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Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses www.rsis.edu.sg ISSN 2382-6444 | Volume 11, Issue 7 September 2019 A PUBLICATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND TERRORISM RESEARCH (ICPVTR) The IS Threat in Indonesia V. Arianti and Nur Aziemah Azman Nexus Between Charities and Terrorist Financing in Indonesia Sylvia Windya Lakshmi IS' Determination to Stay Relevant and Visible in Malaysia Amalina Abdul Nasir Philippines' Foreign Fighter Phenomenon Kenneth Yeo Yaoren Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Volume 9, Issue 4 | April 2017 1 Building a Global Network for Security Editorial Note South East Asia’s Evolving and Resilient Military Landscape The Islamic State’s (IS) territorial losses and details three themes that emerge from JAD's military defeat in Iraq and Syria have not activities in Indonesia: (i) sham charities set up weakened the militant landscape in Southeast by the group as a conduit to generate funds to Asia. Rather, the regional threat landscape has ensure its sustainability; (ii) funds raised for become more resilient and competitive, with pro- charitable causes funneled into terrorist activities IS militant groups exhibiting better operational and (iii) social media used to not only recruit capabilities, knowledge of explosive-making and members but also raise funds. Given IS' focus on networking linkages. Moreover, pro-IS groups in global expansion in the post-caliphate era, the the region have found traction by exploiting local multi-pronged threat posed by its affiliate issues to spread the terror group’s extremist networks in Indonesia and surrounding region, of Wideology. which terrorism financing is a component, will need to be addressed by policymakers and security agencies going forward. Several major challenges have emerged from the recent setback to IS in the Middle East. First is the issue of returning foreign fighters (FTFs) and The next article by Amalina Abdul Nasir upholds how to deal with them. Such returnees pose a that despite numerous setbacks in Syria, IS is plethora of legal, political and security challenges quite determined to stay alive in Malaysia. The to Southeast countries, particularly Malaysia, pro-IS Malaysian militant groups are exploiting Indonesia and the Philippines. A second local issues to advance the terror group’s challenge is IS’ efforts to declare new wilayat extremist ideology. In this new phase, according (provinces) in different parts of the world. While to the author, Malaysian IS supporters have IS has officially declared the East Asia wilayat acquired better bomb-making capabilities and based in the Philippines, the declaration of new fostered deeper operational linkages with foreign wilayat cannot be ruled out as witnessed in South militants. Moreover, Malaysia is also dealing with Asia and Africa. Further, terrorist groups such as the issue of returning fighters. The Malaysian IS constantly require increasing financial policymakers need to ensure an effective resources to expand and sustain their operations. rehabilitation policy in dealing with returning In Southeast Asia, IS-linked groups have set up militants and to continue to carefully manage the Islamic charities to raise funds and conceal their ethnic and religious climate in Malaysia so as to activities. minimise exploitation of related local issues by pro-IS groups. Against this backdrop, the September issue of the Counter Terrorists Trends and Analyses Finally, Kenneth Yeo discusses the prospects for (CTTA) features four articles looking at different a consolidation of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) aspects and dimensions of Southeast Asia’s in the Southern Philippines following IS‘ territorial threat landscape in the post-territorial caliphate losses this year. According to the author, IS' environment. The first article by V. Arianti and weakened presence in the Iraq-Syria theatre has Nur Aziemah Azman argues that the IS fighters positioned the Philippines as an attractive in Indonesia may continue to empower their destination for FTFs in Southeast Asia given its affiliated groups in the country. According to the status as an alternate conflict theatre within authors, this is evident by the apparent attempts jihadist discourse. The article argues there could by Indonesian IS fighters in Syria to create a be a consolidation of rebel forces in hotspots wilayah (province) in Indonesia by strengthening such as Mindanao, with IS affiliated groups two Indonesian militant groups, the Mujahidin seeking to complement local fighters with FTFs Indonesia Timur (MIT, Mujahidin of Eastern and youth militants to launch attacks and gain Indonesia) and Jamaah Ansharud Daulah (JAD, territory. With the added impetus of a leadership Congregation of Supporters of IS). IS transition within IS' networks in the Philippines, acknowledged Indonesia as part of its East Asia comprehensive counter-terrorism measures are Wilayah (encompassing primarily the Philippines needed to address these developments, which and Indonesia) in July 2018. also have regional implications. In the second article, Sylvia Windya In conclusion, this is the first quarterly issue, Lakshmi examines the nexus between charities following the earlier announced transition from a and terrorism financing, through the case-study monthly publication. The next quarterly will be of the IS-affiliated Jamaah Ansharut Daulah issued in January 2020. Thank you for your (JAD) in Indonesia. Given recent reports of continued subscription! Counterconvictions Terrorist Trendsaround and Analysesthe world of non-profit Volume 9, Issue 4 | April 2017 organisations that misuse their revenues to finance the activities of terrorists, the article 2 ADVISORY BOARD Dr. Jolene Jerard Dr. Stephen Sloan Adjunct Senior Fellow, Professor Emeritus, International Centre for Political The University of Oklahoma Violence and Terrorism Research, Lawrence J. Chastang, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Distinguished Professor ,Terrorism Studies, The University of Central Florida Dr. Rohan Gunaratna Professor of Security Studies, Dr. Fernando Reinares S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Director, Program on Global Terrorism, Elcano Royal Institute Professor of Security Dr. Kumar Ramakrishna Studies Universidad Rey Juan Carlos Associate Professor, Dr. John Harrison WHead of Policy Studies & Coordinator of Associate Editor, National Security Studies Programme, Journal of Transportation Security S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies Dr. Hamoon Khelghat-Doost Dr. Marcin Styszyński Senior Lecturer in Political Science, Assistant Professor, Science University of Malaysia Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies Adam Mickiewicz University EDITORIAL BOARD Senior Editorial Advisors Vijayalakshmi Menon Noorita Mohd Noor Editor Amresh Gunasingham Associate Editor Abdul Basit Copy Editor Remy Mahzam Design and Layout Okkie Tanupradja The views expressed in the articles are those of the authors and not of ICPVTR, RSIS, NTU or the organisations to which the authors are affiliated. Articles may not be reproduced without prior permission. Please contact the editors for more information at [email protected]. The editorial team also welcomes any feedback or comments. Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses Volume 9, Issue 4 | April 2017 3 The IS Threat in Indonesia The IS Threat in Indonesia V. Arianti and Nur Aziemah Azman Synopsis the fall of the terror group’s last stronghold in Baghouz, in March 2019. As a result, the This article examines the threat of the Islamic remaining (144) Indonesian fighters have State (IS) in Indonesia, arguing that been killed, imprisoned or displaced. Indonesian IS fighters may continue to empower their affiliated groups in Indonesia in Against this backdrop, this article discusses the post-caliphate environment. This is the Indonesian threat landscape in two backed by the attempts of Indonesian IS sections. The first section elaborates on how fighters in Syria in recent years to create a Indonesian IS fighters have empowered their wilayah (province) in Indonesia by affiliate groups in Indonesia in a bid to create empowering Indonesian militant groups, a wilayah in the country. The second section namely the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT, analyses the possible continuity of such Mujahidin of Eastern Indonesia) and Jamaah empowerment following the fall of Baghouz. Ansharud Daulah (JAD, Congregation of Supporters of IS). Indonesia has since been Attempts to Create a Wilayah in Indonesia acknowledged as part of IS’ East Asia Wilayah (encompassing primarily the Philippines and Wilayah, an extension of the physical territory Indonesia) in July 2018. Such a status is likely of the IS “caliphate”, can be seen as IS’ to continue to keep the wilayah aspirations of attempt to grow its influence, especially since pro-IS Indonesian jihadists alive today. 2015 when it began to gradually lose territories in Syria and Iraq. Creating a wilayah Introduction contributes to IS’ sphere of influence, which is done by visibly increasing IS’ presence, The IS declaration of a self-styled “caliphate” organising local groups that can give IS a in June 2014 significantly increased the viable military presence and ultimately a state- terrorist threat in Indonesia. Since then, like representation in the area in question, and multiple terrorist attacks and plots in the providing them with resources and training to country have been linked to IS or its inspired increase their effectiveness in combat.3 and affiliated militant groups and fighters. Between 2015 and
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