Cooperation between the and : What is the Future?

RIAZ A. KHOKHAR

ISSUES

Analysis from the East-West Center SUMMARY Within the Indo-Pacific region, the United States and Pakistan No. 143 January 2020 have sharply divergent strategic objectives. While American objec-

tives have changed over time, focusing in recent years on rivalry with About the Author

Riaz A. Khokhar is a Research Assistant with the China, Pakistan’s strategic objective has remained constant—to main- Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS) in Islamabad, Pakistan. He was a Visiting Fellow in the tain a balance of power with India. Yet Pakistan retains close strategic East-West Center’s Washington, D.C. office from April to June 2019. and economic ties with China, and the United States considers India

He can be reached at: [email protected] an important strategic partner. Nevertheless, the two countries have

worked together for nearly two decades toward two tactical goals—

achieving a political settlement in Afghanistan and eliminating terror- Papers in the AsiaPacific Issues series feature topics of broad interest and significant impact relevant to current and emerging policy debates. ism in . There is potential for them to cooperate more The views expressed are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Center. broadly, for example, increasing direct foreign investment to Pakistan and helping Islamabad balance its relations with the United States

and China. Washington’s willingness to expand such cooperation will

depend on Pakistan’s cooperation in fighting terrorism in the region. 2

Analysis from the East-West Center

Shared Tactical Goals: Afghanistan officials have advocated including the in and Counter-Terrorism the Afghan political process and have assured the The U.S.-Pakistan relationship is predominantly Americans that the Taliban, or any other terror- governed by two shared tactical goals: reconcili- ist group, will not use Afghanistan as a safe haven The United States ation efforts in Afghanistan and counter-terrorism to carry out terrorist attacks against the United and Pakistan cooperation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. States or its allies. Despite Pakistan’s assurances, On August 21, 2017, U.S. President Donald there is mistrust on this point. As a result, the share two Trump announced a new South Asia Strategy United States feels compelled to retain some level tactical goals: that includes an exit strategy from Afghanistan of troop presence in Afghanistan, which is a bone reconciliation as well as measures to ensure that Pakistan helps of contention in the peace talks with the Taliban. efforts in achieve U.S. objectives in the region. In July If and when the United States draws down its Afghanistan and 2019, the White House welcomed Pakistan’s troops in Afghanistan, there is a risk that it will Prime Minister Imran Khan in recognition of lose interest in Pakistan. Alternatively, the U.S. counter-terrorism Islamabad’s help in bringing the Taliban to the relationship with Pakistan could become stron- cooperation. negotiating table and assurances that Pakistan ger.2 Indeed, without a troop presence, the United will continue to play a role in convincing the States may feel a greater need for Pakistan to help Taliban to remain committed to peace talks. provide stability in the region.3 At some point, the Yet Afghanistan and counter-terrorism United States will have to choose between these have remained areas of discord as well as coop- two paths because it is unlikely that American eration. The core friction point is the two coun- troops will remain in Afghanistan indefinitely.4 tries’ slightly different strategic objectives. If It is most likely that Pakistan will remain Washington’s strategic interest is to ensure that important for U.S. policy in the region, given Afghanistan does not become a base for terrorist not only its counter-terrorism capability but attacks on the United States or its allies, Islamabad also its historical, geographical, cultural, and is on the same page. Islamabad’s alleged support economic linkages with Afghanistan.5 The U.S. for the Afghan Taliban, however, emanates from State Department expects Pakistan to fulfill its its strategic objective to contain ’s “pledges” on two fronts—helping the United influence in Afghanistan. At the same time, States conduct peace talks with the Taliban, and Pakistan and the United States have cooperated acting decisively against the militant groups that to eliminate Al Qaeda and its affiliate terrorists are allegedly “operating from within its soil.”6 in the region. According to a 2008 Congressional Indeed, Islamabad is currently taking steps to Research Service report, U.S.-Pakistan counter- eliminate militant groups by arresting their terrorism cooperation had resulted in the capture leaders and closing down their foundations, or killing of almost 700 Al Qaeda terrorists.1 but the United States expects to see a consis- As the Taliban resurfaced in Afghanistan, tent, long-term commitment to these goals. they initiated terrorist attacks, including attacks Thus, Pakistan’s commitment to the on American troops. Various American officials Afghan peace process and to counter-terrorism voiced the claim that Islamabad follows a double efforts is a necessary precursor to any expan- standard, receiving large amounts of money from sion in the scope of the U.S.-Pakistan relation- the United States for counter-terrorism activi- ship. Ongoing developments in the Afghan ties while assisting the same terrorists who, from peace process suggest that the United States Pakistan’s perspective, help curb Indian influ- may retain some form of counter-terrorism pres- ence in Afghanistan. For their part, Pakistani ence in Afghanistan and that Pakistan’s role will 3

Analysis from the East-West Center

remain important. But are there prospects for a Pakistan’s Balancing Act and the wider U.S.-Pakistan strategy that takes account U.S. Response of Pakistan’s own goals and its potential role in a Pakistan wants to maintain its strategic partner- broader Asian perspective? Therein lies the rub. ship with Beijing and at the same time have a good Beyond the U.S. South Asia Strategy—which is relationship with the United States.12 Islamabad focused on Afghanistan and counter-terrorism— and Beijing have had a strategic partnership since lies the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy, which focuses the 1960s, even when Pakistan was participat- strongly on China as America’s strategic rival. ing in a strategic alliance with Washington to oppose communism. Most importantly, Pakistan has never used its strong relationship with China U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy: What Role to harm U.S. interests, nor has it used its rela- for Pakistan? tionship with the United States to harm China. Pakistan was a member of the South-East Indeed, on many occasions, Pakistan has served U.S. strategic Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) in the as a bridge between Washington and Beijing. objectives focus 1950s when the United States’ strategic rival Henry Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State, was the Soviet Union, and Islamabad stood by acknowledged the role that Islamabad played on rivalry with Washington against the expansion of commu- in the Sino-U.S. rapprochement in the 1970s. China, while nism.7 Today, China is as much an ideologi- Similarly, during the nearly 40 years that Pakistan seeks cal threat as a political, economic, and military the United States has not had a diplomatic to maintain a rival of the United States. At the same time, relationship with Iran, the Pakistani ambas- balance of power Pakistan and China are close strategic and sador has represented Iranian interests in economic partners. By association, the strategic Washington.13 During Washington’s ongo- with India. community in the United States tends to view ing confrontation with Tehran, President Islamabad as positioned in an adversarial camp. Trump reportedly sought Islamabad’s media- By contrast, there is a widespread view that tion, and Pakistan’s Prime Minister met with New Delhi can help balance the U.S. military, Iranian and Saudi Arabian leaders. Strategic economic, and political relationship with Beijing. analysts in Pakistan consider these gestures Indeed, it is often argued that America is primar- as a reflection of trust by Washington that ily a maritime power8 whose priority is to retain Pakistan will serve as an honest broker between alliances across the Atlantic and Pacific. As a the United States and Iran, or between regional balancing strategy, the United States is Washington and Beijing for that matter.14 looking for partners to help uphold the principles As for Pakistan’s economic relationship with of freedom and openness in the Indian Ocean Beijing, most policymakers in Islamabad believe Region.9 Even if the geographic construct of the that China made investments in Pakistan at a Indo-Pacific widens to include Pakistan and other time when these investments were sorely needed countries in the region, Americans are unlikely to and other countries were reluctant to come consider Pakistan as playing as important a role forward.15 In contrast to the popular sentiment as India in the balance of power with China.10 On in the West that Islamabad has given Beijing the other side, from Pakistan’s viewpoint, a close exceptional access to land and resources,16 relationship with China is not seen as inconsis- Pakistani officials believe that ports such as tent with cooperation with the United States.11 Gwadar, Karachi, and Bin Qasim, roads, and Exclusive Economic Zones will provide significant revenue to Pakistan once they are more widely 4

Analysis from the East-West Center

utilized.17 Also, China’s total investment in tive, the government needs to take some funda- Pakistan under the China-Pakistan Economic mental steps. First and foremost, Islamabad needs Corridor (CPEC) is not the $60 billion reported to continue to facilitate an Afghan peace process in many media forums, but is rather about that includes an honorable exit for U.S. troops. Pakistan retains $18.9 billion. Funded by CPEC investments, Secondly, Islamabad needs to maintain its oppo- close ties with Pakistan and China have launched 22 energy sition to the militant groups that allegedly repre- and infrastructure projects over the past five sent a security threat to the South Asian region. China, while the years, with 12 completed and 10 still under Pakistan is noticeably on the right course on both United States construction.18 China’s investments through counts, but these actions must be consistent.21 considers India the CPEC have addressed Pakistan’s energy As reflected by Prime Minister Khan’s invitation an important crisis and improved transportation between to the White House and U.S. Ambassador Alice strategic partner. cities and provinces. For this reason, negative Wells’s recent testimony before the Senate Foreign comments from American officials or policy Relations Committee, the United States appears analysts are not well received in Pakistan, either to be ready to expand economic and defense by policymakers or at the grassroots level. ties if Pakistan holds up its end of the bargain. From a strictly economic lens, Washington More generally, if Pakistan wishes to has no problem with China making investments play a pivotal role in the broader region, it in Pakistan and contributing to the country’s must navigate between world powers and not economic stability. The United States does become too closely aligned with either the not have any reason to oppose CPEC because United States or China.22 There may be direct the goals of CPEC align with Washington’s and indirect ways to balance Pakistan’s rela- interests in Pakistan. So, for example, build- tionship with the two global powers.23 ing infrastructure, producing electricity, The direct route is complicated. It involves creating prosperity, providing employment, convincing the United States that Pakistan is not and assuring stability are the very things that totally in China’s camp. For one thing, Pakistan the United States wants for Pakistan.19 could do more to speak out against Beijing’s The problem lies in the fact that the treatment of the Xinjiang Muslim community in United States tends to look at everything China. It is an issue that Islamabad and Beijing that China does as a threat. Americans will have to grapple with eventually. Second, do not view the Sino-Pakistan economic Islamabad could improve transparency regard- relationship as inherently problematic, but ing its debts under the CPEC. The recommen- Washington encourages diverse private dation is that Pakistan should either invite the investment in Pakistan as an alternative or World Bank or form a national committee of supplement to Chinese investment. One experts to assess the sustainability of Chinese impediment, however, voiced by Washington loans and publish a report for foreign investors. policymakers and many economists, is the Third, Islamabad might refuse to purchase concern about a lack of transparency in the fifth-generation mobile technology from the information available to foreign investors.20 Chinese company Huawei. Some have argued that purchasing fifth-generation technology from China will lead Pakistan to adopt an authoritar- Measures to Expand Cooperation within ian digital model of internet governance, suppress an Indo-Pacific Strategy online freedom, and increase digital surveil- If Pakistan wants to expand its relationship with lance. This perspective is debatable, however, the United States in a wider regional perspec- and requires a more thorough exploration of 5

Analysis from the East-West Center

the role of 5G technologies in shaping digi- Strategic Objectives and Tactical Goals: tal governance discourse in democratic coun- a Real Challenge tries. At the moment, control of the news It is important to remember that the United media in Pakistan is already tightening, includ- States and Pakistan have divergent strategic ing censorship of some television programs objectives in their bilateral engagement, yet they and opinion articles, and detentions of oppo- have survived the inevitable frictions for many sition politicians are increasing, although years and each country has achieved its tacti- mostly on corruption charges. For some cal objectives with some success. Throughout its American political analysts, the undermin- bilateral engagement with the United States since ing of democratic culture in Pakistan is partly the Cold War era, regardless of American strate- a corollary of China’s increasing influence. gic objectives, Pakistan has consistently worked If Islamabad takes a principles-based stance to strengthen its defenses and improve its balance on these issues in relation to China, it may possi- of power with India.28 This pattern will continue bly obtain more financial investment and politi- for the foreseeable future. Although U.S. officials cal and diplomatic support from the United and academics may consider Pakistan’s align- States. But the outcome is far from assured.24 ment with China as a threat to American inter- Pakistan could also improve the balance ests, in fact Pakistan’s sole strategic objective is in its relationship with the United States and to counter any threat from India. Truth be told, China by more indirect means. Islamabad Pakistan has invited foreign investments from Pakistan should could expand its narrow foreign-policy focus the United States and other Western countries broaden its on Afghanistan and India to a broader policy because it has no desire to serve as a pawn in vision that involves diplomatic, cultural, and China’s global game against the United States. engagement in economic ties with many countries, such Washington needs to maintain realistic multilateral as Association of Southeast Asian Nations expectations and recognize both the poten- cultural, (ASEAN) members Indonesia, Malaysia, tial and the limitations of its engagement with economic, Singapore, and the Philippines, as well as Pakistan.29 The United States would be well and strategic Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, advised to support Islamabad’s ability to navi- European countries such as Britain, France, gate between Washington and Beijing and not diplomacy. and Germany, and countries further afield to increase Pakistan’s dependence on China. such as Brazil and South Africa.25 The cost of not maintaining a good relation- As a cautionary note, these countries will ship with Islamabad could be considerable.30 only be interested in forging closer ties if First, Washington could lose its current influ- Pakistan’s foreign policy becomes less narrowly ence within the Pakistani strategic and politi- focused on security and if Islamabad does a cal community. Second, Washington could better job reining in the militant groups that lose an important ally in the region, one that claim responsibility for cross-border terrorism supports U.S. strategic and tactical interests in India.26 Thus, improving the business climate in South Asia, the Middle East, and the “Area alone will not offset the reservations of foreign of Responsibility” under the U.S. Central investors, especially from those countries that Command. Third, Washington could force have strong strategic and/or economic ties with Pakistan to deepen its relations with countries New Delhi.27 All told, Pakistan’s increasingly that are not friendly to the United States. constructive engagement with Indo-Pacific To avoid such strategic setbacks, there and European countries will help improve may be two ways forward. The United States perceptions in Washington. Plus, it will help should offer private investments to Pakistan to the country play a useful role as a pivotal state. complement Beijing’s CPEC investments. U.S. 6

Analysis from the East-West Center

Ambassador Alice Wells recently signaled that Islamabad, the goal would be to stabilize the the American Commerce Department is work- economy, achieve economic growth, increase ing to improve trade relations with Pakistan.31 employment for its burgeoning youth popula- The implementation of the Better Utilization of tion, and protect its society from radicalization. The United Investment Leading to Development (BUILD) In general, the strategic and political States should Act and the recent creation of the U.S. Inter- community in Islamabad would prefer that the national Development Finance Corporation United States shift its Pakistan policy from the offer private (DFC) are both aimed at encouraging private- current focus on Afghanistan to a broader view investments to sector investments in low-income countries. of Pakistan itself and the potential role that Pakistan that Ambassador Wells described Pakistan as a Pakistan could play in the wider Asian region. In complement country of great interest for private-sector this context, the key challenge for any American investment investment. Pakistan should welcome these administration is that India is considered a net investments and create an enabling business security provider in the Indo-Pacific region, a from China. environment to make it easier for American major defense ally, and an important economic companies to do business in the country. Strong partner. Plus India enjoys considerable good will bilateral business ties will strengthen the political among U.S. policymakers.34 By contrast, one and strategic relationship between Pakistan and often hears in Washington that “Pakistan is in the United States. bed with China.” To strengthen Pakistan’s role Playing partisan politics in a way that in U.S. foreign policy to a level equivalent to that discourages private investment will only harm of India will require a significant paradigm shift Pakistan’s interests. Indeed, American inter- in American bureaucratic, policymaking, and ests will be better served if U.S. investments are academic circles. not framed as a zero-sum game with China, compelling Islamabad to jettison Chinese invest- ments in favor of investments from the United Conclusion States. Rather, Chinese and American invest- Achieving a political settlement in Afghanistan ments in Pakistan should be complementary. and cooperating in counter-terrorism efforts can In addition, the United States should provide a basis for expanding the relationship encourage allied countries such as Britain, between the United States and Pakistan into France, Germany, Japan, and Australia to make other areas of mutual interest. Islamabad’s investments in Pakistan that supplement or cooperation with the United States in eliminat- supplant Chinese investments.32 A promising ing terrorism from South Asia will determine approach would be to invest in areas where the extent to which Washington wants to expand China is not active, for example in infrastruc- cooperation in other areas. Although the stra- ture projects in the tribal belt and Baluchistan.33 tegic objectives of the two countries are diver- Among other advantages, the presence of gent, there is a potential for them to cooperate American and other Western companies on the on broader tactical goals such as increasing direct ground in Pakistan would help counter concerns foreign investment in Pakistan for economic regarding Chinese strategic ambitions in the stability and prosperity and reinforcing Pakistan’s country. The goal for the United States would ability to balance its relations with the United be to contain China’s growing power and influ- States and China. For Washington, the costs of not ence in Pakistan and in the region at large. For providing Pakistan with complementary invest- 7

Analysis from the East-West Center

ment options as an alternative to Beijing’s remarks of the following scholars, diplomats, investments are considerable. Strengthening and government officials: Michael Kugelman, the American relationship with Pakistan will be Andrew Small, Marvin G. Weinbaum, Laurel challenging, however, given the strong tilt toward Miller, Ellen Frost, Shamila N. Chaudhary, K. India in U.S. bureaucratic and policy circles. Alan Kronstadt, Yun Sun, Husain Haqqani, And Pakistan would be better served if it improves Sajit Gandhi, Ashley J. Tellis, Thomas F. Lynch, the fundamentals of its relationship with the Joshua T. White, Elizabeth Threlkeld, Robert United States, remains nonaligned in great Hathaway, Susan Kahrs, Jeff Smith, Hannah power politics, broadens its foreign-policy vision, Haegeland, Shuja Nawaz, Moeed Yusuf, and increases its engagement in multilateral Teresita C. Schaffer, Robin Raphel, Marcus cultural, economic, and strategic diplomacy. Lumb (Australia Embassy), Ferry A. Pasaribhu (Indonesia Embassy), Keiichi Onozawa (Japan Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry), Acknowledgements Jalil Abbas Jilani, Riaz M. Khan, Najmuddin I am thankful to the East-West Center in Shaikh, and Aizaz Ahmad Chaudhry. I greatly Washington for hosting me as a Visiting Fellow appreciate the support of the East-West Center from April to June 2019 and helping me in Washington staff, especially Program arrange research interviews with Washington- Coordinators Sarah Wang and Peter Valente, based scholars and government officials. I for providing administrative support. I also am especially grateful to Satu Limaye, Vice want to thank the anonymous reviewers for President and Director of East-West Center their erudite and constructive remarks that in Washington, and Daniel S. Markey, Senior helped me revise and improve this paper. And Research Professor at Johns Hopkins’ School lastly, I wish to thank Sidney B. Westley at the of Advanced International Studies, for their East-West Center in Honolulu for the excellent support and cooperation throughout my editing of this paper. fellowship. I also appreciate the very helpful

Notes

1 K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman (2008), Islamist 7 Since SEATO served Pakistan’s own strategic objective militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region and U.S. of defense and balance of power vis-à-vis India. policy, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service. 8 Author’s conversation with Satu Limaye, June 2 Author’s conversation with Moeed Yusuf, June 2019. 2019; see also Henry Kissinger (2011), On China, New York: Penguin Press, p. 514. 3 Author’s conversation with Laurel Miller, June 2019. 9 Ibid. 4 Author’s conversation with Michael Kugelman, May 2019. 10 Author’s conversation with Thomas Lynch, May 2019 5 Congressional Research Service (2019), Afghanistan: Background and U.S. policy in brief, Washington, DC. 11 Ibid; also author’s conversation with Jeff Smith, June 2019.

6 Alice G. Wells (2019), U.S. interests in South Asia 12 Author’s conversation with Moeed Yusuf, June 2019. and the FY 2020 budget, statement before the House 13 Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, DC. Author’s conversation with Jalil Abbas Jilani, June 2019. 8

Analysis from the East-West Center

14 Ibid. 25 Author’s conversation with Daniel Markey, June 2019.

15 Khurram Dastagir Khan, in response to author’s 26 Center for International Security and Cooperation, question, at the Jinnah Institute’s Ideas Conclave Stanford University (2019), Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), 2019, Serena Hotel, Islamabad, August 2019. https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/ jaish-e-mohammed; BBC News, Pulwama attack: What 16 Author’s conversation with a White House official, May 2019. is militant group Jaish-e-Mohammad?, February 15, 2019, 17 Vestal McIntyre (2019), Top Pakistan finance officials and https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47249982. HKS faculty assess future after debt crisis, Cambridge, MA: 27 Author’s conversations with diplomats from the Australian Harvard Kennedy School, https://www.hks.harvard.edu/ and Indonesian embassies in Washington, DC, and with a faculty-research/policy-topics/development-economic- Japanese trade representative for South Asia, May‒June 2019. growth/top-pakistan-finance-officials-and-hks. 28 Howard B. Shaffer and Teresita C. Schaffer (2011),How 18 Information available on https://cpecinfo.com. Pakistan negotiates with the United States: Riding the roller coaster, 19 Author’s conversation with Michael Kugelman Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, pp. 178‒82. and Andrew Small, May 2019. 29 Ibid.

20 Ibid. 30 The author is thankful to Laurel Miller for this key point.

21 Wells (2019). 31 “A conversation with Ambassador Alice Wells on the China- 22 Christophe Jaffrelot (2016), U.S.-Pakistan relations under Pakistan Economic Corridor,” Wilson Center, November 21, Obama: Resilience of clientelism?, in Christophe Jaffrelot, 2019, https://www.state.gov/a-conversation-with-ambassador- ed., Pakistan at the crossroads: Domestic dynamics and external alice-wells-on-the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/. pressures, Gurgaon: Random House, pp. 220‒66. 32 Author’s conversation with Ellen Frost, April 2019.

23 The author borrowed these phrases from Daniel 33 Author’s conversation with Shuja Nawaz, June 2019. S. Markey’s talk as a discussant at author’s seminar at East-West Center in Washington D.C., June 30, 34 Daniel S. Markey (2013), No exit from Pakistan: 2019, https://vimeo.com/345019972#t=900s. America’s tortured relationship with Islamabad. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 180‒81. 24 The author found these critical points of widespread concern within the academic/think-tank community in Washington.

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