Cross,51 Saferworld

There are multiple causes and characteristics of Africa’s security dilemma. Two Factors, however, arguably lie at the heart of the problem.The first is the breakdown of the state and its ability to provide security for its citizens.Whilst independence and the end of the Cold War in some respects facilitated peace accords and gave rise to emerging democracies, in other respects state hegemony has crumbled, leaving huge power vacuums to be manipulated by warlords, rival ethnic groups, multinational corporations and private security companies, amongst others. The second factor is the excessive proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Huge surplus weapons stocks left over from the Cold War are readily available on the black market and are frequently trafficked into and across Africa. Ineffective demobilisation of troops and guerrilla groups in the region has also led to many retaining their weapons and large caches have been left undetected.Weapons are cheap to buy, easy to use and transport and are one of the main factors fuelling conflict, crime, human rights abuses and under-development across the continent.

In attempting to address problems of insecurity in Africa’s conflicts, a concerted, multi-layered and co-ordinated effort is required. Local, regional, national and international partnerships are essential to this process. The EU-Africa partnership therefore has a vital role to play. Key priorities to be addressed include the need for effective demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) programmes, the importance of reforming the security sector, and the need to tackle the spread of small arms.

Improving the effectiveness of DDR programmes

In the immediate aftermath of a conflict one of the most pressing challenges is effectively demobilising, disarming and reintegrating ex-combatants. Yet the recent history of this in many African countries is not encouraging. Too often the main focus of African governments and international donors who are supporting the process has been on quickly demobilising soldiers with little provision made for their effective disarmament and reintegration.

Experience shows that without a more comprehensive approach, such short-term fixes often just store up problems for the future and are a major factor in the recurrence of conflict. The presence of thousands of unemployed ex-combatants, whose only skill may be soldiering and whose only valuable asset is an assault rifle, poses a significant threat to security in many countries. Reintegrating soldiers back into communities, providing skills training and creating social and economic opportunities is an urgent priority. The EU-Africa partnership should review best practice internationally in DDR programmes, ensure that such programmes are adequately resourced and ensure that peacekeeping missions have effective mandates that include disarmament.

51 Peter Cross is the Project Coordinator, for Saferworld’s Arms and Security Programme. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 67

The need for security sector reform (SSR)

Incumbent regimes have often used security forces to protect their own interests rather than those of the population. Large militaries can divert public expenditure away from more pressing social needs, unprofessional and unaccountable police and security forces can create mistrust within communities and a corrupt and inefficient judicial system can deny people access to justice. This makes it difficult to pursue strategies to foster peace and to secure the co-operation of the public to stem the flow of small arms and can actually increase the demand for weapons. Security sector reform projects, in pre and post-conflict environments, can help bring about more positive and accountable security structures that meet the needs of society and go a long way to bridging the gap between government and local people. As the problems in the security sector are largely interlinked, it is often beneficial to take a sector-wide approach that attempts to address different aspects simultaneously. Improving the capacity and accountability of policing will not necessarily, for example, bring about an improved security environment if it is not linked to support for the judiciary.

In the past there has sometimes been reluctance on the part of some African governments to engage in meaningful reform of the security sector, and many European donors have also been wary of supporting such programmes. There is now, however, a greater acceptance in many African governments about the need for SSR, and a greater willingness on behalf of donors to use development assistance to address security issues.

Community-based policing

One innovative aspect of security sector reform being pursued at varying degrees across Africa is community-based policing.This system is based on the simple premise of policing by consent, not coercion, and in partnership with the community, rather than policing of the community. In Kenya, for example, the Office of the President and the Kenya police, in association with national and international NGOs, have developed a pilot community-based policing programme. Key aspects include developing a national community-based policing policy, creating a strategic development plan for the police, training police and civil society organisations, implementing crime prevention strategies in pilot sites and education and public awareness-raising. Thus far, community-based policing has proved a cost effective and efficient way of achieving greater public confidence in the criminal justice system. Supporting the development of such comprehensive programmes not only improves security but also aims to enhance social and economic development.

Combating the spread of small arms and light weapons

It is now widely recognised at international, regional and national levels that the easy availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in Africa escalates conflicts, undermines political stability and has devastating impacts on human and state security. At the Cairo Summit, EU and African governments agreed to intensify efforts to fully co-operate at international level to combat the problem of illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, and agreed to ensure a successful outcome of the UN Conference on ‘The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects’ in 2001. Whilst the UN conference was in many ways a missed opportunity since no legally binding measures were enforced, a fairly comprehensive Programme of Action (PoA) was developed which, if implemented, would go a long way to combat the illicit trafficking of SALW. The biennial review conference this July provides an important opportunity for the EU to encourage further action to implement the PoA.

In addition, some important regional initiatives have been taken in Africa to combat the spread of small arms, notably the development of the Bamako Declaration, the SADC Firearm Protocol, the 68 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

Nairobi Declaration and the ECOWAS Moratorium. Implementation of these legal and political agreements, particularly in Eastern and Southern Africa is now gaining momentum.

The EU has provided some support to these regional and sub-regional initiatives and it is vital that this continues and increases. The EU-SADC Joint Working Group on Small Arms was, for example, established in 1999 to act as a forum for the exchange of experience, in which projects for funding could be identified and evaluated and co-ordination enhanced on a wide range of issues. The EU-SADC Working Group met to discuss projects in support of the SADC Protocol on Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials at a seminar in Brussels in November 2002. The partnership has, however, experienced difficulties, partly due to the inflexibility of EU structures, which do not allow for working group meetings to take place outside of Brussels.

The main challenge now is ensuring the effective implementation of these regional and sub-regional agreements at the national level. One of the most positive recent developments has been the development in Tanzania of a National Action Plan for Arms Management and Disarmament. Following a comprehensive national analysis of the small arms and security challenges, the government and civil society are jointly implementing a plan which includes: undertaking a thorough review of national legislation governing the control of small arms and light weapons; training and capacity building for the police, the judiciary, customs and immigration officials; establishing development programmes in areas suffering from the impact of small arms and developing the capacity of civil society to work alongside the government, for example, by raising awareness of the dangers of small arms within communities. The EU is currently funding the implementation of the five-year Tanzanian National Action Plan. Other countries including Kenya, Mozambique and Uganda are now developing their own action plans and it is to be hoped that the EU can also provide support to these.

3.6. New perspectives on EU-Africa trade for peace and development

Kato Lambrechts,52 Christian Aid

Can trade deliver peace and development in Africa?

One of the symptoms of Africa’s underdevelopment is the continent’s inability to trade its way out of poverty. While investing in production for the international market is not a panacea for economic development, under certain conditions it can assist in the structural transformation of African economies, away from a reliance on the production or extraction of one or a few primary mineral or agricultural commodities to a more diversified industrial base. Given the primary role of the agricultural sector in African societies and economies, currently providing a livelihood to around 70 per cent of working adults, agro-processing industries such as clothing and textiles, footwear and food products are a realistic first step away from the continent’s vulnerability to fluctuating international commodity prices, which has been at the root of the steady decline in its terms of trade as well as its balance of payments and long-standing foreign debt crises.

International trade and investment has the potential to create wealth that could, if fairly distributed, address one of the root causes of intra-state conflicts in Africa, namely contestations over access to scarce material resources. Evidence shows, however, that extractive investment and trade in precious commodities such as oil and diamonds, which accounts for the larger amount of investment on the continent, have fuelled and prolonged violent conflicts in countries such as Angola, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (see section 3.6. following).

52 Kato Lambrects is Christian Aid’s Senior Policy Officer for Southern Africa. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 69

EU-African trade relations

Exports originating in African countries have long benefited from preferential access to the European market, first under the Yaoundé and Lomé Conventions, and now under the Cotonou Framework Agreement. At present, about 99 per cent of all actual African exports to the EU are eligible to enter the European market without facing any tariff barriers (they continue to face a range of non-tariff barriers, especially seasonal agricultural and processed food products). Despite this very favourable access in theory, African exports to the EU have declined by more than half between 1975 and 1995. Given this discouraging situation, coupled with the general lack of export diversification and the increasing threat of challenges in the WTO against the preferential market access accorded by the EU to the ACP53 the European Commission has been developing the idea of negotiating reciprocal free trade areas with the ACP since 1996. The ACP group has been vehemently opposed to the idea of giving EU agricultural exporters special access to their markets in view of the unfair competition EU imports, benefiting from domestic and export subsidies under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP),54 would pose to domestic producers.

The margins of preference African exports have been enjoying on the EU market are being gradually eroded; it is expected that by 2010 African exports will no longer have any significant margins of preferences over that of competitors. Despite this, however, due to the multilateral tariff reduction commitments of the EU, the ending of the MultiFibre Agreement in 2005, and the EU strategy of negotiating free trade areas with favoured trading partners around the world, African countries believe that there is still a strong case to be made for trade preferences to continue for the time being, if they offer real benefits.

An EU-African partnership on trade for development

The European Commission mandate to negotiate a new trading partnership with African (and Caribbean and Pacific) countries is highly problematic. The new EU leadership will be challenged to address serious omissions and revisit anti-developmental demands in the mandate, building on the long-nurtured spirit of trust and respect between African and European countries.

First, African countries need an assurance that European leaders, encouraged by the Commission, will seriously engage with their agricultural constituencies to explore how to lift the barriers facing actual and potential African exports of CAP- sensitive products such as processed fruits and vegetables, beef, sugar, and diary products to the EU market by 2008. These barriers include tariff quotas, seasonal restrictions, entry prices, and the escalation of tariffs on processed food products. Full Everything But Arms (EBA) access to all ACP countries, as proposed by the UK, Swedish and Danish governments, would be a significant first step.

Second, African countries need an assurance that the Commission and national ministries of agriculture and trade will investigate how to compensate African (and other Caribbean and Pacific) exporters and producers, especially those benefiting from the special protocols for sugar, beef and veal, rum, and bananas, for the reduction in EU prices as a result of CAP reforms for a transitional period.

53 The EU-ACP trade regime has not been sanctioned by the GATT Enabling Clause because the ACP group consists of a mix of least developed and developing countries. The stronger dispute settlement procedures introduced in 1995 in the WTO have increased the threat of disputes to all members. 54 The Common Agricultural Policy, better known as the CAP,is a system of subsidies paid to European Union farmers. Its main purposes are to guarantee minimum levels of production, so Europeans have enough food to eat, and to ensure a fair standard of living for those dependent on agriculture. 70 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

Third, the Commission needs to commit funds and political resources to investigate how future CAP reforms, especially the move to direct income support, will affect the development of agro- processing industries in African countries. The concern is that direct income support to European farmer will allow them to charge cheaper prices for key inputs into the food processing industry in Europe, such as wheat, diary, and sugar. These artificially cheap inputs would allow food industries to capture markets in Europe and elsewhere, capping investment in food processing industries in African countries.

Fourth, European leaders and the Commission should further extend the French Government’s suggestion of a moratorium on export subsidies to a permanent elimination of export subsidies on exports destined for African markets and competing with local products in the short-term, and work towards a guarantee of a full elimination in the medium-term.

Fifth, ACP negotiators and the Commission need to undertake an urgent and thorough investigation and revision of the rules of origin that African products need to comply with in order to qualify for preferential treatment. These rules, which generally require double transformation of a product, ignore the development of global production chains in industries such as clothing and textiles and provide no incentive for potential domestic or foreign investors in these sectors. Finally, the Commission and European trade ministers need to substantially revise the series of demands they have included in their mandate that concern the opening up of African markets upon entry into force of Economic Partnership Agreements. These include their demand for national treatment of European goods, the abolition of quantitative restrictions of both parties, the abolition of charges with equivalent effect to tariffs, and the demand that countries negotiate tariff reductions from applied rather than bound rates.

3.7. EU-Africa harnessing the private sector for peace and development

Jessica Banfield,55 International Alert

The role of the private sector in conflict and peace-building in Africa

International attention has turned in recent years towards understanding the economic causes of violent conflict. Although the nature and behaviour of the private sector has been identified as a significant factor in many conflicts, little effort has been made to date to engage the different types of private sector actor systematically in conflict prevention. In many African countries, the private sector continues, at worst, to exacerbate conflict and, at best, fails to fulfill its potential to contribute to conflict reduction.This relates to:

• European-based companies investing in Africa – particularly but not exclusively those in the natural resource extractive industries The link between the business activities of natural resource extractive industries and violent conflict is becoming an issue of increasing importance to civil society, governments and socially responsible businesses alike.This can be seen in Nigeria, Angola, Sudan, Gabon and across Africa. Other Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) sectors can also become caught up in conflict, as the violence surrounding last year’s Miss World contest in Nigeria indicates.

• Indigenous national level, provincial and grassroots businesses The potential of artesian miners and traders in both legal and illegal, natural and

55 Jessica Banfield is Project Officer for the Business and Conflict Programme at International Alert. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 71

manufactured commodities to become caught up in conflict dynamics has been illustrated in Sierra Leone, Liberia, Burundi, and Angola. But local private sectors can also act as engines of growth and peace, as was the case in South Africa during transition, and elsewhere.56

• Foreign investing companies participating in EU development policy goals Through outsourcing and public-private partnerships, the private sector is increasingly being brought into development policy implementation in Africa as elsewhere.The need for conflict-sensitivity with regard to companies’ role in this regard, and their potential to contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding priorities is a new area of research.

Current EU-African engagement

The EU is beginning to think about the relationship between the private sector and conflict prevention.The EU’s Conflict Prevention Programme of 2001 acknowledges the negative elements of the private sector role as a potential ‘root cause’ of conflict, and one of the four main objectives of the Communication on Conflict Prevention of 2001 is the targeting of specific causes of conflict – including the ‘cross-cutting’ issues of natural resources and private sector activity in unstable countries.

With regard to natural resources, the EU has played a crucial role in supporting the Kimberley Process to control the trade in conflict diamonds, and has also done preliminary preparatory work on a communication on conflict timber trade.With regard to the mention of private sector activity in unstable countries in the 2001 Communication, a link is made to the EU actively promoting OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, however, no specific projects, programmes or policies have yet been developed to address the issue further. Largely due to the efforts of NGOs, the issue of European corporate activity in conflict zones was addressed peripherally, in discussions around the Commission Communication ‘Corporate Social Responsibility: A Business Contribution to Sustainable Development’ (2002), which forms the basis for the European Strategy on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). Recommendations that the Multi stakeholder Forum process include a roundtable on business and conflict were not followed, however, the broader Sub-Group on International Dimensions of CSR offers some opportunity.

As yet, there has been little work looking at the conflict-sensitivity of EU support to local business and enterprise in unstable countries, or the potential of the private sector to participate in EU conflict-sensitive development policy. In its recent ‘Communication on the Participation of Non- State Actors in EC Development Policy’ (November 2002), the role of the private sector envisaged by the EU is not fully addressed, and there is a lack of clarity regarding the different types of private sector actor role, including in conflict prevention and peace-building.

Innovative ways to address this issue through EU-Africa partnership

The EU has taken positive steps towards mainstreaming conflict prevention, however, these should be increased.To be effective, all areas of EU policy in relation to African countries that affects local private sector activity must be covered, including trade and private sector activity, and development assistance. A liaison body should be institutionalised to monitor and link decision-making and implementation for increased conflict prevention effectiveness.The EU is the largest governing body of member states that together make up a large portion of the world’s foreign investors in conflict zones. It is also the biggest donor of humanitarian and development assistance to Africa – and its commitment to harnessing different types of private sector actor in peace and development is vital.

56 International Alert is in the process of collecting case studies of examples of different levels of ‘local’ business actors playing a constructive role during conflict including Africa that will published later in 2003. 72 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

• European-based companies investing in Africa – particularly but not exclusively those in the natural resource extractive industries The EU should apply political pressure to ensure that the Kimberley Process legislation stays on track, including provision for formal monitoring mechanisms, and preparing private sector actors to follow-through on their commitments under the Process. Preparations for a communication on conflict timber should also be progressed, and include a comprehensive definition of and specific provisions for ‘conflict timber’.

In relation to corporate social responsibility (CSR), the Multi stakeholder Forum on CSR Sub- Group on the International Dimensions of CSR should develop clear guidelines for European trans-national companies (TNCs) operating in conflict zones. DG Employment, in particular, needs to incorporate TNCs and conflict as a crucial part of the CSR strategy, and to conduct research into the role of EU policy in encouraging the private sector to engage in conflict prevention.

With regard to strengthening the institutional monitoring and evaluation processes, DG Trade’s use of Sustainable Impact Assessment tools should be developed to include conflict impact assessment. The European Investment Bank (EIB) should follow international best practice for its lending with regard to social issues to match those already implemented on the environment.The EU-ACP PROINVEST programme should also factor in conflict impact assessment and guidelines to companies for investing in conflict zones.

• Indigenous national level, provincial and grass roots businesses Pressure should be exerted on exporting countries to accept independent experts to monitor for the illegal trade in conflict commodities. EU development assistance to local enterprise and private sector development in African countries should also be assessed for its conflict-sensitivity, and informed by greater awareness of the peacebuilding potential of local private sector actors.

• Foreign investing companies participating in EU development policy goals The European Commission should explore options for partnering with the private sector in poverty reduction, development and conflict prevention programmes. More specifically, the recent ‘Communication on Participation of Non-State Actors in EC Development Policy’ (November 2002) should be revised to include greater clarity on the different role that different types of private sector actor can play, including in conflict prevention. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 73

4. CONCLUSION

The challenges for an enhanced partnership for peace and development between the EU and Africa are considerable, but many opportunities exist that are realistic and achievable. To capitalise on these will require a sustained focus of political will and resources, and a commitment to the implementation of better practice and innovative responses by EU and Africa leaders, institutions, regional organisations and civil society actors. Working towards common ends over the long- term, the EU and Africa can meet these challenges, ultimately improving the prospects for peace and development for all their citizens.

For a summary of policy recommendations from the Discussion Paper please see the Executive Summery in Section 2. 74 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

Appendices Protocol was signed and a prolonged period of ‘no war, no peace’ began. UNITA, which controlled large parts of the country, refused to abide by the NATIONAL AND REGIONAL CASE STUDIES: ANALYSIS OF articles of the Protocol and gradually lost its international support base. In THE STRUCTURAL AND PROXIMATE CAUSES OF December 1998, the MPLA-dominated government, provoked by increased CONFLICT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA UNITA attacks, opted for a full-out military strategy against its old rivals. Its war effort had always been paid for by oil exports. Angola’s oil production, APPENDIX 1. CASE STUDY: ANGOLA mostly offshore, has grown spectacularly since the 1960s and is about to bypass that of Nigeria. In the years 1993-2002, UNITA financed its military campaign mainly by exploiting Angola’s rich diamond fields, but it was Guus Meijer, 57 Conciliation Resources increasingly hit by international sanctions, the loss of its rear bases in and Zaire, and of the political and military support of the USA. Background to the conflict in Angola Structural and proximate causes of conflict in Angola The main armed conflict in Angola came to an end on 4 April 2002, when the commanders of the Angolan Armed Forces and of Jonas Savimbi’s rebel Since 1992, the overriding factor driving the war in Angola was Savimbi’s UNITA forces signed a ceasefire agreement, six weeks after Savimbi himself unrelenting personal ambition and bid for power. At the same time, an had been killed in combat. On 23 February 2002, the day after Savimbi was increasingly corrupt ruling elite in Luanda could see in UNITA a threat to its killed, the representative of the EU to the Great Lakes region, Aldo Ajello, privileged position. The majority of the population was abandoned by both said in Luanda that Savimbi’s death was an "appropriate time for a definite sides and suffered in silence. Regional and ethnic factors have always been peace in Angola". He continued that "the death of a man is always sad present to different degrees, in the sense that the MPLA has traditionally news, but at the same time, and in this case, it is an opportunity for peace been to a large extent the party of the Kimbundu people and of the mixed- and peace concerns all people of Angola". race and assimilated black elites of Luanda and other urban centres, while UNITA became more and more the champion of the largest ethnic group, the Angola had been at war for over 40 years and it is difficult to capture the Ovimbundu people of the central highlands, historically marginalised and various phases of this long conflict in a single equation. The parties, their humiliated during colonial times – with the northern Bakongo the traditional motivations and the dynamics of the war changed considerably from phase constituency of the FNLA. Ethnic sentiments have played major roles at to phase. From 1961 to 1975, several movements waged an armed struggle certain moments, but it would be misleading to qualify the Angolan war at for ‘national liberation’ against the colonial power, Portugal. The main any stage as primarily an ‘ethnic conflict’. contenders were the FNLA (National Front for the Liberation of Angola) – mostly Western-oriented and led by Holden Roberto and supported by Zaire In summary, the main structural causes of the Angolan conflict go back to and the USA – and the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of colonial times and Portugal’s inability to develop adequate state structures Angola) – supported by the Socialist bloc and led by Agostinho Neto. In and a viable domestic economy. Colonial rule was based on exclusion rather 1966, Jonas Savimbi left the FNLA and founded his own movement UNITA than inclusiveness, while the local economy, heavily dependent on the (National Union for the Total Liberation of Angola). exploitation of mineral resources, was dominated by external forces and failed to develop internal linkages. These characteristics were only reinforced When the Portuguese colonial empire collapsed in 1974-75, Neto’s MPLA by post-independence developments, thus creating further alienation managed to out-manoeuvre its rivals. It captured the capital, Luanda, and between a narrow elite and the majority of the population, between city and declared independence in November 1975, after having successfully fought countryside, and between different ethnic groups. The result has been a off, with the help of Cuban troops, the FNLA and a South African invasion. zero-sum power struggle that proved virtually endless. UNITA did not play a major military role at this phase but became the main armed opposition movement after the FNLA gave up its resistance and its Analysis of African and EU initiatives to address conflict in Angola cadres integrated themselves into the one-party system set up by the MPLA. The main driving forces of the war at this stage were, on the one hand, African initiatives to intervene non-militarily in the Angolan conflict have been discontentment of the various African elites with Portuguese domination, and limited. Historical tensions between Angola and South Africa and their on the other, political and ideological rivalry between the various movements respective leaderships have made it difficult for South Africa to play a bigger and their leading personalities. role in Angola’s peace process; SADC and the OAU (now African Union) have been equally powerless. South African business is well represented and The war between 1975 and the end of the 1980s became a typical Cold quickly displacing, for example, Portuguese interests. The African War confrontation, with the MPLA supported by the Socialist countries and Development Bank (ADB) and the Development Bank of Southern Africa UNITA, despite some ideological orientation towards China, mostly dependent (DBSA) are looking for investment opportunities now that reconstruction and on the USA – with South Africa and Zaire as close regional allies, and some development are back on the agenda. other African countries in supporting roles. The end of this second phase of the Angolan war coincided with the end of the Cold War. Namibia became At various stages, the EU and several of its Member States have played active independent, Cuban troops left Angola and the one-party State with a roles in trying to bring the Angolan conflict to an end or helping the country to centralised economy gave way to a semblance of liberal democracy. During rebuild itself. Portugal has always taken a special position in this regard. It this stage, Angola had been one of the major flash points of global Cold War hosted the earlier peace talks (in Alvor and Bicesse) and was later part of the rivalry, with the struggle against Apartheid South Africa and other regional Troika of Observers to the Lusaka Protocol. Trade relations with Portugal are issues playing a role as well in the complex dynamics of the war. also not negligible, while for many years it engaged in ‘technical military co- operation’ with the Angolan Government, despite its presumed role as The Bicesse Peace Accords of May 1991 led to elections in September ‘neutral’ observer. Yet, with the dissolution of the Joint Commission that was 1992, but Savimbi resumed the war when he did not win. This third phase of overseeing the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol on 21 November 2002, the war was extremely destructive, both in terms of human lives and in the role of the Troika (USA, Russian Federation, Portugal) came to an end as terms of infrastructure. It lasted until November 1994, when the Lusaka well. Despite a certain donor fatigue and the conviction of many governments that Angola itself has to contribute more of its own resources, there are practically no individual Member States that have not taken an active interest in Angola – a fact not unrelated to the country’s immense mineral wealth and, 57 Guus Meijer is a Dutch free-lance consultant and trainer in conflict transformation and peacebuilding and a Programme Associate of accordingly, opportunities for foreign companies. Conciliation Resources. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 75

The EU as such was particularly active during the period of the ‘Bicesse • Socio-economic rehabilitation and change: Upgrading basic social peace’ (1991-92), supporting the elections and other elements of the services such as health and education and making them more equitably implementation of the agreement. When the war had resumed, aid became accessible, as well as measures to boost the rural economy and life in largely limited to emergency relief, such as food aid and medicines, while at the countryside, such as the regulation of land disputes. Rebuilding the the political level the EU supported UN efforts in trying to persuade Savimbi physical infrastructure. to abide by the Lusaka Protocol, culminating in strong support for sanctions against UNITA from 1998 onwards – a strategy that has proven successful. • Reconciliation and justice: Healing the psychosocial wounds of war and A 2002 UN report concluded that "the case of Angola is a clear example of reconciliation at national and local levels, collectively and individually. how a sanctions regime, when duly monitored, can be a real instrument of How can the painful past best be overcome? Do war crimes have to be peace as the Security Council intended. The Council did not impose prosecuted or is there a place for some sort of truth commission? Here sanctions on UNITA as punitive action. Rather, it adopted the resolutions with is a clear role for civil society and the Churches, but they need support a view to inducing the movement to abandon war, and to be becoming an from Government and the international community. integral part of the peaceful political process in the country". In the second half of the 1990s, the EU also supported human rights initiatives, including The list is far from complete. Further problems that have not been the funding of human rights monitors and the European Community (EC) is adequately addressed so far include the HIV/Aids virus that threatens all the driving force of the so-called Kimberley Process, through which the countries in Southern Africa, the weak position of civil society and illegal trade in conflict diamonds is being addressed. independent media, and the marginalisation of women and youth.

Soon after the signing of the Luanda Memorandum in April 2002, the EU reconfirmed its "will to aid the efforts of the people of Angola to reach a lasting peace, stability and sustained development of the country". But rapid changes in aid flows are difficult to achieve and, in the short-term, the humanitarian crisis in Angola was only deepening. In 2002 (the year of "peace"), the EC donated over $15.5 million to the UN Consolidated Inter- Agency Appeal, over 90 per cent of which consisted of food aid. It also contributed to mine clearing programmes and pledged $123 million for food and medicines for the quartering areas, including the family reception areas. In order to fulfil its promises, the EU has to refocus its aid to Angola in a strategic way, consolidating the peace and contributing not only to short- term survival and physical reconstruction, but also to social rehabilitation and political change. This would crucially involve not only the Angolan government but also civil society.

Challenges and opportunities for peace

In the words of a recent International Crisis Group report, although "[t]he immediate threat of resumed war is quite low [..,.] decades of war have left a serious legacy of latent divisions and inequities". The failure to address the most pressing political, economic and social issues will threaten the prospects for long-term stability and prosperity. Among the most pressing post-conflict challenges are the following:

• Disarmament and demilitarisation: UNITA has been effectively disarmed and demobilised. There are, however, hundreds of thousands of arms in the hands of civilians, especially in Luanda where over the years arms have been distributed without any control or register. The regular army has to be downsized to reasonable peacetime proportions. Roads and agricultural land have to be demined.

• Return, reintegration and rehabilitation: of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as of demobilised soldiers, mainly from UNITA’s 80,000 troops. The war, coupled with the abandonment of the rural population by both sides, caused a major humanitarian crisis and massive migration flows, both over the borders and to urban centres such as Luanda, Benguela, Lobito and Lubango.

• Democratisation and political reform: Reform of the State in all its aspects and at all levels, including constitutional reform, elections, decentralisation, fight against corruption, good governance, strengthening of the judiciary and the rule of law, and the integration of traditional authorities and other structures of local administration. The historical legacy is one of a deeply entrenched authoritarianism and arrogance on the part of the State, coupled with insecurity, incompetence and corruption at all levels. The clientelist system of patronage, which has its highest manifestation in President José Eduardo dos Santos and his presidential clique, needs to be tackled in order to achieve greater social and economic equity and justice, and thus a more sustainable peace. 76 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

Appendix 2. Case study: Sudan effort to improve relations with neighbouring countries the risk remains that armed activity along Sudan’s borders (with Eritrea and Uganda, Chad and Libya Wilfred Hughes58 in particular) could spark further conflict and endanger a future peace.

Background to the conflict in Sudan At the national level the two main parties to the conflict, the Government of Sudan (GoS) and SPLM, fight a military strategy targeting resources (land, oil, The war in Sudan is one of the longest on-going conflicts in the world. The food, water, and people), underpinned by political and religious objectives. roots of the conflict run deep into Sudan’s history. They lie in the persistent under-development of the peripheral regions of the country (of which there At the state/meso level, conflicts continue and are often politicised and fuelled are many), the narrow social, political and economic agenda pursued by by the main parties to the conflict. Examples include the government’s use of successive centralist governments, and the vexed issue of defining a Arab tribes to guard supply trains to government garrisons in the South Sudanese identity that is inclusive of and tolerates Sudan’s diverse religions spurring increased abductions and banditry against African tribes in the South and cultural practices. Resistance and rebellion in Sudan’s regions has been and West. The government has also supported militia in the oil producing driven by the demand for equitable development and self-determination regions to clear land of its indigenous populations for oil exploration and road (rather than easy access to saleable commodities such as diamonds and building into the South (with the consent of foreign investors). minerals, which have fuelled conflicts in Angola or the Congo). At the local level, various conflicts continue between nomadic pastoralists and The tendency of centralist states to plunder Sudan’s periphery (for slaves, sedentary farmers (often rival ethnic groups) and are exacerbated by the etc) has been an enduring theme in Sudan’s history through the ancient displacement of populations, the disruption of traditional boundaries and Sudanic kingdom states to the Turkish-Egyptian colonisation of the Sudan in competition for land and water. The disintegration of traditional conflict 1820. British colonial rule was based on a policy of separate development resolution mechanisms and the weak governance structures in these regions for the South (halting the spread of Islam and Arabic), which effectively limits opportunities for sustainable solutions.60 Some of these smaller contributed to the continued underdevelopment of the southern region. Civil conflicts have been deliberately politicised by the main parties to the civil war. war broke out shortly before Sudan gained independence from Britain and Egypt (the joint colonial powers) in 1956. Negotiations for independence had Analysis of structural and proximate causes of conflict in Sudan engaged nationalists in northern Sudan who inherited power without obligations to accommodate the South. In 1972 the Addis Ababa agreement The structural causes of conflict in Sudan are those that are inherent in the brought a decade of peace until the agreement was abrogated by Nimeri in country’s situation including historical, institutional (i.e. governance), socio- 1982 with the introduction of the September laws (re-introducing Shariah economic and socio-cultural issues that have lead to conflict. These include: law throughout the country). In the same year, oil was discovered by Chevron in regions of the South. Nimeri was overthrown in April 1985 by • Lack of a culture of democracy, and popular participation in governance. demonstrations in Khartoum, and a short democratic period of government • Weak culture of the rule of law with political agreements and existing began along with revived but slow negotiations for a peace agreement with legal safeguards often ignored by successive governments (including the South. This democratic period was short-lived and, in June 1989, the peace agreements, human rights law and the constitution through National Islamic Front (NIF) effected a coup d’etat with Brigadir Umar EL derogation, national security legislation and presidential decrees). Bashir putting an end to the peace negotiations and issuing in an era of • Weak Sudanese national identity and the quest for pure lineage within intensified conflict, wide-scale human rights abuses (on both sides) and social groups resulting in intolerance and sectarian policies. years of sanctions and international isolation. • A history of military rather than political responses to discontent and instability (ie. the recent militarisation of , and establishment of Armed resistance to the government in Khartoum has shown various political ‘special’ military courts). manifestations in the South, and has also erupted in the central regions of • Persistent under-development of Sudan’s regions outside of a few southern Blue and Abyei and also in the East and West towns and cities. of the country (eastern Sudan and Darfur). The Sudan People’s Liberation • Competition over scarce resources, particularly land and water (i.e. Movement/Army (SPLM/A) is the main southern actor, but the South has conflicts between farmers and pastoralists, and the use of Nile waters). been be-devilled by factional conflicts among southern armed groups,59 • Loss of customary laws and traditional systems of community leadership. fuelled by ethnic tensions, different interpretations of what constitutes self- • Years of displacement and loss of traditional livelihoods, infrastructure, determination, and political alliances struck by some southern factions (with social services, education, trust among communities and traditional an explicit separatist political agenda) with the government in Khartoum conflict resolution mechanisms. (most notably the 1997 Fashoda and Khartoum Peace accords which largely fell apart when in 2002 when the largest southern faction disillusioned with Intermediate causes of conflict are often latent structural causes that have allegiance with the government in Khartoum, merged again with the SPLM). been exacerbated, manipulated or politicised. These include: A lack of trust among different regions and ethnic groups and the direct sponsorship of militia groups further complicate the situation. • Links between commercial and military interests: the battle to control Sudan’s natural and human resources, in particular the drive to control At the regional level, the involvement of neighbouring countries in Sudan’s wars the oil producing regions and fertile land, including the cheap labour is no longer the central factor to the conflicts within Sudan it once was. The provided by the war displaced. governments or rebel groups of Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Chad and Libya have • Social discrimination in all directions: from North to South (the ‘infidel’, all been involved within Sudan since its independence. Despite a concerted ‘outlaws’ and ‘slaves’ of the South), and similarly from South to North

58 Wilfred Hughes has worked with the European Commission in the human rights unit of DG RELEX in Brussels and, since 2001, in universities in Khartoum and with civil society organisations on both sides of the Sudanese civil war. 59 The political interpretation of ‘self-determination’ has itself been at the core of political divisions within the South.The first armed movement emerged in 1965 (Anyanya I) with the objective of direct succession of the southern part of the country.The Sudan People’s Liberation Movement, which later became the primary rebel faction, based itself on the philosophy of the anti-colonial ‘Liberation movements’ and aimed at ‘liberating’ a united ‘New Sudan’ which would have a secular and African identity in contrast to the Arab and Islamic identity proffered by successive political groups in the North. 60 Environmental degradation has intensified on account of the destruction caused by the multiple, on-going conflicts within Sudan, and on account of rural populations forced to over-utilise land as certain areas become too dangerous (because of militia, landmines, bombing, etc).This has lead to new conflict over depleting resources intensifying over water, grazing and farming land. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 77

(‘the Arab colonialists’ of the North) and often within North and South suggestion of a referendum on Shariah law in the North. (i.e. towards the west of Sudan and between various ethnic groups throughout). EU initiatives • Imposition of a narrow interpretation of Islam by the Government in Khartoum onto areas such as the Nuba mountains with many The EU plays a major role in supporting the IGAD peace process through the languages and religions, strong cultural traditions and a history of IGAD Partners Forum. The UK and Italy are key players in facilitating and religious tolerance and mixed marriages. supporting the Machakos process, alongside the United States and Norway. • Abolition of customary land rights: under the Civil Transaction Act of 1984 and amendment of 1990, which annulled all legal mechanisms to The EU engages with Sudan through the framework of the Cotonou Agreement, contest confiscation. Land was then re-distributed via patronage signed by the government of Sudan in June 2000, though co-operation has networks to businessmen (for mechanised farming projects, charcoal remained suspended since 1990 due to concerns about peace, human rights, production, etc). Many subsistence farmers found themselves landless democracy and the rule of law.63 The EU re-started a political dialogue with the labourers on terrain that had been theirs for generations. Government of the Sudan in 1999, aimed at progressive normalisation of • The politicisation of ethnic conflicts (abased on racial, ethnic and relations, conditional to progress in the political dialogue. In December 2002, the religious differences) EU committed itself to full resumption of co-operation upon the signing of a • Militarisation of the mind – and a culture of war through, for example, peace agreement.64 In March 2003, a formal EU-SPLM political dialogue began war songs, children in army uniforms for school, media propaganda. under the acting presidency of Greece.

Proximate causes of conflict include precipitating events that have sparked Challenges and opportunities for peace: conflict, often arising from, or superimposed upon, structural causes, notably: The main challenges for the peace process involve the need for: • Imposition of Shariah Law. • Oil revenues fueling the war, facilitating the procurement of military • Sustained international involvement and monitoring. hardware and the development of a Sudanese arms industry. • A transparent framework for democratisation (and the involvement of • The proliferation of arms, use of irregular armed forces and militia, political and military groups excluded from the Machakos peace process). landmines, and prospectively from the demobilisation of soldiers. • Security sector reform of internal security apparatus in both GoS and SPLM • Internal displacement of people leading to conflicts between displaced areas. persons and host communities. Challenges and opportunities for EU engagement are: Analysis of African and EU initiatives to address conflict in Sudan • To effectively engage with the central states to support a major process African initiatives61 of reform and restructuring for an interim government and to engage with a broad range of non-state actors. Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD): progress so far62 • To make the political dialogue more transparent and participatory with A breakthrough in the peace process was heralded with the signing of the clear benchmarks and verifiable indicators of progress in areas of Machakos protocol on 20 July 2002. This included a memorandum of democratisation, human rights and the rule of law, and to involve other understanding on cessation of hostilities (strengthened in February 2003), political parties and civil society. unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance, and independent monitoring • To translate the intention of placing peace at the heart of development of the ceasefire. The IGAD is also involved in on-going negotiations on co-operation into practice whilst unintentionally spurring new conflicts, issues of power-sharing and future government structures, wealth sharing corruption and competition among groups (to ensure political pluralism and security arrangements. without encouraging political fragmentation) by ensuring that a detailed analysis of root causes of conflict informs, policies and programmes. IGAD: weaknesses • To encourage and support concrete processes of legal and Only the two main parties to the war are parties to the peace, nor does the administrative reform to guarantee human rights and freedoms of Machakos protocol provide an agreed and transparent roadmap for future expression, association and movement which are currently restricted democratisation. The IGAD process, therefore, relies heavily on the two through existing laws and institutions. This should include scheduling a parties initiating separate memoranda of understanding with other political timetable for: lifting the state of emergency and cancelling presidential leadership. Similarly, IGAD lacks a framework for involving civil society and decrees that have rendered existing legal protection of rights linking with successful grass-root peace initiatives, such as those facilitated ineffective, and a timescale for facilitating dialogue on NGO law and the by the New Sudan Council of Churches. Humanitarian Aid Commission, the press law and the National Press Council – both in GoS areas and institutions such as the SRRC in SPLM There are also inadequate guarantees for implementing agreements. The areas. There is a real danger that the Machakos peace process will not agreement on unimpeded access for humanitarian assistance to the Nile address these issues and that ‘nation-building’ may serve as a new Corridor was, for example, signed in October 2002 but was not practically excuse for internal repression and human rights abuse. The EU should facilitated until early 2003. The IGAD has also failed to focus enough on maximise the use of the political dialogue, economic leverage and the governance issues within both the North and the South with, for example, no principles and provisions of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement to

61 The potential role of the African Union in conflict prevention merits reflection even at this early stage (since the interim African Commission has defined priorities to be conflict resolution, governance and civil society participation). 62 The IGAD process was re-invigorated following increased international interest and support, including, for example, the US lead initiative that brokered a cease-fire in the Nuba Mountains in 2001/2. 63 Other key issues that affected EU-Sudan relations throughout the 1990s included Sudan’s relations with neighbouring countries and the issue of international terrorism. 64 Despite suspended co-operation, the EU has continued to provide substantial levels of humanitarian assistance to Sudan and has used budget lines such as EIDHR and Food Security. Progress in the regular dialogue between the EC delegation and the Government also paved the way for the Government to request the release of some suspended funds (under the 6th EDF) for priority actions in support of the political dialogue. These include: the Humanitarian Plus Programme (18 million euro), a capacity building programme for non-state actors (2 million euro) and for the NAO (2 million euro), the Landmine Action Initiative (SLIRI) and the Max Planc Institute’s assistance to Sudanese officials in drafting frameworks for a future constitution.The package of assistance being programmed for resumption of cooperation totals 407 million euro. 78 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

generate pluralist dialogue on development policies, activate civil Appendix 3. society and discuss issues limiting their effective involvement. Case study: Great Lakes region of Africa • To ensure effective co-ordination and preparation with other donors, both North and South, and to strengthen the capacity of Andrew Sherriff,65 International Alert the EC Delegation. • To protect Sudan’s fragile domestic markets from opportunistic Background to conflicts in the region business practices, and to consider the potentially damaging impact of enhanced international trade whilst also linking future debt relief and The core area of the Great Lakes region of Africa comprising Burundi, trade preferences to genuine policy reform. Rwanda, and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has suffered • To plan for the de-militarisation of Sudan, including the provision of in recent years from conflicts that have had a particularly violent and alternative livelihoods for demobilised soldiers. detrimental impact on the people of the region and their long-term prospects • To put land rights high on the political and economic agenda of EU- for development. While the Rwandan genocide of 1994 set horrific new Sudan relations. standards for violence in the region, violent conflict has been a significant factor for forty years in Burundi, Rwanda and the Eastern provinces of DRC.

The human, developmental and societal cost of these conflicts has been devastating. In Rwanda in 1994, 800,000 were killed in the genocide; in the five eastern provinces of the DRC an estimated 3.5 million have died in the past four years as a result of conflict; in Burundi approximately 250,000 have been killed since 1993. These conflicts have led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands; in Burundi 15 per cent of the population is displaced (over one million people), either internally or in refugee camps in Tanzania. The consequences of the conflict have also been the degradation and, at times, complete destruction of already weak infrastructure and public services (such as health and education). The conflicts have been punctuated with truly horrific human rights abuses, with the most vulnerable in society, including women and children, suffering particularly. Rape has systematically also been used as a weapon of war.

Most conflicts in the sub-region are inter-related, although, they have their distinct characteristics. These conflicts have a very strong regional dynamic and a significant cross-border impact in the form of refugees, armed groups, trade and illicit exploitation of natural resources, and even national militaries moving between countries. Fragile peace and on-going localised conflict (at times of vicious intensity) currently characterise much of Burundi and the DRC, and despite peace processes, in neither country is there an effective ceasefire. While progress has been made in terms of reconciliation in Rwanda, political space is limited and its long-term structural stability is also in question. It would, however, be a mistake to contend that there was not some progress in terms of peace and reconciliation in recent years. In Burundi a new government have been established in line with national peace processes, in DRC a transitional administration is being negotiated, and in Rwanda justice and reconciliation initiatives, such as the Gacaca trials, have progressed. Most of the structural causes of conflict within the region, however, remain unresolved, making progress in terms sustainable peace and development difficult and very susceptible to set-backs.

Analysis of structural and proximate causes of the conflict

Conflict in the Great Lakes region arises from a combination of factors interacting in a complex dynamic that can not be reduced to a simple explanation. Rather than focusing on the issue of bad governance, social- political identity or competition over natural resources in isolation, it is important to consider the inter-relationship between these factors. It is this complex dynamic that fuels conflict in the region and has defied so many attempts to achieve sustainable peace. Attempts to address conflict in either a single sector (e.g. natural resources) or at one level (e.g. the national level) without simultaneously addressing the other dimensions have had a limited impact in terms of peace and development.

Regional conflict dynamics: between countries of the region (including Uganda). These are typically fought through proxy armies and allied rebel groups to

65 Andrew Sheriff is Manager of the Development and Peace-building Programme and also works with the African Great Lakes Programme at International Alert. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 79

establish a sphere of influence and security buffers beyond national borders, international governance structures. For peace initiatives at the political level to and to gain control over the extraction and trade of natural resources (e.g. be sustainable, they must be complemented by a strategy that addresses Rwandan and Ugandan support for military/political groupings in eastern DRC). basic human needs as well as longer-term economic development.

National conflict dynamics: over control of the government and the tools and Analysis of African and EU initiatives to address the conflict resources of the state. This manifests in conflicts between national armies and their allies (usually representing one ethnic identity), and various armed African initiatives groups (representing other ethnic identities) - (e.g. the rebel groups in Burundi versus the national army). While in West Africa, Southern African and the Horn, sub-regional organisations (ECOWAS, SADC, IGAD) are well developed with active Local conflict dynamics: This includes local level grievances that are often participation, there is no equivalent structure in the core Great Lakes region. manipulated by elite actors and conflated with regional and national level There are some regional organisations in this area, but those that do exist conflicts (e.g. in Ituri province in eastern DRC). This generally involves tend to be weak, with overlapping memberships and mandates, are not conflict between ethnic groups, and often between pastoralist and supported by their members, and have had a limited impact on peace, agriculturalist communities (e.g. between the Banyamulenge and Babembe security and regional economic integration in the region. The absence of in South Kivu, DRC). well-developed and effective cross-regional institutions has certainly hampered the mounting of successful regional cross-border peace and Structural and proximate causes of conflict in the Great Lakes development initiatives. It is at this point unclear whether European Community (EC) support through their Regional Strategy Paper (including a The pursuit and exercise of power in the region, at the local as well as the welcome commitment to conflict prevention) to the Economic and Monetary national level, has been a constant source of tension and potential conflict. The Community of Central Africa and Economic Community of Central African colonial rulers generally bequeathed a system of governance designed to States will pay peace and development dividends for the region. Clearly extract maximum benefit in terms of resources at minimum cost in terms of supporting effective regional initiatives at both governmental and civil society providing welfare services. This negative legacy was compounded by the levels is important, however, the EU should also identify and support effective colonial strategy of divide and rule, which entailed exploiting and mechanisms that fulfil this role in addition to supporting the regional institutionalising historical animosities between communities. Conceptions and organisations identified. One key opportunity for the EU is to support the systems of governance relating to particular groups were nurtured at the UN-sponsored initiative, that has the backing of the African Union, for a expense of more pluralistic and inclusive forms of politics. State resources regional conference for peace and development scheduled for 2004. This were used to further the interests and development of one group at the conference will involve key stakeholders from the region including civil expense of others. This pattern of exclusion has continued since independence society, and will hopefully be part of larger process to address these issue. – witness, for instance, the unequal access to education in Burundi, which favours a particular ethnic group and region.66 The same pattern prevails in the In response to the largest inter-state conflict in Africa, the African Union has DRC where there is no formalised state but where power and resources are had a particular interest in the region. It has undertaken a number of political used in a similar fashion by various local ‘authorities’ to ensure the political initiatives as well as a more functional crisis management role in the region, dominance of their interest group, as well as their personal enrichment. and the AU recently launched its first peacekeeping mission in Burundi. The limited capacity at its disposal and the lack of political will among certain Socio-cultural identity is often placed at the heart of any analysis of conflict in the leaders in the region threatens, however, to limit its impact. Another major region, most saliently between the and Hutu. While this is an important African-led initiative to address conflict within the region has been mounted factor that can not be overlooked, there have also been conflicts within the Tutsi by South Africa, who have provided not only political leadership and military and Hutu communities, and also between other ethnic groups, particularly within peacekeeping resources, but have also enabled mediation and dialogue to DRC. It is often the manipulation of identities and communities by elite actors to occur between conflicting parties, and have pressured parties to adopt more gain control over power that provokes violent conflict, rather than an inherent conciliatory positions. The EU should support the role played by South Africa sense of grievance between communities. Persistent exclusion and unequal and the emerging African Union in the Great Lakes region. access to opportunities and resources does, however, inevitably reinforce any underlying sense of grievance. The difficulty of mobilising genuinely EU initiatives representative political movements, that are credible to all communities, makes inclusive governance a challenge in all of the countries concerned. In light of this The EU has a significant role in the Great Lakes region as political, trade and situation, electoral processes themselves are not a sufficient recipe for achieving development partner of all countries and as a provider of development and good governance, and may be even counter-productive.67 humanitarian assistance. All of the countries concerned are also former colonies of EU Member States. The need for all stakeholders (particularly Competition over natural resources has fuelled conflict in the region ever since the EU) to develop a well-informed regional vision, and the mechanisms to the colonial scramble for Africa’s riches in the late C19th. In the DRC, the respond to it in an integrated way, is the key to supporting sustainable peace United Nations identified the exploitation by armed groups (including national and development in the Great Lakes region. armies of neighbouring states) as a key factor in the war.68 In Rwanda and Burundi, competition over scare resources, notably land, has also contributed The region has recently been the focus of various diplomatic initiatives to promote to tension and violence, as has the inability of these countries to develop peace, stability and development driven by individual Member States, particularly economies capable of providing for all, let alone equitable provision. The Belgium, France and the United Kingdom, as well as those led by the European economic development of these countries is significantly constrained by the Union, and its Special Representative for the Region, Aldo Ajello. The coherence of international economic environment (particularly for primary products) and Member States’ actions in the region is, however, undermined by competing

66 See Tony Jackson, Equal Access to Education in Burundi: An Imperative for Peace, International Alert, London, 2000. 67 See for example, Human Rights Watch, Rwanda Preparing for Elections:Tightening Control in the Name of Unity Human Rights Watch Backgrounder, New York, May 2003. 68 UN Panel of Inquiry 2001 Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo, S/2001/357, April; UN Panel of Inquiry 2001, Addendum to the Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2001/1072; UN Panel of Inquiry 2002, Interim Report of the Panel of Experts on Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the DR Congo, S/2002/565. 80 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

foreign policy visions and country focuses. While there may be agreement on Appendix 4. Case study: Horn of Africa70 broad generalities at the macro-policy level, there are distinct differences in the aid strategies and levels of support provided by Member States to countries in the Thomas Ansorg,71 Saferworld region. For example, the Rwandan government enjoys good relations with the UK and significant direct support in aid, but Belgium and France have been more Background to the conflict in the Horn of Africa circumspect; while the converse applies in the case of Burundi. The Horn of Africa72 has been the site of many intra and inter-state conflicts Recently the EU launched its first ever military operation outside Europe, in a (notably Sudan and Somalia), which continue to pose a threat to life and belated response to the human rights situation in Ituri province of Eastern DRC. livelihood in the region. Over the past four decades, over three million people The lack of a clear EU political initiative and strategy, led by a robust diplomatic have died due to protracted conflicts and civil war in the region. Widespread figurehead to complement and support the EU’s first military operation in Africa human displacement and acute food insecurity and severe environmental is problematic. It is a clear opportunity for the EU to demonstrate greater degradation are the result. The famine in the 1980s in Ethiopia, which was used political commitment and coherence among Member States in relation to by the Ethiopian regime as an instrument of the war, alone cost one million lives. peace and conflict issues in the region, and this should be capitalised on. In the early 1990s, fighting between various factions in Somalia lead to all- Governments of the region contend that more budgetary support from the out war and famine. Military intervention by the USA ended in disaster and European Commission and its Member States is essential for the development peacekeeping attempts by the UN were unsuccessful. In 1998, a major and bolstering of peace, sustainable development and good governance. inter-state war between Ethiopia and Eritrea was fought over an arid area of There is a concern that existing budgetary support could even fuel conflict, and land. After enormous human cost, material destruction and financial loss, an that such mechanisms should be used with considerable caution.69 agreement brought the war to an end in 2000 and two years later both countries accepted a new border drawn by an independent commission. Individual EC development budget lines, such as EIDHR, have prioritised Civil war, inter-communal conflict or clan fighting, however, remains on-going countries in the region and significant resources have been challenged in Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia and Kenya. through ECHO, who have been flexible in the interpretation of their mandate to meet the needs of the effected population. Regional European Violence, insecurity and, increasingly, the spread of low-intensity conflicts Development Funds (EDFs) have also been made available in Burundi for such as cattle rustling destabilise the situation in the Horn and hamper mediation around the peace talks and for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue. In efforts at development. The impacts are devastating and pervasive: all Rwanda and Burundi, EDF funds have been primarily focused on rural countries in the Horn are affected, either forced to become host to refugees, development, macro-economic support and infra-structural needs, mainly or internally displaced persons (IDPs), often both. In 2002, approximately one disbursed in the form of budgetary support and technical assistance. There is out of every 30 people resident in the Horn was targeted for relief by the UN also a welcome commitment to supporting good governance with EDF funds. system as victims of conflict. Conflict and insecurity contribute to the vulnerability of many people ostensibly targeted under regional 'drought' Challenges and opportunities for peace appeals. Many thousands more are highly vulnerable as a consequence of conflict and remain inaccessible to assessment and relief efforts. Underlying The EU has a comparative advantage in that it has a presence in all countries the direct costs of the relief efforts are the extensive economic and social in the region, it has large development resources at its disposal, it is not seen costs to the affected societies. as political, nor suffers from the same historical legacy as certain individual Member States. If the EU was collectively to use its considerable leverage in Conflict, therefore, constitutes perhaps the single greatest barrier to the region in a coherent way to promote peace then the chance of it having a economic and social development in the Horn of Africa. The poverty of the positive impact would be significant. Through joint analysis and understanding Horn is partly the cause of armed conflicts and partly the consequence. The of collective capabilities the EU must develop a shared regional strategy and countries of the region have spent decades trapped in a repetitive cycle of implementation plan for the Great Lakes region. To do this there needs to be: frustration, instability, repression and violence. The different types and levels of conflict in the Horn of Africa are often interlinked: • Local political engagement with a genuinely shared regional vision by EU Member States and the EC. With this shared EU regional strategy, • Interstate conflict is rare, only three instances in the post-colonial articulation of how EU military deployment in Bunia – DRC is period (e.g. war between Ethiopia and Eritrea). complemented by a focused and sustained EU political engagement. • Civil war or internal conflict is more frequent and characterised by a • Greater coherence at the political level in how EU Member States interact challenge to a state or regime by groups that challenge their legitimacy with governments of the region in terms of aid engagement and aid focus (e.g. Sudan, Ethiopia and initial stages of Somali conflict). both within and between countries and in terms of how different EU Member States address and respond to critical conflict issues (such as • Intercommunity conflict is widespread throughout the region, often exploitation of resources). A first step in achieving this would be a cross- over territory, resources and political power, leading to chronic EU working group supported at the political level (European Council) but insecurity amongst affected populations (e.g. pastoral areas of Kenya, with a distinctly operational expression drawing on relevant officials from Uganda, Sudan and Somali regions). Member States and the Commission. A clearer understanding of the impact of the EU’s aid on peace and conflict dynamics in the region so that they can make informed choices as to which are the most effective aid strategies to support peace and development. 70 This section draws from the discussion document by Terhi Lehitin, Enhancing the capacity of the European Union to foster peace and • Greater flexibility to support legitimate civil society initiatives, and more stability in the Horn of Africa, Africa Peace Forum, InterAfrica Group and Saferworld, 2003 capacity in the delegations to monitor the implementation and added 71 Thomas Ansorg is the Project Co-ordinator of the Horn of Africa value to the quality of EC assistance in the region. project at Saferworld. He has extensive experience working on conflict issues in the Horn of Africa region, including the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development and the Early Warning Unit FAST at Swisspeace. 69 See Catherine Andre and Laurent Luzolele Lola,The European Union’s 72 For the purpose of this paper the Horn of Africa is defined as the aid policy towards countries involved in the Congo war: lever for peace IGAD member states: , Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan or incitement to war?, Réseau Europeén Congo (REC), Belgium, 2001. and Uganda. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 81

Structural and proximate causes of conflict in the Horn of Africa spread of weapons is not of itself a cause of the recourse to violence, their availability could, nonetheless, considerably intensify a conflict. The situation in the Horn of Africa represents a very complex system, in which conflicts influence and determine one another. Structural causes The dilemma posed by war economies is that they are often very efficient include competition for scarce resources, recurrence of droughts and the and successful in relation to the alternatives available. Development co- general poverty of the region. Deterioration in living conditions — combined operation was called upon to develop credible alternatives, in order to break with regional, national, and local causes of conflict — can produce an through the links binding economic activity and criminal/war-promoting explosive mixture likely to trigger armed conflicts. In addition to competition enterprises. Standing in the way of this, however, was the vicious circle of for scarce resources, conflicts in the region have resulted where ethnic and underdevelopment and insecurity, which made it difficult to produce the kind religious differences have systematically been politicised, from political of economic dynamic needed to offer a sufficiently large section of the exclusion, the phenomenon of ‘failed states’ and the resultant political population alternative sources of income within a reasonable period. fragmentation or warlordism. These structural causes and long-term conditions create the potential for violent conflict. Analysis of African and EU initiatives to address conflict in the Horn of Africa Proximate causes include systematic neglect by governments of pastoral areas, politicisation of conflict, the enormous increase in available modern African initiatives weapons, inappropriate government responses to conflict, provision of food aid without developing suitable livelihood opportunities for the recipients, Attempts by the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) interference by political leaders, weakened traditional authority systems, at bringing about peace in the Horn of Africa have largely been unsuccessful. increased levels of violence, inflammatory media reports, and the The major regional organisation now active in the Horn is the Inter introduction of commercial raiding. Most of these causes are external, or Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In 1996, the organisation are the result of external influences. A series of livestock thefts, a raid or a had been equipped with a new mandate to address food security and government operation can then trigger immediate violent conflict. In several environmental protection; political and humanitarian affairs, including conflict cases, the proximate causes are also effects of violence, creating a vicious prevention and resolution; and regional economic security. Restructuring the circle of influence. organisation’s mandate had prompted the support of many western countries, providing funds for the creation of a relevant section in the IGAD Various fault lines have successfully been politicised and are a significant secretariat in Djibouti. IGAD has documented demobilisation efforts in the pattern throughout the Horn. The division between highland and lowland region, led peace processes in Sudan and Somalia, and has drawn up a populations has led to a fragmented society, hampered by a lack of means programme of measures to promote a culture of peace. of communication. Lowland pastoralists often compete for land and resources with highland farmers. A general suspicion between members of Over recent years, substantial efforts have been devoted to developing and civil society and government officials exists in most Horn countries. This is disseminating conflict early warning approaches and methodologies. In accentuated by a lack of legal regulations, and of viable political institutions. January 2002, IGAD adopted the Khartoum Declaration for the establishment Furthermore, the divide between peasant cultures and nomadic pastoralism of a conflict early warning and response mechanism (CEWARN) for IGAD is often linked with ethno-political boundaries. member states thereby establishing a new peace and security mechanism for the region. CEWARN is intended to provide a regional platform for Arabic and Black African cultures link with the distinction between Muslim integrated (state and civil society) conflict management and peace building, and Christian cultures. For most countries in the Horn, informal but strong which rests on solid analytic foundations. linkages with centres and powers outside the region has always been much stronger than the links among the IGAD countries themselves. This has EU initiatives grown out of the Horn’s strategic geopolitical importance, as it provides a prime spot from which to project power and provide rear-base support for The EU and Member States have a long history of co-operation in the Horn military intervention in the Middle East and Persian Gulf. region, both at the national and regional level. The Horn countries are members of the ACP countries whose relations with Europe dates back to Another significant factor of the conflict in this region is the culture of the first Lomé Conventions in 1975. Today, the application of the 2000 external interference in the affairs of neighbouring states. Most opposition Cotonou Agreement, the successor of the Lomé Conventions, is underway in groups have been driven out of the country and organised in exile, allowing the Horn with the development of Country Strategy Papers, National and them to launch cross-border attacks and campaigns from abroad. Countries Regional Indicative Programmes and a Regional Strategy Paper, which in the region often intervene in their neighbours’ states by providing arms or integrate conflict prevention aspects. Assistance to the Horn region is also supporting movements opposed to governments. provided through co-operation instruments outside the ACP-EU framework, such as the European Community pillar budget. Food insecurity may also play a role in triggering or exacerbating conflict — particularly in areas where scarce natural resources are poorly managed and The EU’s regional approach has primarily been state-centric as it considers when control over resources is critical to the livelihoods of competing groups the formal regional structures (e.g. African regional organisations whose — as, for example, is often the case in pastoral areas. The linkages between membership is reserved to the states of the region) as key partners for conflict and food security are varied, complex and often reciprocal. Conflict security co-operation. The EU has recently started to pay attention to the has been a cause of many of the most serious food security crises in the role of regional civil societies in peace-building. The EU has been engaging Horn of Africa. with IGAD as a ‘formal’ regional inter interlocutor, although other forms of regional co-operation are now emerging. Civil wars over the years in Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia and Uganda have led to proliferation of small arms and light weapons. The availability of arms altered In the past, EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) initiatives that the cultural foundations of many communities – erosion of traditional conflict focus on countries in the Horn have been relatively limited, however, this is resolution mechanisms in the face of arms-bearing youth being one of the changing. The EU has employed joint declarations, special envoys and high most significant examples. Arms have provided the means for communities level visits to a number of countries with the aim of positively influencing to seek alternative livelihoods, such as livestock rustling and banditry. The political developments in the region. Given the conflict-prone environment in phenomenon of livestock warlord rivalry and cattle rustling has assumed the Horn region, the EU has issued several foreign policy declarations on the dangerous proportions, most notably in the Kenya, Sudan, Uganda border situation in the region. Sudan, Somalia and the Eritrea/Ethiopia border war area. Warlords command small and well-equipped armies. Even if the have received attention from EU governments. Since September 2001, the 82 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

strategic importance of the Horn of Africa has increased for the EU, which is Appendix 5. Case study: West Africa aware of the security risks in the area. Nana K.A. Busia, Jr., Lulsegged Abebe & Lindsay Alexander 73, International Alert The Commission plays an active role in the Horn trying to co-ordinate divergent approaches of Member States by suggesting informal ‘common approaches’ among EU actors, which could improve the coherence of the EU in the Horn. Background to conflict in West Africa The joint EU declaration on Sudan and Somalia, for example, has served as a common platform for EU action in a given country. The European Commission The conflict dynamics of West Africa should be viewed as one, integrated has established specific financial instruments to promote human rights, regional conflict system. Even after the post-independence power struggles democracy and civil society participation in developing countries. In 2001, the of the second half of last century, violent conflicts in West Africa have Commission defined a new strategy for the European Initiative for Democracy become more frequent since the end of the Cold War. While most of the and Human Rights (EIDHR), which selected 29 ‘focus countries’ for an conflicts originate in one country, they involve cross-border activities that enhanced human rights support. Three Horn countries, Sudan, Eritrea and overflow state borders to engulf other communities and states. Kinship, Ethiopia, were chosen. This will allow more pro-active programming of and linguistic and religious networks in neighbouring states are dragged into increased funding for human rights and peace-building activities. these seemingly intra-state conflicts creating strong inter-state linkages and a sub-regional conflict dynamic. Populations in the Horn of Africa suffer from periodic drought and famine, which have led to the extensive provision of emergency assistance. In Although there is not one state in West Africa that has not suffered from response, the Commission has started to develop strategies that allow some form of conflict in the past decade, there are four main current conflict moving from emergency food aid to a more integrated approach to food areas in the region: the Mano River Union (MRU), constituting Liberia, Sierra security and disaster preparedness. Leone and Guinea-Conakry, and the Ivory Coast, which relates closely to the MRU conflict; Senegal and Guinea-Bissau; Mali and Niger; and Nigeria as a Underpinning all of these initiatives is the EU’s engagement with non-state self-contained conflict. actors. Non-state actors play a key role in conflict prevention and peace- building, and their role is a stated objective of the Cotonou Agreement. Civil The Liberian conflict is typical of the sub-regional nature of the conflict society groups in the Horn do, however, need support to increase their dynamic and, as such, remains at the centre of the conflicts and a principal understanding or the EU and Cotonou. factor in undermining security in the region. Starting in 1989 when the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) deposed Liberia's Second Republic, Challenges and opportunities for peace the Liberian conflict has had profound effects on the neighbouring countries of Sierra Leone and Guinea-Conakry, and more recently the Ivory Coast, Even if the conflicts in the Horn of Africa are not interconnected, many of through, for example, President Charles Taylor’s support and sometimes them have causes, which, are similar, or consequences, which are regional creation of surrogate armed groups in these neighbouring countries. The in scope, and therefore could benefit greatly from collective treatment within conflict has also, to a lesser degree, impacted on, and gained varying a regional framework. Causes of conflict throughout the Horn of Africa, for degrees of patronage from, other countries in the region such as Gambia, example, shortage of water and drought, cannot be dealt with by national Senegal and Guinea-Bissau. efforts alone. They have to be addressed through regional strategies of conflict resolution, in which the different governments co-ordinate their The impacts of war have had, and continue to have, catastrophic conflict management efforts with one another and work to improve the consequences for the people, communities and infrastructure of the region. efficiency of regional organisations. The war raging in the Mano River area has created a severe humanitarian crisis, which has been exacerbated by the recent intensification of violence The EU should: in the Liberian capital, Monrovia. Aside from the massive human rights abuses and destruction of physical and economic infrastructure, the • Build on and learn from positive experiences of the existing adaptations hostilities have killed one million people during the last ten years and created of EU strategies and CSPs to special circumstances in the Horn. more than three million IDPs and refugees out of a sub-regional population • Strengthen the conflict prevention perspective of sectoral of 30 million. Guinea alone hosts close to 200,000 refugees from Liberia, strategies/approaches (in social sectors, transport etc) identified in the Sierra Leone and Coté d’Ivoire. The severity of the crisis has earned the PRSPs in the Horn countries. sub-region the unenviable title of "Africa’s first world war". • Use joint CFSP declarations, internal codes and common approaches as a way to reach consensus among EU Member States about the EU’s Conflicts in the region are typically expressed in several forms: the position in the Horn. ethnicisation of politics; the use of religion as a means of political • Recognise the political nature of the programming process (i.e. the role mobilisation (e.g. there is an opinion that this is the case through the of member states) while ensuring that the political interests of EU expression of Sharia law in Kanduna, Nigeria); the violent assertion of rights Member States (including the fight against terrorism) will not undermine to self-determination (e.g. the secessionist movement by the Diola in the the delivery of Commission development assistance to the poorest Cassamance, Senegal); the collapse or near collapse of the state (e.g. state populations in the Horn. collapse in Liberia and the Ivory Coast through the militarisation of the state), • Ensure timely handover from ECHO funded humanitarian projects to resource conflicts (e.g. the Tuareg rebellion against the Malian government rehabilitation and development interventions in the Horn to avoid using and the Nigerian government’s violent response to the Ogoni People in emergency funding for longer-term development projects. Nigeria) and criminality through trading diamonds and other precious • Recognise that awareness-raising and proper information about minerals, arms, people and drugs in parallel markets (e.g. the illicit Nigerian Cotonou are preconditions for effective non-state actor participation. oil and Sierra Leone diamond trade, and arms trafficking across the Senegalese-Malian-Guineas-Conakry and Bissau borders).

73 Nana K.A. Busia, Jr. is the Head of West Africa Programmes, Lulsegged Abebe is the Senior Programme Officer of the West Africa Programme with responsibility for ECOWAS and Lindsay Alexander is the EU Policy Officer for the Development and Peacebuilding Programme at International Alert. EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA • 83

West Africans was formed under the auspices of ECOWAS. Despite varying Structural and proximate causes of conflict in West Africa successes, ECOMOG was the first attempt at initiation of conflict intervention modalities in Africa by a regional grouping and, to a reasonable extent, The root causes of these conflicts in the region are multiple. The socio- succeeded in bringing about cessation to the hostilities in Liberia and later political landscape is heavily influenced by the legacy of direct and indirect on in Sierra-Leone and Guinea-Bissau. In 1997, the conflict prevention colonialism; the settler factor; the unfinished business of nation-state mechanism, ECOWATCH, was established with capacities in conflict building; post-independence, militarised authoritarian governments and the prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping, humanitarian Cold War legacy. After independence, the avowed goals of most West support, peace-building and sub-regional security. Since its inception, African governments were to "catch up" with the rest of the developed however, little has been established on the ground to enable the mechanism world. In this process, identity (ethnic or otherwise) was subjected to the to take off. In addition to the regional mechanisms, ECOWAS also works to grand objectives of nation-building and economic development, thus giving link up the regional security and development approach with continent-wide legitimacy to the imposition of one party states, life presidents and strong mechanisms and processes, such as NEPAD and the AU peace and security executives. By the late 1960s, the military exploited the weaknesses of agenda. states to deliver, through successive, domino effect coups d’états. The Since the 1990s, there has been an exponential increase in the number of military were, however, shown to be no alternative, but repressive and lacked civil society organisations existing in various West African countries. Civil legitimacy or competence to govern, e.g. the Nigerian civil war of 1967- society organisations originally took the form of trade associations, religious 1970. By the end of the Cold War, these latent conflicts were finding open groups, ethnic organisations and, in more recent times, the proliferation of and manifest expressions in various emergent conflicts, as exemplified by human rights organisations. Conflict resolution is a relatively new field, the protracted Liberian and Sierra Leonean civil wars, armed insurrections in however, yet it is clear that NGOs in West Africa now play an increasingly Guinea, Mauritania, Guinea-Bissau and secessionist attempts in Senegal. important role in conflict resolution. While it is they who hold the key to real non-violent social change, the activities of these NGOs have, however, The introduction of the neo-classical/liberal economic development previously lacked systematic linkages and effective structures necessary for paradigm, typified by structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) in the late mutual support. Nevertheless, a recent consultation on Strengthening the 1980s, has also contributed structurally to the conflicts by undermining the Human Security Capacities of ECOWAS and Civil Society in West Africa, held capacity of the state to provide the basic needs of the population. This would in Abuja, Nigeria (May 30 to June 1, 2003), has worked to address these reflect why the most entrenched conflicts are taking place in the most deficiencies.74 As a result, a civil society liaison representative is to be deprived countries in the region. According to the United Nations appointed within the ECOWAS secretariat and a civil society co-ordination Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Index, for example, in committee to be set up as mechanisms through which civil society can 1999 Sierra Leone was ranked the lowest of the 174 countries, coming just engage with conflict prevention issues in the region and influence ECOWAS’ after Liberia. policies on human security. These structural causes, among others, are exacerbated by a politics of exclusion, coupled with assimilationist policies, which seek to suppress EU initiatives group identities (religious, ethnic or otherwise). In addition, the lack of a broader social consensus of the recent democratic transitions, rampant While the EU works through the delegations with national governments in corruption, uneven distribution of resources, environmental degradation, the West Africa, one of the priorities of the EU is to enhance regional integration militarisation of societies through arms trafficking, the recruitment of and co-operation. ECOWAS has been the prime actor in facilitating this unemployable youth, and the marginalisation and oppression of women all relationship, under the leadership of Nigeria, which has taken on the primary contribute to the exacerbation of violence as a survival strategy and an role of maintaining "law and order" in the region, a function that the UN has expression of suppressed identity and participation in society. As a result, been unable to perform since the end of the Cold War. Aside from the ex- nearly all West African states have open or latent conflicts, which threaten to colonial influences of the French and British Member States, European Union spiral out of control across the sub-region if not effectively managed. engagement in West Africa has principally taken place through the development of the Lomé Agreements and EU-ACP Cotonou Partnership Analysis of African and EU initiatives to address the conflict issues (2000). This has included negotiations with regional, national and civil in West Africa society actors on the delivery of aid, trade, good governance and security to the region. The EU Special Envoy in the Mano River region, Hans Dahlgren, African initiatives has also been an important link in promoting political dialogue and co- operation with and between ECOWAS and the UN in support of peace When the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was processes in the region, although the EU could do more to support this role created in 1975, it was envisaged as primarily an attempt at socio-economic (see Chapter 3.2). development of the West African sub-region, however, as the socio-political climate has manifested, the remit has developed so that paramount among A number of positive steps have taken place recently at the diplomatic-policy its principles is the maintenance of regional peace, stability and security. level through deconcentration and EU engagement at the regional This was reflected in the ECOWAS declaration of political principles of July institutional level with ECOWAS. In November 2002, an EU Troika- ECOWAS 1991 and Article 58 of the ECOWAS revised treaty that stated that there was meeting was held in Ouagadougou focusing on the Ivory Coast, Liberia, a direct link between economic development and the security of the peoples economic integration and conflict prevention.75 The EU expressed its of the states. The promotion and strengthening of good neighbourliness, recognition of the role of ECOWAS in the prevention, management and peaceful settlement of disputes, promotion and consolidation of a democratic system of governance, solidarity and collective self-reliance, inter-state co- operation, harmonisation of policies and integration of programmes are the 74 The Consultation on Strengthening the Human Security Capacities of key means through which a regional approach to conflict prevention and ECOWAS and West African Civil Society in Abuja, Nigeria (May 30-June transformation are approached. ECOWAS has recently been active in this 1 2003) was hosted by ECOWAS, Centre for Democracy and capacity through leading, under the auspices of the UN, the ceasefire Development and International Alert. 75 negotiations between the Liberian Government and the country’s two main The West African delegation was led by the President of the ECOWAS Council of Ministers Cheikh Tidiane Gadio, Minister of Foreign Affairs of rebel factions – although the ceasefire has yet to be upheld. Senegal, the EU delegation by State Secretary Carsten Staur of the Danish EU Presidency.The Troika also comprised EC Commissioner Aside from diplomatic co-operation (track I approach), the key mechanisms Poul Nielson, Greek Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Ioannis for their operationalisation are ECOMOG and ECOWATCH. In June 1990, the Mangriotis and the EU Presidency´s Special Representative for the ECOWAS monitoring group, ECOMOG, a multi-national peacekeeping force of Mano River Union, Swedish State Secretary Hans Dahlgren. 84 • EU CONFLICT PREVENTION, MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION IN AFRICA

resolution of conflicts in the sub-region. The EU stressed the importance of • Strengthen the capacities of ECOMOG – dependent on West African the new move to build a coherent security architecture in Africa. The co- Member State contributions – to be responsive to the regional operation between the African Union and ECOWAS is important in this peacekeeping needs and support the operationalisation of ECOWATCH regard. The EU expressed its willingness to support the process of further as a monitoring mechanism. deepening of ECOWAS' capacity in this field. The EU also expressed its • All member states should implement the ECOWAS protocols. Only support for the ECOWAS Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons, and three of the 15 states have ratified the 1999 Security protocol stressed the need to operationalise it through an arms control mechanism. In establishing the ECOWAS mechanism by August 2002. Until all states December last year, the EU also agreed to donate 500,000 euros for have ratified the security protocol it will be difficult to implement ECOWAS mediation efforts in Cote d’Ivoire under the EC Rapid Reaction political and security decisions. Mechanism (RRM).

In February this year, under the European Development Fund (EDF), a grant of euros 235 million was promised by the EU with the signing of the Regional Strategy document and Regional Indicative Programme (over a five- year period: 2003-2007) between the EU, the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and ECOWAS. While the main area of concentration is on economic integration and trade, one of the areas to which the fund is applicable is the provision of the mechanism for conflict prevention, management resolution, peacekeeping and security. In April this year, the EU Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, also visited Ghana and Senegal to discuss the launch of negotiations for the EU-West Africa Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) and the on-going Doha Development Agenda talks with the World Trade Organisation aimed at better integrating the region in to the global trading system. Replying to a request for funding from ECOWAS, the Commission (through its Rapid Reaction Mechanism) has also made 390,000 available for the launch in June of round-table discussions on Liberia to initiate a comprehensive peace process including a cease-fire agreement. This is in addition to budget allocations for humanitarian aid, rehabilitation and food security and a programme in favour of former refugees and displaced persons worth 25 m being in place for the period 2001-2003 (despite the fact that co-operation with Liberia is formally suspended).

While the UN has, to lesser or greater affect, been engaged in West Africa with regard to building civil society forums (e.g. the UN Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) supporting small arms networks in the region), and in peacekeeping missions (e.g. in Sierra Leone), the EU has yet to be fully engaged at these levels. Although there is an informal pan-African EU-ACP civil society forum, there is no mechanism yet established for West Africa. Similarly, in the recent consultation between ECOWAS and civil society on building conflict prevention capacities in the region, EU representation was absent. EU Commissioner for Development, Poul Nielson has, nevertheless, hinted that EU peacekeeping forces may have a role to play in Liberia.

Challenges and opportunities for peace

Processes made explicit in the Cotonou Partnership, the Regional Strategy Paper and through recent EDF and RRM funds do provide a strong background on which to build complementary relationships between the EU, West African governments and civil society. Stronger mechanisms and processes could be established to consolidate and enhance EU engagement at the different levels (e.g. from special representative level down to civil society engagement). The potential for the EU to support the on-going regional, national and local initiatives should therefore be harnessed for the promotion of security, trade and development in the region.

The EU should:

• Enhance the ECOWAS machinery through more effective use of the Council of Elders in relation to conflict resolution and advice to the Executive Secretary of the organisation. • Link into and support the ECOWAS - civil society mechanisms that are being established to facilitate stronger interface between the EU and local, national and regional actors. • Commit peacekeeping troops to stabilise the region. The US and the UN would be natural allies and this would provide an opportunity to show that the EU, US and UN can work side by side.